The Growth of Populism in The Political Mainstream The Contagion Effect of Populist Messages On Mainstream Parties Communication Jakob Schwörer

The Growth Of Populism In The Political
Mainstream The Contagion Effect Of

Populist Messages On Mainstream
Parties Communication Jakob
Schwörer
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Springer Series in Electoral Politics
Series Editors: Daniel Stockemer · Daphne Halikiopoulou
Jakob Schwörer
The Growth
of Populism in
the Political
Mainstream
The Contagion Effect of Populist
Messages on Mainstream Parties’
Communication
Series Editors
Daniel Stockemer, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON,
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Jakob Schwörer
The Growth of Populism

in the Political Mainstream
The Contagion Effect of Populist Messages
on Mainstream Parties’ Communication
Jakob Schwörer
Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD)
Leuphana University of Lüneburg
Lüneburg, Germany
Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Dissertation, 2021
ISSN 2524-8103 ISSN 2524-8111 (electronic)

ISBN 978-3-030-72448-1 ISBN 978-3-030-72449-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72449-8
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Preface
The present book examines the discursive “populistisation” of mainstream parties in

Germany, Austria, Italy and Spain. For a long time, populist and radical right parties
have been a main subject of investigation in academic research. Yet, how main-
stream parties react to the rise of such actors is less known. Scholars assume a “pop-
ulist Zeitgeist”, a populist contagion claiming that the political mainstream actively
engages in populist and nativist discourses. This study tests this widespread assump-
tion analysing whether centre-left and centre-right mainstream parties adopt populist
messages as well as content related to the leftist and right-wing host ideologies of
populist actors.
Building on recent spatial theory, a variety of variables is identified expected to
influence mainstream parties’ communication. Conducting a quantitative and qual-
itative content analysis, it is first assessed how degrees of populist, nativist and
leftist messages in mainstream parties’ election manifestos shift over time in the
face of external pressure. Unlike other studies, the analysis relies on two different
types of text sources: election manifestos reflecting the official party discourse and
statements on the websites of mainstream parties as a less institutional type of party
communication. In addition, previous work has measured populist discourses without
considering leftist and nativist discourses, which derive from to the host ideologies
of populist actors and might influence mainstream parties’ communication as well.
The findings suggest that several mainstream parties become more populist and
leftist in their manifestos when respective parties gain electoral success and experi-
ence an electoral breakthrough or when shifts in public opinion occur. In sum, public
opinion seems to have a crucial impact on mainstream parties’ discourses. Yet, the
political mainstream is much more prone to adopt nativist than populist and leftist
messages. In this regard, it seems to be more appropriate to talk about a “nativist”
than “populist” Zeitgeist. However, the findings from the online statements deviate
from the manifestos’ analysis. In this regard, it is argued that party manifestos are
more suitable for measures of populist, nativist and leftist content since they are
constructed more consciously and strategically than short-lived online messages.
v
vi Preface
Furthermore, the book explores the quality and content of populist, nativist and
leftist discourses in election manifestos. Previous comparative and longitudinal anal-
yses mostly provided quantitative data regarding populist communication of main-
stream parties and did not mention the concrete content of these discourses and how it
develops over time. This work explores the quality of messages towards the political
and economic elite, the people and specific outgroups and immigration and whether
mainstream parties talk in a new or different way about these targets in the face
of external pressure. The findings reveal that mainstream parties do not only talk
more frequently about these targets when they are confronted with external pressure
but also introduce distinct discourses about them. Among others, the political main-
stream sometimes mentions own past measures it claims to have taken against the
political elite, economic actors, outgroups and immigration and for the people when
respective competing parties or public moods are on the rise.
Finally, the study analyses the consequences of these “contagions” for liberal
democracies. Anti-pluralism and illiberalism are usually considered as the main
threats deriving from populist and nativist discourses. Right-wing populists question
the legitimacy of the political establishment accusing it of not acting in the (native)
people’s interest and evaluate the supposed will of the (native) people as more impor-
tant than unelected institutions and constitutional law. The study shows that illiberal
and anti-pluralist messages are linked to nativist rather than populist statements.
Mainstream parties’ demands towards the political elite and the people do not ques-
tion the legitimacy of political actors or prioritise a supposed will of the people over
constitutional rights. Such messages are only present in mainstream parties’ nativist
statements. Almost only in Austria, mainstream parties prioritise the will of the “Aus-
trians” over the basic right of asylum and minority rights when external pressure is
high. Since it is rather nativism than populism that is adopted by mainstream parties
and that communicates illiberal views, this work concludes claiming that the rise of
populism is not the main challenge for liberal democracy nowadays but the growth
of radical right parties and the behaviour of the (centre-right) political mainstream
engaging with discourses once owned by the radical right.
Lüneburg, Germany Jakob Schwörer

Contents
1 Introduction: Populistisation of Mainstream Parties? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Theoretical-Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1 Populism, Populist Communication and Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Party Competition and Contagion Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 A Populist Contagion? The State of Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3 Study Design and Analytical Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.1 Research Design and Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 Method and Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2.1 Independent Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4 Contamination of Mainstream Parties’ Messages? Shifting
Degrees of Communicative Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.1 Indications of Contagion Effects on Formal and Institutional
Party Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.1.1 Populist Contagions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.1.2 Nativist Contagions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.1.3 Leftist Contagions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2 Indications of Contagion Effects on Informal Party
Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2.1 Populist Contagions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2.2 Nativist Contagions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.2.3 Leftist Contagions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.2.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
vii
viii Contents
5 From Degrees to Content: The Meaning of Communicative

Content and New Emerging Discourses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.1 Anti-elitist Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.1.1 Populist and Mainstream Parties’ Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.1.2 Communicative Shifts of Mainstream Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.2 People-Centred Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.2.1 Populist and Mainstream Parties’ Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.3 Anti-outgroups Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.3.1 Radical-Right and Mainstream Parties’ Messages . . . . . . . . . 138
5.4 Anti-immigration Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.4.1 Radical-Right and Mainstream Parties’ Messages . . . . . . . . . 153
5.5 Messages Against Economic Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
5.5.1 Leftist and Mainstream Parties’ Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
5.6 Consequences for Democracy: Indications of Illiberal
and Anti-Pluralist Contagions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
5.6.1 Illiberal Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
5.6.2 Anti-pluralist Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
5.6.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
5.7 Summary: The Content of Mainstream Parties’ Populist,
Nativist and Leftist Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Uncited References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Abbreviations
AfD Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany)

BZÖ Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria)
CDU/CSU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands/Christlich-Soziale
Union in Bayern (Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian
Social Union in Bavaria)
CHES Chapel Hill Expert Survey
C-L Centre-left
C-R Centre-right
FI/PdL Forza Italia/Il Popolo della Libertà (Forward Italy/The People of
Freedom)
FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria)
IET Issue evolution theory
IU Izquierda Unida (United Left)
LN Lega Nord (Northern League)
LP Left parties
M5S Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement)
NCCR National Center of Competence in Research
ÖVP Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People’s Party)
PD Partito Democratico (Democratic Party)
PEGIDA Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (Patri-
otic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident)
Pod Podemos (We Can)
PP Partido Popular (People’s Party) or Populist Parties [mentioned only
in some tables]
PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party)
RRP Radical right parties
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of
Germany)
SPÖ Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Social Democratic Party of
Austria)
TS Team Stronach
ix
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Average vote shares for populist parties in national

and European elections in Austria, Belgium, Switzerland,
Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, UK, Ireland,
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Note As at 15/9/2919.
Data from ParlGov. Parties characterised as populist
according to the “popu-list” (Rooduijn et al. 2019)
and “Populismtracker” (https://progressivepost.eu/spotli
ghts/populism-tracker. Last access 29/9/2019.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Fig. 2.2 Number of new publications per year containing the term
“populis*” (title or abstract) based on the Scopus database . . . . . 13
Fig. 4.1 Populist messages in mainstream parties’ manifestos
and vote shares for populist parties (PP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Fig. 4.2 Anti-elitist messages in mainstream parties’ manifestos
and public distrust in institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Fig. 4.3 Anti-elitist messages in election manifestos of mainstream
parties (n = 31) and public moods (cross-national
scatterplot) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Fig. 4.4 Nativist messages in mainstream parties’ manifestos
and vote shares for radical-right parties (RRP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Fig. 4.5 Nativist messages in mainstream parties’ manifestos
and public salience of immigration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Fig. 4.6 Nativist messages in election manifestos of the centre-right
(n = 15) and public salience of immigration (cross-national
scatterplot) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Fig. 4.7 Leftist messages in mainstream parties’ manifestos
and vote shares for left parties (LP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Fig. 4.8 Leftist messages in mainstream parties’ manifestos
and public salience of the national economy’s situation . . . . . . . . 83
Fig. 4.9 Populist messages in mainstream parties’ online statements
and vote shares for populist parties (PP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Fig. 4.10 Anti-elitist messages in mainstream parties’ online
statements and public distrust in institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
xi
xii List of Figures
Fig. 4.11 Nativist messages in mainstream parties’ online statements

and vote shares for radical-right parties (RRP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Fig. 4.12 Nativist messages in mainstream parties’ online statements
and public salience of immigration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Fig. 4.13 Leftist messages in mainstream parties’ online statements
and public salience of the national economy’s situation . . . . . . . . 98
Fig. A.1 Anti-elitist messages in mainstream parties’ manifestos
and accumulated vote shares for populist parties (PP) . . . . . . . . . 211
Fig. A.2 Leftist messages in mainstream parties’ online statements
and vote shares for left parties (LP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Addressees of populist and nativist communication

