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Small Baltic
States and the
Euro-Atlantic
Security Community
s a n di s sr a de r s
Small Baltic States and the Euro-Atlantic
Security Community
Sandis Sraders
Small Baltic States

and the Euro-Atlantic
Security Community
Sandis Sraders
Baltic Defence College
Tartu, Estonia
ISBN 978-3-030-53762-3 ISBN 978-3-030-53763-0 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53763-0
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
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To My Wife, Madara
Contents
Introduction 1
Small Baltic States: Sensitivities and Vulnerabilities 7

Military 14
Economy 35
Social Capital 49
The Surge of the Euro-Atlantic Community: 1956, 1968,

1981 71
A Road to Hungary, 1956 80
Prague Spring, 1968 100
Solidarity in Poland, 1981 114
American Foreign Policy and the Baltic States 129

Malign: Between the Wars 130
Benign: The Cold War 137
Redemption: NATO Refined 151
The Baltic Predicament: Russia’s Shadows 167

Ideas Defining Russia Today 171
Yeltsin’s Democratic Experiments 183
Putin Curbs Democracy 197
vii
viii CONTENTS
The Baltic States in Europe 221

Germany: Reluctance 223
France: Ambivalence 232
The United Kingdom: Reforms 238
New and Auxiliary Actors 244
Conclusion 257
Index 267
List of Figures
Small Baltic States: Sensitivities and Vulnerabilities

Fig. 1 UN Member states: 1945–2011 (Source UN) 10
Fig. 2 Military Spending, % of GDP (Source SIPRI) 22
Fig. 3 Baltic Embassies: Number and Location, 2019 (Source Web
pages of Baltic Foreign Ministries [Accessed on January 05,
2020]) 50
Fig. 4 Latvian Emabassies, 1994 and 2004 (Source Yearbook of
the ministry of foreign affairs of the republic of Latvia
2004 [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia:
McAbols, 2005], 113–128) 53
Fig. 5 The comparison of GDPpc in 2018 (Nominal, USD) (Source
World Bank) 55
Fig. 6 Constitutional amendments in Latvia and Russian speakers in
Estonia, 2012 (Source Central Election Committee of Latvia
and Statistics Estonia) 63
The Baltic Predicament: Russia’s Shadows

Fig. 1 The frontline 178
Fig. 2 Oil price, 1999–2016 (Source Europe Brent Spot Price FOB) 202
Fig. 3 Russian military activities, 2008–2016 (Sources The
European Leadership Network Report [2015], The McCain
Institute Report [2016], Report of the Information Agency
under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense of the
Republic of Latvia “Tevijas Sargs” [2015]) 210
ix
List of Tables
Small Baltic States: Sensitivities and Vulnerabilities

Table 1 Baltic trade, 1995 and 2018 (Source World Bank [World
Integrated Trade Solutions, WITS]) 38
Table 2 Diplomatic list in 1994 and 2004 (Source Ministry of
foreign affairs of the Republic of Latvia [2016]) 52
The Baltic Predicament: Russia’s Shadows

Table 1 Top 3 the most hostile by Russians, 2005–2018 (Source
Russian Public Opinion by Levada Center [2019]) 181
xi
Introduction
Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians are known as people who love to

live in peace, indulge their hard-working traditions, and enjoy their bond
with their land and nature. Quite frequently and for significant periods the
Baltic lust for peace was obstructed by Swedish kings, Polish emperors,
German noblemen, Russian tsars and communists. Moreover, Lithuania
had ascended as a type of empire in its own commonwealth with Poland.
Nevertheless, the recent five-decade occupation period under the Soviet
Union almost led to Baltic nations becoming a piddling drop on the Baltic
littoral, but they survived. For centuries have the destinies of each of the
Baltic States heavily depend on foreign policies of major powers in the
region to which they belong.
This experience has aggregated to the recognizable fact that the small
Baltic States cannot withstand large power superiority. All Baltic States
appeared as independent out of the collapse of the Russian empire by
1918—the result of the Russian revolution. The Soviet Union took the
independence back by 1940, but the collapse of the Communist empire
made independence possible in 1990s.
Subsequently, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as well as the other small
European states desperately looked for protection and a geopolitical
asylum. In the 1990s, few choices existed to avoid the repetition of their
historic predicament. Thankfully, since the beginning of the Cold War
other European states had shared similar objectives at a time when the
United States was ready to embrace Europe to avoid future conflicts.
© The Author(s) 2021 1

S. Sraders, Small Baltic States and the Euro-Atlantic Security Community,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53763-0_1
2 S. SRADERS
Broadly shared in the West, Franklin Delano Roosevelt explicitly noted

that “more than an end to war, we all want an end to the beginnings of
all wars.” The shared objective was expressed by a person who had seen
myriad atrocities even before the dawn of the Cold War descended over
Europe. The West was exhausted from the European history frequently
going mad with few choices, all bad.
Since the willingness existed to deter conflicts and institutionalize
cooperation, the West corrected what was wrong with the past. European
integration aimed at creating an affluent and stable partner for the United
States, but NATO was built for the defense of a Euro-Atlantic partner-
ship. Sadly, not all European countries could join the Euro-Atlantic club
at the outset. As a warning for the rest, Stalin prevented Czechoslovakia
from joining the West early in 1948.
Since 1945, the Cold War pitted the West against the East for five
decades, but the ideological clash is yet enduring. The West primarily
focused on the containment and the eventual defeat of the communist
regime then, but now the focus is on deterring the resurgent Russia along
the borders of the Euro-Atlantic alliance and its partners. The objective of
rebuilding the European continent whole and free was never abandoned
in the past and remains the same today.
When the Soviet Union approached its imminent final destination, the
European Union (EU) and NATO were still enduring, and the next steps
for the future of Europe and Euro-Atlantic cooperation, were debated.
At this moment the Baltic States never hid their willingness to join the
Euro-Atlantic community. In relations with NATO, the former Estonian
President Lennart Meri colorfully described the security cooperation the
Baltic States were desperately seeking with NATO, since for them “secu-
rity was seen like a virginity: you’re either a virgin or you’re not. You
either have security or you don’t.”1 While no country could account for
absolute safety, the pronouncements of the Baltic leaders indicated the
utter sense of insecurity and discomfort with Russia in the region.
When the Baltic States were invited to start accession talks with NATO,
it was also concluding the EU accession negotiations. On that occasion,
in 2002, Latvian President Vaira Vı̄ķe-Freiberga remarked that “it was
not just a year which could be symmetrically read from both sides. It
was a moment when states, small and large, from East and West, deleted
1 Lennart Meri, “Meriisms,” City Paper’s Baltics Worldwide (1994), accessed on March
17, 2016, http://www.balticsworldwide.com/quotes/merisms.htm.
INTRODUCTION 3
the last remnants from World War II on the Europe’s map based on
the legality and equality of all.”2 From the Baltic perspective, the failure
to join NATO was seen as imminently resulting in re-imposition of the
Russian domain, while a possibility to join the EU was seen as an end to
the soviet economic deprivation and social injustices. Yet, in order to gain
access to these communities, the Baltic States had to undertake significant
transformation and enjoy the welcoming approaches by major powers for
their membership in the Euro-Atlantic community.
To outline these aspects this book will first focus on intrinsic weak-
nesses of the Baltic States. Chapter “Small Baltic States: Sensitivities and
Vulnerabilities” will outline some important instances as indicators for
military, economic and social vulnerabilities and sensitivities in the post-
Cold War until the EU and NATO enlargement and thereafter. This
unique outline of intrinsic sensitivities and vulnerabilities for the Baltic
States will dwell on paradigms and experiences of other small states in
international affairs. This chapter will also deliver some answers if the
Euro-Atlantic integration became a remedy for all inherent weaknesses
for the Baltic States.
Chapter “The Surge of the Euro-Atlantic Community: 1956, 1968,
1981” of this book will emphasize foreign and security policies of the
United States and the Soviet Union until the end of the Cold War.
Despite this book focuses on the Baltic integration into NATO and the
EU in the post-Cold War, this chapter will explain the patterns and ideas
behind the policies of major powers (their ways and temptation to use
force against small states in their neighborhood). The Cold War shared
experiences of former Soviet states became the intrinsic reasons for early
fragmentation of the Soviet bloc and dwindling of Kremlin’s power. Until
the enlargement of NATO and the EU in 2004, the Baltic States were
mentioning experiences of Hungary from 1956, Czechoslovakia from
1968 and Poland from 1980s. These historical lessons explain the over-
arching inability by Moscow to construct benevolent relations with its
constituents and its neighbors. Thus, the possible voluntary reintegration
of the Baltic States into the Russian polity or political order was popularly
2 Vaira Vı̄ķe-Freiberga, “The Speech of the President of the Republic of Latvia,”

