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 TUOMO PELTONEN

TOWARDS WISE
MANAGEMENT
Wisdom and Stupidity in
Strategic Decision-making
 Towards Wise Management

“This book is a refreshing and out-of-­the-box contribution to the discussions on

managerial decision-­making and leadership. It combines philosophical insights
with a series of historical and contemporary case studies that illuminate the
multifaceted processes around wisdom and stupidity in critical strategic situa-
tions. It provides invaluable reading for students and practitioners of strategic
decision-making.”
—Henrikki Tikkanen, A. I. Virtanen Professor of Marketing and Consumer
Research, Aalto University School of Business, Finland

“Wise reflection on wise management by a wise researcher. Tuomo Peltonen’s

book offers a badly needed antidote to the superficial leadership discourse of our
times. The philosophically profound reflection in this book is not only an aca-
demic curiosity but also helps to understand key cases from history and the
contemporary world; from the Cuban Missile Crisis, to the Second World War,
to iPhone and Nokia.”
—Eero Vaara, Professor of Organization and Management, Aalto University
School of Business, Finland
 Tuomo Peltonen

Towards Wise
Management
Wisdom and Stupidity in Strategic
Decision-making
Tuomo Peltonen
School of Business
Aalto University
Helsinki, Finland

ISBN 978-3-319-91718-4    ISBN 978-3-319-91719-1 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91719-1

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018944201

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer International
Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and trans-
mission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or
dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or
the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
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Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer International
Publishing AG part of Springer Nature.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Preface

I first got the idea to write this book in the early 2010s. The outbreak of
the financial crisis had just surprised all economic experts. Soon, other
social and economic upheavals took place, and, again, experts and
decision-­makers were unable to sense or anticipate the coming changes. I
also noticed a feature associated with many of the surprising turns: the
amazement and disbelief among the specialists turned soon into a project
of trying to find plausible explanations to what had happened.
I wanted to have a more detailed look at the managerial and organisa-
tional dynamics that would help to distinguish and evaluate the different
dimensions or spheres of decision-making in critical situations. This path
first led to a review of the long tradition of the theories of wisdom, as well
as looking for cases of strategic decision-making suitable for exploring
these themes, to provide specific examples for a more philosophically
attuned understanding of wisdom in managerial thinking. The general
objective of this book is to present and defend the role of philosophical
and intuitive wisdom in good management. Too often, these dimensions
remain sidelined in discussions of decision-making.
The main focus is on strategic decision-making, both in large compa-
nies and at the level of the nations and economies. Although the main
bulk of management and leadership scholars are affiliated with business
schools, it is also valid to try and discuss managerial wisdom in the context
of non-corporate sectors, including political and military d ­ ecision-­making
v
vi Preface

instances. The field of decision-making research has traditionally been

concerned with managerial situations across sectors, from business to mil-
itary to presidential governance, aiming to generate common insights that
transcend a particular domain of leadership activity. The cases chosen rep-
resent some of the most prolific successes and failures in strategic decision-
making and foresight.
I would like to thank the Finnish Association of Non-Fiction Writers
and Wihuri Foundation for their financial support. The Department of
Management at Aalto University School of Business, with the help of
Professor Henri Schildt, kindly took the English version of the book
under their wings, for which I am extremely grateful. Professor Eero
Vaara graciously commented on a manuscript of this book—thank you
again Eero for taking time to read my work.

Helsinki, Finland Tuomo Peltonen

6April 2018
 Contents

1 Introduction   1

2 The Three Levels of Wisdom  27

3 Case Study 1: Wise Leadership During the Cuban Missile

Crisis  69

4 Case Study 2: The Wisdom and Stupidity of Military

Calculations in International Politics 103

5 Case Study 3: Interpretations of the Emergence

of the Financial Crisis in the Finnish Print Media 135

6 Case Study 4: The Collapse of Nokia’s Mobile Phone

Business 163

vii
viii Contents

7 In Conclusion: The Opportunities and Obstacles

of Reinforcing Wisdom in Management 189

Index 209
 List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 General logic of the decision-making process according to the

analytical-­rational approach. (Based on Dean and Sharfman
(1996) and Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992)) 29
Fig. 2.2 Plato’s divided line. (Based on: Plato (1993))  38
Fig. 2.3 The three levels of wisdom as expanding knowledge 45
Fig. 2.4 Development path to the use of philosophical wisdom in the
decision-­making process. (Based on: Plato (1993)) 47

ix
 List of Tables

Table 2.1 Differences between the intuitive and the analytical approach
to information processing 33
Table 2.2 Obstacles to building wisdom at different levels 50
Table 3.1 Features of John F. Kennedy’s wise leadership during the
Cuban Missile Crisis 100

xi
 1
Introduction

Today, there is an almost unlimited amount of information available to

us. I can do a Google search on a topic of interest, and dozens or hun-
dreds of links from the media, blogs and encyclopaedias will instanta-
neously appear on my computer screen. Through my university
connection, I can remotely access a huge collection of scientific articles
and books, which I can download to read whenever I need to. People’s
level of education has increased. Most young people obtain a tertiary
education. The amount of people with PhD degrees has multiplied in
recent decades. People travel, study abroad, and know the world better
than previous generations.
Nevertheless, we still make stupid decisions. Leaders are unable to read
the signs of change or to ponder the background to the solutions.
Researchers cannot predict imminent upheavals and crises. Ministers are
involved in politics with a short attention span. The wider audience
believes what it is told on social media. General education is shallow. Let
us consider some of the recent events:

The Financial Crisis In 2008, the global financial system ended up in a seri-
ous crisis. As a consequence, there was a global economic recession, which
progressed from a bank crisis to the real economy and then to a government

© The Author(s) 2019 1

T. Peltonen, Towards Wise Management,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91719-1_1
2 T. Peltonen

debt crisis in Europe. Economists could not foresee this massive, systemic
crisis. Only a few marginal researchers (Foster & Magdoff, 2009) warned
about the instabilities of financial capitalism, but nobody took any notice.
The world’s leading organisations specialising in fiscal policy were com-
pletely unaware of the approaching problems. During 2005–2007, the
Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, repeatedly assured the
public that the housing market was stable (https://mises.org/library/ben-
bernanke-was-incredibly-uncannily-wrong). International Monetary Fund
(IMF) economists were blissfully unaware of the fragility of the financial
situation in Europe before the eruption of the euro crisis in 2010 (Blustein,
2015).

The Arab Spring In 2011, a series of uprisings shook the Arab countries.
Dictators were toppled in many places. In Syria, the uprising escalated
into a civil war, which in turn caused a massive influx of refugees into
Europe. The chaotic nature of the security situation in Arab countries,
together with the power vacuum in Iraq caused by the withdrawal of US
troops, contributed to the rise of Islamist movements such as Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). However, the sudden collapse of authori-
tarian regimes was a surprise to researchers studying Middle Eastern poli-
tics (Gause, 2011). Top-level academicians and analysts assumed that the
decades-long tenacious rule of dictators in the region implied that these
countries naturally reject democratic change. They could not even imag-
ine that this kind of long-term authoritarian regime could collapse in a
matter of months.

The Collapse of Nokia’s Mobile Phone Operations In 2007, Nokia was the
global market leader for mobile phones. It had a strong financial position,
and extensive financial and research resources. During the same year,
Apple launched the iPhone, which became the world’s most coveted
phone model in only a few years, thanks to its user-friendly design and
openness to various applications. Nokia did not initially consider the new
competing product to be a threat. When it became evident that a new
type of smartphone would be the product of the future in the mobile
phone market, Nokia aimed to develop its operations to strengthen the
software and applications in their phones, ultimately without much suc-
 Introduction 3

cess in the matter (Ollila & Saukkomaa, 2013). The company sold its
mobile phone operations to Microsoft in 2011. Microsoft in turn let the
mobile phone operations take a turn for the worse in 2016. The collapse
of Nokia’s mobile phone operations is one of the most dramatic falloffs in
modern corporate history.

Brexit and Trump In 2016, there were two unexpected turns in politics.
The UK voted in favour of leaving the European Union (EU), and
Donald Trump was elected as the 45th US President. During both elec-
tions, the media and research institutions predicted the end result incor-
rectly. The traditional elite and the media sector were blind to the public
dissatisfaction with the current system. Social media played a big role as
a construer of reality. The voting behaviour of the people was a surprise,
and the election results turned out to be something that was previously
considered mostly impossible. Political experts were wrong.