(based on: Schwörer 2016, 16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Table 3.1 Case selection for election manifestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Table 3.2 Case selection for websites’ statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Table 3.3 Content analytical approaches and research questions . . . . . . . 56
Table 4.1 Results from content analysis of election manifestos . . . . . . . . 66
Table 4.2 Populism scores of mainstream parties’ election
manifestos (n = 31) by party type and Pearson
correlations with vote shares for populist parties (PP)
and with public distrust in institutions (cross-national
model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Table 4.3 Messages of mainstream parties and vote loss (Pearson
correlation for each country) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Table 4.4 Summary of explanation for anti-elitist shifts
of mainstream parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Table 4.5 Nativism scores of mainstream parties’ election
manifestos (n = 31) by party type and Pearson
correlations with vote shares for radical-right parties
(RRP) and with public salience of immigration
(cross-national model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Table 4.6 Summary of explanation for nativist shifts of mainstream
parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Table 4.7 Left scores of mainstream parties’ election manifestos
(n = 31) by party type and Pearson correlations
with vote shares for left parties (LP) and with public
salience of the economy’s situation (cross-national
model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Table 4.8 Summary of explanations for leftist shifts of mainstream
parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Table 4.9 Summary of tested hypotheses for the quantitative
analysis of mainstream parties’ election manifestos . . . . . . . . . 86
xiii
xiv List of Tables
Table 4.10 Results of content analysis of websites’ statements

(mean values for all time units; n = 52) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Table 4.11 Populism scores of mainstream parties’ online statements
(n = 30) by party type and Pearson correlations with vote
shares for populist parties (PP) and with public distrust
in institutions (cross-national model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Table 4.12 Messages of mainstream parties and vote loss (Pearson
correlation for each country) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Table 4.13 Nativism scores of mainstream parties’ online statements
(n = 31) by party type and Pearson correlations with vote
shares for radical-right parties (RRP) and with public
salience of immigration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Table 4.14 Left scores of mainstream parties’ online statements
(n = 31) by party type and Pearson correlations
with vote shares for left parties (LP) and with public
salience of the economy’s situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Table 5.1 Frequency of anti-elitist submessages in election
manifestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Table 5.2 Frequency of mainstream parties’ anti-elitist demands
in election manifestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Table 5.3 Striking communicative shifts of mainstream parties
in election manifestos (anti-elitist communication) . . . . . . . . . 119
Table 5.4 Frequency of people-centred submessages in election
manifestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Table 5.5 Frequency of mainstream parties’ people-centred
demands in election manifestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
in election manifestos (people-centred communication) . . . . . . 135
Table 5.7 Frequency of anti-outgroup submessages in election
manifestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Table 5.8 Frequency of mainstream parties’ demands against
outgroups in election manifestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
in election manifestos (messages against outgroups) . . . . . . . . 151
Table 5.10 Frequency of anti-immigration submessages in election
manifestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Table 5.11 Frequency of mainstream parties’ anti-immigration
messages in election manifestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
in election manifestos (messages against immigration) . . . . . . 165
Table 5.13 Frequency of left-wing submessages in election
manifestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Table 5.14 Frequency of mainstream parties’ demands against
economic actors in election manifestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
List of Tables xv

in election manifestos (messages against economic
actors) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
Table 5.16 Emphasising own actions towards targets as new
communicative content in election manifestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Table 5.17 New communicative content in election manifestos . . . . . . . . . 194
Table A.1 Numbers of immigrants from non-EU countries arriving
per year based on data from Eurostat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Table A.2 Category system for measures of anti-elitist,
people-centred, anti-outgroup, left and anti-immigration
messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Table A.3 Messages of mainstream parties in election manifestos
and opposition status (mean value for each party and all
time units) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
Table A.4 Selected websites of mainstream parties for Sect. 4.2 . . . . . . . . 213
Table A.5 Messages of mainstream parties on their websites
and opposition status (mean value for each party and all
time units) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
Table A.6 Mainstream parties’ anti-elitist demands in election
manifestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
Table A.7 Mainstream parties’ people-centred demands in election
manifestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Table A.8 Mainstream parties’ demands towards outgroups
Table A.9 Mainstream parties’ messages against immigration
Table A.10 Mainstream parties’ demands towards economic actors
List of Graphic
Graphic 3.1 Potential explanations for mainstream parties’ (MP)

populist, nativist and leftist communicative shifts . . . . . . . . . . 61
xvii
Chapter 1
Introduction: Populistisation
of Mainstream Parties?
The rise of populist parties in Western Europe has brought about the thesis of the
“populist Zeitgeist” (Mudde 2004) in Western democracies. The increasing electoral
success of such political actors over the past decades can in fact hardly be denied
(Lewis et al. 2018; Fig. 1). Since the 1980s, populists’ vote shares increase in a consid-
erable way and almost linearly. The spectrum of populist parties in Western Europe is
extremely diversified, including left-wing, far-right and other types of populist parties
(Caiani and Graziano 2019). According to most scholars, populism as ideology, set of
ideas or type of political communication, consists of two main elements (Decker and
Lewandowsky 2017; Hawkins et al. 2012; Mudde 2004; Rooduijn 2014a; Wolinetz
and Zaslove 2018): On the one hand, a rejection and negative evaluation of the polit-
ical elite, which is portrayed as bad and evil and as not acting in the people’s interest.
On the other hand, positive references to the common people whose will should guide
politics.
Besides highlighting the growing electoral success of populist parties in the last
decades, the populist Zeitgeist also refers to a “populistization” (Manucci and Weber
2017, 4) of mainstream parties. In his well-known article from 2004, Mudde claims
that by trying to exclude populists from power, mainstream parties increasingly
include “populist themes and rhetoric to try and fight off the challenge. This dynamic
will bring about a populist Zeitgeist, like the one we are facing today, which will
dissipate as soon as the populist challenger seems to be over its top” (p. 563). In a
recent article for The Guardian, Mudde (2019) reinforced this assumption: “More
and more mainstream politicians are using ‘pro-people’ and/or ‘anti-elite’ rhetoric to
win voters—in part to fight off electoral challenges from true populist actors”. Thus,
mainstream parties are expected to include populist elements in their discourses when
they are put under pressure—for example, by the success of competing populist
parties. This development is referred to as “populist contagion” (Rooduijn et al.
2014). The term contagion in the context of research on populism is usually not
clearly operationalised but refers to communicative or programmatic shifts of parties
towards more populist discourses or policies due to changes in political surroundings
(Rooduijn et al. 2014). In order to strengthen his argument, Mudde (2019) refers to
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 1

