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The Historical–
Critical Method
A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED
9780567111302_Pre_Final_txt_print.indd i 1/27/2012 4:29:06 PM

T&T CLARK GUIDES FOR THE PERPLEXED
T&T Clark’s Guides for the Perplexed are clear, concise and accessible
introductions to thinkers, writers and subjects that students and read-
ers can find especially challenging. Concentrating specifically on what
it is that makes the subject difficult to grasp, these books explain and
explore key themes and ideas, guiding the reader towards a thorough
understanding of demanding material.
Guides for the Perplexed available from T&T Clark:

The Historical Jesus: A Guide for the Perplexed, by Helen K. Bond
Martyrdom: A Guide for the Perplexed, by Paul Middleton
New Testament and Jewish Law: A Guide for the Perplexed,
James G. Crossley
The Origin of the Bible: A Guide for the Perplexed,
Lee Martin McDonald
Paul: A Guide for the Perplexed, Timothy G. Gombis
9780567111302_Pre_Final_txt_print.indd ii 1/27/2012 4:29:06 PM

The Historical–
Critical Method
DAVID R. LAW
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Published by T&T Clark International
A Continuum imprint
The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX
80 Maiden Lane, Suite 704, New York, NY 10038
www.continuumbooks.com
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted

in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying,
recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
© David R. Law, 2012
David R. Law has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act, 1988, to be identiﬁed as the Author of this work.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
EISBN: HB: 978-0-567-57820-4
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd, Chennai, India

Printed and bound in India
9780567111302_Pre_Final_txt_print.indd iv 1/27/2012 4:29:07 PM

To my Grandmother
Eileen Muriel Law
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CONTENTS
Preface viii
1 Introduction 1
2 A Brief History of Historical Criticism 25
3 Textual Criticism 81
4 Source Criticism 113
5 Form Criticism 140
6 Redaction Criticism 181
7 The End of the Historical–Critical Method? 216
Appendix 238
Notes 242
Bibliography 288
Bible References 313
Index 318
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PREFACE
The historical–critical method has developed over the past 300 years
or so as a means of making sense of the Bible. Its employment by lead-
ing scholars of the day has led to original, stimulating and nuanced
insights into the different writings that make up the Bible and has shed
light on the processes by which they have come into existence. This
book is a conscious attempt to simplify these methods as much as pos-
sible in order to give the reader a foothold in what are complex ways
of reading the Bible that require a high degree of technical expertise
on the part of the interpreter. For the sake of providing the reader with
as clear an introduction as possible to the different methods employed
in historical criticism, I have simplified and ‘streamlined’ the presenta-
tion of the methods in four ways.
(1) The methods of textual criticism, source criticism, form criti-

cism and redaction criticism belong together and are usually employed
in conjunction with each other by the biblical scholar. It is thus some-
what artificial to separate them in the way I have done in this study,
especially with regard to the separate application of the four methods.
For the sake of clarity and to enable the reader to grasp the distinctive
features of each method, however, I have treated them as far as pos-
sible independently of each other.
(2) Chapter 2 provides a brief history of historical criticism and
focuses on the scholars who have played a role in the development of
historical approaches to the interpretation of the Bible. Chapters 3 to
6 contain sections sketching the history of textual criticism, source
criticism, form criticism and redaction criticism, respectively. Since
these methods are the outcome of the historical approach to the Bible,
it is again to some extent artificial to separate them from the general
development of historical criticism. Nevertheless, such separation is
helpful in order to highlight what is distinctive about the different his-
torical methods that have come into existence to interpret the Bible.
(3) The Old Testament and New Testament are distinct bodies
of literature raising their own particular problems of interpretation.
Treating them together thus risks homogenizing them and failing to do
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PREFACE ix
justice to their distinctiveness. To give the reader as straightforward

an introduction as possible, however, and for reasons of limitation of
space, I have attempted to identify the common features of the differ-
ent historical methods and to show how they can be applied to both
Old and New Testaments. The reader should bear in mind, however,
that the distinctive character of the two testaments as well as the dif-
ferent types of literature they contain raise genre-specific questions of
interpretation that cannot be addressed in a work of this kind.
(4) To highlight the distinctive features of textual criticism, source
criticism, form criticism and redaction criticism, we shall apply them
to the same two biblical texts, namely Gen. 2.4b–3.24 and Matt.
15.21–28, which can be found in the appendix. The aim of applying
the methods to the same two texts is both to highlight what is distinc-
tive about each method and to show their interdependence. As we
shall see, the different methods often take as their point of departure
the results of the other methods or are attempts to resolve issues inad-
equately addressed by the other methods.
Biblical references are to the New Revised Standard Version Bible:

Anglicized Edition, copyright 1989, 1995, Division of Christian
Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the
United States of America. Used by permission. All rights reserved.
Like all authors I am indebted to family, friends, colleagues, and stu-

dents in a multitude of ways. I am grateful to my colleague Professor
George Brooke for allowing me to draw upon his expertise in textual
criticism. Above all, I have been blessed by the constant support of my
wife Claudia (Prov. 31.29). This book is dedicated to my grandmother
as a small token of my affection and esteem on the occasion of her
ninety-fi fth birthday.
David R. Law
Manchester 2011
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
‘Historical criticism’ and ‘the historical–critical method’1 are generic terms

given to a cluster of related approaches which all focus in some way on the
historical character of the Bible. History in one form or another plays an
important role in the Bible. The ‘historical’ books of the Old Testament
such as Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings and Chronicles relate the history of
Israel, while the prophetic works contain frequent references to contem-
porary events and persons. The same is true of the New Testament. The
Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles are organized in what appears to be
a chronological sequence, and these works contain references to contem-
porary Jewish and Roman history. The importance of history in the Bible
is further evident in the fact that both Judaism and Christianity claim that
God has revealed his will in a series of historical events that are recorded
in the Bible. Judaism and Christianity are sometimes said to be ‘historical
religions’ precisely because they are based on historical events in which
God is said to have revealed himself and his purpose for humankind. The
Old Testament describes how God selected Israel as his chosen people,
led them out of Egypt and gave them the land of Canaan, while the New
Testament tells the story of Jesus of Nazareth, a fi rst-century Palestinian
Jew in whom Christians believe God has revealed himself in a new and
defi nitive way. The Bible also contains a distinctive understanding of his-
tory. In the Old Testament, Israel’s history is determined by its covenant
with God and successes and misfortunes ascribed to whether Israel has
fulfi lled or broken its side of the agreement. The apocalyptic works of the
Bible such as Daniel in the Old Testament and the Revelation of St. John
in the New Testament present a vision of history moving towards a dra-
matic climax, culminating in the end of the world, divine judgement and
the dawning of the kingdom of God. If we wish to understand the nature
and meaning of the Bible, then it is necessary to be attentive to its histori-
cal character.
A question of importance to communities who base their faith on the
Bible is that of the historical trustworthiness of the Bible. There are,
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2 THE HISTORICAL–CRITICAL METHOD
however, numerous episodes in the Bible which modern readers may fi nd

difficult to accept at face value. How was Cain able to fi nd a wife and
father children if he was the only human being alive in his generation,
as the Bible seems to imply after he had murdered his brother Abel (Gen.
4.17)? How could Moses have written the entire Pentateuch, which is the
traditional view, in light of the fact that it relates his own death (Deut.
34.5–8)? What was the point of Jesus commanding the witnesses of his
healing of Jairus’ daughter to conceal the miracle (Mark 5.43) since it was
already common knowledge that the girl had died (Mark 5.38–40)?
The problem of historical improbability becomes even more acute with
those biblical accounts that describe supernatural occurrences. To the
modern reader whose understanding of the world has been moulded by
the natural sciences, biblical accounts of prophetic visions, miracles, visi-
tations by angels and demonic possession seem inherently implausible.
Other problems concern what appear to be inconsistencies between
different books of the Bible. Why are there different accounts in Kings
and Chronicles of what appear to be the same events? Why does the date
of the crucifi xion differ in John’s account from that stated in Matthew,
Mark and Luke, and whose account is correct? How is the chronology
of Paul’s missionary journeys as related in Acts to be reconciled with
the information Paul himself provides of these journeys in his letters?
A good example of the problems created by variant parallel accounts in
the Bible is provided by the three versions of the parable of the wicked
husbandmen (Matt. 21.33–46; Mark 12.1–12; Luke 20.9–19), which,
despite their similarities, have different endings. In Matthew’s ver-
sion, Jesus’ hearers answer his question what the owner of the vineyard
would do to the tenants who had murdered his son (Matt. 21.40–41),
while according to Mark and Luke Jesus himself answers the ques-
tion (Mark 12.9; Luke 20.16). Luke diverges from both Matthew and
Mark in telling us that the crowd responded to the parable with the
exclamation ‘Heaven forbid!’ (Luke 20.16), while there is no mention
of this response in either of the other two Gospels. Another example of
parallel but divergent narratives is provided by the accounts of the fi rst
missionary journey of the disciples. According to Mark, Jesus com-
manded the disciples to take nothing but a staff on their travels (Mark
6.8), while in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, the disciples were not
permitted even this small concession (Matt. 10.10; Luke 9.3).
The order of biblical narratives may also diverge, raising questions
about the veracity of the chronology of the events depicted in the Bible.
In Matthew, Jesus heals a leper (Matt.8.1–4), before later healing Peter’s
mother-in-law and the people brought to him by the crowds who have
flocked to see him (Matt. 8.14–17). Mark, however, places these events in
the opposite order (Mark 1.29–31, 40–45). Another example of divergence