What is common to all of the upheavals described above is that (a)

they have had a vast impact: an established political order or the market
structure of an industry has changed radically; and on the other hand, (b)
they have been previously perceived as highly unlikely or even
impossible.
These observations are essential because to begin with: (a) not all
unpredictable or presumably unlucky upheavals are necessarily disrup-
tions for the operating fields of organisations or societies. In organisa-
tions, there constantly occur surprising events that are difficult to evaluate
simply as successes or failures. A move that is seemingly erroneous at the
time it occurs may well turn out to be a successful business decision when
viewed from a longer strategic perspective. Companies may find success
as a consequence of their own wise solutions, but also due to the bad
decisions of their competitors. The structure of a field of business may
collapse suddenly, as a consequence of various factors.
There can be changes within an established order also in politics, or
upheavals that break the prevalent rules of the game. The election victory
of a particular party is not surprising in itself, but the breakthrough of a
completely new political movement or a candidate far removed from
mainstream politics can be seen as an actual cataclysm. An economic
4 T. Peltonen

recession that occurs during a normal economic cycle does not constitute
a breakdown of familiar structures, while a full-scale financial crisis with
banks declaring bankruptcy and foreign currency issues must be viewed
as a disruption of the established order.
On the other hand, upheavals breaking up the dominant structures
and order are not necessarily in every case (b) unpredictable, or outside of
the frame of reference for analysing the future, the so-called black swans
(Taleb, 2007). To begin with, let us consider digitalisation, which has
broken up traditional business structures and professional associations.
For example, the retail industry has recently had to re-examine the fun-
damental principles of its business model. On the other hand, the forms
of digitalisation—such as commerce moving into the digital world, and
the emergence of new communication methods and business operations
that are based on smartphone applications—have not been particularly
surprising. The direction of technological development has been rather
clear for about 5–10 years before the wider spread of new applications
within society and the economy. Another example could be the weaken-
ing dependency ratio of certain Western countries. It has also been known
for some time that without a radical increase in immigration or births,
the proportion of the elderly will rapidly expand in the 2020s in coun-
tries like Finland, causing pressure on the national economy (e.g. Rechel
et al., 2013). This change in the dependency ratio has been accepted in
the public consciousness.
The same distinction can also be outlined with the help of more estab-
lished concepts. Typically, literature on management distinguishes
between strategic and other, more operative decisions (Nutt & Wilson,
2010). Strategic decisions are associated with the general guidelines
related to long-term operations, with extensive impact on the other parts
of systems. On the other hand, operative decisions refer to solving
smaller-scale problems within a limited context. Here, we will be focus-
ing namely on strategic-level decision-making. It is also customary to
make a distinction between routine, repetitive decisions to which a for-
mulaic approach can be applied, and which can largely be mechanised
with analytical tools; and decisions made in changing, uncertain situa-
tions, which cannot be “programmed” but which need situational con-
templation and more extensive reflexive analysis than routine decisions
 Introduction 5

(Simon, 1977). This book focuses more clearly on non-programmable

decisions, which take place in surprising, unique situations, and require
the decision-maker to struggle with uncertainty, a lack of previous similar
cases, and quick reactions. In other words, the subject of this book
includes strategic decisions or turns with wider consequences, which take
place in such new or unique situations where previous habits and assump-
tions are no longer applicable.
If we compare the explosion of the available information and the rising
levels of formal education with the frequent occurrence of failed predic-
tions and decisions, the picture inevitably becomes contradictory. How is
it possible that in the age of information, made possible by advances in
information technology (IT) and communication networks, people are
unable to analyse features of social and economic development? Why are
noteworthy groups of highly educated specialists and university research-
ers unable to read the signs of the time, and give hints about upcoming
changes and strategic challenges? Why is it that experienced decision-
makers who have completed modern managerial training do not know
how to read the signs prevalent in their operating environment?
The answer offered in this book is: development has not transformed
into sustainable sensibility because the people and groups who make
decisions and assessments do not use the full potential of their wisdom.
The increased amount of information and the technology used for obtain-
ing, processing and spreading it do not guarantee a versatile and open
interpretation of a situation. The strengthening of expertise does not nec-
essarily mean that the knowledge of specialist professionals is combined
into a comprehensive synthesis during the steps of strategic decision-
making. The available knowledge might be outdated, incorrect or ideo-
logically tainted in various ways:

Blind Faith in Technology Many think that technological progress will

solve most of humanity’s problems. IT revolutions and digital systems
seem to offer supreme solutions for information collection and interpreta-
tion. Machines are seemingly developed to be increasingly more intelli-
gent. On the other hand, while our life is becoming increasingly more
technological, systems are becoming more fragile. If a perfect system fails,
it will take us back to the Stone Age. For example, if the power grid and
6 T. Peltonen

the internet were to be destroyed, the current Western order would be

severely crippled. As the sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992) has stated, we are
living in a risk society. Digital technologies produce a huge amount of
information that is available for us, but humans are still required to high-
light significant patterns and signals from among the masses of data.
Machines have no imagination or emotions. Technology has its limits.

The Rationalisation of Specialist Work Specialists work in increasingly

narrower fields of expertise. Researchers at universities are specialising in
particular phenomena and perspectives, and tend to discuss within cir-
cumscribed communities. The increase in knowledge work has meant an
increase in various “symbolic analysts” (Reich, 1991) each in their own
area of expertise. At the same time, competence in one particular spe-
cialism can lead to blindness towards the bigger picture. Extensive ideo-
logical, cultural and political arcs of development remain hidden or
ignored. Classical wisdom that can be found in philosophy, religions
and statecraft is not preferred in the current market of ideas. Generalists
are dead.

The Limitations of the Scientific Method Modern scientific research is

mainly based on empirical analysis. Within such research, interpretations
are made based on observations regarding the forces and factors affecting
a phenomenon. This type of inductive reasoning is based on the assump-
tion that observations made at a certain time and place are also applicable
on a more general level (Bendasolli, 2013). However, there can exist
things or cause and effect relationships which our observations or experi-
ence have not yet reached. This is the so-called black swan (Taleb, 2007)
dilemma: in our experience, we have only observed white swans, so we
create the theory that all swans are white. Then, somewhere, a black swan
appears, and previous assumptions have to be abandoned. Research may
fail to foresee unexpected events.

Market Ideology Instead of wisdom gained by traditional education and

learning from experience, it is a blind faith in the power of the markets
that to a great extent makes the modern world go round (Harvey, 2007;
 Introduction 7

Khurana, 2007). Market theory or neoliberalism sees free or efficient

markets as the fundamental social dynamics affecting various sectors.
There is nothing behind the markets. The ideology of economic liberal-
ism may prevent wise decision-making, particularly if it is used as the
dominant lens for analysing failures or surprises. The market ideology is
a grand narrative (Lyotard, 1984), which can suffocate unprejudiced
analysis and reflection needed for wise management.