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia (November 18, 2002), accessed on
March 19, 2019, http://www.mfa.gov.lv/aktualitates/zinas/runas-raksti-intervijas-prese/
16951-valsts-prezidentes-vairas-vikes-freibergas-runa-valsts-svetkos-pie-brivibas-pieminekla-
2002-gada-18-novembri.
4 S. SRADERS
denied at the outset due to inherent incompatibility. During the occupa-

tion years, the Baltic States shared similar experiences with the Visegrad
countries resulting in the adamant foreign policy orientation to join all
Western structures to escape Moscow’s dominance.
Chapter “American Foreign Policy and the Baltic States” will focus
on American foreign policy toward Europe and the Baltic States. This
policy and the actor was indispensable to balance and deter Russia against
military temptation to take the Baltic States back by force or abuse its
economic superiority. The United States was the only militarily, econom-
ically, and socially apt power to ensure security and stability in Europe
in the post-Cold War. Periods of American approaches to Europe in
a comparative perspective will outline malign, benign, and beneficial
American foreign policy doctrines for Europe, and the Baltic States.
Chapter “The Baltic Predicament: Russia’s Shadows” will focus on
Russia. Baltic security, economy and social affairs strongly depend on ways
Kremlin approaches its neighbors. Despite the Baltic States would like
to enjoy cooperative relations with Russia, its ideological background,
unsuccessful democratic experiments, and resurgent neo-imperial and
neo-communist traditions make co-existence complicated at least. The
faith of the Baltic States strongly depends on Russia while there is little
any or all Baltic States together could do to inflict any change inside
Russia or when it comes to its foreign and security policies. This chapter
will provide insights to ideological torrents in Russia that are shaping and
limiting its attempts to build democratic-benevolent polity.
Chapter “The Baltic States in Europe” of this book will describe how
European powers, sandwiched between the United States and Russia,
were approaching the Baltic States in their shared and unilateral attempts
to join NATO, the EU, and the democratic West. Security, economic,
and social interests of major European powers as well as regional ones
were determining European approaches toward the Baltic States. Since
democracy became the criteria for Baltic entry into NATO, the policies
of major European powers as well as regional and institutional influ-
ences played important roles. This chapter will outline European interests
toward Russia that were tearing some major powers apart in their osten-
sible effort to rebuild the common home Europe—whole and free from
atrocious ideologies, oppression, deprivation, and wars.
INTRODUCTION 5
This book will eventually provide the answer to what extent if at

all foreign and security policies of major powers allow small states to
mitigate their sensitivities and vulnerabilities. The Baltic States and their
experiences will serve as an example.
Small Baltic States: Sensitivities
and Vulnerabilities
As is the case with many other small states, there are few studies about
the Baltic States. Small states might simply not be as interesting as major
powers, institutions, multinational organizations, interests groups or any
other influential actor in international affairs. Additionally, it may be
assumed that there is little rationale for studying small states with minis-
cule global impact. So, why should we study small states in general or any
one in particular?
International relations have been a state-centered discipline. Since the
peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the emergence of nation states as the
primary actors in international affairs, the focus of analysis has been on
a comparison of diverse states––large and small, or weak and powerful.
Most experts have been interested in major and powerful actors. Thus,
the debate about small states emerged as a residual category with the
tendency to surge as the number of small states grew.
Before World War I, the debate was solely about major powers, and,
for many of them, their empires. Such world order was apparent between
the unification of Germany until the run up to World War I when major
powers had incorporated inside their polities most small states.1 Some
authors mention that in the run up to the war, there were six major
powers (Germany, Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and
1 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics (St. Martin’s Press, 1984).
© The Author(s) 2021 7

S. Sraders, Small Baltic States and the Euro-Atlantic Security Community,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53763-0_2
8 S. SRADERS
Italy). The rest could be viewed as “small” powers with Denmark, Turkey,
and Sweden the most notable exceptions as middle powers.2 Therefore,
a small state was defined by what it was not, assuming it even existed, or
as an impediment to large and middle powers.3
A few new states emerged during the interwar period. That includes
the Baltic States. But their viability was immediately put to test when the
world order was based on hard to enforce idealistic principles suggesting
the preservation of small states only legally.4 As a result, the interwar
order offered novel foreign policy possibilities for small states, but small
and microstates had to rely on their own capabilities to withstand external
pressure.5 The dawn of the Second World War proved to be the viability
test for small states where most failed.
Around 1945, the post-war world offered different principles. The
order was determined mainly by two superior powers and the balance
of power principles.6 The post-war period divided the world into two
ideologically different poles.7 The structure was rigid, especially at first.
Nevertheless, some powers managed eventually to rise as middle powers.
2 Francis Harry Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the
History of Relations Between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 245–
255.
3 Ivar B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, “Lilliputian’s in Gulliver’s World?” ed. Chritine
Ingebritsen, Ivar Neumann, Sieglinde Gstöhl, and Jessica Beyer, Small States in Interna-
tional Relations (Seattle: University of Washington Press and Reykjavik: University of
Iceland Press, 2006), 6.
4 David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Rela-
tions (Greenwood Publisher Group, 1967); Elmer Plischke, Microstates in World Affairs:
Policy Problems and Options (Studies in Foreign Policy: AEI Press, 1977); Sheila Harden,
Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World (Frances Pinter Publishers Ltd, 1985).
5 William E. Rappard, Problems of Peace: Pacifism is Not Enough (Geneva Institute of
International Relations, 1934).
6 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and the War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics (W. W. Norton & Company, 2001); Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after
the Cold War,” International Security, Volume 25, No. 1 (Summer, 2000).
7 Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1954);
Judt and Snyder, Thinking the Twentieth Century; Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe
Since 1945 (England: Penguin Books, 2005).
SMALL BALTIC STATES: SENSITIVITIES AND VULNERABILITIES 9
For example, in the 1960s France rose as a European nuclear power or

a power that could keep a finger on the nuclear trigger of major powers.8
The Fifth Republic shaped French-British and French-German relations
with consequences on the rise of a united Europe as a salient power.
During the Cold War, small and weak states grouped around two major
power blocs. Thus, their fate depended on the policies of major powers.
At the pinnacle of the Cold War, a great power was able to assert its
will against a small state, while a small state was not able to do the same
against a great power.9 In the same way as major powers were ascending
and descending powers, the distribution and emergence of small states
have been a historic process. Major powers called all the shots interna-
tionally. Middle powers were invited to participate and contribute to the
bargaining process of major powers, but small states were not involved in
great power games.
However, one profound trend happened after World War II and during
the Cold War. There was a significant increase in the number of small
states. The UN membership enhanced the legitimacy of even the smallest
international members. Owing to de-colonization trends and the disinte-
gration of the Soviet Union, there were more than 40 additional states at
the UN in the 1950s and 50 in 1960s while almost 30 additional states
joined the UN from 1990 to 1995, the Baltic States were among them
(See Fig. 1). Therefore, small states together could attempt to defend
their common interests.
As the debate of this book is about the post-Cold War, the focus is on
the end of the bipolar world order when new discussions about small and
large states and their powers ensued. The definition of size and power
had been a point for endless debates. From the normative point of view,
all states are equal before the law. From the political perspective, they
are far from equal. In fact, all states are unique. Thus, sovereign equality
between states has hardly existed before. Moreover, small and weak states
have been viewed as an unimportant category in international relations or
one that is an impediment to, or unnecessary reason for, struggles among
great powers. Some American foreign policy pundits had overtly criticized
8 Simon Serfaty, France, De Gaulle and Europe: The Policy of the Fourth and Fifth
Republic toward the Continent (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1968), 89–117,
143–149.
9 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace
(New York: Knopf, 1960), 129–130.
10 S. SRADERS
Fig. 1 UN Member states: 1945–2011 (Source UN)
the United States approach to small states like the Baltic States in inter-
national affairs as impediment to better relations with major powers, like
the Russian Federation.10
Many authors have argued that the right to self-determination
promoted by the UN Charter was precisely the reason for the surge of
numerous small states, as well as causes for significant governance prob-
lems for major and middle powers.11 However, no group or no small
power alone hindered the designs of major UN powers. Discussions were,
instead, about aspects related to the extent to which small states depended
on major powers.12
It was broadly conceived that small states could escape the pressure of
major powers by entering into alliances with major powers or convincing
them that the neutrality of a small state could be beneficial.13 The roles
of small states depended on changes in international trade, transport,
10 Michael Mandelbaum, Mission Failure: America in the World in the Post-Cold War
Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 68–70.
11 Patricia Wohlgemuth Blair, The Ministate Dilemma (Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace, 1968); Stanley A. De Smith, Microstates and Micronesia: The Problems of
America’s Pacific Islands and Other Minute Territories (New York University Press, 1970);
Richard L. Harris, Death of a Revolutionary: Che Guevara’s Last Mission (New York: W.
W. Norton, 1970).
12 Otmar Holl, Small states in Europe and Dependence (Austrian Institute for Interna-
tional Affairs, 1983).
13 Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: the United States and the
Balance of Power (Transaction Publishers, 2008); Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small
States: Diplomacy in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1959).
security, foreign policy or culture and ideology, for example. By utilizing