INTRODUCTION 3
of order is provided by the story of the stilling of the storm. Matthew places
this event some time before Jesus’ teaching in parables (Matt. 8.23–27;
13.1–52), while Mark has Jesus preach his parables immediately before
the stilling of the storm (Mark 4.1–41).
Such parallel but divergent accounts prompt us to raise the question:
which account is the most accurate? Which of these accounts gives us the
most reliable description of the events they purport to relate? And how do
we account for the divergences that exist between such parallel accounts?
It is such questions that prompt historical investigation into the biblical
writings in the hope of constructing the most plausible historical account
of the events the Bible describes.
Historical investigation of the biblical texts is also prompted by confl ict
between the biblical and secular accounts of the same historical events,
or when discrepancies arise between biblical accounts and archaeologi-
cal evidence. An example of such a discrepancy is Luke’s statement that
Quirinius was governor of Syria when Augustus held his census (Luke
2.1–2). This confl icts with the account of the Jewish historian Josephus,
who tells us that Quirinius’ governorship and census did not take place
until 6 CE, several years after Jesus’ birth.2
Further historical questions emerge when we refl ect on the role
of the communities in which the biblical writings were formed and
handed down. Those responsible for passing down the literature of
the Bible such as the followers of the Old Testament prophets and the
early Christian communities had their own theological agendas. What
appears at fi rst sight to be a historical account may in reality be a con-
struction of a community or an individual writer in order to further
their theological, ecclesiastical and political interests. To understand
the meaning of biblical texts, it is thus necessary to identify the inter-
ests of the author(s) and to consider to what degree these interests have
moulded and modifi ed the formation of the text. This will help us to
establish to what degree the text we have before us has been written for
historical or theological purposes. For example, if we can ascertain that
a passage in one of the Gospels is strongly influenced by the evange-
list’s theological assumptions, then we will be inclined to interpret the
text as a refl ection of the theological development of the early Church
rather than as an objective account of an event in the life of Jesus.
Historical questions are also posed by the literary genre of biblical texts.
Is a particular text a historical account or does it belong to a different cat-
egory such as poetry, liturgy or pious embellishment? Are such passages
as the description of Jesus’ temptations by the devil (Matt. 4.1–11; Luke
4.1–13) or the rending of the veil in the temple (Matt. 27.51/Mark 15.38)
to be understood as accounts of historical events or are they rather sym-
bolic expressions of the overwhelming significance of the person at their

centre? To interpret the stories of the Good Samaritan and the Prodigal Son
as historical records rather than as parables would be to misunderstand
them. Clearly our understanding of the Bible and the events it relates will
be affected by whether we interpret biblical texts as the literal accounts of
historical events or as symbolic representations or literary constructions.
Historical criticism is a method that has developed in order to address
the historical questions posed by the Bible. In this book, I aim to provide
an outline of the most significant features of this method, to sketch its
history, to consider the various approaches it has developed to make sense
of the Bible and to consider its strengths and weaknesses. In this chapter,
however, we shall be concerned to consider the critique that has been lev-
elled at the term ‘historical–critical method’ before going on to consider
the senses of Scripture with which the historical–critical method has been
understood to be concerned. This will be followed by a sketch of the pre-
suppositions of historical criticism.
The disputed status of the

historical–critical method
On the basis of our discussion so far, the character of historical criticism
would seem to be fairly straightforward. The terms ‘historical criticism’
and ‘historical–critical method’ refer to approaches which are concerned
with the history of the Bible both with regard to the history of the text and
the events which the text recounts. Each element in the phrase ‘historical–
critical method’, however, has been challenged in the late twentieth and
early twenty-fi rst centuries. Indeed, some commentators have argued for
the abandonment of the term ‘historical–critical method’ and its replace-
ment by some other term such as ‘biblical studies’ or ‘biblical criticism’.
Other commentators have disputed the appropriateness of the methodol-
ogy of historical criticism to the Bible and have called for it to be supple-
mented or even replaced by other methods.
Problems with the term ‘historical’

in the historical–critical method
Several scholars have questioned whether ‘historical criticism’ and ‘histori-
cal–critical method’ are appropriate terms to describe the work of the bibli-
cal critic. James Barr prefers to avoid the term ‘historical criticism’, since
in his opinion it ‘is much too narrow and limited a term to indicate how
scholars handle and interpret the Bible’. Furthermore, biblical criticism is

INTRODUCTION 5
not ‘necessarily primarily historical in character’, since ‘the basis of biblical

criticism seems . . . to be essentially literary and linguistic, rather than his-
torical in character’.3 John Barton has similar reservations, asking, ‘How far
is a concern for history a defining characteristic?’4 Barton rightly points out
that critical approaches to the Bible need not be historical in character and
that scholars of the Bible have been concerned with many other issues, such
as biblical theology, the literary forms of the Bible and particular types of
material in the Old and New Testaments such as wisdom, prophecy, apoca-
lyptic, Gospels, epistles and so on.5 As Barton puts it, ‘a great deal of their
[i.e. biblical scholars’] time is not spent in reconstructing history anyway,
and to call biblical criticism the historical–critical method skews our aware-
ness of this’.6 Barton further observes that, ‘biblical criticism is essentially a
literary operation, concerned with the recognition of genre in texts and with
what follows from this about their possible meaning’.7 It is textual issues
such as literary genre and internal inconsistencies in the text rather than his-
torical concerns that prompt the work of the biblical scholar. Thus the quest
to identify the sources of the Pentateuch and the Gospels, for example, was
motivated by the awareness of incompatibilities in the text, which is first and
foremost a literary rather than a historical concern and predates the concern
to reconstruct the history of Israel or the life of Jesus. To describe biblical
criticism as historical criticism thus fails to capture the literary character
of the study of the Bible. For these reasons, Barton has ‘reservations about
building a historical quest into the very name of the discipline and for that
reason prefer[s] the older name’,8 by which he means ‘biblical criticism’.
A further difficulty in describing the work of the biblical scholar as
the ‘historical –critical method’ stems from the difficulty of pinning down
the meaning of ‘history’. The problem here is that there are four different
senses in which the term ‘history’ has been employed in biblical studies.
Firstly, the ‘history’ with which the historical–critical method has been
said to be concerned is the historical truth of the events recounted in the
Bible. The historical–critical method is ‘historical’ in that it is concerned
with identifying and reconstructing the historical events that underlie the
biblical text. Understood in this sense of history, the historical–critical
method is concerned with the reconstruction of the history of Israel, the
life of Jesus and the history of the early Church.
Secondly, the historical–critical method may be concerned with the his-
tory of the biblical text. Here the focus of the biblical scholar is on the
development of the text itself and on identifying the sources from which it
has been constructed. This involves identifying the different layers of the
text and tracing which go back to the originator of the text and which are
later additions.
A third sense of history to which ‘historical’ could refer is the ‘his-
torical meaning’ of texts, i.e. ‘the meaning that [biblical] texts had

in their original historical context’.9 Here the task of the historical–

critical method consists in identifying how biblical terms were used by
the original authors of the biblical texts.
Finally, ‘historical’ in ‘historical–critical method’ can denote the use
of secular historical methods in interpreting the text. The historical critic
notes that the age in which the biblical texts were composed was a super-
stitious age that lacked scientific knowledge and attributed what were
probably natural events to supernatural agency. Assuming that the past
was like the present and that what is impossible in the present was also
impossible in the past, the historical critic searches for alternative, ‘natu-
ral’ explanations for the supernatural events described in the Bible. If it is
this secular meaning of history that is intended, then the historical–critical
method comes to be identified with historicist and reductionist ways of
interpreting the Bible. Secular historical–critical study of the Bible is scep-
tical of the historicity of the events described in the Bible, particularly
those which describe supernatural agency and divine intervention.
In short, the term ‘historical’ in historical–critical method can denote
different things according to how ‘history’ is understood, each under-
standing of which has different consequences for how the method of his-
torical criticism is considered to operate. Consequently, ‘historical–critical
method’ is an unreliable and confusing term to describe the scholarly study
of the Bible.
It is such considerations that prompt Barton to offer ‘an alternative
approach’.10 Barton holds that although ‘history has been a considerable
part of what some biblical critics have been interested in’, ‘it is not part
of the defi nition of biblical criticism’.11 For Barton, ‘the defining marks of
biblical criticism do not include an interest in history, but come down to
three features, which are linked in a logical chain’.12 These defi ning marks
are a concern with semantics and genre, both of which are literary con-
cerns, and a refusal on the part of the reader of the Bible to be ‘constrained
by prior convictions about the text’s meaning, drawn from an interpreta-
tive tradition’.13 Because of the primary literary and critical character of
biblical studies, Barton advocates replacing the term ‘historical–critical
method’ with ‘biblical criticism’, which he believes captures more ade-
quately the type of work in which biblical scholars are engaged.14
There are two responses that could be made to Barton’s argument. Firstly,
Barton is right to draw attention to the fact that the term ‘historical–critical
method’ gives undue prominence to the historical element in biblical criti-
cism and obscures the central role played by literary considerations in bibli-
cal studies. This is an argument, however, not for the removal of the term
historical, but rather for a greater consciousness of the literary basis of this
emphasis on history. The distinctive feature of the historical–critical method
is that it addresses the internal inconsistencies of biblical texts by looking to

INTRODUCTION 7
history to solve these problems. Thus the historical–critical method is differ-

ent from other methods such as, for example, harmonizing and synchronic
approaches, which do not turn to historical solutions to explain the internal
tensions and contradictions of the Bible. It is therefore perfectly legitimate to
use the designation ‘historical criticism’, for it captures something essential
about this approach to interpreting the Bible. Furthermore, the anomalies
the biblical scholar recognizes in the text raise not only literary questions
but also historical questions. What were, for example, the historical circum-
stances that prompted the editor(s) of the Pentateuch to combine a variety
of different sources into a continuous narrative? Perhaps the most accurate
term would be historical-literary-critical method. It is, however, the phrase
‘historical–critical method’ that has established itself and it is this phrase
which we will continue to employ in this study.
Secondly, Barton’s critique is valid only if historical criticism is regarded
as a synonym for biblical criticism as such. Barton’s argument excludes
only using ‘historical criticism’ and ‘historical–critical method’ to denote
all critical approaches to the Bible. It does not rule out these terms to
denote a specific type of biblical interpretation, namely as a designation of
a subdivision within biblical criticism that is concerned above all with the
historical questions, problems and issues arising from the biblical texts.
That is, ‘biblical criticism’ should be considered to be a broader term than
‘historical–critical method’ and should be reserved for a generic approach
that employs critical methods of a variety of different kinds to make sense
of the Bible. The phrase ‘historical–critical method’, on the other hand,
should be employed to denote critical methods employed with reference to
the historical questions raised by the Bible.
In my opinion, it lends clarity to the study of the Bible and makes
clear the role the historical–critical method, if we establish a hierarchy
of terms to describe the different ways in which readers may engage with
the Bible. The term ‘biblical studies’ should arguably be applied to all
types of reading of the Bible, both critical and non-critical. It is a broad,
generic term encompassing the work of the scholar, the activities of church
bible study groups and the individual’s private meditation on the Bible.
Barton’s preferred term of ‘biblical criticism’ should be reserved for all
forms of engagement with the Bible from a critical perspective of some
sort. Thus understood, ‘biblical criticism’ includes canonical criticism,
reader-response criticism, rhetorical criticism, feminist criticism, libera-
tion exegesis, structuralist and poststructuralist interpretation and so on.
Finally, the phrase ‘historical–critical method’ should not be identified
either with biblical studies or biblical criticism but reserved for a particu-
lar type of criticism, namely the critical study of the Bible with an eye to
the historical questions raised by the text and employing a cluster of his-
torical techniques to address these questions.

