The Impact of Cleavages on Swiss

Voting Behaviour A Modern Research

Approach 1st Edition Andreas C.
Goldberg (Auth.)
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-impact-of-cleavages-on-swiss-voting-behaviour-a-
modern-research-approach-1st-edition-andreas-c-goldberg-auth/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Swiss Public Administration Andreas Ladner

https://textbookfull.com/product/swiss-public-administration-
andreas-ladner/

The Mathematics of Voting and Elections A Hands On

Approach 2nd Edition Jonathan K Hodge

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-mathematics-of-voting-and-
elections-a-hands-on-approach-2nd-edition-jonathan-k-hodge/

Consumption Behaviour and Social Responsibility A

Consumer Research Approach Karnika Gupta

https://textbookfull.com/product/consumption-behaviour-and-
social-responsibility-a-consumer-research-approach-karnika-gupta/

Interventionist Research in Accounting : A

Methodological Approach 1st Edition Vicki C. Baard

https://textbookfull.com/product/interventionist-research-in-
accounting-a-methodological-approach-1st-edition-vicki-c-baard/
Making an Impact on Mental Health The Applications of
Psychological Research 1st Edition James N Kirby

https://textbookfull.com/product/making-an-impact-on-mental-
health-the-applications-of-psychological-research-1st-edition-
james-n-kirby/

Innovation in Social Services A Systematizing Overview

based on the EU Research Platform INNOSERV Andreas
Langer

https://textbookfull.com/product/innovation-in-social-services-a-
systematizing-overview-based-on-the-eu-research-platform-
innoserv-andreas-langer/

The Impact of Racism on African American Families

Literature as Social Science Paul C. Rosenblatt

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-impact-of-racism-on-african-
american-families-literature-as-social-science-paul-c-rosenblatt/

Partial Differential Equations of Classical Structural

Members A Consistent Approach Andreas Öchsner

https://textbookfull.com/product/partial-differential-equations-
of-classical-structural-members-a-consistent-approach-andreas-
ochsner/

Assessing the Economic Impact of Tourism: A Computable

General Equilibrium Modelling Approach 1st Edition
Samuel Meng

https://textbookfull.com/product/assessing-the-economic-impact-
of-tourism-a-computable-general-equilibrium-modelling-
approach-1st-edition-samuel-meng/
Contributions to Political Science

Andreas C. Goldberg

The Impact of
Cleavages on
Swiss Voting
Behaviour
A Modern Research Approach
Contributions to Political Science
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11829
Andreas C. Goldberg

The Impact of Cleavages

on Swiss Voting Behaviour
A Modern Research Approach

123
Andreas C. Goldberg
Amsterdam School of Communication
Research (ASCoR)
University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Additional material to this book can be downloaded from http://extras.springer.com.

ISSN 2198-7289 ISSN 2198-7297 (electronic)

Contributions to Political Science
ISBN 978-3-319-45999-8 ISBN 978-3-319-46000-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46000-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016955550

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of
the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation,
broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information
storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or
the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
errors or omissions that may have been made.

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Acknowledgements

This book is based on my doctoral thesis entitled “The impact of cleavages in a

longitudinal and contextual perspective” which I defended at the Geneva School of
Social Sciences at the University of Geneva in November 2015.
During the preparation of this publication, I received valuable comments and
support from various persons and institutions, which I would like to thank. First and
foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Pascal Sciarini for his continuous
support since the start of my doctoral studies. He has always been very generous
with his time and has given me precious advice to develop the original outline of the
project into this final version. I would also like to thank the other members of my
jury – Simon Hug, Mark Franklin and Hanspeter Kriesi – for the lively discussion
during the defence and the very helpful comments they provided me with. A special
thanks in this context goes to Simon Hug for his statistical advices throughout the
last years.
My doctoral project was a cooperation between the Department of Political
Science and International Relations at the University of Geneva and the Swiss
Electoral Studies based at FORS in Lausanne. Although the collaboration with the
Swiss Electoral Studies, especially following the 2011 Swiss national elections,
meant a lot of work, I really enjoyed working in our team. Under the leadership
of Georg Lutz, I learned a lot about the data basis I used for this publication. I
would also like to thank my SELECTS colleagues Nicolas Pekari, Thomi de Rocchi,
Robert Baur and Reto Wattenhofer for our meetings and inspiring discussions.
During the last years, I also had the chance to meet several scholars working
on similar topics who provided valuable feedback and assistance with occurring
problems. Here, I want to mention especially Daniel Oesch, Romain Lachat,
Line Rennwald and Nathalie Giger. I further want to thank the colleagues at
the University of Geneva for the nice and stimulating working atmosphere. For
proofreading the book, my thanks go to Colleen Tait and Monique Beerli, who
kindly agreed to read parts or even the whole manuscript.
Last but not least, I want to thank my family and friends who supported me
during my research project. For the financial funding, I gratefully acknowledge the
support by the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant Nr 10FI13-133957).

v
Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 Theory of Cleavage Voting .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1 Schools of Electoral Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Electoral Behaviour in a Cleavage Perspective .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 Definition of Cleavage .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.2 Linking the Cleavage Concept to Real Voting.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.3 Historical Cleavages and New Types . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.4 Recent Developments.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.5 Cleavage System in Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 The Contextual Aspect of Voting .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.1 Definition of Contextual Effect . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.2 Mechanism .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.3 Moderating Influence .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3 Longitudinal Impact of Cleavages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.1 Conceptualising the Impact of Cleavage .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 Theoretical Effect and Empirical Evidence .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.1 Religious Voting Between Decline and Content Change . . . . . 47
3.2.2 A Changing, but Stable Class Vote? . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.3 The Classical Rural-Urban Cleavage in Decline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2.4 A Stable, but Moderate Influence of Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3 Data and Method .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.3.1 Swiss Electoral Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.3.2 Operationalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.3.3 Lambda Index .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.4 Cleavage Strength Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.4.1 The Declining but Prevailing Religious Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.4.2 Social Class in Transformation and with a New Facet .. . . . . . . 94

vii
viii Contents

3.4.3 The Vanished Effect of the Classical Rural-Urban

Cleavage .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.4.4 Language with a Modest but Stable Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4 Impact Across Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.1 Party-Specific Voting Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.2 Data and Method .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.3 Descriptive Statistics of Individual Party Vote. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.3.1 Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.3.2 Social Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.3.3 Rural-Urban .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.3.4 Normative Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.4 Net Effects of Cleavage Voting .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5 Contextual Approach of Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.1 Cantonal Distribution of Cleavage Influence . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.2 Cleavage Voting in Three Types of Cantons . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.2.1 Cluster Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.2.2 Voting Patterns in Three Clusters . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.3 Individual, Contextual and Joint Effects . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.3.1 Two Faces of Religious Influence .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.3.2 Social Class Voting Due to Economic Inequalities . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.3.3 Urbanisation and its Influence on Voting Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.4 Data and Method .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.5 Empirical Findings .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
5.5.1 Separate Influence of Individual and Contextual Effects . . . . . 169
5.5.2 Cross-Level Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
6 Combined Approach in a Longitudinal and Contextual
Perspective .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
6.1 Theory About Harmonisation of Cleavage Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
6.2 Data and Method .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
6.2.1 Typology of Swiss cantons .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
6.2.2 Lambda Comparison Across Clusters . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
6.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
6.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
Contents ix

7 General Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Acronyms

AG Aargau (Argovia)
AI Appenzell Innerrhoden (Appenzell Inner-Rhodes)
AR Appenzell Ausserrhoden (Appenzell Outer-Rhodes)
BDP Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei (Conservative Democratic Party)
BE Bern
BfS Bundesamt für Statistik (Federal Statistical Office)
BL Basel-Land (Basle-Country)
BS Basel-Stadt (Basle-City)
CSP Christlich-soziale Partei (Christian Social Party)
CVP Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (Christian Democratic People’s Party)
EEA European Economic Area
EGP Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero
EU European Union
EVP Evangelische Volkspartei (Evangelical People’s Party)
FDP Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
FR Fribourg
GE Genève (Geneva)
GfS Gesellschaft für praktische Sozialforschung
GL Glarus
GLP Grünliberale Partei (Green Liberal Party)
GR Graubünden (Grisons)
GP Grüne Partei (Green Party)
ISCO International Standard Classification of Occupations
JU Jura
LPS Liberale Partei der Schweiz (Liberal Party)
LU Luzern (Lucerne)
MCG Mouvement Citoyens Genevois (Geneva Citizens’ Movement)
MCR Mouvement Citoyens Romand (Romandie Citizens’ Movement)
NE Neuchâtel
NW Nidwalden
OW Obwalden

xi
xii Acronyms

PR Proportional representation
SG St. Gallen
SH Schaffhausen
SO Solothurn
SP Sozialdemokratische Partei (Social Democratic Party)
SVP Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People’s Party)
SZ Schwyz
TG Thurgau (Thurgovia)
TI Ticino
UR Uri
US United States of America
VD Vaud
VS Valais
ZG Zug
ZH Zürich
Chapter 1
Introduction

