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 T H E P R I M I T I V IS T T H E O R Y O F T R U T H

Jamin Asay’s book offers a fresh and daring perspective on the age-
old question ‘What is truth?’ with a comprehensive articulation and
defense of primitivism, the view that truth is a fundamental and
indefinable concept. Often associated with Frege and the early
Russell and Moore, primitivism has been largely absent from the
larger conversation surrounding the nature of truth. Asay defends
primitivism by drawing on a range of arguments from metaphysics,
philosophy of language, and philosophy of logic, and navigates
between correspondence theory and deflationism by reviving ana-
lytic philosophy’s first theory of truth. In its exploration of the role
that truth plays in our cognitive and linguistic lives, The Primitivist
Theory of Truth offers an account of not just the nature of truth, but
also the foundational role that truth plays in our conceptual scheme.
It will be valuable for students and scholars of philosophy of lan-
guage and of metaphysics.

jamin asay is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Lingnan

University, Hong Kong. He has published articles in journals includ-
ing Philosophy of Science, Philosophia Mathematica, Philosophical
Studies, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, and International Studies in
the Philosophy of Science.
 CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

General Editors
j o n a t h a n l o w e (University of Durham)
n o a h l e m o s (College of William and Mary)

Advisory Editors
j o n a t h a n d a n c y (University of Reading)
j o h n h a l d a n e (University of St. Andrews)
g i l b e r t h a r m a n (Princeton University)
f r a n k j a c k s o n (Australian National University)
w i l l i a m g . l y c a n (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)
s y d n e y s h o e m a k e r (Cornell University)
j u d i t h j . t h o m s o n (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Recent Titles
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f r e d d r et s k e Perception, Knowledge, and Belief
l y n n e r u d de r b a k e r Persons and Bodies
r o s a n n a k e e f e Theories of Vagueness
john greco Putting Skeptics in Their Place
r u th g a r r e t t m i l l i k a n On Clear and Confused Ideas
derk perebo om Living Without Free Will
b r i a n e l l i s Scientific Essentialism
a l a n h . g o l d m a n Practical Rules
c h r i s t o p h e r hi l l Thought and World
a n dre w n e wm an The Correspondence Theory of Truth
i s h t i y a q u e h a j i Deontic Morality and Control
wayne a . davis Meaning, Expression and Thought
p et e r r a i l t o n Facts, Values, and Norms
j a n e h e a l Mind, Reason and Imagination
jonathan kv anvig The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit
of Understanding
andrew melnyk A Physicalist Manifesto
w i l l i a m s . r o b i n s o n Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness
d . m . a r m s t r o n g Truth and Truthmakers
keith f rankish Mind and Supermind
m i c h a e l sm i t h Ethics and the A Priori
n o a h l e m o s Common Sense
 j o s h u a g er t Brute Rationality
a l e x a n d e r r. p r u s s The Principle of Sufficient Reason
fo l k e t e r s m a n Moral Disagreement
j o s e p h m e n d o l a Goodness and Justice
d a v i d co p p Morality in a Natural World
lynne rudd er baker The Metaphysics of Everyday Life
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sa n fo rd g ol d be rg Anti-Individualism
c r a w f o r d l . e l d e r Familiar Objects and their Shadows
The Primitivist Theory
of Truth

Jamin Asay
Lingnan University
 University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press,

New York
Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.
It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107038974
© Jamin Asay 2013
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2013
Printed in the United Kingdom by Clays, St Ives plc
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data
Asay, Jamin, 1980–
The primitivist theory of truth / Jamin Asay, Lingnan University.
pages cm. – (Cambridge studies in philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-1-107-03897-4
1. Truth. 2. Primitivism. I. Title.
BD171.A83 2013
121–dc23
2012051081
ISBN 978-1-107-03897-4 Hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or
accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to
in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such
websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
For Emily
 Contents

Preface page xi

Introduction 1

part i identifying primitivism 9

1 Truth, truth, and ‘truth’ 11
1.1 What is the theory of truth? 12
1.2 What is a primitivist theory? 28
2 The golden age of primitivism 40
2.1 Frege 43
2.2 Moore 51
2.3 Russell 65
2.4 After the golden age 75
3 A two-pronged theory of truth 78
3.1 Metaphysical deflationism 78
3.2 Conceptual primitivism 81
3.3 A preliminary objection 83
3.4 Nearby views 88

part ii defending primitivism 101

4 Metaphysical deflationism 103
4.1 What is it for a property to be “metaphysically
substantive”? 104
4.2 The point and purpose of properties 108
4.3 Taking truth to absurdity 121
4.4 Some objections and replies 125
4.5 The metaphysics of truth and correspondence 129

ix
 Contents

5 Conceptual primitivism: treadmills and omnipresence 138

5.1 Frege’s treadmill 138
5.2 The argument from omnipresence 148
6 Conceptual primitivism: open questions, foundations, and
logical apparatus 173
6.1 The open question 173
6.2 The foundationalist argument 188
6.3 The argument from logical apparatus 197
6.4 Conclusion 211
7 Tarski and primitivism 213
7.1 Tarski’s theory of truth 214
7.2 Primitivism and the semantic conception 219
7.3 Tarski, Davidson, and primitivism 237
7.4 Convention T 243
7.5 Conclusion 254
8 Primitive truth at work 259
8.1 Problems for deflationism 259
8.2 Assertion 265
8.3 Declaratives and truth aptness 275
8.4 Meaning 283
8.5 Epistemic justification 288
8.6 Falsity 293
8.7 Scientific theories 300
8.8 Conclusion 306
9 Primitivism and the liar 308
9.1 Perspectives on paradox 309
9.2 Three attitudes concerning paradox and truth 312
9.3 Paradox and primitivism: neutrality 318
9.4 Paradox and primitivism: inexpressibility 322
Conclusion 329

References 331
Index 348

x
 Preface

My interest in the theory of truth began with my very first

graduate seminar at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, in a course co-taught by Keith Simmons and
Thomas Hofweber. I was hooked. Ever since, I have wondered
if there was a better option in the theory of truth, one that
avoided the Scylla and Charybdis of correspondence theory
and deflationism. My goal in writing this book was to defend
one such option.
I do not recall when I first became attracted to primitivism
about truth. I have long suspected that deflationary accounts
cannot tell the whole story about truth, but my interest in the
theory of truthmaking has led me to believe that the metaphys-
ical pull behind correspondence theory is best captured not by
any particular account of the nature of truth, but rather by an
explicitly metaphysical theory such as truthmaking. Anyone
who doubts that progress can be made in philosophy should
make a study of theories of truth in the twentieth century. The
debates that were live at the dawn of analytic philosophy
between correspondence theorists, coherentists, and pragma-
tists were inextricable from the corresponding metaphysical
debates between realism, idealism, and quietism. The lesson
we can glean, first from Tarski, and later from the deflationists,
is that issues surrounding the nature of truth can be separated
from questions about realism and anti-realism. As a result, the
questions we can ask about the nature of truth have been
thrown into relief. Are we interested in asking primarily