We might think of biblical studies in terms of an axis suspended between

the two extremes of literary and historical concerns. The approach of indi-
vidual scholars could be plotted at different points on this sliding scale
according to the prominence they give to either of these elements. Some
scholarly approaches such as rhetorical criticism, reader-response criticism
and poststructuralist interpretation will be situated more closely to the
literary pole of the literary-historical axis, whereas source criticism will be
located nearer to the historical pole. We could also perhaps express this
idea in terms of direction. All approaches to understanding the Bible are
in some sense literary, since they all begin with the text. The question is
what is to be done with the text. This can be understood in terms of the
direction of interpretation. More historically minded interpreters move
from the text to the historical questions it poses. More literary-minded
interpreters move from the text to its role within the community of readers
and its interrelationship with other texts.
Problems with the term ‘critical’

The terms ‘criticism’ and ‘critical’ have negative connotations in everyday
speech. ‘To be critical’ or ‘to criticize’ normally means to find fault with
someone or something. This is not intended to be the meaning the term
has when applied to the study of the Bible. Reinhart Kosellek points out
that, ‘The terms critique and “criticism” (and also “criticks”) established
themselves in the seventeenth century. What was meant by them was the
art of objective evaluation – particularly of ancient texts, but also of litera-
ture and art, as well as of nations and individuals’.15 The Oxford English
Dictionary puts it still more succinctly, defi ning criticism as ‘the art of
estimating the qualities and character of literary or artistic work’. The
term ‘critical’ does not mean that the scholar is hostile towards the Bible
and is hell-bent on picking holes in it. Nor is ‘criticism’ synonymous with
‘scepticism’ or ‘unbelief’. The terms ‘criticism’ and ‘critical’ do not refer to
the personal disposition and motives of the scholar towards the Bible, but
to the approach he or she is employing to make sense of the text. In Barr’s
words, ‘criticism means the freedom, not simply to use methods, but to
follow them wherever they may lead. Applied to theological problems, this
means: the freedom to come to exegetical results which may differ from,
or even contradict, the accepted theological interpretation’.16 ‘Criticism’
denotes the application of reason to the Bible, irrespective of where this
may take the human being and a refusal to allow the understanding of the
Bible to be dictated by tradition, the Church, the academy or any other
supposed authority.

INTRODUCTION 9
This view of the openness of and suspension of judgement by the biblical

scholar, however, has been questioned by some scholars. For Gerhard Maier
in his The End of the Historical–Critical Method, it is not the ‘historical’
element that is controversial and revolutionary, for the use of the term ‘his-
torical’ ‘obviously has justifiable support in historical change and in man’s
experience of God’. It is rather the word ‘critical’ in the historical–critical
method that is the problem, for it commits the interpreter in advance to a
secular interpretation of the Bible. As Maier puts it, ‘a critical method of
biblical interpretation can produce only Bible-critical propositions’.17 Far
from being open and unprejudiced, the historical–critical method ‘repre-
sents a prejudgement in the sense of an a priori decision concerning the
outcome’.18 We shall deal with Maier’s critique in more detail in the final
chapter. Here it suffices to note his challenge to the impartiality of the
historical–critical method and his claim that the method is prejudiced by
its alleged commitment to a secular world view. Treating the Bible critically
and freely as if it were like any other book is not an unbiased approach but
implicitly treats the Bible as a human work rather than as the Word of God.
In doing so, it rules out in advance the truth of the doctrinal content of the
Bible and the reality of the God of whom it speaks. The historical–critical
method is thus not objective and ideologically neutral, but is the biased
application to the Bible of an implicitly secular world view.
This challenge to the impartiality of the historical–critical method is
often accompanied by the argument that criticism is an inappropriate atti-
tude towards divine revelation. In subjecting the Bible to the historical–
critical method we are guilty of imposing human judgement on the Divine
Word. This is a point made by Christopher Seitz with reference to the Old
Testament:
The basic challenge of the Old Testament is not historical distance,

overcome by historical–critical tools, or existential disorientation,
overcome by a hermeneutics of assent or suspicion. The Old Testament
tells a particular story about a particular people and their particular
God, whom in Christ we confess as our God, his Father and our own,
the Holy One of Israel. We have been read into a will, a fi rst will and
testament, by Christ. If we do not approach the literature with this
basic stance – of estrangement overcome, of an inclusion properly
called “adoption” – historical–critical methods or a hermeneutics of
assent will still stand outside and fail to grasp that God is reading us,
not we him.19
On this view, in applying historical criticism to the Bible, we are pre-

sumptuously measuring the divine contents of Scripture according to our

human judgement and are guilty of presupposing a notion of what the

Word of God should be. Furthermore, human reason is subject to sin, and
is therefore unable to make judgements concerning revelation. In view of
our human limitations, the proper response to divine revelation is thus not
critique but obedience. It is not our task to correct God’s revelation but to
allow ourselves to be corrected by it. As Maier puts it, ‘He who is to be
redeemed has about as much right to stand in judgement about redemp-
tion as a patient has the right to change the prescription of his physician
according to his own whim’. 20
Barton, however, claims that the objectivity attacked by critics of histori-
cal approaches to Bible is ‘something of a straw man’.21 He claims: ‘Few
biblical critics have ever claimed the degree of objectivity they are being
accused of. What they have argued for is reasonable objectivity, that is, a
refusal simply to read one’s own ideas into the text or to have no sense of
detachment from it even for the purposes of study.’22 Furthermore, treating
the Bible like any other work can arguably highlight how it differs from
other works. One of the consequences of historical criticism may be to
show that the Bible is not like any other book. A truly impartial reading will
neither favour nor rule out the possibility that the Bible may be more than
merely a collection of ancient texts. The historical–critical method need not
necessarily be sceptical towards the Bible being the Word of God. Its critical
spirit consists in attentiveness to the character of the text, particularly to its
problematic features. As Barton puts it, ‘the critical spirit . . . consist[s] in
the observation that the text contains difficulties’. In this usage, ‘Criticism
. . . is understood to be any attempt to deal rationally with such difficul-
ties’.23 The term ‘critical’ in the phrase ‘historical–critical method’ thus does
not presuppose the application of a secular world view to the Bible but
rather refers to the attempt to be open to the meaning of the text without
prejudice or regard to what the consequences of our critical investigation
might be.
Problems with the term ‘method’

Finally, some commentators have questioned the appropriateness of
describing historical criticism as a method. In his Discerning the Mystery,
Andrew Louth argues that the term belongs in the natural sciences and
its use in the phrase ‘historical–critical method’ is an attempt to smug-
gle the criteria of a secular world view into the study of the Bible. He
regards the historical–critical method as an example of what George
Steiner calls the ‘fallacy of imitative form’,24 which Louth defines as that
‘whereby humane culture relinquishes to a scientific method, depending

INTRODUCTION 11
upon the non-verbal, non-humane language of mathematics, concern for

what is true’.25 The humanities have taken scientific method as their ideal
and have attempted to develop an analogous method in the hope of pro-
ducing results as empirically convincing as those of the natural sciences.
According to Louth, they have achieved this and have developed a pseu-
do-scientific method by developing the notion of historical consciousness,
by which is meant the theory that to grasp the meaning of texts we must
imaginatively enter into the mind of the author and attempt to understand
the text in the light of that author’s historical context. Passages in the text
which are problematic from the modern perspective can be attributed to
the historical epoch in which the author was writing, which naturally
conditioned the thought forms and vocabulary in which he was able to
express himself. According to Louth, this notion of historical conscious-
ness provided the basis of a method which some believed was appropriate
to the humanities, namely the historical–critical method.26
In Louth’s opinion, however, the historical–critical method smuggles in
assumptions that are inappropriate to the humanities, namely, ‘the notion
of objective and subjective truth’ and ‘a privileged position being ascribed
to the present, or what is thought to be the present’. 27 The natural sciences
attempt to eliminate the subjectivity of the scientist in order to achieve
the objective truth, that is, ‘truth that inheres in the object, independent
of the one who knows this truth’. 28 The historical–critical method allows
this principle to be applied to the humanities by conceiving of there being
an objective meaning embedded in texts which the skilful interpreter can
extract and which is independent of the subjectivity of that interpreter.29
For Louth, such a method is inappropriate to theology, for in theology
the individual does not stand over against the object of study in an objec-
tive relationship, but is personally addressed by it. We do not know God
by treating him as an object of investigation but only by entering into a
relationship with him. The historical–critical method is thus utterly inap-
propriate to the ‘object’ with which theology is concerned.
Barton also questions historical criticism’s status as a method, albeit on
different grounds from those of Louth. Barton points out that the methods
that comprise historical criticism, namely source criticism, form criticism
and textual criticism, do not follow the procedures we would normally
expect of a genuine method. Barton’s argument is based on a distinction
he makes between method and understanding. If I have understood him
correctly, Barton holds that a ‘method’ is a neutral tool or technique that
can be applied to the object of study in order to elicit objective informa-
tion, which can then become the basis for ‘understanding’ that object of
study. Those who hold source criticism to be a method, for example, do
so because they consider it ‘to be a procedure involving no “understand-
ing” of the texts, but only the application of a quasi-scientific technique

based on observations about word frequencies and distributions, and

perceptions of inconsistencies between passages on a superficial, literal-
minded level’.30 This, however, Barton points out, ‘is a caricature of the
approaches of source critics. What comes fi rst in source analysis is always
an act of understanding, or rather of attempted understanding. Source
criticism did not arise from a theoretical idea about how the biblical text
should be studied. It arose from an attempt to understand the biblical nar-
ratives, especially in the Pentateuch, as fi nished wholes, an attempt that
the texts themselves seemed systematically to frustrate’. 31 As Barton puts
it in Reading the Old Testament, ‘source analysis did not really begin with
the application of a “scientific” technique to the text of the Pentateuch,
but with an intuition about the text, springing from an attempt to read it
with understanding, to grasp it as a coherent whole’.32 On similar grounds,
Barton claims that form criticism is not a method, but ‘a set of hypoth-
eses’. Classifying verses according to their genre, he claims, ‘is not best
characterized as the application of a method’. This is because ‘One can-
not set out rules that will generate the identification of literary forms;
one comes upon them serendipitously in reading the Bible with a certain
kind of openness to its literary character’. 33 Barton also denies that textual
criticism is a method: ‘Such a basic text-critical principle as preference for
the harder reading – far from being a piece of method that can be applied
without any entering into the meaning of the text – makes sense only if it
can be assumed that the critic already understands what the text means,
for only so can one judge a particular reading to be “harder,” that is, less
intuitively probable in its context and therefore less likely to have been
introduced by a copyist.’34
The reason Barton denies that the various approaches of historical criti-
cism are methods is that the person employing these methods already has
an understanding in place before he or she begins to apply them to the
text. Rather than the understanding of the object of study arising from the
application of method, a prior understanding of the object of investiga-
tion dictates the character and the application of the method. Those who
regard these approaches as methods are thus mistaken in their belief that
they are applying a set of neutral techniques to the Bible. They fail to real-
ize that source criticism, form criticism and textual criticism are based on
a prior understanding of the text and that these are placed in the service
of this understanding.
The conclusion Barton draws from these considerations is ‘that biblical
criticism is not correctly seen as any kind of method, and as such does not
rightly attract the kind of critique leveled at it by Louth’.35 Barton prefers
to see biblical criticism as ‘the application, not of method, but rather of a
sort of intuition. One cannot establish through any method what a text
means: one has to grasp it by an intuitive appropriation of the combination

