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Matthew Fluck (Auth.)
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The Concept of Truth
in International
Relations Theory
Matthew Fluck

The Concept
of Truth
in International
Relations Theory
Critical Thought Beyond Post-Positivism
Matthew Fluck
University of Westminster
London, United Kingdom

ISBN 978-1-137-55032-3 ISBN 978-1-137-55033-0 (eBook)


DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55033-0
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017931662

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017


The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in
accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to
the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institu-
tional affiliations.

Cover illustration © aleksandarvelasevic and Lee Powers / Getty Images

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature


The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
The registered company address is: The Campus, 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW,
United Kingdom
For Ann Fluck
1945–2013
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Much of the research for this book was conducted in the Department of
International Politics at Aberystwyth University. Thanks are due to the
Department and to the Economic and Social Research Council for their
support, as well as to colleagues at Aber for providing a stimulating
atmosphere in which to develop the project. I owe a particular debt to
Hidemi Suganami and Howard Williams, whose insight and guidance
were essential to the development of the argument presented here.
Thanks are also due to Milja Kurki and Nick Rengger for helpful com-
ments and advice concerning the ways in which the project might be
developed.
I have also benefitted from many productive conversations with Daniel
R. McCarthy, with whom I look forward to further pursuing issues identi-
fied in this research. The book was completed in the Department of Politics
and International Relations and Centre for the Study of Democracy at the
University of Westminster – my thanks to Westminster colleagues for
providing a collegial environment in which to finish the project.
Special thanks are due to my wife, Ann-Marie Olden, without whose
unstinting love, patience, and support this book could never have been
completed. I must also express my deep gratitude to my father, Mike
Fluck, for a lifetime of invaluable support and encouragement.
This book is dedicated to the memory of my mother, Ann Fluck.

vii
CONTENTS

1 Introduction: A Political Question 1

Part I Post-Positivism and Truth

2 The Parameters of Post-Positivism 23

3 Truth, Violence, and Difference 67

4 Truth and Communication 105

Part II Truth and Objectivity

5 Critical Realism and Truth-Based Critique 147

6 Adorno, Truth, and International Relations 181

7 Conclusion 225

Bibliography 231

Index 243

ix
CHAPTER 1

Introduction: A Political Question

The political question . . . is truth itself.


Michel Foucault1

1 MODERN ANXIETIES
Attitudes to the concept of truth in modern politics are increasingly char-
acterised by contradiction and confusion. The last decade of British politics
has, for example, seen widespread demands that supposedly hidden facts be
revealed – most notably those relating to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The
same desire for a truth was apparent in the run-up to the UK referendum on
membership of the European Union, when members of the public repeat-
edly lamented the failure of politicians to provide them with hard facts upon
the basis of which they could decide how to vote. Such demands are
expressed, however, in a context in which the availability of a position
from which to identify the truth is increasingly in doubt. Modern liberal
politics are often presented as involving negotiation between different social
perspectives or the freedom to create or choose an identity for oneself. There
is little place in such a political system for straightforward truth claims or, say,
for the identification of and fidelity to hidden truth about society which
characterised nineteenth- and twentieth-century socialism.2 At a global level,
the ‘universal’ truths of the West are regularly challenged from elsewhere in
international society.3 An increased ability to share information appears only
to add to the confusion. For some it points to the possibility of a more
‘transparent’ politics, but it has also provided the conditions of possibility for
‘weaponised relativism’ – propaganda of the kind deployed by the Putin

© The Author(s) 2017 1


M. Fluck, The Concept of Truth in International Relations Theory,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55033-0_1
2 THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

government in Russia, which aims not to persuade the world of a particular


truth but to cast doubt on the possibility of their being any truth of the
matter at all.4
Bernard Williams summarises this situation as follows:

On the one hand, there is an intense commitment to truthfulness – or, at any


rate, a pervasive suspiciousness, a readiness against being fooled, and eager-
ness to see through appearances to the real structures and motives that lie
behind them . . . Together with this demand for truthfulness, however, or
(to put it less positively) this reflex against deceptiveness, there is an equally
pervasive suspicion about truth itself: whether there is such a thing; if there
is, whether it can be more than relative or subjective or something of that
kind; altogether, whether we should bother about it, in carrying on our
activities or in giving an account of them.5

In philosophy and social theory the confrontation between these two


attitudes sustains a conflict which rages more fiercely than anywhere.
Supporters of a ‘common-sense’ attitude to truth portray the doubters
and sceptics as monkish occupants of ivory towers.6 For example, Williams
is scathing in his condemnation of the ‘frivolity’ of those in the humanities
who cast doubt on everyday truths, labelling them ‘émigrés from the
world of real power, the Secret Agents of literature departments’.7
Sceptics about truth, meanwhile, portray their detractors as, at best,
adherents to an outdated faith in a God’s-eye view of the world and very
often as unwitting enemies of freedom.8 Such philosophical confronta-
tions are, of course, not entirely new; at different points in the history of
philosophy Plato criticised the sophists and Russell the pragmatists, whilst,
on the other side, the ancient sceptics advocated the suspension of judge-
ment, and Nietzsche questioned the very value of truth itself.9
Moral and political concerns are seldom far from view in such discus-
sions. Thus, the philosopher Simon Blackburn can be found asserting that:

there is something diabolical in the region of relativism, multiculturalism or


postmodernism, something which corrupts and corrodes the universities
and the public culture, that sweeps away moral standards, lays waste to
young people’s minds, and rots our precious civilization from within.10

In contrast, one of the best-known Anglophone critics of the desire for


truth, Richard Rorty, argues that the potential of Western liberal societies
1 INTRODUCTION: A POLITICAL QUESTION 3

can only be fulfilled if we stop worrying about truth and embrace a form of
‘liberal ironism’. According to Rorty, we should acknowledge that there is
no hope of ‘mirroring’ the world in thought, of identifying the way things
really are, and get on with constructing a society in which each member is
free to ‘create’ themselves as they see fit.11
The discipline of International Relations (IR) has not avoided this
conflict. The early 1980s saw the beginning of a sustained critique of the
Positivist theory which had previously dominated the discipline. Positivism
is defined by a faith in the natural sciences according to which the scientific
method, based on empirical observation and the identification of laws,
could be deployed in the pursuit of the truth about the social world.12
In IR this led to an emphasis on the ‘facts’ of a world of states, and to
attempts to identify and explain the law-like regularities apparent in rela-
tions between them in a manner reminiscent of the natural sciences.13
A number of dichotomies are central to the Positivist position; facts are
separated from values, theory from practice, and facts from theories. In IR
these distinctions drove the supposedly detached scientific pursuit of the
objective truth about world politics, free from political or normative
considerations. Behind the dichotomies lies the assumption of a separation
of the knowing subject from the objective world, according to which the
scientist stands apart from the world she examines; her theorising plays no
role in shaping it, and she is free from any distorting influence which it
might exert on her identification of the facts.
One of the main targets of the ‘Post-Positivist’ critique in IR was this
assumption that the social scientist could occupy an Archimedean position
above her subject matter.14 Far from involving some vantage point above
the fray, the social scientific pursuit of truth cannot be separated from the
norms, practices, and institutions of which world politics consists. For
Post-Positivists, knowing subject and object known merge, and with this
distinctions between facts and values, theory and practice begin to blur
and collapse. Early Post-Positivists like Robert Cox, Richard Ashley, and
Andrew Linklater – and many others following them – argued that, despite
their claim to scientific detachment, Positivist IR theorists played a role in
preserving certain practices and institutions whilst helping to repress
others.15 In particular, the scientific pursuit of truth tended to obstruct
consideration of normative questions concerning the desirable forms of
international political practice and of the nature of change within world
politics.16 As a result, far from being neutral observers, Positivists were
conservative supporters of an often violent and unjust status quo; they
4 THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

stifled those political and normative tendencies which are at odds with a
world of power-seeking nation-states.17
The Post-Positivists dragged truth and knowledge into the social world
and with this the pursuit and identification of truth was revealed to be a
constitutive social and political activity in which certain features of inter-
national life were created and maintained. From the perspective of these
‘Critical’ IR scholars, there was no longer any hope of identifying the
‘objective’ truth or of pursuing it through a process of theorising free of all
normative and practical implications. Whereas for Positivists truth had
consisted in correspondence of ideas and statements with the empirical
facts, for Post-Positivists this was impossible; there was no position from
which such correspondence could occur. Now that the knowing subject
had lost its Archimedean position – now that the subject-object distinction
had collapsed – the mind could no longer play the role of a mirror held up
to the political life, and texts and ideas were no longer reflections of the
world but rather a part of it.18 From the perspective of this new critical
international thought, the social scientist was engaged in an inherently
normative activity and cannot avoid taking a political position. For Post-
Positivists, the proper response is to reflect on the social forces and inter-
ests that lie behind truth claims and to consider the ways in which such
claims can play a role in creating the very truths they claim to identify.19