intensified communication channels, small states could convince larger
countries that the use of force against them could favor their adversaries
or while their neutrality could be beneficial.
Scandinavian countries in general, and Switzerland in particular, have
often been described as the neutrals in Europe. Remaining neutral was
admired by those that were forced to take sides or, more frequently,
simply comply. The ability to remain a neutral state was explored by
Hans Mouritzen who analyzed the ability of small Nordic countries to
stay neutral. The process was called the Finlandization - the politics of a
weak country whose regime feels compelled to make some concessions
to a powerful neighbor in order to preserve more important elements
of its independence.14 This strategy of non-commitment or neutrality is
more effective if supported by a credible level of strength and military
preparedness.15
Some debates about small states were aimed at questioning the quality
of their power. Such states as Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and
Iceland could keep their pride not because they were large and capable
major powers but because they could be the most just, organized or
moral.16 Thus, multiple small states were depicted as essential actors in
specific issue areas like the financial sector (Switzerland and Luxembourg),
the oil sector (OPEC countries), or moral and normative issues (Scandi-
navian countries). Smallness and greatness, therefore, were not criteria to
be applied to size or systemic level only, but to distinct areas where even
small states could challenge the clout of major powers.17
Despite the fact that small states might look like a doomed category in
international affairs, always exposed to the goodwill or pressure of major
powers, Peter Katzenstein’s pivotal work on Small States in World Markets
showed that small states, owing to the efficiently acquirable democratic
consensus, could not only survive but also even thrive.
14 A. E. Campbell, “Review: Finlandization: Towards a General Theory of Adaptive

Politics,” International Affairs: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Volume 65, No.
2 (1989): 315.
15 Hans Mouritzen, Theory and Reality of International Politics (Brookfield: Ashgate
Publishing, Ltd., 1998), 44–45.
16 Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (Routledge, 1992), 75.
17 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Longman,
2012).
12 S. SRADERS
They could turn some of their domestic properties into niche power
capabilities to better serve their domestic interests. The work was
significant because it was not about systemic vulnerabilities and sensi-
tivities resulting from large states decisions. The narrative was about
small Western European countries––the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden,
Switzerland and Austria––that managed to offset negative external condi-
tions by adapting domestic institutions and interest groups to respond
to changes in international markets. This work about world market and
democratic consensus implicitly implies that there is little small states can
do in the face of military threats.
Until the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, there had been
no other significant research that would challenge Professor Katzenstein’s
general conclusions. The first literature that questioned the new roles
of small states was devoted to Scandinavia, which had been previously
neutral against the Soviet Union. If still neutral, then against whom?
That policy dilemma absorbed Sweden or Finland, for example. Since the
end of the Cold War, the enhancement of small state domestic interests
were broadly sought within international organizations. Liberal coopera-
tion was widespread and the military realm had gone out of fashion for a
while.
It was argued that the decisions taken by small countries depended on
domestic structural interests.18 Moreover, there has been some research
devoted to explaining how easy it was for small and large countries to
satisfy their combined interests even when their societies were heteroge-
neous.19 The work argues that man-made political boundaries of states
should dovetail with the economic interests and market possibilities of a
group.
Thus, the emergence of new small states or the federalization of larger
ones could be a result of market forces. Such arguments were rooted in
a quantitative analysis by computing the optimal size of a state in theory,
and explaining the phenomenon of a country size in reality. Here, again,
the debate fails to explain the impact of military power while more focus
is on markets.
18 Christine Ingebritsen, The Nordic States and the European Unity (Cornell University
Press, 1998).
19 Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore, The Size of Nations (Boston: MIT Press, 2003).
International trade, political affairs, social affairs, and diplomatic inter-

action were all becoming more dynamic. As a result, the need for a
strategy for small states gained prominence.20 One side argued that, by
having a strategy, small states could better guide their domestic societies.
The other side held that a strategy from the past might be outdated for
challenges of the present. Consequences of modernity were that it became
harder to discern security from danger and risk from trust in a highly
dynamic environment.21 Therefore, there was a risk that domestic soci-
eties might be misguided by charting a rigid national path in terms of
strategy or foreign policy of a small state.
Despite the fact that the future of small states does not look promising
in a more complex and modern environment, institutional frameworks,
markets or alliances designed to best pursue international opportunities
were viable options.22 Small states could be more mobile and versa-
tile. Therefore, they may be better able to adapt to current challenges
than larger countries. Small states could act like dynamic speedboats
while large states will always resemble huge, clumsy, resource-endowed
tankers. In theory, it should be easier for small states to adapt to
changing international environment if in practice domestic structures can
be resiliently adapted. The literature suggests that even the Baltic States
have applied different methods to reorient their domestic structures and
pursue interests.23
However, from the perspective of security, little has changed. On the
outskirts of Europe, neutrality at the outset of the first independence
proved to be delusional for the Baltic States. The experience of the Scan-
dinavian and Swiss “neutrality ghetto” only underlines such a stance. The
complete neutrality had proved as something negative, even menacing.24
20 Alyson J. K. Bailes, “Does a Small State Need a Strategy,” University of Iceland:

Centre for Small State Studies Publication Series, Occasional Paper No. 2 (2009).
21 Anthony Giddens, Consequences of Modernity (Stanford University Press, 1991).
22 Harald Balderstein and Michael Keating ed., Small in the Modern World: Vulner-
abilities and Opportunities (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2015); Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits, Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s
Periphery (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2012).
23 Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits, Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s Periphery
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2012), 96–131.
24 Timo Hellenberg, “Foreword,” ed. Atis Lejiņš and Žaneta Ozoliņa, Baltic Security
Prospects at the Turn of the 21st Century (Helsinki: Kikimora Publications, 1999), 6.
14 S. SRADERS
Thus, this experience has a significant effect on the domestic debates

about the future. The frequent incorporation of the Baltic States made
the search for foreign policy or the creation of grand strategy profound.25
To outline the challenges for the enduring grand strategy and foreign
policy, the author will focus on three distinct areas. First, the Baltic States
face the overarching question: how to avoid becoming occupied again.
The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union had looted their independence
twice. The potential for military capabilities, alliances and prospects for
security therefore must receive the necessary attention.
Second, markets and economy render small states interdependent and
therefore sensitive or vulnerable to external market adjustments (and
political pressure by larger countries). As a result, a part of this research
will focus on some distinct areas that are exposing the Baltic States to
intentional market adjustments. Particular focus will be on such areas as
energy, finance and transit (in relations with the Russian Federation).
The third part will focus on what social instances make the Baltic
States exposed in the big power games. The particular focus will be on
Baltic diplomatic networks, leaders and humanitarian capital as well as
domestic cultural and social (ethno-political) challenges to the demo-
cratic consensus (pan-Baltic and each of the Baltic States). The author
will investigate some of the most challenging known areas and trends for
the coherence of the Baltic States.
Military
The strategic significance of small powers emanate from various polit-
ical, geographical, economic and military factors that are not always easy
to identify or disentangle.26 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
constellation of power in the proximity of the Baltic States was reshaped,
but the attention from Russia never shifted. Thus, military capacities still
25 Anders Wivel, “The Grand Strategies of Small European States,” Paper Presented
at the 50th Annual ISA Meeting (February 15, 2009), Accessed on November 25,
2016, http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/1/7/4/
pages311749/p311749-1.php.
26 Tim Sweijs, “The Role of Small Powers in the Outbreak of Great Power War,” Centre
for Small State Studies Publishing Series: University of Iceland, Occasional Paper (2010),
5.
played an important role even when the application of power seemed to

be out of fashion.
One reason for small states to be concerned with great power clashes
has to do with the essential assets they might hold in great power
games.27 For example, a forceful takeover of a part or the whole terri-
tory of a NATO member state by the Russian Federation would mean
the collapse of NATO and waning of the United States power in Europe.
Same thinkers of American foreign policy that formerly blamed the
United States for spoiling relations with large players like Russia are now
reversing their position. They say the United States must defend the tiny
Baltic States on Russia’s border; “by defending them, the United States
could encounter same difficulties it did defending West Berlin,” from
1948 until 1949.28 Nevertheless, this would become the decisive test for
NATO’s credibility or the United States presence and power in Europe
and internationally.
On the other hand, small states themselves might need their own inter-
national strategy to mobilize domestic resources or explicitly adhere to
security interests of larger countries.29 Here, all measures to offset Russia
militarily and forge closer ties with the US-led NATO must be the strategy
for the Baltic States to balance Russia. The historical relations and ideo-
logical importance of history for Russia to retake the lost territories is
sufficiently bold argument for any of the Baltic States to embrace such
strategy. Thus, defense and security matters must top national security
concerns for the Baltic States.
Small countries are primarily concerned with their viability, but their
access to sufficient military capabilities depends on their economic poten-
tial. In the military domain, trends have changed. In 1914, there was
no need for large-scale investments to equip an army. The war required
an infantry to be equipped with almost universal and fundamentally
simple equipment used by all armies. More importance was attached to
numbers, natural obstacles and the territory of a state. However, with new
technological advances the military requirements rapidly changed.
27 Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the
Balance of Power (Transaction Publishers, 2008), 19.
28 Michael Mandelbaum, “The New Containment: Handling Russia, China, and Iran,”
Foreign Affairs (March/April, 2019).
29 Alyson JK Bailes, “Does a Small State Need a Strategy?” Center for Small State
Studies Publication Series: University of Iceland, Occasional Paper (2009), 40–41.
16 S. SRADERS
Therefore, modernizing military became a possibility for smaller states,

