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Ignorance is a neglected issue in philosophy. This is surprising for,
Rik Peels
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Martijn Blaauw
Delft University of Technology
University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107175600
© Rik Peels and Martijn Blaauw 2016
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2016
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Peels, Rik, 1983– editor.
The epistemic dimensions of ignorance / [edited by] Rik Peels, Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam, Martijn Blaauw, Delft University of Technology.
New York : Cambridge University Press, 2016.
LCCN 2016025916 | ISBN 9781107175600
LCSH: Ignorance (Theory of knowledge) | Knowledge, Theory of.
LCC BD221 .E65 2016 | DDC 121–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016025916
ISBN 978-1-107-17560-0 Hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of
URLs for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication
and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.
Not ignorance, but ignorance of ignorance is
the death of knowledge.
attributed to Alfred North Whitehead
Contents
Introduction
rik peels and martijn blaauw page 1
1 The Nature of Ignorance: Two Views
pierre le morvan and rik peels 12
2 The Varieties of Ignorance
nikolaj nottelmann 33
3 Ignorance and Incompetence: Linguistic Considerations
berit brogaard 57
4 Explicating Ignorance and Doubt: A Possible Worlds
Approach
erik j. olsson and carlo proietti 81
5 Ignorance and Epistemic Contextualism
michael blome-tillmann 96
6 Anti-Intellectualism and Ignorance
jessica brown 114
7 Ignorance and Epistemic Value
duncan pritchard 132
8 Ignorance and the Religious Life
justin mcbrayer 144
9 Epistemic Injustice and the Preservation of Ignorance
miranda fricker 160
10 Ignorance and Racial Insensitivity
jose medina 178
References 202
Index 215
vii
Introduction
1
See Steup (2005). 2 See, for instance, Audi (2011); Moser (2005).
3
See, for instance, Unger (1975).
4
See Guerrero (2007, pp. 63–64); Houlgate (1968, pp. 112–113); Rivera-López (2006,
p. 135); Zimmerman (1997, p. 424).
1
2 Rik Peels and Martijn Blaauw
5
E.g., Harman (2011).
6
Driver (1989, pp. 373–376); Fields (1994, p. 403); Flanagan (1990, p. 422); Houlgate
(1968, p. 109); Unger (1975, p. 93); Zimmerman (1988, p. 75; 2008, ix).
7
Goldman (1986, p. 26); Goldman and Olsson (2009, pp. 19–21); Guerrero (2007,
pp. 62–63); Rivera-López (2006, p. 135); Van Woudenberg (2009, p. 375).
8
In a short exchange with Pierre Le Morvan, we have tried to put on the agenda the issue of
what the nature of ignorance is. See Le Morvan (2011, 2012, 2013); Peels (2010, 2011a,
2012).
9
For an answer to this question, see Haas and Vogt (2015, pp. 18–19).
Introduction 3
10
It is widely acknowledged that ignorance can be rational. For an overview, see Somin
(2015).
4 Rik Peels and Martijn Blaauw
can be helpful for debates in these other fields. In this section, we will give
four examples to illustrate this claim.
First, in A Theory of Justice, John Rawls provides a social contract
account of justice in which the concept of ignorance plays a crucial
role.11 The core idea is that in our reasoning about the fundamental
principles of justice, we should imagine ourselves to be free and equal
persons who should jointly come to agree upon and commit themselves to
certain core principles of justice. In order to guarantee that everyone’s
reasoning is maximally impartial, everyone is supposed to be ignorant of
their personal social and historical circumstances. They do know certain
general facts, such as interests people generally have and facts about
psychology, biology, physics, and so on. But, due to their so-called veil
of ignorance, they do not know what their personal circumstances will be.
According to Rawls, imagining ourselves to be in such a situation helps us
establish the principles of justice that we all ought to embrace. A thorough
analysis of the epistemic dimensions of ignorance can help us to get
a firmer grip on exactly what kind of ignorance the veil of ignorance
requires. If ignorance is lack of knowledge, for instance, then
Gettierized true belief will count as ignorance but, it seems, this is not
the kind of ignorance that Rawls has in mind. So, what kind of ignorance
is it? And is a certain degree of ignorance required here?