2 THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF TRUTH


The book seeks to clarify the role of truth in critical theories of IR. It
explores the strengths and weaknesses of some of the most influential
conceptions, whilst looking beyond them to consider the ways in which
as yet unexplored understandings of truth might help to reinvigorate the
critical tradition in IR. The same conflict is to be found in IR as elsewhere
in the political and intellectual life of the modern West; the desire for truth
comes up against increasing suspicion of the notion of truth itself. The
story is, however, rather more complex than it might first appear. Rather
than demonstrating that the concept of truth should simply be aban-
doned, critical international theorists began to consider a constellation
of political issues and concerns which cluster around it. With this, a shift
occurred in the role of truth in IR theory. IR Post-Positivists had to reflect
on the relationship of their own knowledge to political norms and inter-
ests. They also began to consider the ways in which the pursuit and
identification of truth functioned as an element within the practices of
1 INTRODUCTION: A POLITICAL QUESTION 5

which international political life consists. In the words of Friedrich


Kratochwil, ‘a critical theory has to address the problem of how modes
of knowledge and political practices interact positively and negatively’.20
Thus the critical tradition in IR did not simply oppose Positivist objecti-
vism with scepticism, but introduced a new way of looking at truth and
knowledge as political matters, constitutive of international realities.
Debates and anxieties about truth then turned out to be as much about
the actual and desirable shape of society, and about human freedom and
potential, as about supposedly abstract philosophical questions.
This concern with the political or constitutive significance of truth has
been one of the most significant contributions of Post-Positivist theorists to
the discipline. From this perspective, the question is not simply whether
international theorists and actors should pursue truth or not, but what sorts
of political behaviour it is tied up with. Where truth remains a goal – as it
does for Critical IR Theorists – it becomes one the attainment of which
would be a political and social as well as scientific achievement. Even where
it is rejected – especially by Poststructuralists – truth remains associated
with norms and practices which play an important, albeit largely negative,
role in world politics. Rather than a simple confrontation between acolytes
and enemies of truth – or ‘Veriphiles’ and ‘Veriphobes’, as they will be
labelled here – we find a new way of engaging with the concept. This mode
of theorising provides the focus of this book.
This way of approaching epistemic matters draws on a broad philoso-
phical tradition concerned not simply with the question of whether or not
truth is possible, but also with the way in which it relates to power,
progress, and identity. Critical international scholars have, to a degree,
been conscious of their participation in this tradition, having formulated
their theories by drawing upon the work of some of its main adherents.
Two schools of thought have been particularly influential. The first is that
of the Critical Theorists, consisting of the members of the ‘Frankfurt
School’ – especially Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Jürgen
Habermas – and the Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci. Influenced by
Marx and Hegel, but also keen to resurrect the ancient connection
between the good and the true, these thinkers have highlighted the
historicity and sociality of truth and knowledge. At the same time, they
have sought to identify the intellectual and practical grounds of a form of
truth through which a more free and just society might be constructed.21
Critical IR Theorists like Andrew Linklater, Robert Cox, and (in his earlier
work) Richard Ashley followed such an approach in IR.22 The second
6 THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

major influence has been that of Poststructuralist thinkers, in particular


Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, who understood truth’s political sig-
nificance in less positive terms.23 Following these thinkers, Poststructuralist
IR scholars like David Campbell, Jenny Edkins, James Der Derian, and (in his
later work) Ashley have taken a negative view of the relationship between
truth and world politics.24 Whereas Critical Theorists follow the tradition of
philosophical history in linking a non-Positivist conception of truth with
progressive, emancipatory political practices, Poststructuralists have pre-
sented the ideals and norms which cluster around truth as key elements in a
modern politics of violence and domination.
As we will see in the following chapters, the differences between these
two broad strands of critical international thought certainly lend support
to the idea of a confrontation between sceptics and supporters of truth
within Post-Positivist IR. However, such a picture of critical IR would be a
limited one since, in contrast with Positivists, Critical IR Theorists and
Poststructuralists both offer detailed accounts of the political significance
of truth in the manner just outlined. To this extent they are members of
the same critical tradition. Second, and perhaps surprisingly, we shall see
that there are significant similarities in the ways they understand truth –
not only do they agree that it is of political significance but they also agree
about many of its characteristics.
This book will consider the conceptions of truth which have been
employed by the main schools of critical international thought and the
ways in which these conceptions have shaped theories of International
Relations. In doing so it will be possible to gain a clearer understanding
of the claims about world politics and proposals for its transformation
formulated by critical IR scholars – of their origins, limitations, and poten-
tial. Of course, Post-Positivist scholars have already discussed epistemologi-
cal questions and their significance for IR theory at some length. This book
engages with a body of literature which has been defined by a sustained
interest in epistemic matters – in addition to and overlapping with the works
of critical international thought just described, there is a large body of
secondary literature which has sought to assess the impact and significance
of critical Post-Positivism on the discipline. From the initial identification of
a ‘Third Debate’ in IR25 through to more recent retrospectives the critical
tradition has, true to its word, been characterised by an abundance (some
would say an excess) of self-reflection. Early discussions of Post-Positivism
such as Yosef Lapid’s essay ‘The Third Debate’, Steve Smith’s ‘Positivism
and Beyond’, and Jim George’s ‘International Relations and the Search for
1 INTRODUCTION: A POLITICAL QUESTION 7

Thinking Space’ are especially concerned with the implications of the


critique of Positivism for the future of the discipline. In most cases episte-
mological matters take pride of place.26
More recently, there has been no small amount of stock-taking regard-
ing the state of critical international thought.27 A common feature of these
more recent retrospectives has been a sense of impatience with the focus
on epistemology which has characterised critical international thought.
There is a current of thought according to which, if critical IR scholars are
to avoid excessive abstraction, less attention should be paid to the critique
of ‘problematic forms of knowledge in the academy’28 and ‘philosophical
first principles’29 and more to their ability to engage with the world, either
empirically or by increasing their ‘motivational purchase’ on political
actors.30 The desire for a more empirical form of critical theorising is
apparent, for example, with Craig Murphy’s suggestion that critical IR
needs to try harder to engage with ‘the self-understanding of the world’s
least advantaged’ and with Thomas Risse’s account of the role of
Habermasian communicative action in diplomacy.31 Regarding the ques-
tion of motivation, Critical IR Theorists have been concerned with iden-
tifying the sources of emancipatory action or ‘praxis’, and epistemological
reflection can seem to be more of a hindrance than a help in this search.32
Such concerns are further apparent in recent discussions concerning the
supposed ‘End of IR Theory’, in which there is apparent a widespread
attitude of pluralistic pragmatism; any position is fine as long as it is useful
in addressing substantive international phenomena and issues.33 Whilst
dissatisfaction is expressed with IR’s narrative of Great Debates, another
concern is that IR scholars have been prone to focusing on questions
about epistemology, ontology, methodology rather than substantive ques-
tions about world politics. These recent concerns about the ill-effects of
reflective theory take a variety of forms, from those of analytical eclecticists
who believe IR should focus on ‘middle-range’ theorising and ‘substantive
problems’ to those of critical scholars who fear that IR scholarship is too
remote from the concerns and experiences of ordinary people.34
The eclecticists draw on pragmatism to argue that IR’s recurring theory
wars have been at best a distraction and at worst a struggle between ‘quasi-
religious’ beliefs.35 Arguing in the latter vein, David Lake asserts that
theorists should not need to defend their ‘methodological, ontological,
and epistemological assumptions at every turn’.36 A similar call for a stance
of analytical eclecticism has been made by Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein.
Such an approach focuses on ‘substantive problems’ and ‘concrete issues
8 THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

of policy and practice’. It does so by adopting a pragmatist attitude which


‘sets aside metatheoretical debates’.37 Pragmatism, of course, rejects first-
order questions and focuses on the ‘consequences of truth claims’, empha-
sising the revisability of such claims and the importance of dialogue.38
Frustration has also been expressed by IR scholars of a more ‘critical’
persuasion, for some of whom the eclecticist position has held a certain
appeal.39 There is a more general feeling that the metatheoretical and
epistemological concerns which have characterised critical IR are now
proving to be a distraction. For example, Christine Sylvester argues that
war should be approached by focusing on the people who experience it
rather than ‘theoretical abstractions’.40 This is a concern she shares with
Milja Kurki, who laments the lack of ‘real systematic, effective or realistic
opposition’ to dominant models.41

3 WHY TRUTH NOW?


As far as matters of truth and knowledge are concerned, then, the litera-
ture shows every sign of being saturated or exhausted; earlier theorists
discussed epistemic matters at length, whilst contemporary theorists are
increasingly turning away from them. This being the case, what can be
gained by further investigation into the role of conceptions of truth in
IR theory?
There are a number of reasons to think that critical international
thought might benefit from renewed engagement with such questions.
These fall into three categories. Some relate to the epistemic anxieties,
assumptions, and self-confidence which continue to characterise modern
societies – IR theorists might be losing their interest in epistemic matters,
but actors in the ‘real’ world show little sign of doing so. In the context of
a culture and society which displays anxieties and disagreements about
truth – not least in popular attitudes to the secrecy which defines interna-
tional politics – it is surely necessary for critical international theorists to
continue to reflect on questions of truth and knowledge as politically
significant.42 There is an important distinction to be drawn between an
introspective critique of ‘forms of knowledge in the academy’, on the one
hand, and fidelity to the fundamental critical insight into the sociality of
knowledge and truth and the role they play in constituting political
realities, on the other.43 The modern anxieties described above reveal
the extent to which our beliefs about knowledge and truth are tied up
with normative and political questions. Indeed, world politics is frequently
1 INTRODUCTION: A POLITICAL QUESTION 9