INTRODUCTION 13
of words that make it up’. 36 For Barton, then, it is not by means of a method
but rather by intuition that the biblical critic engages with the text.
The validity of the arguments of Louth and Barton hinges on what
we mean by ‘method’. Their denial of the appropriateness of the term
‘method’ to historical criticism is based on the use of the term in the
natural sciences to denote an allegedly neutral set of procedures aimed
at eliciting objective facts about the object of study. Scientifi c method,
however, is arguably less ‘objective’ than it is often taken it to be, for
it consists not in the neutral, theory-free application of an objective
and universally accepted set of techniques, 37 but is a procedure emerg-
ing from a particular understanding of the object to be investigated.
As Thomas Kuhn has argued, scientifi c method takes place within a
paradigm that generates certain research questions, the solution of
which constitutes the everyday work of the scientist. The scientist does
not apply a set of procedures to the object of investigation and then
arrive at ‘facts’, which can be combined into a theory. Rather, he or
she begins with a theory, i.e. a potential understanding of the object
of study, which generates testable research questions. 38 In the attempt
to resolve its research questions, the theory either proves its mettle, as
Popper puts it, 39 or it is shown to be inadequate, for example, by being
unable to answer the research questions generated by the paradigm or
by arriving at results which do not fit the initial theory. The response
to such a state of affairs is to modify the theory to accommodate the
results, or – in extreme cases – there may take place a paradigm shift,
where a new theory replaces the inadequate older theory, and the whole
process begins again. It seems to me that a similar procedure is at work
with historical criticism. An initial theory or understanding is pro-
posed to explain the anomalies in the text, namely that, to take source
criticism as our example, the tensions in the text can be explained by
theorizing that the text has come into existence through the confl ation
of multiple sources. The theory is then tested by attempting to separate
out the constituent elements of the text and considering whether this
results in the identifi cation of coherent sources. If this procedure is able
to explain the presence of tensions in the text, then it can be accepted
as a plausible way of understanding the text. If the theory is only par-
tially successful, then it must be modifi ed to account for the data unac-
counted for by the initial theory. If it fails completely, then the theory
must be abandoned and the search begun for a more adequate way
of accounting for the data. There is arguably a procedural coherence
involved in the work of the biblical critic that merits the description of
‘method’.
Barton’s own description of the procedure of biblical criticism implies
that – even if it is not a method in the scientific sense of the word – it can

nevertheless be methodical in its approach to the biblical texts. He states:

‘Like science, biblical criticism appeals to evidence; it weighs probabilities;
it judges between what is more and what is less probable. But there is no
divide between the sciences and the humanities in this respect; both are
intellectually rigorous.’40 He further points out: ‘Criticism is a semantic
operation, and grasping the macrosemantics of entire texts is not a task
for which there is any method; it requires empathy and imagination.’ He
emphasizes, however, that, ‘this does not mean on the other hand that
it is simply a manner of unfocused emotion. Detailed attention to ques-
tions of language, historical context, and authorship is required. But these
questions in turn cannot be settled by method; they too require informed
judgement’.41 To my mind this emphasis on intellectual rigour and on criti-
cism as an empathetic, imaginative semantic operation implies a type of
method. To be intellectually rigorous, the humanities must have a set of
procedures acknowledged by experts in the field to be adequate to the
subject matter under investigation. Furthermore, to avoid empathy degen-
erating into unfocused imagination it is surely necessary to determine the
means for focusing the empathy and imagination necessary for engaging
with biblical texts. If historical criticism is indeed intuition – and I would
not wish to deny that intuition plays an important role in reading the
Bible – then it is guided intuition. Indeed, ‘guide’ might be a better descrip-
tion of historical criticism than method. Nevertheless, there is a degree of
guidance in historical criticism that in my opinion legitimates its descrip-
tion as a method. As Barton points out, biblical criticism is an ‘attitude
towards texts’. But this attitude can arguably be formulated as a series of
guidelines or principles, i.e., a sort of method.
The sense of Scripture

The historical–critical method is concerned with the ‘meaning’ or ‘sense’
of the Bible. This raises the question of with what type of ‘meaning’ or
‘sense’ of Scripture historical criticism is concerned. There are five mean-
ings or senses that have been regarded as the goal of the historical–critical
method.
(a) The original sense

It is often said that historical criticism is concerned with the original sense
of the Bible. There is indeed evidence to support this view, for much of
the work of historical critics has been concerned with getting back to the
earliest form of the text and then tracing how the fi nal, canonical version
was built up through additions and modifications until it came to be fi xed

INTRODUCTION 15
in its fi nal literary form. One of the tasks of the historical–critical method
has been to peel back the layers of interpretation the text has accumulated
in the attempt to recover the original meaning of the very earliest form
of the text. Commenting on the biblical scholarship of the past hundred
years Robert Alter describes this approach as ‘what we might call “excava-
tive” – either literally, with the archeologist’s spade and reference to its
fi ndings, or with a variety of analytic tools intended to uncover the origi-
nal meanings of biblical words, the life situations in which specific texts
were used, the sundry sources from which longer texts were assembled’.42
Historical criticism has an archaeological character in the sense that it
resembles the work of the archaeologist who painstakingly strips away
layers of soil to reveal the original form of, say, a bronze age village lying
beneath the modern city.
This concern with the original sense has been criticized for privileging
the earliest form of the text, thereby ignoring the fact that it is the final
version of the text which is canonical and which is used by synagogues and
churches. Furthermore, this privileging of the original sense leads to a dis-
paraging of the later stages of the text’s development. It sets up an opposi-
tion between what the text meant and what it now means, and gives the
former precedence over the latter. Focus on the original sense also leads to
the fragmentation of the text into primary and secondary and ‘authentic’
and ‘inauthentic’ elements.
To avoid such problems the meaning of ‘original sense’ has been broad-
ened to denote not the first form a text might have had but the meaning
the text – including its subsequent layers of modification – may have had
in its original setting. That is, the notion of the original sense applies not
only to the earliest level of the text but also to its subsequent layers, all of
which can be properly understood only if we can identify their meaning
in their original historical setting. Here the focus on the original sense is
motivated by the concern to avoid reading the biblical text anachronisti-
cally and imposing upon it meanings that do not do justice to the text.
(b) The intended sense

Closely connected with the ‘original’ sense is the notion of the ‘intended’
sense. That is, biblical interpretation should be concerned with identify-
ing the meaning the authors of the biblical texts had in mind. The search
for the intended sense need not be restricted to the originator of a text,
however, but can be extended to those involved in its later modifications
and adaptations. Indeed, to understand the original sense, it is important
to identify the meaning intended by later adaptors in order to differentiate
their meaning from the one intended by the originator of the text.

Historical criticism’s concern with the intended sense of Scripture has

been criticized on several grounds. Firstly, Barton questions whether under-
standing biblical criticism to be concerned primarily with the intended
sense of Scripture does justice to the work of biblical scholars. He points
out that scholars such as Mowinckel, Noth and von Rad were certainly
biblical critics, and yet they were not concerned with the ‘intended mean-
ing’ in their work on the Psalms and the Pentateuch, but were interested ‘in
tradents rather than authors’.43 Describing biblical criticism as concerned
with identifying the intended sense of the biblical texts thus does not do
justice to the work of these scholars. Secondly, some biblical texts owe
their existence not to a single author or even group of authors but to the
community as a whole. Texts such as the Pentateuch, Psalms and Proverbs
are the products of the life of a community and embody the folk memory,
worship and wisdom of that community, all of which developed over a
long period before fi nally coming to be set down in writing. In the case of
such texts, it is questionable whether we can speak of a sense intended by
the ‘original’ author. A further significant point, Barton points out, is that
‘much biblical writing was produced in a culture that placed less empha-
sis on the intention of authors in any case. Ancient authors were often
producing something more like a score for performance than a distilla-
tion of their thoughts for appropriation, and expected that readers would
bring to the text an element of interpretation that went beyond the ideas
the author had consciously had’.44 If we are to continue to speak of the
intended sense, then it is arguably better to speak of the work’s intention
rather than that of the author.
A serious challenge to the concept of ‘intended sense’ has come from a
different quarter, namely, from the notion of the ‘intentional fallacy’ that
has played an influential role in modern literary studies. The ‘intentional
fallacy’ denies that authorial intention is defi nitive for understanding the
text. The author has no right to determine the meaning of the text,45 for
the act of writing sets the text free for interpretation by its readers. There
is an important insight contained in the ‘intentional fallacy’, namely, that
once a text enters the public domain, the meaning supposedly intended by
the original author can no longer dictate the way the work is appropriated
by its recipients. It is furthermore the case that the text may contain pos-
sibilities of meaning of which the author him/herself was not conscious.
While, however, acknowledging the importance of such insights and the
way they can liberate the text for a wealth of new readings and mean-
ings, it seems to me to be an exaggeration to condemn the search for the
intended sense as ‘the intentional fallacy’. The intended sense is one of the
senses we should take into account when embarking on our interpretation
of a text. It is not, however, the only sense, nor is it necessarily the most
important one. It is, however, one of the meanings we should take into

INTRODUCTION 17
account if we wish the text to address us and if we wish to avoid our sim-
ply imposing our own agenda upon the text. Historical criticism can play
an important role here, for it can help us to identify the intended sense. In
doing so, it provides the checks and balances that are needed to do justice
to the reality of the text.
(c) The historical sense