Second, it is widely acknowledged in the philosophical literature that
ignorance sometimes counts as a moral excuse.12 Ethicists have paid sig-
nificant attention to whether blameworthy ignorance can also excuse or
whether only blameless ignorance excuses,13 and whether one is excused
only if one acts from ignorance or also if one acts in ignorance.14 These are
important questions, but there are further questions to be asked about
ignorance as a moral excuse that have to do with the epistemic dimensions
of ignorance.15 Imagine, for instance, that I falsely believe that the choco-
late cake in front of me contains no poison whatsoever and that I am
blameless for holding that belief. It seems that in that case, my ignorance
that the chocolate cake is poisoned excuses me for giving it to my friend.
11
See Rawls (1971).
12
See, for instance, Brandt (1969, p. 349); Fischer and Ravizza (1998, pp. 12–13);
Goldman (1970, p. 208); Rosen (2003, pp. 61–62); Smith (1983, pp. 543–571);
Zimmerman (2008, pp. 169–205).
13
According to some philosophers, blameworthy ignorance provides a full excuse (e.g., Ross
1939, pp. 163–164). Others argue that it provides only a partial excuse (e.g., Beardsley
1979, p. 578). And still others claim that it provides no excuse at all (e.g., Kornblith 1983,
pp. 35–36). Smith (1983, pp. 548–551), distinguishes between these three views.
14
The former is claimed or suggested by, for instance, Donagan (1977, pp. 128–130) and
Zimmerman (1997, p. 424). The latter view is advocated by, among others, Houlgate
(1968) and Rosen (2008, 598n).
15
For an exploration of two of these questions, see Peels (2014).
Introduction 5
16
For an exposition of the relation between the apophatic tradition and ignorance, see
Franke (2015).
17
See, for instance, Jacobs (2015). 18 See, for instance, Blaauw (2013).
6 Rik Peels and Martijn Blaauw
3 Outline
Finally, let us introduce the essays in this volume. The first four essays
map a terrain that has not received much attention in the philosophical
literature, namely the nature of ignorance, the varieties of ignorance,
degrees of ignorance, and the relation between ignorance and the closely
related propositional attitude of doubt.
The opening essay by Pierre Le Morvan and Rik Peels explores the
nature of ignorance, that is, it explores what it is to be ignorant. More
specifically, it discusses two rival accounts of what are individually neces-
sary and jointly sufficient conditions for being ignorant. These two
accounts can be found in the literature and have recently received further
articulation and defence. On the first view, called the Standard View,
ignorance is the lack or absence of knowledge, whereas on the second
view, called the New View, ignorance is the lack or absence of true belief.
Rather than defending a particular account of ignorance, the essay spells
out each of these two views in more detail and provides an overview of the
main arguments for each of them. The reader will notice that the
19
See Firestein (2012). 20 For further examples, see Gross and McGoey (2015).
21
For a recent introduction to agnotology, see Proctor and Schiebinger (2008).
22
See Peels (2016).
Introduction 7
attention from epistemologists, let alone the relation between the two.
They start out by identifying what they consider to be the main concep-
tual ingredients of these two propositional attitudes. They then propose
a semiformal account within the possible worlds framework of epistemic
and doxastic logic. The upshot is that while ignorance can be construed as
the absence of knowledge of any of the alternatives under scrutiny, doubt
is a very special kind of ignorance. They develop two specific proposals for
how to capture special features of doubt in their framework. One centres
on the notion that doubt, as opposed to ignorance, requires maximum
plausibility of opposing alternatives. The other is based on the assump-
tion that, for an agent to doubt a proposition, she must entertain the
question whether that proposition is true on her research agenda.
The next three essays discuss ignorance in relation to contemporary
debates in epistemology: ignorance and contextualism, ignorance and
arguments against anti-intellectualism, and the epistemic value that
ignorance could have.
Michael Blome-Tillmann defends contextualism against the sceptic’s
claim that our ignorance about the external world is universal and ubiqui-
tous. Prima facie convincing arguments have been produced in support of
scepticism and a lively philosophical debate has emerged ever since
Descartes introduced such an argument in his Meditations. In this chapter,
Blome-Tillmann considers one such argument for our ignorance about the
external world and outlines how Epistemic Contextualism—a contemporary
view about the semantics of ‘knowledge’-attributions—aims to resolve the
threat posed by the argument. After discussing the contextualist’s take on
our alleged ignorance about the external world, he considers contemporary
objections to contextualism that have proven influential in the recent
literature. Along the way the paper discusses the issue of whether ascrip-
tions of ‘ignorance’ are context-sensitive and develops a problem for
absence-of-true-belief accounts of ignorance that have been popular in
the recent literature.