xi
 Preface

metaphysical questions about the nature of the property of

truth, or about what it is that makes things true or false? Or
are we interested in asking conceptual questions about our
concept of truth, and what it is to possess such a notion? My
project offers a primitivist account of our concept of truth that
perfectly harmonizes with a fully deflationary account of the
property of truth. As for the distinctly metaphysical question of
what makes our judgments true, I believe that it is best explored
independently, from the perspective of truthmaker theory.
I owe a huge debt of gratitude to a number of friends
and colleagues who have supported me throughout the process
of writing this book. My greatest intellectual debt is to Keith
Simmons, who has supported me at every stage of my career.
Keith has taught me a tremendous amount about the philo-
sophical problems that surround truth; but more importantly,
he has been a perfect model of an advisor, teacher, and
philosopher.
Special mention also goes to Jody Azzouni and Nic
Damnjanovic, who provided me with thoroughgoing com-
ments for the bulk of the manuscript. I am grateful to the
many others who have given their time reading, commenting
on, and talking with me about this project. This list includes
Bob Adams, Dorit Bar-On, Sam Baron, Jake Beck, Simon
Blackburn, Katie Elliott, Drew Johnson, Marc Lange, Bill
Lycan, Ram Neta, Pete Nichols, David Oderberg, Geoff
Sayre-McCord, and surely others I have failed to mention.
Various portions of the book have been presented to a
number of audiences, including one at the 2012 meeting of
the North and South Carolina Philosophical Societies, and at
the philosophy departments at Texas Tech University, the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the University
of Reading, and the University of Sydney. My thanks go to all
those in attendance for their constructive comments and
questions.

xii
 Preface

Some of the material from Chapter 4 has been previously

published in my ‘‘Against Truth,’’ forthcoming in Erkenntnis. I
thank Springer for permission to reproduce it here. Material
from Chapter 7 has been previously published in my ‘‘Tarski
and Primitivism about Truth,’’ forthcoming in Philosophers’
Imprint.
It is only fitting that this book should come out with
Cambridge University Press. The early defenders of primitivism –
Moore and Russell – formulated, defended, and later retracted
their brand of primitivism while at Cambridge. Frege, that era’s
other important primitivist, came to be known to the English-
speaking world through the efforts of the Cantabrigians. So
I am delighted that the book is being released by Cambridge,
and I am grateful to Hilary Gaskin for her efforts and support of
the project throughout its various stages.
Let me also take this opportunity to express my appreciation
to all the various philosophy departments that have supported
me along the way. My teachers at Whitman College recruited
me to philosophy, and I shall be forever grateful. My teachers
at Northern Illinois University set me on the course I continue
today, and I cannot overestimate the influence that the faculty
at the University of North Carolina have had on my philo-
sophical development. I also appreciate the warm welcome
I have received from all my new colleagues at Lingnan
University; I cannot imagine a better place to have started my
professional career.
Finally, let me express my deepest gratitude to my partner
Emily Matchar for all she has done to help make this book
become a reality. Emily has seen this project progress from
beginning to end; we were together in Sydney when the idea
for the book first occurred to me, in Chapel Hill for the bulk
of its writing, and now in Hong Kong seeing it through to the
end. I can only hope that some day I shall be half the writer
that she is.

xiii
 Introduction

Gottlob Frege begins his canonical paper “On sense and

reference” with an intriguing puzzle (1952). Consider a sim-
ple sentence of the form ‘A is identical to B.’ It is rather trivial
that everything is what it is, and not something else. So all
identity sentences, in a sense, are trivial. If A is identical to B,
then A just is B, and so ‘A is identical to B’ really amounts to
no more than just ‘A is identical to A.’ And yet identity
sentences can be incredibly informative, something it takes
ages to discover. (The classic example being that Hesperus,
the evening star, is identical to Phosphorus, the morning
star.) How is this possible? How can identity be both trivial
and informative?
Frege solves his puzzle by distinguishing between the sense
of a term and its referent. The senses associated with the names
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are different, though their refer-
ent (Venus) is the same. The difference in sense between
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ accounts for the informativeness
of the sentence ‘Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus,’ as this
truth differs in its sense from the trivial sentences ‘Hesperus is
identical to Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus is identical to
Phosphorus.’
This book begins with a different puzzle – one which also
caught Frege’s attention – and which is importantly similar in
structure to the puzzle over identity. In “The thought,” Frege
considers the equivalence that holds between a sentence ‘p’ and
the sentence ‘It is true that p’:

1
 The Primitivist Theory of Truth

It is also worthy of notice that the sentence “I smell the scent

of violets” has just the same content as the sentence “it is true that
I smell the scent of violets.” So it seems, then, that nothing is added
to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth. And yet
is it not a great result when the scientist after much hesitation and
careful inquiry, can finally say “what I supposed is true”?
(Frege 1956: 293)

On the one hand, Frege points out, the appearance of truth

here is utterly dispensable. It adds nothing. To discover that it
is true that there are subatomic particles is no more than to
discover that there are subatomic particles. But was this not a
remarkable discovery? Did it not mark a great scientific
advance? Scientific inquiry aims for the truth, yet adding
truth to our thoughts seems to be no addition at all. How is
this possible? How can truth be so dispensable, and yet so
important?1
This book is an exploration into the nature of truth. My aim
is to offer an account of truth that respects the two features to
which Frege calls our attention. On the one hand, we need to
countenance the equivalence, whatever its nature, between
the thought that p and the thought that it is true that p. But
coming to accept this feature of truth – whether it is called its
“redundancy,” “transparency,” or ability to “disappear” –
should not lead us to think that truth is an unimportant,
impotent, or dispensable notion. Truth, I shall argue, belongs
amongst our most basic and fundamental notions. But this
perspective on truth is fully compatible with taking truth not
to be an ordinary property, such that predicating truth of
something does not really “add” anything to it.
The theory of truth that I shall be advancing is best described
as being metaphysically deflationary while conceptually sub-
stantive. I argue that there is no property of truth, in any sense