Electoral research literature offers a wide array of studies that examine a number
of factors that may influence individual voting behaviour. Among the classic,
most studied factors are socio-structural variables. Following the well-known
work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967b) the analysis of socio-structural variables was
conceptually termed cleavage voting. As of today, many scholars have analysed the
influence of factors linked to cleavages, such as religion or social class, on voting
behaviour. In recent years, though, other approaches like issue ownership voting or
rational-choice models have gained in popularity. Cleavage voting is often portrayed
as a somewhat outdated approach that no longer fits modern electoral behaviour.
In the context of religiously-motivated voting, Broughton and ten Napel (2000, 4)
write that “if the topic of religion is mentioned at all, it is usually only in passing
and largely to conclude that it doesn’t matter anymore, that religion has ‘declined’
in its impact on electoral choice.”
Especially in the last decade, an increasing number of scholars have challenged
the almost generally accepted decreasing trend in cleavage voting. Whereas some
scholars demonstrate evidence of an overall more stable impact (e.g. Brooks et al.
2006; Elff 2007), others argue that only the mechanism has changed, meaning
that today, cleavage variables exert a more indirect influence on voting behaviour
(Raymond 2011). A third group suggests the emergence of new or reformulated
types of cleavages (e.g. Inglehart 1977; Kriesi et al. 2006). The divergence of
findings on cleavage voting and subsequent conclusions drawn from the mass
literature, however, is not surprising given variation in temporal and geographical
limits as well as the different operationalisation of cleavage variables. The problem
of country-specific findings is very hard to solve as comparative datasets including
many countries exist for recent elections, but usually do not cover more than a
couple of elections. This inhibits a longitudinal analysis across many countries.
However, for single countries, the contradictory evidence between a decreasing
versus a stable influence is possible to check by running a thorough analysis of
the impact of cleavages in a longitudinal way, covering as many election years as

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 1

A.C. Goldberg, The Impact of Cleavages on Swiss Voting Behaviour,
Contributions to Political Science, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46000-0_1
2 1 Introduction

possible. The same is true for the problem of varying operationalisations used. A
more flexible research approach using different operationalisations for the same data
can help identify the sensitivity of reported results in cleavage voting to variations
in the coding of variables.
Furthermore, several scholars criticize the concentration on the traditional
individual characteristics as exclusive explanatory variables (e.g. Huckfeldt and
Sprague 1993; Zuckerman 2005). Cleavages might affect voting behaviour in other
ways than simply through direct effects caused by individual factors. This idea fits
with another trend in electoral research, namely the incorporation of effects of the
environment or context one lives in. Although scholars in the 1980s already argued
that “understanding the influence of social contexts on individuals is (. . . ) a task
of central importance for students of politics” (Books and Prysby 1988, 213), it
was only with the introduction of newly developed statistical methods in the 1990s
that researchers could begin to appropriately examine contextual effects on voting
behaviour. Still, not many studies in the field of cleavage voting systematically
include contextual effects. Thus, a final conclusion with regard to the effects of
contextual characteristics has not yet been found.
Hence, to address the mentioned problems and shortcomings of previous studies,
this book examines cleavage voting from a variety of perspectives. First, from a
longitudinal perspective, the following question is addressed: how has cleavage
voting evolved over the last decades? Second, from a contextual perspective, the
book analyses the current impact of cleavages in a cross-sectional view. The research
question is: to what extent are the differences in cleavage voting due to individual
factors, contextual characteristics or a joint effect of both? A final third approach
combines both perspectives and asks whether or not cleavage voting has become
more similar across different contexts?
For answering these questions I will use post-electoral survey data (SELECTS)
to analyse voting behaviour in Switzerland, a country that offers almost ideal
conditions for such a study. First, available data covers election years from 1971
until 2011, which enables an analysis of developments from a long-term perspective.
Second, although Switzerland is obviously only one country, the internal variations
between cantons in terms of social structure, culture and also political systems allow
for a contextual analysis of voting. Another advantage of studying Switzerland
is the traditionally strong impact of socio-structural conflicts on electoral choice.
At least in the past, several studies have confirmed the empirical importance of
cleavages – religion, social class, rural-urban and language – for Swiss citizens’
voting behaviour (e.g. Hug and Sciarini 2002; Lijphart 1979; Trechsel 1995).
Nowadays, political actors, such as parties, are still interested in knowing the extent
to which traditional socio-structural conflicts have an influence on voting decisions
and maybe even more so under what circumstances, i.e. in which context, these
conflicts are particularly relevant for party choice.
The purpose of a longitudinal perspective covering 40 years is to examine the
overall trend in cleavage voting. Given the findings of most studies, an overall
decrease in cleavage voting seems probable. However, some developments, e.g. the
reformulation of the class cleavage, may also lead to a rather stable influence or
1 Introduction 3

even an increase in cleavage voting in the last elections, although the latter is less
probable. In order to measure the long-term development of cleavage strength I will
rely on the so-called “lambda index” (Lachat 2007a,b). The resulting lambda values
enable a simple comparison of cleavage strength over time and between cleavages.
An even more crucial advantage of the lambda index is the possibility to differentiate
between structural and behavioural changes in voting behaviour. This differentiation
is surprisingly understudied in the literature, although developments driven by a
change in group size or in the link between voters and parties may lead to very
different outcomes, even for the same cleavage. Moreover, in contrast to most other
studies, I will use more than one coding for several cleavage variables to test the
extent to which the findings vary in function of the operationalisation.
Besides these technical and methodological aspects, a longitudinal study of
Swiss voting is also relevant given the dramatic changes in the party system that
have taken place over the last couple of decades. The formerly relatively stable
Swiss party system began to change with the reinforcement of extreme right parties
and the emergence of the Greens in the 1970s/1980s. At first, these changes were
rather modest. However, with the extraordinary rise of the Swiss People’s Party
(SVP) since the 1990s, the party system has been considerably modified. This has
even led to the breakup of the so called “magic formula”, which for decades had
defined the fixed allocation of government seats to the four big parties. The national
elections in 2011 have shown that this process of change is still ongoing with the
electoral success of the two youngest parties, the BDP and the Green Liberals.
The contextual perspective will concentrate on the two Swiss elections of 2007
and 2011 to examine in more detail current voting behaviour due to cleavages. The
motivation for this second perspective stems from the interconnection between two
lines of electoral research. First, several studies have unveiled that the influence
of cleavages is not uniform across and within countries, but varies considerably
depending on the context (e.g. Armingeon 1998; Dalton 1996, 2002; Lijphart 1979).
Especially for federalist countries like Switzerland, a study only examining voting
behaviour at the national level cannot tell the whole story. Switzerland is even quite
a special case as the cantons strongly differ in institutional terms directly related to
voting behaviour. Although one speaks of national federal elections, the different
cantonal electoral systems (PR vs. majoritarian) and the significant variations in
district magnitude add a strong cantonal component to national elections. Here,
the second line of research comes into play, the contextual theory of voting (e.g.
Andersen and Heath 2002; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1993; Marsh 2002). Such studies
explicitly model the effect of the context on individual’s voting decision. By doing
so, scholars reject the common, intrinsic idea of studies that people live and decide
in a vacuum. The argument of contextual analysis is rather that people
(. . . ) form attitudes and make choices in variable environments, which come in the form
of formal institutional rules that govern people’s behavior or in the form of differential
economic, social, and political conditions that shape people’s interpretations and actions
(Anderson 2007, 590).
4 1 Introduction

