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The Tool Instinct
 Series Editor
Jean-Charles Pomerol

The Tool Instinct

François Osiurak
First published 2020 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as
permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, this publication may only be reproduced,
stored or transmitted, in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the publishers,
or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms and licenses issued by the
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undermentioned address:

ISTE Ltd John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

27-37 St George’s Road 111 River Street
London SW19 4EU Hoboken, NJ 07030
UK USA

www.iste.co.uk www.wiley.com

© ISTE Ltd 2020

The rights of François Osiurak to be identified as the author of this work have been asserted by him in
accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Library of Congress Control Number: 2019955365

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978-1-78630-471-1
 Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Chapter 1. The Tool With a Capital T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.1. Defining the Tool: the behavioral reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. Blinded by tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3. From analogy to specificities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4. The select club of animal users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5. In-defining the Tool: cognitive reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5.1. The absence of boundaries between tool use,
tool making and construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5.2. Tool use: a fragile definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Chapter 2. Instinct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1. Tools not necessary for survival. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1.1. The necessity hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1.2. An intrinsic and non-extrinsic pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1.3. The Tool, useful but not necessary for survival . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2. Digging your own ditches to cross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.1. At the root of our own problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.2. The illusion of technological progress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.3. Telefantasies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3. From appetence to instinct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.1. On the instinct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.2. The hand and the tool: the Baldwin effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
vi The Tool Instinct

Chapter 3. The Myth of Manual Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

3.1. Gestum ago, ergo instrumentis munio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1.1. From popular beliefs to metatheories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1.2. The manipulation-based approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2. The myth of motor programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.1. Empirical data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.2. Theoretical and epistemological reflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3. Instrumentis munio, ergo gestum ago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3.1. Tool incorporation and object-object manipulation . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3.2. Primate prehension system: recycled mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Chapter 4. A World Without a Technical Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

4.1. The reason for the Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1.1. Apraxia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1.2. Tool use and mechanical problem solving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.2. The technical transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2.1. Absence of transfer in animals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2.2. No transfer after brain damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3. Beyond manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3.1. Simple versus complex tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3.2. Counterintuition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.4. Mechanical knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.4.1. Inaccuracy and magic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.4.2. Understanding the unexplainable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.5. Technical reasoning and dialectics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.5.1. From essentialism to phenomenology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.5.2. First movement of dialectics: from problem to solution . . . . . . . 77
4.5.3. Second movement of dialectics: from solution to problem . . . . . 79
4.5.4. Analogy and causality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.6. Reasoning and dynamism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.6.1. Toward the ideomotor approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.6.2. Diagnosis, adjustment and fixing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Chapter 5. Reasoning versus Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

5.1. Executive functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.1.1. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.1.2. What about the role of executive functions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.1.3. What can we do without executive functions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.2. Reasoning versus planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
 Contents vii

5.2.1. The amalgam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

5.2.2. Planning and reasoning: two orthogonal capacities . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.2.3. Empirical evidence from neuropsychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.2.4. Action disorganization syndrome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.3. From routine schemas to recursivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.3.1. Generated schemas, not stored . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.3.2. Recursivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.4. Cognitive archaeology: new perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4.1. The illusion of complexity as a subject of study . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4.2. No technical planning without reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.4.3. Recycling of executive functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.5. Using one tool to create another . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.5.1. Sequential tool use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.5.2. Sequence versus recursivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Chapter 6. Tool Disorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

6.1. Tools in stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.1.1. Future planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.1.2. Episodic memory: recycled mechanism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.1.3. Semantic reasoning: rupture mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.2. From use to consumption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.2.1. Accumulation behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.2.2. Excessive accumulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.3. Tool making: toward crafts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.3.1. Making, manufacture and crafting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.3.2. Motor simulation and decision making: recycled mechanisms . . . 127
6.4. Toolbox and uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.4.1. A well-defined repertoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.4.2. Functional flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.4.3. Functional fixedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Chapter 7. Between Fascination and Shaping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

7.1. From instinct to technical stigmergy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
7.1.1. Technical stigmergy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
7.1.2. There’s always a price to pay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.2. The distance between the maker and the user . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
7.2.1. Cognitive step 1: mental making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
7.2.2. Cognitive step 2: use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
7.3. Cumulative technological culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
viii The Tool Instinct

7.3.1. From individual learning... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

7.3.2. ...to social learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.3.3. Forms of social learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.3.4. Culture and cumulative technological culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7.3.5. The shared intentionality hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
7.3.6. Limitations of the shared intentionality hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.3.7. Roles of technical reasoning and semantic reasoning . . . . . . . . . 153
7.3.8. Theory of the mind and symbolic language:
recycled mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
 Introduction

The Tool Instinct is an essay on the cognitive origins of human

materiality. The aim is to jointly address the question of why and how
mankind is constantly changing its physical environment, in particular
through tool making and tool use. If you are intrigued by this question, be
aware that the answer may seem confusing in the sense that the why certainly
has its source in the how. “What author did you come across?”, you may
think to yourself. In fact, this is a small nod to the readers who, among you,
may be familiar with Konrad Lorenz’s work. Perhaps this will be enough for
them to already have an idea of the answer proposed in this book. For the
others, I am sorry, but I do not have any more clues to give you right now.
Please have patience.

This introduction presents the purpose, subject, route and project of this
book1. To fully understand my thinking, it seemed essential to me to write
these few pages that make it possible to clearly delimit the field of research
studied here, namely what I mean by “the cognitive origins of human
materiality” (i.e. the purpose). I will also specify my positioning (i.e. the
subject) so that you know who is writing, but above all in what context what
the “writing” occurs. I will continue by specifying that disciplines are
concerned throughout this book and what was their trajectory (i.e. the route).
I will conclude by detailing the book’s project, which aims to answer the
central question mentioned above by conducting both a critical reflection on

1 These terms are borrowed from Jean Gagnepain, a linguist from Rennes, France at the
origin of mediation theory. This author had a significant impact on the development of my
thinking, especially during my thesis. The division I have chosen here does not really reflect
what he meant by each of these terms, but is a tribute to his work, which was a great source of
inspiration for me.
x The Tool Instinct

what is said in the literature on the subject and a theoretical elaboration to

provide new answers. Let us start with the purpose.

I.1. The purpose

I am passionate about humans. This passion is reflected in the smiles that

I sketch out daily as I scan my conspecifics. It could be a teenager proudly
wearing a hooded jacket, a woman laughing while listening to her
smartphone, or a bus driver stuck behind the wheel. How many times a day
do I sketch these smiles? Three and maybe four times. The reason behind
these smiles? Cynicism? Certainly not. I am not one of those who consider
these behaviors to be ridiculous or contemptuous, thinking that I am the only
one who realizes that we are nothing more than disguised primates2. I am
aware of that. So be it. But what fascinates me is the propensity that humans
have to handle clothing, tools, new technologies, etc., as if all this were
natural to us.

However, there is nothing natural about wearing a jacket, using a

smartphone or driving. There is nothing natural about pushing pedals to
move forward. There is nothing natural about talking to a person through a
device, when the person is hundreds of kilometers away, if not on the other
side of the world. There is nothing natural about wearing clothes to warm up.
And what about bridges, buildings, roads, cars, computers, rockets, all these
marks left by the human species and which reflect the profound change in
the environment brought about by this (these) species? Very often, I observe
these marks, without any esthetic judgment – I am sorely lacking in the latter
anyway – just because I wonder what cognitive processes specific to our
species have allowed us to get there. This question – the cognitive origins of
human materiality – accompanies me in my daily life, like a prism that
would be fixed on my gaze. Looking for answers to this question is what I
am passionate about. And this is precisely the purpose of cognitive3
anthropology (see Table I.1) and, a fortiori, of this book.

2 This first “negative” movement of thought clearly joins the Hegelian dialectic in the sense
that it is certainly necessary to extract oneself from our daily point of view to see the world
differently. However, there is little glory in maintaining oneself in this negative retreat on
things. The second movement of “positive” thinking, which consists of reinvesting this step
back to improve our understanding of the human species, remains, in my opinion, the only
movement that can be valued because it is constructive. In other words, if I was ever cynical,
it was only toward cynicism!
3 Table I.1 lists the definitions of the main concepts – in bold – discussed in this introduction.
 Introduction xi

A discipline aimed at establishing a finite number of

characteristics (e.g. morphological, see physical
Anthropology
anthropology; psychological, see psychological
anthropology) to define humans.

Subdiscipline of anthropology aimed at establishing a finite

Physical anthropology number of morphological, anatomical or biomechanical
characteristics characterizing humans.

Subdiscipline of anthropology aimed at establishing a finite

Social anthropology number of observable characteristics in social behaviors that
would be specific to humans.

Subdiscipline of anthropology to describe human

Behavioral/psychological
characteristics and particularities at the
anthropology
behavioral/psychological level.