like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In their military modernization
efforts, small states will be always more constrained due to their limited
availability of resources for national defense. For example, Estonia could
afford buying five F35 fighter jets, but there would be no money for
gas or personnel left. Latvia could afford six such fighter planes, but no
finance would be left to pay salaries to military command or national
guards. Lithuania could afford one Mistral aircraft carrier and approx-
imately the same number of F35s as Estonia or Latvia separately, but
when it comes to financing maintenance or operation, also Lithuania
would end up with the same financial constraints as the two smaller Baltic
countries.30
When it comes to national defense, smaller actors will also have to be
more vigilant and resilient. A single major defeat for a small state can
mean the loss of the most valuable parts of the country-if not all of it-
and the loss of any prospect of a victory with the nation’s own resources.
Greater powers have larger territories and populations, which puts them
in a strategically advantageous position. They can push the perimeter of
conflict from its vital population, economy, supplies or decision-making
centers. Conversely, at the outset of a military intervention smaller coun-
tries can lose a fight for strategically important assets and, as a result, a
war. Even the smallest losses can lead to the inability to retaliate, rehabil-
itate, or push back enemies’ forces. Thus, a smaller country must await
the enemy at the gates, at the outer limits of its vital centers, invariably
so when it is alone. All pre-emptive means for security must be mobi-
lized and applied instantly. It makes defense highly demanding from a
socio-economic perspective.
Considering the myriad difficulties in ensuring sufficient contingency
measures, small states tend to employ the best military deterrent possible.
30 See Trading Economics data for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, https://tradingec
onomics.com/lithuania/latvia/estonia/gdp (2019: GDP for Estonia was 31 bnUSD and
2% or 620 mUSD for defense, for Latvia 36 bnUSD and 2% or 720 mUSD for defense,
and Lithuania 54 bnUSD and 108 mUSD for defense). One F35 fighter jet costs approx-
imately 120 mUSD, see article “How much does the F-35 Cost? Producing, Operating
and supporting a 5th Generation Fighter,” accessed April 30, 2020, https://www.f35.
com/about/cost. One Mistral ship vacillates between 600–700 mUSD, see article by
Sebastien Roblin, “How France Almost Sold Russia Two Powerful Aircraft Carriers,” The
National Interest (September 1, 2019), accessed on April 30, 2020, https://nationalinte
rest.org/blog/buzz/how-france-almost-sold-russia-two-powerful-aircraft-carriers-77241.
A small, non-aligned power, at least in so far as it is involved in, or

anticipates, conflict, has the most profound reasons for attempting to
offset limited numbers, limited supplies and limited maneuverability by
acquiring weapons of the highest fire-power, mobility, destruction and
operational efficiency.
Then in search of such superior military capabilities, small states can
attract the attention of the greatest powers even if small states will be
economically fit to acquire and sustain such defense capabilities that are
primarily oriented toward preventing war. For example in a nuclear-armed
system, a philosophy of live-and-let-live among powers becomes the
only practical alternative to the high risk of annihilation.31 After all, the
stronger the capacity to resist militarily and the greater the damage a state
can inflict on its enemies in the event of attack, the more restricted the
greater powers are in their own political and military movements against
smaller and weaker entities.32 Nevertheless, there are several downsides
that small states must consider when contemplating the development and
application of nuclear military capability.
First, the actual application of such might as nuclear weapons might
be a delusional security guarantee: insistence on the pursuit of what
appears to be the national interest may lead to defeat, and even to self-
destruction. Small states, because of their limited territory and human
resources, can inflict significant damages on their own territory and popu-
lation by attempting to stop conventional attack with weapons of mass
destruction. As a result, the alliance and protection of a greater power
should be sought if political and geographic circumstances warrant it.33
Military strategies for small states will depend on the security environ-
ment to which they belong. In addition, geography for small states plays
a dominant, if not the dominant, role in international affairs. States will
not be able to choose their neighbors in the same manner as humans
cannot choose their parents.34 Thus, military strategies and investment
31 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problems in International
Relations (University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 171.
32 Vital, 159–160.
33 Ibid., 58–68.
34 Brendan Halligan, Strategies for a Small State in a Large Union (Dublin: The
Institute of International and European Affairs, 2013), 8.
18 S. SRADERS
policies will depend on inherent security perceptions.35 The lessons of

history teaches some important things to the Baltic States and the present
foreign and security policy trends assertiveness compounded the surge or
neo-imperial and neo-communist ideas makes the security in Baltic Sea
Region worrisome. Small states should not embrace appeasement, but
remain non-provoking. Most importantly, they must maintain significant
military notwithstanding costs to raise the price of seizing them high
enough.
Before and during the Second World War, Denmark’s policy of
pre-emptive appeasement only encouraged the German invasion. When
Denmark could no longer accept surging demands from Nazi Germany,
it reversed most of the concessions, and Denmark was soon overrun
because of being in the path of the Reich without a sufficient military
deterrent. Soon thereafter, Hitler turned against Norway, which, facing
overwhelming military force, surrendered. Since Norway discovered oil
resources only after World War II, its economic significance was not suffi-
cient for potential allies to support it militarily, or for Hitler to regard
it as an economic asset. It was neither sufficiently militarily strong nor
strategically important to avoid its annihilation by the major power.
In the case of the Soviet invasion in Finland, the narrative is different.
When Hitler and Stalin designed the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,
Finland was not a part of the Soviet plan. In the same way as Lithuania
was given to Stalin unexpectedly late, Finland was added to the Soviet
playground belatedly. As a result, Moscow had poor intelligence and weak
military plans and preparedness to occupy Finland during the Winter
War.36 In addition, Finland’s topography and willingness to fight played
a crucial role. Severely cold conditions were as familiar to the Russians
as they were to the Finns, but the severe Soviet military losses salvaged
Finland’s neutrality during the Cold War years.
Finland’s neighbor, Sweden, was located between Norway and
Denmark, with the Soviet Union close to the north. As a result, Sweden
had developed four scenarios. Three were directed against a potential
Soviet invasion, and one, possible rather than probable, was aimed at the
German Reich.
35 Vital, 89.
36 Viktor Suvorov, Inside Soviet Military Intelligence (New York: MacMillan Publishing
Company, 1984), 24.
When one of the first three scenarios materialized and the Soviet
Union indeed attacked Finland during the Winter War of 1939, Sweden
politically downplayed its military involvement by describing itself as a
non-combatant, rather than as neutral to fight together with Finland
against the Soviet Union.37 Furthermore, since Finland reached peace
accords with Russia, and subsequent neutrality by 1944, Sweden could
further discard the first three strategies and opt for defense against
Germany.
Learning from Norwegian-German and Danish-German lessons,
Sweden quickly mobilized its domestic production resources with firms
like Husqvarna, Ericsson, and Volvo. Apart from quick and sound
improvements in naval capabilities, Sweden rapidly developed its own
domestic aircraft design and production company, SAAB (Svenska Aero-
plan Aktienbolaget ). It made Swedish defense strategy more efficient
and the country could stay militarily non-committed since it did not
procure military equipment from abroad.38 Apart from building its own
military-industrial complex, in early 1942 Sweden launched large-scale
mobilization by recruiting 300,000 men; there is evidence that this move
might have deterred Germany from “liquidating” Sweden.39
What allowed Sweden to incrementally adapt to changing external
conditions were not just its geographic location and the wartime expe-
rience of its neighbors or military mobilization. Wartime Germany relied
on Sweden for about 40% of its supplies of iron ore––one of the most
contentious issues in the war. As a result, Sweden’s foreign relations could
be succinctly explained as maneuvering on the margins since there was
a strong opposition from the United Kingdom and the United States
regarding the Swedish trade.
Sweden’s trading policies were closely tied to its foreign policies. It
was the “double-negotiation”––a delicate balancing, sometimes blackmail
and brinkmanship, aimed at taking care of both wartime parties without
upsetting any of them.40 Sweden proved itself compliant as it efficiently
switched its support to the winning party notwithstanding the moral
37 John Gilmour, Sweden, Swastika and Stalin (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2010), 211–212.
38 Gilmour, 216–217.
39 Ibid., 219.
40 Ibid., 113.
20 S. SRADERS
ambiguities. During the German invasion of Denmark and Norway, it