The aforementioned cantonal variations in Switzerland then facilitate a detailed

study of effects that stem from the contextual (cantonal) level alongside common
individual effects. For this simultaneous analysis of individual and contextual effects
I will use multilevel (hierarchical) models. In addition to analysing the extent of
separate effects from both individual characteristics and contextual factors, another
aim of the book is to examine cross-level effects, i.e. interactions between the
individual and the context. So far, few studies have tackled the possibility of an
interdependence between a person and the environment he or she lives in.
A combined perspective brings both the longitudinal and contextual dimensions
together. The aim is to analyse if the impact of cleavages has become more similar
across cantons over the last decades. In particular, the growing nationalisation
of the Swiss party system following the rise of the Swiss People’s Party points
towards a harmonisation in voting behaviour. The rise of the SVP and subsequent
overall changes in the Swiss party system started in the mid 1990s, thus almost
exactly in the middle of the time period covered by the analysis. Combining
both research perspectives in the sense of a longitudinal comparison of cantonal
differences in cleavage voting then enables a study of the relation between changes
in the (national) party system and (cantonal) voting behaviour. Likewise, the
simultaneous analysis of all cleavages in Switzerland will help to see whether or
not voting behaviour has become homogeneous regarding cleavages in general or if
some single cleavage-specific developments are observable. For the calculation of
differences between cantonal voting patterns and respective development over time,
I will again rely on the lambda index, however, not measured on the national level,
but measured separately for types of cantons.
What are the principal results of the three studied perspectives of cleavage
voting? Overall, the results of the long-term analysis confirm the decreasing trend
in the impact of cleavages. This trend is particularly strong for the cleavages of
religion and rural-urban. Voting behaviour according to social class differences is
somewhat more stable, but has also lost in importance over the last decades. The
only cleavage with a stable and even slightly increasing influence is the linguistic
one. Regarding the question of underlying mechanisms in terms of structural or
behavioural changes, the results show that most of the developments are due to
changes in the behaviour of social groups. Structural changes in group size show
only minor effects on the impact of cleavage voting.
The findings of the cross-sectional analysis show that individual voting patterns
differ significantly between Swiss cantons. The subsequent multilevel analysis with
an explicit modelling of contextual (cantonal) effects proves the continuing and
stable importance of individual socio-structural differences when controlling for
contextual effects. Conversely, direct contextual effects are weaker than expected.
Only the religious composition of a canton shows a significant influence on
voting behaviour. The analysis of cross-level interactions displays mixed results.
Interaction effects between the individual and contextual level are more complicated
than expected in the sense that the interactive influence is not uniform across all
parties and all individual categories of a cleavage variable. An overall confirmation
of a systematic interdependence between the individual and the context is thus
1 Introduction 5

not possible. However, the partly found very strong relations between both levels
of cleavage voting highlight the usefulness of the conducted contextual approach,
particularly when non-linear effects are at work to influence voting behaviour.
Finally, the combined perspective reveals a significant homogenisation in the
impact of cleavages across cantons over time. The religious and social class
cleavages display the strongest trends in the harmonisation of voting behaviour. A
surprising finding is that most of the homogenisation took place before 1995 and
is thus not linked to the significant changes in the Swiss party system following
the rise of the SVP. The findings rather suggest that it is the harmonised weaker
cleavage voting that first enabled the rise of the SVP by loosening the straitjacketing
effect of cleavages that previously hindered significant changes in the party system.
Furthermore, the results show that the harmonisation was especially driven by
decreasing cleavage strength in former strongholds of the respective cleavages, e.g.
in more traditional regions. This particularly strong declining cleavage impact in
former strongholds may then also be responsible for the general drop of cleavage
voting found in the longitudinal analysis.
With the proposed research design integrating three perspectives, the book will
address several of the mentioned shortcomings of other voting studies in the field
of cleavages. However, it cannot solve all of them. Despite the main advantages
of having data for a comparatively long time period, integrating contextual effects
and using different operationalisations of cleavage variables, the study also has
some limitations. The major limitation is probably the restriction to the case of
Switzerland. Hence, the found results cannot be seen as valid for all other countries.
However, as Switzerland due to its unique institutional system often counts as a
laboratory for testing different political phenomenon, the country may serve as a
starting point for the proposed research approach. In the course of the book I will
mention some more detailed limitations of the analysis.
The structure of the book does not follow the usual strict separation of literature
review, theory, data and analysis. Rather, the structure follows the logic of the
three perspectives, which each include an overview of the relevant literature, the
development of hypotheses given the theory, a presentation of the data used and a
subsequent empirical analysis. Before starting with the first longitudinal perspective,
the following second chapter is an overarching chapter with a more general
theoretical discussion that matters for all of the three perspectives. This discussion
starts with a presentation of traditional and more modern schools of electoral
research. Subsequently, it follows with more information about the origin and theory
of cleavage voting. This includes a definition of the cleavage concept following the
work of Bartolini and Mair (1990), an overview of traditional types of cleavages
(e.g. Lipset and Rokkan 1967a), a presentation of more recent developments and,
lastly, the cleavage system in Switzerland. An introduction to the contextual aspect
of voting is presented in the final part of this general theoretical chapter.
The third chapter analyses the longitudinal perspective of cleavage voting at the
national level. This chapter includes the most comprehensive literature review of
the impact of cleavages, with much of the presented evidence also relevant for the
other two perspectives. The same is true for the data presentation as all empirical
6 1 Introduction

analyses rely on a common source of data. The empirical analysis of the longitudinal
hypotheses then follows an explanation of the lambda index.
The fourth chapter is in-between both the longitudinal and contextual perspective
and shall serve as a link between these two. The aim of this chapter is to provide
more detailed information about the two national elections in 2007 and 2011 by
examining party-specific effects in more detail.
The fifth chapter comprises the contextual analysis. To begin, this chapter
presents the cantonal distribution of cleavage influence, still using the lambda
index. Subsequently follow party choice models for similar groups of cantons. The
latter result from a cluster analysis presented in detail preceding the regression
models. Delving deeper into the relation between the individual and the contextual
level leads to a multilevel approach of voting using voting propensities. After the
discussion of the related theory and literature, the empirical analysis tests for the
presence and the strength of individual, contextual and interactive effects in cleavage
voting.
The sixth chapter merges both longitudinal and contextual analyses and examines
the evolution of cleavage voting in a combined perspective. A theoretical discussion
of possible effects results in the development of hypotheses. Relying on the
groups of cantons developed in the previous chapter, the final step is the empirical
examination of the cleavage impact over time and across cantons.
Lastly, the seventh chapter is a conclusion in which I will summarise once more
the most important findings and limitations of the study. In addition, I will put the
results in a broader perspective and discuss possible future research that may build
on the proposed approach and its findings.
The results of the book rely on many statistical models. To show all correspond-
ing tables in the main text or in the printed appendix would have required too
much space. Thus, many of the regression tables are available in an online appendix
under http://extras.springer.com. The main text refers to these additional tables at
the corresponding passages.

References

Andersen, R., & Heath, A. (2003). Social identities and political cleavages: The role of political
context. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society A, 166(3), 301–327.
Anderson, C. J. (2007). The interaction of structures and voter behavior. In R. J. Dalton & H.-D.
Klingemann (Eds.), Oxford handbook of political behavior (pp. 589–609). Oxford/New York:
Oxford University Press.
Armingeon, K. (1998). Es gibt sie doch, die Schweizer Wahlen! Die Unterschiedlichkeit des
Wahlverhaltens zwischen Kantonen im internationalen Vergleich. In H. Kriesi, W. Linder, &
U. Klöti (Eds.), Schweizer Wahlen 1995 (pp. 273–295). Bern: P. Haupt.
Bartolini, S., & Mair, P. (1990). Identity, competition and electoral availability: The stabilisation
of European electorates, 1885–1985. Colchester: ECPR Press.
Books, J. W., & Prysby, C. L. (1988). Studying contextual effects on political behavior: A research
inventory and agenda. American Politics Research, 16(2), 211–238.
References 7

Brooks, C., Nieuwbeerta, P., & Manza, J. (2006). Cleavage-based voting behavior in cross-national
perspective: Evidence from six postwar democracies. Social Science Research, 35, 88–128.
Broughton, D., & ten Napel, H.-M. (2000). Introduction. In D. Broughton & H.-M. ten Napel
(Eds.), Religion and mass electoral behaviour in Europe (pp. 1–6). London/New York:
Routledge.
Dalton, R. J. (1996). Political cleavages, issues, and electoral change. In L. LeDuc, R. G. Niemi, &
P. Norris (Eds.), Comparing Democracies (pp. 319–342). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
Dalton, R. J. (2002). Political cleavages, issues, and electoral change. In L. LeDuc, R. G. Niemi,
& P. Norris (Eds.), Comparing Democracies 2 (pp. 189–209). London: SAGE Publications.
Elff, M. (2007). Social structure and electoral behavior in comparative perspective: The decline of
social cleavages in Western Europe revisited. Perspectives on Politics, 5(2), 277–294.
Huckfeldt, R. R., & Sprague, J. (1993). Citizens, contexts, and politics. In A. W. Finifter (Ed.),
Political science (pp. 281–303). Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.
Hug, S., & Trechsel, A. H. (2002). Clivage et identification partisane. In S. Hug & P. Sciarini
(Eds.), Changements de valeurs et nouveaux clivages politiques en Suisse (pp. 207–235). Paris:
Harmattan.
Inglehart, R. (1977). The silent revolution: Changing values and political styles among Western
publics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2006). Globalization and
the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared. European
Journal of Political Research, 45(6), 921–956.
Lachat, R. (2007a). A heterogeneous electorate: Political sophistication, predisposition strength,
and the voting decision process. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Lachat, R. (2007b). Measuring cleavage strength. Retrieved from http://www.romain-lachat.ch/
papers/cleavages.pdf 27 Feb 2014.
Lijphart, A. (1979). Religious vs. Linguistic vs. Class Voting: The “Crucial Experiment” of
comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland. American Political Science
Review, 73(2), 442–458.
Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (1967a). Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments:
An introduction. In S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (Eds.), Party systems and voter alignments:
cross-national perspectives (pp. 1–64). New York: Free Press.
Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (Eds.). (1967b). Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national
perspectives. New York: Free Press.
Marsh, M. (2002). Electoral context. Electoral Studies, 21, 207–217.
Raymond, C. (2011). The continued salience of religious voting in the United States, Germany,
and Great Britain. Electoral Studies, 30(1), 125–135.
Trechsel, A. H. (1995). Clivages en Suisse: Analyse des impacts relatifs des clivages sur l’électorat
suisse lors des élections fédérales (Vol. 31). Genève: Université de Genève Dép. de Science
Politique.
Zuckerman, A. S. (2005). Returning to the social logic of political behavior. In S. Zuckerman (Ed.),
The social logic of politics (pp. 3–20). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Chapter 2
Theory of Cleavage Voting