described in epistemically loaded terms – we live in a supposed ‘informa-


tion age’ in which things such as ‘big data’ and ‘transparency’ promise to
transform our lives.44 In a political context defined by Wikileaks, the
Snowden revelations, the Panama Papers, and most recently concerns
about ‘Post-Truth’, the epistemically infused nature of political discourse
is increasingly prominent. Considered against this backdrop, IR’s own
philosophical struggles should be seen not as an abstract precursor to
engagement with ‘real’ political questions, but as the discipline’s engage-
ment with substantive political issues.
One of the most significant achievements of the key critical thinkers
on whom IR Post-Positivists have drawn – including Horkheimer, Adorno,
Habermas, Foucault, and Derrida – was precisely to examine modern
society through the lens of knowledge and truth seen as practices shaped
by, but also shaping, social interests, power relations, and institutions.45 In
doing so, each undermined the myth of the sovereign Cartesian ego
occupying an Archimedean position over society, and that of society as an
objective realm of facts which can be accessed via the observations of such a
subject. They have shown, in differing ways, that these epistemological
myths and ideals are always also forms of social and political practice, and
are often tied up with practices of control and domination. The need to
remain attuned to the links between philosophical, political, and social
problems was certainly one that Marx was aware of when he coupled the
critique of idealism with his critique of capitalism.46 Likewise, that Foucault
was conscious of the same need is apparent in his combination of meticu-
lous social and historical studies with his theory of power, knowledge, and
truth.47 For Habermas, too, epistemology has been the basis of critical
political theory.48 For Horkheimer and Adorno, it was the epistemic self-
confidence of the modern world which generated the need to consider such
matters, rather than any abstract philosophical concerns.49
Post-Positivist IR theorists must tread carefully, therefore, when
attempting to take the next step in critical theorising, taking care not to
re-render abstract that which they have succeeded in drawing into the
social world. None of this means, for example, that Murphy is wrong to
insist on the need for critical IR scholars to engage more extensively with
the most disadvantaged of the world’s inhabitants. It does mean, however,
that they should not do so without bearing in mind the constitutive role of
epistemic practices and relationships in modern political life.
A second reason to consider truth’s significance for critical international
thought arises from the dynamism of IR theory itself. It would be wrong
10 THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

to assume that philosophical questions of truth and knowledge were


settled decades ago, and that critical IR scholars can therefore turn away
from them to a new, more concrete set of concerns. In doing so, theorists
risk the calcification of the epistemological concepts and theories which
have been established, causing them to change into rigid foundations no
longer open to question. In the interests of rigorous international theory,
it is vital that IR theorists do not forget or deny their debt to epistemo-
logical debates and theorising.
Indeed, despite the general movement away from epistemic concerns,
questions to do with truth have retained some importance as old critical
orthodoxies have been challenged. One of the main arguments of this
book is that whilst talk of ivory tower theorising in relation to critical IR is
to a great extent misplaced, the way in which truth has been politicised is
problematic and has led to a certain level of abstraction as a result. That
this is the case has become apparent with the appearance of Scientific
or Critical Realism in IR. Critical Realists have highlighted the extent
to which the main schools of thought in IR – Critical Theory and
Poststructuralism included – are based on a common set of assumptions;
all reject the subject-object distinction and attempt to understand political
reality by examining the nature of human knowledge.50 Critical Realists
suggest that this obsession with things epistemic obscures the more fun-
damental ontological question of what the world must be like for us to
have knowledge in the first place.51 Quite apart from the substance of
Critical Realist arguments, this is a significant development in critical
international thought. The common perception in the discipline is that
the critique of Positivism generated a new plurality of perspectives in the
place of the scientistic one advocated by Positivists. In claiming that this
apparent plurality actually rests on a consensus, Critical Realists have
highlighted the specificity of Post-Positivism as a family of theories united
by a set of shared assumptions.52
Such a sense of specificity opens the way for reflection on assumptions
which were widely taken for granted by critically minded IR scholars.
Critical Realists share many of the concerns of Post-Positivists; their
international theory aims to further the goal of creating a more just and
more rational world politics through criticism of political practices and
institutions which are wrongly presented as if they were part of the natural
order of things. They reject, however, the philosophical foundations of
Post-Positivism, and especially the idea that truth has nothing to do with
objective reality. This has important implications for the ways in which
1 INTRODUCTION: A POLITICAL QUESTION 11

they believe we can set about pursuing the emancipatory goals of critical
international thought. Thus, Critical Realists have shown that questions
about the significance of truth are far from settled.
The impetus for the present work arises not only from a consideration
of developments in contemporary critical international thought but also
from a concern with older works of Frankfurt School Critical Theory.
The theories upon which Post-Positivist IR scholarship has largely been
based certainly mesh nicely with some matters of particular concern to IR
theorists. The Habermasian emphasis on communicative interaction is
appealing to those searching for a means of overcoming the present state
of mutual estrangement between political communities. Likewise, the
Poststructuralist emphasis on the links between truth and domination
links up with concerns about sovereignty, violence, or global governance.
However, the productiveness of these positions when applied to IR –
which will be discussed in Part I of this book – has led critical international
theorists to brush over matters which were of central importance to earlier
generations of Critical Theorists.
The motivation for this book arises, in particular, from a concern with
issues which were raised by Theodor Adorno. Unfortunately for those
seeking both to defend and advance the critical tradition in IR, Adorno’s
work has received little attention in the discipline. Indeed, in many
respects he appears not to have much to offer contemporary international
thought. He avoided making specific political prescriptions, which no
doubt explains his reputation for pessimistic abstraction. Nor did he
focus on specifically ‘international’ issues to do with sovereignty or diver-
sity. However, that Adorno’s work can be productively applied in the
discipline has not entirely escaped the notice of IR theorists.53 Daniel
Levine’s recent call for an Adornian project of ‘sustainable critique’ is
particularly notable. As Levine points out, there is a close connection
between Adorno’s concern with ‘chastening reason’ and the needs of the
discipline of IR as it responds to the ongoing ‘crisis of modernity’.54
Whilst Levine focuses on IR in general, the present work looks to
Adorno – and specifically to his theory of truth – as a means of reviving
the tradition of critical international thought. Post-Positivist IR scholars
have generally accepted the critique of Positivism according to which truth
is an intersubjective phenomenon. In contrast, despite their recognition
of the complicity of certain sorts of truth claim with modern forms of
domination and the loss of meaning, Adorno and his colleague
Horkheimer insisted on the possibility and need for a truth which could
12 THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

not be equated with utility or consensus. Horkheimer wanted to retain


what he called the ‘knowledge of the falling fighter’ – the way in which
truth might be maintained in the face of near overwhelming opposition –
and emphasised the need to avoid equating truth with political or social
success.55 Adorno was keen to assert the need for objective truth – albeit,
as we shall see, of a very different kind to that rejected by Post-Positivists –
and was critical of liberal faith in the political utility of mere opinion.56
This attitude is no doubt partly due to the different political circumstances
which the early Frankfurt School faced as refugees from Nazi totalitarian-
ism. Nevertheless, it suggests there is reason to think more carefully before
rejecting the notion of a truth which can stand at odds with prevailing
opinion or discourse.
Another area of concern for Adorno – one closely connected to his
conception of truth – was the subject-object relationship. Early Critical
Theorists displayed a Marxian interest in the objective activity of human
subjects – their interaction with the natural, material world of which they
are part – and the way in which this activity is related to the norms,
practices, and institutions of which social life consists. This interest in
the relationship between subjectivity, objectivity, and intersubjectivity
informed Adorno’s understanding of truth. In contrast, IR Post-
Positivists were quick to replace the concern with subject-object relations
with a focus on linguistic intersubjectivity. It is not clear that this move has
ever been adequately justified. Rather, as will be argued in Chapter 2, the
concern with a subject-object relationship has been condemned through
association with Positivist objectivism and a crude form of scientistic
Marxism. Critical international thought was able to move away from the
question of the relationship between subject and object to a great extent
through critique of these two positions. In doing so, it moved too quickly;
there was a failure to engage with the sophisticated consideration of the
subject-object relationship which is found in Adorno’s theory of truth.57
As we shall see, this failure left Post-Positivists vulnerable to some of the
criticisms levelled at them by Critical Realists.
Consideration of these three areas – the epistemic tone of modern
political discourse, the Critical Realist challenge, and the concerns of
the early Frankfurt School – suggests that there is much more to be
said about the role of truth in critical international thought, and about
Post-Positivist assessments of its political significance. It will be argued
here that, far from representing a retreat into the ivory tower, such a
reconsideration of the epistemic concerns which shaped Post-Positivist
1 INTRODUCTION: A POLITICAL QUESTION 13

IR points to the means by which this critical tradition might be


reinvigorated and extended.