Modern development, with its information revolution, explosion of

scientific information and market dynamics, does not transform directly
into sensibility. Wisdom is something wider and more fundamental than
simply the thoughtless application of ever-evolving information systems
and technologies. To achieve wisdom, an independent approach is
required for using information and research analytics, as well as patience
in the application of fashionable concepts and ideologies. Wisdom can
include other perspectives and values next to pure expertise when prepar-
ing strategic decisions. It draws upon personal experience, intuition and
human imagination as it tries to openly outline various options and their
consequences.
Certainly, wisdom can be supported by the tools provided by science,
technology and market mechanisms, as well as the general increase in
education levels, global dialogue and media awareness, but this kind of
assistance may well make decision-makers subject to a kind of impercep-
tible laziness. As so much information is available, it is easy to structure
it technologically, and as the world seems to work universally on the
terms of a market economy, leaders may well start to think that there is
no longer a need to contemplate situations from various perspectives in a
mindful and contemplative fashion. Ethical or spiritual values are seem-
ingly also relics of the past. Decision-making seems effortless.
However, wise decisions are often indicative of an ability to detach
oneself from the flow of information, or from the dominant business
fashions. As an example, in Finland, the so-called Pellervo-oriented coop-
erative businesses (https://pellervo.fi/english/) largely survived the 1990s
recession with relatively little damage, and became a strong success story
by the turn of the century. Finnish cooperative banks suffered from very
8 T. Peltonen

small credit losses compared to the savings banks (Vihriälä, 1993) after
carefully entering new financial markets, and were able to grow into what
is now known as the OP-Group. On the other hand, in the early 1980s,
S-Group, a cooperative retailer, was on the brink of bankruptcy, but after
heavy cutbacks, the company managed to become profitable again
(Herranen, 2004; Lamberg & Tikkanen, 2006). With its leaner struc-
ture, it survived the deep recession of the early 1990s, and over the years,
it became a leading company in the field of food retailing. Both of these
cooperative companies share a combination of a modern business
approach with a more traditional societal mission, as well as the wisdom
culture stemming from the values of the cooperative movement. As
Tuominen, Jussila and Rantanen (2010) have noted in their study about
the management know-how of S-Group, an approach balancing the tra-
ditional rational skills and techniques of business management with
experience gained through learning and development visionary thinking
is essential in the group’s management culture. Both S-Group and
OP-Group have traditionally also had one foot in the regional units of
the counties, which has helped them keep a distance from the metropoli-
tan approaches and management methods. The ideational and regional
basis of the co-ops may have aided them to act wisely in critical moments.
On the other hand, not even these types of values can guarantee the con-
tinuation of sensible leadership as the circumstances change.
However, on a general level, it can be said that the recent turns in dif-
ferent fields indicate serious deficiencies regarding the anticipation of
change and sensible strategic decision-making. It is evident that the char-
acteristic phenomena of our time, such as the development of IT, the
breakthroughs in the media environment and an increased amount of
research-based knowledge, have not in all cases transformed into wise
leadership; instead, they have played their part in preventing the use of
the virtues of traditional contemplation and evaluation in challenging
decision-making situations. Wisdom requires an ability to reflect in an
unprejudiced manner and use various perspectives in managerial think-
ing. Likewise, good decisions require the ability to distance oneself from
immediate emotional reactions as well as imperceptible foregone conclu-
sions and ideological dogmas. Only the virtuous can be wise. But what
actually is wisdom?
 Introduction 9

1.1 What Is Wisdom?

In English, the concept of wisdom originates from a Proto-Germanic
word wissaz, which in turn stems from the Proto-Indo-European term
weid (http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=wise&allowed_in_
frame=0). Weid means “to see”, and the same stem is still present in the
concept of vision, referring to sight and vision, but also in the word idea,
as introduced by the Greeks. Outside of the Indo-European languages,
the Finnish concept äly (reason, wit) has a similar etymology: it originally
meant noticing or observing (Häkkinen, 2004). Wisdom in its etymo-
logical origin refers to the ability to see the inner truth behind various
instances, a kind of supernatural sight that is essential for the emergence
of pure understanding.
The distinction between wisdom and other kinds of knowledge and
intelligence has interested people since the time of Ancient Greece.
Socrates considered a characteristic feature of a philosopher to be the
acknowledgement of their own ignorance, and constant attempts at criti-
cal dialogue with themselves and others (Plato, 1954). Plato (1993) made
a distinction between fleeting opinions (doxa) and true wisdom (nous),
and considered decision-making and leadership based on opinions to be
the largest problem in society. Buddhists refer to mindfulness wisdom,
something that exceeds spontaneous emotional impulses (Weick &
Putnam, 2006). In the twentieth century, the political philosopher
Hannah Arendt (2009) stated that the people who had made bad deci-
sions were not actually stupid, but, instead, thoughtless. Many philo-
sophical and religious traditions think that prudent decision-making
requires a more general contemplative sensitivity to deeper truths beyond
the changing sensations of the here and now (Cooper, 2012).
Who have been those wise people we could consider to be the role
models of real thoughtfulness? When doing an online search with the
keyword “wisdom role models”, you will see a wide variety of various
public figures. The results include moral pioneers such as Gandhi, the
Dalai Lama and Martin Luther King, but also lighter-weight thinkers,
such as athletes and actors. It is not easy to find examples of truly wise
people. Would the celebrity chef Jamie Oliver be considered one?
Hardly.
10 T. Peltonen

It could be assumed that the role models of spiritual quest and abso-
lute moral wisdom are specifically wise old men and women. It is only
with age and experience that a more mature form of sensible wisdom
can be achieved. In international politics, the group known as “The
Elders” has been influential for some time: the group consists of experi-
enced statesmen and diplomats who are no longer active in everyday
politics (http://www.theelders.org). Among others, the group includes
Jimmy Carter and Martti Ahtisaari, and it was originally convened by
Nelson Mandela. The purpose of this group is to act as an intermediary
in difficult conflicts, and to promote the implementation of human
rights around the world. The Elders organisation only includes ten peo-
ple. The group’s potential for promoting good intentions is based on a
combination of long experience, and the prestige of the members’ previ-
ous work, and the positioning of the group outside of traditional politi-
cal interest groups and nationalities. Also, business people with
experience in the corporate world could share their views, for example,
in a company management board or as coaches. Some offer their wis-
dom as consultants. Often, during crises or critical situations of change,
organisations need a more mature perspective, which almost always
requires previous experience from successes and failures in strategic
decision-making.
However, it cannot be claimed that only experience gained by age can
create wisdom. A mere career history of tackling challenging organisa-
tional events without any contemplation on the experiences, or learning
from the mistakes, successes and achievements, does not necessary lead to
wisdom. For example, a Finnish tyre maker, Nokian Renkaat continued
the production of enhanced test tyres in the 2000s (Pietiläinen &
Teittinen, 2016) despite another company, Continental, having previ-
ously been caught for adding features to test tyres that were different
from commercially available products (Mäkelä, 2005). Nokian Renkaat
was later caught for this deceit, and this led to a severe decline of the
company’s reputation. In addition to rational analyses, a higher-level syn-
thesis is necessary, which requires the contemplation of the significance
of previous events based on a wider frame of reference. This contempla-
tion highlights the evaluation of various goals, the revision of human
understanding and the conceptualisation of long-term cause and effect
 Introduction 11

relationships. Wisdom typically entails a search for a wider frame of refer-

ence, which often requires asking completely new kinds of questions.
From afar, it seems that the role model of a wise leader is becoming an
increasingly distant, historical thing. This is evident, for example, in the
fact that only few contemporary people make it onto the list of excep-
tionally discerning people. For example, in 2013, Time magazine com-
piled a list of the most significant figures in history (http://ideas.time.
com/2013/12/10/whos-biggest-the-100-most-significant-figures-in-his-
tory/). The top ten on this list are, from highest to lowest: Jesus, Napoleon,
Mohammed, William Shakespeare, Abraham Lincoln, George
Washington, Adolf Hitler, Aristotle, Alexander the Great, and Thomas
Jefferson. Two spiritual leaders and one philosopher made it onto this list.
The majority of the rest are statesmen. There are no women on the list.
The extended list of the top 100 persons adheres to the same formula: it
includes philosophers and spiritual teachers (e.g. Kant, Plato, Luther and
Augustine) as well as statesmen (Ronald Reagan) and tyrants (Stalin). The
vast majority of these people have been dead for a long time. Despite
their historical standing, it is difficult to comprehend what all of them
have in common. The methods of influence were vastly diverse, for exam-
ple, Socrates died in Ancient Athens after announcing his ignorance,
while tyrants like Joseph Stalin and Genghis Khan had an incomprehen-
sible amount of blood on their hands. It seems that wisdom and a ruth-
less lust for power are on the same line when assessing remarkable role
models of leadership.
There is no need to take the lists of significant people compiled by the
media too seriously. On the other hand, these types of listings could be
based on such deep cultural currents that partly hinder a focus on wisdom
alongside other ideals and symbolic role models influential during our time.
Strong myths about a nation’s fateful moments and the people impacting
on them, the great historical turning points and scientific advances all shape
our views of people we consider to be our role models. Popular people
reflect the valuations and concepts regarding the past, as well as activities
and activism related to significant upheavals, as is characteristic of their era.
Role models reflect our own beliefs—our hopes and fears—which are
strengthened by various cultural meanings and stories. Today, these cultural
values do not seem to appreciate deep, philosophical wisdom.
12 T. Peltonen

