Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Concept of Truth in International Relations Theory: Critical Thought Beyond Post-Positivism 1st Edition Matthew Fluck (Auth.)
The Concept of Truth in International Relations Theory: Critical Thought Beyond Post-Positivism 1st Edition Matthew Fluck (Auth.)
The Concept of Truth in International Relations Theory: Critical Thought Beyond Post-Positivism 1st Edition Matthew Fluck (Auth.)
https://textbookfull.com/product/international-relations-theory-
a-critical-introduction-3rd-edition-cynthia-weber/
https://textbookfull.com/product/critical-theory-and-the-thought-
of-andrew-feenberg-1st-edition-darrell-p-arnold/
https://textbookfull.com/product/imagining-disarmament-
enchanting-international-relations-matthew-breay-bolton/
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-concept-of-constitution-in-
the-history-of-political-thought-1st-edition-gornisiewicz-
arkadiusz-szlachta-bogdan/
Post-Truth, Post-Press, Post-Europe: Euroscepticism And
The Crisis Of Political Communication 1st Edition Paul
Rowinski
https://textbookfull.com/product/post-truth-post-press-post-
europe-euroscepticism-and-the-crisis-of-political-
communication-1st-edition-paul-rowinski/
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-truth-about-nature-
environmentalism-in-the-era-of-post-truth-politics-and-platform-
capitalism-bram-buscher/
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-rise-of-china-and-
international-relations-theory-1st-edition-jean-kachiga/
https://textbookfull.com/product/politics-and-technology-in-the-
post-truth-era-anna-visvizi/
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-self-and-social-relations-
matthew-whittingham/
The Concept of Truth
in International
Relations Theory
Matthew Fluck
The Concept
of Truth
in International
Relations Theory
Critical Thought Beyond Post-Positivism
Matthew Fluck
University of Westminster
London, United Kingdom
Much of the research for this book was conducted in the Department of
International Politics at Aberystwyth University. Thanks are due to the
Department and to the Economic and Social Research Council for their
support, as well as to colleagues at Aber for providing a stimulating
atmosphere in which to develop the project. I owe a particular debt to
Hidemi Suganami and Howard Williams, whose insight and guidance
were essential to the development of the argument presented here.
Thanks are also due to Milja Kurki and Nick Rengger for helpful com-
ments and advice concerning the ways in which the project might be
developed.
I have also benefitted from many productive conversations with Daniel
R. McCarthy, with whom I look forward to further pursuing issues identi-
fied in this research. The book was completed in the Department of Politics
and International Relations and Centre for the Study of Democracy at the
University of Westminster – my thanks to Westminster colleagues for
providing a collegial environment in which to finish the project.
Special thanks are due to my wife, Ann-Marie Olden, without whose
unstinting love, patience, and support this book could never have been
completed. I must also express my deep gratitude to my father, Mike
Fluck, for a lifetime of invaluable support and encouragement.
This book is dedicated to the memory of my mother, Ann Fluck.