Subdiscipline of anthropology aimed at clarifying the

Cognitive anthropology
cognitive characteristics specific to humans.

Psychology Behavioral science in animals or humans.

A subdiscipline of psychology that seeks to understand the

Comparative psychology differences and similarities between humans and other animal
species, or between non-human animal species.

Subdiscipline of psychology aimed at interpreting our

Cognitive psychology
behaviors through a cognitivist approach.

A current of thought assuming that our thinking is made up of

Cognition/cognitivism
a set of processes such as memory, reasoning and language.

A current of thought interested only in the formulation of

Behaviorism
behavioral laws.

A discipline that aims to understand how humans generate

Epistemology knowledge by studying the historical facts and scientific
prerequisites that underlie the way a problem is posed.

Influential theory that is considered as a paradigm in the

Metatheory sense that it serves as a framework for reflection by being
unrecognized for a long time.

A framework of thought that determines how researchers

Paradigm
approach a problem (see metatheory).

Answer given to a question, which corresponds to a possible

Theory variant of a metatheory, without questioning the very
foundations of this metatheory.
xii The Tool Instinct

Corresponds to a collection of data to support the predictions

Empirical evidence
of a theory.

Methodology that consists of supporting a theory on the basis

Science
of a collection of empirical evidence.

Reflection on an issue of interest, without necessarily seeking

Philosophy
to resolve it with empirical evidence.

Theory that considers that there is no difference in nature

Continuity
between humans and other animal species.

Thesis that suggests a difference in degree between

Discontinuity
humans and other animal species.

Cognitive mechanism considered as present only in the human

Rupture mechanism
species.

Cognitive mechanism pre-existing to the human species, but

Recycled mechanism whose use is modified due to the appearance of a rupture
mechanism.

Phylogenetics Corresponds to the evolution of a species over time.

Ontogenetics Corresponds to the development of an individual over time.

Table I.1. Definitions of the main concepts covered in the introduction

To be clear, I will not discuss how we moved through the history from
the first tools shaped by our ancestors to the latest space shuttle designed by
NASA. Whether the first representatives of the genus Homo mastered fire by
observing the effects of lightning or whether they developed the first silex
knives by cutting off their hands will not be discussed here. Unfortunately,
dear reader, if it is these answers that you are looking for, namely answers
on the historical evolution of human technology, then you are on the wrong
track with this book. Rather, I invite you to turn to works such as those
written by André Leroi-Gourhan, which describe the historical evolution of
techniques in prehistory, for example. However, if what intrigues you is to
understand the reasons underlying this historical evolution, and if your
interest is primarily directed toward the cognitive evolution of the human
species, then this book can provide you with answers, or at least potential
explanations, to this great question. To paraphrase Bachelard, the purpose
here is not “why are things the way they are?” but rather “why could things
have become what they are?” I would add to this “from a cognitive point of
 Introduction xiii

view”. After all, it is not only the Homininae4 who have been able to see the
damage caused by lightning or who have cut themselves off from body parts
when in contact with a sharp stone. Understanding what caused the
discoveries is fascinating for a historian. However, for a cognitive
anthropologist, the problem is not to describe the historical conditions,
whether natural or not, that led to the discovery of a given technique, but
rather to understand what cognitive processes are necessary to control and
reproduce these accidents in order to constitute what can be called a
technique. To paraphrase Emmanuel Kant this time, the purpose of this book
is the underlying cognitive structure and not the forms taken by its content5.

I.2. The subject

I am not a “pure scientist”. I concede that. Unlike most of my colleagues,

I have difficulty reconsidering certain theoretical positions, and I often have
the impression that I am sinking into my positioning, rather than opening up
to new horizons. As such, my work is necessarily ideological, and I am not
ashamed to say it. In fact, some time ago, I accepted the idea that my career
could be about defending a point of view by pushing it to its limits. Too bad
if I ever find that this point of view is wrong. At least I tried. In any case,
this part of subjectivity permeates my subject, because I am the subject of
this book. Therefore, it seems important to me to clarify some of my
assumptions, because I am aware that my remarks may be misunderstood,
and may lead to a process of intention toward me, because I have not been
able to qualify my position accurately and unequivocally. So I would like to
remedy this immediately.

On the one hand, although I am fascinated by Man, I do not admire him.

My point is neither philanthropic nor misanthropic. I do not attribute
exceptional qualities to the human species. Man is nothing extraordinary or

4 The Homininae correspond to the close relatives of Homo sapiens. They share a common
ancestor with the panins – the extinct close relatives of chimpanzees and bonobos – who
probably lived about 4–6 million years ago. Homininae include species of the genus Homo
(e.g. Homo habilis, Homo erectus, and Homo neanderthalensis), but also species of another
genus (e.g. Australopithecus and Paranthropus).
5 My discussion in this book focuses on the tool. However, the same logic can be applied to
other areas, such as politics. In this field, the question that a cognitive anthropologist asks
himself is not to understand how the French people managed to propose political parties as we
know them now, which corresponds to a historical questioning, but rather what are the
cognitive bases that allow humans to develop political organizations.
xiv The Tool Instinct

rather superior and – even if it means being shocking – it does not matter to
me whether our technical bulimia leads us one day to our loss or to leaving
the planet. No, what matters to me is to unravel the mystery of how Man is
able to get closer to his wildest fantasies. Let us take teleportation. Of
course, we are not there yet. But the use of trains, planes, cars, etc., already
allows us to move without moving, which is a definite step forward. We are
getting closer. And it is the cognitive mechanism that allows this permanent
convergence that puzzles me. Why is this happening among our species?

On the other hand, I also know that my position can be criticized as

reflecting a contemporary analysis of the problem, neglecting that the human
species is not characterized only by recent technological advances, since for
a long time there was talk of the use of stone tools and certainly also wooden
ones6. My answer to this criticism is as follows. Yes, I am fascinated by
current human productions. It often happens that when my plane is stopped
on the tarmac, I look out the window at the planes in front of me. And then
I am amazed by this ability that has allowed us to produce a flying object of
several tens or even hundreds of tons, thus realizing a real thumbnail to
gravity. So, yes, I often let myself be subjugated by contemporary visions of
human technology. But these visions are highly instructive, because they
reflect what Man – nowadays at the origin of our species – is able to
produce. In short, whether it is a question of producing a six-knife or an
aircraft; in both cases, the same reasoning could well be at work. The
question remains to understand what form this reasoning can take, whether
by focusing on what Man is capable of building, either now or a long time
ago7.

I.3. The route

The key discipline addressed in this book is cognitive anthropology.

However, I am aware that this discipline – and in particular its boundaries –
may seem somewhat obsolete to a novice. In this section, I will focus on this

6 This criticism was again addressed to me indirectly, recently, by a colleague coming for a
thesis follow-up committee of one of my doctoral students.
7 In fact, I find any technical production worthy of interest. I was also fascinated by the
pyramids, or by the architecture of cities like Rome, Tokyo, Dubai or Lisbon. I am not
making any value or esthetic judgments here. Once again, my interest is just in this ability to
change our environment, sometimes by building technological objects that greatly exceed our
natural capabilities.
 Introduction xv

notion by explaining the trajectory – the route – followed by it within the

social sciences and humanities. This will lead me to discuss the notions of
anthropology, psychology and cognition.

I.3.1. Physical anthropology and social anthropology

At a time when we plan to send the first settlers to Mars and the number
of exoplanets discovered is flourishing, it is becoming more and more
reasonable to consider that the long-awaited encounter with extra-terrestrial
life is imminent. No, you might say? Maybe I am a sweet dreamer, that is
true. Nevertheless, one day we will have to prepare for the eventuality of this
meeting by being able to answer the important question, which justifies the
very existence of the sciences that we call human, and that our kind aliens
could ask us very quickly, as soon as they have put a “foot” on Earth: what is
a human? How to recognize one? Imagine that you are the lucky one, the
very first one to whom this question was addressed. What would you say?
Take a few seconds, one or two minutes if necessary. But try to answer
correctly, because the future of humanity may well depend on it!

If you have done this exercise, you should have some snippets of answers
to this question, which, behind its apparent simplicity, masks a disconcerting
complexity. How can we ensure that an extra-terrestrial observer does not
confuse us with another species? What criteria can we set? This question,
that of the threshold of the human being, is the hallmark of anthropology.
Inventorying the criteria is the ultimate challenge, until we can characterize
humans by differentiating them from other species.