In democratic systems, the most important opportunities for the electorate to directly
exert influence on political outcomes is by the election of legislatures and in
presidential systems, additionally the election of the constitutionally independent
chief executive.1 During these elections the preferences of citizens and the (future)
governance of politicians meet and interact (Kitschelt 2010). Although not the only
important feature of a democracy, elections are said to be “the critical democratic
instruments” in establishing “connections that compel or greatly encourage the
policy-makers to pay attention to citizens” (Powell 2000, 4). As a result of the
utmost importance of elections for a democratic society, scholars have extensively
studied the reasons that lie behind a given voting behaviour. Research has contin-
uously shown that aggregate voting behaviour is less shaped by short-term factors
from an election campaign, but much more by long-term factors. Most of these
voting analyses are based on one of the three classical theories in electoral research
– the socio-structural, the socio-psychological and the rational-choice approach.
A commonality between the three traditions is the goal-oriented, instrumentally
motivated citizen, but this motivation is a product of different sources and factors in
each theory (Carmines and Huckfeldt 1998).
The first part of this chapter will provide a closer look at the three schools of
electoral research complemented by some more modern approaches. As the main
focus of the book is on the socio-structural approach and more specifically on
cleavage voting, I will then examine in detail the theory of cleavages using the
works of Lipset and Rokkan (1967a). The respective section includes a definition
of the concept and the empirical link of cleavages to actual voting behaviour.
Furthermore, I will discuss the historical cleavages from the 1960s and more recent
types developed over the last decades. Subsequently a more general discussion of

1
In the Swiss case and in other states with direct democratic elements, referendums can be
considered as equally important. For many citizens they might be even more important as a direct
impact on a concrete policy outcome is observable.

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 9

A.C. Goldberg, The Impact of Cleavages on Swiss Voting Behaviour,
Contributions to Political Science, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46000-0_2
10 2 Theory of Cleavage Voting

recent developments in (cleavage) voting will follow. As the later empirical analyses
focus on the case of Switzerland, I will also provide an overview of the Swiss
cleavage system including more detailed information about the parties involved.
The topic of the third and last part of the chapter is the theory of contextual effects.
Although the early socio-structural approach already mentions the importance of
contextual effects, many studies still focus primarily on individual effects. Hence,
I will provide a detailed overview of the literature examining contextual effects
including a definition of the concept, possible mechanisms to explain how the effect
works and a link with the effects stemming from individual characteristics.

2.1 Schools of Electoral Research

The oldest theory of party choice is the socio-structural approach, also known as
the “Columbia School” (see Berelson et al. 1954; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944). Instead
of providing a direct or even deterministic translation of social characteristics into
individual voting preferences, the idea is rather that an individual is embedded
in a given social structure and receives relevant information from this (social)
environment to form political preferences (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987; McPhee
et al. 1963). Hence, the basic emphasis lies in the importance of the social envi-
ronment for individual voting behaviour (Bornschier and Helbling 2005; Carmines
and Huckfeldt 1998). The environment shows influence through societal conflicts,
class consciousness, communication with opinion leaders, membership in certain
groups and corresponding background variables such as social class, urban-rural
differences or denomination. Different alignments with parties are then the product
of group-based inequalities leading to rivalling interests (Brooks et al. 2003).
Socio-psychological approaches, also known as the “Michigan School”, differ
from socio-structural approaches in the sense that belonging to a certain group does
not explain electoral behaviour, but the political attitudes of each citizen and his or
her experience with the political system do (Campbell et al. 1960). The authors do
not deny that social groups can have a certain influence, but argue that it is rather a
minor effect in the long-run. The main concept to explain the actual voting decision
is party identification. During childhood people acquire a party identification, which
afterwards becomes an enduring component of the voters’ identity. At least in the
case of the US, the electorate is said to be unable to make a decision based on
policy evaluations, so the vote choice is something like an unreflective and habitual
decision (Brooks et al. 2003, 139). In the systematic version of the approach, the
“funnel of causality”, attitudes towards candidates and concrete policy issues are
even closer to the final voting decision than party identification is. However, due to
the low political sophistication of the electorate, the influence of attitudes and issue
preferences is limited (Campbell et al. 1960). In the last years, however, several
scholars have reported a growth of issue-based voting (e.g. Dalton 1996; Dalton and
Klingemann 2007; Deegan-Krause 2007). Issues and attitudes will also be a part of
this book in terms of value preferences.
2.1 Schools of Electoral Research 11

The third of the traditional schools of electoral research is linked to economic

theories of democracy, often named the rational-choice approach (Downs 1957).
Similar to the socio-structural model, material interests are the main drivers of
electoral behaviour. Yet, the source of these interests differ in important ways. In
the economic approach the focus lies on economic opportunities and risks for the
individual in contrast to political preferences resulting from inequalities of status
or assets (Brooks et al. 2003, 142–143). The basic idea is that each citizen knows
his or her self-interest, evaluates parties or candidates accordingly and finally votes
for the party that maximizes his or her utility. These may be long- or short-term
interests. The rational-choice approach has gained influence, especially from the
1980s onwards, and is considered the most modern model, although this electoral
approach is slightly older than the socio-psychological one.
For many years, the debate in electoral research has been especially vivid
between the Michigan school and the rational choice theory. As these approaches
focus strongly on the individual level, the social logic of politics has lost importance
(Zuckerman 2005). However, in the last decades this has changed significantly and
analyses about voting behaviour have reintroduced the social environment as an
explanatory factor. The present study will follow these examples and analyse in
how far the context matters for electoral decision-making.
In addition to the three traditional schools of electoral research, there are many
other approaches which aim to conceptualise and explain the voting decision. For
instance, Jackson (1975) combines several aspects, such as social background vari-
ables from the socio-structural approach or party identification from the Michigan
model, into his own model of the electoral process. His main explanatory variables,
though, are citizen’s issue positions and the evaluations of the parties’ or candidates’
positions on these issues. According to Jackson, a person’s issue position depends
on a set of social, economic and geographic variables and party identification. In
contrast to former studies, e.g. the ideas of the Michigan School, party identification
is now an endogenous (varying) part of the electoral process and not some
previously derived voter characteristic. Still, the socializing experience matters for
developing a certain party identification, but candidate or party evaluations are also
strongly linked to party identification. Therefore, in different combinations and
to varying extents, all mentioned aspects with the central component of voters’
evaluations of parties’ issue positions have an effect on the final voting decision.
Jackson’s study may thus be seen as a precursor of the current popular theory of
issue ownership voting (e.g. Petrocik 1996).
Since the 1990s, several studies link the voting decision to political psychology.
Factors such as political information, attentiveness, sophistication or education are
central to these studies, so one may summarize them as a “cognitive approach” (e.g.
Lau and Redlawsk 2006; Lavine et al. 2012; Lodge and Taber 2013; Sniderman
et al. 1991; Zaller 1992). One of the first studies by Zaller (1992) aims to explain
a citizen’s opinion by the information framed in elite discourse that they receive, a
varying level of attention by citizens to this information and individual differences in
predispositions or values. In the context of a generally low level of information and
depending on a person’s level of political awareness, each citizen varies in his or her
12 2 Theory of Cleavage Voting