1.2  he Modern Era and the Degradation

T
of Wisdom Culture
Why does our culture not know how to highlight wise people? This may
partially occur because people think that knowledge is so equal in a mod-
ern society that it is not worth reflecting through exceptional individuals.
Among others, the so-called postmodern philosophy has attempted to
criticise the idea that supreme knowledge only belongs to a chosen scien-
tific elite (e.g. Derrida, 1976; Foucault, 1972). Information is available to
all people (Lyotard, 1984), and, for example, in social media, discussions
about world events are carried out without guidance from learned experts
or professional media. It is believed that all of us consume and produce
wisdom.
Although, for example, in organisations and working communities, it
is beneficial to brainstorm new solutions together (Brown & Duguid,
1991; Rumens & Kelemen, 2013), the democracy of knowledge, when
taken to its extreme, can be harmful to the construction of wisdom.
Equal analysis and contemplation often denote a kind of uninterrupted
market meeting, where masses are guided towards supporting a particular
perspective, acting on emotions and irrational incitement. Extensive par-
ticipation in decision-making dulls the qualitative dimension, which
could be reached if contemplation were to be concentrated in the hands
of such people and groups who are prepared to use extensive and in-
depth wisdom-based knowledge.
On the other hand, the negative aspects of democracy, which, for
example, Plato (1993) highlighted skilfully in his philosophy (Saxonhouse,
1998), do not mean that any seemingly competent person or manage-
ment group should be placed in charge of organisations and states.
Patience and humility are prerequisites of wisdom, which in turn often
require a long, comprehensive maturing process. In Plato’s own Academy,
getting acquainted with wisdom was a combination of scientific and phil-
osophical training, as well as spiritual and moral preparation (Peltonen,
2017). According to him, knowledge could not be separated from ethics.
Indeed, the focus was on the refinement of moral virtues, in addition to
neutral information and objective analysis skills.
 Introduction 13

The classical Western tradition of education continued along the path

paved by Plato. Plato’s student Aristotle added empirical and practical
knowledge to spiritual wisdom, but like Plato, he emphasised goodness
and virtues as the ultimate measures of intelligence (Kraut, 2016). The
early philosophy of Christianity drew from Plato, seeing God as a repre-
sentative of the highest form of reason (logos), which people should aspire
to instead of a secular understanding (Wells, 2010). The focus was on
subduing human desires and impulses to a deeper level of wisdom. As the
philosopher Michel Foucault (1983) has stated, in classical or pre-mod-
ern culture, it was thought that real information can only be achieved by
those who have reached such a level of the ethical self through spiritual
and ascetic exercises that they are mature enough to distinguish the truth,
and use the information with deliberation. In philosophy, Neoplatonism
continued Plato’s thoughts about transcendental universal Forms and
their roles in exercising human wisdom (Cooper, 2012; Remes, 2014).
The modern era largely detached ethics and virtuous living from intel-
lectual wisdom. René Descartes (Descartes & Cottingham, 2013) stated
that we can doubt everything else, but not intellectual doubt itself. This
made it possible to base sustainable knowledge on cognitive processes,
instead of using transcendental Platonic Ideas or the word of God as the
indicators of wisdom. The Age of Enlightenment allowed people to prac-
tise independent critical contemplation. Immanuel Kant (1998) stated
that a rational and orderly world is primarily created through human
reasoning, where the mind organises external observations and stimuli
into something comprehensively logical. Thus, the meaningfulness and
order of the universe are largely contained within the structures of our
own thinking, which is why human interpretations are a reliable source
of construing truth.
The modern age reflects two parallel paths of development in the phi-
losophy of knowledge: (1) on the one hand, the extreme democratisation
and the consequential shunning of deeper or special wisdom, and, on the
other hand, (2) the modern idea of the independent nature of human
reason, separated from ethics. Democratic or shared knowledge has paved
the way for various sudden movements in the development of societies.
The emergence of nation states and, later, the political movements (such
as socialism and nationalism) based on the power of the people have
14 T. Peltonen

manifested themselves over the past 150 years as occasional revolutions

and political upheavals, as well as in large-scale wars. In economics, the
idea of an efficient market is based on the assumption that essential infor-
mation is available to all operators. Markets live according to freely flow-
ing information, which has not always denoted a state of balance, but
increasingly more often violent transitions from one extreme to the other
(financial system bubbles, as well as financial crashes and crises).
As the connections between wisdom and ethics and moral exercises have
been severed, we have had to witness alignments and decisions whose seem-
ing rationality contains plenty of human distortions. To obtain power and
leadership, it is no longer required to show moral endurance and virtue as
in classical times; instead, in modern institutions, pleasing one’s superiors
and collecting quick victories are essential for creating an image of success
(Jackall, 1988; McIntyre, 1985). Once people have reached a higher level,
they may become misled by believing that career progress is a sign of wis-
dom. In other words, many leaders suffer from hubris. They overestimate
their own abilities of contemplation and critical reflection, and end up
making unlucky decisions. Excessive attachment to one’s own ego can eas-
ily lead to risky or megalomaniac projects. Autonomy based on power,
achieved as a consequence of a hierarchical progression, is a completely
different matter compared to the independence of a truly wise man or
woman from the prevalent beliefs or theoretical trends.
The extreme democracy of information and managerialist culture are
amalgamated into a situation where narcissist leaders make rushed and
grandiose decisions while being dependent on the ever-changing opinions
and emotions of the larger masses. We need not stretch our imagination
too far: we already have an example of perhaps the most surprising and
confusing leader figure of our time, Donald Trump, the US President. As
a construction entrepreneur, he is the product of a neoliberal economic
system, but he is also a universally popular media figure who climbed into
public consciousness as a reality TV star. Trump’s political ascent combines
the mobilisation of large masses with the help of social media and an indi-
vidualistic management culture. Thorough contemplation and humility
towards changing circumstances are overshadowed in populist managerial-
ism, creating the right conditions for a harmful decision-making culture.
The modern era is the enemy of traditional wisdom.
 Introduction 15

1.3  he Goals of This Book, and Its Position

T
in Relation to Other Wisdom Literature
This book aims to participate in the managerial discourse on wisdom by
providing an overview of the core discourses of the field to a Finnish
audience, as well as by bringing the classical Platonic-Socratic concept of
wisdom closer to decision-making and organisation. Wisdom and its
related topics have been extensively discussed both in the wider scientific
discourse and in management and organisation studies. The Handbook of
Organizational and Managerial Wisdom (Kessler & Bailey, 2007) provides
a comprehensive overview of the subject. Due to the extent and disper-
sion of the literature, it is impossible to provide an exhaustive overview of
the field. However, we can juxtapose the perspective found in this book
with a few influential views on wisdom and stupidity.
Plato’s dialogues which animate Socrates’ ideas are the first Western
writings on wisdom. In the Platonic-Socratic view, wisdom or sophia is
first and foremost the rationality of the soul, cherished in everyday life.
Wisdom does not constitute cognitive intelligence or analytical informa-
tion but becoming a virtuous person, instead. A wise person seeks and
adheres to timeless and unchanging truths: harmony, beauty and justice.
Such a person would not trust their instincts or variable observations and
beliefs; instead, they would look inside for the wisdom of their soul,
which helps them adhere to the right ability of judgement in every situa-
tion, and to avoid emotionally or perceptually tinted evaluations
(Robinson, 1990). Csikzentmihalyi and Rathunde (1990) condense the
classical approach to wisdom into three core topics:
1. Wisdom does not mean the observation of phenomena rushing past,
but first and foremost, the search for and use of long-lasting, universal
truths.
2. Wisdom is not specialised information; rather, it is an attempt to
understand how the different aspects of reality are connected to each
other; the goal is to achieve a holistic understanding.
3. Wisdom is not value-free knowledge; instead, it requires the hierarchical
evaluation of various truths so that the purest and most fundamental
truth would be positioned first, ahead of other forms of understanding.
16 T. Peltonen