Let us start by looking at the type of answers you were able to provide. It
is very likely that some of you started your inventory by focusing on the
physical aspects that could be specific to humans. In this case, you have
practiced, perhaps unknowingly, physical anthropology, which aims to
produce a catalogue of human morphological, anatomical and biomechanical
characteristics. You may have noticed the bipedalism, which is a mode of
locomotion consisting of moving on its two hind legs. It is indeed a defining
feature of our species, Homo sapiens, even if we are not the only ones to
practice this mode of locomotion, since it is also the preserve of birds, for
example. The opposable thumb is another physical characteristic of humans,
allowing a fine grip, using the thumb and index finger – as when you handle
a pencil. Without an opposable thumb, the only possible grip is called a
xvi The Tool Instinct

power grip, and consists of gathering all the fingers toward the palm, as
when handling a hammer. Like bipedalism, this trait characterizes us,
although it is not specific to humans, as other primate species also have this
ability.

The referencing of these physical characteristics is not the only concern

of anthropology, which may reassure some readers who had opted for
another direction in order to carry out the proposed exercise, with a greater
emphasis on behavioral aspects. For example, only humans perform funeral
rites, which consist of commemorating the death of an individual through a
set of actions and words. Another example reported by the eminent French
anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss is the prohibition of incest, which is
found in all human civilizations. The repertoire of these traits could have
been the objective of behavioral anthropology, since it is indeed a question
of listing the supposedly species-specific behaviors. However, historically,
the term social anthropology has been used, for the simple reason that the
first anthropologists who officiated at the end of the 19th Century and the
beginning of the 20th Century sought above all to understand the invariants
present both in Western societies and in societies considered primitive at the
time, such as the Indigenous peoples of the Amazon. In other words, they
sought to understand the social traits shared by all human societies.

I.3.2. Social anthropology and behavioral anthropology

An epistemological limitation – I will come back to this notion later –

inherent in social anthropology is to naturally focus on social characteristics,
as if human beings defined themselves and distinguished themselves mainly
from other species by their social behaviors. You will tell me that this
remark is relatively tautological and not very informative, since this form of
anthropology would not be called “social” if it were not so. However, such a
presupposition presents significant risks to the understanding we can have of
our species at a psychological level.

To clarify my point, let us take an example that is at the heart of this

book, namely tool use. As I will discuss later, tool use is not unique to
humans, other species are also able to show this behavior, such as
chimpanzees or crows from New Caledonia. However, human tool use
differs in several respects from that reported in animals. Let us consider one
of these specificities, namely the cumulative technological culture, which
 Introduction xvii

consists of transmitting and improving a technique employed over

generations, leading us, among other things, to switch from the flint, to the
knife, then to the electric knife. If the assumption is that any difference
between our species and other species necessarily results from the emergence
of unique social skills – as implied by social anthropology – then the only
way to explain this cumulative cultural phenomenon is to suggest that it
appears because humans have developed specific social skills. This thesis is
the one defended by Michaël Tomasello, a renowned contemporary
psychologist, who is not considered to be developing work in social
anthropology. However, the same assumption exists in his research. For him,
this cumulative cultural phenomenon illustrates what distinguishes us from
other animal species, namely the ability to develop an effective pedagogy
based on active teaching that reveals the teacher’s ability to understand the
teacher’s intentions during learning. If I was convinced that all human
behavioral characteristics can be summed up in this thesis, then this book
should have been called “The Social Instinct”. However, as you will have
understood, I am not convinced that this thesis should be accepted in its
entirety, since a significant number of studies indicate that the human
threshold cannot be limited to unique social skills. The objective of this book
is precisely to develop an alternative thesis on the question of tool use.

Where does this critique of social anthropology lead us? First of all, it is
possible that when you read the idea that every human civilization practices
funeral rites or prohibits incest, the following question may not have escaped
your attention: why are we doing this? A number of theories have been
formulated in this regard by illustrious authors, such as Sigmund Freud, who
saw in these behavioral invariants the hallmark of psychological functioning
that was preoccupied, even tortured, by existential anxieties about death and
the prohibited. I will not develop here these theories that I have relatively
poor knowledge of, I must admit. Simply, I will insist on the psychological
dimension that Freud gave to these phenomena, by reminding everyone that
all behavior, social or not, necessarily rests on a psychological functioning
specific to each of the individuals of the species. In other words, for him,
social anthropology is above all a psychological anthropology. This point
of view is also the one I share.

In other words, if we remove the assumption that our species is only

socially singular, we gradually move toward the idea that Man could possess
a set of specific psychological characteristics, reflected in a number of
specific behaviors as well, which may or may not be social. Social
xviii The Tool Instinct

anthropology would then only be a special case of a behavioral

anthropology, which encompasses all the behaviors, social or not, that
characterize the human species. We carry out behaviors, some of which
characterize us as a species. The purpose of behavioral anthropology is to
understand them. In this respect, behavioral anthropology is at the crossroads
of two disciplines: anthropology (the human threshold) and psychology (the
behavioral dimension). This may require a little more detail on the term
psychology, which although it has become common, often refers to mistaken
beliefs, including that psychology is not a scientific discipline.

I.3.3. Psychology

The term psychology comes etymologically from psyche (soul) and logos
(discourse), literally meaning the discourse on the soul. This definition is
now obsolete since it corresponds to a leap made at the time by the ancient
Greeks, who had invented this notion. Why am I talking about leaps? The
reason is simple. At that time, the Greeks, under the influence of Platonic
thought, considered that our behavior was guided by the soul, an immaterial
substance, the fruit of divine creation. This anthropocentric perspective –
since Man was considered to be the only species to possess this privilege,
thus placing him at the center of creation – was for a long time the dominant,
classical approach to the philosophy of the mind, supported by illustrious
thinkers such as René Descartes. In fact, this Platonic approach is at the very
origin of creationist religions, such as Christianity, and is still largely
espoused by many of us. I will come back in a few paragraphs to the
scientific revolution that led to the formulation of an alternative thesis,
evolutionism. In short, according to this anthropocentric perspective, all
behavior is guided by the soul. In other words, studying our way of behaving
or even thinking is like studying the soul. In this sense, the term psychology
etymologically corresponds to a confusion between the subject of study and
the theoretical approach useful for its interpretation.

This bias is also very common among psychology students and their
university teachers. For example, if you ask a student about a possible
definition of psychology, he or she will most likely raise the idea that
psychology is the study of psychic processes. It is at this precise moment
that it is necessary to be intractable so that the student does not reproduce the
confusion inherent in the term. Psychology is the study of behavior.
Behavior is the only tangible data we need to study, whether it is an act or a
 Introduction xix

word produced by others. We do not access the thoughts of others. Of

course, you will tell me that we are accessing our own thoughts and that in
this case, introspection can be useful to understand them. This method was
precisely the one advocated by Plato to access the soul. However, these
thoughts cannot be studied as such. They can be a source of scientific
inspiration and I do not deny that we all experience them. But they do not
correspond to the subject of psychological study, namely behavior.

That being said, psychologists, like all scientists, have theories, that is,
models that aim to explain groups of data and predict others. It is known that
these theories are formulated on the basis of analogies. For example,
Sigmund Freud drew inspiration from the thermodynamic models of his time
to develop his theories on the interactions between the different
psychological processes. For some, this may be perceived as a discovery,
like Freud himself, who considered that his formulation of the unconscious
corresponded to the third greatest scientific revolution in history, after the
Copernian revolution – the transition from geocentrism to heliocentrism –
and the Darwinian revolution – the transition from anthropocentrism to
evolutionism. Unfortunately, the unconscious remains a theoretical concept,
not tangible, unlike the two revolutions mentioned above. Also, when a
student says that she/he studies psychic processes, this is not true. This is not
the subject of study, but a possible interpretation of the subject of study, i.e.
behavior. After all, no teacher will ever come with a jar in his hand, asking
the students to get closer to the desk, so that in a few moments she/he can
observe this famous Freudian unconscious locked in the jar. I would like to
inform the reader that I am not challenging Freudian theory here, far from it.
The same criticism can be leveled at colleagues who may believe that
psychology is the study of cognitive mechanisms. I say this because my
research laboratory is called that, like many others. However, again, at no
time do we study cognitive mechanisms. We study behaviors, which we
interpret through theories rooted in the cognitivist approach also called
cognitivism. In short, psychology is a neutral discipline, theoretically, even
if any researcher in psychology necessarily has a theoretical framework that
helps him/her to interpret the observed behaviors.

I.3.4. Psychologies

Just as there are many forms of anthropology, there are also many forms
of psychology. Here, I will not go into the details of what can be social
xx The Tool Instinct

psychology, clinical psychology, health psychology, developmental

psychology, or many others. I will simply focus on a distinction that is useful
for me, namely the distinction between human and animal psychology (also
called ethology); these two forms can be studied together and then give rise
to comparative psychology.

For many, psychology is necessarily human, which in a sense reinforces

its academic position within the human sciences. It is true that the majority
of university teaching focuses on the study of human behavior. However,
there is nothing redundant in qualifying psychology as human, since as a
behavioral science, its object can be either human or animal. At the origin of
scientific psychology, at the end of the 19th Century, this frontier was even
inoperative. The supporters of behaviorism had been keen to go beyond the
methodology used by philosophers to understand our mind, namely the
introspection introduced by Plato and the ancient Greeks perpetuated since
then by classical philosophy. The objective of the behaviorists was precisely
to break with this methodological tradition to develop an experimental
approach consisting of observing behavioral responses to environmental
stimuli. The focus was definitely on behavior, opening the door to the real
definition of psychology, the science of behavior.