1
Cf. Greimann (2004).

2
 Introduction

of ‘property’ that bears any metaphysical weight. This take on

the property of truth helps us explain the equivalence between
‘p’ and ‘It is true that p.’ But I am no deflationist about the
concept of truth. To the contrary, I argue that truth is one of
our most important concepts. It is a fundamental or primitive
concept, one which we cannot analyze, define, or reduce into
further, more basic concepts. We understand much else in
terms of truth, but truth itself is bedrock.
My goal for this book is to articulate and defend a novel
theory of truth. The genus to which my account belongs has
not received much philosophical attention, though it enjoys a
noble heritage. By defending a primitivist theory of truth, I join
a club that includes Frege, Donald Davidson, and certain early
stages of both G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. But although
all of these thinkers belong in the primitivist camp, there are
crucial differences between their views, and none of them
adopts (or even recognizes) the particular combination of
metaphysical deflationism and conceptual primitivism that
I advocate. Aside from these famous proponents of primitiv-
ism, a number of contemporary philosophers have expressed
sympathy with the view, though they have not argued in favor
of it.2 My goal is to offer the sustained articulation and defense
that primitivism deserves.
Primitivism typically receives very little attention in philo-
sophical discussions of truth. In his quite comprehensive
survey of the theory of truth, Richard Kirkham mentions
primitivism only by way of noting that Davidson holds it
(1992: 248). In their survey of the theory of truth, Alexis
Burgess and John Burgess mention primitivism only in passing,
also by noting that the view belongs to Davidson (2011: 86–9).
Wolfgang Künne’s magisterial tome on truth acknowledges

2
See Wiggins (2002: 316), Armstrong (2004: 17), Lowe (2007: 259; 2009: 215), and
Schaffer (2008: 309).

3
 The Primitivist Theory of Truth

up front that it will engage primitivism “only indirectly”

(2003: 13, 18). Frederick Schmitt’s anthology on the theory
of truth includes no coverage of primitivism (2004).3
Despite not receiving much overall attention from theorists
of truth, primitivism has attracted an uncommon amount of
scorn. Reporting on this fact, Stewart Candlish notes that
“primitivism has generally been thought so implausible that
almost no one else has ever been able to take it seriously, and
even Russell himself, despite what Peter Hylton has called his
‘White Queen-like talent for believing the impossible,’ could
not manage to hold it for long” (2007: 101).4 Barnett Savery
describes primitivism as being the result of a “youthful aberra-
tion” on the part of Russell and Moore, and states that he will
“dispose of this view with abruptness” (1955: 515). Paul
Horwich also abruptly dismisses primitivism as “the least
attractive conclusion” in the theory of truth, treating it as a
theory of last resort (1990: 10).
The inattention and bad publicity given to primitivism is
unfortunate, though perhaps understandable. It might be
thought that taking truth as a primitive entails not being able
to say anything informative about truth. If truth is primitive,
then there is nothing to say about it, let alone an entire book.
But this view is mistaken. To say that truth cannot be analyzed
into more fundamental notions is not to say that we cannot say
anything informative about the concept of truth. Because truth
is primitive, it can be used to elucidate other notions. We
appreciate the nature of truth by seeing how it fits together
with other notions such as knowledge, justification, assertion,
meaning, and others.

3
But note that the truth anthology by Blackburn and Simmons (1999) includes
Davidson’s locus classicus on primitivism (Davidson 1996), as does Lynch (2001),
which also includes Ernest Sosa’s defense of primitivism (Sosa 2001).
4
See Hylton (1984: 385), where Hylton himself calls the view “absurd.”

4
 Introduction

One way of arguing for primitivism is by way of elimination:

show how all the other theories of truth face insuperable
difficulties, and conclude that primitivism is the best of a bad
lot.5 I think we can do better by arguing for primitivism
directly. There are plenty of well-known criticisms of the
various non-primitivist accounts of truth, and it is not my
ambition to rehearse them again.6 My focus instead will be
on giving arguments that take primitivism as their conclusion,
and then showing the various theoretical virtues that accom-
pany primitivism about truth. Nevertheless, along the way
I shall be arguing directly against other theories of truth here
and there, though my main goal is to stand up for primitivism.
The book is divided into two main parts, and proceeds as
follows. The aim of Part I is to identify and articulate the
specific theory of truth that I advance. In Chapter 1, I outline
my favored approach to the theory of truth. Crucial to this
approach is the tripartite distinction between the property
of truth, the concept of truth, and the word ‘truth.’ Each of
these dimensions in turn admits of a substantive/deflationary
distinction. These two distinctions are crucial for articulating
my own view, which is substantive about the concept of truth
and deflationary about the property of truth. Chapter 2 delves
into the history of primitivism, focusing mainly on the “golden
age” of primitivism of the early twentieth century when Frege,
Moore, and Russell courted the view (though only Frege would
hold onto the theory throughout his life). Chapter 3 then
presents the official statement of my two-pronged theory of
truth, clears up a preliminary objection, and contrasts my view
with some contemporary primitivists (Ernest Sosa, Colin
McGinn, and Trenton Merricks).

5
Cf. Patterson (2010).
6
Kirkham (1992) and Künne (2003) are excellent sources of such objections.

5
 The Primitivist Theory of Truth

Part II presents the argumentative portion of the book.

Chapter 4 commences the defense of my positive view by
articulating the nature of and then arguing for the truth of
metaphysical deflationism. The argument draws on considera-
tions involving recombination and truthmaking, and concludes
that there is no property of truth in any metaphysically robust
sense. (Importantly, we shall see just what it is for a property to
be “metaphysically robust.”) This chapter also argues against
correspondence theories by showing how metaphysical defla-
tionists can undercut the motivation for such theories by appeal-
ing to truthmaker theory. Chapter 5 turns to the defense of
conceptual primitivism, and begins with Frege’s own argument
for primitivism, the “treadmill.” Though the treadmill is ulti-
mately broken, I show how we can revive the argument by way
of Frege’s doctrine of “omnipresence.” Chapter 6 then presents
a battery of arguments that also seek to establish primitivism
directly. In Chapter 7 I show how primitivists can take advant-
age of Tarski’s pioneering work on truth in support of their
position. Chapter 8 offers a sustained indirect argument for
primitivism by demonstrating the various theoretical virtues
that primitivism enjoys over its rivals, particularly deflationary
theories of the concept of truth. Hence, this chapter includes the
book’s most direct criticisms of deflationism. I conclude in
Chapter 9 by taking up the liar paradox, and showing how
primitivists enjoy a wide variety of theoretical resources in
handling it.
A wider objective of the book is to shift the dialectic in the
theory of truth. Nowadays, most of the attention in the theory
of truth is split between deflationary theories and correspond-
ence theories. When we view the dialectic in these terms,
problems with one view can be taken as support for the
other. For example, the explanatory impotence of deflationary
views leads some toward a more substantive correspondence
theory. But the metaphysical baggage and obscurity of the

6
 Introduction

correspondence theory’s key theoretical notions leads others

to the theoretically clear and simple deflationary platform.
Everything changes once primitivism arrives on the scene.
The brand of primitivism that I offer avoids both of these
worries. It offers a substantive, explanatory account of the
nature of truth without taking on any problematic metaphys-
ical consequences. As a result, we need to rethink the over-
arching dialectic in the theory of truth. Hence, even if
primitivism is not, at the end of the day, the best account of
the nature of truth, its very availability as a contender reshapes
the way that we ought to think and argue about truth. If
the pages that follow do not convince you that primitivism is
true, at the least they should make you rethink how to think
about truth.