4 THE ARGUMENT
There are two broad elements to the argument advanced in the following
chapters. The first, outlined in Part I, concerns the character of the critical
Post-Positivist tradition in IR. It will be argued that, despite the difference
of opinion between Critical Theorists and Poststructuralists as to whether
truth is of positive or negative value, the significance of truth has been
understood by Post-Positivists on the basis of the two common pillars
mentioned above. The first of these is a ‘critical epistemological proble-
matic’ which emerges once truth is recognised as a social phenomenon.
The problematic consists of three questions concerning: the relationship
between socialised truth and the forms of community and practice which
characterise world politics; the possibility of achieving the level of context-
transcendence necessary to sustain a critical international theory; and the
relationship between truth and political progress. The second unifying
factor is the intersubjective conception of truth with which the proble-
matic has generally been addressed. According to this conception, which is
implicit in most Post-Positivist IR theories, truth is understood in terms of
intersubjective epistemic practices and idealisations about the conditions
in which they take place, rather than in terms of the subject-object
relationship.
The way in which these two factors interact in critical international
thought will be illustrated through an investigation of key works of Post-
Positivist IR theory. Chapter 2 explores the origins of the critical epistemo-
logical problematic and the intersubjective understanding of truth in early
works of Post-Positivism, especially those of Ashley, Cox, and Linklater.
The breaking down of a sharp subject-object distinction is identified as the
most significant element of the critique of Positivism in IR. Contrary to
many analyses, however, the result of this merging was not theoretical
pluralism but the critical epistemological problematic. Two major attempts
to address the latter are identified, one involving the Veriphilia of Critical
Theorists and the other the Veriphobia of Poststructuralists. Despite their
opposing positions concerning the value of truth, both have tended to work
with an intersubjective understanding of the concept.
Chapter 3 considers a major Poststructuralist work – David Campbell’s
National Deconstruction – to show how the critical problematic and
14 THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

intersubjective understanding of truth function when the political signifi-


cance of truth is understood in negative terms, as a source of domination
and violence.58 The chapter focuses on the influence of Derrida’s under-
standing of truth in particular. According to Campbell, the grounds for
critique and political progress (the subjects of questions 2 and 3 of the
critical epistemic problematic) lie in turning away from the pursuit of truth
altogether and towards an ethical concern with difference. Chapter 4 takes
a major work of Habermasian Critical IR Theory – Andrew Linklater’s The
Transformation of Political Community – and shows how the same pro-
blematic is addressed with an intersubjective conception of truth, but this
time from a perspective according to which truth is a source of progress.59
In this case, truth is redeemed through association with discursively gen-
erated consensus arrived at under ideal epistemic conditions. The possibi-
lity of progress and moral learning lies not in the assertion of sovereign
rationality standing over the world, as Poststructuralists fear, but in a form
of communal rationality based on the intersubjective, discursive pursuit of
truth claims and the construction of institutions which approximate the
conditions ideal for this pursuit.
Both the Veriphobic and Veriphiliac perspectives generate important
insights into the nature of world politics; Campbell’s into the prevalence
of certain unreflexive forms of Veriphilia and their links with political
violence, Linklater’s into the possibility that the pursuit of truth might
still be connected to a progressive practice. Nevertheless, both encounter
difficulties as a result of their intersubjective understandings of truth. In
Campbell’s case, the rejection of truth leads to a reliance on some proble-
matic quasi-transcendental concepts and an excessive emphasis on the
influence of Western philosophical tradition in explanations of political
practice. Despite the emphasis on difference, this Poststructuralist
approach takes on the character of a traditional philosophical system.
The Habermasian discourse theory of truth implicit in Linklater’s work
seemed to go some way to addressing these problems, but leaves him
struggling to address the normative and political issues surrounding
human relations with the material world.
Part II further investigates the sources of these problems and outlines the
second element to the book’s argument, according to which the difficulties
in question are partly due the intersubjectivist understanding of truth which
obscures the importance of the subject-object relationship. In Chapter 5 we
examine the arguments of Critical Realists, who introduce the idea that
truth is significant not because of the constitutive role of the intersubjective
1 INTRODUCTION: A POLITICAL QUESTION 15

practices and ideals with which it is associated, but rather because it involves
the cognitive relationship of human subjects with an objective reality. The
reintroduction of the subject-object relationship is an important step, but
the Critical Realists lapse into a scientism (faith in science) at odds with
Post-Positivists’ insights into the constitutive significance of truth.
Chapter 6 presents Adorno’s Critical Theory as a means of reconciling
Post-Positivist insights with Realist concerns, demonstrating how the poli-
tical significance of truth arises from both the subject-object relationship
and from the norms and practices with which truth is associated. Adorno
offers a conception of truth closely tied to his belief in the ‘primacy of
the objective’ and the importance of the ‘non-identical’ – the fact that
the world can never be captured ‘without remainder’.60 For Adorno, the
non-identical must be brought back in through the pursuit of a truth which
is objective, but also emphatic – in that it has normative content – and
‘unintentional’ – in that it requires us to search for ways in which the
objective is ‘expressed’ in the conceptualisations and structures established
through modern rationality. This understanding of truth points to the
substantive nature of critical IR’s epistemic concerns – the way they help
to illuminate real problems and predicaments encountered by individuals
living in a heavily bureaucratised, marketised, but divided world. At the
same time, it offers a means of overcoming the tendency to abstraction
which has emerged from the assertion that truth is purely intersubjective.

NOTES
1. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writing
1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), p. 133.
2. John Rawls rejects the idea that truth should play any significant role in
liberal politics, an idea challenged by Joshua Cohen. Joshua Cohen, ‘Truth
and Public Reason’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 37, 1 (2005), pp. 2–42.
3. Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Reflections on the “Critical” in Critical Theory’,
Review of International Studies, 33, Special Issue: Critical International
Relations Theory after 25 years (2007), pp. 25–45, reference p. 40.
4. The Guardian, ‘The Guardian View on Russian Propaganda: The Truth is
Out There’, 2 March (2015), http://www.theguardian.com/commentis
free/2015/mar/02/guardian-view-russian-propaganda-truth-out-there
[accessed 7 June 2016].
5. Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2002), p. 1.
16 THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

6. William Wallace, ‘Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and
Practice in International Relations’, Review of International Studies, 22, 3,
(1996), pp. 301–321.
7. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, p. 11.
8. Derrida states that ‘All the metaphysical determinations of truth . . . are
more or less inseparable from the instance of the logos’ and includes within
the latter ‘the sense of God’s infinite understanding’. Jacques Derrida, ‘The
End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing’, in Truth: Engagements
Across Philosophical Traditions, ed. José Medina and David Wood (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2005), pp. 207–225.
9. Plato, Gorgias, trans. Walter Hamilton (London: Penguin, 1960);
Bertrand Russell, ‘William James’s Conception of Truth’, in Truth, ed.
Simon Blackburn and Keith Simmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999), pp. 69–82; Sextus Empiricus ‘Outlines of Pyrrhonism’, in
Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches, ed. Paul
K. Moser and Arnold vander Nat (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995), pp. 80–90; Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans.
R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 2003).
10. Simon Blackburn, Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed, (London: Penguin,
2005), pp. xiv–xv.
11. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, Solidarity, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989).
12. W.H. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science, (London: Routledge,
1981), p. 1.
13. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading, MA: Addison
Wesley, 1979).
14. Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International
Relations Theory’, Millennium 10, 2 (1981), pp. 126–155.
15. Ibid.; Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International
Relations, 2nd Edition, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); Richard Ashley
‘Political Realism and Human Interests’, International Studies Quarterly
25, 2 (1981).
16. Linklater, Men and Citizens, p. 28.
17. Cox, ‘Social Forces’.
18. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1979).
19. The best known Positivist reply is Robert Keohane’s International Studies
Association Presidential address of 1988. Robert Keohane, ‘International
Institutions: Two Approaches’, International Studies Quarterly 32, 4
(1988), pp. 379–396.
20. Kratochwil, ‘Reflections’, p. 36.
1 INTRODUCTION: A POLITICAL QUESTION 17

21. See e.g. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests; Max Horkheimer,
‘On the Problem of Truth’, in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader,
ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978),
pp. 407–443.
22. Ashley, ‘Political Realism and Human Interests’; Cox, ‘Social Forces’;
Linklater, Men and Citizens.
23. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p. 133.
24. David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the
Politics of Identity, Revised Edition (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1998); Jenny Edkins, Whose Hunger? Concepts of Famine, Practices
of Aid (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); James Der
Derian, ‘The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International
Relations’, in International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings
of World Politics, ed. James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (New York:
Lexington, 1989), pp. 3–10.
25. Yosef Lapid, ‘The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory
in a Post-Positivist Era’, International Studies Quarterly 33, 3 (1989),
pp. 235–254.
26. Ibid.; Jim George, ‘International Relations and the Search for Thinking
Space: Another View of the Third Debate’, International Studies
Quarterly 33 (1989), pp. 269–279.; Steve Smith, ‘Positivism and
Beyond’, in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. Steve Smith,
Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), pp. 11–44.
27. See for example Nick Rengger and Ben Thirkwell-White eds., Review of
International Studies, Special Issue: Critical International Relations Theory
After 25 Years, 33 (2007) and the contributions to the ‘Forum on
Habermas’ Review of International Studies, 31, 1 (2005).
28. Nicholas Rengger and Ben Thirkwell-White, ‘Still Critical After All These
Years? The Past, Present and Future of Critical Theory in International
Relations’, Review of International Studies 33, S1 (2007), pp. 3–24, refer-
ence p. 21.
29. Thomas Diez and Jill Steans, ‘A Useful Dialogue? Habermas and
International Relations’ Review of International Studies 31, 1 (2005),
pp. 127–140, reference p. 138.
30. Rengger and Thirkwell-White, ‘Still Critical?’, pp. 21–22.
31. Craig Murphy, ‘The Promise of Critical IR, Partially Kept’, Review of
International Studies, Special Issue: Critical International Relations Theory
After 25 Years, 33 (2007), pp. 117–134, reference p. 118; Thomas Risse
‘“Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics’, International
Organization 54, 1 (2000) pp. 1–39.
18 THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