However, historically, this development has been supported by Charles

Darwin’s evolutionary theory, leading to the erasing of any “mental”
difference between humans and animals. Since every individual produces
behaviors, the same psychological laws can be stated to understand the
origin of these behaviors. In this context, behaviorists have naturally turned
to animals – rats and pigeons being the most studied species – to model
human behavior as animals, the difference being only a matter of degree, not
nature. The first memory models were tested in rats and then mechanically
transferred to humans. Moreover, the main argument for the animal
behavioral study was that it is entirely possible to know the experiences
encountered by animals since birth, thus making it possible to fully control
past acquisitions, where such control appears ethically impossible in
humans. For example, some studies involved depriving rats of any solid
element from birth to their first year of life, in order to understand whether
their construction “instinct” operated from birth, or whether it was subject to
some form of learning, resulting from their interactions with the environment
from birth. Such a study obviously seems unthinkable in humans. In short,
the behaviorists practiced a psychology, which was intended to be both
animal and human.
 Introduction xxi

However, this conception has evolved with the emergence of the

cognitivist approach, which, although based on the experimental method of
behavioral study initiated by behaviorists, has broken with this trend by
focusing on “mental” processes, called cognitive. These processes are purely
theoretical, like theories on psychological functioning. At no time will a
teacher be able to show these processes to her/his students. They are another
way of interpreting behavior based on an analogy, which is based on the
functioning of the computer. An individual receives stimuli that are a source
of information, then processes them using several cognitive processes, and
finally emits a behavioral response. Understanding these different processes
is the objective of the cognitivist approach. When the interpretation is
limited to behavioral observation, it is referred to as cognitive psychology.
When it concerns the collection of data from the brain, it is called cognitive –
or behavioral – neuroscience, if a link is established with the behavior
without underlying cognitive interpretation.

I.3.5. Cognitive anthropology

In short, psychology is the study of behavior, whether human or animal.

To interpret it, several theoretical currents are possible, such as cognitivism.
If we are then interested in cognitive processes that are specific to humans, it
is possible to talk about cognitive anthropology. As indicated, this discipline
can draw its sources from several fields. This may involve comparing animal
and human behavior to identify fundamental differences. In this case,
comparative psychology provides some answers for cognitive anthropology.
It is also possible to search for invariants between different cultures or
societies, without necessarily focusing on social aspects, as social
anthropology does. In this case, we are talking about ethnology. It may also
involve studying humans through experimental procedures, such as in
cognitive psychology, for example. In any case, the project of cognitive
anthropology is to list all the cognitive processes – and therefore theoretical
processes – that can characterize the human species. Therefore, the purpose
of this book will be to focus on the use of tools and technology, detailing
human cognitive particularities in this regard.

I.4. The project

In this book, I will give considerable importance to epistemological

reflection, which will often be reflected in the titles of the different chapters.
xxii The Tool Instinct

In the following, I will detail what this notion refers to and how it relates to
theory and empirical evidence. Then, I will present the key concepts of
rupture mechanisms and recycled mechanisms, concepts that will form
the basis of the cognitive anthropological approach at the heart of the project
of this book.

I.4.1. Epistemology, theory and empirical evidence

No scientific theory is neutral. It always depends on a point of view and

on a way of posing the problem (i.e. the subject). The greatest challenge for
a researcher is to grasp the point of view developed by other researchers,
which inevitably leads to major scientific advances. This reflection on the
very origins of the reasons that drive researchers to move toward certain
theoretical models is the objective of epistemology, i.e. a discipline that is
globally interested in the way knowledge is generated, whether in an isolated
individual or a group of individuals, like scientists.

Let us take the case of the individual. Jean Piaget, an illustrious Swiss
psychologist, had, in his time, founded a genetic epistemology – in fact
ontogenetic – consisting of detailing how children, during their
development, acquire new knowledge about their physical and social
environment, through a dialectic of structure–destructuring–restructuring8.
The genetic aspect of his theory assumes that this dialectic takes place at
different stages of a child’s development, allowing the child to move from
one stage to another, the stages being understood here as periods of stability
in the structure. In other words, the evolution of knowledge in children is
undergoing revolutions, in the sense that it is not a progressive and
cumulative acquisition, but rather marked by significant breaks.

Like the isolated individual, the evolution of knowledge at the species

level also follows a nonlinear trajectory punctuated by significant breaks.

8 For example, Piaget explained that the child’s morals are originally constructed around the
question of the consequences attributed to a behavior, so that a child will be more upset by
another child who hurts her/him very much while playing, than another child who hurts
her/him little, regardless of the degree of intention of these behaviors. Later, the child will
disrupt this conception of morality, integrating intention as a factor of responsibility, certainly
at a time of development when the child becomes able to attribute intentions to others. When
this integration takes place, the child then becomes somewhat lost, in the sense that her/his
way of dealing with moral judgment becomes inoperative, the criterion of consequence no
longer being for a time the sufficient criterion for judging the actions of others – and her/his
own by extension. This period corresponds to the destructuring phase.
 Introduction xxiii

For example, as I mentioned earlier, the two greatest ruptures in the history
of science correspond to the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions. These
revolutions correspond to what epistemologists interested in the history of
science – such as Gaston Bachelard or Thomas Kuhn – call paradigm shifts,
understood as a change in thinking framework, in order to pose the problem.
Interestingly, it seems that these two revolutions consisted of challenging the
default paradigm that is: “We are the center of the universe”. This paradigm
is in itself intuitive, given the egocentric nature of our thinking. After all, the
only world perspective I have access to is my own phenomenological
experience. So when I sail from one place to another, this perspective moves
with me all the time, giving me the illusion of being at the center of
everything. This egocentrism is obviously very marked in children, as
education often consists of nothing more than teaching them to get out of
their own point of view. However, it is a daily struggle, because we
obviously remain self-centered by default. In this context, to conceive that it
is not the place where we live that is the center of the universe – that is,
geocentrism – or our species that is at the heart of everything – that is,
anthropocentrism – requires a considerable challenge to the default paradigm
built on egocentrism. The two major revolutions mentioned above therefore
consisted of challenging this paradigm, considerably changing the way we
think and raising the problem of our origins. Note that this paradigm shift
can only exist if another point of view exists. This other point of view
remains the greatest challenge for a scientist.

I hope you will understand the major interest of epistemological

reflection. If we want to move forward on a scientific issue, we must be able
to understand how the problem usually arises, what are the default
assumptions that authors accept, sometimes without even knowing it, simply
because they are rooted in a framework of thought, a paradigm. For this
reason, this book will present as soon as possible – it will in fact depend on
my thinking skills – an epistemological critique of current models in order to
understand their ins and outs. This will lead me to discuss what I call
metatheories, theories so powerful that they have shaped the way students
and researchers have thought for decades. An example that I will discuss at
length is the distinction between procedural and declarative memory. The
first form refers to skills that are often referred to as motor skills, useful for
implicitly learning how to ride a bike or type. The second form contains our
knowledge of the world and the support of language. This distinction is
taught in a massive way among psychology students, which is quite
xxiv The Tool Instinct

legitimate given its heuristic power, making it possible to understand our

behavior quite simply. So when I ask students – or even colleagues – which
memory allows us to use tools, the answer given is systematically the same:
procedural memory. And, this answer is produced by reasoning in this
context, in the sense that it may arise even though at no time did a teacher
explain to students that this was the case. In other words, this distinction is
an important paradigm in psychology, guiding students and researchers on
how to conceive human cognition and the use of tools. As you will see in
this book, one of my reflections will be to overcome this epistemological
obstacle by submitting the idea that this distinction is far from sufficient to
understand the cognitive bases of human tool use.

In this approach, the notion of theory is at a lower level than the paradigm
or metatheory, in the sense that it refers to the solutions provided within the
pre-established framework. For example, if the paradigm is the distinction
between procedural and declarative memory, then a theory that tool use is
based on motor memories is a possible solution based on this distinction,
since the latter ultimately allows little freedom. Three types of criticism can
therefore be made against a theory. The first type consists of questioning the
epistemological validity of the underlying paradigm. In this case, the theory
proposed in response necessarily goes beyond the paradigm and then
diverges diametrically from the theory being criticized. In reality, this level
refers more to epistemological reflection by asking whether the problem was
correctly posed in the beginning. Criticisms may be directed not only against
this theory, but also against the parent theories. The second type is not to
question the paradigm that serves as a framework, but rather the answers
provided by this theory within it (i.e. theoretical validity). For example,
it could be worth considering that tool use does not only come out of
procedural memory, but also from declarative memory – this is an example
and not my point, as you will see later. In this book, I will sometimes situate
myself at this level, but the criticisms will often be of an epistemological
nature, so that it will rarely be a single theory that I will question, but rather
a group of theories because they belong to the same paradigm. The third type
consists of reflecting on the empirical validity of the theory in question by
examining the arguments used. In the end, many researchers are only
interested in this aspect, considering that data collection is the very
foundation of research. However, if a theory is not conceptually valid, it may
be that the collection of data to support it is of little value, given the inability
 Introduction xxv

to accurately examine the predictions of that theory9. In other words,

although I will obviously discuss this form of validity to discuss current
theories on tool use, I remain convinced that this aspect remains relatively
minor, particularly with regard to epistemological validity.