7
 part i

Identifying primitivism
 1
Truth, truth, and ‘truth’

Philosophical theories of truth have taken on many

forms over the years. Not every theory of truth addresses
the same set of questions, and not every theory approaches
the nature of truth in the same way. As a result, our
first task is to isolate the framework with which we
shall be approaching the theory of truth. The main goals
of this chapter, accordingly, are two-fold. First, we need to
understand just what is at stake in the theory of truth.
What is a theory of truth out to accomplish? To answer
this question, we must begin by drawing two crucial
distinctions. The first is that between the property of
truth, the concept of truth, and the word ‘truth’ (and its
cognates). The second distinction is between substantive
and deflationary approaches to the theory of truth.
Equipped with both distinctions, we can appreciate that
whether a substantive or deflationary approach is called
for depends upon whether we are concerned with the
property, concept, or word.
Having drawn these paramount distinctions, the second
goal is to understand what, in general, a primitivist theory
is. Primitivist theories have arisen in various corners of
philosophy (such as ethics, epistemology, and the philoso-
phy of science). These fellow travelers demonstrate that
primitivist views are not theories of last resort: quite
to the contrary, they are independently plausible and
defensible.

11
 The Primitivist Theory of Truth

1.1 What is the theory of truth?

A theory of truth will not tell you what is true. To find out what
is true, we have to turn to empirical and rational investigation.
The sciences and mathematics provide us with lots of truths
about the world. They tell us what is true. But they do not tell
us what truth is, which is the main objective of a theory of
truth. Theories of truth set out to capture the nature and
essence of truth, assuming it even has one. Physics teaches us
that the sentence ‘All motion is relative to frames of reference’
is true. The theory of truth tells us what it is in which the truth
of that sentence consists. A theory of the nature of, say, water
will offer an account of what it is that is shared by all samples
of water, in virtue of which they are samples of water.
Similarly, a theory of the nature of truth will offer an account
of what it is, if anything, that is shared by all truths, in virtue of
which they are true.
Examples of theories of truth are far easier to find than
adequate statements of what the theory of truth is. Perhaps
most commonly, there are correspondence theories of truth.1
These theories maintain that truth is defined in terms of corre-
spondence with fact, or reality: something is true just in case it
corresponds to some fact. Next, there are coherence theories
of truth.2 Here truths are true in virtue of their cohering
together in some further specified way. There are also prag-
matic theories of truth3 and epistemic theories of truth.4 These
theories make something’s being true depend, respectively,
upon its usefulness to us in believing it, or on certain facts

1
Classic (but importantly distinct) examples include Chapter 12 of Russell (1912) and
Austin (1950). Contemporary correspondence theories are found in Fumerton
(2002), Newman (2002), David (2004), and Vision (2004).
2
See, e.g., Joachim (1906) and Young (2001).
3
See, e.g., Dewey (1941) and James (1981).
4
See, e.g., Dummett (1958–9) and Putnam (1981).

12
 Truth, truth, and ‘truth’

about our evidence-gathering capabilities. There are deflation-

ary (or “minimalist”) theories of truth, which hold that truth
has no unified nature, that there is no substantive or genuine
property shared by all and only truths.5 Finally, there are
pluralist (or “functionalist”) theories of truth that maintain
that the nature of truth may vary from domain to domain.6
According to such theories, what it is for, say, an ethical claim
to be true may be different from what it is for a claim of physics
to be true.7
Each of these families of theories offers different answers
to the questions ‘What is the nature of truth?’ and ‘What, if
anything, do all truths share in common?’ The primitivist
theory I shall be defending rejects all of these views. My version
of primitivism is monistic, as it rejects the pluralists’ claim
to truth having multiple natures. It is fundamentalist, in that
it cannot be defined in terms of more basic notions like corre-
spondence, coherence, utility, or warrant. Finally, it is some-
times deflationary and sometimes substantive. To appreciate
primitivism’s complex relationship to deflationary theories, we
need to turn to a pair of key distinctions.

1.1.1 Property, concept, word

Theories of truth do indeed investigate the nature of truth, but
our topic still needs further disambiguation. When discussing

5
See, e.g., Ramsey (1927), Ayer (1952), Quine (1970), Grover, Camp, and Belnap
(1975), Leeds (1978), Horwich (1990; 1998b), and Field (1994a).
6
See, e.g., Wright (1992) and Lynch (2009).
7
Complicating matters further is, following Beall and Glanzberg (2008), the distinc-
tion between theories concerned with the nature of truth (as in all the views just
mentioned) and theories concerned with the logic of truth (e.g., Kripke 1975; Gupta
and Belnap 1993). The latter theories are motivated directly by the liar paradox,
which tends not to be the focus of the nature-based views. The views I shall be
engaging most are focused on questions involving the nature of truth, but I do
discuss the liar paradox below in Chapter 9.

13
 The Primitivist Theory of Truth

truth, we may be interested in the property of truth, that

feature (if it exists) that all truths share and all falsities lack.
We might be interested in the concept of truth, our mental
understanding of that notion that we use the word ‘truth’ to
pick out. Or we might be interested in the word ‘truth’ as well
as ‘true’ and its associated predicates (‘is true’) and operators
(‘it is true that’). Keeping this threefold distinction in mind is
absolutely vital. Views that may be attractive for one of the
dimensions of truth may not be so attractive for the others.8
The topic of the property of truth involves the metaphysics
of truth. What sort of property is truth? Is truth a natural kind?
A naturalistic property? A merely logical property? Is it even a
property at all? If so, is it a fundamental or a derivative prop-
erty? Is it monadic or relational? Simple or complex? We shall
take up these sorts of questions in Chapter 4, when we delve
into the various metaphysical approaches that are taken with
respect to properties.
The topic of the concept of truth often involves truth’s
connection to other concepts. Is truth an explanatorily inter-
esting concept? Does truth play a role in our thought that
extends beyond its linguistic role in forming generalizations
and anaphora? Can it be used to analyze other concepts? Can it
be itself analyzed into further concepts? Or does it admit of no
non-circular analysis, or perhaps no analysis at all? Questions
concerning the concept of truth also involve what mental
agents have to have in order to deploy the concept of truth.
What other concepts or mental abilities does one have to have
in order to have the concept of truth? Is there anything more to
having a concept of truth than being disposed to infer ‘p’ from
‘It is true that p’ and vice versa? These sorts of questions take

8
This section (and the general approach to truth that it advocates) owes much to
Dorit Bar-On and Keith Simmons, and their thinking about truth (particularly
2007). I thank them for turning me on to it.