ability to act according to his or her interests and values. Sniderman et al. (1991) put
forward a similar argument by first challenging the once common image of a limited
citizen that is unable to organize his political opinions. Again, the authors assume
a general low level of attention to politics. However, they highlight the importance
of political sophistication for political decision-making. Depending on the level of
sophistication (and information), people differ in how they make up their mind and
the range of considerations they take into account before reaching a voting decision.
The process-oriented framework proposed by Lau and Redlawsk (2006) focuses
entirely on (political) information and how people use this information for decision-
making. In their framework, central variables from other electoral schools such as
individual background characteristics of the voter (including different factors from
gender to partisan identification), political sophistication or contextual factors of a
given campaign, are said to have a direct effect on the information-processing of a
person. However, Lau and Redlawsk acknowledge that people are limited in their
capability to process information, so that they at least sometimes (have to) rely on
cognitive shortcuts that may result in inaccurate judgements.
A last study I would like to mention by Lavine et al. (2012) questions the
assumption of an (uncritical) adoption of the information received from political
elites (e.g. Zaller 1992). Lavine et al. assign a more active role to the citizens in their
decision how to decide. The authors argue that it is normally not limited cognitive
abilities that result in poor citizen performance, but rather a lack of motivation to
go beyond the simple voting according to party identification. The latter features
heavily in their approach, but is complemented by short-term evaluations of parties’
actions. Their ideal type of an “ambivalent partisan” combines both factors in
having a partisan identification and being responsive to the political environment by
using cognitively demanding criteria to form opinions. In contrast to other studies,
Lavine et al. (2012) deny the universally positive effect of political sophistication
and promote the advantages of partisan ambivalence like a non-partisan biased
perception of reality or even a partisan ignorance when contradicted by more
diagnostic information.

2.2 Electoral Behaviour in a Cleavage Perspective

From the three presented traditional schools of electoral research, the socio-
structural approach is the most important one for the following analysis. However,
the main theoretical basis does not stem from the original approach by the Columbia
School, but from an extension by Lipset and Rokkan (1967a). In their seminal
work, the authors reacted to criticism to the original micro-sociological studies and
developed a macro-sociological approach, in which the individual decision for a
certain party depends on the social structure and the institutions of a political system
(Hardmeier 1995). This further developed approach became known as “cleavage
theory”. Before going into detail about the concrete impact such cleavages might
have, one must clarify and define the concept of cleavage.
2.2 Electoral Behaviour in a Cleavage Perspective 13

2.2.1 Definition of Cleavage

The concept of cleavage is strongly linked to the works of Lipset and Rokkan
(1967b) and Rokkan (1970). However, although these studies represent the starting
point for cleavage theory, the authors did not provide an explicit definition of the
concept of cleavage. Rae and Taylor (1970) provide one of the first real, albeit
general, definitions:
Cleavages are the criteria which divide members of a community or subcommunity into
groups, and the relevant cleavages are those which divide members into groups with
important political differences at specific times and places (ibid.: 1).

Rae and Taylor (1970) classify three types of cleavages, which are important
to study: (1) ascriptive or “trait” cleavages such as race or caste; (2) attitudinal or
“opinion” cleavages such as ideology and preference; and (3) behavioral or “act”
cleavages elicited through voting and/or organisational membership (ibid.: 1). A
problem with this early typology is its very broad focus. As a cleavage has to fit into
only one of the three categories, the concept comprises practically every social or
political division. Instead of regarding the three mentioned aspects of a cleavage as
mutually exclusive, Bartolini and Mair (1990) consider them as constitutive aspects
of every cleavage. They label the three levels of a cleavage slightly differently
and speak of an empirical, a normative and an organisational/behavioural element
(ibid.: 199).2
The first, empirical element, is defined in social-structural terms. This element
separates the population by certain social characteristics like religion, social class or
ethnicity. Typical rivalling groups would be Catholics vs. Protestants or workers vs.
employers. Such simple divisions are, however, not sufficient. They only give rise
to the potential for a full-grown cleavage to develop.
The second, normative element adds a sense of collective identity, which must
be present among the social groups. A common set of values and beliefs is the basis
for the developed identity and also reflects the self-consciousness of the group(s).
Each cleavage can consist of only one normative dimension, but there can be also
several values/beliefs that separate the involved groups. In addition to the awareness
of their collective identity, the members of a given group must be also willing to act
on their common base.
The last, organisational/behavioural element comprises the articulation of the
group’s interest through institutions or organisations. Typical examples are the
church, unions or political parties. The resulting organised groups’ interests lead to
an institutionalisation of the normative conflict(s). This third element is especially
decisive when it comes to defining a cleavage (e.g. Kriesi 2010; Zuckerman 1975).
In Kriesi’s (2010: 673) words “a structural division is transformed into a cleavage,
if a political actor gives coherence and organized political expression to what
otherwise are inchoate and fragmentary beliefs, values and experiences among

2
For the following description of the three elements see also Gallagher et al. (1992, 90–91).
14 2 Theory of Cleavage Voting

members of some social group”. Accordingly, only when all three elements are
present, one can speak of a “cleavage” in the sense of Bartolini and Mair (1990).
Using this widely acknowledged definition shows that the later discussed persis-
tence or decline of cleavages can happen at three different levels. The most obvious
change can occur in the social divisions. Certain groups like workers or Catholics
might become smaller over time which thus leads to a weakening importance of the
respective cleavages. Such a reduction in size of certain social groups, however, does
not need to equal a diminishing influence of the other two levels. The normative
dimension may become even more important in the sense of a stronger collective
identity among the shrinking group. This can be the case when some groups see their
current (minority) status and power in danger against growing opposing groups.
The same could be true on the organisational level. Parties might still focus on
the electorate of the declining group. Another possible and more likely reaction
of parties, though, is an opening up to a broader electorate, which could then further
reduce the impact of the given cleavage. The following analysis will consider the
extent to which all three or just one or two levels are responsible for a change in the
impact of cleavages.
Another advantage of the three-part concept of cleavage is the clear differ-
entiation from the concepts of division or conflict. First, a social division is an
essential and intrinsic part of a cleavage, but the latter goes beyond the rather general
category of division (Gallagher et al. 1992: 90; Zuckerman 1975: 231). Bartolini
(2005) provides a very detailed and useful discussion about the differences and
links between both concepts. For him, a cleavage is a particular type of a “division
composée”. In case an opposition or grouping is present at only one of the three
levels, he speaks of simple divisions in terms of interest, culture or affiliation.
Additionally, each combination of two levels forms a specific composite division.
The term cleavage is reserved for composite divisions that combine the presence of
all three levels of division (socio-structural, normative and organisational).
A second important distinction is between cleavage and conflict. Again, the con-
cept of cleavage is more specific and thus requires a different definition (Bartolini
2005; Gallagher et al. 1992; Kriesi 2010). For Lane and Ersson (1999, 41) a cleavage
needs some underlying probability of conflict. A cleavage might potentially lead
to conflict between social groups and/or their representative organisations, but not
necessarily. Consequently, a visible conflict in the society or electorate can be a
sign of the presence of a cleavage, but not all cleavages must result in real conflict.
Enyedi (2008, 300) defines cleavages as “institutionalized conflicts” in contrast
to simple conflicts. This approach highlights again the importance of the third,
behavioural/organisational element. Through the institutionalization of a conflict,
the resulting cleavage leads to stability and social peace.3

3
Lipset and Rokkan (1967a) offer a similar discussion. By referring to the analyses of Ross (1920)
and Simmel (1923), the authors argue that the “establishment of regular channels for the expression
of conflicting interests has helped to stabilize the structure of a great number of nation-states”
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967a, 4–5).
2.2 Electoral Behaviour in a Cleavage Perspective 15

In some of the cleavage literature (e.g. Franklin 2010; Pappi 1983), one more
typical characteristic appears that is not explicitly part of the definition by Bartolini
and Mair (1990). This characteristic is the durability of a cleavage. Authors such as
Dahl (1966, 48) or Zuckerman (1975, 236) argue that in almost all studies a cleavage
persists over a long period of time. Specific short-term effects of a particular election
do not directly affect the presence of a given cleavage (Zuckerman 1982, 131). This
is another differentiation from the concepts of division and conflict. Whereas the
latter two can be used also for ephemeral appearances, a cleavage is long-standing.
The aim of Bartolini and Mair (1990) was not only to provide a coherent
definition of cleavage, but also to get rid of the confusing adjectives that are often
used together with the expression of cleavage. Instead of referring to “social”,
“political”, “economic” or “cultural” cleavages, their definition shall be autonomous
without such a specification. In case one uses these adjectives to describe the
cleavage in more detail, the concept will become synonymous to the larger notion of
division (Bartolini 2005, 10). The problem of this incorrect use of the term cleavage
often stems from a different perspective of research (cf. Bartolini and Mair 1990;
Ladner 2004b). The concept of cleavage has an intermediary position between two
approaches. Scholars arguing from the impact of social stratification on political
behaviour speak of “social cleavages”, while others arguing from the impact of
political institutions on the social structure speak of “political cleavages”. However,
as both lines of argumentation are incorporated in the aforementioned definition by
Bartolini and Mair (1990), the use of adjectives is redundant.
Due to its clear and precise definition, the three-part concept by Bartolini and
Mair (1990) is widely accepted in scholarly literature (e.g. Bornschier 2007; Enyedi
2008; Hug and Sciarini 2002; Kriesi 1998; Lachat 2007). In recent years, however,
the conceptualization also received some criticism. Some authors argue that modern
cleavages in post-industrial societies fit less and less with the narrow definition,
particularly as the organisational element has weakened (e.g. Henjak 2010; Oesch
2006). The new value-based cleavages,4 e.g. materialism vs. postmaterialism, are
especially difficult to link to general structural concepts. Additionally, these new
cleavages show less organisational closure among the involved groups compared
to the classic cleavages of class or religion. As a result, some authors conclude
that “cleavage” becomes a less powerful concept and former structures of political
divisions are replaced by increasing volatility in voting behaviour (e.g. Franklin
et al. 1992).