faced a number of hard decisions as to when to give in, and by how much,
to German demands and expectations. Only after a series of German
defeats in 1942 and 1943 did Sweden withdraw most of previous conces-
sions.41 By then the Swedes were already making more concessions to the
likely victors. As a sign of reciprocal courtesy, in 1946 Sweden did not
hesitate to extradite Baltic and German refugees to the Soviet Union.42
Around the Swiss borders before the start of World War II, conditions
were changing more rapidly. Thus, mobilization efforts in Switzerland
were effective and swift. Civilian institutions elected General Guisan the
army chief on August 30, 1939, to maintain the security, independence,
and neutrality of Switzerland, for defending the economic interests of the
country, and for insuring its economic survival.43 That openly signified
that the days as usual were over. Switzerland quickly mobilized around a
435,000-man fighting force out of a population of 4.2 million. It was a
significant accomplishment even if the Swiss army was not highly mech-
anized. The military strategy was based on sound anti-tank infantry and
mass resistance organized around natural obstacles inside the country.
The result was that the Swiss neutrality and national interests depended
on how “the new might of Germany would express itself.”44 Even before
World War II, Swiss compliance toward German wishes was evident.
Switzerland conceded to such financial pro-German concessions as the
extradition of the Czech gold reserves to the German Reichsbank by the
Governor of the Bank of England.45 During the war, Swiss authorities
maintained friendly relations and permitted Germany to run substantial
41 Håkan Wiberg, “Coping with a Greedy Neighbor,” Journal of Peace Research, Volume
26, No. 3 (1989): 319–325, 321.
42 See “Zviedrija izdod baltiešu un vācu bēgļus PSRS” Nekropole, accessed on
January 25, 2017, https://nekropole.info/lv/events/Zveidrija-izdod-baltiesu-un-vacu-beg
lus-PSRS; See “The Baltic Tragedy - Nazi and Soviet occupation in Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania,” a documentary, accessed on January 25, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=x440cUS4uTU.
43 Urs Schwarz, The Eye of the Hurricane: Switzerland in World War Two (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), 2–9.
44 John Kimche, Spying for Peace: General Guisan and Swiss Neutrality (New York: Roy
Publishers Inc., 1961), 58.
45 Christopher Kopper, “Hitler, the West, and Switzerland, 1936–1945,” German
Studies Review, Volume 26, No. 1 (2003): 198–199, 199.
trade deficits. By not withdrawing from financial cooperation, Switzer-

land was no less a participant of the appeasement than Paris or London
during the Munich Agreement.
Switzerland could also prove itself beneficial for the German Reich
more broadly. A focal point for political and financial transactions, it was
important for the Reich’s military, political, and economic edifice. There
is evidence that corporate headquarters even in the United States and
the branch plants in Germany stayed in contact with each other, either
indirectly via subsidiaries in neutral Switzerland, or directly by means of
modern worldwide systems of communications.46
Furthermore, between 1940 and 1944, the Swiss military industrial
complex provided arms and ammunition valued at 633 million Francs
to the Axis countries such as Germany, Italy, Romania and Japan, and
similar goods (later) to the Allied countries including France, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway for a value of 57.5
million Francs.47 Switzerland exported arms to such neutral countries as
Sweden and Finland, too, but the value of the Reich’s military imports
highlights the intensity of the cooperation.
The cases of Sweden and Switzerland prove that neutrality for a small
state depends on several crucial conditions. One, however, is especially
salient. Even if a small state can prove itself an economic asset, without
a strong and modern military attuned to local topography and natural
obstacles there can be no non-alignment or neutrality. The Baltic States
were tantamount to Norway before Hitler’s invasion and some of them
have resembled the Denmark’s elements of appeasement against Stalin.
None of these strategies had worked to maintain Norwegian indepen-
dence, Danish security or Baltic sovereignty. Furthermore, none of the
Baltic States can boast about financial institutions or natural resources
indispensable to countries like Russia. Conversely, Kremlin holds pride
with self-sufficiency of resources and an overwhelming military might. It
is Russia’s modern army much stronger than the financial figures would
46 Jacques R. Pauwels, “Hitler, the West and Switzerland, 1936–1945,” Labour-Le