J. Schwörer, The Growth of Populism in the Political Mainstream, Springer Series
in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72449-8_1
2 1 Introduction: Populistisation of Mainstream Parties?
a study conducted by Team Populism (Hawkins et al. 2019) that classified main-
stream leaders such as the former British prime minister Theresa May as “somewhat
populist” based on an analysis of public speeches (Lewis et al. 2019b).
The idea of a generalised populist contagion is highly debated: Some scholars
argue that mainstream parties do not become thoroughly populist, but adopt a “soft
populism”, or a “populist rhetoric” in the face of populist pressure (Mudde 2013, 9).
Mazzoleni (2008, 57) reiterates the claim that a “populist contamination of main-
stream political discourse” can be observed. Analysing a speech of Tony Blair from
1999, Mair (2002, 92) states that “one of the first things this rhetoric reveals is the
extent to which a populist language has now become acceptable within what has long
been perceived as a decidedly non-populist political culture”. Mény and Surel (2002,
13) agree on the fact that “political leaders or parties borrow the political rhetoric of
populism for electoral opportunism”. Mentioning an example from French politics,
they (2002, 13) find it “ironic to listen to Jacques Chirac criticising the French elites of
whom he is the epitome”. Decker and Lewandowsky (2017) even see it as proven that
the established non-populist parties take over (right-wing) populists’ appeal to the
voter but also their main issues. As an example, they (2017, 22) mention the “aggres-
sive presidential election campaign of Nicolas Sarkozy in 2012 in France”. Yet,
besides anti-elitist and people-centred demands, Decker and Lewandowsky (2017)
claim that elements deriving from the host ideologies of populist actors—mostly
issues owned by the far-right—are further adopted by mainstream parties such as
anti-Islam positions.
Thus, within the academic literature, we find widespread assumptions about
how mainstream parties react to the success of populist parties. Leading scholars
assume that traditional parties adopt populist rhetoric as well as issues and demands
from populist parties. According to spatial theories of party competition, this is not
surprising. This branch of literature pictures political parties as rational vote-seekers
attempting to increase their support by adopting strategies, discourses or policies,
which seem to be promising. In this sense, parties might copy political competi-
tors or adopt positions, which are popular among the public when they think that
this strengthens their electoral appeal (Adams et al. 2004; Downs 1957; Fagerholm
2016; Meguid 2005).
Yet, even though a populistisation of mainstream actors is assumed in academia,
this is “rarely investigated empirically” (Manucci and Weber 2017, 1), which is
surprising since populism and liberal democracy are mostly considered as “not fully
compatible” (Rooduijn 2013, 4) and a supposed contagion of mainstream parties’
rhetoric might therefore pose a considerable danger for Western democracies. Indeed,
several scholars mention threats that might derive from populist ideas and messages
(Abts and Rummens 2007; Canovan 1999; Mény and Surel 2002; Mudde and Kalt-
wasser 2017; Müller 2016). First, populists are expected to be anti-pluralist. The
populists’ critique towards the political elite often questions the legitimacy of the
other political actors accusing them of being immoral or of acting against the people’s
will (Müller 2016). Mudde (2015) explains that as follows:
1 Introduction: Populistisation of Mainstream Parties? 3
As the populists are the vox populi, ie the voice of all the people, anyone with a different
view speaks for ‘special interests’, ie the elite. Given that the key distinction is between the
pure people and the corrupt elite, any compromise would lead to the corruption of the people
and is therefore rejected.
Second, populist actors are often considered illiberal since they prioritise the will
of the people over unelected institutions and constitutional rights (Mudde and Kalt-
wasser 2017). Populists reject “all limitations on the expression of the general will,
most notably the constitutional protection of minorities and the independence (from
politics, and therefore from democratic control) of key state institutions” (Mudde
2004, 561).
However, it should be noted that some scholars refuse the assumption that
populism is necessarily linked to illiberalism and anti-pluralism. Akkerman (2017)
as well as March and Mudde (2005) claims that left-wing populists in Europe do
not pose a danger to liberal democracy unlike radical right parties, which do so due
to their nativist and illiberal host ideology. Rydgren (2017) argues in the same way
and identifies “ethnic nationalism”—not populism—as the main driver of populist
radical right parties. The fact that some populist parties claim, “that they, and they
alone, represent the people as a whole” (Müller 2016, 20) is mostly due to ideolog-
ical elements from the far-right (Rydgren 2017, 492). Nevertheless, investigating a
supposed contagion effect of populist discourses and demands on mainstream parties
is highly a relevant issue since a large number of scholars evaluate populism as a
considerable threat for liberal democracy. As long as populism remains on the fringe
of the political spectrum, it “will most likely not be influential enough to affect
the functioning of liberal democratic systems” (Rooduijn 2013, 4). However, if it
is adopted by mainstream political actors, also illiberal and anti-pluralist narratives
might spread and change the political culture or even the liberal character of Western
democracies.
So far, only few studies assess the contagious potential of populism on main-
stream parties’ political communication in a comparative perspective. As shortly
mentioned above, the study conducted by Team Populism analyses speeches from
heads of governments and does not address the question how the rhetoric of these
leaders (or of mainstream parties) develops over time.1 Only two studies directly
or indirectly touch upon this question and provide a systematic, comparative and
longitudinal analysis of mainstream parties’ populist communication in election
manifestos (Manucci and Weber 2017; Rooduijn et al. 2014). Their focus is the
measurement of people-centrism and anti-elitism labelled as the two main features
of populism. While these studies can be considered as ground-breaking contributions
to the populist contagion thesis, they do not address messages, which derive from
the host ideology of populist parties and do hardly highlight potential consequences
for democracy. As mentioned above, some scholars argue that it is first and fore-
most nativism (or ethnic nationalism) that characterises most populist parties while
populist ideas themselves play only a secondary role (Akkerman 2017; Rydgren
1 They indeed have a longitudinal approach but they analyse speeches of different
leaders over time.
Accordingly, they do not touch upon the question whether the same actors become more populist.
2017). Accordingly, we are confronted with little evidence for a populist conta-
gion so far but it further is to be investigated whether populism or the actual host
ideology has a larger impact on mainstream parties’ communication and whether the
consequences of these contagions pose a threat for democracy.
Hence, focussing exclusively on populist messages might disregard potentially
illiberal and anti-pluralist elements within radical-right discourses, which are some-
times seen as the main driver of illiberalism and anti-pluralism. In order to provide
a more comprehensive picture of contagion effects and its consequences on main-
stream parties, this thesis focuses on both populist and radical right—or nativist—
messages. To complete the picture, it is further assessed whether specific left-wing
populist messages are adopted by mainstream parties. While populist communica-
tion is about criticising the political elite, especially populists from the left further
attack economic elites (Corbetta 2013; Katsambekis 2017; Pauwels 2014; Pelinka
2013; Schwörer 2016).
As mentioned below in more detail, the overarching research interest touches upon
the question whether a populist, nativist or leftist contagion occur in west Europen
party systems. Therefore, I first trace changes in the degree of mainstream parties’
populist, nativist and leftist messages over time starting before the 2008 European
economic crisis—leading to the establishment and success of non-right-wing populist
parties in southern Europe—until the first election after the so-called refugee crisis
in 2015 boosting electoral results of populist radical right parties in Germany and
Austria. I observe if centre-right and centre-left parties in Italy, Spain, Germany
and Austria use such messages more frequently when respective competing parties’2
gain electoral success and public opinion shifts towards more anti-elitist, nativist
and leftist moods. In a second step, I investigate the content of populist, nativist and
leftist messages: Does the nature of such messages differ between mainstream and
respective populist, leftist and nativist parties—which are refered to as niche parties
in this study?3 How do mainstream parties talk about the people, the political and
2 Zulianello (2019) classifies the populist parties in these countries as “non-integrated” or “negatively
integrated” populists. According to him, both types are “anti-system” parties in ideological terms
since they challenge “constitutional limitations of popular sovereignty and pluralism” (Zulianello
2019, 15). Yet, several scholars doubt that left-wing populist parties such as Podemos or Die Linke
are illiberal (Akkerman 2015; March 2017; March and Mudde 2005).
3 Meguid (2005) mentions three characteristics of niche parties. First, these parties “politicize sets
of issues which were previously outside the dimension of party competition” (347) such as green
issues or immigration (the same is true for the people-elite cleavage). Moreover, “niche parties
appeal to groups of voters that may cross-cut traditional partisan allignments” (348) so their issues
do not coincide with classical lines of division (e.g. labour and capital). Last, niche parties focus
on a smaller number of topics than traditional parties, such as immigration or ecological issues.
These characteristics apply to parties with a primarily populist agenda and discourse. Yet, left-wing
populists focus on several issues, which coincide with traditional lines of political division such as
taxes, global solidarity, anti-capitalism and redistribution. Nevertheless, due to practical reasons, I
refer to populist, radical right and left parties as niche parties in this work.
economic elite and cultural outgroups in the face of external pressure4 and do they
introduce new and distinct discourses during such periods? Thus, I do not only focus
on the degree of mainstream parties’ populist, nativist and leftist messages but also
on their concrete content and how it develops over time. At this point, the study
further addresses the question whether illiberal and anti-pluralist elements can be
identified within populist, nativist or leftist communication of mainstream parties
and whether they become more salient when external pressure increases.
To sum up, the overarching research question for this study can be summerised
as follows:
Are there reasonable indications for a populist, nativist and leftist contagion
effect on mainstream parties and does that pose a threat for liberal democracy?
The question will be empirically explored through five more specific questions.
First, in order to assess whether the quantity of respective communicative elements
increases, it needs to be assessed whether the degree of such elements in mainstream
parties’ discourses is on the rise. This is done by the following question:
(I) Does the degree of populist, nativist and leftist messages increase in mainstream
parties’ election manifestos and websites’ statements when external pressure
increases?
Second, the overarching research question distinguishes between populist, nativist
and leftist contagion effects. Yet, these might not occur to the same extent. Which of
these messages are more likely to be adopted by mainstream parties is formulated in
the second specific research question.
(II) What seems to be more contagious for mainstream parties: populist, nativist
or leftist messages?
Focussing exclusively on mainstream parties might overlook differences in the
quality of statements compared to “true” populist or nativist parties. Thus, it is neces-
sary to distinguish, for example, between the concrete content of messages blaming
the political establishment raised by mainstream and populist parties. Do mainstream
parties use the same kind of discourses as populist parties or do they appear more
“soft” (Mudde 2013, 9)? The third specific question is therefore as follows.
(III) How does the content of populist, nativist and leftist messages differ between
mainstream and respective (populist, radical right, leftist) niche parties? Do
they talk in a different way about the people, the elite, outgroups, immigration
and economic actors?
Besides observing whether the degree of populist, nativist and leftist messages
increases among mainstream parties or to what extent the content of these messages
differ between mainstream and populist parties, qualitative changes might also occur
4 Externalpressure exists when considerable increases on the scores of the independent variables
occur. These are mainly increases in niche parties’ vote share (populist, radical right or left ones),
the emergence of new relevant niche parties and shifts in public moods.
over time. For instance, mainstream parties might attack political elites in a different
way when put under pressure by electorally successful populist parties. How and
under what conditions the content of populist, nativist and leftist messages change
is covered by the fourth research question.
(IV) Do mainstream parties change the way they talk about their targets—the
people, the political and economic elite, outgroups and immigration—when
external pressure increases? Do they emphasise different traits, actions and
aspects than usual?
Last, the overarching research questions further point towards implications of
a supposed populistisation of mainstream parties for liberal democracies. Does
that also imply an increase of illiberal and anti-pluralist elements, considered as
main threats deriving from populism (Mudde 2015; Müller 2016)? The last specific
question touches upon this aspect.
(V) What are the consequences of the populist, nativist and leftist contagion on
mainstream parties’ discourses in terms of illiberal and anti-pluralist elements?
Are the latter part of mainstream parties’ populist, nativist or leftist discourses?
As illustrated within the previous paragraphs, the topic of this thesis is highly
relevant for academic research. It steps into a research gap investigating mainstream
parties’ communication in the face of (populist, radical right, leftist) niche parties’
successes and shifts in public opinion. It reveals whether potential contagion effects
have implications for liberal democracy assessing if populist or nativist (or leftist)
messages published by traditional parties communicate illiberal or anti-pluralist
views. It further has some political implications for the non-academic field. If not
populism but rather nativism threatens liberal democracy, politicians and the media
should rather emphasise the radical right than populism when highlighting the rise
of illiberal political actors in Western Europe. In summary, my analyses reveal that
several mainstream parties become more populist and leftist when external pres-
sure increases but are even more prone to adopt nativist messages. Furthermore,
while mainstream parties’ populist as well as leftist messages hardly contain illib-
eral or anti-pluralist discourses, their nativist discourses sometimes tansmit illiberal
elements. Mainstream parties’ messages towards political elites and the people do
not question constitutional principles while some nativist statement claims that the
native people should judge over the rights of refugees and immigrants instead of
independent courts deciding on the basis of constitutional law. In this sense, I argue
that the main challenge in party politics is not the rise of populism but nativism.
The thesis proceeds as follows. I provide a definition of populism and a conceptu-
alisation of populist, nativist and specific leftist messages directed towards economic
actors (Sect. 2.1). Despite the fact that populism has been a contested term for many
years among scholars, recently there seems to be at least a common understanding
about its main features. Based on these core elements, I provide a first conceptuali-
sation of populist communication. I further explain the main ideological features of
the nativist host ideology of radical-right parties and core traits of left-wing populist
parties.
Section (2.2) describes the theoretical background of this study. Modified spatial
approaches provide explanations for shifts in party behaviour, which can easily be
adapted to the purpose of this study, namely explaining shifts in the degrees and
content of populist, nativist and leftist communication of mainstream parties. Unlike
previous studies concerned with populist contagions or communication (Manucci
and Weber 2017; Rooduijn et al. 2014), I rely on a variety of explanatory factors
discussed in populism and communication studies and spatial theory. Shifts in public
opinion in particular are seen as a crucial driver of party behaviour (Fagerholm 2016)
but respective data is often difficult to access for periods that lie further in the past.
This might be the reason why studies such as Rooduijn et al. (2014) did not include
it as independent variable. The subsequent Sect. (2.3) describes the state of research
regarding contagion effects of populist, nativist and leftist messages and reveals a
considerable research gap regarding the effects of populist and leftist messages on
mainstream parties.
Section 3.1 illustrates the research design including case and source selection. In
order to identify clues for contagion effects, I rely on a variety of sources as shortly
indicated above. Grasping a contagion on the formal or institutional communica-
tion of mainstream parties, I analyse 52 election manifestos of 16 different political
parties in Italy, Spain, Germany and Austria. The focus is on party manifestos of
the mainstream centre-left and centre-right in each country. I expect that the degrees
of populist, nativist and leftist messages increase when populist/radical-right/leftist
parties gain electoral support (or establish themselves as new relevant competitors),
when public opinion shifts in a respective way and when mainstream parties experi-
ence several other changes in their surroundings. In order to capture a more informal
or public-related type of communication, I rely on a second type of analysis, namely
statements from the party websites. While election manifestos are sometimes thought
to not appeal to the electorate (Rooduijn et al. 2014), websites’ statements could
be expected to be directed more explicitly towards an audience, mainly the own
followers or the media.
The methodological approach and sources are described in Sect. 3.2. I use a quanti-
tative but not computer-based content analysis in order to trace shifts in the degrees of
populist, nativist and leftist messages of political parties in the four countries. All texts
are coded manually referring to a codebook created by scholars from the “National
Centre of Competence in Research” (NCCR) and to several empirical studies working
with it. The codebook provides different subcategories of people-centred and anti-
elitist messages. It can further be used for measures of nativist communication and
messages towards economic elites since respective categories capture evaluations
and demands towards any kind of targets. The subcategories are useful to analyse
the meaning of people-centred and anti-elitist communication of mainstream parties.
Yet, in order to examine the concrete content of respective messages, I further conduct
a more qualitative analysis, which allows inductive category building and captures
further dimensions of populist, nativist and leftist messages.
Chapter 4 illustrates the findings of the content analyses for party manifestos
and public statements of mainstream parties covering different periods. It should
already be made clear at this point that the present study cannot identify any clear
causal relationship but rather good arguments for or against existing assumptions.
I observe communicative shifts of mainstream parties over time testing whether
common explanations from rational choice approaches are able to explain these shifts.
Besides “classical” explanations such as successes of competing niche parties, I also
include public opinion as an explanatory variable. In addition, I discuss the findings
referring to further explanations from country-specific literature, where necessary. I
mainly use descriptive statistics—due to a rather small n—in order to illustrate the
connection between shifting degrees of communicative content and the independent
variables. It is further attempted to highlight communicative behaviour that cannot be
explained by existing approaches. Section 4.1 provides good arguments to assume
that a populist contagion is indeed taking place in election manifestos of several
mainstream parties. Yet, the political mainstream seems to be more prone to adopt
nativist than populist (and leftist) messages. In contrast, the results from the content
analysis of the websites’ statements (Sect. 4.2) do not indicate a populist contagion
but only suggest that mainstream parties sometimes become more nativist when
external pressure grows. In the conclusion of the chapter (Sect. 4.3), I emphasise the
similarities and differences between the findings for the manifestos’ and websites’
analysis and argue that election programs are more suitable for measures of populist
communication.
Chapter 5 investigates the concrete content of anti-elitist, people-centred, nativist
and leftist messages in election manifestos. In a first step, I analyse the main traits of
mainstream parties’ populist, nativist and left-wing communication comparing the
content to respective messages from populist, far-right and left parties. I do so to
determine whether mainstream parties and their populist, nativist and leftist niche
competitors engage in similar discourses or whether their messages can be distin-
guished from another in terms of content. According to Mudde (2013), mainstream
parties’ rhetoric is not identical to that of the populists and can rather be described as
“soft populism”. Second, I observe what the supposed contagion is about and whether
mainstream parties change the way they talk about the political and economic elite,
the people, outgroups and immigration when external pressure increases. In sum,
I conclude that mainstream parties do not only talk more often about their targets
when respective pressure grows but also introduce new and distinctive discourses
about them.
In Sect. 5.6, I search for illiberal and anti-pluralist elements within mainstream
parties’ populist, nativist and leftist messages building on the discussion about the
consequences of populism and nativism for liberal democracies. After defining illib-
eral and anti-pluralist elements, I attempt to identify them in anti-elitist, people-
centred and nativist statements of the centre-right and centre-left using a qualitative
content analysis. Moreover, it is clarified whether illiberalism and anti-pluralism
are mainly linked to populist or rather to nativist content. The findings suggest that
mainstream parties’ anti-elitist and people-centred discourses do not become more
illiberal and anti-pluralist and that illiberal and anti-pluralist elements are present in
nativist rather than populist messages.
Chapter 6 summarises the findings from the different analytical sections and
connects them to broader theoretical and normative debates about populist conta-
gions and their relation to democracy. I refer to the exceptional German case, explain
the different findings for the two types of text sources—manifestos and online state-
ments—and the fact that my findings deviate from results of previous studies. The
chapter concludes by critically discussing the challenges regarding populist and
nativist contagion studies and by giving an outlook for future analyses.
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Mény, Yves, and Yves Surel. 2002. The constitutive ambiguity of populism. In Democracies and
the populist challenge, ed. Yves Mény and Yves Surel, 1–21. New York: Palgrave.
Mudde, Cas. 2004. The populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition 39 (4): 541–563.
Mudde, Cas. 2013. Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what?
European Journal of Political Research 52 (1): 1–19.
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politicians-populist-rhetoric-populism-people-elites?CMP=share_btn_tw. Accessed March 12,
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Chapter 2
Theoretical-Conceptual Framework
This chapter begins with a description and defintion of the concept of populism I
refer to in this study and further explains the main ideological and communicative
traits of left- and right-wing populists’ host ideologies. I move on with the theoretical
assumption that underlie this study, mainly from economic (or spatial) theory of party
competition. This approach offers hypotheses, which are to be tested empirically
in the analytical part of this study. I conclude the chapter by illustrating the state
of research regarding populist, nativist and leftist contagion effects on mainstream
parties.
2.1 Populism, Populist Communication and Messages
I start with the academic debate about the concept of populism and with my defini-
tion of populism as ideology. Since this study attempts to measure populist as well
as specific nativist and left-wing communicative content, I further mention the core
traits of populist political communication described in the literature. Specific char-
acteristics of the populist radical-right and left as well as respective communicative
elements are illustrated in order to operationalise them in the methodological chapter.
Populist movements and parties are not a new political phenomenon—at least
outside Western Europe. Already at the end of the nineteenth century, respective
movements and parties in the USA were able to achieve considerable successes:
The Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party (also known as “populist party”). As
representatives of the farmers’ interests, these actors appealed to the ordinary and
hard-working man portrayed as oppressed by powerful interests (Canovan 1981;
Spier 2006). The people was “seen as a uniform entity that transcended specific
classes and other groups” (Rooduijn 2013, 37). The Russian Narodniks—radical
intellectuals attempting to find popular support among farmers for their revolu-
tionary ideas (unsuccessfully)—are often considered as another example of an early
populist movement. In the 1870s, thousands of young students gave up their lives in
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 11