vii
CONTENTS
7 Conclusion 225
Bibliography 231
Index 243
ix
CHAPTER 1
1 MODERN ANXIETIES
Attitudes to the concept of truth in modern politics are increasingly char-
acterised by contradiction and confusion. The last decade of British politics
has, for example, seen widespread demands that supposedly hidden facts be
revealed – most notably those relating to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The
same desire for a truth was apparent in the run-up to the UK referendum on
membership of the European Union, when members of the public repeat-
edly lamented the failure of politicians to provide them with hard facts upon
the basis of which they could decide how to vote. Such demands are
expressed, however, in a context in which the availability of a position
from which to identify the truth is increasingly in doubt. Modern liberal
politics are often presented as involving negotiation between different social
perspectives or the freedom to create or choose an identity for oneself. There
is little place in such a political system for straightforward truth claims or, say,
for the identification of and fidelity to hidden truth about society which
characterised nineteenth- and twentieth-century socialism.2 At a global level,
the ‘universal’ truths of the West are regularly challenged from elsewhere in
international society.3 An increased ability to share information appears only
to add to the confusion. For some it points to the possibility of a more
‘transparent’ politics, but it has also provided the conditions of possibility for
‘weaponised relativism’ – propaganda of the kind deployed by the Putin
can only be fulfilled if we stop worrying about truth and embrace a form of
‘liberal ironism’. According to Rorty, we should acknowledge that there is
no hope of ‘mirroring’ the world in thought, of identifying the way things
really are, and get on with constructing a society in which each member is
free to ‘create’ themselves as they see fit.11
The discipline of International Relations (IR) has not avoided this
conflict. The early 1980s saw the beginning of a sustained critique of the
Positivist theory which had previously dominated the discipline. Positivism
is defined by a faith in the natural sciences according to which the scientific
method, based on empirical observation and the identification of laws,
could be deployed in the pursuit of the truth about the social world.12
In IR this led to an emphasis on the ‘facts’ of a world of states, and to
attempts to identify and explain the law-like regularities apparent in rela-
tions between them in a manner reminiscent of the natural sciences.13
A number of dichotomies are central to the Positivist position; facts are
separated from values, theory from practice, and facts from theories. In IR
these distinctions drove the supposedly detached scientific pursuit of the
objective truth about world politics, free from political or normative
considerations. Behind the dichotomies lies the assumption of a separation
of the knowing subject from the objective world, according to which the
scientist stands apart from the world she examines; her theorising plays no
role in shaping it, and she is free from any distorting influence which it
might exert on her identification of the facts.
One of the main targets of the ‘Post-Positivist’ critique in IR was this
assumption that the social scientist could occupy an Archimedean position
above her subject matter.14 Far from involving some vantage point above
the fray, the social scientific pursuit of truth cannot be separated from the
norms, practices, and institutions of which world politics consists. For
Post-Positivists, knowing subject and object known merge, and with this
distinctions between facts and values, theory and practice begin to blur
and collapse. Early Post-Positivists like Robert Cox, Richard Ashley, and
Andrew Linklater – and many others following them – argued that, despite
their claim to scientific detachment, Positivist IR theorists played a role in
preserving certain practices and institutions whilst helping to repress
others.15 In particular, the scientific pursuit of truth tended to obstruct
consideration of normative questions concerning the desirable forms of
international political practice and of the nature of change within world
politics.16 As a result, far from being neutral observers, Positivists were
conservative supporters of an often violent and unjust status quo; they
4 THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
stifled those political and normative tendencies which are at odds with a
world of power-seeking nation-states.17
The Post-Positivists dragged truth and knowledge into the social world
and with this the pursuit and identification of truth was revealed to be a
constitutive social and political activity in which certain features of inter-
national life were created and maintained. From the perspective of these
‘Critical’ IR scholars, there was no longer any hope of identifying the
‘objective’ truth or of pursuing it through a process of theorising free of all
normative and practical implications. Whereas for Positivists truth had
consisted in correspondence of ideas and statements with the empirical
facts, for Post-Positivists this was impossible; there was no position from
which such correspondence could occur. Now that the knowing subject
had lost its Archimedean position – now that the subject-object distinction
had collapsed – the mind could no longer play the role of a mirror held up
to the political life, and texts and ideas were no longer reflections of the
world but rather a part of it.18 From the perspective of this new critical
international thought, the social scientist was engaged in an inherently
normative activity and cannot avoid taking a political position. For Post-
Positivists, the proper response is to reflect on the social forces and inter-
ests that lie behind truth claims and to consider the ways in which such
claims can play a role in creating the very truths they claim to identify.19
they believe we can set about pursuing the emancipatory goals of critical
international thought. Thus, Critical Realists have shown that questions
about the significance of truth are far from settled.
The impetus for the present work arises not only from a consideration
of developments in contemporary critical international thought but also
from a concern with older works of Frankfurt School Critical Theory.