14
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 declares its firm conviction that the manufacture,
exportation, importation, and sale of alcoholic beverages has
produced such social, commercial, industrial, and political
wrongs, and is now so threatening the perpetuity of all our
social and political institutions, that the suppression of the
same by a national party organized therefor is the greatest
object to be accomplished by the voters of our country, and is
of such importance that it, of right, ought to control the
political actions of all our patriotic citizens until such
suppression is accomplished. The urgency of this course
demands the union without further delay of all citizens who
desire the prohibition of the liquor traffic. Therefore be it

"Resolved, That we favor the legal prohibition by state and

national legislation of the manufacture, importation, and sale
of alcoholic beverages. That we declare our purpose to
organize and unite all the friends of prohibition into one
party; and in order to accomplish this end we deem it of right
to leave every prohibitionist the freedom of his own
convictions upon all other political questions, and trust our
representatives to take such action upon other political
questions as the changes occasioned by prohibition and the
welfare of the whole people shall demand."

{572}

Resolved, "The right of suffrage ought not to be abridged on

account of sex."

Those delegates who were dissatisfied with this platform

withdrew from the convention, assembled in another hall,
assumed the name of "The National Party," adopted the
following declarations, and nominated Charles E. Bentley, of
Nebraska, and J. II. Southgate, of North Carolina, for the two
highest offices in the national government:

"The National Party, recognizing God as the author of all just

power in government, presents the following declaration of
principles, which it pledges itself to enact into effective
legislation when given the power to do so:

"The suppression of the manufacture and sale, importation,

exportation, and transportation of intoxicating liquors for
beverage purposes. We utterly reject all plans for regulating
or compromising with this traffic, whether such plans be
called local option, taxation, license, or public control. The
sale of liquors for medicinal and other legitimate uses should
be conducted by the State, without profit, and with such
regulations as will prevent fraud or evasion.

"No citizen should be denied the right to vote on account of

sex.

"All money should be issued by the General Government only,

and without the intervention of any private citizen,
corporation, or banking institution. It should be based upon
the wealth, stability, and integrity of the nation. It should
be a full legal tender for all debts, public and private, and
should be of sufficient volume to meet the demands of the
legitimate business interests of the country. For the purpose
of honestly liquidating our outstanding coin obligations, we
favor the free and unlimited coinage of both silver and gold,
at the ratio of sixteen to one, without consulting any other
nation.

"Land is the common heritage of the people and should be

preserved from monopoly and speculation. All unearned grants
of land, subject to forfeiture, should be reclaimed by the
Government and no portion of the public domain should
hereafter be granted except to actual settlers, continuous use
being essential to tenure.

"Railroads, telegraphs, and other natural monopolies should be

owned and operated by the Government, giving to the people the
benefit of service at actual cost.

"The National Constitution should be so amended as to allow

the national revenues to be raised by equitable adjustment of
taxation on the properties and incomes of the people, and
import duties should be levied as a means of securing
equitable commercial relations with other nations.

"The contract convict-labor system, through which speculators

are enriched at the expense of the State, should be abolished.

"All citizens should be protected by law in their right to one

day of rest in seven, without oppressing any who
conscientiously observe any other than the first day of the
week.

"American public schools, taught in the English language,

should be maintained, and no public funds should be
appropriated for sectarian institutions.

"The President, Vice-President, and United States Senators

should be elected by direct vote of the people.

"Ex-soldiers and sailors of the United States army and navy,

their widows, and minor children, should receive liberal
pensions, graded on disability and term of service, not merely
as a debt of gratitude, but for service rendered in the
preservation of the Union.

"Our immigration laws should be so revised as to exclude

paupers and criminals. None but citizens of the United States
should be allowed to vote in any State, and naturalized
citizens should not vote until one year after naturalization
papers have been issued.

"The initiative and referendum and proportional representation

should be adopted.
 "Having herein presented our principles and purposes, we
invite the co-operation and support of all citizens who are
with us substantially agreed."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1896.

Socialist-Labor Party Nominations.

Still another party which placed candidates for the presidency

and vice-presidency in nomination was the Socialist-Labor
organization, which held a convention in New York, July 4-10,
and named for the two high offices, Charles H. Matchett, of
New York, and Mathew Maguire, of New Jersey. Its platform
embodied the essential doctrines of socialism, as commonly
understood, and was as follows:

"The Socialist Labor Party of the United States, in convention

assembled, reasserts the inalienable rights of all men to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

"With the founders of the American Republic we hold that the

purpose of government is to secure every citizen in the
enjoyment of this right; but in the right of our conditions we
hold, furthermore, that no such right can be exercised under a
system of economic inequality, essentially destructive of
life, of liberty, and of happiness.

"With the founders of this Republic we hold that the true

theory of politics is that the machinery of government must be
owned and controlled by the whole people; but in the light of
our industrial development we hold, furthermore, that the true
theory of economics is that the machinery of production must
likewise belong to the people in common.

"To the obvious fact that our despotic system of economics is

the direct opposite of our democratic system of politics, can
plainly be traced the existence of a privileged class, the
 corruption of Government by that class, the alienation of
public property, public franchises, and public functions to
that class, and the abject dependence of the mightiest of
nations upon that class.

"Again, through the perversion of democracy to the ends of

plutocracy, labor is robbed of its wealth which it alone
produces, is denied the means of self-employment, and by
compulsory idleness in wage slavery, is even deprived of the
necessaries of life.

"Human power and natural forces are thus wasted, that the
plutocracy may rule. Ignorance and misery, with all their
concomitant evils, are perpetuated, that the people may be
kept in bondage. Science and invention are diverted from their
humane purpose to the enslavement of women and children.

"Against such a system the Socialist Labor party once more

enters its protest. Once more it reiterates its fundamental
declaration that private property in the natural sources of
production and in the instruments of labor is the obvious
cause of all economic servitude and political dependence.

{573}

"The time is fast coming when, in the natural course of social

evolution, this system, through the destructive action of its
failures and crises on one hand, and the constructive
tendencies of its trusts and other capitalistic combinations
on the other hand, shall have worked out its own downfall.

"We therefore call upon the wage-workers of the United States,

and upon all honest citizens, to organize under the banner of
the Socialist Labor party into a class-conscious body, aware
of its rights and determined to conquer them by taking
possession of the public powers, so that, held together by an
indomitable spirit of solidarity under the most trying
conditions of the present class struggle, we may put a summary
end to that barbarous struggle by the abolition of classes,
the restoration of the land and of all the means of
production, transportation, and distribution to the people as
a collective body, and the substitution of the co-operative
commonwealth for the present state of planless production,
industrial war, and social disorder, a commonwealth in which
every worker shall have the free exercise and full benefit of
his faculties, multiplied by all modern factors of
civilization.

"With a view to immediate improvement in the condition of

labor we present the following demands:

"1. Reduction of the hours of labor in proportion to the

progress of production.

"2. The United States shall obtain possession of the

railroads, canals, telegraphs, telephones, and all other means
of public transportation and communication; the employés to
operate the same co-operatively under control of the Federal
Government and to elect their own superior officers, but no
employé shall be discharged for political reasons.

"3. The municipalities shall obtain possession of the local

railroads, ferries, waterworks, gas-works, electric plants,
and all industries requiring municipal franchises; the
employés to operate the same co-operatively under control of
the municipal administration and to elect their own superior
officers, but no employé shall be discharged for political
reasons.