4
If one can label them “cleavage”, as many of them apparently do not fulfil all three requirements,
in particular the organisational one.
16 2 Theory of Cleavage Voting

2.2.2 Linking the Cleavage Concept to Real Voting

In the last century, the concept of cleavage was of primary importance. The
underlying social divisions defined the main ideological basis of Western politics
and provided a framework for party competition (Dalton 1996). Additionally, early
electoral research assumed that voters were overstrained by the complexity of
politics. As guidance for their electoral behaviour, people relied on shortcuts such
as their social group cues, which simplified the decision-making process (Dalton
and Klingemann 2007). Although the assumption of an overstrained electorate does
not hold anymore (e.g. due to better education), many people still rely on these
shortcuts. Consequently, a cleavage might influence today’s voting behaviour in two
different ways. The first mechanism stems from the definition discussed earlier.
Social group belonging and the developed identity result in a vote for a party
which represents the respective group interest. This causal chain is the original
way in which cleavages influence voting behaviour. Often, these links between
social groups and political parties persist over generations of voters, even if the
conflict which led to the formation of a cleavage is no longer present (cf. Ignazi
and Wellhofer 2013). In the latter case the observed connection between voters and
parties is thus not really due to a cleavage, but is the result of a socialisation process
(cf. Franklin 2010). This is the second mechanism that works in the sense that older
persons simply stick to their (learned) voting behaviour from the past. Younger
people may then adapt these habits of thought and action from their elders. As a
result, some older and younger voters still vote according to traditional cleavage
behaviour simply due to their own or adapted habits.
This routine in voting (almost) always for the same party goes hand in hand
with party competition. A big advantage of social cleavages is that the underlying
social conflicts are routinised into electoral competition (Brooks et al. 2003). Parties
(or other political institutions) organise the conflicts to prevent an open outbreak
of the conflict. Cleavages thus possess a mediating role between social conflicts
and political competition. Due to this role, cleavages are expected to stabilise not
only the size and identity of parties, but also democracies in general (Brooks et al.
2003; Enyedi 2008). This stabilisation effect for democracy is even bigger the more
frequent cross-cutting of cleavages is. Cross-cutting means that people belong to
several social groups, e.g. a Catholic worker. Such a person could either vote based
on his/her religious affiliation or his/her social class belonging. Lipset (1960, 88–
89) argues that voters who are pulled among conflicting forces should then have
2.2 Electoral Behaviour in a Cleavage Perspective 17

an interest in reducing the intensity of political conflict(s).5 In the example of the

Catholic worker, he could socialise with other Catholic fellows, who belong to a
different social class, so that a possible class conflict declines due to the overlapping
religious belonging.6
One more aspect of cleavage voting to consider is the direction of causality.
Often, the line of causality considers political parties as the final step with the
function of representing the social divisions and developed identity. However,
several scholars attribute the parties a much more active role in shaping the
political agenda (e.g. Colomer and Puglisi 2005; Enyedi 2008; Kriesi 1998; Ladner
2004b). Instead of being only a representative element, the parties or other political
actors actively decide how to shape the political competition. They may select
to emphasize certain preferences, but ignore others and in doing so facilitate or
complicate the translation of social divisions into politics.7 In an extreme view, the
parties may even create new cleavages among the electorate (Colomer and Puglisi
2005, 518). In this sense, parties are not only a product of the society, but vice versa:
they also have a conditional influence on the society.
Bellucci and Heath (2012) propose another mechanism that neither starts in
the social structure of the electorate, nor in the agenda shaping by parties. Based
on the consistency theory by Sniderman and Bullock (2004), they argue that
the socio-structural composition is not only important in the society, but also in
the representing organisations. The authors’ idea is a direct dependency between
the first and third element of the cleavage definition. Whereas most studies focus
on the organisational density of social groups like workers or Catholics in the
electorate, it is equally important to check how these groups are represented in (and
not only by) political parties. The expectation is that the more voting is based on
cleavages, the more consistent the individual social characteristics of a voter are
displayed in the characteristics of the party. For a party it is thus not only important
to represent the preferences of a given social group, but also to have persons with
the same social group belonging at the party’s organisational level. If this is not the

5
Summarizing the arguments by Simmel, Ross and Coser, Rae and Taylor (1970) argue along the
same lines. In their view, the more cross-cutting there is, the less people share the same combination
of characteristics of both cleavages. For instance, although Catholic and Protestant workers differ
in their religious denomination, they share a similar class belonging. Furthermore, not all Catholics
belong to the working class, but also to other classes such as managers or clerks. This mix of group
belonging of two cleavages makes it more difficult to build a coalition as there are very few people
who have no links to the opposition in one of the cleavages.
6
Switzerland is a typical case for cross-cutting cleavages. For instance, the segregation according
to language is not accompanied by a segregation in terms of class or religion (Ladner 2004b, 302).
7
Lipset and Rokkan (1967a) also consider the possibility that parties themselves become significant
poles of attraction independent of the social or cultural structure of a given movement. In terms
of transforming a cleavage structure into the party system, the authors attribute the parties a
strategic role. The parties act according to their organisational or electoral strategy, meaning that
each division on the empirical and normative level does not automatically translate into party
oppositions.
18 2 Theory of Cleavage Voting

case, some voters might face cross-pressures8 and may either vote for a different
party or not vote at all.
In the forthcoming analysis, the main focus will be on the demand-side mech-
anism, namely the (continuing) influence of social group belonging on voting. To
some extent I will also discuss changes on the supply side, namely changing party
strategies. The impact of the social composition of parties – although certainly
interesting to examine – is not part of the analysis. Such an analysis would require
more time for data collection. Furthermore, the discussed definition of cleavage
voting does not include any reference to a compositional effect of the party.

2.2.3 Historical Cleavages and New Types

Probably the most important reference for cleavage studies is the aforementioned
work by Lipset and Rokkan (1967a). In their pioneering study of the development
of cleavages in Western democracies, the authors speak of four main conflicts which
have led to the formation of the national party systems and which thus shape the
individual voting behaviour of the electorate. To varying degrees, the resulting
cleavages continue to show their influence on political life today. According to
Lipset and Rokkan (1967a), two main events are responsible for the development
of the four cleavages. The first event is the “National Revolution” that stands for
developments leading to the formation of modern European states. One important
historical development is the Reformation, which resulted in the conflict between
the Subject and Dominant culture. This conflict represents the division between
the centre and periphery of a country. These two parts or cultures of a country
may be different in terms of ethnicity, language or religion, where the aim of
the periphery was to protect their specific cultures against the centralizing one. A
second conflict linked to the “National Revolution” is the one between the Nation-
State and the Church. Again, the Reformation first shaped this conflict leading to
tensions between Protestants and Catholics, in which Protestants have been often
linked to nationalist forces longing for national autonomy. Religious issues thus
have been mixed into the process leading to the building of nation-states. After the
French Revolution, the religious tensions flared up again, with both religious forces
(Protestants and Catholics) now defending their church interests against the liberal
and secular movements. Although this conflict was partly also about economic
matters between the church and the state, the actual issues were linked to morals.
The main point of contention was about control and who, the state or the church,
holds the power to determine crucial policies, especially in the field of education
(see also Knutsen 2004).