On anti-intellectualism, whether a subject knows that p depends not
only on traditional truth-conducive factors, but also on the stakes for her.
Now, two of our most important sources of knowledge are testimony and
memory. Thus, it would be problematic for any view of knowledge if it
were in tension with the idea that these sources yield knowledge. For, it
would leave us much more ignorant than we ordinarily take ourselves to
be. In her chapter, Jessica Brown defends anti-intellectualism against the
claim that it interrupts the transmission of knowledge by memory and
testimony, and makes a demand of stakes-sensitivity on our practices that
we do not meet. She argues that, when properly formulated, anti-
intellectualism is not incompatible with plausible principles concerning
Introduction 9
23
See, for instance, De Ridder (2013); Mathiesen (2006).
10 Rik Peels and Martijn Blaauw
24
We thank Irma Verlaan for her astute assistance in editing the final version of this book.
A heartfelt thank you to our executive editor, Hilary Gaskin, our production editor,
Rosemary Crawley, and our copy editor, Brian Black, for their hard work to make the
publication of this volume possible. For helpful advice on the cover image, we would like
to thank Maarten Buijs, Naomi Kloosterboer, Jojanneke van der Veen, and Irma Verlaan.
Publication of this book was made possible through the support of a grant from
Templeton World Charity Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Templeton World Charity
Foundation.
1 The Nature of Ignorance: Two Views
Introduction
Our purpose in this chapter is to explore the nature of ignorance.
When we ask about its nature, we ask what it is to be ignorant.
We address this question by considering two rival accounts that can
be found in the literature, each of which specifies a distinct set of
conditions taken to be individually necessary and jointly sufficient for
ignorance.
The two rival accounts have recently been developed in more detail
and defended on the basis of various arguments. In this chapter, we
spell out these two different views and provide an overview of the main
arguments for them. On the first view, called the Standard View,
ignorance is lack or absence of knowledge, whereas on the second
view, called the New View, ignorance is lack or absence of true belief.
Among the adherents of the Standard View are Lloyd Fields, Susan
Haack, Pierre Le Morvan, and Michael Zimmerman.1 The New View
is embraced, among others, by Alvin Goldman, Alexander Guerrero,
Rik Peels, and René van Woudenberg.2
The chapter is structured as follows. First, we make a few preliminary
comments by distinguishing various kinds of knowledge and explicating
in more detail what the difference between the Standard and New Views
amounts to (§ 2). Then, we provide a case for the Standard View (§ 3).
We spell out three arguments that one might provide in favor of this
conception: an argument from common usage (§ 3.1), an argument
from unifying theorizing about knowledge and ignorance (§ 3.2), and an
argument from ignorance of falsehoods (§ 3.3). Next, we provide a case
for the New View (§ 4) by laying out three arguments in favor of it: an
1
See Fields (1994, p. 403), Haack (2001, p. 25), Le Morvan (2011, 2012, 2013);
Zimmerman (1988, p. 75; 2008, ix).
2
See Goldman (1986, p. 26), Goldman and Olsson (2009, pp. 19–21), Guerrero (2007,
pp. 62–63), Peels (2010, 2011a, 2012, 2014), Van Woudenberg (2009, p. 375).
12
The Nature of Ignorance: Two Views 13
argument from intuitions about cases of true belief that fall short of
knowledge (§ 4.1), an argument from ignorance as an excuse (§ 4.2),
and an argument from ignorance by acquaintance and procedural ignor-
ance (§ 4.3). The purpose of Sections 3 and 4 is not to convince the reader
of a particular view on ignorance, but merely to present arguments that
adherents of these two views might advance in favor of them. We leave it
up to the reader to decide which of the two views she or he finds more
convincing. We conclude with a couple of retrospective and prospective
remarks (§ 5).
2 Ignorance: Preliminaries
In this section we make two preliminary comments that will play an
important role in the two following sections.
First, since on the Standard View, ignorance is the lack or absence
of knowledge, it is important to note that it is widely thought that
there are three different kinds of knowledge.3 First, there is what is
often called factual or factive knowledge, that is, knowledge that some
specific proposition is true. Knowing that one’s wife is at her office,
that Abuja is the capital of Nigeria, and that 83 is a prime number
belong to this class of knowledge. Second, there is objectual knowl-
edge: knowing a certain object, where that object can but need not be
a person. One can know one’s friend, the taste of pineapples, one can
know cities such as Berlin, and one can know what it is to be fired or
to be in love. Third, there is procedural knowledge: knowledge of how
to do something, how to perform some task.4 Here are a few exam-
ples: knowing how to ride a bicycle, knowing how to open a wine
bottle, knowing how the play the oboe, and knowing how to forgive
someone who wronged one. We return to this threefold distinction
below.5
3
Many epistemologists have accepted the distinction between these three kinds of knowl-
edge. There are a few exceptions, though. Some philosophers contend that both objectual
and procedural knowledge are reducible to factual knowledge, or that they are a subspecies
of factual knowledge. For some tentative arguments in favor of this thesis, see Snowdon
(2004) and for an elaborate, mainly linguistic defense of it, see Stanley and Williamson
(2001). We find this view unconvincing, but cannot elaborate on this issue here; for a good
linguistic note on Stanley’s and Williamson’s article, see Rumfitt (2003).
4
We prefer to talk about procedural knowledge rather than knowledge-how, for, as Paul
Snowdon has convincingly argued, there are instances of knowledge-how that are not
instances of procedural knowledge. See Snowdon (2004, p. 7).
5
For an overview of these kinds of knowledge by one of those epistemologists, see Lehrer
(2000, p. 5). For an influential account of the distinction between factive and procedural
knowledge, see Ryle (1945, pp. 4–16; 1973, pp. 28–32, 40–41).
14 Pierre Le Morvan and Rik Peels
6
As we later see, an intuition motivating the New View is that one can only be ignorant that
p if p is true; accordingly, one cannot be ignorant that Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo
in 1799, because Napoleon lost that battle in 1815 rather than in 1799.
The Nature of Ignorance: Two Views 15
14
Augustine (2009, p. 43).
18 Pierre Le Morvan and Rik Peels
though capable of believing it, (c) one believes its contradictory without
inconsistency, or (d) one fails to believe it because it has never occurred to
one to believe it.
Ad (ii): alethic ignorance occurs when a proposition is not true. Take the
following false proposition:
(2) Platypuses are native to Tanzania.
Since (2) is false, no one can know that (2) is true. Since, on the Standard
View, ignorance is the complement of knowledge, it follows that everyone
is alethically ignorant that (2) is true. As we shall see below, adherents of
the New View reject the possibility of alethic ignorance insofar as they
maintain that one can be ignorant that p only if p is true.
Ad (iii): justificational ignorance occurs when a proposition is believed
without justification. Suppose for instance that Alex believes (1) without
justification, that is, without any reason or ground. Lacking justification
for believing (1), Alex’s belief does not satisfy a necessary condition for
knowing that (1) is true, and thus satisfies a sufficient condition for
justificatory ignorance that Alex is ignorant that platypuses are
monotremes.18
Ad (iv): Gettier-type ignorance occurs when a proposition is true
and believed with justification, but is subject to Gettier-type
counterexamples.19 Imagine for example that Sam sees w, w is a genuine
Cartier watch, and Sam believes it to be a genuine Cartier watch because it
looks to him to be so. Suppose then that Sam’s belief is true and justified.
Suppose as well, however, that w is ensconced in a display of a hundred
counterfeit Cartier watches, and Sam is not able to distinguish w from the
counterfeits, and w is only in the display by accident. Many are inclined to
conclude that Sam does not know that w is a genuine Cartier watch even if
he has a justified true belief that it is. If this conclusion is correct and on the
Standard View’s supposition that failure to meet a necessary condition for
knowledge that p is a sufficient condition for ignorance that p, it follows
that Sam is in a state of Gettier-type ignorance.
18
Interestingly, different accounts of the nature of justification have a bearing on how to
conceive of the nature of justificatory ignorance. For instance, Foundationalism results in
a different account of justification than does Coherentism, and Externalism results in
a different account than Internalism. Thus, various accounts of Foundationalism,
Coherentism, Externalism, and Internalism will yield varying accounts of justificatory
ignorance. Space constraints preclude discussing here the various ways in which such
accounts can be developed.
19
Here, we understand Gettier-type counterexamples in a broader sense than the original
Gettier examples that involved inferences from false beliefs to justified true beliefs.
A Gettier-type counterexample in this broad sense is any counterexample to knowledge
understood as true justified belief.
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fonctionnaires, il n’y a pas eu de règlement depuis 1875. Les terres
laissées en friche pendant une saison paient le même impôt que les
terres cultivées, à moins que leur improductivité ne vienne de
l’inondation ou autre fléau (lisez ici : tremblements de terre). L’impôt
gouvernemental est calculé d’après la valeur nominale de la terre,
prenant comme unité une mesure d’environ 11.000 pieds carrés, soit
un quart d’arpent.
Or, un des moyens de connaître la valeur nominale de la terre est
de savoir ce que les chemins de fer l’ont payée. Le terrain le plus
favorable à la culture du riz, en comptant le dollar japonais à 3
shillings, est d’environ 65 livres et 10 shillings par arpent. Les terres
non irriguées, pour la culture des légumes, dépassent parfois 9 livres
12 shillings et les forêts 2 livres 11 shillings. Étant donné que ces
prix sont les taux payés par les chemins de fer, ils peuvent
s’appliquer à de vastes superficies bien que, dans les ventes
privées, ces prix peuvent raisonnablement atteindre un chiffre plus
élevé.
On doit se rappeler que certains des meilleurs terrains donnent
deux récoltes de riz par année, que la plupart des terres portent
deux récoltes, la première étant du millet, du colza, des légumes,
etc., semée dans du sol sec et récoltée à la fin de mai. Puis on
prépare immédiatement la terre pour la récolte exigeant de l’humidité
et qui sera moissonnée en octobre environ. L’impôt foncier est
payable en deux versements : pour les rizières, entre le 1er
novembre et le 15 décembre, et entre le 1er janvier et le dernier jour
de février ; pour les autres terres, entre juillet et août, et entre
septembre et décembre. Voyons donc quelle est la moyenne du
rapport. Le monsieur au chapeau de soleil et portant ceinture autour
des reins pousserait des cris d’effroi en voyant ces chiffres qui sont
cependant approximativement exacts. Le riz subit de grandes
fluctuations, mais on peut l’évaluer en gros à 5 dollars japonais le
koku de 330 livres. Le froment et le maïs de la récolte printanière
valent environ 11 shillings le koku. La première récolte rend presque
1 koku 3/4 par « tan » (quart d’arpent, l’unité de mesure précitée) ou
18 shillings par quart d’arpent, soit 3 livres 12 shillings par arpent. La
récolte de riz donne 2 koku soit 1 livre 10 shillings par quart d’arpent,
ou 6 livres par arpent. Total 9 livres 12 shillings. Ce résultat n’est pas
à dédaigner si l’on réfléchit que la terre en question n’est pas la
meilleure de toutes, mais de qualité no 1, ordinaire, à 25 livres 16
shillings l’arpent, valeur nominale.
Le fils a le droit d’hériter des biens fonciers de son père avec la
même imposition, tant que dure le terme ou, si le terme est expiré, il
a un droit de priorité sur tout acquéreur. Une partie de ces recettes
reste, dit-on, au bureau de la préfecture de l’endroit comme fonds de
réserves contre les inondations. Cependant, et c’est là ce qui paraît
assez confus, il existe cinq ou sept autres impôts locaux, provinciaux
et municipaux, qui en tout bien et en tout honneur pourraient être
employés aux mêmes usages. Aucun ne dépasse la moitié de
l’impôt foncier, sauf celui de la préfecture, qui est de 2,5 %.
Autrefois, les habitants étaient imposés, ou disons plutôt
pressurés, de façon à payer la moitié environ du rendement de leurs
terres. Il peut se trouver des gens pour dire que le système actuel
n’est pas aussi avantageux qu’il en a l’air. En effet jadis les fermiers
payaient de lourds impôts, mais seulement sur leurs biens
nominaux. Ils pouvaient donc, et cela arrivait souvent, posséder plus
de terres que ne l’indiquait leur imposition ; tandis qu’aujourd’hui une
bureaucratie sévère surveille chaque pouce de leurs fermes, et les
oblige à payer. On entend encore formuler des plaintes analogues
par la modeste classe campagnarde des Indes, car s’il est une
chose que l’Oriental déteste par-dessus tout, c’est ce vice maudit
des Occidentaux : l’exactitude, manie qui pousse à agir suivant des
règles. Cependant, en regardant ces champs en terrasses, où l’eau
est amenée si adroitement de niveau en niveau, on songe que le
cultivateur japonais doit éprouver au moins une émotion. Si les
villages au-dessus de la vallée s’amusent à gaspiller l’eau, ceux qui
sont en bas ne manquent certainement pas de protester
énergiquement, d’où discussions, protestations, bagarres, etc. Le
romantisme n’a donc pas disparu à tout jamais de la terre…