"4. The public lands declared inalienable. Revocation of all

land grants to corporations or individuals the conditions of
which have not been complied with.

"5. The United States to have the exclusive right to issue

money.

"6. Congressional legislation providing for the scientific

management of forests and waterways, and prohibiting the waste
of the natural resources of the country.

"7. Inventions to be free to all: the inventors to be

remunerated by the nation.

"8. Progressive income tax and tax on inheritances; the

smaller incomes to be exempt.

"9. School education of all children under fourteen years of

age to be compulsory, gratuitous, and accessible to all by
public assistance in meals, clothing, books, etc., where
necessary.

"10. Repeal of all pauper, tramp, conspiracy, and sumptuary

laws. Unabridged right of combination.

"11. Prohibition of the employment of children of school age

and of female labor in occupations detrimental to health or
morality. Abolition of the convict-labor contract system.

"12. Employment of the unemployed by the public authorities

(county, State, or nation).

"13. All wages to be paid in lawful money of the United

States. Equalization of women's wages to those of men where
equal service is performed.

"14. Laws for the protection of life and limb in all

occupations, and an efficient employers' liability law.

"15. The people to have the right to propose laws and to vote
upon all measures of importance according to the referendum
principle.
 "16. Abolition of the veto power of the Executive (National,
State, or municipal), wherever it exists.

"17. Abolition of the United States Senate and all upper

legislative chambers.

"18. Municipal self-government.

"19. Direct vote and secret ballots in all elections.

Universal and equal right of suffrage without regard to color,
creed, or sex. Election days to be legal holidays. The
principle of proportional representation to be introduced.

"20. All public officers to be subject to recall by their

respective constituencies.

"21. Uniform civil and criminal law throughout the United

States. Administration of justice free of charge. Abolition of
capital punishment."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1896.

The Canvass and Election.

The canvass which occupied the months between party

nominations and the election was the most remarkable, in many
respects, that the country had ever gone through. On both
sides of the silver question intense convictions were burning
and intense anxieties being felt. To the defenders of the gold
standard of value—the monetary standard of the world at
large—an unlimited free coinage of silver legal tender money,
at the ratio of 16 to 1, meant both dishonor and ruin—national
bankruptcy, the wreck of industry, and chaos in the commercial
world. To many of those who strove with desperate eagerness to
bring it about it meant, on the contrary, a millennial social
state, in which abundance would prevail, the goods of the
world be divided more fairly, and labor have a juster reward.
 So the issue fronted each as one personal, vital, almost as of
life and death. Their conflict bore no likeness to those
commonly in politics, where consequences seem remote, vague,
general to the body politic,—not, instantly overhanging the
head of the individual citizen, as in this case they did. Not
even the patriotic and moral excitements of the canvass of
1860 produced so intense a feeling of personal interest in the
election—so painful an anxiety in waiting for its result. And
never in any former political contest had the questions
involved been debated so earnestly, studied so widely and
intently, set forth by every artifice of exposition and
illustration with so much ingenious pains. The "campaign
literature" distributed by each party was beyond computation
in quantity and beyond classification in its kinds. The
speeches of the canvass were innumerable. Mr. Bryan
contributed some hundreds, in tours which he made through the
country, and Mr. McKinley, at his home, in Canton, Ohio,
received visiting delegations from all parts of the country
and addressed them at more or less length.

{574}

With all the excitement of anxiety and the heated conflict of

beliefs there was little violence of any kind, from first to
last. The critical election day (November 3) passed with no
serious incidents of disorder. The verdict of the people,
pronounced for the preservation of the monetary standard which
the world at large has established in general use, was
accepted with the equanimity to which self-governing citizens
are trained. Nearly fourteen millions of votes were cast, of
which the Republican presidential electors received 7,104,244;
electors representing the various parties which had nominated
Mr. Bryan received, in all, 6,506,835; those on the National
Democratic ticket received 134,652; those on the Prohibition
tickets, 144,606; those on the Socialist-Labor ticket, 36,416.
In the Electoral College, there were 271 votes for McKinley,
and 176 for Bryan. The States giving their electoral votes for
 McKinley were California (excepting 1 vote, cast for Bryan),
Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky
(except 1), Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West
Virginia, Wisconsin. The States which chose electors for Bryan
were Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, besides
the single votes won in California and Kentucky. For Vice
President, Hobart received 271 electoral votes—the same as
McKinley; but Sewall received 27 less than Bryan, that number
being cast for the Populist candidate, Watson. This was
consequent on fusion arrangements between Democrats and
Populists in 28 States.

In some States, the majority given against silver free coinage

was overwhelming, as for example, in New York, 268,000
plurality for McKinley, besides 19,000 votes cast for the
"Gold Democratic" candidate; New Jersey, 87,000 Republican
plurality and 6,000 votes for General Palmer; Pennsylvania,
295,000 and 11,000; Massachusetts, 173,000 and 11,000. On the
other hand, Texas gave Bryan a plurality of 202,000, and
Colorado 135,000.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (November).

Agreement with Great Britain for the settlement of the
Venezuela dispute.

See (in this volume)

VENEZUELA: A. D. 1896-1899.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (December).

President Cleveland on affairs in Cuba.

See (in this volume)

 CUBA: A. D. 1896-1897.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896-1897.

Immigration Bill vetoed by President Cleveland.

On the 17th of December, 1896, a bill to amend the immigration

laws, which had passed the House of Representatives during the
previous session of Congress, passed the Senate, with
amendments which the House refused to accept. By conferences
between the two branches of Congress an agreement was finally
reached, in which the House concurred on the 9th of February
and the Senate on the 17th. But the President disapproved the
measure, and returned it to Congress on the 2d of March, with
his objections set forth in the following Message:

"I herewith return without approval House bill No. 7864,

entitled 'An act to amend the immigration laws of the United
States.'

"By the first section of this bill it is proposed to amend

section 1 of the act of March 3, 1891, relating to immigration
by adding to the classes of aliens thereby excluded from
admission to the United States the following: 'All persons
physically capable and over 16 years of age who can not read
and write the English language or some other language; but a
person not so able to read and write who is over 50 years of
age and is the parent or grandparent of a qualified immigrant
over 21 years of age and capable of supporting such parent or
grandparent may accompany such immigrant, or such a parent or
grandparent may be sent for and come to join the family of a
child or grandchild over 21 years of age similarly qualified
and capable, and a wife or minor child not so able to read and
write may accompany or be sent for and come and join the
husband or parent similarly qualified and capable.'