In contemporary discussions, one of the most important developers of

wisdom discourse has been the psychologist Robert Sternberg (2003,
2007). In his famous balance theory of wisdom, Sternberg (2004) states
that wisdom is the contemplated use of various types of knowledge
according to the special characteristics of the situation. In addition to
objective information, a wise person also relies on creativity, practical
common sense and abstract reasoning. Sternberg emphasises that wis-
dom is a combination of information and silent or practical understand-
ing. He also states that wisdom is characterised by the balanced weighing
of different interests. Personal benefits, as well as the advantages of the
organisation and the wider social field, should be taken into consider-
ation in every decision-making situation. For him, wisdom also means a
multidimensional reaction to environmental requirements. In Sternberg’s
theory, the common good is the main criterion for balancing everything.
Sternberg (2003, 2007) has applied his wisdom model also to
management.
Sternberg’s model focuses on individual situation assessment, and the
balanced analysis of diverse views, interests and effects in a wider ethical-
social context. These are undoubtedly the same goals as in the classical
Greek wisdom culture. Compared to wisdom literature drawing on Plato
(1993), Sternberg’s approach nevertheless emphasises individual charac-
teristics more. For Sternberg, wisdom, cognitive intelligence and creativ-
ity are all essential elements from the perspective of sensible and good
leadership (Sternberg, 2007). Plato, instead, claims that wisdom refers to
a philosophical attitude, where knowledge is evaluated to the ethical, aes-
thetic and spiritual completeness of transcendental forms or ideas.
Socrates’ (Allen, 1959) writings seem to emphasise that the premise of
wisdom is the acknowledgement of human ignorance. Compared to
these ideals, Sternberg’s “common good” plays a rather limited role with
regard to the concept of wisdom; instead, he emphasises the significance
of different types of human or cognitive skills in overall wisdom. The
Socratic-Platonic concept of wisdom is primarily contemplative, which is
why a mind’s abilities regarding creativity and analytical intelligence are
clearly secondary compared to the principles of philosophical wisdom (as
illustrated by Plato’s Forms).
 Introduction 17

One feature that intersects contemporary wisdom discourse in the

areas of leadership, strategy and decision-making is an emphasis on prac-
tical wisdom or phronesis (e.g. Nonaka & Toyama, 2007; Shotter &
Tsoukas, 2014; Sliwa & Crains, 2009). Phronesis is Aristotle’s concept.
He distinguishes between three types of wisdom: episteme, techne and
phronesis. Of these, episteme represents truth-seeking theoretical knowl-
edge in the spirit of Plato’s theory of Ideas. Techne denotes technique, or
practical and creative skill. Phronesis, on the other hand, refers to contem-
plative intelligence, which aims to see the best possible solution while
taking into consideration circumstantial limitations as well as ethical val-
ues. Phronesis aims to guide us towards decisions that are possible with
the given resources, the participants’ abilities and the social context, while
keeping the common good as the overall goal.
Phronesis and the related views on managerial wisdom that stem from
the Aristotelian tradition (e.g. McKenna, Rooney & Boal, 2009; Rooney
& McKenna, 2007) differ from Platonic thinking to the extent that they
emphasise more the practical and circumstantial limitations in exercising
wisdom. Although wisdom strives for the good, and requires its practitio-
ner to be virtuous, striving towards transcendental, abstract ideals as pro-
moted in Plato’s works are not considered inevitable or even possible.
Behind all this are the differences in the philosophies of Plato and
Aristotle. While Plato represented unconditional idealism and turning
away from secular knowledge, Aristotle was more interested in under-
standing and analysing the empirical reality.
On the other hand, it is important to notice that Aristotle was Plato’s
student, and he did not completely abandon his teacher’s views (Gerson,
2005). Like Plato, Aristotle believed that the highest knowledge is possible
only if its seeker strives for a good or virtuous life. In other words, accord-
ing to the contemporary concept of empirical knowledge, Aristotle was not
a positivist who thought that information can be obtained completely neu-
trally, without the purity of the knower’s own purposes and morals. Wisdom
is something nobler and ethically more comprehensive than mere informa-
tion or analytical data obtained using scientific methods (Ryan, 2014).
With this in mind, Aristotle focused on a wide variety of virtues, where
mere empirical or social knowledge could be combined with ethical goals
that serve the common good. Aristotle also acknowledged the position of
18 T. Peltonen

Platonic theoretical wisdom or sophia in the quest for a good and sensible
life, although he wanted to include phronesis with it: a wisdom applicable
in practical situations (Curnow, 2011). On the other hand, in his later
works, Plato moved towards a more practical perspective that takes action
into consideration (Klein, 1988). However, in wisdom literature, phronesis
has gained more of a foothold compared to the Platonic sophia (Trowbridge,
2011).
Another influential contribution to management science comes from
Mats Alvesson and Andre Spicer (2012). They launched the concept of
“functional stupidity”, with which they refer to a systematic culture or
context where stupidity becomes an acceptable approach in organisa-
tions. Alvesson and Spicer (2012; 1201) define functional stupidity as the
“inability and/or unwillingness to use cognitive and reflexive capacities to
other than a narrow or limited extent”. Stupidity is characterised by three
features: first, a stupid decision-maker is not able to question and criti-
cally analyse the premises of their own deductions. Managerial work is
not reflexive. Second, the stupid person would not know how to justify
their decisions and choices, particularly to their subordinates and the
wider public. The manager lacks the argumentative and communicative
skills. Third, functional stupidity is related to an instrumental limitation
to pre-determined objectives and technical knowledge. That is why man-
agers are unable to analyse situations from the perspective of a wider
impact or context.
Alvesson and Spicer’s stupidity-based theory leans heavily on the
thoughts of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory (Held, 1980). The
overall aim of the Critical Theory is to liberate people from wrong aware-
ness and the straitjacket of instrumental rationality through social reform
and transformation. In this regard, the stupidity theory is similar to the
work of Plato, who emphasised the shallowness of popular opinion and
apparent knowledge compared to the depth of philosophical wisdom.
For example, in his widely used book on organisation theories, Morgan
(2006) has juxtaposed Plato’s allegory of the cave with sociological analy-
sis and surpassing of ideological distortions and limitations, largely in the
spirit of Critical Theory.
However, Alvesson and Spicer’s (2012) stupidity theory differs from
the Platonic-Socratic wisdom concept defended in this book. To begin
 Introduction 19