32. Jürgen Haacke, ‘Theory and Practice in International Relations: Habermas,


Self-Reflection, Rational Argumentation’, Millennium, 25, 2 (1996),
pp. 255–259; Diez and Steans, ‘A Useful Dialogue?’, p. 138; Friedrich
Kratochwil suggests that Critical Theorists need to address the question of
the nature of action, but unlike many IR scholars does not seem to believe
that such an avenue is blocked by the concern with epistemology.
Kratochwil, ‘Reflections’, p. 36.
33. Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen, and Colin Wight, ‘The End of International
Relations Theory?’, European Journal of International Relations 19, 3
(2013), pp. 405–425. See also Damiano de Felice and Francesco Obino
eds. ‘Out of the Ivory Tower’, Millennium, Special Issue 40 (2012), 3.
34. David Lake, ‘Theory is Dead, Long Live Theory: The End of the Great
Debates and the Rise of Eclecticism in International Relations’, European
Journal of International Relations 19, 3 (2013), pp. 567–587; Rudra Sil
and Peter Katzenstein, ‘Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics:
Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms Across Research Traditions’,
Perspective on Politics 8, 2 (2010), pp. 411–431; Christine Sylvester,
‘Experiencing the End and Afterlives of International Relations/Theory’,
European Journal of International Relations 19, 3 (2013), pp. 609–626;
Craig Murphy, ‘The Promise of Critical IR, Partially Kept’, Review of
International Studies 33, Special Issue: Critical International Relations
after 25 Years (2007), pp. 117–134.
35. Lake, ‘Theory is Dead’, p. 568.
36. Ibid., p. 580.
37. Sil and Katzenstein, ‘Analytic Eclecticism’, p. 417.
38. Ibid.
39. Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Beyond Meta-Theory?’, European Journal of
International Relations 19, 3 (2013), pp. 589–608, reference p. 603.
40. Sylvester, ‘End and Afterlives’.
41. Ibid., p. 616; Milja Kurki, ‘The Limitations of the Critical Edge: Reflections
on Critical and Philosophical IR Scholarship Today’, Millennium: Journal of
International Studies 40, 1 (2011), pp. 129–146.
42. Matthew Fluck, ‘Theory, Truthers, and Transparency: Reflecting on
Knowledge in the 21st Century’, Review of International Studies 42, 1
(2016), pp. 48–73.
43. Kratochwil, ‘Reflections’, p. 36; Diez and Steans, ‘A Useful Dialogue?’,
p. 132.
44. Steve Fuller, The Knowledge Book, (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2007), pp. 82–87.
Daniel McCarthy and Matthew Fluck ‘The Concept of Transparency in
International Relations: Towards a Critical Approach’, forthcoming
European Journal of International Relations.
1 INTRODUCTION: A POLITICAL QUESTION 19

45. Horkheimer, ‘On the Problem of Truth’; Theodor Adorno, Negative


Dialectics, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973); Habermas, Knowledge
and Human Interests; Foucault, Power/Knowledge; Jacques Derrida of
Grammatology, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
46. See for example, Karl Marx, ‘The Holy Family’, in David McLellan ed. Karl
Marx: Selected Writings, 2nd Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), pp. 145–170; Karl Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts’, in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, 2nd Edition, ed. David
McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 83–121.
47. Foucault, Power/Knowledge.
48. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests.
49. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment,
(London: Verso 1972).
50. Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wight, ‘After Post-Positivism? The Promises of
Critical Realism’, International Studies Quarterly 44, 2 (2000), pp. 213–237,
reference p. 217.
51. Colin Wight, ‘A Manifesto for Scientific Realism in IR: Assuming the Can-
Opener Won’t Work!’, Millennium 39, 2 (2007), pp. 379–398, reference
p. 390.
52. Patomaki and Wight, ‘After Post-Positivism?’
53. Exceptions include Nicholas Rengger, ‘Negative Dialectic? The Two Modes
of Critical Theory in World Politics’, in Critical Theory and World Politics,
ed. Richard Wyn Jones (London: Lynne Rienner, 2001) pp. 91–109;
Columba Peoples, ‘Theodor Adorno’, in Critical Theorists and
International Relations, ed. Jenny Edkins and Nick Vaughan-Williams
(London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 7–18; Shannon Brincat, ‘Negativity and
Open-Endedness in the Dialectic of World Politics’, Alternatives: Global,
Local, Political 34, 4 (2009), pp. 455–493; Daniel Levine Recovering
International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
54. Levine, Recovering International Relations.
55. Horkheimer, ‘On the Problem of Truth’, pp. 428–429.
56. Theodor Adorno, ‘Opinion Delusion Society’, trans. H Pickford, Yale
Journal of Criticism 10, 2 (1997).
57. Adorno, Negative Dialectics.
58. David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in
Bosnia, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).
59. Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical
Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
60. Theodor Adorno, ‘Subject and Object’, in The Essential Frankfurt School
Reader, ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (Oxford: Blackwell 1978),
pp. 497–511; Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 5.
PART I

Post-Positivism and Truth


CHAPTER 2

The Parameters of Post-Positivism

From now on, my dear philosophers, let us beware of the dangerous old
conceptual fable which posited a ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing
subject’.
Friedrich Nietzsche1

this world of nations has certainly been made by men, and its guise must
therefore be found within the modifications of our own human mind.
Giambattista Vico2

1 INTRODUCTION
Accounts of the ‘sustained theoretical effervescence’ of IR’s Third
Debate have often given it the air of a rebellious golden age, an
unprecedented period of disciplinary self-reflection and fecundity.3
Early assessments of its significance celebrated the openness and plur-
alisation to which the turn supposedly gave rise. With varying degrees
of optimism and enthusiasm, the turn to ‘Post-Positivism’4 was char-
acterised by its participants as a productive pluralisation of metatheore-
tical perspectives5; as giving rise to the ‘next stage’ in IR theory6; as
the search for increased ‘thinking space’7; as a theoretical and practical

© The Author(s) 2017 23


M. Fluck, The Concept of Truth in International Relations Theory,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55033-0_2
24 THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

‘opening up’8; and in terms of a pluralisation of ‘dissident voices’


previously repressed by IR’s Positivist orthodoxy.9
In most accounts, this theoretical opening-up was presented as hav-
ing occurred by predominantly epistemological means. Steve Smith
referred to the critique of Positivism as the ‘epistemology debate’.10
Jim George identified four defining features of the ‘agenda of dissent’,
each of them at least partly epistemological: identification of the inade-
quacy of empiricism; the substitution of the Cartesian cogito, autono-
mous individuality, sense data, and correspondence notions of truth
with the investigation of the social, historical, and cultural constitution
of knowledge; the rejection of ‘the foundationalist search for an objec-
tive knowledge’; and a belief in the linguistic construction of reality.11
The prevailing view has been that the crumbling of the old Positivist
fiction of the ‘view from nowhere’ allowed theories to multiply, ‘dis-
sidents’ to be heard, and new theoretical and practical possibilities to be
explored.
Pluralisation continues to be celebrated. Indeed, as discussed in the
introduction, for some IR scholars this might be the truly lasting
achievement of Post-Positivism. The epistemological dimension of the
critique of Positivism has proved to be of less enduring appeal. Indeed, it
has become common to observe that critical IR cannot remain forever in
the realm of metatheoretical or epistemological reflection, but must
move on to empirical studies and practical applications.12 Such concerns
have been played a prominent role in recent discussions of the ‘end of IR
theory’.13
The present chapter argues that the insights of critical IR scholars
did not simply emerge with the blooming of a thousand theoretical
flowers. In fact, a specific set of epistemic concerns and theoretical
orientations shaped the development of critical international thought,
setting the parameters in which issues of more obvious relevance for IR
could be addressed. The first part of the chapter examines the early,
pioneering Critical Theory of Robert Cox, Richard Ashley, and
Andrew Linklater and reconstructs from within it an overarching ‘cri-
tical epistemological problematic’. The second section looks at the
debate about foundations and the emergence of Poststructructuralist
IR theories. It identifies not only a division between ‘Veriphiles’ and
‘Veriphobes’ but also, more importantly, a broad common understand-
ing of truth as intersubjective.
Another random document with
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outline straight and declinate to the nostrils, then direct and slightly
concave, the sides sloping and concave at the base, broadly convex
toward the end, the edges soft, with about forty short erect lamellæ
internally on each side, the unguis linear-oblong, suddenly decurved
and directed backwards, its lower part transversely expanded and
serrulate. Nostrils in an oblong depression covered with skin, medial,
rather small, linear oblong, pervious. Lower mandible flattened, a
little recurved, its angle very long and narrow, the laminæ about a
hundred and forty and extremely small, the unguis oblong.
Head rather large, oblong. Eyes of moderate size. Neck short and
thick. Body full, much depressed. Legs short and placed rather far
behind; tibia bare for a short space; tarsus very short, compressed,
with an anterior series of small scutella, an outer short series going
to the fourth toe, the rest reticulated. Hind toe very small, with a free
inferior web; anterior toes very long, slender, the middle toe double
the length of the tarsus, the outer almost as long, the inner
considerably shorter, and having a broad lobed margin; the webs
reticulated. Claws rather small, slender, compressed, slightly arched,
acute.
Plumage dense, blended, on the upper parts very soft; on the fore
part of the head stiffish; on the lower parts with a silky gloss, and
stiff, having the extremities broad, and the barbs strong and pointed.
Wings very short, of moderate breadth, concave, pointed; primaries
tapering, the first longest, obliquely rounded. Tail short, much
graduated, of eighteen stiff, narrow feathers, of which the shaft is
very strong, and runs out in a flattened concave point.
Bill and edges of eyelids greyish-blue. Iris hazel. Feet dull greyish-
blue; webs inclining to dusky; claws greyish-brown. Upper part of the
head and nape deep bluish-black, that colour running to a point
about the middle of the neck; a large white patch on each side of the
head, from the bill to behind the ear, narrowed on the throat. Neck all
round, and all the upper parts, as well as the sides of the rump, rich
glossy brownish-red or chestnut; the lower parts greyish-white,
tinged with brown, and marked with transverse interrupted bands of
dusky. Wing-coverts, quills, and tail-feathers, blackish-brown.
Length to end of tail 14 3/4 inches, to end of wings 12 1/2, to end of
claws 15, to carpal joint 7 3/4; extent of wings 21 1/2; wing from
flexure 6 1/4; tail 3 1/2; bill along the ridge 1 5/8, along the edge of
1/
lower mandible 1 5/8; tarsus 1 1/4; hind toe and claw 4 2/8; inner toe
1 3/4, its claw 1/4; middle toe 2 3/8, its claw 3/8; outer toe 2 3/8, its claw
1/ . Weight 1 3/4 lb. Average measurements of six individuals.
4