J. Schwörer, The Growth of Populism in the Political Mainstream, Springer Series
in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72449-8_2
12 2 Theoretical-Conceptual Framework
the university cities “going to the people” (Russian: narodnichestvo) (Spier 2006).
A third often named historical example of a populist movement is Perón’s Justi-
cialist Party in Argentinia (Crassweller 1987). Elected as president in 1946 “Perón
strongly emphasised the struggle between the (good) people and the (bad) oligarchy”
(Rooduijn 2013, 40). Defining his political ideas as a “third way” besides capitalism
and socialism, he forged “a cross-class alliance of supporters—a uniform entity in
its opposition against the elite” (Rooduijn 2013, 40).
Despite these (incomplete) historical examples of people-centred and anti-elitist
movements and new emerging parties in Western European countries in the 1970s
and 1980s—often characterised as “populist”—populism was seen as a contested
term in the early Western academic debate and understood above all as a political
style implemented in order to catch votes. Scholars stressed the lack of a generally
accepted concept of populism in academia. Dubiel (1986, 43) once criticised that
“different groups of social scientists with different theoretical backgrounds” speak
“on different occasions about different social phenomena”. According to Dubiel
(1986, 34), it remains “open, what the term ever meant”.
Still during the Cold War Ionescu and Gellner (1969, 1) stated,
A spectre is haunting the world – populism. A decade ago, […] the question that was asked
was - how many will go Communist? Today, this question, so plausible then, sounds a little
out of date. In as far as the rulers of new states embrace an ideology, it tends more often to
have a populist character.
Ionescu and Gellner (1969, 1) raised similar concerns as Dubiel did some decade
later:
There can, at present, be no doubt about the importance of populism. But no one is quite
clear just what it is. As a doctrine or as a movement, it is elusive and protean. It bobs up
everywhere, but in many and contradictory shapes. Does it have any underlying unity, or
does one name cover a multitude of unconnected tendencies?
Canovan (1981, 3) once stated, “although frequently used by historians, social