Another sense with which historical criticism has been concerned is what
has been described as the historical sense. The meaning of texts is histori-
cally and culturally conditioned. Texts arise in a particular time and place,
and naturally reflect the mode of thought, vocabulary and cultural assump-
tions of the particular time and place in which they came into existence.
Consequently, knowledge of the historical and cultural context of a word,
phrase or text is essential for understanding a text’s meaning. Words can
change in meaning over time and if we are to do justice to a text, we must
be aware of how the terminology it uses was used in earlier historical and
cultural settings and how the meaning of these terms may have shifted in
their current usage. Umberto Eco provides a good example of this with
reference to Wordsworth’s I wandered lonely as a cloud, which contains
the verse that ‘a poet cannot but be gay’. Eco points out that, ‘a sensitive
and responsible reader is not obliged to speculate about what happened in
the head of Wordsworth when writing that verse, but has the duty to take
into account the state of the lexical system at the time of Wordsworth. At
that time “gay” had no sexual connotation, and to acknowledge this point
means to interact with a cultural and social treasury’.46 That is, before
we begin speculating on Wordsworth’s sexuality we should fi rst establish
whether the term ‘gay’ had the same connotations in the early nineteenth
century as it does in the twenty-fi rst century. To avoid misunderstand-
ing terms such as ‘gay’ in nineteenth-century literature, it is necessary to
investigate the way these terms were used in the past. The historical inves-
tigation of the text is thus an essential activity, for it is the means by which
we ensure that we are giving the text its due and not subordinating it to
the interests of its current readers. It secures the text’s status as a genuine
dialogue partner.
The importance of establishing the historical sense of the text does not
necessarily mean, however, that the historical–critical method is histori-
cist, although some of its proponents have been. Nor need it mean that
historical criticism is motivated by merely antiquarian interest. Concern to
identify the historical sense of a text does not commit the reader to the view
that its past meaning is the only meaning there is in the text. Nor does it
shut out other, non-historical meanings that can emerge from the text. To

be concerned to establish the historical sense of a biblical term entails only

that if we wish to understand the text it is necessary to investigate how the
text was understood in its historical and cultural context. This historical
sense is not the defi nitive meaning of the text, but is one of the factors that
must be taken into account when attempting to ascertain the text’s mean-
ing for us today. Literature is open to future interpretations, but not to all
interpretations. The text must control the range of interpretations if these
are indeed to be interpretations of the text and not instances of modern
readers reading their own agendas and ideologies into the text.
(d) The literal sense

It might be said that concern with the historical sense of the text stems from
a concern to establish the literal meaning of the text. This may come as a
surprise to some, since historical criticism has sometimes been criticized for
not being true to the literal meaning of the text. For example, reading the
creation accounts of Gen. 1-2 as mythology rather than as a literal account
of God’s creation of the universe has long been a contentious issue between
conservative evangelical Christians and advocates of the historical–critical
method. The crucial issue here is what constitutes the literal meaning of
the text. The term ‘literal’ should not be equated with ‘literalist’. A literal
understanding of the Bible means understanding the letter of the Bible.
But understanding the letter of the Bible means being attentive to the types
of literature the Bible contains. We misunderstand the Bible if we do not
take literary genre into consideration when interpreting a text. A literal
reading of a metaphor, for example, means respecting the metaphor as a
metaphor. If we interpret the proverb ‘the grass is always greener on the
other side of the fence’ in a literalist way and take it to be an objective state-
ment concerning the superiority of my neighbour’s lawn to mine, then we
have fundamentally misunderstood the proverb. Attempting to prove the
truth of the proverb by doing tests to show the superior greenness of my
neighbour’s grass or to insist on its superiority simply on the grounds of the
authority of the proverb indicates merely that we have not grasped its true
meaning. Understanding the statement ‘the grass is always greener on the
other side of the fence’ will consist of recognizing its literary genre, namely
that it is a proverb. This will give us the key to grasping the literal meaning
of the text, namely that it expresses the insight that human beings have the
tendency to be dissatisfied with what they themselves have and envy what
others have. Similarly, only by being attentive to the types of literature the
Bible contains will we be able to ascertain the literal sense of the Bible.
Others have argued that it is the Church which determines the literal
sense of Scripture. Thus Childs argues that the literal sense is not identical