This last aspect leads me to introduce the notion of empirical evidence,

which corresponds to the collection of data – in this case behavioral data –
since this is indeed a book of psychology, although I will also discuss neuro-
anatomical data and neuroimaging, which will sometimes divert this book
into the field of neuroscience. This evidence may or may not be based on
statistical analysis. I would like you to know that I do not consider, in any
case, that evidence is necessarily based on statistics. After all, the two great
scientific revolutions did not need that. However, in psychology, it is true that
the contribution of statistics is important to be able to conclude on the
generalization of the results obtained. Again, it is possible to criticize the
methodologies used to acquire the data. I will also discuss this experimental
aspect, although I consider it essential not to drown in these considerations, at
the risk of wasting time that would be much more useful for epistemological
reflection. Finally, I will address here the question of the distinction between
science and philosophy, which is essentially distinguished in this respect. If
philosophy consists of conducting epistemological and theoretical reflection
on concepts, science adds to this the need to support conclusions on the basis
of empirical evidence. A good balance between these two aspects seems to
me essential to the success of any research objective. Too much philosophy,
and the theories formulated may lack evidence. Too much science, and the
theories formulated may lack validity.

I.4.2. Continuity versus discontinuity

The Darwinian revolution had an unparalleled impact in the history of the

humanities. Before this one, the question of the criteria necessary to define

9 I recently had the opportunity to have a discussion on this subject with a researcher in the
field. According to her, her theory is clearly supported by the accumulation of empirical
evidence. It is true that her work on this issue is considerable. However, my main criticism of
her work is that she does not accumulate evidence, but empirical data in the sense that her
data do not rule out other alternative theories. In a way, this approach to scientific work
reflects what I call the researcher’s illusion, namely the idea that our job is to accumulate
data, not to reflect in depth on the value of any data collection in validating or invalidating a
specific theory.
xxvi The Tool Instinct

what a human is did not arise, the answers being in any case all found in the
sacred texts. As a result of this revolution, scientists began to grasp the
question of what distinguishes us from other species, seeing the emergence
of anthropology whose objective is precisely articulated around this
question.

The first answer was formulated by Darwin himself, who in his impetus
suggested that there is no qualitative or natural difference between humans
and other species, the differences being only quantitative or degree. This
argument followed a logic similar to what he demonstrated in terms of
morphological aspects, the wing of the birds being nothing more than a
progressive modification of the fin of the fish. He had the same reasoning at
the behavioral level, postulating that morals, attention, reasoning, etc.,
already existed in non-human animals, the difference being simply once
again that humans have more. This thesis can be characterized as
continuous due to the assumed continuum between humans and other
species.

This proposal was accepted at the time by the dominant current in

psychology, namely behaviorism, a paradigm according to which all
behavior is guided by learning that connects a stimulus and a response,
consolidated by reinforcing loops. In this context, the same process can be
applied to humans and non-human animals, the difference in complexity
being not a qualitative difference, but a quantitative one. For Watson, one of
the main proponents of behaviorism, the description of these relationships
between stimulus and response was simply easier to achieve in animals than
in humans. At present, this approach is still widely used, particularly in the
field of animal cognition, where many authors refuse to address the idea that
qualitative cognitive differences exist between humans and certain animal
species – except perhaps with regard to symbolic language.

During the 20th Century, and particularly with the emergence of

cognitivism, several authors questioned the thesis of continuity, suggesting
that at least some cognitive traits could be specifically human. This is the
thesis of a discontinuity. This was the case, for example, of Noam
Chomsky, who argued that only humans are capable of generative grammar,
and Michael Tomasello, who (as mentioned above) advocated the idea that
only humans are capable of understanding the intentions of their fellow
human beings, or of Daniel Povinelli, according to whom humans have the
particularity to understand their world through analogical reasoning. In a
 Introduction xxvii

way, this perspective finally joins traditional philosophy such as the

Cartesian approach, according to which humans possess mental skills
distinct from animals.

Importantly, the authors supporting the discontinuity thesis do not reject

the idea that, in humans, more archaic cognitive processes can be reused in
favor of more recent processes. For example, for Daniel Povinelli, human
analogical reasoning would partly recycle the natural capacity – and shared
with the animal – to carry out associative learning on concrete objects.
Simply put, this reasoning would correspond to a form of recycling of this
associative learning, thus making it possible to extract what is analogous in
different situations to obtain a relationship between abstract elements. Other
authors such as Michael Anderson have suggested that a large part of our
cortex, useful for more archaic cognitive processes, is being redeployed to
support certain more recent brain regions and destined for new functions
from a phylogenetic point of view.

It is within this epistemological framework that the reflection I will lead

in this book will take place. In other words, I will accept the idea common to
many supporters of the discontinuity thesis that certain cognitive
mechanisms do not characterize us as such, which I will call recycled
mechanisms. As you will see, this will be the case in particular with our
motor-control system for grasping. On the other hand, I postulate that certain
cognitive mechanisms are singular to us, redeploying themselves on the
basis of more archaic mechanisms, recycling them as a result. These
mechanisms will be called rupture mechanisms. This will include technical
reasoning, a process similar to Povinelli’s analogical reasoning. In other
words, I consider that the thesis of continuity does not allow us to grasp the
particularity of human cognition, which leads above all to minimize or mask
differences in order to support the idea that our cognition and animal
cognition are similar.

I.5. Towards instinct

In summary, this book focuses on the cognitive origins of human

materiality, not to explain the historical evolution of our technology, but to
understand the cognitive reasons for this evolution. This is indeed an attempt
at cognitive anthropology. The thesis I defend is that we have an instinct to
change our physical environment, what I call “Tool instinct”. This instinct is
xxviii The Tool Instinct

based on rupture mechanisms, one of which is certainly at the very origin of

this appetence for tools, namely technical reasoning. Although many
scientists – and non-scientists – can agree on this thesis, it remains largely
counterintuitive in the field, since for many tool use remains a problem of
manual dexterity, manipulation and motor programs. Through this book, I
wish to break this epistemological tradition, which will lead me to criticize
many of the assumptions widely spread and accepted by the scientific
community.

This book will be structured as follows. I will begin in Chapter 1 by

questioning the very definition of the tool, extending it to tool making and
construction behaviors. As I will detail, this will lead me to propose the term
Tool with a capital T, aiming to encompass all the manifestations of human
materiality. Chapter 2 will aim to present the notion of Tool instinct, an
instinct that characterizes us as humans. This instinct is necessarily based on
a specific cognitive structure, a rupture mechanism. In Chapter 3, I will
explain that the so-called motor programs containing information on how to
manipulate tools are not the right candidates to understand this rupture
mechanism. As discussed in Chapter 4, this rupture mechanism could be
related to a specific form of reasoning about our physical environment, what
I call technical reasoning. In Chapter 5, I will explain how the recycling of
planning skills through technical reasoning allows the development of
complex tool behaviors, such as the use of one tool to create another, a
behavior observed only in our species. Chapter 6 presents an opportunity to
open the discussion on an aspect generally ignored by scientists, namely our
ability to store tools for future use. This lack of interest is surprising,
considering the incredible amount of tools we store, gradually moving us
from use to consumption. Chapter 7 will provide some explanations as to the
impact of our socialization on the development of complex technologies.
Finally, I will conclude by opening with the most exciting questions that
should shape research on the cognitive Tool in the coming years.

Dear readers, enjoy this book.

 1

The Tool With a Capital T

Scientists in the field have an unparalleled fascination with tools1, you

know, those objects that we most often manipulate with our hands. It can be
a hammer, screwdriver, fork or branch, as long as it is used to interact with
the environment. It is true that tools reflect an important part of our
materiality. However, should we consider that such a fascination is justified?
I think you anticipate my answer to that question: no. No, the tools are not
the only reflection of our materiality, far from it. Worse, being so fascinated
by these tools that we consider them as the only subject of study of human
materiality can lead to a lack of understanding of the underlying cognitive
mechanisms.