Travail, Issue 51 (2003): 223–249, 236.
47 Independent Commission of Experts: Switzerland––Second World War, Switzerland,
National Socialism and the Second World War (Zurich: Pendo Verlag GmbH, 2002), 200.
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bridegroom part of the way to the bride’s apartment. So, lifting the
heavy Mohammed, I carried him a few paces. He was evidently
pleased at my doing him this friendly service, and, the form having
been gone through, sprang quickly down, and, taking me and one of
his other friends each by a hand, began to run. Before us sped a
young man; the rest followed. We were breathless when we reached
the caves.
All was in order. A crowd of spectators began to gather
immediately, and we slipped in through the gates and down the
passage, rapidly crossed into the first court, thence through the
underground passage and out into the other court. This was half-
dark, but from one of the caves shone a light. Here we entered. The
vaulted oblong room with its whitewashed walls was brilliantly lit up.
At the far end a carpet hung right across the room, concealing
something on the ground; in front was spread another carpet. Here
Mohammed seated himself, facing the door. There was no other
furniture visible.
On the bridegroom’s left his friend took a seat, pointing to me to
take my place on the right. There was not the slightest sign on the
features of the former expressive of any emotion, either of gladness
or gravity. To the looker-on he appeared merely phlegmatic, and sat,
wrapped in his cloak, staring into vacancy. His friend, who was also
clothed in red, sat, like himself, in silence.
In the open doorway I saw the faces of Belkassim and Mansur,
also some children, Jews, and the men who had followed us. No
women were present.
When we had been seated thus for a while, there appeared, from
the part of the room divided from us by the hangings, a large dish of
kus-kus and, soon after, a pitcher of water. These were placed
before Mohammed, who took a mouthful of the food—the first meal
prepared for him by his bride.
We sat silent a moment longer, then Belkassim dismissed the
spectators from the door, and I rose, shook hands with my friend the
bridegroom, and left. In the doorway I looked back. There sat the
bridegroom, dumb and stiff, but behind him I saw the carpet being
drawn a little aside, and in the dim light beyond it fancied I caught
sight of a woman’s face. Whether it were pretty, young, or smiling, I
know not. I only know that it must have been the bride’s.
In the open air the festival was in full swing. Closely packed in
front of the gate, and all along the approach, sat veiled women. The
banks and hollows were white with spectators. The negroes danced,
played, and drummed. There a mulatto sang a droll ballad; here two
men danced a stick dance, and so on.
I had been requested to take my place amongst the bridegroom’s
friends, who held themselves in a group apart, prepared to show him
this last day’s homage.
About an hour elapsed, then from the bridal cave a muffled gun-
shot was heard; it was scarcely noticeable, as the shrieking and
booming of the music overpowered all sounds. Ali hastily handed me
a gun, which I discharged, and several shots were fired from our
group. Every one of those present knew what this meant, and
rejoiced, but none more so than the family of the bride. They, who
had waited anxiously, were reassured, for she would not now, under
cover of the silent dark night, and wrapped in a grey blanket, be
hunted at a given word out of the village, and driven home to
sorrowing and disgraced parents and relatives.
The festival was not interrupted, but continued as before.
With the Khalifa by my side, and surrounded by his sons, the
sheikhs, and the principal guests, I remained seated all the evening
and far into the night, watching the entertainment, that in course of
time became very monotonous.
Now and again some men stepped forward, either singly or two
together. Over their shoulders hung red cloaks, and they posed in
graceful attitudes, with their heads held high, one foot forward, and
the left arm hidden beneath the burnous and the red cloak, whilst the
right hand was extended. On each side of them crouched a negro,
with the flaps of his burnous spread out before him to catch the coins
shortly to be thrown to him. Round these figures danced other
negroes, whilst the drums played.
Now one of the red figures raised an arm and threw a coin into the
negro’s lap, then again, slipping his hands into the folds over his
breast, pulled out another coin. This went on incessantly, that all
might witness how much money was distributed.
First it was the turn of the representatives from Beni Sultan, then
from Zaraua, Tamezred, or other villages, who in this way paid the
tribute expected of them on such festive occasions for the benefit of
the negro musicians.
When at last the men ceased, and the chink of coin was no longer
heard, one of the negroes advanced towards the group of women,
and, half-singing, half-declaiming, told them that the men of such
and such villages had given so much, at the same time praising not
only their generosity, but also their other virtues. Now and then his
song was interrupted by the “Yu, yu” of the women, which this
evening, owing to the number of voices, sounded quite imposing.
When he concluded, the applause was deafening.
Now and then a solo was sung, two or three voices joining in the
chorus that followed, the singers sticking their noses as close
together as they could during the performance. These songs are
always sung in a nasal tone, without any modulation, and the time
never varies.
CHAPTER XI
Over the Mountains and across the Plain
from Hadeij to Metamer
During the night most of the guests wended their way homewards,
but a few still remained next morning; some of whom desired to
accompany me to Beni Sultan.
The bridegroom was expected to emerge from his cave at any
moment, so I lingered awhile, partly in hopes of bidding him farewell,
and also because I had been told he would be received with
rejoicings, and would distribute sweetmeats amongst the village
children. But the time fixed for my departure came, and I had to ride
off without witnessing this concluding scene of the festival.
Mansur’s mule was brought me. The Khalifa himself arranged my
saddle and lengthened the stirrups, thus showing me the final marks
of courtesy. He then gave the guide his instructions, and I took my
leave with warm expressions of thanks to him and to his sons, and
also to the assembled men. I rewarded little Ali for the services he
had rendered me, bowed respectfully to the Khalifa, and rode off with
my heart full of gratitude towards him and his people for their great
hospitality, and with the pleasant impression that my stay in the
Matmata mountains had given me the opportunity of seeing manners
and customs which, to my knowledge, no European had yet
witnessed in these regions. I thankfully recognised my good fortune
in having had the goodwill and assistance of the authorities; and
was, above all, grateful for the great hospitality of the people from
whom I had then just parted, and for their friendship which I flattered
myself I had gained.
A mule saddle is very broad, and resembles somewhat a pack. Its
peculiarity is that the stirrup-leathers are not secured to it. A leather
strap with a stirrup hung at each end is slung over the saddle, so
that, to mount, one must either vault into the saddle without setting
foot in the stirrup or be lifted into it. To anyone accustomed to the
ordinary English saddle it is an extremely uncomfortable seat, as it is
necessary to bear equally on both stirrups, or one risks losing one’s
balance and falling off; but I must say my mule proved to be
altogether a success on the difficult mountain road.
For nearly an hour we rode along the mountain top, whence we
had a lovely view; then we descended into a long valley in which
were many half-dead olive trees and green palms. Just as we began
the descent, we met a couple of men on their way to Hadeij from
Beni Sultan to complain to the Khalifa that their sheep had been
stolen.
In the valley was a deep, broad river bed, then dry, and the
mountain sides were furrowed with deep watercourses leading
thereto. In these furrows stood a number of palms surrounded by
embankments.
We halted in a lovely grove of olives, amongst which sprung a few
palms. Here some of our guides awaited us. They had crossed the
mountain by a shorter but precipitous path, whilst we had circled
round by a less steep and fatiguing route.
From an eminence some way down the valley we observed a
village looking like an eagle’s nest. This was the ancient Beni Sultan,
now deserted and in ruins, the present village lying on the incline on
the farther side of the mountain. A few of the houses in this deserted
village were excavated in the ground.
We travelled directly across the valley, and by a very dangerous
and slippery path reached the lowest point of the mountain ridge.
From thence we looked down on the valley on the other side. Facing
us were the ruins of the old village, standing picturesquely against
the sky. We rode down in a zigzag line past the farms and houses
scattered on the mountain side; the dwellings were crowded with
domestic animals, with men and women, and especially with
children.
Not till we reached the valley did we halt, close to the descent to a
cluster of cave dwellings belonging to the Sheikh, in absence of
whom I was most cordially received by one of his nearest relatives.
The passage to the cave was not covered, and was cut into steps
where it sloped down into the ground towards the gate. On one side
of the wall by the steps was dug out a vaulted and somewhat
decorated cave; this was the guest-room where I dined. Afterwards I
visited the nearer of the Sheikh’s houses, with permission to
examine them from top to bottom.
In the main these dwellings were on the same plan as those of
Hadeij, but I found several cisterns in both the farms and the ruins.
Water flowed from the mountains into these through canals and
primitive pipes.
The caves were not all dug down and around a courtyard, but
were often high up on a perpendicular wall, and were reached by
steps.
The women offered me dates and showed me their looms. I saw
where they slept, generally on benches like low tables, called by
them “mokera.”
In one of the underground vaults, to which the access was
through a very heavy gate, was an oil-mill, and in another a granary.
After spending a couple of hours in the shelter of the caves, we
again started riding through the valley in a southerly direction, and
passing through large palm and olive groves. Nowhere in the
mountains had I seen such rich vegetation.
Close to the village were some ten women clad in dark blue,
drawing water from one of the few wells on this mountain. Two large
columns, formed of hewn palm stems, were inserted on either side of
the well, so as to slope inwards. These supported another palm stem
placed horizontally on the top of them; this again sustained a
wooden disk by means of which the water was hauled up. This
system of drawing water is rather comical, for the women, instead of
hauling up the bucket by moving their hands on the rope, seize the
latter and take a quick run, the distance covered being equal to the
depth of the well. When they have thus drawn a pitcherful of water
they return to the well to take another run.
We constantly passed spots in the valley planted more or less
largely with olive trees, but some of these were in an unhealthy
condition, showing grey or yellow instead of a deep fresh green. If
rain were not soon to fall these would die, and it would be many
years before others could be grown and bear fruit.
It cut me to the heart to see all this wealth on the verge of
destruction, and the more so when I learnt that the Khalifa owned
many of the trees. Rain had fallen in many other districts, but none in
this.
Quitting the valley we turned to the right, and rode in a westerly
direction amongst colossal cliffs and into a wild ravine, where we
were surrounded to the north, west, and south by towering rock
pinnacles. Only the very centre of this chasm was reached by the
sun, which, hidden behind the mountain, streamed in glorious
radiance through a rift in the wall of the cliff. On either side of this rift,
with the light playing on their roughly piled grey masses, were the
two villages of Tujan, clinging to the precipitous sides like swallows’
nests to a wall. On one side, high up the mountain, I caught a
glimpse of what appeared to be an eagle’s nest as the sunlight
glanced on it. On inquiring what it was I received the reply that in old,
very old, days the village people resided there, before they moved
lower down the slope.
When we arrived at a difficult pass, my guide, “Erzib ben Hamed,”
who had his home in the village, asked me to dismount. So, leading
our animals, we walked slowly up, our feet slipping, and the stones
rattling down behind us. Beneath some olive trees we again
mounted to make our entry.
We were now near enough to discern that the rift was a deep
ravine; on either side was an irregular mass of dreary, grey houses
piled one over the other, above which the nearly perpendicular cliffs
rose steeply to almost the very top of the mountain, broken only in
one place by a flat surface. On the side nearest to us stood the ruins
of the village of bygone days, perched like a mediæval castle on the
summit of the cliff.
I sat in silent contemplation of this imposing sight, till interrupted
by Hamed, the faithful Hamed, who came up dragging his horse
behind him. He told me to turn round and look at the view of the
Mediterranean.
Great heavens! how glorious was the sight when I raised myself
and looked back. It was so beautiful that even Hamed and the Arabs
were awed by its splendour.
Looking down directly over the slopes, the valley, and the
mountains on either side, we saw the blue sea far away beyond the
plains. In the evening light all the tints of blue, violet, brown, yellow,
and green were softly blended and intermingled as into a veil which
spread over the whole landscape, and imagination divined more than
was actually visible, thus adding to the fascination of the scene.
By the first house, the Sheikh’s, we halted. Some people came
out, one of whom, I suppose, acted as his representative, since he
invited me in; but Hamed was already off his horse and had gone in
to look at the quarters. He returned and announced that they were
very bad, upon which I inquired whether notice had been given of my
coming, and whether the Sheikh had not directed that I should be
given decent accommodation. The spokesman insisted that there
was no other room available. I suspected this to be false, and
ordered Hamed and Erzib to mount their horses at once, and we
rode up a narrow lane and alighted outside Erzib’s dwelling, where
he had already told me I should be welcome. I heard the man
following us, and saw that a number of people had gradually
assembled.
Erzib’s dwelling lay high up on the side of the cliff, but there were
others that were higher still, and yet others below. In front of these
dwellings ran a narrow path, that, starting from the highest farms, led
in a zigzag course down to those below. The outside of the path was
on the edge of a steep declivity, down which all refuse was thrown,
and was therefore dirty; looking, as did all the other banks when
seen from a distance, as though scored with black stripes. On the
slope below us was a house with a courtyard between it and the cliff
wall. This yard, in which a woman was working, was completely
open to view. Thence the ground fell gradually away till it ended in
palm-grown gorges and valleys; beyond these were low hills, then a
plain, and, last of all, the sea.
Below us, and a little to one side, was the principal edifice of the
village—a little mosque, or Marabout’s tomb, outside which a crowd
of men had gathered to perform their evening devotions. Kneeling
almost simultaneously, they kissed the earth and rose again. A few
of them presently disappeared through the open door of the
Marabout’s tomb, but the remainder stayed outside.
Looking upwards, the eyrie on the summit was visible above
Erzib’s house, that is, one could discern it by stretching one’s neck.
On the opposite side, at the end to the left, lay the other village.
In the evening the women sallied forth in numbers to fetch water
from the cisterns in the valley, and the village dogs barked,
answering each other from every side. Below us, at the foot of the
slope, a crowd of men gathered. I could hear their shouts and see
their gesticulations, as, with extended arms, they pointed to one
figure. Some of them turned and called up the bank to us, one of
them being the man who had met me on the Sheikh’s behalf. They
shouted that I should come down and live wherever I pleased with
the other men, and when I replied that I was well installed, they
informed Erzib that fowls, eggs, and bread would shortly be sent,
that the stranger guest might have a really good meal prepared for
him.
Through a very broad gateway I descended into a court. Opposite
was a long house with its own entrance, to the right another
resembling it; and between the two was a passage leading to a third
dwelling that was situated at the back. To the left was a wall.
On the flat roof of the nearest of these houses stood some
enormous rush-bins for corn, and in the courtyard was another.
There also were two fireplaces, one on either side, screened off with
branches. Behind the screen to the left sat a woman laying small
faggots on the fire to warm her hands, for it was cold since the sun
had set. Some children came out of the door, but fled when they
caught sight of me, wrapped as I was in the folds of Erzib’s burnous.
From the door on the left peeped out an elderly and rather nice-
looking woman.
These two were Erzib’s wives: each had her own house; the
children belonged to the woman I saw seated by the hearth.
Erzib told his wives to come forward. This they did quite naturally
and willingly, retiring again after I had shaken hands with them.
Soon after, I saw people arriving with screaming fowls and a
basket of eggs and bread. Erzib at once drew his knife and vanished
with the hens—his intentions were easy to divine.
In the meanwhile carpets had been spread on the floor of the
house, and a couch arranged for me. I lit a candle which had been
placed in a small square recess in the wall. The room was very
irregularly shaped. The floor was of beaten clay, and the walls not
whitewashed. In the background a door led into another room
containing a loom, and where gala dresses hung on a cord, and
household goods on the wall. Through yet another door in the wall to
the right was a room with a bed in it raised on four slight stumps: this
was made of twigs, and had no coverings.
This dwelling was inhabited by the younger wife and her children
—two boys and a little girl. The wife was pretty and not old.
In the house in the courtyard the elder wife resided. In this the
anteroom was larger, and contained household goods and
implements; behind it was the sleeping apartment.
A grown-up married son, then absent, occupied a house tucked
away at the back, and designed on the same plan as the others. His
wife was at home.
Whilst the pile of wood burnt and crackled in the yard and the
women were busy preparing food, I sat on a bank outside the house
in company of my host and several other men.
The moon had risen and shone clearly over mountain and vale. I
could see down into a courtyard at the foot of the slope, where a fire
burnt brightly on a hearth. Over it hung a cauldron watched by the
housewife. She was young and pretty, and as she moved to and fro
a couple of little children trotted after her. Now and then she stood
still, shading her eyes with her hand, and gazing up in our direction;
possibly in the stillness of the night our voices reached her, for it was
not likely that she could see us. By the hearth a white dog lay and
growled, and when the woman paused and looked up he moved
restlessly, for he also was watching the stranger.
Erzib’s first wife came out and stood leaning against the doorway.
She did not speak, but was evidently interested in our conversation.
Her husband glanced at her and said abruptly—
“She has a great sorrow, and has grieved and wept for many
years. Ali, her only son, who was in service at Gabés, was sent to
prison, accused of having stolen money from the tradesman he
served. But he was innocent—that we know; he was a good boy, and
his mother loved him. It is now four years and four months since we
heard from him, and eight months more must pass before we can
have him home again.”
“Do you not even know if he lives?”
“Yes, we have learnt through strangers that he is alive, and
supposed to be imprisoned at Bona in Algeria.”
The old woman drew herself along the wall till she was close to
me when she heard of what we were talking.
“Are you from Bona?” she asked, whimpering.
“No,” I replied, “I come from a much more distant place, and have
never been in Bona.”
“Ah! then you do not know Ali,” she said, with a sob.
“No, poor woman,” I replied; “that I do not; but now you will soon
see your son alive. You have waited so long for him that the
remaining time will soon pass ere he return to you and be happy with
you again, for you love him. He will have thought so often of you,
and he will be so good to you that both of you will rejoice.”
“Ah! it was a great misfortune, for he was innocent—I am sure of
that; another must have been the culprit, for he was so young.”
“How old was he?”
“That I do not remember.”
“Don’t you know what year he was born?”
“No, I cannot recollect; we never know anything of that.”
“Don’t you know either, Erzib?”
“No, Sidi; but it was before the strangers came to this country.”[2]
The poor woman sobbed audibly, and Erzib pushed her inside the
door that her weeping might not trouble me, saying, “She is very
unhappy, Sidi.”
“Oh yes, Erzib. Would I were able to help you to get back your
son sooner, or at least to procure you tidings of him. But this I can
promise—I will speak to the Khalifa of Gabés on the subject, and, if
possible, send you greeting from your son.”
To my regret, however, I must confess that I was unable later to
do anything for these poor folk. Whether the boy is still in prison I
know not, and whether innocent or no, I know less. My sincere hope
is that he may be worthy of his parents’ touching affection.
The repast was now brought and set out in the house, on the clay
floor, where I enjoyed it; the father, surrounded by his children whom
he caressed, sat aside with Hamed and the younger wife.
When I had finished, and Hamed and Erzib had also eaten, we
remained seated. I talked with the wife about her children. The eldest
may have been about ten years old; he was a lively boy, who nodded
continually to me, and was indefatigable in showing me all the
treasures of his home, from an old musket to his father’s agricultural
implements. When I showed surprise at a very primitive and curious
harrow used to break up the soil, his father gave it to me.
Next in age to the boy was a very pretty little girl about six years
old. Unfortunately she had lost one eye; her father told me that it was
in consequence of a severe attack of inflammation when she was
quite little, and that the eye had fallen out of itself. Here in the south
one meets with an alarming number of people who are blind or
suffering from eye complaints. A doctor told me that many are born
thus; with others it is the result of dust, heat, and uncleanliness.
The youngest child was a bright little fellow of two, who clung to
his father, whose neck he clasped tightly in his arms.
Feeling disposed to take a stroll before retiring to rest, I bade
Erzib follow me. As we crossed the court, he inquired whether I
would not like to see all the dwellings. Accordingly we went first to
visit the elder lady. When we entered with a light we found her
crouching in a corner, her face buried in her hands; beside her lay a
large dog which growled at me.
Thence we went into the son’s house. Asleep on the bed, quite
dressed,—for the natives never undress at night,—was a woman
wrapped in blue clothing; she was evidently the son’s wife.
We walked on and up amongst other houses till we were nearly at
the top of the village. Beneath, we saw the lights and fires in the
courts, and heard the incessant barking of dogs. Shortly after, we
climbed a difficult ascent just over the village, to a ledge or terrace of
some width cut in the side of the cliff, which from thence rose, quite
straight and steep, to the old deserted village that lay in darkness on
the very summit. According to Erzib, we could not reach it from the
side we were on.
I contented myself with examining some real cliff caves, which I lit
up by means of matches. They were excavated from the terrace,
and, according to tradition, had once been inhabited; they were
irregular in form, and not very large.
After an hour’s enjoyment of the beautiful evening, we descended
from this high point.
Wrapping myself in my burnous I lay down on my couch on the
ground; in the same room lay both Hamed and Erzib. In the side
chamber, of which the door remained open, slept the children and
their mother. Just as I was falling asleep a woman came and spread
a covering over me; it warmed me well, and I slept till daybreak, and
was only once disturbed by a little kid coming in through the open
door leading from the courtyard and tripping over me. I heard then
the children, who with their mother were sleeping in the next room,
Hamed and Erzib moving on their beds, and, out of doors, the distant
and continuous barking of dogs. I slept again, and when I awoke saw
that what had been spread over me was a brand new festal garment
that evidently was considered none too good for the guest.
From the doorway overlooking the courtyard I saw through the
gate and down into the valley, where grew a solitary palm, and at the
same time had a view of the flat roofs of several houses, and of the
path where the horses and mules stood ready saddled. From a side
chamber the head of a cow came peering in at the gate, and above
the gateway a white dog lay on the wall watching me.
I gave some money to the children, ate a couple of dates with a
sup of water, and, having thanked the women for their hospitality,
mounted, with Erzib in front and Hamed behind me. As we left, the
women came out to throw refuse down the slope, and vanished
again behind the wall.
From the hearths rose a light blue smoke that was wafted over the
valley beneath us.
We had a view over the mountains of the valley, the plains, and
the Mediterranean Sea, as we followed the route along the western
declivity of the Matmata range, which commands the low-lying land
that extends right away to Tripoli.
For a while we were accompanied by two women who were on
their way to the mountains. They tripped along beside our horses,
and stared at me in astonishment through carelessly drawn veils.
The mountain tops, where lie the villages of Shenini and Sguimi,
are a continuation of the southern range. As I was aware that the
inhabitants of these villages were absent sowing their crops, and
having been told that the dwellings were similar to those I had
already seen, I decided not to visit them. We therefore left them on
one side and rode down the mountain and across a small plain
encircled by hills, behind which lie the great steppes. Towards the
east this plain is bounded by low hills, where water springs are
found, and where we could descry herds grazing. It was here that,
when passing through a little thicket, we spied a covey of partridges
running amongst the bushes. Erzib tried to fire at them from his
horse, but it would not stand long enough, and when he got off it was
too late—the birds had flown.
Before traversing the last of these hills, we halted and partook of
dates, bread, and water, as many hours would elapse before we
could arrive at any place of habitation.
The ride on the mule had tired me, so I preceded the others on
foot, and reached the farther side of the acclivity. There lies an
interminable flat plain stretching as far as the eye can reach from the
east to the north-west; whilst towards the south the mountains fade
away in long undulations. In the midst of the plain I distinguished a
hill, and on its summit what appeared to be a tower or fortress. This
was the signal station near Metamer. It corresponds to the one we
saw near Gabés, and also to another farther south.
I wandered down the gentle slope, through bushes and among
stones, and crossed the bed of the river, that, coming from the
mountains, winds out into the plain. There were many paths, all
leading in an easterly direction. I followed one of these, crossed yet
another stony torrent bed, and continued steadily towards the east,
making the signal station my point of direction; until, looking round, I
discovered the two riders in their white burnouses far away towards
the south. They beckoned to me, as we were compelled to make a
détour to avoid a rough and uneven river bed.
Joining once more my party, we rode farther and farther over the
plain, which becomes dismally desolate and monotonous; with the
exception of the hill and its signal station, nothing breaks the long
line of the horizon.
At last we viewed in the distance a couple of palm trees, and
concluded that the Ksar of Metamer was probably near them, but we
could not see it at all, as it lay in a hollow.
For long, naught but these trees showed on the level horizon.
Then at last the tops of other palm trees appeared, and a little later
some huts; the number of these increased, and proved to be the
outskirts of the town. The huts—of straw and branches—were round,
as a rule, with a pointed thatch. But it was easy to infer that the
inhabitants were absent, as the network which usually encloses the
verandah that runs round each hut had been removed, and only the
centre of the huts remained, their thatched eaves sticking out all
round, so that they resembled thick mushrooms on short stalks.
As the day advanced, the heat became stifling, so that I took off
my gaiters and bared my legs. But after a couple of hours they were
so scorched by the sun that, on arrival at Medinin, I had to ask a
doctor to dress them for me, to ease the pain of the sun-scorch, and
it was eight days before they recovered.
CHAPTER XII
Metamer and Medinin
Arriving at the palm grove in the hollow we had seen from the
distance, we found that it lay by a river bed. The trees were not
particularly well cared for, as could be seen at a glance; they were
far apart, and there were few ditches for irrigation.
On a slope to the east of the valley and above it, there is a village
of peculiar construction, with whitewashed buildings that are dazzling
in the sunlight. This is the “Ksar” Metamer. The ground plan of the
houses is oblong and rectangular, and their raised roofs are vaulted.
They lie lengthwise, as the houses do at home in towns dating from
the Middle Ages—the gable ends turning towards the streets. In
general they are erected round an open square. The fronts of those
facing the plain are without any aperture, except some loop-holes
here and there. In other words, every quarter, and also the town as a
whole, forms a little fortress. This is the style of building adopted
here in the plains; it is, in fact, the same plan as that employed in
cave construction, but in this case carried out aboveground; since
the natives have found it impossible to reach the inaccessible
mountain peaks, or to dig down into the rocky ground. The houses
are very often seven storeys high. On every storey there is a well-
barred door to the inner gable. This is reached by steps or by stones
projecting from the walls. The effect is most peculiar and
picturesque. Each inhabitant carries in his hand a key that he takes
with him everywhere. This locks his rooms, which are mostly used as
corn stores.
Not far from the “Ksar” are barracks for the little garrison, and
shops that supply the needs of the soldiers, not only of the place, but
also of those quartered in the neighbouring town of “Medinin.” I did
not wish to visit the camp just then, so dismounted outside an Arab
dwelling, and was invited to enter and partake of stewed kid.
After a hurried visit to the town, and having taken leave of Erzib,
who desired to ride a long way towards his home that evening, I
procured a new guide and rode eastwards over the plain, so as to
arrive before nightfall at the Ksar of Medinin. As we approached its
neighbourhood we turned into the highroad from Gabés.
Before us and to our left lay the “Ksar” of Medinin, illuminated by
the evening sun. The ends of the houses were turned outwards,
producing the effect of a circular wall scalloped at the top. Above
these vaulted gable ends I caught a glimpse of higher buildings, and
amongst them, in the centre of the town, a large square block. This
was the Kasba. Through a narrow opening in the row of houses I
saw the inner gable ends of dwellings, and doors disposed one
above the other, the whole calling to mind the pictures one sees of
Mexican “pueblos.”
A STREET IN BENI BARKA.
Parts lay in deep shadow, parts blinding white in the sunshine.