The theories upon which Post-Positivist IR scholarship has largely been
based certainly mesh nicely with some matters of particular concern to IR
theorists. The Habermasian emphasis on communicative interaction is
appealing to those searching for a means of overcoming the present state
of mutual estrangement between political communities. Likewise, the
Poststructuralist emphasis on the links between truth and domination
links up with concerns about sovereignty, violence, or global governance.
However, the productiveness of these positions when applied to IR –
which will be discussed in Part I of this book – has led critical international
theorists to brush over matters which were of central importance to earlier
generations of Critical Theorists.
The motivation for this book arises, in particular, from a concern with
issues which were raised by Theodor Adorno. Unfortunately for those
seeking both to defend and advance the critical tradition in IR, Adorno’s
work has received little attention in the discipline. Indeed, in many
respects he appears not to have much to offer contemporary international
thought. He avoided making specific political prescriptions, which no
doubt explains his reputation for pessimistic abstraction. Nor did he
focus on specifically ‘international’ issues to do with sovereignty or diver-
sity. However, that Adorno’s work can be productively applied in the
discipline has not entirely escaped the notice of IR theorists.53 Daniel
Levine’s recent call for an Adornian project of ‘sustainable critique’ is
particularly notable. As Levine points out, there is a close connection
between Adorno’s concern with ‘chastening reason’ and the needs of the
discipline of IR as it responds to the ongoing ‘crisis of modernity’.54
Whilst Levine focuses on IR in general, the present work looks to
Adorno – and specifically to his theory of truth – as a means of reviving
the tradition of critical international thought. Post-Positivist IR scholars
have generally accepted the critique of Positivism according to which truth
is an intersubjective phenomenon. In contrast, despite their recognition
of the complicity of certain sorts of truth claim with modern forms of
domination and the loss of meaning, Adorno and his colleague
Horkheimer insisted on the possibility and need for a truth which could
12 THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
4 THE ARGUMENT
There are two broad elements to the argument advanced in the following
chapters. The first, outlined in Part I, concerns the character of the critical
Post-Positivist tradition in IR. It will be argued that, despite the difference
of opinion between Critical Theorists and Poststructuralists as to whether
truth is of positive or negative value, the significance of truth has been
understood by Post-Positivists on the basis of the two common pillars
mentioned above. The first of these is a ‘critical epistemological proble-
matic’ which emerges once truth is recognised as a social phenomenon.
The problematic consists of three questions concerning: the relationship
between socialised truth and the forms of community and practice which
characterise world politics; the possibility of achieving the level of context-
transcendence necessary to sustain a critical international theory; and the
relationship between truth and political progress. The second unifying
factor is the intersubjective conception of truth with which the proble-
matic has generally been addressed. According to this conception, which is
implicit in most Post-Positivist IR theories, truth is understood in terms of
intersubjective epistemic practices and idealisations about the conditions
in which they take place, rather than in terms of the subject-object
relationship.
The way in which these two factors interact in critical international
thought will be illustrated through an investigation of key works of Post-
Positivist IR theory. Chapter 2 explores the origins of the critical epistemo-
logical problematic and the intersubjective understanding of truth in early
works of Post-Positivism, especially those of Ashley, Cox, and Linklater.
The breaking down of a sharp subject-object distinction is identified as the
most significant element of the critique of Positivism in IR. Contrary to
many analyses, however, the result of this merging was not theoretical
pluralism but the critical epistemological problematic. Two major attempts
to address the latter are identified, one involving the Veriphilia of Critical
Theorists and the other the Veriphobia of Poststructuralists. Despite their
opposing positions concerning the value of truth, both have tended to work
with an intersubjective understanding of the concept.
Chapter 3 considers a major Poststructuralist work – David Campbell’s
National Deconstruction – to show how the critical problematic and
14 THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
practices and ideals with which it is associated, but rather because it involves
the cognitive relationship of human subjects with an objective reality. The
reintroduction of the subject-object relationship is an important step, but
the Critical Realists lapse into a scientism (faith in science) at odds with
Post-Positivists’ insights into the constitutive significance of truth.