scientists and political commentators, the term [populism] is exceptionally vague
and refers in different contexts to a bewildering variety of phenomena”. According
to her, populism describes “techniques of direct democracy […] but also certain
kinds of dictatorships such as that of Peron in Argentina”. Still twenty years later,
Paul Taggart claimed that populism as a concept “has an essential impalpability,
an awkward conceptual slipperiness. For different sets of people, it veers between
having great meaning and fundamental vacuousness” (Taggart 2000, 1).
At least since the release of Mudde’s “populist Zeitgeist” article in 2004, the
debate about what populism actually means has developed considerably. Since then,
interest in populism research has increased significantly—together with the rise of
populist parties in Western Europe (Fig. 2.1)—which is reflected in the considerable
growth of academic publications on populism (Fig. 2.2). Mudde (2004, 543) defines
populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’
and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general
will) of the people”. In the same article, he clarifies that populism is not a full
2.1 Populism, Populist Communication and Messages 13
25
Average vote share
20
15
10
0
1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09 2010-14 2014-19
Fig. 2.1 Average vote shares for populist parties in national and European elections in Austria,
Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, UK, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway
and Sweden. Note As at 15/9/2919. Data from ParlGov. Parties characterised as populist according
to the “popu-list” (Rooduijn et al. 2019) and “Populismtracker” (https://progressivepost.eu/spotli
ghts/populism-tracker. Last access 29/9/2019.)
900
800
Number of new publications
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Fig. 2.2 Number of new publications per year containing the term “populis*” (title or abstract)
based on the Scopus database
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CHAPTER XXV.
THE DISTURBING ELEMENT.
"We must have a Baby Show before the summer is over," said Mrs. Greville,
as she sat in the garden by Rachel's side darning stockings, "and next year a
Flower Show. The village has been dreadfully neglected, evidently, by the last
Rector."
"I don't think so," said Rachel. "He was a splendid visitor and was looked upon
as a father by the people."
"Perhaps; but there is nothing social by which to draw the people together.
Now a Women's Institute ought to be started."
"But you must remember there is not a single helper in the parish with the
exception of a very nice farmer's daughter, who conducts the whole Sunday
School. It would be impossible to start things here that need helpers."
But Mrs. Greville was not to be put off.
"I expect if helpers were really looked for they would be found. I'll look round
the parish and see what I can do."
Rachel sighed.
"You won't make the people want things that they can't have, will you?" she
said.
"Certainly not. But there is no need to say they can't have them. Anyhow I am
here to help; and anything in the way of writing I am sure you could do. There
are two workers at once."
"Oh, you must not think of me as a worker," said Rachel. "I can only just live."
She had been more conscious of her weakness since her mother-in-law's
advent than ever before.
"My dear, of course you cannot be a worker in the ordinary sense. But believe
me you would feel all the better with something to interest you a little. It never
does anyone any good to lie and think about themselves all day. I found that
out when I was ill; and no sooner did I begin to think of my work than I felt
better at once."
Rachel was silent. She wondered how much longer she could endure the
intense activity of her mother-in-law. She thought she would have to take to
her bed; but she knew the air was the only thing for her.
"Let me see," continued Mrs. Greville. "There's a Mrs. Simpkins at the bottom
of the hill who has a fine boy, and next door is that poor thriftless woman
whose baby is nothing but skin and bones. It will do the mothers a world of
good having to weigh their babies; they'd be ashamed then of their little puny
creatures. We must certainly have the Show before the summer is over. When
shall it be?"
"Whenever you like," said Rachel wearily. Then she added, "Ask Luke."
"Oh it won't make any difference to Luke. It is a question for his mother and
wife to decide. Shall we say at the end of August?"
"Luke has a clerical meeting here one day in August. You had better ask him."
"Will the clergy be here to tea?"
"Yes, and they come to lunch too."
"Come to lunch! How ridiculous! In these days to give lunch is quite

unnecessary I am sure. Why it can't be done under—"
"Oh don't say that to Luke," interrupted Rachel. "It's such a delight to him to be
able at last to offer hospitality to his brother clergy. He is quite looking forward
to it."
"Well I call it very unnecessary. What are they going to have? I hope you are
not preparing a spread. Because you have a rather better living than your last
it does not mean that you must forget the necessity of being economical."
Rachel laughed hysterically. Here it was again! Eggs at 4d and margarine

instead of butter!
"Don't let us talk of economy yet," she said. "Let us enjoy, anyhow for a time,
being able to give something to one's neighbours."
"And pray who is going to do the cooking?"

"Emma. In her last place she had to cook for clerical lunches and knows just
what is necessary. And," she added laughing, "I mean to give them a good
lunch."
"What do you mean by a good lunch?"
Mrs. Greville sarcastically. "Do you intend to give them chickens? They are
nine shillings each at Trowsby."
"No I don't mean to give chickens. They are probably tired of them in the
country. But they shall have a good lunch, I am determined about that, for
Luke's sake."
"My dear you are talking like a very silly woman;" said Mrs. Greville gravely.
"Am I? I am sorry, but for once in my life I mean to be silly. So you must
forgive me," said Rachel.
Mrs. Greville said no more, but came to the conclusion that Rachel was a little
light-headed, particularly as the conversation had set her laughing weakly.
She supposed her presence was too exciting for her, so in a few minutes she
picked up her work and made for the house, and before long Rachel caught
sight of her making her way towards the gate with a note book and pencil in
hand.
"She is going to look after the babies," sighed Rachel. "I hope she won't make
those poor mothers too miserable by her comments." Then her mind reverted
to one of Mrs. Greville's remarks.
"I wonder," she thought, "if she really imagines that I lie and think of myself all
day! A woman with a husband and child, not to mention a mother-in-law and
the housekeeping, has scarcely time to lead an idle life even in thought. Little
Pat's clothes would be enough to keep me busy even if I had nothing else to
do." And Rachel, who had laid down her work while talking to Mrs. Greville,
took it up again. It was not long before she heard the gate open and her
mother-in-law's somewhat heavy tread on the gravel.
"You are back sooner than I expected," said Rachel. Mrs. Greville looked tired
and dispirited.
"Yes. I found my suggestion of a Baby Show rather upset the women. They
seemed to take offence and were up in arms at once. That thriftless creature
with the puny baby was almost rude to me, so I felt it would be as well to put
the show off for a time."
Rachel sighed a sigh of relief.
"I'm sorry that you have had your walk for nothing," she said, "but on the other
hand it would be such a pity to create an ill feeling. Besides I would so much
rather that our first gathering should be a tea in the garden. They would get to
know us then and Luke could talk to them. I am bent, when I feel a little
stronger, on inviting the whole parish."
"Another expense," said Mrs. Greville.
"I know. But it need not be an annual affair; just a kind of house warming."
"I wonder how much it would cost."
Rachel, who had been anticipating managing the tea herself directly she felt
strong enough, had noticed the disappointed expression on Mrs. Greville's
face when her plan of the baby show had failed; she evidently felt a little
depressed. Should she put the whole management of the tea into her mother-
in-law's hands? She knew Mrs. Greville would not be happy unless she had
plenty to do, In fact she was so restless that she would make work if it were
not provided for her. It would be a disappointment, but anything was better
than to have an unhappy, restless, person in the house.
When Rachel asked Mrs. Greville if she would undertake the tea for her she
cheered up at once. Taking out her pocket book she put down the probable
number that they might expect, and began to discuss at once how much
bread would be wanted, and what the whole affair would cost.
"I shall give them margarine," she said. "It would be quite absurd to go to the
expense of butter." Rachel would have given them butter but she knew it
would be useless to suggest this.
"And the tea might be sugared also altogether. It is much easier to have it all
ready mixed with the milk."
"But some may not like sugar in their tea," objected Rachel.
"Well they mustn't mind it just for once," answered Mrs. Greville. "It is by far
the best way when you have a large party. Then I almost think the cake and
bread and butter had better be divided up before they come, and put on their
plates. They will all fare alike then, and they'll know exactly how much they
can have. If they don't want to eat it all they can take it away with them."
"But they are not by any means all children. I want them to be treated just as
we should treat our own friends," Rachel expostulated. She began to wish she
had never asked her mother-in-law to undertake the tea.
"But," said Mrs. Greville, "you see you have not had much experience in these
matters and have no idea how much easier it is if you arrange everything
beforehand. Method is everything on these occasions."
"But I want to make it really nice for the people," said Rachel eagerly. "It's
better not to have the tea at all than in any way to hurt their feelings. I don't
think for instance the men would at all like the plan of the food being piled on
to a plate. Besides I want them to have sandwiches, and they would not be
nice all mixed up with cake. I do hope you don't mind," she added, seeing that
Mrs. Greville, who was considered such a first-rate caterer in Trowsby, was a
little flushed at the thought that her suggestions were not liked. "I fancy that
people in a country village would not be used to that kind of thing; besides
there will not be very many of them. I do want them to have a dainty tea."
"Dainty? How do you mean?" said Mrs. Greville. She was evidently put out.
"I mean the same kind of tea that we would give to our own personal friends.
Of course, rather thicker sandwiches as they would not appreciate the thin
ones, but I am thinking more of the way it is all arranged."
"Well," said Mrs. Greville shortly, "if you will tell me exactly how you wish
things to be done I will follow your directions."
Rachel wished that the subject of the tea had never been mentioned. The
slight discussion had tired and rather worried her.
"Shall we talk about it another day?" she said, "there is plenty of time, and,"
she added, "of course you may be right. I have had no experience in such
things and you have had so much."
Mrs. Greville was slightly mollified. She was not used to having her plans
criticised. She preferred criticising the plans of others.
"Well my dear," she said, "I don't think you need worry about it. I promise you
that your guests will have enough to eat; and after all that is the main thing."
Rachel did not think so. She thought that the manner in which the food was
presented to them was as important as the food itself; but she did not say so.
"You can leave it all in my hands perfectly happily," added Mrs. Greville. "I will
take the whole responsibility of it so don't worry yourself. Why, you look quite
flushed even at the thought of it. There is really no need to be anxious," and
Mrs. Greville moved towards the house notebook and pencil in hand.
Rachel sighed.
CHAPTER XXVI.
LUKE TELLS RACHEL ABOUT HIS DREAM.
"What is Luke doing all day in his study? That sedentary life is very bad for
him and he ought to be visiting his people."
Rachel, who was trying on a little frock for Pat which she had been making,
looked up amused.
"He has visited every one of his people a dozen times since he came here. In
fact he was afraid of over visiting them."
"But then what is he doing all day? He is young and strong and ought to be at
work," said Mrs. Greville, standing in front of Rachel as if she was in some
way to blame. Her face was anxious and perplexed. She could scarcely
understand work without movement, and rush.
"You may be quite sure he is not wasting his time," said Rachel; then hoping
to distract her mother-in-law's thought she held up the baby to be admired.
"Doesn't he look sweet," she said. "He shall wear this little frock when we
have the villagers to tea. He must look his best."
But once Mrs. Greville was on the war path nothing would move her.
"It isn't as if he had an intellectual congregation to preach to as he had at