Let us do a fairly simple exercise. Take a quick look around you. What
do you see? Certainly a pen, a computer, books, furniture, a desk, walls,
maybe even a road, if you are near a window, with cars and trucks driving on
it. Leave your house or apartment, and imagine yourself now on a plane,
near a window, looking at the ground – if you are not already there after all.
What do you see? Again, roads, buildings, bridges, even cities. Let us now
travel back in time. Think of the Middle Ages, Antiquity, or Ancient Egypt.

1 The observation of this fascination comes from my expertise in the field, where I rarely
meet researchers interested in tool making or construction behavior in humans. Nevertheless,
this observation reflects an objective view of what is really going on. For example, I had fun
searching with the “PsycINFO” search engine for the number of occurrences of articles in the
field of psychology published in international journals containing the terms Tool Use and
Cognition, Tool Making and Cognition and Construction Behavior and Cognition. I
deliberately added the term cognition to reduce the search, at the risk of reducing occurrences.
The result obtained is unequivocal. Tool Use appears in 550 articles, Tool Making in
36 articles and Construction Behavior in four articles.

The Tool Instinct, First Edition. François Osiurak.

© ISTE Ltd 2020. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
In the Council’s collection are:—
[418]Ornamental plaster ceiling in Board Room on first floor
(photograph).
[418]Carved deal chimneypiece in Board Room (photograph).
[418]Ornamental plaster ceiling in Grand Secretary’s Room, first floor
(photograph).
XL.—GREAT QUEEN STREET CHAPEL
(Demolished).
General description and date of
structure.
Before its destruction in 1910 the Wesleyan Chapel in Great
Queen Street occupied the greater portion of the sites of three houses
with their gardens. These were Nos. 66 to 68, intervening between
Conway House and the stream which divided Aldwych Close from
Purse Field.
The land on which these three houses were erected was
roughly the shape of a truncated right-angled triangle, the base of
which was represented by Great Queen Street, the perpendicular by
the line of Middle Yard, and the hypotenuse by the course of the
stream. The land in question was leased[419] by Newton to Peter
Mills[420], of Christchurch, London, bricklayer, and it would seem
that at that date (15th September, 1639) no houses had been erected
thereon.[421] The building was therefore carried out probably in 1640;
at any rate No. 66 is known to have been occupied in December,
1641. No information can be gleaned from the ratebooks as to when
the three houses were rebuilt, but at least one (No. 67) seems to have
been still standing at about 1817, when an illustration of it was
included in Parton’s Hospital and Parish of St. Giles-in-the-Fields.
The first reference that has been found to the building of a
chapel of ease for the parish occurs in the Vestry Minutes under the
year 1693:[422] “Ordered, to inquire of the gentry in Lincoln’s Inn
Fields, which of them will take pews in case a chappell should be
erected in the neighbourhood of Lincoln’s Inn Fields, and report to
be made to the next Vestry.” It was, however, left to private
enterprise to provide such a building.
In 1706 a Mr. Baguley took a house (apparently No. 67)[423],
built a chapel in the rear, and seems even to have officiated therein,
although not in Priest’s orders. Naturally enough, he soon got into
trouble with the Rector of St. Giles, who, as Baguley affirmed,[424]
induced the vendor of the house and land to break off his agreement
with Baguley, and sell to “one Burges, a coachmaker.” According,
however, to the ratebooks the house occupied by Burges was No. 68.
Between 1720 and 1723 the assessment of No. 68 also dropped.
Whether this implies an extension of the chapel over a portion of the
ground in the rear of that house is uncertain, but it will be seen that
when the chapel comes, as it were, into the light of day, at the
beginning of the 19th century, it covers nearly the whole of the rear
of both houses.
The whole of its early history, however, is shrouded in
obscurity, and no reference to it or to the services held therein has
been found between 1728[425] and its acquisition by the Rev. Thomas
Francklyn. Even the date at which this occurred cannot be definitely
stated. The chapel seems to have been in his hands in February,
1758, for on the 17th of that month he preached a sermon there,
which he published in the same year.[426] In 1759 his name appears in
the parish ratebook in connection with the chapel.[427] His residence
at the house (No. 67) does not seem to have begun until 1761. On
Francklyn’s death in 1784, his executors appear to have carried on
the work of the chapel. On 19th July, 1798, Mrs. Francklyn’s
executors sold to the Society formerly carrying on the West Street
Chapel, Seven Dials, their leasehold interest in the two houses and
the chapel for £3,507 10s.[428]
The chapel was at that time, says Blott,[429] a very homely
structure; it was dark, and, lying below the level of the street, could
not easily be kept clean, and the entrance to it was by a passage
through a dwelling house. The surrounding houses overlooking it
were at times a means of annoyance during service. Negotiations
were therefore entered into with the owners of No. 66, and on 14th
March, 1815, a purchase was effected of the whole of the back part of
the premises, bounded by Middle Yard on the one side and the old
chapel on the other, and having a length of 102½ feet and a breadth
of 31 feet.[430] The new chapel was opened on 25th September, 1817.
[431]
Alterations were carried out in 1840, when an improved frontage
and new portico were constructed.[432]
The elevation to Great Queen Street (Plate 32) was of brick
faced with stucco, the lower part having a portico of four Greek Ionic
columns the full width of the building, executed in Talacre stone
from North Wales.[432] Above this, in the main wall of the chapel was
a three light window with Corinthian columns and pilasters
supporting an entablature, over which was a semi-circular pediment
and tympanum. Crowning the whole was a bold modillion cornice.
The interior (Plate 33) had a horseshoe gallery supported by
Ionic columns; above the back of the side galleries were other
smaller galleries. Facing the entrance was an apse ornamented with
Corinthian columns, pilasters and entablature carrying an elliptical
arch. Covering the whole area was a flat ornamental ceiling.
There is preserved by the West London Mission a measured
drawing of the elevation of the Chapel to Great Queen Street with the
adjacent buildings by R. Payne, Architect, June 21 (18)56, and an
internal view in perspective drawn with ink and coloured, probably
executed by the same hand and about the same date. Both these
drawings agree with the illustrations taken in 1906, and reproduced
in Plates 32 and 33. The premises were demolished in 1910, and new
buildings erected. The room over the portico was used at first as a
day school room, but in 1860 the school was removed to new
premises in the rear.
Biographical Notes.
No. 66.
The first occupant of No. 66, of whom any record has been found,
was the Countess of Essex, who was there in December, 1641.[433] This was
Elizabeth, the daughter of Sir William Paulet, who, in 1631, became the
second wife of Robert Devereux, third Earl of Essex. The marriage turned
out very unhappily, and eventually a separation took place. Subsequently
she married Thomas Higgons (knighted after her death), who survived her.
She died in 1656.[434]
The Subsidy Roll for 1646 contains the item: “The Lord Kensington
in the Countes of Essex house.” This was presumably Robert Rich, son of
Henry Rich, first Earl of Holland, the latter having been created Baron
Kensington in 1623. The former in 1673 succeeded his cousin Charles, as
fifth Earl of Warwick.
In 1665 and 1666 Magdalen Elliott is shown at the house, and in 1673
Lady Porter. The entries in the Hearth Tax Rolls, Jury Presentment Rolls
and sewer ratebook from this time until 1700 vary between “Lady Porter,”
“Lady Diana Portland,” and “Lady Ann Porter.” There can be no doubt that
they all refer to the same individual, viz., Lady Diana Porter. She was a
daughter of George Goring, Earl of Norwich, and married (1) Thomas
Covert, of Slaugham, Essex, and (2) George Porter,[435] eldest son of
Endymion Porter, royalist and patron of literature. George Porter served as
lieutenant-general in the western royal army, under the command of his
brother-in-law, Lord Goring. The latter described him as “the best company,
but the worst officer that ever served the king.” Porter died in 1683.
The ratebook for 1703 contains the name “Ralph Lane” crossed out,
and “Wortley” substituted. This seems to point to Lane having recently
moved and “Wortley” taken his place. The “Ralph Lane” in question is no
doubt the person of the same name, who had in the previous year purchased
the house to the west of Conway House (see p. 74). His residence at No. 66
could not have lasted more than about two years. The “Wortley” of the 1703
ratebook is expanded in the records of 1709 and 1715 to “Wortley Montague,
Esq.” and “Sidney Wortley als Montague, Esq.” This was Sidney, second son
of Edward Montagu, first Earl of Sandwich, who married Anne, daughter
and heir of Sir Francis Wortley, Bt., and assumed the surname of Wortley.
His eldest son, Edward Wortley Montagu, married Lady Mary Pierrepont,
the famous Lady Mary Wortley Montagu. Sidney Montagu died in 1727.
After Montagu’s residence the occupiers of No. 66 seem to have been
as follows:—
 Before 1720 until after 1723. Martin Wright.
Before 1730. Elizabeth Perry.
1730–42. William Aspin.
1743–45. Dr. John Taylor.
1746. —— Davis.
1747. Lilley Smith.
1748. “Augusti” Arne.
1749–51. Col. Guy Dickens.
1753–61. Elizabeth Falconer.
1761–62. —— Davis.
1762–63. The Rev. Mr. Francklin.
1763–64. Miss Faulkner.
1764–83. —— Davis.
1783–87. —— Saunders.
1789–94. Ric. Sadler.
1795– J. Savage.