The black on the head of the male is sometimes marked with a few
white feathers.
Adult Female in summer. Plate CCCXLIII. Fig. 2.
The plumage presents the same characters as in the male. The bill
is of a darker greyish-blue; iris as in the male; feet darker. The top of
the head, and all the upper parts, are dark reddish-brown, minutely
dotted and undulated with dusky; wings and tail as in the male; lower
parts duller than in the male, but similarly marked; the throat, and a
band from the base of the upper mandible to beneath the eye,
brownish-white.
Male one year old. Plate CCCXLIII. Fig. 3.
Bill, eyes, and feet as in the adult. A similar white patch on the side
of the head; upper part of head and hind neck dull blackish-brown;
throat and sides of the neck greyish-brown; lower part of neck, dull
reddish-brown, waved with dusky; upper parts as in the adult, but of
a duller tint; lower parts greyish-white.
Young in December. Plate CCCXLIII. Fig. 4.
Bill dusky; iris hazel; feet yellowish-green, webs dusky. All the upper
parts dull reddish-brown tinged with grey, and barred with dusky;
wings and tail dark greyish-brown. Cheeks, fore part and sides of
neck, and all the lower parts, dull yellowish-white, undulated with
dusky; as is the rump above; the lower tail-coverts white.
The tongue of a male is 1 inch 8 twelfths long, and of the same
general form as that of the Fuligulæ, but a little more dilated at the
end. The œsophagus is 1/2 inch in diameter until its entrance into the
thorax, when it contracts, and again expands to 6 twelfths, to form
the proventriculus, of which the glandules are oblong, small, and
very numerous, occupying a space of 2 1/4 inches in length. The
stomach is a strong gizzard, of a roundish form, 1 inch 5 twelfths
long, 1 1/2 inch broad; its lateral muscles very large, and about 8
twelfths thick; the epithelium confined to two round spaces 1/2 inch in
diameter, opposite the lateral muscles. The intestine is 5 feet 1 1/2
inch long, its diameter varying from 5 twelfths to 3 1/2 twelfths. The
rectum is 2 inches 10 twelfths long; the cœca 4 inches 2 twelfths
their greatest diameter 2 1/2 twelfths.

In another male, the œsophagus is 7 1/2 inches long; the stomach 1


inch 5 twelfths long, 1 inch 6 twelfths broad; the intestine 5 feet 11
inches long; the rectum 2 3/4 inches; the cœca 4 1/8 inches, their
greatest diameter 2 1/2 twelfths.

The trachea is 5 3/4 inches long. The thyroid bone is comparatively


large, forming an expansion 7 twelfths long, 5 twelfths broad. At its
upper part the trachea has a diameter of 3 twelfths, about the middle
enlarges to 4 twelfths, and so continues nearly to the end, when it
contracts to 2 twelfths. The last ring is very large, being formed of
five or six united rings, of which the last two or three are split; but
there is no expansion or tympanum as in other ducks. The muscles
are as in the other species of this family. The bronchi are of
moderate length, with about 15 half rings.
LONG-LEGGED SANDPIPER.

Tringa Himantopus, Bonap.


PLATE CCCXLIV.

I have often spoken of the great differences as to size and colour


that are observed in birds of the same species, and which have
frequently given rise to mistakes, insomuch that the male, the
female, and the young, have been considered as so many distinct
species. The Long-legged Sandpiper has been treated in this
manner, and has latterly reappeared under the name of Tringa
Douglassii, in the Fauna Boreali-Americana of my friends
Richardson and Swainson. Bonaparte was, in truth, the first who
described this bird; and although some differences might be found
between his specimen and the one described in the work just
mentioned, they are trifling compared with those which I have
observed between seven or eight individuals all procured from the
same flock at a single shot. It is strange that neither Bonaparte nor
Swainson have mentioned the sex of their specimen.
On the morning of the 4th of April 1837, while seated among the drift
wood that had accumulated on the southern shore of the island of
Barataria, forty miles from the south-west pass of the Mississippi,
and occupied in observing some Pelicans, I saw a flock of about
thirty Long-legged Sandpipers alight within ten steps of me, near the
water. They immediately scattered, following the margin of the
retiring and advancing waves, in search of food, which I could see
them procure by probing the wet sand in the manner of Curlews, that
is, to the full length of their bill, holding it for a short time in the sand,
as if engaged in sucking up what they found. In this way they
continued feeding on an extended line of shore of about thirty yards,
and it was pleasing to see the alacrity with which they
simultaneously advanced and retreated, according to the motions of
the water. In about three quarters of an hour, during all which time I
had watched them with attention, they removed a few yards beyond
the highest wash of the waves, huddled close together, and began to
plume and cleanse themselves. All of a sudden they ceased their
occupation, stood still, and several of them emitted a sharp tweet-
tweet, somewhat resembling the notes of Totanus solitarius;
immediately after which seven birds of the same species passed
close to me, and alighted near those which I had already watched.
They at once began to feed, and as I thought that the first flock might
join them, and that I might lose the opportunity of procuring
specimens, in sufficient number, I fired and killed eleven. The rest
flew off, and were joined by the second group, the whole flying to
windward in a compact body, and emitting every now and then their
sharp tweet, tweet, until out of sight and hearing.
My son John obtained several of these birds on the same island
while they were feeding on the margins of a fresh-water pond; and
we saw them on almost every island and bay on our way to the
Texas, where we also procured some on Galveston Island.
The flight of these Sandpipers is rapid and regular. They move
compactly, and often when about to alight, or after being disturbed,
incline their bodies to either side, shewing alternately the upper and
lower parts. On foot they move more like Curlews than Tringas, they
being as it were more sedate in their deportment. At times, on the
approach of a person, they squat on the ground, very much in the
manner of the Esquimaux Curlew, Numenius borealis; and their flesh
is as delicate as that of the species just named. In the stomach of
several individuals I found small worms, minute shell-fish, and
vegetable substances, among which were the hard seeds of plants
unknown to me. I suspect that in summer and autumn they feed on
small fruits and berries, though of this I have no proof.
Among those which we procured, I found the differences in the
colour of the plumage quite as great as in Scolopax noveboracensis,
some of the younger birds being yet in their winter dress, while the
older had already assumed a reddish colour on the cheeks, the top
of the head, and the breast. The females were all larger than the
males, and differed from each other not only in the markings of the
plumage, but also in the length of the bill, to the extent of a quarter of
an inch, and of the legs, to a still greater extent. Whether or not this
species assumes a uniform reddish tint in the breeding season, such
as is observed in the Pigmy Curlew, Tringa subarquata, I am unable
to say, although I am much inclined to think that it does.
Their passage through the United States is very rapid, both in spring
and autumn, Some few spend the winter in Lower Louisiana, but
nearly all proceed southward beyond the Texas.

Tringa Himantopus, Ch. Bonaparte, Synopsis of Birds of United States, p.


316.
Tringa Douglassii, Swainson, Douglas’s Sandpiper, Richards. and
Swains. Fauna Bor.-Amer. vol. ii. 379.
Tringa Himantopus, Slender-shanks Sandpiper, Richards. and Swains.
Fauna Bor.-Amer. vol. ii. 380.
Long-Legged Sandpiper, Audubon’s Stilt Sandpiper, and Douglass’
Stilt Sandpiper, Nuttall, Manual, vol. ii. p. 138, 140, 141.

Male in Spring. Plate CCCXLIV. Fig. 1.