with, their critique in itself does not deny the potential role of human
thinking and reasoning processes in the construction of sustainable wis-
dom. The main premise is that a wider reflexive and communicatively
rational sensibility has been imprisoned by various ideologies. In Plato’s
(1993) thinking, instead, the premise is an attempt to strive towards wis-
dom by first distancing oneself from all rationality based on human
observation and deduction—in a Socratic spirit. Both approaches strive
to search for a more sustainable basis for rationality than what can be
offered by the ideological trends of the day, but pinpoint wisdom to dif-
ferent objects: Plato to unchanging transcendental Forms (Truth, Beauty,
Justice), while Critical Theorists pinpoint it to the idea of an autono-
mous, self-sufficient subject, based on the ideas of the Enlightenment,
and particularly Kant’s philosophy (Scherer, 2011).
Second, Alvesson and Spicer (2012) focus more on the obstacles and
limitations of wisdom, rather than on the normative features of the
ideal state of wise governance. This approach also stems from the
Marxist philosophy of Critical Theory; the main object of interest is the
critique of instrumental rationality, as well as unreflexive and undemo-
cratic contemplation—not so much the utopian vision of the ideal
organisation or society (Paden, 2002). Although there are some aspects
in Plato’s (1993) thinking that focus on the features limiting and suf-
focating wisdom in the immanent culture, the undercurrent in his phi-
losophy is the assumption that people have an innate ability to become
connected to the sources of philosophical wisdom, the Platonic Forms
(Allen, 1959). This process reminds a kind of a spiritual or even reli-
gious conversion (Cooper, 2012; O’Meara, 2005), albeit one with a lot
of academic and practical work alongside with the contemplative search
for the truth. As the philosopher Pierre Hadot (1995) has stated, in the
ancient world, a philosophy similar to Plato’s was first and foremost a
“way of life”, a holistic practising of relevant philosophical and spiritual
exercises. On the other hand, Plato (1993) thought that after becoming
united with the domain of true knowledge, practitioners of wisdom
could be invited or requested to join the decision-making strata in soci-
eties and organisations, taking thus the position of the so-called
Philosopher-Kings.
Another random document with
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also, yet in its absence it is not likely that it kept either valuables
or money at Westminster. But side by side with the state office
was the household office of finance, the Wardrobe, and, though
the wardrobe office was itinerating with the king, it still kept a
“treasury” or storehouse at Westminster, and this, for the sake of
greater safety, had been placed for some years at least within
the precincts of the abbey. From the monastic point of view, it
was doubtless an inconvenience that nearness to the royal
dwelling compelled them to offer their premises for the royal
service. Accordingly, kings not infrequently made demands upon
the abbey to use its buildings. Thus the chapter house became a
frequent place for meetings of parliament, and at a later time it
was used and continued to be used till the nineteenth century, for
the storage of official records. In the same way Edward secured
the crypt underneath the chapter house as one of the
storehouses of his Wardrobe. When the crypt was first used for
this purpose I do not know, but records show us that it was
already in use in 1291, at which date it was newly paved. It was
not the only storehouse of the Wardrobe. There was another
“treasury of the wardrobe” in the Tower of London, but this was
mainly used for bulky articles, arms and armour, cloth, furs,
furniture, and the like. Most of what we should call treasure was
deposited in the Westminster crypt, and we are fortunate in
having still extant a list of the jewels preserved there in 1298, the
time when the court began to establish itself for its five years’
sojourn in the north. In 1303 jewels and plate were still the chief
treasures preserved there. Some money was there also, notably
a store of “gold florins of Florence,” the only gold coins currently
used in England at a time when the national mints limited
themselves to the coinage of silver. But I do not think there could
have been much money, for Edward’s needs were too pressing,
his financial policy too much from hand to mouth, for the crypt at
Westminster to be a hoard of coined money, like the famous
Prussian Kriegsschatz at Spandau, which, we now rejoice to
learn, is becoming rapidly depleted. Whatever its contents,
Edward estimated that their value was £100,000, a sum
equivalent to a year’s revenue of the English state in ordinary
times. Unluckily mediaeval statistics are largely mere guess-work.
But the amount of the guess at least suggests the feeling that
the value of the treasures stored in the crypt was very
considerable.
The crypt under the chapter house is one of the most
interesting portions of the abbey buildings at Westminster. It is
little known because it is not, I think, generally shown to visitors.
I am indebted to the kindness of my friend, Bishop Ryle, the
present dean, for an opportunity of making a special inspection of
it. It is delightfully complete, and delightfully unrestored. The chief
new thing about it seems the pavement, but the dean’s well-
informed verger told me that it was within living memory that this
pavement had replaced the flooring of 1291. Numerous windows
give a fair amount of light to the apartment; though the enormous
thickness of the walls, some thirteen feet, it was said, prevent the
light being very abundant, even on a bright day. The central
column, the lower part of the great pillar from which radiates the
high soaring vaults of the chapter house above, alone breaks the
present emptiness of the crypt. Considerable portions of the
column are cut away to form a series of neatly made recesses,
and there are recesses within these recesses, which suggest in
themselves careful devices for secreting valuables, for it would be
easy to conceal them by the simple expedient of inserting a
stone here and there where the masonry had been cut away, and
so suggesting to the unwary an unbroken column. I should not
like to say that these curious store-places already existed in
1303; but there is no reason why they should not. Certainly they
fit in admirably with the use of the crypt as a treasury.
One other point we must also remember about the
dispositions of this crypt. There is only one access to it, and that
is neither from the chapter house above nor from the adjacent
cloister, but from the church itself. A low, vaulted passage is
entered by a door at the south-east corner of the south transept
of the abbey, now for many centuries the special burial place for
poets, eminent and otherwise. This passage descends by a flight
of steep steps to the crypt itself, and the flight originally seems, I
am told—doubtless as another precaution against robbery—to
have been a broken one suggesting that a steep drop,
presumably spanned by a short ladder, further barred access to
the crypt. We must remember, too, that this sole access to the
treasury was within a few feet of the sacristy of the abbey. The
sacristy was the chapel to the south of the south transept, and
communicating with it where the sacrist kept the precious vessels
appropriated to the service of the altar. Altogether it looks as if
the crypt were originally intended as a storehouse for such
church treasure as the sacrist did not need for his immediate
purposes. From this use it was diverted, as we have seen, to the
keeping of the royal treasures. Nowadays the sacristy is called
the chapel of St. Faith and is used for purposes of private
devotion. We must not forget the close connexion in our period of
the sacristy and the crypt. The connexion becomes significant
when we remember that among Pudlicott’s monastic boon
companions at the palace-keeper’s lodge was the sacrist of the
abbey, Adam of Warfield.
Pudlicott had made up his mind to steal the king’s treasure.
The practical problem was how to get access to it. If we examine
the evidence collected at the enquiry, we find that there are two
discrepant accounts as to how the robber effected his purpose.
The one is warranted by the testimony of a large number of
sworn juries of reputable citizens of every ward in the city of
London, of burgesses of Westminster, and of the good men of
every hundred in the adjacent shires of Middlesex and Surrey. It
is—like much truthful evidence—rather vague, but its general
tendency is, while recognizing that Pudlicott is the prime offender,
to make various monks and palace officers his accomplices. Of
the latter category William of the Palace seems to have been the
most active, while of the many monks Adam Warfield the sacrist
was the most generally denounced. But the proved share of both
Adam and William was based largely on the discovery of stolen
property in their possession. The evidence of the juries suggests
theories as to how the crime may have been perpetrated; it does
not make the methods of the culprits clear and palpable. But it
suggests that masons and carpenters were called in, so that
some breaking in of the structure was attempted, and in particular
it suggests that the churchyard was the thoroughfare through
which the robbers removed their booty.

Let us turn next to Pudlicott’s own confession, that remarkable

document from which I have already borrowed many details,
though seldom without a word of warning. According to his
confession, Pudlicott, having resolved to rob the treasury, came to
the conclusion that the best way to tackle the business was to
pierce a hole through the wall of thirteen feet of stone that
supported the lower story of the chapter house. For so colossal a
task time was clearly needed. Richard accordingly devoted
himself during the dark nights of winter and early spring to drilling
through the solid masonry. He attacked the building from the
churchyard or eastern side, having access thereto from the
palace. But the churchyard was open to the parish and the thrifty
churchwardens of St. Margaret’s had let to a neighbouring
butcher the right of grazing his sheep in it. Now the butcher was
told that his privilege was withdrawn, and passers-by were sent
round by another path. This was a precaution against the casual
wayfarer seeing the hole which was daily growing larger. To hide
from the casual observer the great gash in the stonework,
Richard tells us that he sowed hempseed in the churchyard near
the hole, and that this grew so rapidly that the tender hemp
plants not only hid the gap in the wall, but provided cover for him
to hide the spoils he hoped to steal from the treasury. When the
hole was complete on 24 April, Pudlicott went through and found
to his delight that the chamber was full of baskets, chests, and
other vessels for holding valuables, plate, relics, jewels, and gold
florins of Florence. Richard remained in the crypt gloating over
the treasure surrounding him from the evening of 24 April to the
morning of 26 April. Perhaps he found it impossible to tear
himself away from so much wealth; or perhaps the intervening
day, being the feast of St. Mark, there were too many people
about, and too many services in the abbey to make his retreat
secure. However, he managed on the morning of 26 April to get
away, taking with him as much as he could carry. He seems to
have dropped, or to have left lying about, a good deal that he
was unable to carry, possibly for his friends to pick up.