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It is strange that this young woman, far from accepting with pleasure
the liberty that he wished to restore to her, made great efforts to re-
enter the house of this old man who divorced her,[113] but he was
inflexible. This time he had had enough of marriage, and it is said
that, when his friend Hirtius came to offer him the hand of his sister,
he refused her, under the pretence that it is difficult to attend at the
same time to a wife and to philosophy. It was a wise answer, but he
would have done well to have thought of it sooner.
III.
Cicero had two children by Terentia. His daughter Tullia was the
elder. He had brought her up in his own way, initiating her into his
studies, and giving her the taste for those intellectual things that he
loved so much himself, and which, it appears, his wife did not care
for. “I find in her,” he said, “my features, my words, my mind;”[114]
accordingly he loved her tenderly. While she was still very young her
father could not refrain from making allusion in one of his pleadings
to the affection he had for her.[115] This affection, certainly the
deepest he ever felt, was the great anxiety of his life. A sadder fate
than that of this young woman it is impossible to imagine. Married at
thirteen to Piso, then to Crassipes, and separated from them by death
and divorce, she re-married for the third time while her father was
absent governing Cilicia. Suitors were numerous, even among young
men of illustrious family, and it was not only the renown of the
father-in-law that attracted them, as we might think. He tells us that
they supposed he would return from his government very rich. By
marrying his daughter these young men thought to make an
advantageous match which would allow them to pay their debts.[116]
Among them were the son of the consul Sulpicius and Tiberius Nero,
who was the father of Tiberius and Drusus. Cicero favoured the
latter, who even went to Cilicia to seek his consent, but his wife and
daughter, to whom on leaving he had given the right of choosing,
decided without him for Cornelius Dolabella. He was a young man of
high family, a friend of Curio, of Caelius and Antony, who till then
had lived like them, that is to say in risking his reputation and
wasting his fortune; he was, besides, a man of wit and fashion. This
husband was not much to the taste of Atticus; but it seems that
Terentia was gained over by his great name, and perhaps Tullia was
not insensible to his fine manners. At first the marriage seemed a
happy one. Dolabella charmed his mother-in-law and his wife by his
good-nature and kindness. Cicero himself, who had been at first
surprised at the haste with which the affair had been carried through,
thought that his son-in-law had a good deal of wit and refinement.
“For the rest, he added, we must be resigned.”[117] He referred to the
frivolous and dissipated habits that Dolabella did not give up
notwithstanding his marriage. He had promised to reform, but kept
his promise badly, and, however willingly Cicero would have shut his
eyes to his dissoluteness, ended by making resignation very difficult.
He continued to live like the youth of that time, making an uproar in
the streets at night under the windows of fashionable women, and
his debaucheries seemed scandalous in a city accustomed to
debauch. He attached himself to a fashionable woman, celebrated by
her amorous adventures, Caecilia Metella, wife of the consular
Lentulus Sphinther. She was the same woman who afterwards ruined
the son of the great tragic actor Aesopus, that madman who, not
knowing what to invent to ruin himself most quickly, had the strange
caprice, at a dinner that he gave to his mistress, to dissolve and
swallow a pearl worth a million sesterces[118] (£8000). With a woman
like Metella, Dolabella soon squandered his fortune, he then
dissipated his wife’s, and not content with betraying and ruining her,
threatened to divorce her when she dared to complain. It seems that
Tullia loved him very much, and for a long time resisted those who
advised a divorce. Cicero blames, somewhere, what he calls his
daughter’s[119] folly, but she had at last to decide for this after fresh
outrages, and leave her husband’s house to return to her father’s. She
was enceinte. The confinement that followed in these painful
circumstances carried her off at Tusculum at the age of thirty-one.
Cicero was inconsolable for her death, and his grief at losing her
was certainly the greatest of his life. As his affection for his daughter
was well known, letters came to him from all sides, of the sort that
usually console those only who have no need of consolation. The
philosophers, to whom his name gave credit, tried by their
exhortations to make him support his loss more courageously.
Caesar wrote to him from Spain, where he had just vanquished
Pompey’s sons. The greatest personages of all parties, Brutus,
Lucceius, Dolabella himself, shared his sorrow; but none of these
letters must have touched him more sensibly than that which he
received from one of his old friends, Sulpicius, the great lawyer, who
at that time governed Greece. Fortunately it has been preserved. It is
worthy of the great man who wrote it and of him to whom it was
addressed. The following passage has often been quoted: “I must tell
you a reflection that has consoled me, perhaps it will succeed in
diminishing your affliction. On my return from Asia, as I was sailing
from Aegina towards Megara, I began to look at the country
surrounding me. Megara was in front of me, Aegina behind, the
Piraeus on the right, Corinth on the left. Formerly these were very
flourishing cities, now they are but scattered ruins. At this sight I
said to myself: How dare we, poor mortals that we are, complain of
the death of our friends, whose life nature has made so short, when
we see at one glance the mere corpses of so many great cities lying
around!”[120] The thought is new and grand. This lesson drawn from
the ruins, this manner of drawing moral ideas from nature, this grave
melancholy mingled with the contemplation of a fine landscape, are
sentiments little known to pagan antiquity. This passage seems
inspired by the spirit of Christianity. We should say it was written by
a man familiar with the sacred writings, and “who was already
sitting, with the prophet, on the ruins of desolate cities.” This is so
true that Saint Ambrose, wishing to write a letter of condolence,
imitated this one, and it was thought, quite naturally, to be Christian.
Cicero’s reply was not less noble. We see in it a most touching picture
of his sadness and isolation. After having described the sorrow he felt
at the fall of the republic, he adds: “My daughter at least was left me.
I had a place to which to retire and rest. The charm of her
conversation made me forget my cares and sorrows; but the dreadful
wound I received in losing her has re-opened in my heart all those
wounds that I thought closed. Formerly I retired into my family to
forget the misfortunes of the state, but can the state now offer me
any remedy to make me forget the misfortunes of my family? I am
obliged to shun, at the same time, both my home and the Forum, for
my home no longer consoles me for the trouble the republic causes
me, and the republic cannot fill the void that I find in my home.”[121]
Tullia’s sad fate, and the grief that her death caused her father,
attract us towards her. When we see her lamented so much we wish
to know her better. Unfortunately, not a single letter of hers remains
in Cicero’s correspondence; when he lavishes compliments on her
mind, we are obliged to take it upon trust, and a father’s
compliments are always open to suspicion. From what we know, we
can easily admit that she was an accomplished woman; lectissima
femina, is the praise Antony, who did not like her family, gives her.
[122]
We should like to know, however, how she bore the education
that her father gave her. We rather mistrust this sort of education,
and we cannot help fearing that Tullia suffered somewhat from it.
The very manner in which her father bewailed her is, to our way of
thinking, prejudicial to her memory. In composing on her death, that
treatise “On Consolation” which was filled with her praises, he has
not, perhaps, done her a great service. A young woman so
unfortunate deserved an elegy; a philosophic treatise seems to weigh
on her memory. Is it not possible that her father rather spoilt her in
wishing to make her too learned? It was quite the custom at that
time. Hortensius had made his daughter an orator, and it is asserted
that, one day, she pleaded an important case better than a good
advocate. I suspect that Cicero wished to make his a philosopher, and
I am afraid he succeeded only too well. Philosophy presents many
dangers for a woman, and Madame de Sévigné had not much reason
to congratulate herself on having put her daughter under the system
of Descartes. That dry and pedantic figure is not calculated to make
us like women philosophers.
Philosophy succeeded still less with Cicero’s son Marcus than with
his daughter. His father was completely mistaken about his tastes
and abilities, which is not very extraordinary, for parental tenderness
is often more warm than enlightened. Marcus had only the instincts
of a soldier, Cicero wished to make him a philosopher and an orator,
but he lost his labour. These instincts, repressed for a moment,
always broke out again with added force. At eighteen, Marcus lived
like all the young men of that time, and it was necessary to
remonstrate with him on his expenditure. He was bored with the
lessons of his master, Dionysius, and with the rhetoric that his father
tried to teach him. He wished to set out for the Spanish war with
Caesar. Instead of listening to him, Cicero sent him to Athens to
finish his education. He had an establishment like a nobleman’s son.
They gave him freedmen and slaves that he might make as good a
figure as the young Bibulus, Acidinus and Messala who studied with
him. About a hundred thousand sesterces (£800) were assigned to
him for his annual expenses, which seems a reasonable allowance for
a student in philosophy; but Marcus went away in a bad humour, and
his stay at Athens did not have the results that Cicero expected. No
longer under his father’s eyes he indulged his tastes without
restraint. Instead of following the lectures of the rhetoricians and
philosophers, his time was taken up with good dinners and noisy
entertainments. His life was so much the more dissolute as, to all
appearance, he was encouraged in his dissipation by his master
himself, the rhetorician Gorgias. This rhetorician was a thorough
Greek, that is to say, a man ready to do anything to make his fortune.
In studying his pupil he saw that he should gain more by flattering
his vices than by cultivating his good qualities, and he accordingly
flattered his vices. In this school, Marcus, instead of paying attention
to Plato and Aristotle, as his father recommended him, acquired the
taste for Falernian and Chian wine, a taste that continued with him.
The only reputation that he was proud of afterwards was that of
being the hardest drinker of his time; he sought and obtained the
glory of conquering the triumvir Antony, who enjoyed a great
reputation in this line, that he was very proud of. This was his way of
avenging his father, whom Antony had put to death. Later, Augustus,
who wished to pay the son the debt he had contracted with his father,
made him a consul, but did not succeed in breaking him of his habits
of debauchery, for the sole exploit that we are told of him is, that one
day, when he was drunk, he threw his glass at Agrippa’s head.[123]
We can understand what sorrow Cicero must have felt when he
learnt of his son’s early dissoluteness. I suppose he hesitated to
believe it for a long time, for he liked to delude himself about his
children. So when Marcus, lectured by all the family, dismissed
Gorgias and promised to behave better, his father, who was very
willing to be deceived, was eager to believe it. From this time we see
him constantly engaged in begging Atticus not to let his son want for
anything, and in studying the letters he receives from him to try and
discover some progress. There remains just one of these letters of
Marcus of the time when he seems to return to better habits. It was
addressed to Tiro, and is full of protestations of repentance. He
acknowledges himself so humiliated, so tormented by all his faults,
“that not only his soul detests them, but he cannot bear to hear of
them.” To convince him thoroughly of his sincerity he draws the
picture of his life; it is impossible to imagine one better occupied. He
passes his days and almost his nights with the philosopher
Cratippus, who treats him like a son. He keeps him to dinner in order
to deprive himself of his society as little as possible. He is so charmed
with the learned conversation of Bruttius that he wishes to have him
near him, and pays his board and lodging. He declaims in Latin, he
declaims in Greek with the most learned rhetoricians. He only visits
well-informed men; he only sees learned old men, the wise Epicrates,
the venerable Leonidas, all the Areopagus in fact, and this edifying
narration ends with these words: “Above all, take care to keep in
good health, that we may be able to talk science and philosophy
together.”[124]
It is a very pleasing letter, but in reading it a certain suspicion
comes into our mind. These protestations are so exaggerated that we
suspect Marcus had some design in making them, especially when
we remember that Tiro possessed the confidence of his master, and
disposed of all his liberalities. Who knows if these regrets and high-
sounding promises did not precede and excuse some appeal for
funds?
It must be said in favour of Marcus that, after having grieved his
father by his dissipation, at least he consoled his last moments.
When Brutus passed through Athens, calling to arms the young
Romans who were there, Marcus felt his soldierly instincts revive. He
remembered that at seventeen he had successfully commanded a
cavalry corps at Pharsalia, and he was one of the first to respond to
the call of Brutus. He was one of his most skilful, most devoted and
most courageous lieutenants, and often deserved his praise. “I am so
pleased,” wrote Brutus to Cicero, “with the valour, activity and
energy of Marcus, that he seems always to recall to me the father
whose son he has the honour to be.”[125] We can well understand how
pleased Cicero must have been with this testimony. It was while
rejoicing over this awakening of his son that he wrote and dedicated
to him his treatise De Officiis, which is perhaps his finest work, and
which was his last farewell to his family and his country.
IV.
This study of Cicero’s family life is not yet complete; there remain
a few details to add. We know that a Roman family was not only
composed of the persons united by relationship, but that it also
comprised the slaves. Servant and master were then more closely
connected than they are now, and they had more community of life.
In order to know Cicero thoroughly, then, in his family, we must say
a few words about his relations with his slaves.
In theory, he did not hold opinions upon slavery different from
those of his time. Like Aristotle, he accepted the institution, and
thought it legitimate. While proclaiming that a man has duties to
fulfil towards his slaves, he did not hesitate to admit that they must
be held down by cruelty when there was no other means of managing
them;[126] but in practice he treated them with great mildness. He
attached himself to them so far as to weep for them when he had the
misfortune to lose them. This, probably, was not usual, for we see
that he almost begs pardon for it of his friend Atticus. “My mind is
quite troubled, he writes to him; I have lost a young man named
Sositheus, who was my reader, and I am more grieved perhaps than I
ought to be at the death of a slave.”[127] I only see one, in all his
correspondence, with whom he seems to be very angry; this was a
certain Dionysius whom he sought for even in the depths of Illyria,
and whom he wished to have again at any price;[128] but Dionysius
had stolen some of his books, and this was a crime that Cicero could
not forgive. His slaves also loved him very much. He boasts of the
fidelity they showed towards him in his misfortunes, and we know
that at the last moment they would have died for him if he had not
prevented them.
We know better than the rest one of them, who had a greater share
in his affection, namely, Tiro. The name he bears is Latin, which
makes us suspect that he was one of those slaves born in the master’s
house (vernae), who were looked upon as belonging to the family
more than the rest, because they had never left it. Cicero became
attached to him early, and had him carefully instructed. Perhaps he
even took the trouble to finish his education himself. He calls
himself, somewhere, his teacher, and likes to rally him about his way
of writing. He had a very lively affection for him, and at last could not
do without him. He played a great part in Cicero’s house, and his
powers were very various. He represented in it order and economy,
which were not the ordinary qualities of his master. He was the
confidential man through whose hands all financial matters passed.
On the first of the month he undertook to scold the debtors who were
in arrears, and to get too pressing creditors to have patience; he
revised the accounts of the steward Eros, which were not always
correct; he went to see the obliging bankers whose credit supported
Cicero in moments of difficulty. Every time there was some delicate
commission to be executed he was applied to, as for instance when it
was a question of demanding some money of Dolabella without
displeasing him too much. The care he gave to the most important
affairs did not prevent him being employed on the smallest. He was
sent to overlook the gardens, spur on the workmen, superintend the
building operations: the dining-room, even, fell within his province,
and I see that he is entrusted with the sending out the invitations to a
dinner, a thing not always without its difficulties, for one must only
bring together guests who are mutually agreeable, “and Tertia will
not come if Publius is invited.”[129] But it is as secretary, especially,
that he rendered Cicero the greatest services. He wrote almost as
quickly as one speaks, and he alone could read his master’s writing,
that the copyists could not decipher. He was more than a secretary
for him, he was a confidant, and even a collaborator. Aulus Gellius
asserts that he helped him in the composition of his works,[130] and
the correspondence does not belie this opinion. One day when Tiro
had remained ill in some country house, Cicero wrote to him that
Pompey, who was then on a visit to him, asked him to read him
something, and that he had answered that all was mute in the house
when Tiro was not there. “My literature,” he added, “or rather ours,
languishes in your absence. Come back as quickly as possible to re-
animate our muses.”[131] At this time Tiro was still a slave. It was not
till much later, about the year 700, that he was manumitted. Every
one about Cicero applauded this just recompense for so many
faithful services. Quintus, who was then in Gaul, wrote expressly to
his brother to thank him for having given him a new friend. In the
sequel, Tiro bought a small field, no doubt out of his master’s bounty,
and Marcus, in the letter he wrote him from Athens, rallies him
pleasantly on the new tastes this acquisition will develop in him.
“Now you are a landowner!” says he, “you must leave the elegance of
the town and become quite a Roman peasant. How much pleasure I
have in contemplating you from here under your new aspect! I think
I see you buying agricultural implements, talking with the farmer, or
saving seeds for your garden in a fold of your robe at dessert!”[132]
But, proprietor and freedman, Tiro was no less at his master’s service
than when he was a slave.
His health was poor, and not always sufficiently attended to.
Everybody liked him, but under this pretext everybody made him
work. They seemed to agree in abusing his good-nature, which they
knew to be inexhaustible. Quintus, Atticus, and Marcus insisted
upon his constantly giving them news of Rome and of Cicero. Tiro so
readily took his share of each addition to the business that came
upon his master, that at last he fell ill. He fatigued himself so much
during Cicero’s governorship of Cilicia that, on the return journey, he
had to be left at Patras. Cicero very much regretted the separation
from him, and to testify the sorrow he felt at leaving him, he wrote to
him as often as three times in the same day. The care that Cicero
took on every occasion of this delicate and precious health was
extreme; he became a doctor in order to cure him. One day, when he
had left him indisposed at Tusculum, he wrote to him: “Take care of
your health, which you have heretofore neglected in order to serve
me. You know what it demands: a good digestion, no fatigue,
moderate exercise, amusement, and keeping the body open. Come
back a good-looking fellow, I shall like you all the better for it, you
and Tusculum.”[133] When the illness was graver the advice was given
at greater length. All the family joined in writing, and Cicero, who
held the pen, said to him, in the name of his wife and children: “If
you love us all, and particularly me who have brought you up, you
will only think of re-establishing your health.... I beg you not to
regard expense. I have written to Curius to give you all that you want,
and to pay the doctor liberally that he may be more attentive. You
have rendered me numberless services at home, at the Forum, at
Rome, in my province, in my public and private affairs, in my studies
and my literary work; but you will put the finishing touch if, as I
hope, I see you again in good health.”[134] Tiro repaid this affection by
an indefatigable devotedness. With his feeble health, he lived more
than a hundred years, and we may say that all this long life was
employed in his master’s service. His zeal did not flag when he had
lost him, and his time was taken up with him to his last moments. He
wrote his biography, he brought out his unpublished works; that
nothing should be lost, he collected his smallest notes and witty
sayings, of which, it is said, he made a somewhat too large collection,
for his admiration did not allow him to distinguish, and he published
some excellent editions of his speeches, which were still consulted in
the time of Aulus Gellius.[135] These assuredly were services for which
Cicero, who thought so much of his literary glory, would have most
heartily thanked his faithful freedman.
There is one reflection that we cannot help making when we study
the relations of Tiro with his master, and that is, that ancient slavery,
looked at from this point of view, and in the house of such a man as
Cicero, appears less repulsive. It was evidently much softened at this
time, and letters have a large share in this improvement. They had
diffused a new virtue among those who loved them, one whose name
often recurs in Cicero’s philosophical works, namely, humanity, that
is to say, that culture of mind that softens the heart. It was by its
influence that slavery, without being attacked in principle, was
profoundly modified in its effects. This change came about
noiselessly. People did not try to run counter to dominant prejudices;
up to Seneca’s time they did not insist on establishing the right of the
slave to be reckoned among men, and he continued to be excluded
from the grand theories that were made upon human brotherhood;
but in reality no one profited more than he by the softening of
manners. We have just seen how Cicero treated his slaves, and he
was not exceptional. Atticus acted like him, and this humanity had
become a sort of point of honour, on which this society of polished
and lettered people prided themselves. A few years later, Pliny the
younger, who also belonged to this society, speaks with a touching
sadness of the sickness and death of his slaves. “I know well, he says,
that many others only regard this kind of misfortune as a simple loss
of goods, and in thinking thus they consider themselves great and
wise men. For myself, I do not know if they are as great and wise as
they imagine, but I do know that they are not men.”[136] These were
the sentiments of all the distinguished society of that time. Slavery,
then, had lost much of its harshness towards the end of the Roman
republic and in the early times of the empire. This improvement,
which is usually referred to Christianity, was much older than it, and
we must give the credit of it to philosophy and letters.
Besides the freedmen and slaves, who formed part of the family of
a rich Roman, there were other persons who were attached to it,
although less closely, namely, the clients. Doubtless the ancient
institution of clientage had lost much of its grave and sacred
character. The time had gone by when Cato said that the clients
should take precedence of kinsmen and neighbours in the house, and
that the title of patron came immediately after that of father. These
ties were much slackened,[137] and the obligations they imposed had
become much less rigid. Almost the only one still respected was the
necessity the clients were under of going to salute the patron early in
the morning. Quintus, in the very curious letter that he addressed to
his brother on the subject of his candidature for the consulship,
divides them into three classes: first, those who content themselves
with the morning visit; these are, in general, lukewarm friends or
inquisitive observers who come to learn the news, or who even
sometimes visit all the candidates that they may have the pleasure of
reading in their faces the state of their hopes; then, those who
accompany their patron to the Forum and form his train while he
takes two or three turns in the basilica, that everybody may see that
it is a man of importance who arrives; and lastly, those who do not
leave him all the time he is out of doors, and who conduct him back
to his house as they had gone to meet him there. These are the
faithful and devoted followers, who do not haggle about the time they
give, and whose unwearied zeal obtains for the candidate the
dignities he desires.[138]
When a man had the good fortune to belong to a great family, he
possessed by inheritance a ready-made clientage. A Claudius or a
Cornelius, even before he had taken the trouble to oblige anybody,
was sure to find his hall half filled every morning with people whom
gratitude attached to his family, and he produced a sensation in the
Forum by the number of those who accompanied him the day he
went there to plead his first cause. Cicero had not this advantage;
but, although he owed his clients to himself alone, they were none
the less very numerous. In that time of exciting struggles, when the
quietest citizens were exposed every day to the most unreasonable
accusations, many people were forced to have recourse to him to
defend them. He did so readily, for he had no other means of making
a clientage than by giving his services to a great many. It was this,
perhaps, that made him accept so many bad cases. As he arrived at
the Forum almost alone, without that train of persons whom he had
obliged, which gave public importance, it was necessary for him not
to be too particular in order to form and increase it. Whatever
repugnance his honest mind may have felt on taking up a doubtful
case, his vanity could not resist the pleasure of adding another
person to the multitude of those who accompanied him. There were,
in this crowd, according to his brother, citizens of every age, rank,
and fortune. Important personages no doubt were mingled with
those insignificant folks who usually formed this kind of retinue.
Speaking of a tribune of the people, Memmius Gemellus, the
protector of Lucretius, he calls him his client.[139]
It was not only at Rome that he had clients and persons who were
under obligation to him; we see by his correspondence that his
protection extended much further, and that people wrote to him
from all parts demanding his services. The Romans were then
scattered over the entire world; after having conquered it they busied
themselves in making the greatest possible profit out of it. In the
track of the legions and almost at their heels, a swarm of clever and
enterprising men settled on the just conquered provinces to seek
their fortunes there; they knew how to adapt their skill to the
resources and needs of each country. In Sicily and in Gaul they
cultivated vast estates, and speculated in wines and corn; in Asia,
where there were so many cities opulent or involved in debt, they
became bankers, that is to say, they furnished them, by their usury, a
prompt and sure means of ruining themselves. In general, they
thought of returning to Rome as soon as their fortune was made, and
in order to return the sooner, they sought to enrich themselves as
quickly as possible. As they were only encamped, and not really
settled in the conquered countries, as they found themselves there
without ties of affection and without root, they treated them without
mercy and made themselves detested. They were often prosecuted
before the tribunals and had great need of being defended, and so
they sought to procure the support of the best advocates, above all
that of Cicero, the greatest orator of his time. His talent and his
credit were not too great to extricate them from the discreditable
affairs in which they were mixed up.
If we wish to become well acquainted with one of those great
merchants of Rome, who, by their character and their fate,
sometimes resemble the speculators of our days, we must read the
speech that Cicero delivered in defence of Rabirius Postumus. He
there narrates the whole story of his client. It is a lively story, and it
is not without interest to sum it up in order to know what those
Roman business men, who so often had recourse to his eloquence,
were like. Rabirius, the son of a rich and acute farmer of taxes, was
born with the spirit of enterprise. He did not confine himself to a
single branch of commerce, for he was one of those of whom Cicero
said that they knew all the roads by which money could come in,
omnes vias pecuniae norunt.[140] He transacted all kinds of business,
and with equally good fortune; he undertook much himself, and
often shared in the enterprises of others. He farmed the public taxes;
he lent to private persons, to the provinces and to kings. As generous
as he was rich, he made his friends profit by his good fortune. He
created employment for them, gave them an interest in his business,
and a share in the profits.
His popularity therefore was very great at Rome; but, as
sometimes happens, his prosperity ruined him. He had lent a good
deal of money to Ptolemy Auletes, King of Egypt, who probably gave
him good interest. This king having got himself expelled by his
subjects, Rabirius was induced to make him fresh advances in order
to recover the money that was at stake. He pledged his own fortune
and even that of his friends to provide for his expenses; he defrayed
the cost of the magnificent royal cortège when Ptolemy went to
Rome to demand the support of the senate, and, what must have cost
him still more, gave him the means of gaining over the most
influential senators. Ptolemy’s business appeared safe. As people
hoped much from the gratitude of the king, the most important
personages strove for the honour or rather the profit of reinstating
him. Lentulus, then proconsul of Cilicia, contended that they could
not refuse it to him; but at the same time Pompey, who received the
young prince at his house at Alba, demanded it for himself. This
rivalry caused everything to miscarry. The opposing interests
counteracted each other, and in order not to cause jealousy by letting
one man profit by this fortunate opportunity, the senate would not
grant it to anybody. It is said that Rabirius, who knew the Romans
well, then gave the king the bold advice to apply to one of those
adventurers of whom Rome was full and who flinched from nothing
for money. A former tribune, Gabinius, governed Syria. He was
promised 10,000 talents (£2,200,000) if he would openly disobey
the decree of the senate. It was a large sum; Gabinius accepted the
bargain, and his troops brought Ptolemy back to Alexandria. As soon
as Rabirius knew that he was re-established he hastened to meet
him. To make more sure of recovering his money, he consented to
become his overseer of the revenue (diaecetes), or as we should now
say, his minister of finance. He wore the Greek mantle, to the great
scandal of strict Romans, and put on the insignia of his office. He
had only accepted it with the idea that he should never be better paid
than if he paid himself, through his own hands. This is what he tried
to do, and it appears that in raising the money promised to Gabinius
he also cautiously took enough to repay himself; but the people, who
were being ruined, complained, and the king, to whom Rabirius had
become intolerable now that he had no longer need of him, and who
was no doubt delighted to find a convenient means of getting rid of a
creditor, threw him into prison and even threatened his life. Rabirius
fled from Egypt as soon as he could, happy to have left only his
fortune there. He had only one resource left. At the same time that he
administered the king’s finances, he had bought on his own account
Egyptian merchandise, paper, flax, glass, and had laden several
vessels which unloaded at Puteoli with considerable ostentation. The
report of this reached Rome, and, as people there were used to the
lucky adventures of Rabirius, rumour took pleasure in exaggerating
the number of the vessels and the value of their cargo. It was even
said, in an undertone, that there was among these ships a smaller
one that was not shown, no doubt because it was full of gold and
precious objects. Unfortunately for Rabirius there was no truth in all
these tales. The little ship only existed in the imagination of news-
mongers, and the goods that the others carried being sold at a loss,
he was quite ruined. His disaster made a sensation at Rome, and was
the talk of a whole season. The friends he had so generously obliged
deserted him; public opinion, which up to that time had been so
favourable to him, turned against him. The most indulgent called
him a fool, the most violent accused him of feigning poverty and of
withholding a part of his fortune from his creditors. It is certain,
however, that he had nothing, and only lived on the bounty of
Caesar, one of that small number who remained true to him in his
misfortune. Cicero did not forget him either. He remembered that, at
the time of his exile, Rabirius had put his fortune at his disposal and
paid men to accompany him, and therefore he hastened to plead for
him when it was proposed to include him in the prosecution of
Gabinius, and he succeeded at least in preserving his honour and
liberty.
One trait is missing in this description. Cicero tells us in his speech
that Rabirius was only moderately educated. He had done so many
things in his life that he had not had time to think of learning, but
this was not usual; we know that many of his colleagues,
notwithstanding their not very literary occupations, were none the
less witty and lettered men. Cicero, recommending a merchant of
Thespiae to Sulpicius, tells him: “He has a taste for our studies.”[141]
He looked upon Curius of Patras as one of those who had best
preserved the turn of the ancient Roman humour. “Make haste and
come back to Rome, he wrote him, lest the seed of our native humour
be lost.”[142] Those knights who associated themselves in powerful
companies and farmed the taxes, were also men of wit and men of
the best society. Cicero, who came from their ranks, had connection
with almost all of them; but it seems that he was more especially
connected with the company that farmed the pasturages of Asia, and
he says that it put itself under his protection.
This protection was also extended to people who were not Romans
by birth. Foreigners, we can well understand, regarded it as a great
honour and security to be in any way connected with an illustrious
personage in Rome. They could not be his clients, they wished to
become his hosts. At a time when there were so few convenient
hotels in the countries one passed through, it was necessary, when
you wished to travel, to have obliging friends who would consent to
receive you. In Italy, rich people bought little houses where they
passed the night on the roads they were accustomed to travel; but,
elsewhere, they journeyed from one host to another. To shelter a rich
Roman in this way was often a heavy expense. He always had a large
train with him. Cicero tells us that he met P. Vedius in the depths of
Asia “with two chariots, a carriage, a litter, horses, numerous slaves,
and, besides, a monkey on a little car, and a number of wild
asses.”[143] Vedius was a comparatively unknown Roman. One may
judge of the suite that a proconsul and a praetor had when they went
to take possession of their provinces! However, although their
passage exhausted the house that received them, this ruinous honour
was solicited because numberless advantages were found in securing
their support. Cicero had hosts in all the great cities of Greece and
Asia, and they were almost always the principal citizens. Kings
themselves like Deiotarus and Ariobarzanes considered themselves
honoured by this title. Important cities, Volaterrae, Atella, Sparta,
Paphos frequently claimed his protection and rewarded it with public
honours. He counted entire provinces, nations almost, among his
clients, and after the affair of Verres, for instance, he was the
defender and patron of Sicily. This custom survived the republic, and
in the time of Tacitus orators of renown had still among their clients
provinces and kingdoms. It was the only mark of real distinction that
remained to eloquence.
These details, it seems to me, complete our knowledge of what the
life of an important person was at that time. As long as we are
satisfied with studying the few persons who compose what we should
now-a-days call his family, and only see him with his wife and
children, his life very much resembles our own. The sentiments
which are the foundation of human nature have not changed, and
they always lead to very nearly the same results. The cares which
troubled Cicero’s domestic hearth, his joys and misfortunes, are
much like ours; but as soon as we leave this limited circle, when we
replace the Roman among the crowd of his servants and familiar
friends, the difference between that society and ours becomes
manifest. Now-a-days life has become more plain and simple. We
have no longer those immense riches, those extensive connections,
nor that multitude of people attached to our fortunes. What we call a
great retinue would scarcely have sufficed for one of those clerks of
the farmers of the revenue who went to collect the taxes in some
provincial town. A noble, or even a rich Roman knight, did not
content himself with so little. When we think of those armies of
slaves they gathered together in their houses and on their estates, of
those freedmen who formed a sort of court around them, of that
multitude of clients who encumbered the streets of Rome through
which they passed, of those hosts they had throughout the world, of
those cities and realms that implored their protection, we can better
understand the authority of their speech, the haughtiness of their
bearing, the breadth of their eloquence, the gravity of their
deportment, the feeling of personal importance which they threw
into all their actions and speeches. It is here, above all, that the
perusal of Cicero’s letters renders us a great service. They give us a
notion of lives lived on a scale such as we no longer know, and thus
help us to understand better the society of that time.
ATTICUS
Of all Cicero’s correspondents, none kept up a longer or more