Chapter 6 presents Adorno’s Critical Theory as a means of reconciling
Post-Positivist insights with Realist concerns, demonstrating how the poli-
tical significance of truth arises from both the subject-object relationship
and from the norms and practices with which truth is associated. Adorno
offers a conception of truth closely tied to his belief in the ‘primacy of
the objective’ and the importance of the ‘non-identical’ – the fact that
the world can never be captured ‘without remainder’.60 For Adorno, the
non-identical must be brought back in through the pursuit of a truth which
is objective, but also emphatic – in that it has normative content – and
‘unintentional’ – in that it requires us to search for ways in which the
objective is ‘expressed’ in the conceptualisations and structures established
through modern rationality. This understanding of truth points to the
substantive nature of critical IR’s epistemic concerns – the way they help
to illuminate real problems and predicaments encountered by individuals
living in a heavily bureaucratised, marketised, but divided world. At the
same time, it offers a means of overcoming the tendency to abstraction
which has emerged from the assertion that truth is purely intersubjective.
NOTES
1. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writing
1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), p. 133.
2. John Rawls rejects the idea that truth should play any significant role in
liberal politics, an idea challenged by Joshua Cohen. Joshua Cohen, ‘Truth
and Public Reason’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 37, 1 (2005), pp. 2–42.
3. Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Reflections on the “Critical” in Critical Theory’,
Review of International Studies, 33, Special Issue: Critical International
Relations Theory after 25 years (2007), pp. 25–45, reference p. 40.
4. The Guardian, ‘The Guardian View on Russian Propaganda: The Truth is
Out There’, 2 March (2015), http://www.theguardian.com/commentis
free/2015/mar/02/guardian-view-russian-propaganda-truth-out-there
[accessed 7 June 2016].
5. Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2002), p. 1.
16 THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
6. William Wallace, ‘Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and
Practice in International Relations’, Review of International Studies, 22, 3,
(1996), pp. 301–321.
7. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, p. 11.
8. Derrida states that ‘All the metaphysical determinations of truth . . . are
more or less inseparable from the instance of the logos’ and includes within
the latter ‘the sense of God’s infinite understanding’. Jacques Derrida, ‘The
End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing’, in Truth: Engagements
Across Philosophical Traditions, ed. José Medina and David Wood (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2005), pp. 207–225.
9. Plato, Gorgias, trans. Walter Hamilton (London: Penguin, 1960);
Bertrand Russell, ‘William James’s Conception of Truth’, in Truth, ed.
Simon Blackburn and Keith Simmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999), pp. 69–82; Sextus Empiricus ‘Outlines of Pyrrhonism’, in
Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches, ed. Paul
K. Moser and Arnold vander Nat (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995), pp. 80–90; Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans.
R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 2003).
10. Simon Blackburn, Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed, (London: Penguin,
2005), pp. xiv–xv.
11. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, Solidarity, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989).
12. W.H. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science, (London: Routledge,
1981), p. 1.
13. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading, MA: Addison
Wesley, 1979).
14. Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International
Relations Theory’, Millennium 10, 2 (1981), pp. 126–155.
15. Ibid.; Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International
Relations, 2nd Edition, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); Richard Ashley
‘Political Realism and Human Interests’, International Studies Quarterly
25, 2 (1981).
16. Linklater, Men and Citizens, p. 28.
17. Cox, ‘Social Forces’.
18. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1979).
19. The best known Positivist reply is Robert Keohane’s International Studies
Association Presidential address of 1988. Robert Keohane, ‘International
Institutions: Two Approaches’, International Studies Quarterly 32, 4
(1988), pp. 379–396.
20. Kratochwil, ‘Reflections’, p. 36.
1 INTRODUCTION: A POLITICAL QUESTION 17
21. See e.g. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests; Max Horkheimer,
‘On the Problem of Truth’, in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader,
ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978),
pp. 407–443.