“Augusti” Arne is almost certainly Thomas Augustine Arne, the

celebrated composer. He was the son of Thomas Arne, an upholsterer, and
was born in 1710. On leaving school he was placed in a lawyer’s office, but
his love of music overcame all obstacles, and eventually his father was
induced to allow him to cultivate his talent in this respect. His first work, a
setting of Addison’s Rosamond, was produced at Lincoln’s Inn Fields
Theatre in 1733. This proving successful, it was quickly followed by the
Opera of Operas and Dido and Æneas. In 1738 he established his
reputation by his music to Comus, and in 1740 he wrote the music to
Thomson and Mallet’s Masque of Alfred, containing Rule Britannia. His
later works included the songs Where the bee sucks, Under the greenwood
tree, Blow, blow, thou winter wind, the oratorios Abel and Judith, and the
opera Artaxerxes. In 1769 he set to music the ode by Garrick, performed at
the Shakespeare jubilee at Stratford on Avon. He died in 1778.
No allusions have been found to his residence at No. 66, Great Queen
Street. He is stated to have been living “next door to the Crown in Great
Queen Street,” in 1744[436] but that must refer to a different house. The
sewer ratebook for 1734 shows a “Mr. Arne” resident at No. 34, Great Queen
Street, but there is no proof that this was the musician. His residence at No.
215, King’s Road, Chelsea, has already been mentioned.[437]

No. 67.
 Early records of the residents at No. 67 are wanting. The first
mention of the house occurs in the Hearth Tax Roll for 1665, which gives
“Lady Thimbleby” as the occupier. This was Elizabeth, one of the six
daughters of Sir Thomas Savage and Elizabeth, Countess Rivers (see p. 67).
She married Sir John Thimbleby of Irnham, in Lincolnshire.[438] How long
she had been at No. 67 in 1665 is unknown, but it is permissible to suggest
that she was there while her mother was still living three doors away. It
seems likely that during Lady Thimbleby’s stay here, her sister, Henrietta
Maria, who had married Ralph Sheldon, of Beoley,[439] also came to live
close by, for the Jury Presentment Roll for 1683 shows “Ralph Sheldon,” in
occupation of No. 69. Another sister, Anne, who had married Robert
Brudenell, afterwards second Earl of Cardigan, was also only a short
distance away, on the south side of Lincoln’s Inn Fields.[440]
Lady Thimbleby’s residence lasted until between 1700 and 1703, and
in the latter year the name of John Thimbleby appears in respect of the
house. He had left before 1709, when the house is shown as empty. The
occupiers after that date were as follows:—

1715. Mr. Vaune.

1720. Mr. Froude.[441]
Before 1723 until 1734. Mary Forrester.
1735–51. Adam Hallam.
1751–54. William Pritchard.
1755–61. Stephen Hunt.
1761–84. The Rev. Thomas Francklin.
1784–95. Mrs. Francklin.
1795–98. Francis Const.[442]
1798. —— Rowley.

Thomas Francklin, son of Richard Francklin, a bookseller of Covent

Garden, was born in 1721. He was educated at Westminster School and
Trinity College, Cambridge. For some time he found employment as usher
in his old school, and in 1750 he became Greek professor at Cambridge, a
position which he held until 1759, when he was presented to the vicarage of
Ware. At the same time he was fulfilling other clerical duties in London. As
early as 1749 he seems to have held a chapel in Bloomsbury, for in June of
that year he performed the marriage ceremony for Garrick there.[443] By
1758 he had obtained the lectureship at St. Paul’s, Covent Garden, and was
installed in the Great Queen Street Chapel. He was appointed King’s
chaplain in 1767, and ten years later he vacated the living at Ware for the
rectory of Brasted, in Kent. Through the influence of Dr. Johnson and Sir
Joshua Reynolds, he was appointed chaplain to the Royal Academy, and on
 the death of Goldsmith in 1774 he obtained the professorship of ancient
history. His literary output was considerable. In 1757 he brought out a
periodical paper called The Centinel, which only lasted two years. He wrote
four plays, the most important of which was The Earl of Warwick. His
translations were numerous, those of Sophocles’ tragedies being long
considered the best in the English language. After a laborious life he died in
his house in Great Queen Street[444] in March, 1784. His widow died in
1796.[445]

No. 68.

In the case of No. 68 also, no records of the names of any occupiers

exist before the Hearth Tax Roll for 1665. In that document the occupant’s
name is given as “Sir Willm. Hartupp.” This seems to have been Sir William
Hartopp, of Rotherby, son of Sir Thomas Hartopp, of Burton Lazars. Sir
William married Agnes, daughter of Sir Martin Lister.[446]
The Hearth Tax Roll for 1666 shows the house “Empty,” and that for
1672, “Empty—Mr. Bradshaw owner.” It seems probable that between these
dates occurred the joint occupancy of Lord Roos and Lady Chaworth, if
indeed that can be referred to this house at all. An item in Lord Roos’s
expenditure under date of 25th February, 1667–8, runs: “Paid Major Seales
for Sir William Hartopp for one quarter’s rent for the house in Queen Street,
beginning the 18th October, when his Lordship had the keyes, at 80li per
annum, Lady Ch[aworth] is to pay the next quarter, 20li.”[447] That Sir
William Hartopp’s house in 1667 was the same as that in 1665 is probable,
but unfortunately cannot be considered certain. Assuming, however, that
such is the case, Lord Roos’s occupation is seen to have commenced on 18th
October, 1667.
John Manners, third son of the eighth Earl of Rutland, was born in
1638. On the death of his two elder brothers, he assumed, apparently
without right,[448] the title of Lord Roos.[449] His first marriage, in 1658, to
Lady Anne Pierrepoint, was unhappy, and he was divorced from her by Act
of Parliament in 1670. In 1677 he was made Lord Lieutenant of
Leicestershire. He succeeded to the earldom in 1679. At the coronation of
James II. in 1685 he bore the Queen’s sceptre, but he does not seem to have
been in favour and in 1687 was dismissed from his lord lieutenancy. He
supported William at the Revolution, and was soon after restored to his
office. In 1703 he was created Marquess of Granby and Duke of Rutland. He
died in 1711.
His sister Grace married Patricius Chaworth, third Viscount
Chaworth.[450] Apparently the expenses of the house in Great Queen Street
were shared equally between her and her brother, for numerous items such
as the following occur in the Accounts of Lord Roos’s Expenditure
contained in the Duke of Rutland’s MSS.:—[451]
“1670. April 21. For the repaires of the parish church and maimed
soldiers, etc., this Queene Street house is taxed 5s., whereof Lady Chaworth
paying ½, his lordship ½, comes to 2s. 6d.”
“To the beadle for watching the Queene Street house ending the
above said Christmasse [1671] 4s.; Lady Cha[worth] paying ½, his lordship
other ½, comes to 2s.”
“July 3, 1669. The hire of paper windowes last year, 1668, to save the
hangings in the dining roome and drawing roome, the ½ of cost, Lady
Cha[worth] payes the other half, 5s.”
Some indication of the reason that influenced Lady Chaworth in
setting up housekeeping with her brother may be afforded from a letter
dated 25th June, 1670, from Lord Chaworth to his wife, at Lord Roos’s
house in Great Queen Street, requesting her to return to him, and offering
to receive her with respect and affection.[452]
In the Hearth Tax Roll for 1673, the house is shown as “Empty.” Two
years later “The Lady Morpeth” is shown in occupation. This was Elizabeth,
dowager lady Berkeley, wife of Edward Howard, Viscount Morpeth,
afterwards second Earl of Carlisle. It was in this same year that her eldest
son Charles, afterwards third earl, was born. Later occupants of the house
were:—
1683. Sir Edward Mosen.
Before 1698 until after 1709. Mrs. Eleanor Complin.
Before 1715 until after 1720. Thomas Burges.
Before 1723 until 1732. Ashburnham Froude and Thomas Burges.[453]
1733. Ashburnhame Froud.
1733–1740. Madame Eaton.
1740–44. Madame Pain (Paign).
1746. —— Davis.
1747–51. Elizabeth Falconer.
1753–55. James Ward.
1755–57. G. Stewart.
1758–70. Thos. Brock (Brooke).
1770–74. Thos. Rudd.
1775–78. Ric. Rudd.
1779. —— Thomas.
1780–86. Mrs. Thomas.
1786– John Arthur.
In the Council’s collection are:—
[454]Exterior(photograph).
Side entrance in Middle Yard, erected 1859–60 (photograph).
Interior from the gallery (photograph).
Interior looking south (photograph).
Interior looking north (photograph).
Fanlight under stairs (photograph).
Staircase (photograph).
Lantern light over staircase (photograph).
Loculi in crypt (photograph).
Two silver chalices dated MDCIIIC, originally presented for use in
West Street Chapel (photograph).
 XLI.—SITE OF WELD HOUSE.