regular intercourse with him than Atticus. Their friendly relations
lasted without interruption and without a shadow till their death.
They corresponded during the shortest absences, and, when it was
possible, more than once a day. These letters, sometimes short to
communicate a passing reflection, sometimes long and studied,
when events were graver, playful or serious according to
circumstances, that were written in haste wherever the writers
happened to be, these letters reflect the whole life of the two friends.
Cicero characterized them happily when he said “They were like a
conversation between us two.” Unfortunately, at present, we hear
only one of the speakers and the conversation has become a
monologue. In publishing his friend’s letters Atticus took good care
not to add his own. No doubt he did not wish his sentiments to be
read too openly, and his prudence sought to withhold from the public
the knowledge of his opinions and the secrets of his private life; but
in vain he sought to hide himself, the voluminous correspondence
that Cicero kept up with him was sufficient to make him known, and
it is easy to form from it an exact idea of the person to whom it is
addressed. This person is assuredly one of the most curious of an
important epoch, and deserves that we should take the trouble to
study him with some care.
I.
Atticus was twenty years old when the war between Marius and
Sulla began. He saw its beginnings and nearly became its victim; the
tribune Sulpicius, one of the chief heads of the popular party, and his
relation, was put to death with his partisans and friends by Sulla’s
orders, and as Atticus often visited him he ran some risk. This first
danger decided his whole life. As, notwithstanding his age, he had a
firm and prudent mind, he did not allow himself to be discouraged,
but reconsidered his position. If he had had hitherto some slight
inclination towards political ambition, and the idea of seeking public
honours, he gave them up without hesitation when he saw what a
price must sometimes be paid for them. He understood that a
republic, in which power could only be seized by force, was lost, and
that in perishing it was likely to drag down with it those who had
served it. He resolved then to hold himself aloof from public affairs,
and his whole policy consisted henceforth in creating for himself a
safe position, outside of parties, and out of reach of danger.
Sieyès was asked one day: “What did you do during the Terror?”
“What did I do?” he answered; “I lived.” That was a great thing to do.
Atticus did still more, he lived not only during a terror of a few
months, but during a terror of several years. As if to test his prudence
and ability, he was placed in the most troubled period in history. He
looked on at three civil wars, he saw Rome four times invaded by
different leaders, and the massacres recommence at each new
victory. He lived, not humble, unknown, allowing himself to be
forgotten in some distant town, but at Rome, and in full publicity.
Everything contributed to draw attention to him; he was rich, which
was a sufficient cause for being proscribed, he had a great reputation
as a man of wit, he willingly associated with the powerful, and,
through his connections at least, he was regarded as an important
person. Nevertheless, he was able to escape all the dangers that his
position and his wealth created for him, and even contrived to
become greater at each of those revolutions which, it seemed, might
have ruined him. Each change of government, which hurled his
friends from power, left him richer and stronger, so that at last he
found himself placed, quite naturally, almost on a level with the new
master. By what miracle of cleverness, by what prodigy of skilful
combinations did he succeed in living honoured, rich and powerful at
a time when it was so difficult to live at all? It was a problem full of
difficulties; this is how he solved it.
In view of the first massacres of which he had been a witness,
Atticus decided to take no part henceforth in public affairs and
parties; but that is not so easy to do as one might think, and the
firmest resolution does not always suffice for success. It is useless to
declare that you wish to remain neutral; the world persists in
classing you according to the name you bear, your family traditions,
your personal ties and the earlier manifestations of your preferences.
Atticus understood that, in order to escape this sort of forced
enlistment and to throw public opinion off the scent, it was necessary
to leave Rome, and to leave it for a long time. He hoped, by this
voluntary exile, to regain full possession of himself and break the ties
that, against his will, still bound him to the past. But, if he wished to
withdraw himself from the eyes of his fellow-citizens, he did not
intend to be forgotten by everybody. He meant to return; and did not
wish to return as a stranger, no longer recognized, and lose all the
benefit of his early friendships. Thus he did not choose for his retreat
some distant estate, in an unknown province, or one of those obscure
towns on which the eyes of the Roman people never fell. He retired
to Athens, that is to say, to the only city that had preserved a great
renown, and which still held a place in the admiration of the nations
on a level with Rome. There, by a few well-placed liberalities, he
drew to himself the affection of everybody. He distributed corn to the
citizens, he lent money without interest to that city of men of letters,
the finances of which were always embarrassed. He did more, he
flattered the Athenians on their most sensitive side. He was the first
Roman who dared openly to declare his taste for the letters and arts
of Greece. Up to that time it had been the fashion among his
countrymen to esteem and cultivate the Greek muses in private, and
to laugh at them in public. Cicero himself, who on so many occasions
braved this stupid prejudice, dared not appear to know off-hand the
name of a great sculptor; but Cicero was a statesman for whom it was
proper to show, at least now and then, that haughty disdain for other
nations which partly constituted what is called the Roman dignity. It
was necessary to flatter this national weakness if one wished to
please the people. Atticus, who did not mean to ask anything of
them, was more free; so he openly laughed at these customs.