Bill much longer than the head, very slender, subcylindrical, very
slightly decurved, compressed at the base, the end rather
depressed, considerably enlarged. Upper mandible with the dorsal
line almost straight, being very slightly decurved towards the end,
the ridge narrow, convex, flattened towards the tip, the sides sloping,
with a narrow groove extending nearly to the end, the edges rather
blunt and soft, the tip decurved. Nostrils basal, linear, pervious.
Lower mandible with the angle long and very narrow, the dorsal line
straight, towards the end slightly deflected, the sides sloping
outwards, with a long narrow groove, the tip a little broader.
Head small, oblong, compressed. Eyes small. Neck rather long.
Body slender. Feet long, very slender; tibia bare for an inch; tarsus
long, slender, compressed, covered before and behind with
numerous small scutella; hind toe very small, the rest of moderate
length, slender, the second very slightly longer than the fourth, the
third very little longer; short basal webs, running out along the
margins, that between the third and fourth toes larger. Claws rather
long, very slender, slightly arched, tapering, compressed.
Plumage very soft, blended; the feathers somewhat distinct on the
back. Wings very long, pointed; primaries tapering, the first longest,
the second slightly shorter, the rest rapidly graduated; outer
secondaries slightly incurved, obliquely sinuate on the outer web
towards the end, the inner web rounded; inner secondaries very
narrow, tapering, reaching to three-fourths of an inch of the longest
primary when the wing is closed. Tail of moderate length, nearly
even, but with the two middle feathers exceeding the rest by two and
a half twelfths of an inch, of twelve narrow, rounded feathers.
Bill black. Iris brown. Feet dull yellowish-green, claws black. The
upper parts are brownish-black, the feathers margined with reddish-
white, the edges of the scapulars with serriform markings of the
same; rump and upper tail-coverts white, transversely barred with
dusky; tail light grey, the feathers white at the base and along the
middle. Primary quills and their coverts brownish-black, the inner
tinged with grey, the shaft of the outer primary white, secondaries
brownish-grey, margined with reddish-white, the inner dusky. A broad
whitish line over the eye; loral band dusky; auriculars pale brownish-
red; fore part and sides of neck, greyish-white, tinged with red, and
longitudinally streaked with dusky; the rest of the lower parts pale
reddish-brown, transversely barred with dusky; the middle of the
breast and the abdomen without markings. Dimensions of five
individuals.

Length to end of tail, 8 3/4 8 1/4 7 3/4 8 7 1/2


................................wings, 9 1/4 8 3/8 8 1/2 8 3/4 8 3/4
................................claws, 11 1/4 10 5/8 10 10 1/2 10 7/8
Extent of wings, 16 3/4 16 15 1/2 17 16
Weight of an individual, 2 3/4 oz.

Female. Plate CCCXLIV. Fig. 2.


The female is considerably larger, but otherwise resembles the male.
Dimensions of five individuals.

Length to end of tail, 10 1/2 11 9 1/4 10 3/


4 8 1/
2
................................wings, 11 10 3/4 11 3/4 11 1/
2 10 1/
8
................................claws, 13 1/4 12 1/2 11 1/2 12 3/
4 11 3/
4
Extent of wings, 18 16 1/2 16 7/8 16 1/
2 17 3/
4
Weight of two individuals, 4 oz., 3 3/4 oz.

The winter plumage differs considerably; the bill, iris, and feet, are as
above. The upper parts are brownish-grey, the head narrowly
streaked with dusky; the rump as in summer; the scapulars plainly
margined with whitish; the quills as in summer. The band over the
eye lighter, the loral space grey; the fore part and sides of the neck
greyish-white, longitudinally streaked with grey, the sides similar, and
with the lower tail-coverts barred with grey, the rest of the lower parts
white.
Length to end of tail in a male 9 inches; extent of wings 16 1/2; wing
from flexure 5 1/4; tail 2 4/12; bill along the ridge 1 6/12, along the edge
of lower mandible 1 7/12; bare part of tibia 1; tarsus 1 7/12; hind toe
1/ 1/ 1/
and claw 4 /12; middle toe 9
2 /12, its claw 2
12 /12.
2

The roof of the mouth is flat, with three rows of papillæ. The tongue
is 1 inch 5 twelfths long, emarginate and papillate at the base, very
slender, concave above, tapering to a point. The œsophagus is 4
inches long, very narrow, its diameter 2 twelfths. The proventriculus
is oblong, 7 twelfths in length, 3 1/2 twelfths in diameter. The stomach
is a strong gizzard of a roundish form, compressed, 8 twelfths long,
7 1/12 twelfths broad; its lateral muscles large, its epithelium very
dense, thick, longitudinally rugous, and of a reddish-brown colour.
The intestine is 12 1/2 inches long, its anterior part 2 3/4 twelfths in
diameter, the hind part 1 1/2 twelfth. The rectum is 1 1/2 inch long; the
cœca 11 twelfths long, 1 twelfth in diameter, obtuse.
The trachea is 3 inches long, slender, its diameter at the upper part
1 3/4 twelfths, gradually diminishing to the lower part, where it is 1
twelfth. The rings, about 110 in number, are slender and unossified,
the two last divided. The bronchi have about 15 half rings. The
contractor muscles are thin, the sterno-tracheal slender; and there is
a pair of inferior laryngeal muscles going to the first bronchial rings.
In another individual, the intestine was 13 1/4 inches long, the rectum
1 1/2 inch, the cœca 1 inch.
The contents of the gizzard in both were fragments of shells, small
black seeds, and much sand and gravel.
AMERICAN WIDGEON.

Anas Americana, Gmel.


PLATE CCCXLV. Male and Female.

This lively and very handsome Duck is abundant during winter at


New Orleans, where it is much esteemed on account of the juiciness
of its flesh, and is best known by the name of Zinzin. In the Western
Country, and in most parts of the Eastern and Middle States, it is
called the Bald Pate. Early in September it enters the United States
by their northern extremities, as well as from the Texas; and in both
these regions it is now well known to breed in nearly equal numbers.
Those which retreat south-westward remain along the coast and in
the interior of the Floridas, as well as all that portion of the Gulf of
Mexico extending to the mouths of the Mississippi, where they
remain until the latter part of April, sometimes even until the middle
of May, as they have but a comparatively short journey to perform in
order to arrive in Mexico in time to breed. On the coast of the Atlantic
they keep in the marshes in company with various species of the
same family, being in a manner indifferent as to their associates.
During early spring, in Louisiana, they are often seen alighted on
extensive plains that have very little water on them.
While advancing along the shores of the Bay of Mexico, in April
1837, I and my party observed this species in considerable numbers;
and during the whole of our stay in the Texas, we daily saw and very
frequently procured Widgeons. There they were found in ponds of
brackish water, as well as in the fresh-water streams. Before we left
that country they were all paired, and I was informed by the
Honourable M. Fisher, Secretary to the Texian Navy, that a good
number of them breed in the maritime districts, along with several
other Ducks, and that he annually received many of the young birds.
Their manners at this time fully proved the correctness of the
statements of all those who spoke to me on this subject. Indeed my
opinion is that some of these birds also propagate in certain portions
of the most southern districts of the Floridas, and in the Island of
Cuba, as I have seen Widgeons in the peninsula in single pairs, in
the beginning of May.
Their retrograde movements in spring, like those of other species,
depend much upon the temperature or the advance of the season;
and those which proceed northward set out on their journey much
earlier than those which move in the opposite direction, the former
departing from the middle of March to the 20th of April. Their first
appearance on the waters of the Ohio takes place late in September
or early in October, when they at once throw themselves into the
ponds of the interior, and there remain until the waters are closed by
ice, scarcely any betaking themselves to the rivers, unless to repose
on the sand-bars. They are there, however, less abundant than
nearer the sea-coast, and usually associate with Pintails and Teals,
but rarely with Mallards or Dusky Ducks. Whilst in those retired
ponds of the forest, from one to another of which they roam in quest
of food, they are less noisy than most other species, even than the
Pintails, and in this respect resemble the Blue-winged Teals, whose
notes are feeble and delicate. Those of the Widgeon are a soft
whistle somewhat similar to the word Sweet, enunciated as if
produced by a flute or a hautboy, and in my judgment not at all like
the hew hew spoken off by Wilson. They are less shy in those
retired places than most species, or are to appearance less aware of
the danger of allowing the sportsman to approach them.
In feeding they immerse their neck and the anterior part of the body,
generally swimming closer together than other Ducks, in
consequence of which habits they are easily neared and often shot
in great numbers at a single discharge. During their stay in those
districts they feed on the roots and seeds of grasses, water-insects,
beech-nuts, small fry, and leeches, and are not so delicate as an
article of food as those procured in the rice-fields of South Carolina,
or in the plantations of Louisiana and Florida. On their return in
spring (for in mild winters they remain all the season in Kentucky),
they generally continue until the end of April, and usually pair before
they depart; which induces me to believe that numbers of them
breed within the northern limits of the United States, although I have
not heard of any having actually been seen doing so.
On the lakes near New Orleans, as well as on the Chesapeake, they
are not unfrequently found in company with the Canvass-back
Ducks. Wilson mentions their being partially supplied with food by
the industry of the latter; but they manage very well in most parts
without such assistance. When in full security, the Bald-pates feed at
all hours of the day; but in thickly inhabited parts of the country, they
usually seek for food at night or early in the morning.
The flight of this species is rather swift, well sustained, and
accompanied by the whistling sound of the wings usual in birds of
this family. They move in flocks of moderate size, and without much
care as to the disposition of their ranks, being sometimes extended
into a front line, sometimes in single file, frequently mingled
confusedly, and flying at a moderate height, whether over the land or
over the water. When they are first started, they fly almost
perpendicularly, in a hurried and rather irregular manner. They walk
prettily and with ease. After heavy falls of rain in our Southern
States, they often alight in the corn fields, in company with other
Ducks, where the ploughed earth, being quite moist and soft, yields
them an abundant supply of worms and insects, as well as grains of
corn, pease, and other equally nutritious substances.
Dr Richardson informs us that this species breeds in the woody
districts of the Fur Countries, up to their most northern limits, in
latitude 80°; and Dr Townsend states that it is abundant on the
Columbia River; but he has not furnished me with any account of its
breeding, and I have not had an opportunity of observing it during
the season of propagation, as I left the Texas without having found a
nest or young.