22. Ashley, ‘Political Realism and Human Interests’; Cox, ‘Social Forces’;
Linklater, Men and Citizens.
23. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p. 133.
24. David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the
Politics of Identity, Revised Edition (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1998); Jenny Edkins, Whose Hunger? Concepts of Famine, Practices
of Aid (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); James Der
Derian, ‘The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International
Relations’, in International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings
of World Politics, ed. James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (New York:
Lexington, 1989), pp. 3–10.
25. Yosef Lapid, ‘The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory
in a Post-Positivist Era’, International Studies Quarterly 33, 3 (1989),
pp. 235–254.
26. Ibid.; Jim George, ‘International Relations and the Search for Thinking
Space: Another View of the Third Debate’, International Studies
Quarterly 33 (1989), pp. 269–279.; Steve Smith, ‘Positivism and
Beyond’, in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. Steve Smith,
Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), pp. 11–44.
27. See for example Nick Rengger and Ben Thirkwell-White eds., Review of
International Studies, Special Issue: Critical International Relations Theory
After 25 Years, 33 (2007) and the contributions to the ‘Forum on
Habermas’ Review of International Studies, 31, 1 (2005).
28. Nicholas Rengger and Ben Thirkwell-White, ‘Still Critical After All These
Years? The Past, Present and Future of Critical Theory in International
Relations’, Review of International Studies 33, S1 (2007), pp. 3–24, refer-
ence p. 21.
29. Thomas Diez and Jill Steans, ‘A Useful Dialogue? Habermas and
International Relations’ Review of International Studies 31, 1 (2005),
pp. 127–140, reference p. 138.
30. Rengger and Thirkwell-White, ‘Still Critical?’, pp. 21–22.
31. Craig Murphy, ‘The Promise of Critical IR, Partially Kept’, Review of
International Studies, Special Issue: Critical International Relations Theory
After 25 Years, 33 (2007), pp. 117–134, reference p. 118; Thomas Risse
‘“Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics’, International
Organization 54, 1 (2000) pp. 1–39.
18 THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
From now on, my dear philosophers, let us beware of the dangerous old
conceptual fable which posited a ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing
subject’.
Friedrich Nietzsche1
this world of nations has certainly been made by men, and its guise must
therefore be found within the modifications of our own human mind.
Giambattista Vico2
1 INTRODUCTION
Accounts of the ‘sustained theoretical effervescence’ of IR’s Third
Debate have often given it the air of a rebellious golden age, an
unprecedented period of disciplinary self-reflection and fecundity.3
Early assessments of its significance celebrated the openness and plur-
alisation to which the turn supposedly gave rise. With varying degrees
of optimism and enthusiasm, the turn to ‘Post-Positivism’4 was char-
acterised by its participants as a productive pluralisation of metatheore-
tical perspectives5; as giving rise to the ‘next stage’ in IR theory6; as
the search for increased ‘thinking space’7; as a theoretical and practical
The black on the head of the male is sometimes marked with a few
white feathers.
Adult Female in summer. Plate CCCXLIII. Fig. 2.
The plumage presents the same characters as in the male. The bill
is of a darker greyish-blue; iris as in the male; feet darker. The top of
the head, and all the upper parts, are dark reddish-brown, minutely
dotted and undulated with dusky; wings and tail as in the male; lower
parts duller than in the male, but similarly marked; the throat, and a
band from the base of the upper mandible to beneath the eye,
brownish-white.
Male one year old. Plate CCCXLIII. Fig. 3.
Bill, eyes, and feet as in the adult. A similar white patch on the side
of the head; upper part of head and hind neck dull blackish-brown;
throat and sides of the neck greyish-brown; lower part of neck, dull
reddish-brown, waved with dusky; upper parts as in the adult, but of
a duller tint; lower parts greyish-white.
Young in December. Plate CCCXLIII. Fig. 4.