Such is Pudlicott’s story. It is the tale of a bold ruffian who

glories in his crime, and is proud to declare “I alone did it”. But
there was a touch of heroism and of devotion in our hero thus
taking on himself the whole blame. He voluntarily made himself
the scapegoat of an offence for which scores were charged, and
in particular he took on his own shoulders the heavy share of
responsibility which belonged to the negligent monks of
Westminster. Now as to the credibility of Pudlicott’s story, we
must admit that some of the juries accepted evidence that
corroborated some parts of it. Sworn men declared their belief
that the crypt was approached from the outside; that masons and
carpenters were employed on the business; that the churchyard
was closely guarded, and access refused, even to the butcher
who rented the grazing. It is clear too that the booty was got rid
of through the churchyard, and that piecemeal. There is evidence
even that hemp was sown, though the verdict of a jury cannot
alter the conditions of vegetable growth in an English winter. We
must allow too that it is pretty certain that Warfield had not the
custody of the keys of the crypt; though he was doubtless able to
give facilities for tampering with the door or forcing the lock. Yet
Pudlicott’s general story remains absolutely incredible. It was
surely impossible to break through the solid wall, and no
incuriousness or corruption would account for wall-piercing
operations being unnoticed, when carried on in the midst of a
considerable population for three months on end. Some of
Pudlicott’s lies were inconceivable in their crudity. Is it likely that
hemp, sown at Christmas-time, would, before the end of April,
afford sufficient green cover to hide the hole in the wall, and to
secrete gleaming articles of silver within its thick recesses? And
how are we to believe that there was a great gaping hole in the
wall of the crypt when nothing was heard of the crime for several
weeks after its perpetration, and no details of the king’s losses
were known until two months after the burglary, when the keeper
of the Wardrobe unlocked the door of the treasury and examined
its contents? A more artistic liar would have made his confession
more convincing.
What really happened seems to me to have been something
like this. I have no doubt that Pudlicott got into the treasury by
the simple process of his friend, Adam of Warfield, giving him
facilities for forcing the door or perhaps breaking a window. He
remained in the crypt a long time so that he might hand out its
contents to confederates who, as we learn from the depositions,
ate, drank, and revelled till midnight for two nights running in a
house within the precincts of the Fleet prison, and then went
armed and horsed to Westminster, returning towards daybreak
loaded with booty. But not only the revellers in Shenche’s
headquarters, but many monks, many abbey servants, the
custodians of the palace, the leading goldsmiths of the city, and
half the neighbours must have been cognisant of, if not
participating in, the crime. It speaks well for honour among
thieves, that it was not until deplorable indiscretions were made
in the disposal of the booty that any news of the misdeed
reached the ears of any of the official custodians of the treasure.
Suspicion of the crime was first excited by the discovery of
fragments of the spoil in all sorts of unexpected places. A
fisherman, plying his craft in the then silver Thames, netted a
silver goblet which had evidently been the property of the king.
Passers-by found cups, dishes, and similar precious things hidden
behind tombstones and other rough hiding-places in
St. Margaret’s Churchyard. Boys playing in the neighbouring fields
found pieces of plate concealed under hedgerows. Such
discoveries were made as far from Westminster as Kentish Town.
Moreover, many other people lighted upon similar pieces of
treasure trove. Foreign money found its way into the hands of the
money-changers at London, York, and Lymm, and other remote
parts. The city goldsmiths were the happy receivers of large
amounts of silver plate, among them, I regret to say, being
William Torel, the artist-goldsmith, whose skill in metal work has
left such an abiding mark in the decorations of the abbey church.
There were, too, scandalous stories whispered abroad. One of
them was that a woman of loose life explained her possession of
a precious ring by relating that it was given her by Dom Adam
the sacrist “so that she should become his friend”.

Such tales soon made the story of the robbery common

property. At last it came to the ears of the king and his ministers,
then encamped at Linlithgow for the Scottish war. Thereupon, on
6 June, the king appointed a special commission of judges to
investigate the matter. On 20 June, John Droxford, the keeper of
the wardrobe, came to Westminster with the keys of the crypt,
and then and only then did any official examination of the
treasury take place. An entry was made into the crypt and the
damage which had been done was inspected. The result is still to
be read in an inventory of the treasures lost and the treasures
found which Droxford drew up, and which may now be studied in
print.
It is pleasant to say that by the time Droxford went to work
much of the treasure, which had been scattered broadcast, was
being brought back and that more was soon to follow. The first
investigations as to where the treasure had been carried led to
fruitful results. A good deal of it was found hidden beneath the
beds of the keeper of the palace and of his assistant. Still more
was found in the lodgings of Richard Pudlicott and his mistress.
Adam the sacrist, and some of his brother monks and their
servants, were discovered to be in possession of other missing
articles. Altogether, when Droxford had finished his inventory, a
large proportion of the articles which had been lost were
reclaimed. Ultimately it seems that the losses were not very
severe.
Wholesale arrests were now made. Richard Pudlicott was
apprehended on 25 June, and William of the Palace soon
experienced the same fate. Before long the connexion which the
monks had had with the business seemed so well established
that the whole convent, including the abbot and forty-eight monks,
were indicted and sent to the Tower, where they were soon
joined by thirty-two other persons. This time the king’s net had
spread rather too widely, and the indiscriminate arrest of guilty
and innocent excited some measure of sympathy, even for the
guilty. The majority of the clerical prisoners were released on bail,
but some half-dozen laymen and ten monks were still kept in
custody. Both the released and the imprisoned culprits raised a
great outcry, sending petitions to the king demanding a further
enquiry into the whole matter.

The first commission meanwhile had been empanelling juries

and collecting evidence. But the matter was so serious that in
November a second royal commission was appointed to hear and
determine the matter. The members of this second commission
were chosen from among the most eminent of the king’s judges,
including the chief justice of the king’s bench, Sir Roger
Brabazon and the shrewdest judge of the time, William Bereford,
afterwards chief justice of common pleas.
I have already indicated in outline the result of the
investigations of the two judicial commissions. I have told you
how juries were empanelled from every hundred in the counties
of Middlesex and Surrey, and from the wards of the city of
London and from Westminster. The details of the evidence are
worthy of more special treatment than I can give them here,
because they afford a wonderful picture of the loose-living, easy-
going, slack, negligent, casual, and criminal doings of mediaeval
men and women. I must, however, be content to restate the
general result of the trials. Richard of Pudlicott was found guilty.
Various other people, including William of the Palace, and certain
monks, were declared accomplices, while Adam Warfield was
shrewdly suspected to be at the bottom of the whole business.
More than a year was spent in investigations, and it was not until
March, 1304, eleven months after the burglary, that William of the
Palace and five other lay culprits were comfortably hanged.
The great problem was how to deal with the clerical offenders
without adding to the king’s difficulties by rousing the sleeping
dogs of the church, always ready to bark when the state
meditated any infringement of the claim of all clerks to be subject
solely to the ecclesiastical tribunals. Accordingly Richard of
Pudlicott, and ten monks were reserved for further treatment.
Pudlicott, as we have seen, had been a tonsured person in his
youth, and he probably claimed, as did the monks, benefit of
clergy. It was probably now that Pudlicott nobly tried to shield his
monastic allies by his extraordinary confession. His heroism,
however, availed him nothing. But whatever his zeal for the
church, Edward I was upon adequate occasion ready to ride
rough-shod over clerical privileges, and he always bitterly
resented any attempt of a culprit, who had lived as a layman,
trying to shield himself on the pretext that he had been a clerk in
his youth. His corrupt chief justice, Thomas Weyland, had sought
to evade condemnation by resuming the tonsure and clerical garb
which he had worn before he abandoned his orders to become a
knight, a country squire, and the founder of a family of landed
gentry. But Weyland’s subdiaconate did not save him from exile
and loss of land and goods. Pudlicott’s sometime clerical
character had even less power to preserve him. He also paid
tardily the capital penalty for his misdeed. But it was surely his
clergy that kept him alive in prison for more than two years after
the date of the commission of his crime.
The Outrage at Westminster.
 The fate of the incriminated clerks still hung in the balance
when in the spring of 1305 Edward came back in triumph to
London, rejoicing that at last he had effected the thorough
conquest of Scotland. His cheerful frame of mind made him listen
readily to the demands of the monks of Westminster to have pity
on their unfortunate brethren, and to comply with the more
general clerical desire that ecclesiastical privilege should be
respected. Only a few months after the burglary, the news of the
outrage on pope Boniface VIII at Anagni had filled all
Christendom with horror. At the instance of Philip the Fair, king of
France, and his agents in Italy the pope was seized, maltreated,
and insulted. In the indignant words of Dante, “Christ was again
crucified in the person of his vicar”. The universal feeling of
resentment against so wanton a violation of ecclesiastical
privilege was ingeniously used in favour of the monks of
Westminster. Among the monks, arrested at first, but soon
released with the majority of their brethren, were two men who
had some reputation as historians. One of these was
magnanimous enough to write, two or three years afterwards, a
sort of funeral eulogy of Edward, but the other, Robert of
Reading, who, in my opinion, kept the official chronicle of the
abbey from 1302 to 1326, set forth the Westminster point of view
very effectively in the well-known version of the chronicle called
Flores Historiarum, the original manuscript of which is now in the
Chetham Library. In this is given what may be regarded as the
official account of Richard’s burglary. The robbery of the king of
England was a crime only comparable to the robbery of the
treasure of Boniface VIII, six months later at Anagni. The
chronicler is most indignant at the suggestion that the monks had
anything to do with the matter, and laments passionately their
long imprisonment and their unmerited sufferings. He relies in
substance on the story as told in Pudlicott’s confession. The
burglary was effected by a single robber.
 So lacking in humour was the Westminster annalist that he
did not scruple to borrow the phraseology and the copious
Scriptural citations of a certain “Passion of the monks of
Westminster according to John,” the whole text of which is
unfortunately not extant. I may say, however, that the species of
composition called a “Passion” was particularly in vogue at the
turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and is mainly
characterised by its extraordinary skill in parodying the words of
the Scripture in order to describe in mock heroic vein some
incident of more or less undeserved suffering. For profanity, grim
humour, and misapplied knowledge of the Vulgate the “passions”
of this period have no equal. They are a curious illustration of the
profane humour of the mediaeval ecclesiastic in his lighter
moments.
The Westminster annalist did not stand alone. Other monastic
chroniclers took up and accepted his story. It became the
accepted monastic doctrine that one robber only had stolen the
king’s treasure, and that therefore the monks of Westminster
were unwarrantably accused. One writer added to his text a
crude illustration of how, it was imagined, Pudlicott effected his
purpose. You may see opposite this page his rude pictorial
representation of the “one robber” kneeling on the grass in the
churchyard, and picking up by a hand and arm extended through
the broken window the precious stores within. But Pudlicott’s arm
must have been longer than the arm of justice to effect this
operation, and must have been twice or thrice the length of a tall
man. This same chronicler was not contented with repeating the
parallel now recognised between the sufferings of the monks of
Westminster, under their unjust accusations, and the passion of
pope Boniface, five months later, at the hands of the robbers
hired by the ruthless king of France. He must give a picture of
the Anagni outrage as well as of the orthodox version of the
Westminster burglary. How far he has succeeded, you may
gather from the rude sketch figured on the opposite page. Not
only does he give us so vivid a picture of pope Boniface’s
sufferings from the rude soldiery that the drawing might well be
used as a representation of a martyrdom, like that of St. Thomas
of Canterbury. His sketch of three other sacrilegious warriors,
rifling the huge chest that contained the papal treasures, skilfully
suggests that robbery was the common motive that united the
outrage at Anagni to the outrage at Westminster. He leaves us to
draw the deeper moral that the sinful desire of unhallowed
laymen to bring holy church and her ministers into discredit was
the ultimate root of both these scandals.