Anas Americana, Gmel. Syst. Nat. vol. i. p. 526.—Lath. Ind. Ornith. vol. ii. p.
861.—Ch. Bonaparte, Synopsis of Birds of United States, p. 384.
American Widgeon, Anas Americana, Wils. Amer. Ornith. vol. viii. p. 86, pl.
69, fig 4.
Mareca Americana, Stephens, American Widgeon, Richards. and Swains.
Fauna Boreali-Americana, vol. ii. p. 445.
American Widgeon, Nuttall, Manual, vol. ii. p. 389.

Adult Male. Plate CCCXLV. Fig. 1.


Bill nearly as long as the head, deeper than broad at the base,
depressed towards the end, the sides nearly parallel, the tip
rounded. Upper mandible with the frontal angles short and obtuse,
the dorsal line at first sloping, then concave, at the end decurved, the
ridge broad and flat at the base, then broadly convex, the edges soft,
with about fifty-five internal lamellæ, the unguis obovate, curved
abruptly at the end. Nostrils sub-basal, lateral, near the ridge,
oblong, pervious. Lower mandible flattened, its angle very long and
rather narrow, the dorsal line very short, slightly convex, the edges
soft, with about seventy lamellæ.
Head of moderate size, oblong, compressed. Neck rather long,
slender. Body elongated and slightly depressed. Feet very short;
tibia bare for about a quarter of an inch; tarsus very short,
compressed, anteriorly with two series of scutella, the outer shorter,
the rest covered with reticulated angular scales; toes obliquely
scutellate above; first very small, free, with a narrow membrane
beneath; third longest, fourth considerably shorter, second shorter
than fourth; their connecting webs entire, on the edge crenate; the
second or inner toe with a membranous margin. Claws small, slightly
arched, compressed, rather acute; the hind one very small and more
curved, that of the middle toe curved outwards, and having the inner
edge dilated.
Plumage dense, soft, blended. Feathers of the head and upper neck
oblong, small, those along the crown and occiput longer; of the lower
parts ovate, glossy, with the extremities of the filaments stiffish.
Wings rather long, little curved, narrow, pointed; the first quill longest,
the next scarcely shorter, the rest rapidly graduated; secondaries
very short, broad, obliquely rounded; the inner elongated and
tapering; the tips of the filaments of the outer web of the first primary
are separated and curved a little outwards. Tail short, rounded and
pointed, of sixteen feathers, of which the middle pair are more
pointed and project considerably.
Bill light greyish-blue, with the extremity including the unguis, and a
portion of the margins, black. Iris hazel. Feet light bluish-grey, the
webs darker, the claws dusky. The upper part of the head is white,
more or less mottled with dusky on its sides; the loral space and
cheeks reddish-white, dotted with greenish-black; a broad band from
the eye to behind the occiput deep green. The lower part of the hind
neck, the scapulars, and the fore part of the back, are minutely
transversely undulated with brownish-black and light brownish-red;
the hind part similarly undulated with blackish-brown and greyish-
white. The smaller wing-coverts are brownish-grey; the primary quills
and coverts dark greyish-brown; the secondary coverts white, tipped
with black. The speculum is duck-green anteriorly, bounded by the
black tips of the secondary coverts, black behind, internally black
with white streaks, the inner elongated secondaries having their
outer webs black, margined with white, their inner webs brownish-
grey. The tail-feathers are light brownish-grey. The throat is
brownish-black; the lower part of the neck in front, and the fore part
of the breast, light brownish-red; the breast, belly, and sides of the
rump, white; the sides of the body finely undulated with white and
dusky; the rump beneath and the lower tail-coverts black.
Length to end of tail 20 1/2 inches, to end of claws 21; extent of
1/2
wings 34 1/2; bill to frontal processes 1 7 /12, along the edge of
lower mandible 1 7/12; wing from flexure 11; tail 4 1/2; tarsus 1 7/12;
1/2 1/2
hind toe 4/12, its claw 2 /12, middle toe 1 8/12, its claw 4 /12. Weight
1 lb. 14 oz.
Adult Female. Plate CCCXLV. Fig. 2.
The female is considerably smaller. The bill, feet, and iris are
coloured as in the male. The head and upper part of the neck all
round, are white or reddish-white, longitudinally streaked with
brownish-black, the top of the head transversely barred; the lower
part of the neck in front and behind, the fore part of the back, and the
scapulars, are blackish-brown, the feathers broadly margined with
brownish-red, and barred with the same, the bars on the back
narrow; the hind part of the back dusky; the upper tail-coverts barred
with white. The wings are greyish-brown; the secondary coverts
tipped with white; the secondary quills are brownish-black, the inner
greyish-brown, all margined with white. The tail-feathers are greyish-
brown, margined with white. All the lower parts are white, excepting
the feathers of the sides, and under the tail, which are broadly barred
with dusky and light reddish-brown.
Length to end of tail 18 inches, to end of claws 19 1/2; extent of
wings 30; bill along the ridge 1 6/12; wing from flexure 9 3/12; tail
3 9/12; tarsus 1 6/12; middle toe 1 9/12, its claw 3/12. Weight 1 lb. 5 oz.

A very great diversity of colouring exists in this species, which,


however, is not yet properly understood. Although males are often
found as described above, and as represented in the plate, others
have a very different appearance. Thus, an individual shot at the
mouth of the Mississippi, in the beginning of April 1837, has the head
and neck brownish-orange, the feathers all minutely tipped with dark
green, the lower fore neck lilac; all the upper parts finely undulated
with white and dusky, as are the sides; the wing-coverts light
brownish-grey; the other parts as described above, but the upper
tail-coverts black at the end. In some individuals the top of the head
is reddish-white, in others light red, in others pure white; in some,
most of the smaller wing-coverts are white, in others grey or
brownish-grey; in some the throat is whitish, in others black. These
differences, no doubt, depend upon age and season.
The American Widgeon has been considered distinct from the
European; not on account of any difference in size or form, or texture
of plumage, but because it has in certain stages a green band on the
side of the head, which the European bird is said not to have. The
mirror is the same in both; the wing-coverts are white or grey in both;
the crown is white, or cream-coloured, or orange-brown, in both; but
in the European the head and neck are described as reddish-
chestnut, and in the American as yellowish-white. Now, in fact,
American birds sometimes have the head and neck red, and
European Birds sometimes have the green streak on the side of the
head. In short, on comparing specimens from America, with others
from India and Norway, I cannot perceive any essential difference. At
the same time, not having traced our Widgeon through all its
gradations, and being equally unacquainted with all those of the
European and Asiatic Widgeon, I cannot positively affirm that Anas
Americana is identical with Anas Penelope.
A male preserved in spirits presents the following characters.

The roof of the mouth is deeply concave, with a median prominent


line, and numerous irregular small tubercles on the sides, with
several larger ones at the fore part. Two large branches of the supra-
maxillary nerve run in this ridge, as in other ducks. The tongue is 1
inch 5 twelfths long, with numerous straight, pointed papillæ at the
base, a median longitudinal groove, and a thin broadly rounded
point. The œsophagus, a b c d, is 10 inches long, narrow, dilating a
little on the lower part of the neck, where its diameter is 1/2 inch. The
proventriculus, b c, is 8 twelfths broad; its glands oblong, 2 twelfths
in length, and occupying a belt 1 inch 4 twelfths in breadth. The
gizzard, e f g, is extremely large, of a nearly regular elliptical form,
placed obliquely, its length 1 inch 8 twelfths, its breadth 2 1/2 inches;
its lateral muscles extremely large, the left, e, 1 inch 2 twelfths in
thickness, the other, f, 1 inch and 1 twelfth; the inferior muscle, g,
only 1 twelfth. In the œsophagus are contained slender leaves of
grasses; in the gizzard some of these leaves and other vegetable
matters, small seeds, and a great quantity of sand. The cuticular
lining or epithelium is dense, slightly rugous, much thickened on the
spaces opposite the middle of the lateral muscles. The duodenum, g
h i, is 5 1/2 inches in its first curve, g h, and is then reflected for 7
inches, passes backwards under the kidneys and forms several
convolutions. The intestine, g h i j k l, is 6 feet 2 inches long, 1/2 inch
in diameter in its duodenal portion, gradually contracts to 4 twelfths
at the distance of 18 inches from the pylorus, again enlarges to 5
twelfths, and near the rectum to 7 twelfths. The rectum is 4 1/2 inches
long; the cœca 9 inches, their diameter for nearly 2 inches being 2
twelfths, after which they are enlarged, their greatest diameter being
4 twelfths. The liver is large, the right lobe being 3 1/2 inches long,
the left 2 1/2.

The trachea, m, is 7 1/2 inches long, of moderate diameter, the rings


roundish and ossified, about 140 in number, its breadth at the top
4 1/2 twelfths, gradually diminishing to 3 twelfths. At the lower part
several of the rings are united so as to form an irregular dilatation,
bulging out into a rounded sac, n, on the left side, its greatest
diameter being 10 twelfths. The bronchi are of moderate length,
wide, with about 25 half rings. The contractor muscles are rather
strong; and besides the sterno-tracheals, o, p, there is a pair of
cleido-tracheals.
In a female, the gizzard is 2 inches in its greatest diameter; the
intestine is 5 feet 2 inches long. The contents of the œsophagus and
stomach as in the male.

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