Bill dusky; iris hazel; feet yellowish-green, webs dusky. All the upper
parts dull reddish-brown tinged with grey, and barred with dusky;
wings and tail dark greyish-brown. Cheeks, fore part and sides of
neck, and all the lower parts, dull yellowish-white, undulated with
dusky; as is the rump above; the lower tail-coverts white.
The tongue of a male is 1 inch 8 twelfths long, and of the same
general form as that of the Fuligulæ, but a little more dilated at the
end. The œsophagus is 1/2 inch in diameter until its entrance into the
thorax, when it contracts, and again expands to 6 twelfths, to form
the proventriculus, of which the glandules are oblong, small, and
very numerous, occupying a space of 2 1/4 inches in length. The
stomach is a strong gizzard, of a roundish form, 1 inch 5 twelfths
long, 1 1/2 inch broad; its lateral muscles very large, and about 8
twelfths thick; the epithelium confined to two round spaces 1/2 inch in
diameter, opposite the lateral muscles. The intestine is 5 feet 1 1/2
inch long, its diameter varying from 5 twelfths to 3 1/2 twelfths. The
rectum is 2 inches 10 twelfths long; the cœca 4 inches 2 twelfths
their greatest diameter 2 1/2 twelfths.
The winter plumage differs considerably; the bill, iris, and feet, are as
above. The upper parts are brownish-grey, the head narrowly
streaked with dusky; the rump as in summer; the scapulars plainly
margined with whitish; the quills as in summer. The band over the
eye lighter, the loral space grey; the fore part and sides of the neck
greyish-white, longitudinally streaked with grey, the sides similar, and
with the lower tail-coverts barred with grey, the rest of the lower parts
white.
Length to end of tail in a male 9 inches; extent of wings 16 1/2; wing
from flexure 5 1/4; tail 2 4/12; bill along the ridge 1 6/12, along the edge
of lower mandible 1 7/12; bare part of tibia 1; tarsus 1 7/12; hind toe
1/ 1/ 1/
and claw 4 /12; middle toe 9
2 /12, its claw 2
12 /12.
2
The roof of the mouth is flat, with three rows of papillæ. The tongue
is 1 inch 5 twelfths long, emarginate and papillate at the base, very
slender, concave above, tapering to a point. The œsophagus is 4
inches long, very narrow, its diameter 2 twelfths. The proventriculus
is oblong, 7 twelfths in length, 3 1/2 twelfths in diameter. The stomach
is a strong gizzard of a roundish form, compressed, 8 twelfths long,
7 1/12 twelfths broad; its lateral muscles large, its epithelium very
dense, thick, longitudinally rugous, and of a reddish-brown colour.
The intestine is 12 1/2 inches long, its anterior part 2 3/4 twelfths in
diameter, the hind part 1 1/2 twelfth. The rectum is 1 1/2 inch long; the
cœca 11 twelfths long, 1 twelfth in diameter, obtuse.
The trachea is 3 inches long, slender, its diameter at the upper part
1 3/4 twelfths, gradually diminishing to the lower part, where it is 1
twelfth. The rings, about 110 in number, are slender and unossified,
the two last divided. The bronchi have about 15 half rings. The
contractor muscles are thin, the sterno-tracheal slender; and there is
a pair of inferior laryngeal muscles going to the first bronchial rings.
In another individual, the intestine was 13 1/4 inches long, the rectum
1 1/2 inch, the cœca 1 inch.
The contents of the gizzard in both were fragments of shells, small
black seeds, and much sand and gravel.
AMERICAN WIDGEON.
Anas Americana, Gmel. Syst. Nat. vol. i. p. 526.—Lath. Ind. Ornith. vol. ii. p.
861.—Ch. Bonaparte, Synopsis of Birds of United States, p. 384.
American Widgeon, Anas Americana, Wils. Amer. Ornith. vol. viii. p. 86, pl.
69, fig 4.
Mareca Americana, Stephens, American Widgeon, Richards. and Swains.
Fauna Boreali-Americana, vol. ii. p. 445.
American Widgeon, Nuttall, Manual, vol. ii. p. 389.