Trowsby," she said. "Of course then he had to study and fit himself for the
work. But here they are only uneducated people. I am sure he cannot want all
this time to prepare for them."
"But don't you know that a man like Luke must find it much more difficult to
speak to such people? He has to make everything so plain and to choose the
simplest subjects. I am quite sure he finds it much harder to prepare his
sermons here than he did at Trowsby."
"I don't understand it at all," said Mrs. Greville, moving away to the window.
"And why he should object to me going into his study, I can't imagine. He does
not say in so many words that he prefers my absence to my presence, but I
see it worries him. Of course I used to leave him quite alone at Trowsby, but
then I knew every moment was precious. But here there ought to be plenty of
time for a chat with his mother now and then."
"I must make the sleeves a little shorter," said Rachel. "Don't you think so?"
She hoped that Mrs. Greville would feel interest in the baby's frock and would
not continue the conversation which was getting embarrassing. But no. It was
of no use trying to turn her thoughts.
"I think it's very sad to see a young man getting so idle and losing all interest
in his people," she said. "It's quite different to what it was at Trowsby. Of
course, he worked far too hard before his marriage and, indeed, after it, too,"
she added rather grudgingly. "But I would far rather he worked too much, than
too little."
Rachel's colour rose. She felt indignant.
"But he is working very hard," she said. "He is studying; and you know the
complaint is that the clergy don't study and so can't help their people in these
difficult times. Visiting their parishioners is only part of the work after all."
"Well, all I can say is that things are very different to what they were. And I
never remember a time in which he did not welcome his mother." Mrs. Greville
did not recollect how carefully she kept watch over the dining-room, which
then stood for his study, so that he should never be interrupted. "Of course,"
she added, "I don't suppose I can quite expect things to be exactly the same
as they were before his marriage. I don't imagine he objects to you going into
his study at any time."
Rachel, glancing at her mother-in-law, was aware of a certain pathetic

eagerness displayed in the expression of her face as she waited for the
answer. The slight indignation that Rachel was conscious of feeling passed
away, and she was glad that she could assure Mrs. Greville that she never
interrupted her husband unless it was absolutely necessary as she knew he
would not like it.
"But," she said, "don't you think that he may have been sent here so as to give
him time to study before some great and important post is offered him? That is
what I love to think. I could not bear to believe that he would be here all his
life. When I am stronger, I hope we shall go to some town where he can have
a larger sphere of work. That is one of the things that reconciles me to this
country living."
"Well," said Mrs. Greville, "I feel that he ought to be doing something, and not
spending all those hours in his study."
"He is doing something."
But Mrs. Greville was only half convinced.
Rachel was feeling stronger so that the conversation with her mother-in-law
did not trouble her as it might have done. It almost amused her.
That Luke could possibly be wasting his time in his study was so absurd an
idea that it made her smile. She had sometimes wondered herself at the
amount of writing he was engaged in doing; but she had not asked him about
it, as one of his peculiarities was the fact that he did not care to be questioned
about his work. That she would know in time she had not a doubt. That he
was doing anything that she did not know about did not make her either
curious or restless. Apparently it had that effect on her mother-in-law.
Rachel had noticed that since coming to live with them Mrs. Greville had
shown a propensity for wishing to know exactly what everyone in the house
was doing. She wandered from room to room just to see what was going on.
The servants were not the only people who found it trying. Rachel felt it
getting on her own nerves. She put it down to a restlessness arising from Mrs.
Greville's illness, but this did not make it less trying. She could seldom enjoy
little Pat for long by himself. Mrs. Greville, under the impression that she was
helping, would come into the nursery while Rachel bathed the child, giving her
various hints as to the best way of doing it. Or she would take up a great deal
of her time giving out her theories on the bringing up of children, while Rachel
was busy putting him to bed. It was just as much as Rachel could do in her
present state of health to dress and undress the child, and at times she had to
pass over what was to her such a happy duty to Polly, so that to be talked to,
and to have to listen to various theories on the training of children, was tiring
in the extreme. But she felt she must bear it without complaining as Mrs.
Greville had so little in which to occupy her time, and if she was shown that
her advice was not welcome she would grow melancholy.
But till to-day Rachel had had no idea that Luke had found it trying. His study
door was open that evening when after putting Pat to sleep she went down
stairs. At the sound of her footstep, he called her in, closing the door after her.
He was looking a little worried and distressed.
"I'm afraid I have hurt my mother," he said, "but I find it so difficult to get on
with my work while she is in the room. Three times this afternoon she has
interrupted me at the most unfortunate moment. I try not to let her know it, but
I can't make out what she wants. I fancy it's only a chat, and I can't chat about
nothing in the middle of my work."
"She has not enough to do," said Rachel, "and feels dull I expect."
"That's unfortunate," said Luke, running his fingers through his hair. "I'm sorry
for her. But I had to tell her I was doing some important work to-day and that I
was sorry to say I could not have a chat just then. I'm afraid I've hurt her. I
think," he added, "that my mother has altered a little since her illness. She
used to have such tact."
"It would help matters if you could tell her what the important business is," said
Rachel, laughing.
"I don't much want to tell her," he said. "I'm afraid she would be constantly
referring to it and I could not stand that. You see dear," he said looking down
at his wife with shining eyes, "I believe I have found my work."
"Your work?" said Rachel mystified.