Ce qui suit se passa sur la côte à vingt milles de Yokohama, au
delà des champs, à Kamakura, c’est-à-dire là où se trouve la statue
en bronze du grand Bouddha, assis face à la mer, pour entendre
passer les siècles. On l’a décrit maintes et maintes fois : son air
majestueux et détaché, de chacune de ses dimensions, le petit
sanctuaire qu’il renferme, tout rempli de vapeurs d’encens, non
moins que la colline huppée qui sert d’arrière-plan à son trône. Pour
cette raison il reste, comme il est resté depuis toujours, sans qu’on
puisse jamais espérer arriver à le dépeindre : dieu visible en quelque
sorte, assis dans le jardin d’un monde nouvellement créé. On vend
des photographies, qui le représentent avec des touristes juchés sur
l’ongle de son pouce, et apparemment n’importe quelle brute de
n’importe quel sexe a le droit de griffonner son ignoble nom à
l’intérieur des plaques de bronze massif qui le composent. Mais
songez un instant à l’outrage et à l’insulte ! Représentez-vous les
anciens jardins bien ordonnés avec leurs arbres élagués, leurs
gazons tondus, leurs étangs silencieux fumant dans la brume que le
soleil torride absorbe après la pluie, et l’image en bronze vert du
Prédicateur de la Loi vacillant, croirait-on, au milieu des nuées
d’encens. La terre tout entière ne forme qu’un seul encensoir, tandis
que des myriades de grenouilles font résonner l’air vaporeux. On a
trop chaud pour faire autre chose que de rester assis sur une pierre
et contempler ces yeux qui, ayant tout vu ne voient plus, ces yeux
baissés, cette tête penchée en avant et la simplicité colossale des
plis géants de la robe recouvrant les bras et les genoux. C’est ainsi,
et pas autrement, que Bouddha se tenait dans l’ancien temps
lorsque Ananda lui posa des questions et que le rêveur se mettait à
rêver aux vies qui se trouvaient derrière lui, avant que ne bougèrent
ses lèvres, et que, selon la Chronique : « Il dit une histoire. » Voici
quelle serait sa façon de commencer, car là-bas en Orient les
rêveurs racontent aujourd’hui encore des contes presque pareils :
« Il y a bien longtemps, alors que Devadatta était roi de Bénarès,
vivaient un éléphant vertueux, un bœuf dépravé et un roi dépourvu
d’intelligence. » Et, après que la morale en eut été tirée au profit
d’Ananda, le conte se terminait : « Or, le bœuf dépravé était un tel, le
roi, tel autre, quant à l’éléphant vertueux, c’était moi, en personne,
Ananda. » C’était ainsi qu’il contait dans le bosquet de bambous, et
le bosquet de bambous existe encore aujourd’hui. De petites
silhouettes vêtues de robes bleues, grises et couleur d’ardoise,
passent sous son ombre, achètent deux ou trois bâtons d’encens,
pénètrent dans le sanctuaire, c’est-à-dire le corps du dieu, ressortent
en souriant et disparaissent à travers les arbrisseaux. Une grosse
carpe dans un étang happe une feuille tombée, avec le bruit d’un
petit baiser pervers et frivole. Puis la terre fume, fume en silence,
tandis qu’un papillon, mesurant au moins six pouces, aux teintes
éclatantes, les ailes étendues, fend le courant dans un zigzag de
couleurs et monte voletant jusqu’au front du dieu.
Et pourtant Bouddha veut que l’homme considère toute chose
comme une illusion, — même la lumière, même les couleurs — ce
bronze usé par les airs qui se détache sur le bleu vert des pins, sur
la pâle émeraude des bambous ; cette ceinture citron de la jeune fille
vêtue d’une robe nuance cannelle, aux cheveux ornés d’épingles de
corail, qui s’appuie contre un bloc de pierre blanchie par les siècles,
et, enfin, ce rameau de l’azalée rouge-sang, qui se dresse sur les
nattes d’or pâle de la maison à thé au chaume couleur de miel.
Dompter le désir et la convoitise des richesses, souvent recherchées
pour des motifs vils, voilà qui est concevable, mais pourquoi
l’homme doit-il renoncer aux délices des yeux, à la couleur qui
réjouit, à la lumière qui égaie, à la ligne qui satisfait tout ce que le
cœur renferme de plus profond ? Ah ! si le Bouddha moralisateur
avait seulement pu voir sa propre image !
NOS HOMMES D’OUTRE-MER