8
Cross-pressure refers to conflicts and inconsistencies among factors important for the voting
decision, which drive an individual into opposite directions (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944, 53).
2.2 Electoral Behaviour in a Cleavage Perspective 19

The second main event responsible for the shaping of the remaining two
cleavages is the “Industrial Revolution”. Corresponding conflicts concern mainly
economic interests. The first cleavage is between the Primary and Secondary Econ-
omy, representing the difference between rural and urban interests. The growth in
industrial production and world trade increasingly led to tensions between producers
in rural areas and merchants and entrepreneurs in the urban parts. This conflict
originates in the Middle Ages and deepened during the Industrial Revolution. The
second cleavage separates Workers from Employers and Owners, which today is
known as class cleavage. A very important historical event for this cleavage is
also the Russian Revolution. In this and similar movements in other countries, the
growing working class fought for better working and living conditions. This led
to the formation of labour unions and Socialist parties. The existence and relative
strength of parties depended on the significance of the originating revolutions in
each country (Colomer and Puglisi 2005, 503). The ruling elites chose to form
coalitions with certain social groups representing the four cleavages and in doing
so gave rise to the structure of the final party system (Pappi 1983, 186).9
Without intending to be exhaustive by presenting these four cleavages, Lipset and
Rokkan (1967a) admit that there might also be other important cleavages in certain
countries. Additionally, new cleavages may develop over time (cf. Ladner 2004a,
303). Furthermore, not all four cleavages are inevitably present in a country. Mostly,
however, there are several cleavages present with a certain hierarchy between them
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967a, 6). In general, class and religion are the most important
cleavages in industrial countries. Whereas in most cases the class cleavage seems
to dominate the electoral decision (e.g. Brooks et al. 2006; Zuckerman 1982),
Sartori (1969, 76) argues that class is only the most important factor if no other
major cleavage is present (particularly religion). Other studies argue that religious
divisions, not class, are the main bases of Western parties (e.g. Lijphart 1979; Rose
and Urwin 1969). The different rankings are partly due to different measures and
partly due to different country settings, but they may also be due to changes over
time. Lipset and Rokkan (1967a) do not exclude the possibility of a change in the
hierarchical order over time, which implies an increase or decline in importance and
strength of cleavages.
Traditional cleavages have been said to not only stabilise the party system,
but also the voting behaviour of the electorate, as the alliances between social
groups and political parties remain unchanged (Lachat 2007, 27). Lipset and
Rokkan (1967a) hypothesized that the once established cleavage structures might
lead to stable and durable group-based political conflicts. This became known as
the “freezing” hypothesis of party systems. This hypothesis, though, was often
challenged. As early as the 1980s several party systems had freed themselves from

9
In a comparative perspective the first three cleavages, center-periphery, state-church and rural-
urban, are said to generate national party systems in divergent directions. In contrast, the
worker-owner cleavage brings the party systems closer together (Caramani 2004; Lipset and
Rokkan 1967a, 35).
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Granny
Maumee; The rider of dreams; Simon the
Cyrenian
 This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United
States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away
or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License
included with this ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you
are not located in the United States, you will have to check the
laws of the country where you are located before using this
eBook.

Title: Granny Maumee; The rider of dreams; Simon the Cyrenian

Plays for a negro theater

Author: Ridgely Torrence

Release date: September 12, 2023 [eBook #71626]

Language: English

Original publication: New York: The Macmillan Company, 1917

Credits: Tim Lindell and the Online Distributed Proofreading

Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced
from images generously made available by The
Internet Archive/American Libraries.)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GRANNY

MAUMEE; THE RIDER OF DREAMS; SIMON THE CYRENIAN ***
 GRANNY MAUMEE
THE RIDER OF DREAMS
SIMON THE CYRENIAN

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO · DALLAS
ATLANTA · SAN FRANCISCO

MACMILLAN & CO., Limited

LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE
THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd.
TORONTO

Granny Maumee
The Rider of Dreams
Simon The Cyrenian

Plays for a Negro Theater

 BY
RIDGELY TORRENCE

New York
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1917

All rights reserved

Copyright, 1917,
By RIDGELY TORRENCE
Copyright, 1917,
By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
Set up and printed. Published September, 1917.
For permission to perform these plays application must be made
to the author in care of the publishers.
 To
O. H. D. T.
GRANNY MAUMEE
 GRANNY MAUMEE
Scene: Living room in an old cabin with walls blackened by age. Red
cotton curtains and red covers on the chairs and table. In left
corner back, an open fire smoulders in a great rough fireplace.
There is a door at back leading out of doors. There are also
doors left and right. A bed at left covered with a white
counterpane. The room is neat and there are many growing
flowers about potted in rude wooden boxes. Toward the right is
an iron flower stand consisting of a basin mounted on a tripod.
This stand is filled with a mass of bright red geraniums. A large
chest against the wall at right is covered with red. A table near
centre bears candles. Beside the table in a high-backed chair
sits Granny Maumee. She is seen to be blind. She is black and
thin, with white hair and a face so seared by burns that it masks
her great age. Her great granddaughter Pearl, a girl of
nineteen, is moving briskly about the room straightening chairs
and rearranging flowers.

Pearl
Seem kinder funny fer me to be fixin’ up for Sapphie. Seem like
I’m wukin’ for her by the day. Mebbe she will tek’n hiah me now she’s
married. Seem kinder odd to be hiahed by a blood sisteh.
Granny
Spread my fine-spun sheets on de baid.
Pearl
I got the nex’ bes’.
Granny
Fol’ um up an’ git out de fines’.
Pearl
 Hit weahs um out so to wash um, an’ Sapphie an’ that man of
her’n aint used to such goodness. An’ to muss um up des for one
night!
Granny
Hit’s de night er all nights. Hit’s de boy babe wif ’em dat I wants de
fineness fer.
Pearl
That’s right, the baby. I keeps fohgittin’ hit. I’ll change’m. I’ll git the
linum sheets on an’ then I’ll lay the big covehled.

[She draws coverlid off, hauls box from under the bed,
and opening it takes out bed clothes and remakes
the bed.]

You’n me’ll have to lay in the broke baid this night. You won’t git no
rest.
Granny
No matteh, heah’s a good baid fer de babe an’ I’ll soon git all my
res’.
Pearl
I hope’s Sapphie’s husband aint too hefty, for the th’ee might break
this heah’n same as the otheh’n is broke.
Granny
De husban’ shain’t sleep da nohow. You c’n lay him a bunk in de
wash house.
Pearl
What! You aint goin’ to leave him lay heah?
Granny
Dis baid my Sam bought fo’ me. Onliest man kin eveh lay in hit
shill be Sam’s own blood. De babe an’ his motheh’ll lay heah dis
night erlone.
Pearl
Well, the babe’ll have plenty room and softness.
Granny
W’en my Sam wuz er babe we laid on cotton sack. We didn’ have
no baid, an’ w’en he little shaveh he say, “Mammy, I goin’ git you nice
baid w’en I git er man.” An’ sho’ nuff, w’en he grow up he took ’n do
hit, an’ he mek pu’chus in de attehnoon an’ de baid come nex’ day.
But at midnight betwix’ dee tuk ’n bu’nt ’im.
Pearl
Now, Granny—
Granny
In de black dahk dee come on ’im, de bloody-handed mens, an’
wheah dee cotch ’im dah dee bu’nt ’im, de right man settin’ de wrong
man afieh at de i’un hitchin’ pos’.
Pearl
[Going to her.] Granny Maumee, don’t leave yo’self go that away.
Don’t leave youah mine run on.
Granny
[Rocking back and forth.] My Sam, my man babe-um.
Pearl
Hit git you all wuk up an’ wore out. You won’t look good to
company.
Granny
Look! Has I looked fo’ fifty yeah sence I rush in de fieh fo’ my Sam,
which hit de las’ sight deze eyes seen? Oh, whuffo’ dee drag me out
an’ hilt me back? I bo’ one man an’ him dee tuk’n bu’nt. An’ ’e slep’
right’n dis room w’en de man wuz shot w’ich dee ’cuze ’im er!
Whuffo’ dee drag me back f’um de fieh?
Pearl
I sees the wisdom of Gawd in hit, Granny Maumee. Fifty yeahs
ergo me and Sapphie’s granpap been burnt and yet you was to live
to git a new Sam.
Granny
W’ich ’e neveh come. Dee wuz all gals fum dat on, you an’ yo’
sisteh Sapphie an’ yo’ mammy an’ yo’ mammy’s mammy, all down
from my breas’: all gals.
Pearl
You fuhgits what Sapphie’s fetchin’ you.
Granny
Dat I don’t, but not twell I sees ’im will Sam be cool off in my
heaht.
Pearl
Granny, you can nurse the child but course you cain’t espect to
see him.
Granny
Deze eyes shill yit behole—
Pearl
No, Granny Maumee, your eyes they’re scorched and swiveled
with the fire. But your arms ain’t burnt, is they? An’ they shall hold
the baby! Tain’t often old person live to heft a great-great-gran’baby.
Granny
Befo’ my las’ houah deze eyes shill look an’ see ergin. [She rises.]
Pearl
 Wheah you goin’?
Granny
Has you lay out my raid gown?
Pearl
Yes, it’s all on the sofy.
Granny
Den I goes to primp up an’ mek ready to receive.
Pearl
Yes, it’s only perlite to put on ouah best to meet the husband.
Granny
I dresses fer none but de chile. [She goes slowly out at left.]
Pearl
[Calling.] Betteh lay down fust, they won’t be here for two hour yet.
I’ll be there pres’n’ly.