"I believe my prayers are being answered and that I am being shown why I
have been sent here. Sit down. I want to tell you something." He drew a chair
up to the window for her and sat down by her side.
"I never told you that just before we left Trowsby I had a dream. It was the
most painful dream I have ever had and I can't think of it even now without a
shudder. I'd rather not tell you what it was; but it was nothing more or less
than a looking glass in which I saw myself for the first time, and I want you to
know that I believe we left Trowsby for my sake as well as for yours."
Any great emotion was bad for Rachel, and when Luke turned and looked at
her he was distressed to see how white she had become.
"Am I tiring you dearest?" he said, with concern.
"No. I'm only so very glad to hear what you say," she answered. "The thought
that you had to leave your interesting work for me, has been such a burden on
my mind."
"Well it need be a burden no longer. I believe it was for the sake of your bodily
health that we came here but also for my soul. You see, I doubt if your soul
wants the discipline that mine does. Anyhow, my spiritual life was not in a
healthy condition; I needed to take a back seat, if you understand what I
mean. I am not sure that my work was not becoming my god, and I was too
much in the lime-light. Anyhow, now I can work for God and for Him alone. I
think He has given the work that is best for me."
Rachel, in her weak state could not prevent the tears of sympathy from falling,
but she brushed them away with her hand, and Luke did not see them.
"What is the work?" she asked.
"I'm writing a book for young men. When I was in Trowsby I often felt the need
of one which faced the difficult problems of the day honestly and wisely. I am
trying to contend earnestly for the faith. Of course it means the need of much
prayer and study."
Rachel held out her hand and Luke grasped it in his own.
"You see how much better it is for me than preaching," he explained. "I don't
mean to put my name to the book, and shall never know what it has done for
people. God only will know that, so there will be no chance of conceit and
pride getting the better of me in my work. I do not see how I can forget God in
the work as I need Him every moment. I feel I am contending with the devil
and he does not leave me alone. But no-one knows but God—and now," he
added, "my wife."
Rachel had never loved her husband or admired him more than she did at that
moment. She sat and looked at him with her heart in her eyes; but she did not
speak.
"I meant to keep it a secret," he said, "till I could put the finished book into
your hands. But now you know. I have sent the first few chapters to Sharnis
and he is pleased with them and quite hopes to undertake its publication. But I
don't want anyone to know about it. Now do you think you can help me about
my mother? I don't feel as if I could be constantly asked questions about it. It's
such a sacred thing to me that I cannot talk about it. Besides, as I'm not
putting my name to the book, it is important that no-one should know that I'm
writing it."
"She would be so pleased that she would find it difficult to keep the fact to
herself."
"That's just it."
"What a pity though that she will never know," said Rachel.
"Perhaps sometime after its publication I may tell her, but not now. But can
you manage to keep her from disturbing me without hurting her? A woman
can generally do this kind of thing better than a man. I would not hurt my dear
mother for the world if I could help it."
They neither of them heard the door open and then softly close again, and
Luke never knew that his mother had turned away from his study murmuring:
"Luke was talking to Rachel about me! His mother! I never thought he would
talk to anyone about his mother." The pain was almost too much to bear.
CHAPTER XXVII.
RACHEL'S GARDEN PARTY.
Rachel noticed a marked difference in her mother-in-law's behaviour to her

after finding her talking with Luke in his study. She was perplexed as to its
cause and it worried her. Moreover, she found that her efforts to keep her out
of the study during Luke's busy time there were unavailing, and she came to
the conclusion that it would hurt her feelings less if Luke mentioned the
subject to her himself. Her pride would not be wounded. She told Luke so.
But, manlike, he felt that to burn Pussy's paws was by far the better plan. But
Rachel, unwilling to give him a hint as to his mother's strained feelings in
respect to herself, determined to do nothing in the matter unless she found a
particularly favourable moment in which to speak. Having suffered herself in
the past from jealousy she began to suspect that the same wretched enemy to
all happiness was attacking her mother-in-law; and instead of despising her
for giving way, she felt the situation to be particularly pathetic.
Since the day on which Luke heard of his wife's delicacy, he had been filled
with anxiety about her and was continually thinking of her comfort and good.
In fact, Rachel's health was now his first concern, and plans which would in
any way give her too much to do or think about were put on one side at once,
even though they might be suggested by his mother. His wife and his book
were at present the absorbing interests in his life and everything else fell into
the background.
Rachel had long ago come to the conclusion that Luke found it difficult to
concentrate his mind on many things at the same time. When he was at
Trowsby, his parish and Church took up all his thoughts to the exclusion of
almost everything else. In fact, he suffered from a want of seeing things in
their right proportion. And now that his mind was full of anxiety for his wife, his
mother was somewhat put on one side. It distressed Rachel, for she knew the
signs of the terrible pain caused by jealousy and felt sure she saw them
written on her mother-in-law's face. They had in fact changed places since
leaving Trowsby. Luke now consulted his wife about matters of interest instead
of his mother; and though Rachel loved that it should be so, she felt Mrs.
Greville's position to be very difficult.
Some women would have been triumphant over the reversed positions but
Rachel was above all such unworthy feelings; she could only see the pathetic
side and it distressed her. Remembering too her own fight with the sin that
brings such misery on those who give way to it, she longed to give Luke a hint
as to how matters stood, and to ask him to be very careful; but she knew Luke
would no more understand his mother's feelings than he would have
understood those of his wife in the old days; and she felt it would not be fair to
his mother to enlighten him. It would inevitably make her fall in his eyes; and
up till now, he thought her perfection.
So Rachel came to the conclusion that the only course to take was to behave
to Mrs. Greville as if nothing was the matter, and to ignore the severity of her
expression of face and voice when she spoke to her. But the anxiety and
constant effort not to say anything that might offend or hurt was not good for
her and was tiring.
As the time drew near for the parish garden party, Mrs. Greville's thoughts
became engaged with preparations for the event, and at times she seemed to
forget that she was not pleased with her daughter-in-law.
She had taken the whole affair off Rachel's hands and was thoroughly
enjoying the responsibility of it. Luke was thankful that it meant no effort for his
wife.
"If it hadn't been for my mother being here," he said, "we could not have had
it. The doctor said you were to have perfect rest."
But Rachel was disappointed, though at the same time she was thankful that
her mother-in-law had something to interest her and to fill up her time.
That it was Mrs. Greville's party was quite evident when the day dawned.
Rachel was amused when her mother-in-law told her that she had better stand
at the gate and welcome the people, as she herself would be engaged seating
them at the tables. Rachel had quite intended to be at the gate.
"But," she said, "I think it would be better not to have tea the moment they
arrive. They might walk about the garden and have games first."
But Mrs. Greville had arranged in her own mind that tea was to be the first
item of the programme and she did not wish it altered.
"It's far better to get the business of tea well over first," she said, "then we
shall be free to think of games," and Rachel gave way. She felt it was not
worth while discussing the matter.
About sixty people with their children arrived and were shown at once to their
seats by Mrs. Greville. Rachel saw them looking at the plates before them with
a smile, and heard them making jokes with one another. But after Luke had
appeared and had said a word of welcome and tea began in earnest, they
were silent. The business of eating did not seem in their estimation to need
the effort of talking. Suddenly Rachel heard Mrs. Greville say:
"Mind you all make a good tea, and what you don't want you can put in your
pockets and take home with you. I won't look!" There was a laugh and the
sound of it sent the colour into Rachel's face. The talking too began in real
earnest and did not cease till tea was over; but the words that Rachel
occasionally heard convinced her that Mrs. Greville's tactless remark was not
liked by the men; and she noticed that no-one save the woman with the puny
baby took advantage of the invitation to take the food home.
Rachel did what she could to take away the impression made by her mother-
in-law's mistake, by noticing the many babies that the mothers had brought
with them. And the subject of babies was so absorbing that when Luke took
the men off for a game of bowls, the women were quite contented to sit and
tell Rachel of the various complaints their children had suffered from.
They were not allowed however to sit still for long. Mrs. Greville bustled them
about from one part of the garden to the other dividing them into groups and
setting them to games. The mother with the puny baby alone refused to
budge. She was too tired, she explained, and Rachel, looking at her as she
talked, came to the conclusion, that probably the reason why the baby was so
thin and weird looking was because the money went in drink. She tried to gain
the mother's confidence and to help her, but the woman simply sat and cried
and complained of her hard life. One of the women who had been playing
games and was a little jealous at seeing Mrs. Grot having such a long talk with
the Rector's wife, informed her spitefully, that she was a "bad lot," and left the
baby alone in the house while she went to spend her evenings at the public
house. Rachel came to the conclusion that the village was not such a little
heaven below as she had imagined; but that the great enemy of souls was as
busy there as elsewhere.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
"THINK OF RACHEL."
Gwen came to stay at the Rectory. She was much impressed with two things.
First she was terribly upset at the look of Rachel. She had had no idea that
she had grown so thin and weak. It gave her quite a shock, and she felt
disinclined to admire or appreciate anything of her surroundings.
But she was equally struck with the alteration in Luke. She could find nothing
with which to find fault in his behaviour to Rachel. He was as thoughtful for her
as before he had been negligent.
"What have you done to Luke to change him so?" she asked her sister one
evening, as they were sitting in the garden after supper.
"I have done nothing, but you were blind."
"Then if you are not the cause of his alteration I must be," said Gwen. "I
believe it was the talk I had with him when I told him the truth about himself.
But I must confess I never expected it to have such an effect."
Rachel laughed.
"You had better not remind me of your delinquencies," she said. "I don't think I
ever felt more angry with anyone in my life than I did with you that day.
However I have forgiven you so we will say no more about it."
"One thing I can't understand," said Gwen. "What could have induced you to
have that tiresome old lady to live with you? It isn't as if she were fond of you
for I'm sure she rather dislikes you; that is to say if her manner to you means
anything. Why did you let her come?"
"I don't think she dislikes me. She has a very kind heart, but she has been ill
and finds it a little difficult to be always nice. You must not blame her."
"But I do blame her. Why did you have her?"
"I knew it would make Luke happier. You see she was all alone in rooms in
Trowsby."
"I can't see why Luke should be made happy at your expense."
"But you must remember that before I arrived on the scene she had Luke to
herself. She is devoted to him, and must have missed him dreadfully when we
left Trowsby."
"Well it seems to me that my next move will have to be to tackle her, as my