These lights and shadows were mingled in such dazzling contrast
that the eye could scarcely discriminate what it beheld.
We rode along the exterior wall till we came to some palms;
farther on grew others. These plantations are to the south of the
Ksar and between it and the European quarter, which showed up
gradually on the right, and consisted of barracks for the cavalry and
infantry, quarters for the officers, and those occupied by the “Bureau
de Renseignement.” The soldiers work amongst the palms, and have
enclosed a plot of ground as a garden. In the beds I saw tender
young green plants sprouting, which proved to be cress. In the open
square in front of headquarters, and before the other houses, holes
were being dug for plants by soldiers in light linen clothing.
In the future the whole military quarter will be surrounded by a
beautiful palm grove, affording shade to the dwellings now
completely exposed to the glare of the sun.
I rode up to headquarters—a large building—where the flag was
hoisted half-mast high on account of the death of Marshal
MacMahon.
Lieutenant Henry, who was at the Bureau, came out to welcome
me. He told me that I was expected, and added that I should meet
the officers of the 4th Light Brigade, whom I had known well at
Gabés, they having arrived to relieve the southern station. I was
quickly conducted to real bachelor’s quarters, consisting of a couple
of rooms. All over the walls hung weapons and curiosities collected
in these regions. The furniture, though camp-like, was very
comfortable. At last I was able to indulge in the luxury of a bath and
change.
In the meantime Hamed arrived to say farewell. He wished to ride
back to Metamer on his donkey and accompany Erzib as far as
Tujan, whence he hoped to take the donkey back to Hadeij, and
return later to Gabés.
When I was dressed I called on the Commander-in-Chief of the
district, Commandant Billet, a young man, who invited me to be his
guest.
When I told him that I was most anxious to meet some Tuareg if
possible, he replied, to my great joy, that by riding some thirty-two
miles farther south I should probably have my wish gratified, as a
telegram had just arrived from the signal station that two of these