The history of that part of Aldwych Close lying within the

angle formed by Great Queen Street and Wild Street has already
been traced[455] up to the division of the greater portion of it between
Sir Edward Stradling and Sir Kenelm Digby in 1629. Eleven years
previously, Henry Holford had leased to John Ittery the extreme
southern portion, reaching 100 feet northwards from Sardinia Street,
and a trench had been dug separating Ittery’s portion from that lying
to the north. On the transfer of the latter to Sir W. Calley and Geo.
Strode in trust for Stradling and Digby, Ittery’s portion was included,
and added to Stradling’s share. Stradling without delay began the
erection on his portion of “a faire mansion house with stables and
other outhouses.”[456] On 12th December, 1632, the ground, with the
mansion, etc., was sold by Calley and Strode to Stradling, and was
then described as extending south from the partition wall[457]
between Digby’s and Stradling’s portions “together with that parte
formerly demised to the said John Ittery, and then enclosed together
with the same, at the end next Drewry Lane by a square lyne 300
foote, and at the other end next Lincolne’s Inne Feildes 296 foote.”
By 1632 Stradling had also divided his portion into two by a brick
wall, “beginninge at the west end towards Drewry Lane and
extendinge itselfe eastwards towards Lincolne’s Inne Feildes 144
foote, and then towards the north in length 132 foote, and then again
eastwards towards Lincolne’s Inne Feildes 132 foote, and standinge
distant at the west end thereof from the fore-mentioned partition
wall 157 foote, and at the other end next Lincolne’s Inne Feildes 31
foote.”[458]
On 20th December, 1632, Stradling sold that part lying to the
north of this second partition wall, including the house, etc., to
George Gage. The house had not yet been completed, but a provision
was subsequently made that Strode was to finish, before Easter,
1634, “the dwelling house and buildings now erected or begun to be
erected, within and without ... in all respects, fitt and necessary for
one or more dwelling house or houses.”[459]
The date of completion of the house may therefore be ascribed
with probability to the year 1634.
Gage used the house as his own residence, and while “lyeinge
sicke in the said messuage of the sickness whereof he died” made his
will on 14th August, 1638, bequeathing the premises,[460] together
with other property, to William Darrell and William Bierly to sell for
the payment of his debts. On 25th February, 1639–40, it was
purchased by Humphrey Weld for £2,600.[461]
The portion of Stradling’s property which lay to the south of
the second partition wall, and which extended to the southern limits
of Aldwych Close, Stradling seems to have sold to Dr. Gifford for 500
years for £400 without right of redemption.[462] In 1649 Andrew
Gifford sold the property for £650 to Weld, who assigned it to his
mother, Dame Frances Weld, in trust. Three years later she re-
assigned it to him.
Humphrey Weld thus became possessed of the whole of
Aldwych Close lying to the east of Wild Street, and to the south of the
gardens of the Great Queen Street houses, and he now began to
develop the property by building. A reference to Hollar’s Plan of 1658
(Plate 3) shows that by that year the whole of the east side of Wild
Street, south of Weld House, and all the north side of Sardinia Street
had been covered with houses.[463] Weld himself stated about 1670,
that he had by that time laid out £15,600 in building.[461]
The street which had at least since 1629,[464] and probably
since 1618,[465] led from Great Queen Street to Kemble Street, then
Princes Street, seems for some time to have been without a name. It
is referred to in early deeds as “the back side of Drury Lane,” “a way
leading from Princes Street to Queen Street on the back side of Drury
Lane,” etc. In the Subsidy Rolls up to 1646 inclusive, it is merged in
“Cockpit Side.” The earliest instance of the name Weld Street or Wild
Street[466] so far discovered is in a deed of 24th April, 1658,[467] which
refers to “the street now called Wild Street, but heretofore called a
way or passage of 40 foote breadth leading from Queenes Street to
Princes Streete.”
 How far Weld House was identical with the mansion built by
Stradling and Strode is uncertain. Blott, after mentioning the latter,
says: “Adjoining it, on the south side, were the grounds and premises
of Weld House, Drury Lane, occupied by Lady Frances Weld, widow.
In 1657, Weld House and Stradling House underwent a complete
transformation, the two houses were united together and became
one building, having, besides extensive additions made to it, a
chapel[468] built in the garden; the front arranged to face Aldwyche
Close instead of Drury Lane, and an approach made to it called Weld
Street. This extraordinary enlargement was not to make the building
a residence suitable to the dignity of the Welds, but rather for State
purposes, such as the accommodation of princes and ambassadors in
London.”[469]
Blott gives no authority for his statements, one of which,
relating to the formation of Weld Street, is demonstrably wrong. The
statement that the “extraordinary enlargement” was carried out with
a view to the reception of princes and ambassadors in the building is
probably only an inference from the indisputable fact that
ambassadors did afterwards reside in a portion of the house.[470]
Nevertheless the view of the house given in Hollar’s Plan of 1658
(Plate 3) certainly does suggest the amalgamation of two distinct
houses, and the Subsidy Roll for 1646 shows that at that date two
large residences existed side by side,[471] although of course these may
have been only portions of one very large house.
As early as 1664 the house (or houses) seems to have been
split up among a number of occupants. The entries in the Hearth Tax
Rolls for 1664–1674 in respect of this portion of the street (amending
the wrong order of the first roll) are as follows. The numbers in
brackets represent the number of hearths taxed.
 1665. 1666.
Sam Nelson (6) Samuel Nelson (6)
Lord Baltimore (15) Cecill, Lord Baltimore (15)
Lord Marquess of Winchester in 2 houses
Lady Spencer (16)
(30)[472]
A. Gilbt. Crouch, Esq. (7) Widow Tattershall (6)
B. John Wolstenholm (14) John Wolstenholme, Esq. (14)
C. Humph. Wild, Esq. (14)
The Portugall Embassador’s E (20)
House.
D. Humph. Wild, Esq. (16) Humfrey Weild, Esq. (16)
E. Countess of Exeter (9) E (10)
F. Mary Sanders (9) Mrs. Mary Sanders (9)
G. John Worsley (3) John Worsley, Marcht of Intercost (6)

1673. 1675.
Samuel Nelson (6) Samuel Nelson (6)
Lord Baltimore (15) The Lady Baltimore (15)
Marquess of Winchester (3) Marquess of Winchester (30)
A. Thomas Hawker[473] (7) Thomas Hawker (7)
B. Mary James (13) E (13)
C. The French Embassadour
Spanish Ambassador (20)
(20)
D. Humphrey Wild, Esq. (16) Humphrey Wild, Esq. (16)
E. Thomas Weedon, Esq. (5) Madd. James (5)
F. Mary Saunders (9) Mary Saunders (9)
Mary Watson (1) Mrs. Watson (1)
G. John Worseley (6) John Worsley (6)

Of these neither (A)[473] nor (G)[474] formed part of Weld

House, and (B) is doubtful. (C) and (F) however, certainly did, the
former being the ambassadorial residence (see below) and the latter
being mentioned in a deed of 1673, quoted by Parton[475], as “the
wing of the said great house, late in Mary Saunders’s possession.”
The house was therefore at this time in at least four distinct
occupations.[476]
 The two chief residences thus formed were evidently the
house occupied by Weld himself and the ambassadorial house,
immediately adjoining on the south. The former was the scene of a
wild riot in 1671, when, Humphrey Weld having attempted to arrest
the ringleaders in a tumult close by, the rabble, in a fury, attacked his
house.[477]
The Portuguese Ambassador seems to have taken up his
residence at Weld House in 1659, for on 9th July in that year he
(Francisco de Mello) wrote from “Wild Street” to William Lenthall,
announcing the arrival of his credentials, and asking for an audience.
[478]
The extracts from the Hearth Tax Rolls given above show that he
was still there in 1665, gone in 1666, that the French Ambassador
was there in 1673,[479] and the Spanish Ambassador in 1675.
Numerous references to the residence of the last mentioned occur.
[480]
On the flight of James II. in December, 1688, the mob sacked the
ambassador’s house.
Shortly afterwards Weld House and the ground belonging to it
were purchased by Isaac Foxcroft, who let out the property on
building lease.[481] The house, or a portion of it, was however, still
standing in 1694.[482]
In the Council’s Collection is:—
North-east side of Great Wild Street, in 1906, looking south-east
(photograph).
 XLII.–XLIII.—Nos. 6 and 7, WILD COURT.

The Society for the Improvement of the Condition of the

Labouring Classes are the ground landlords of these houses.
The only objects of interest which the premises contain are
four 18th-century hob grates, illustrated below.
The Council’s collection contains:—
[483]Four cast-iron hob grates (measured drawing).