"A radical departure from our national policy relating to

immigration is here presented. Heretofore we have welcomed all
who came to us from other lands except those whose moral or
physical condition or history threatened danger to our
national welfare and safety. Relying upon the zealous
watchfulness of our people to prevent injury to our political
and social fabric, we have encouraged those coming from
foreign countries to cast their lot with us and join in the
development of our vast domain, securing in return a share in
the blessings of American citizenship. A century's stupendous
growth, largely due to the assimilation and thrift of millions
of sturdy and patriotic adopted citizens, attests the success
of this generous and free-handed policy which, while guarding
the people's interests, exacts from our immigrants only
physical and moral soundness and a willingness and ability to
work. A contemplation of the grand results of this policy can
not fail to arouse a sentiment in its defense, for however it
might have been regarded as an original proposition and viewed
as an experiment its accomplishments are such that if it is to be
uprooted at this late day its disadvantages should be plainly
apparent and the substitute adopted should be just and
adequate, free from uncertainties, and guarded against
difficult or oppressive administration.

"It is not claimed, I believe, that the time has come for the
further restriction of immigration on the ground that an
excess of population overcrowds our land. It is said, however,
that the quality of recent immigration is undesirable. The
time is quite within recent memory when the same thing was
said of immigrants who, with their descendants, are now
numbered among our best citizens. It is said that too many
immigrants settle in our cities, thus dangerously increasing
their idle and vicious population. This is certainly a
disadvantage. It can not be shown, however, that it affects
all our cities, nor that it is permanent; nor does it appear
that this condition where it exists demands as its remedy the
reversal of our present immigration policy. The claim is also
made that the influx of foreign laborers deprives of the
opportunity to work those who are better entitled than they to
 the privilege of earning their livelihood by daily toil. An
unfortunate condition is certainly presented when any who are
willing to labor are unemployed, but so far as this condition
now exists among our people it must be conceded to be a result
of phenomenal business depression and the stagnation of all
enterprises in which labor is a factor.
{575}
With the advent of settled and wholesome financial and
economic governmental policies and consequent encouragement to
the activity of capital the misfortunes of unemployed labor
should, to a great extent at least, be remedied. If it
continues, its natural consequences must be to check the
further immigration to our cities of foreign laborers and to
deplete the ranks of those already there. In the meantime
those most willing and best entitled ought to be able to
secure the advantages of such work as there is to do.

"It is proposed by the bill under consideration to meet the

alleged difficulties of the situation by establishing an
educational test by which the right of a foreigner to make his
home with us shall be determined. Its general scheme is to
prohibit from admission to our country all immigrants
'physically capable and over 16 years of age who can not read
and write the English language or some other language,' and it
is provided that this test shall be applied by requiring
immigrants seeking admission to read and afterwards to write
not less than twenty nor more than twenty-five words of the
Constitution of the United States in some language, and that
any immigrant failing in this shall not be admitted, but shall
be returned to the country from whence he came at the expense
of the steamship or railroad company which brought him.

"The best reason that could be given for this radical

restriction of immigration is the necessity of protecting our
population against degeneration and saving our national peace
and quiet from imported turbulence and disorder. I can not
believe that we would be protected against these evils by
limiting immigration to those who can read and write in any
language twenty-five words of our Constitution. In my opinion,
it is infinitely more safe to admit a hundred thousand
immigrants who, though unable to read and write, seek among us
only a home and opportunity to work than to admit one of those
unruly agitators and enemies of governmental control who can
not only read and write, but delights in arousing by
inflammatory speech the illiterate and peacefully inclined to
discontent and tumult. Violence and disorder do not originate
with illiterate laborers. They are, rather, the victims of the
educated agitator. The ability to read and write, as required
in this bill, in and of itself affords, in my opinion, a
misleading test of contented industry and supplies
unsatisfactory evidence of desirable citizenship or a proper
apprehension of the benefits of our institutions. If any
particular element of our illiterate immigration is to be
feared for other causes than illiteracy, these causes should
be dealt with directly, instead of making illiteracy the
pretext for exclusion, to the detriment of other illiterate
immigrants against whom the real cause of complaint cannot be
alleged.

"The provisions intended to rid that part of the proposed

legislation already referred to from obvious hardship appear
to me to be indefinite and inadequate. A parent, grandparent,
wife, or minor child of a qualified immigrant, though unable
to read and write, may accompany the immigrant or be sent for
to join his family, provided the immigrant is capable of
supporting such relative. These exceptions to the general rule
of exclusion contained in the bill were made to prevent the
separation of families, and yet neither brothers nor sisters
are provided for. In order that relatives who are provided for
may be reunited, those still in foreign lands must be sent for
to join the immigrant here. What formality is necessary to
constitute this prerequisite, and how are the facts of
relationship and that the relative is sent for to be
established? Are the illiterate relatives of immigrants who
have come here under prior laws entitled to the advantage of
these exceptions? A husband who can read and write and who
determines to abandon his illiterate wife abroad will find
here under this law an absolutely safe retreat. The illiterate
relatives mentioned must not only be sent for, but such immigrant
must be capable of supporting them when they arrive. This
requirement proceeds upon the assumption that the foreign
relatives coming here are in every case, by reason of poverty,
liable to become a public charge unless the immigrant is
capable of their support. The contrary is very often true. And
yet if unable to read and write, though quite able and willing
to support themselves and their relatives here besides, they
could not be admitted under the provisions of this bill if the
immigrant was impoverished, though the aid of his fortunate
but illiterate relative might be the means of saving him from
pauperism.

"The fourth section of this bill provides—'That it shall be

unlawful for any male alien who has not in good faith made his
declaration before the proper court of his intention to become
a citizen of the United States to be employed on any public works
of the United States or to come regularly or habitually into
the United States by land or water for the purpose of engaging
in any mechanical trade or manual labor for wages or salary,
returning from time to time to a foreign country.' The fifth
section provides—'That it shall be unlawful for any person,
partnership, company, or corporation knowingly to employ any
alien coming into the United States in violation of the next
preceding section of this act.'

"The prohibition against the employment of aliens upon any

public works of the United States is in line with other
legislation of a like character. It is quite a different
thing, however, to declare it a crime for an alien to come
regularly and habitually into the United States for the
purpose of obtaining work from private parties, if such alien
returns from time to time to a foreign country, and to
 constitute any employment of such alien a criminal offense.
When we consider these provisions of the bill in connection
with our long northern frontier and the boundaries of our
States and Territories, often but an imaginary line separating
them from the British dominions, and recall the friendly
intercourse between the people who are neighbors on either
side, the provisions of this bill affecting them must be
regarded as illiberal, narrow, and un-American. The residents
of these States and Territories have separate and especial
interests which in many cases make an interchange of labor
between their people and their alien neighbors most important,
frequently with the advantage largely in favor of our
citizens. This suggests the inexpediency of Federal
interference with these conditions when not necessary to the
correction of a substantial evil, affecting the general
welfare. Such unfriendly legislation as is proposed could
hardly fail to provoke retaliatory measures, to the injury of
many of our citizens who now find employment on adjoining
foreign soil.
{576}
The uncertainty of construction to which the language of these
provisions is subject is a serious objection to a statute
which describes a crime. An important element in the offense
sought to be created by these sections is the coming
'regularly or habitually into the United States.' These words
are impossible of definite and certain construction. The same
may be said of the equally important words 'returning from
time to time to a foreign country.'