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Textbook The Historical Critical Method A Guide For The Perplexed 1St Edition David R Law Ebook All Chapter PDF

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The Historical Critical Method A Guide

for the Perplexed 1st Edition David R.

Theological Method A Guide for the Perplexed 1st

Russell A Guide for the Perplexed 1st Edition John

Labov A Guide for the Perplexed Matthew J. Gordon

Evil A Guide for the Perplexed Second Edition. Edition

Critical Historical Studies Vol 7 Num 1 1st Edition

The early Arabic historical tradition a source critical

Linked Data for the Perplexed Librarian ALCTS Monograph

Kant s Critique of Pure Reason A Critical Guide James

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Guides for the Perplexed available from T&T Clark:

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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted

© David R. Law, 2012

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EISBN: HB: 978-0-567-57820-4

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9780567111302_Pre_Final_txt_print.indd vii 1/27/2012 4:29:07 PM

(1) The methods of textual criticism, source criticism, form criti-

9780567111302_Pre_Final_txt_print.indd viii 1/27/2012 4:29:07 PM

justice to their distinctiveness. To give the reader as straightforward

Biblical references are to the New Revised Standard Version Bible:

Like all authors I am indebted to family, friends, colleagues, and stu-

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‘Historical criticism’ and ‘the historical–critical method’1 are generic terms

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however, numerous episodes in the Bible which modern readers may fi nd

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9780567111302_Ch01_Final_txt_print.indd 3 1/27/2012 4:21:12 PM

The disputed status of the

Problems with the term ‘historical’

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not ‘necessarily primarily historical in character’, since ‘the basis of biblical

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in their original historical context’.9 Here the task of the historical–

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history to solve these problems. Thus the historical–critical method is differ-

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We might think of biblical studies in terms of an axis suspended between

Problems with the term ‘critical’

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This view of the openness of and suspension of judgement by the biblical

The basic challenge of the Old Testament is not historical distance,

On this view, in applying historical criticism to the Bible, we are pre-

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human judgement and are guilty of presupposing a notion of what the

Problems with the term ‘method’

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upon the non-verbal, non-humane language of mathematics, concern for

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based on observations about word frequencies and distributions, and

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nevertheless be methodical in its approach to the biblical texts. He states:

The sense of Scripture

(a) The original sense

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(b) The intended sense