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Small Baltic States and the

Euro-Atlantic Security Community

Threats to Euro-Atlantic Security: Views from the

Small States and the New Security Environment Anne-

Food Security in Small Island States John Connell

Nation Building in the Baltic States Transforming

The World of Small States Volume 6 Small States and the

Maritime Security Challenges in the South Atlantic

Coastal Landscapes of the Mesolithic Human Engagement

Before the Public Library: Reading, Community, and

Small Baltic States

ISBN 978-3-030-53762-3 ISBN 978-3-030-53763-0 (eBook)

Small Baltic States: Sensitivities and Vulnerabilities 7

The Surge of the Euro-Atlantic Community: 1956, 1968,

American Foreign Policy and the Baltic States 129

The Baltic Predicament: Russia’s Shadows 167

The Baltic States in Europe 221

Small Baltic States: Sensitivities and Vulnerabilities

The Baltic Predicament: Russia’s Shadows

Small Baltic States: Sensitivities and Vulnerabilities

The Baltic Predicament: Russia’s Shadows

Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians are known as people who love to

© The Author(s) 2021 1

Broadly shared in the West, Franklin Delano Roosevelt explicitly noted

2 Vaira Vı̄ķe-Freiberga, “The Speech of the President of the Republic of Latvia,”

denied at the outset due to inherent incompatibility. During the occupa-

This book will eventually provide the answer to what extent if at

© The Author(s) 2021 7

For example, in the 1960s France rose as a European nuclear power or

Fig. 1 UN Member states: 1945–2011 (Source UN)

security, foreign policy or culture and ideology, for example. By utilizing

14 A. E. Campbell, “Review: Finlandization: Towards a General Theory of Adaptive

International trade, political affairs, social affairs, and diplomatic inter-

20 Alyson J. K. Bailes, “Does a Small State Need a Strategy,” University of Iceland:

Thus, this experience has a significant effect on the domestic debates

played an important role even when the application of power seemed to

Therefore, modernizing military became a possibility for smaller states,

A small, non-aligned power, at least in so far as it is involved in, or

policies will depend on inherent security perceptions.35 The lessons of

ambiguities. During the German invasion of Denmark and Norway, it

trade deficits. By not withdrawing from financial cooperation, Switzer-

46 Jacques R. Pauwels, “Hitler, the West and Switzerland, 1936–1945,” Labour-Le

Over the Mountains and across the Plain

from Hadeij to Metamer

Metamer and Medinin

Parts lay in deep shadow, parts blinding white in the sunshine.

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