Edward was satisfied with his Scottish campaign; he was

becoming old and tired; he was pleased to know that a great
deal of the lost treasure had been recovered; and he was always
anxious to avoid scandal, and to minimise any disagreement with
the monks of his father’s foundation. He, therefore, condoned
what he could not remedy. He soon released all the monks from
prison. He even restored Shenche to his hereditary office of the
keepership of the palace. Richard of Pudlicott alone was offered
up to vengeance. In October, 1305, Richard was hanged,
regardless of his clergy.
The Outrage at Anagni.
 Affairs at the monastery of Westminster were not improved
after these events. There was much quarrelling among the
monks. Walter of Wenlock died. There were disputes as to his
succession; an unsatisfactory appointment was made, and there
was a considerable amount of strife for a generation. The feeling
against the king was shown equally against his son, and is
reflected in the bitter Westminster chronicle of the reign of
Edward II. One result of the demonstration of the futility of storing
valuables within the precincts of the abbey was that the chief
treasury of the wardrobe was bodily transferred to the Tower of
London.
Some obvious morals might be drawn from this slight but not
unpicturesque story; but I will forbear from printing them. One
generalisation I will, however, venture to make by way of
conclusion. The strongest impression left by the records of the
trial is one of the slackness and the easy-going ways of the
mediaeval man. The middle ages do not often receive fair
treatment. Some are, perhaps, too apt to idealise them, as an
age of heroic piety, with its statesmen, saints, heroes, artists, and
thinkers; but such people are in all ages the brilliant exceptions.
The age of St. Francis of Assisi, of Dante, of Edward I, of
St. Louis of France, of St. Thomas Aquinas, the age in which the
greatest buildings of the world were made, was a great time and
had its great men. But the middle ages were a period of strange
contrasts. Shining virtues and gross vices stood side by side. The
contrasts between the clearly cut black and white of the thirteenth
century are attractive to us immersed in the continuous grey of
our own times. But we find our best analogies to mediaeval
conditions in those which are nowadays stigmatised as Oriental.
Conspicuous among them was a deep pervading shiftlessness
and casualness. Mediaeval man was never up to time. He
seldom kept his promise, not through malice, but because he
never did to-day what could be put off till to-morrow or the next
day.

Pudlicott then is a typical mediaeval criminal. He was

doubtless a scamp, but most of the people with whom he had
dealings were loose-thinking, easy-going folk like himself. Of
course there are always the exceptions. But Edward I, with his
gift of persistence, was a peculiarly exceptional type in the middle
ages, and even Edward I found it convenient to let things slide in
small matters. Thus on this occasion Edward began his
investigation with great show of care and determination to sift the
whole matter; but when he found that thorny problems were
being stirred up, he determined—not for the first time—to let
sleeping dogs lie, and avoid further scandal.
We must not, however, build up too large a superstructure of
theory on this petty story of the police courts, plus a mild
ecclesiastical scandal. Nor must we emphasize too much or
generalise too largely from the signs of slackness and negligence
shown in mediaeval trials. I become more and more averse to
facile generalisation about the middle ages or mediaeval man.
They may, moreover, be made in both directions. On the one
side we have the doctrine of our greatest of recent scholars,
bishop Stubbs, that the thirteenth century was the greatest
century of the middle ages, the flowering type of mediaeval
christianity and so on. But on the other hand there is the
contradictory generalisation of students, like my friend
Mr. Coulton, who surveys the time from St. Francis to Dante with
the conviction that the so-called great days of faith were the days
of unrestrained criminality and violence. Both these views can be
argued; but neither are really convincing. They seem to me to be
obtained by looking at one side of the question only. A more
fruitful doctrine is surely the view that ordinary mediaeval men
were not so very unlike ourselves, and that their virtues and
vices were not those of saints or ruffians, but were not wholly out
of relation to the ordinary humdrum virtues and vices that are
found to-day.

1 A lecture delivered in the John Rylands Library on 20 January, 1915.

Return to text
 NOTES.

I. Note on Authorities.

The accounts of the robbery of the king’s treasury in the

Chronicles are vitiated by the obvious desire of the writers, who
were mainly monks, to minimise the scandal to “religion” involved
in the suspected complicity of the Westminster monks. This is
seen even in the moderate account originating at St. Alban’s
Abbey, and contained in William Rishanger’s Chronicle (Rolls
Series), pp. 222 and 225, and also in the other St. Alban’s
version in Gesta Edwardi Primi, published in the same volume,
pp. 420–1. The bias is naturally at its worst in the Westminster
Abbey Chronicle, printed in Flores Historiarum, iii. 115, 117, 121,
and 131 (Rolls Series), which is more valuable perhaps as an
index of Westminster opinion than as a dispassionate statement
of the facts. The chief manuscript of this chronicle is preserved in
the Chetham Library, Manchester [MS. Chetham No. 6712]. It
was certainly written by a Westminster monk, and, perhaps after
1302, by Robert of Reading, who undoubtedly was the author of
the account of the reign of Edward II. If Robert wrote the story of
the robbery, it should be remembered that he was one of the
forty-nine monks indicted and sent to the Tower on a charge of
complicity in it. There are useful and more impartial notices in the
non-monastic Annales Londonienses in Stubbs’ Chronicles of
Edward I and Edward II, i. 130, 131, 132, and 134 (Rolls Series).
These date the robbery on 2 May.