"A careful examination of this bill has convinced me that for

the reasons given and others not specifically stated its
provisions are unnecessarily harsh and oppressive, and its
defects in construction would cause vexation and its operation
would result in harm to our citizens.
GROVER CLEVELAND."

In the House of Representatives, the Bill was passed again,

 over the veto, by the requisite vote of two-thirds; in the
Senate it was referred to the Committee on Immigration, and no
further action was taken upon it. Therefore, it did not become
a law.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896-1898.

Agitation for monetary reforms.
The Indianapolis Commission.
Secretary Gage's plan.
The Senatorial block in the way.

On November 18, 1896, the Governors of the Indianapolis Board

of Trade invited the Boards of Trade of Chicago, St. Louis,
Cincinnati, Louisville, Cleveland. Columbus, Toledo, Kansas
City, Detroit, Milwaukee, St. Paul, Des Moines, Minneapolis,
Grand Rapids, Peoria, and Omaha to a conference on the first
of December following, to consider the advisability of calling
a larger convention from commercial organizations throughout
the country for the purpose of discussing the wisdom of
selecting a non-partisan commission to formulate a sound
currency system. This preliminary conference issued a call for
a non-partisan monetary convention of business men, chosen
from boards of trade, chambers of commerce, and commercial
clubs, to meet in Indianapolis, on January 12, 1897. At the
convention there were assembled, with credentials, 299
delegates, representing business organizations and cities in
nearly every State in the Union. The result of its
deliberations was expressed in resolutions which opened as
follows:

"This convention declares that it has become absolutely

necessary that a consistent, straightforward, and deliberately
planned monetary system shall be inaugurated, the fundamental
basis of which should be: First, that the present gold
standard should be maintained. Second, that steps should be
taken to insure the ultimate retirement of all classes of
United States notes by a gradual and steady process, and so as
to avoid the injurious contraction of the currency, or
disturbance of the business interests of the country, and that
until such retirements provision should be made for a
separation of the revenue and note-issue departments of the
Treasury. Third, that a banking system be provided, which
should furnish credit facilities to every portion of the
country and a safe and elastic circulation, and especially
with a view of securing such a distribution of the loanable
capital of the country as will tend to equalize the rates of
interest in all parts thereof."

Recognizing the necessity of committing the formulation of

such a plan to a body of men trained and experienced in these
matters, a commission was proposed. In case no commission
should be authorized by Congress in the spring of 1897, the
Executive Committee of the Convention was authorized to select
a commission of eleven members, "to make thorough
investigation of the monetary affairs and needs of this
country, in all relations and aspects, and to make appropriate
suggestions as to any evils found to exist, and the remedies
therefor."

Congress did not authorize the appointment of a monetary

commission; and the Executive Committee of the Convention
selected a commission of eleven members, which began its
sittings in Washington, September 22, 1897. … The Commission
was composed as follows: George F. Edmunds, Vermont, chairman;
George E. Leighton, Missouri, vice-chairman; T. G. Bush,
Alabama; W. B. Dean, Minnesota; Charles S. Fairchild, New
York; Stuyvesant Fish, New York; J. W. Fries, North Carolina;
Louis A. Garnett, California; J. Laurence Laughlin, Illinois;
C. Stuart Patterson, Pennsylvania; Robert S. Taylor, Indiana;
and L. Carron Root and H. Parker Willis, secretaries. Early in
January, 1898, the report of the Monetary Commission was
made public, and a second convention of delegates from the
boards of trade and other commercial organizations of leading
cities in the country was called together at Indianapolis,
 January 20-26, to consider its recommendations. The measures
proposed by the Commission were approved by the convention,
and were submitted to Congress by a committee appointed to
urge their enactment in law. The Secretary of the Treasury,
Mr. Gage, had already, in his first annual report and in the
draft of a bill which he laid before the House committee on
banking and currency, made recommendations which accorded in
principle with those of the Commission, differing somewhat in
details. Both plans, with some proposals from other sources,
were now taken in hand by the House committee on banking and
currency, and a bill was prepared, which the committee
reported to the House on the 15th of June. But the other
branch of Congress, the Senate, had already declared itself in
a way which forbade any hope of success. By a vote of 47 to
32, that body had resolved, on the 28th of January, that "all
the bonds of the United States issued, or authorized to be
issued, under the said acts of Congress herein before recited,
are payable, principal and interest, at the option of the
government of the United States, in silver dollars, of the
coinage of the United States, containing 412½ grains each of
standard silver: and that to restore to its coinage such
silver coins as a legal tender in payment of said bonds,
principal and interest, is not in violation of the public
faith, nor in derogation of the rights of the public
creditor." The House, by 182 to 132, had rejected this
resolution; but the Senate action had demonstrated the evident
uselessness of attempting legislation in the interest of a
monetary reform. Accordingly the House bill, after being
reported and made public, for discussion outside, was
withdrawn by the committee, and the subject rested in
Congress, while agitation in the country went on.

{577}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897.

The Industrial Revolution.
"In 1865 the problem presented was this: The United States
could certainly excel any European nation in economic
competition, and possibly the whole Continent combined, if it
could utilize its resources. So much was admitted; the doubt
touched the capacity of the people to organize a system of
transportation and industry adequate to attain that end.
Failure meant certain bankruptcy. Unappalled by the magnitude
of the speculation, the American people took the risk. What
that risk was may be imagined when the fact is grasped that in
1865, with 35,000 miles of road already built, this people
entered on the construction of 160,000 miles more, at an
outlay, probably, in excess of $10,000,000,000. Such figures
convey no impression to the mind, any more than a statement of
the distance of a star. It may aid the imagination, perhaps,
to say that Mr. Giffen estimated the cost to France of the war
of 1870, including the indemnity and Alsace and Lorraine, at
less than $3,500,000,000, or about one-third of this
portentous mortgage on the future.

"As late as 1870 America remained relatively poor, for

America, so far as her export trade went, relied on
agriculture alone. To build her roads she had to borrow, and
she expected to pay dear; but she did not calculate on having
to pay twice the capital she borrowed, estimating that capital
in the only merchandise she had to sell. Yet this is very nearly
what occurred. Agricultural prices fell so rapidly that
between 1890 and 1897, when the sharpest pressure prevailed,
it took something like twice the weight of wheat or cotton to
repay a dollar borrowed in 1873, that would have sufficed to
satisfy the creditor when the debt was contracted. Merchandise
enough could not be shipped to meet the emergency, and
balances had to be paid in coin. The agony this people endured
may be measured by the sacrifice they made. At the moment of
severest contraction, in the single year 1893. the United
States parted with upwards of $87,000,000 of gold, when to
lose gold was like draining a living body of its blood. …