[She continues to bestir herself about the room and

then starts to follow Granny. There is a faint tap
at the door at right. Pearl stops and listens. The
tapping is repeated. She goes and opens the door.
A young woman, looking much like Pearl and of
about the same age, but gaudily dressed and
carrying a baby, stands in the doorway.]

Pearl
[With a half-smothered exclamation.] Sapphie!

[Sapphie motions her to be silent and softly, fearfully

enters the room.]

Sapphie
 [In a low voice.] Wheah Granny Maumee?
Pearl
She in the baid-room fixin’ up. Wheah’s youah husband?
Sapphie
[After a pause.] He—didn’—come—
Pearl
Oh, that’s too bad, but it’s good to see you, and let’s see the baby.
Sapphie
[Drawing back with the swathed and veiled child.] Not yet.
Pearl
Oh, he’s asleep, of course.
Sapphie
[Pointing to doorway through which Granny passed.] Shut the
door.
Pearl
[Obeying wonderingly.] Well, hit do look good to see you ergin,
Sapphie. Hit don’t seem like er yeah now sence you lef’ home. Does
youah husband tek you to pictuh shows?
Sapphie
Puhl, what’s Granny Maumee like now, is she failed any? Is she
fie’ce as eveh ’bout the burnin’ and the w’ite mens?
Pearl
Why, of course she is. She don’t neveh change f’um year ter year.
Come on, let’s see baby. What youah husband’s name? You nevah
sent us wu’d what youah new name was.
Sapphie
 That’s what I want to see you for before Granny Maumee comes
out. Come here. [She lifts a veil from the child’s face.]
Pearl
[Peering eagerly forward and then starting back.] W’ite!
Sapphie
[Breathlessly.] How’ll she take hit? What’ll she do? I’m scared of
her.
Pearl
A light-head merlatter! So youah husband didn’t come ’cause they
ain’t no husband. Who’s the man?
Sapphie
You know wheah I work.
Pearl
Lightfoot!
Sapphie
He des would have his way.
Pearl
So, he took you off to town with him, did he, and that’s how come
you have the luck to go. I praise King Jesus he kept me f’um such
luck.
Sapphie
How’ll she take hit?
Pearl
Take hit! Does you spose we can take’n tell her? Thank my Makeh
she’s blind. It’s the mussy of Gawd her eyes was swiveled in w’ite
man’s fire before she see the w’ite man mix with her blood. You—
Sapphie
 Oh, I don’t care what you calls me if you’ll only help me and keep
Granny Maumee off’n me and baby.
Pearl
It’s only helpin’ to keep us all from ’struction that I’ll keep it from
her.
Sapphie
What you think she’d do if she found out?
Pearl
I don’t know. Sometimes when her mine runs on ’bout the burnin’
she begins to go back’ards.
Sapphie
[Fearfully.] What you mean?
Pearl
You knows what I means. Away from the love of Gawd, back to
that Affykin devil stuff.
Sapphie
[Starting with a cry toward the door at back.] Oh, she might witch
me and the baby too.
Pearl
Don’t be scared. She won’t tech you ’cause she won’t know the
sinneh you been.
Sapphie
He des would have his way. [A tap is heard outside Granny’s
door.]
Pearl
She’s comin’.
 [Sapphie shrinks back toward opposite side of room as
door opens and Granny enters wearing a red
dress with red apron and red silk cap on her head.
She pauses just inside and listens intently.]

Granny
Who bin talkin’?
Pearl
Me. [She guides Granny to her chair.]
Granny
Well, talk on. How I look? [She straightens proudly in her chair.]
Pearl
Good. The red ain’t faded none.
Granny
Dat’s good, fer I needs hit bright dis day an’ night. De babe’ll wan’
tuh see hit. Red’s de fus’ coloh er baby notice an’ red allers goes wif
black. Red neveh go wif w’ite. Looks ghas’ly. I use allers tuh wrop
my Sam in red— [She pauses and her voice grows shriller.] an’ red’s
de las’ way I seen ’im.
Pearl
Now, Granny—
Granny
Dat’s right, I mus’ tek my mine off er dat sight now. But I’ll tek’n’
wrop dis noo black babe in my red ap’un dat hilt my Sam. In red he
shill be wrop an’ black he shill shine. Royal black we is an’ royal
black we shill stay. Praise my Makeh, dey ain’ no drop er any yutheh
coloh in ’im. All us wimens wuz hones’, all de way down, an’ we kep’
clean er de w’ite streak. We kep’ us clean, praise my King, an’ we
will ter de een’. W’ite blood were ’stroyin’ angel tuh my fambly f’um
de beginnin’s, but hit neveh yit mix wif us. We wuz save f’um dat las’
pizen.

[Sapphie turns as though to go out through the door at

right with her child. Pearl motions her through
side doorway at left. She goes out softly.]

Pearl
Hattie Lee she uz hones’ an’ her baby’s w’ite. That w’ite man tuk’n
marry her with preacheh.
Granny
Married wif preacheh! Do dat change de trashy blood? I wudn’
have dat kinder mud pumpin’ in er babe er my blood, not ef de
sevumty eldehs had j’ined a w’ite man tuh you er Sapphie.
Pearl
W’ite blood no wus’n black blood.
Granny
’Tis fer us! ’Tis fer dis house er sorrer. Hit’s bin fieh, hit’s bin death,
hit’s bin de crawlin’ stream er hell fer me an’ my fambly as fur as I
knows, an’ dat’s a hunderd yeah. But I lets all de yutheh go, ’ca’se I
hates um ernuff fer dis one thing—

[She goes to red-covered chest at right, lifts the lid and

takes out two half-charred sticks of wood.]

Pearl
Now, Granny, put um back—
Granny
[Waving the sticks.] Deze, w’ut I snatch f’um de fieh undeh Sam.
Deze is ernuff to mek us hate all er dat blood an’ keep hit fur f’um us.
Pearl
 [Going to her and taking the sticks.] Is this heah makin’ ready for
comp’ny? Now ca’m yo’se’f.

[She lays the sticks on top of the chest.]

Granny
[Seating herself and growing suddenly very still as though
listening.] Yo’re right. Time’s up, de houah is heah an’ de chile is
neah. I feels hit. Run an’ open de do’. Sapphie mus’ be comin’ up de
paf. Mek ready. I feel my noo man chile neah me.

[Pearl goes out doorway at left. After a moment she

and Sapphie enter without the baby. Granny
stands up.]

Sapphie
[Going forward hesitatingly to Granny.] Granny Maumee.
Granny
Give ’im heah in deze ahms.
Sapphie
I lay him in yutheh room. I want to see you.
Granny
Fetch ’im.
Sapphie
Aint you glad to have me back?
Granny
Fetch de babe, be swif! [Pearl motions to Sapphie; she goes out
to get the baby.]
Pearl
Her man, he couldn’t come with her.
 Granny
No diffunce. I bless de man an’ wish ’im well, he’s su’ved his
puhpose, but he ain’ none er ouah blood. De boy babe’s de chief un.
[Sapphie enters with the baby.] Give ’im heah, be swif’.

[Sapphie hesitatingly lays the child in Granny’s

outstretched arms. As she does so a strange
reaction, like an electrical shock, seems to
overtake the old woman. She holds out the child
as though she would give it back. After a moment,
however, she presses it to her breast, rocking
back and forth and crooning to it.]

Babe, man babe-um, er noo man, er puore-blood man raise’ up

atter all dem gals. Sam kin res’ now. ’Caze w’y— [She begins to
chant.] ’caze er noo man bin raise up an’ he shill lay hol’ er de stahs
an’ th’ow um down fer vingince. He shill be er ’stroyin’ fieh er
heavum tuh roll ergin de hell fieh w’ut dey lit fer Sam an’ quinch hit
out fuheveh. De wrath er Gawd shill be wif ’im an’ de w’ite blood shill
puhvail no more ergin ’im. De sun an’ moon shill rise no mo’ on my
house an’ fin’ on’y gals, ’caze we got er puore-blood man fer to
gyard an’ carry us on.

[From time to time during her words she has paused

and bent intently over the baby, striving to see it.]

An’ my King’ll not keep de cuss on me now an’ leave me go down

to de grave wifouten sight er you, my babe-um. Dese eyes shill yit
behole. [She rises with the child in her arms.] Go on out er heah,
Puhl an’ Sapphie, lemme be alone now wif my babe. [She waves
them out imperiously.]
Pearl
Whuffo’?
Granny
I wan’s ter see dis chile befo’ I dies.