words take such effect. But look there's Luke. Why is he tearing down the
drive on his bicycle at such a rate?"
"There's a fire in the village," he shouted, and was gone before there was time
to ask questions.
Both girls rose.
"Yes, I smell the smoke," said Gwen. "It comes from the bottom of the hill. I
shall run down and see it."
Rachel stood looking in the direction of the fire and had just made up her mind
to follow Gwen slowly, when Mrs. Greville appeared.
"I saw Luke rushing off on his bicycle," she said. "What is the matter?"
"It's a fire in the village and I'm afraid it must be near those tumble down
cottages in which Mrs. Simpson and Mrs. Grot live. If the fire reaches them
they will burn like tinder."
"Well then I shall go and see if I can't help," said Mrs. Greville. "If anyone is
hurt I may be of use. I shall put a few things in my bag in readiness. I've some
old linen and some carron oil," and she hurried into the house followed by
Rachel, who made her way into the nursery and stood for a few minutes
looking down at her sleeping boy.
It was a hot evening and he had kicked off the coverlet in his sleep. Rachel
kissed the tiny feet gently, holding them in her hand tenderly. Then she
covered him up again.
"You'll take care of him I know," she said to Polly as she moved away. "I'm
going down to see if there is anything to be done in the village. I'm afraid
several cottages must be in danger."
Then as she left the room she looked back once more at her sleeping boy,
saying, "I'm so glad, Polly, that I can trust you implicitly. I know you would
never leave the house under any circumstances, whatever Emma may do."
Polly looked at her with the brightest of smiles. She knew there was no need
for words. Pat was her one thought.
Arrived at the bottom of the hill Rachel found herself in the midst of an excited
crowd, and was dismayed to see that the flames had not only reached Mrs.
Simpson's cottage but were approaching the one next to it, belonging to Mrs.
Grot.
"The Rector has sent a boy off on his bicycle for the fire engines," explained a
woman to Rachel in answer to her questions. "But I doubt if they'll come in
time."
"Is Mrs. Grot here?"
"No Ma'am, she's half a mile away at the 'Three Swans' and has the key with
her. Her baby is still in the cottage."
Rachel was horror struck.
"But somebody must save the baby," she cried. "There's time yet. Where's the
Rector?"
Before the woman could answer a cry rang through the crowd, and Mrs. Grot
rushed in among them shrieking, "My baby! my baby!"
"You just follow me," said the woman to Rachel, "and I'll find the Rector for
you. It's no good that woman 'holloring' like that. It won't mend matters; the
Rector is the one to help." As she pushed her way through the crowd Rachel
caught sight of Luke placing a ladder against the cottage wall.
"There he is Ma'am," said the woman. "He knows what to do, for the poor mite
is in that front upstairs room with the small window."
"Here's Mrs. Grot with the key," shouted a man near by. "Hold on, sir, for a
moment, and I'll unlock the door, we may be able to get in this way."
But alas it was too late. A thick cloud of smoke issued from the door and drove
the man back. A groan came from the crowd.
Rachel caught sight of Gwen rushing towards Luke and catching hold of his
arm.
"You mustn't go Luke," she cried. "You'll be killed. Think of Rachel."
At that moment Rachel saw her husband was on the first step of the ladder.
He was going to save the baby! Her heart gave an exultant leap, and then
almost stood still.
At Gwen's words Luke took a hurried glance at the crowd beneath and his
eyes rested for one moment on his wife's face. Though it was deadly white
there was something in its expression that nerved his steps. She was helping
him, not for the first time by any means, to do what was his duty, and this time
he knew it was at the risk of his life.
He looked down at Gwen as he mounted, with a smile, saying:
"I am thinking of Rachel. That is why I am going to save the baby."
In another moment he was forcing the window out, which gave way easily, and
disappeared within the room.
The silent crowd stood spellbound, but Gwen in a panic ran to the side of her
sister. Her voice alone was heard, crying:
"Why didn't you call him back, why did you let him go?"
Call him back! Rachel would not have called him back for the world. It was just
the brave thing she expected him to do, and knew he would do.
She stood calm and still while the crowd surged around her murmuring.
Suddenly they saw Luke at the window. He dropped a small bundle into the
arms of someone below. A cheer went up but was suddenly checked by the
sound of timber falling and a lurid flame soaring up into the air. There was only
one explanation to give—the floor of the room in which the baby had been
sleeping had given way, and the terror-stricken crowd knew that their Rector
must be lying buried among the ruins.
At that moment the engines arrived, but Rachel stood dazed and unconscious
of what was going on around her. She did not move or speak even when the
women gathered about her, neither did she hear their words of sympathy and
commiseration.
"You'd better go, my dear," said an old woman with tears streaming down her
face, "you'd better go. It don't do any good to him or to you to stay. If your
husband, God bless him, has gone to glory why he's with the Lord, and if not
they'll bring him safe home to you."
"To think," cried a hard-faced woman, "that he's done it to save a drunkard's
baby, that's already half starved to death. He'd have done better to leave it
alone."
The old woman turned sharply at the words.
"That baby, I take it, is as dear as the rest of us to the Lord. But come, my
dear," she said again, addressing Rachel, "go home, I beg of you. You'd be
best at home. And the Lord be with you."
But Rachel did not stir till a touch on her arm suddenly aroused her. She
looked round and met the eyes full of anguish of Luke's mother. No words
were spoken, but the silent cry found its way at once to Rachel's heart and
awoke her from her dazed condition.
"Mother!" she said softly, then taking her arm in hers she slowly moved away.
No words were spoken, as they mounted the hill. The only sounds were
Gwen's sobs as she followed behind them.
On arriving at the house they made their way automatically into Luke's study
and sat down silently together on the sofa—the two women who loved Luke—
clinging to one another, and listening for that sound of all sounds, which
strikes a chill into the bravest heart.
CHAPTER XXIX.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE MOON.
Gwen, in the drawing-room, had hidden her face in the sofa cushion. She had
not wanted to hear the dreadful steps of the men carrying in the stretcher.
She was feeling frightened and unstrung and as if she had lost Rachel. Since
that fearful moment when the floor of the cottage gave way and Luke was
buried in its ruins, her sister had not spoken a word to her. Her dazed
condition frightened Gwen; and she almost dreaded seeing her.
She knew where she probably was at this moment; for no sooner had the men
who had carried in Luke's body left, than Rachel had gone up into the room,
where they had laid him. It was now 10 o'clock and she was still there, and
there was a deathly silence in the house. Gwen opened the door and listened.
Not a sound could be heard. All was still. At last feeling it unbearable she
crept upstairs hoping to find Polly in the nursery.
Polly was sitting by Pat's little crib, crying. It was a relief to Gwen to hear her
sobs. It broke the terrible silence.
"Is Mrs. Luke still there?" she asked, glancing in the direction of the room in
which she knew they had laid him.
Polly could not speak for her tears; but nodded.
"It's ten o'clock," said Gwen. "She ought to be coming to bed. She'll be quite ill
to-morrow. Do you think you could go in and persuade her to come? Tell her I
want to speak to her. Or where is Mrs. Greville? Perhaps she would go."
"She ain't fit Miss Gwen," said Polly, "and I daren't go to her. She's in her room
and maybe in bed for all I know. I guess I'd better go myself."
Gwen stood outside the room while Polly went softly in. The very fact of the
door being opened frightened her; all her nerve had left her and she hoped
that Polly would not be long.
She was not gone a minute; she came out of the room on tiptoe, closing the
door softly behind her. She was trembling so that at first she could not speak
and had to lean against the wall for support.
"Oh what is it? What is it?" cried Gwen in a panic, turning white.

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More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/16216

The Growth of Populism

Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Dissertation, 2021

ISSN 2524-8103 ISSN 2524-8111 (electronic)

The present book examines the discursive “populistisation” of mainstream parties in

Lüneburg, Germany Jakob Schwörer

1 Introduction: Populistisation of Mainstream Parties? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

5 From Degrees to Content: The Meaning of Communicative

AfD Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany)

Fig. 2.1 Average vote shares for populist parties in national

Fig. 4.11 Nativist messages in mainstream parties’ online statements

Table 2.1 Addressees of populist and nativist communication

Table 4.10 Results of content analysis of websites’ statements

Table 5.15 Striking communicative shifts of mainstream parties

Graphic 3.1 Potential explanations for mainstream parties’ (MP)

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 1

2.1 Populism, Populist Communication and Messages

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 11

Canovan (1981, 3) once stated, “although frequently used by historians, social

Average vote share

THE DISTURBING ELEMENT.

But Mrs. Greville was not to be put off.

"Will the clergy be here to tea?"

"Yes, and they come to lunch too."

"Come to lunch! How ridiculous! In these days to give lunch is quite

Rachel laughed hysterically. Here it was again! Eggs at 4d and margarine

"And pray who is going to do the cooking?"

"What do you mean by a good lunch?"

Rachel sighed a sigh of relief.

"Another expense," said Mrs. Greville.

"I wonder how much it would cost."

"It isn't as if he had an intellectual congregation to preach to as he had at

Rachel's colour rose. She felt indignant.

Rachel, glancing at her mother-in-law, was aware of a certain pathetic

"He is doing something."

But Mrs. Greville was only half convinced.

"Your work?" said Rachel mystified.

"Am I tiring you dearest?" he said, with concern.

"What is the work?" she asked.

"That's just it."

Rachel noticed a marked difference in her mother-in-law's behaviour to her

"I have done nothing, but you were blind."

"Well it seems to me that my next move will have to be to tackle her, as my

Both girls rose.

"Is Mrs. Grot here?"

Rachel was horror struck.

"You mustn't go Luke," she cried. "You'll be killed. Think of Rachel."

He looked down at Gwen as he mounted, with a smile, saying: