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PDF The Jazz War Radio Nazism and The Struggle For The Airwaves in World War Ii First Edition Studdert Ebook Full Chapter
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Will Studdert completed his PhD at the University of Kent, where
he specialised on the history of jazz and propaganda during World
War II.
‘This revelatory book throws fresh light on the manner in which the
widespread popularity of jazz was exploited by the Nazis for
propaganda purposes in World War II. One does not require a
knowledge of jazz history to recognise that Studdert’s critical
analysis of the “jazz war” represents an important contribution to the
historiography of World War II and its social and cultural impact is
clear. A wide-ranging, perceptive and authoritative study.’
David Welch, Professor Emeritus of Modern History and
Director of the Centre for the Study of War,
Propaganda and Society at the University of Kent
For Olya
CONTENTS
List of Figures
Glossary
List of Abbreviations
Acknowledgements
Introduction
World War II was the first major conflict in which radio played a
central role. Broadcasting was far more than just a means of
conveying information and entertainment; it had the potential to
inform or deceive, to build or break morale, to amuse and to
intimidate, and, over the course of the war, the ‘battle of the ether’
came to constitute a front in its own right. Listeners in the armed
forces presented broadcasters and propagandists on both sides with
a wholly new kind of audience; young men desirous of upbeat
entertainment and accurate news, living closely together in an
environment where group listening habits and majority taste ruled.
Whatever differences there were in their personal, cultural and
political backgrounds, Allied and Axis forces audiences shared a
common taste for one type of music in particular: jazz.
The widespread international popularity of jazz made it a
potentially formidable weapon, and it is unsurprising that it came to
be exploited as a means of propaganda to such a degree during the
war. My introduction to the curious concept of ‘propaganda jazz’
came some years ago when I chanced upon the recordings of
Charlie and his Orchestra, Joseph Goebbels’ English-language jazz
band. Presumably in keeping with the songs’ original intended
impact on wartime British listeners, I was immediately struck by the
jarring contrast between the familiar American musical ‘evergreens’
and the Nazi worldview reflected in the lyrics, and began seeking out
the existing secondary literature on the subject, starting with Michael
H. Kater’s Different Drummers and Horst J. P. Bergmeier and Rainer
E. Lotz’s Hitler’s Airwaves. Yet the further I delved into books and
primary sources, it became clear that propaganda jazz was far from
being only a Nazi phenomenon; an array of organisations on both
sides of the conflict used popular music as a tool to influence or
attract audiences. The fact that Goebbels’ Reichsministerium für
Volksaufklärung und Propaganda (RMVP) appeared to have initiated
the ‘Charlie’ project as a response to BBC jazz broadcasts to
Germany also suggested that these propaganda strategies did not
emerge in a vacuum but directly influenced and affected one
another.
My comparative research into the uses of jazz music as
propaganda during World War II culminated in a PhD at the
University of Kent, of which this book is the result. Visiting archives
in Britain, Germany, the USA and Canada, I found that the ‘call and
response’ nature of the propaganda was indeed part of an
international discourse involving myriad personalities and
organisations, and encompassing a range of social, political and
cultural histories. Restricting the project’s focus to Britain, Germany
and the USA allowed me to explore the relations between these
individuals and government agencies in greater detail, concentrating
in particular on the work of the RMVP. in Germany, the Office of War
Information (OWI) in the USA, and Britain’s Political Warfare
Executive (PWE), a clandestine body established in August 1941 to
consolidate psychological warfare activities to enemy and neutral
countries. This book does not attempt to provide a comprehensive
overview of the uses of jazz music as a means of manipulation
during the war; the range of its impact and the truly international
nature of its popularity makes this impossible. Instead, it seeks to
reappraise and, in some cases, discuss for the first time several
diverse aspects of ‘the jazz war’ – from semi-legal nocturnal jam
sessions to subversive, clandestine radio stations, and from national
broadcasting policies to governmental debates – in order to facilitate
a clearer and more extensive understanding of jazz’s role in the
conflict.
The broad contemporary interpretations of the terms ‘jazz’ and
‘propaganda’, which I adhere to in this book, differ somewhat from
today’s usage. Although there already existed the belief among
connoisseurs that ‘jazz’ and ‘dance music’ were mutually exclusive
entities,1 in practice the boundaries between these genre distinctions
were fluid, and dance music is inseparable from the wartime jazz
discourse. Even the influential British jazz journal Melody Maker
devoted a great deal of coverage to dance bands, probably because,
since jazz was a minority taste, mainstream appeal was needed to
remain profitable through sales and advertising revenue.2
Meanwhile, many dance musicians, including the popular Geraldo,
jumped on the swing bandwagon during the British swing craze of
1942, and dance-band broadcasts over the BBC would usually offer
‘something for everyone’, from saccharine commercial tunes to ‘hot’
swing numbers.3 Indeed, the BBC had difficulties distinguishing
between jazz, dance music, and swing,4 and aficionados in the USA,
Britain, France, Germany and elsewhere often erroneously perceived
swing to be a slick commercial imitation by white musicians of
‘authentic’ African-American jazz.5 In Germany, the borders between
jazz and dance music were further blurred by the delayed
introduction of jazz to the Weimar Republic.6 A manual issued in
1928 provided instructions on how to convert a salon orchestra into
a jazz band,7 and this distinctly un-swinging model persisted in the
German musical imagination, remaining the dominant format of the
jazz band right up to the end of the Third Reich.
‘Propaganda’ is a similarly problematic concept. From the first
use of the term in Pope Gregory XV’s Congregatio de Propaganda
Fide in 1622 through to continental Marxist parties in the early
twentieth century, it was understood as a vehicle used to spread an
intellectual doctrine, which the Bolsheviks saw as a strictly separate
phenomenon to agitprop – the agitation of the masses. No such
distinction existed for the National Socialists, and propaganda
accordingly assumed a new significance under the direction of
Joseph Goebbels,8 who certainly did the most to ensure that the
word would acquire wholly negative connotations for subsequent
generations. To fully understand the nuances of wartime
propaganda, it is necessary for us to overcome these pejorative
associations and recognise it instead as a variety of communications
processes with differing goals and relationships to the truth.
Indeed, Hans Fritzsche, that otherwise unreliable witness who led
the RMVP’s Press Division from January 1939 until March 1942 and
its Broadcasting Division from November 1942 until May 1945,9
provided a more realistic definition of his craft in his defence at
Nuremberg, describing propaganda as ‘the art of awakening
thoughts or feelings in other people which they would not have
thought or felt without this stimulus’.10 The one consistent element
in all propaganda is the attempt to exert some form of influence
over the recipient, and therefore attempts to bolster morale also
constitute propaganda. They were certainly perceived as such at the
time, with government agencies such as the RMVP, OWI and the
British Ministry of Information (MoI) attempting to psychologically
and emotionally manipulate their own forces and civilians for the
benefit of the war effort. In keeping with the word’s wartime usage,
I will treat both malevolent and benevolent attempts to influence an
audience as propaganda.
Much like the terminology of the era, the wide variety of primary
sources cited in this book is the product of specific contemporary
political and cultural environments. In terms of the jazz discourse,
for example, this is evident in the BBC’s self-perception as the
guardian of British cultural values, a role which was often
incompatible with the arguably more pressing task of making
concessions to popular taste in the name of wartime morale.
Reading between the lines of the empty clichés and bureaucratic set
phrases used by the Nazi cultural apparatus is also vital to any
analysis of Goebbels’ attempted creation of a ‘New German
Entertainment Music’ to replace jazz. I have endeavoured to
contextualise such sources, and the international scope of the book
has in many cases made it possible to cross-reference British,
German and US archive material to provide a range of diverse
perspectives, including an extraordinary German commentary on
BBC dance music policy, revealing some remarkable similarities in
the challenges facing Allied and Axis broadcasters alike in the realm
of musical entertainment.
Melody Maker remains the single most valuable source on jazz
culture in wartime Britain, and was considered significant – or
troublesome – enough by the BBC for the Corporation to keep its
own file on the journal, reopened for the first time for this research.
Its output cannot be properly interpreted without an understanding
of the dramatically varying agendas and credibility of its journalists,
and these are discussed at length in Chapter One. I have also
utilised wartime diaries kept by members of the public for the social
research organisation Mass Observation, which offer fascinating
accounts of everyday life in Britain during the war but cannot be
taken at face value; as Mass Observation’s biographer Nick Hubble
has noted, the diaries have their own ‘internal logic’ rooted in the
organisation’s culture, and the diarists were fully aware that they
were writing for an audience, playing ‘the unique role [. . .] both as
researcher and researched, archivist and archived’.11 Nonetheless,
the various diaries, as well as a series of special reports and
analyses created for and by Mass Observation, provide valuable
personal and street-level perspectives on issues ranging from anti-
Semitism to air raids, morale and popular music, at a time when the
public mood was of paramount importance to the government and
the war effort.
Oral history interviews, too, present their own methodological
problems. The recollections of protagonists, often recorded long
after the events described, are inevitably susceptible to a range of
factors, from manipulation or guidance through the interviewer’s line
of questioning to lapses of memory or attempted self-justification on
the part of the subject. Indeed, the question of vindication is an
obvious challenge when critically assessing evidence such as the
recordings and transcripts of Michael H. Kater’s interviews with
German musicians who collaborated with the Nazis, and may have
had reason to obscure the extent of their complicity. This material
must be approached with appropriate caution, and, wherever
possible, I have corroborated it against other sources. It would,
however, be a mistake to omit such testimony, which, as in the case
of the surviving jazz musicians’ unanimously positive views of Nazi
ministerial official Hans Hinkel, can also open up new and potentially
significant lines of historical enquiry. The experiences of musicians,
broadcasters and listeners on both sides, whether written at the time
or related in retrospect, remain an essential and inextricable part of
the history of popular music in wartime.
This book is chronologically divided into four broadly defined
‘psychological phases’ of the war, each of which is discussed in a
separate chapter. Chapter One will look at the period from the start
of the ‘Phoney War’, the early months of relative military inactivity on
the Western Front, in September 1939 until the beginning of the
Battle of Britain in July 1940. During this time, the so-called ‘cultural
blackout’ intensified the atmosphere of boredom and anxiety on the
British home front, presenting the Nazis with an excellent
opportunity to gain an audience in Britain. Chapter Two covers the
real commencement of Anglo-German hostilities, from July 1940
until the eve of the USA’s entry to the war in December 1941, and
Chapter Three will explore the post-Pearl Harbor ‘turning of the
psychological tide’ through to the catastrophic German defeat at
Stalingrad in February 1943. The final period of the conflict, which
saw Allied ‘total radio warfare’ answering Goebbels’ calls for ‘total
war’, will be discussed in Chapter Four.
CHAPTER 1
THE ‘CULTURAL BLACKOUT’: SEPTEMBER
1939 — JULY 1940
Those who listen to the wireless will tell you that at present
we can pick up in England from eight to ten German stations
daily. If our own broadcasts are not attractive, if the news is
dry, if the entertainment is mediocre, and if the music is of a
low standard, which is what people complain of, the listener
just turns the button and he gets a foreign broadcast. He may
very well tune in to a German programme for its
entertainment value, but he also gets a full measure of
German propaganda, skilfully delivered and in excellent
English. Do not let us undervalue the possible effects of this.
Sir Samuel Hoare, House of Commons, 11 October 19391
Britain
Melody Maker and the BBC
While German radio was co-opting Beethoven to inspire a martial
mentality amongst the populace, the 9 September 1939 edition of
Melody Maker found the British jazz journal in a similarly warlike
spirit. The front page was divided into two parts: ‘Our Job Now’
highlighted the new responsibilities acquired by the musical press,
and ‘Your Job Now’ reminded British musicians of their role in
maintaining morale. Even the heroes of the comic strip Billy Plonkit
and His Band, a weekly feature following the exploits of a hapless
jazz group, were mobilised for the cause. Their wartime debut
showed Plonkit’s group marching in khaki uniforms, complete with
rifles and kit bags, and the bandleader staring determinedly into the
unknown future. The nonchalant caption states: ‘Cheerho, Fellers.
We’ve got a gig in Poland!’13
This militarisation of the Plonkit strip was symbolic of the general
mobilisation of the British jazz scene that was already underway,14
although the gravity of the situation was tempered with a tongue-in-
cheek approach to international developments which, to paraphrase
the historian Martin Doherty, arguably represented ‘bravado
disguised as humour disguising fear’.15 Melody Maker quipped that
the feuding dance musicians Bert Ambrose and Jack Harris were
rumoured to be about to sign a non-aggression pact,16 and the
South-West London Rhythm Club announced the assembly of a
‘Supreme War Council’, which had reached the unanimous decision
that they should ‘continue to grind out jazz propaganda each Sunday
between 3 p.m. and 6 p.m. at their headquarters’, and invited
members of newly defunct rhythm clubs to join for no extra cost.17
Indeed, one week earlier, Melody Maker had already insisted that
jazz would be an active protagonist in the coming conflict:
Is it beyond the wit of all the men at the B.B.C. to devise and
provide a continuous daily entertainment radio service of 24
hours as a means of keeping up the spirits of the populace in
general and civil defence workers in particular?
Cannot [BBC Director-General] Mr. Ogilvie realise that,
after the conclusion of the B.B.C.’s midnight news, there is
nothing for these listeners to do but tune into the violent anti-
British propaganda emanating from a treacherous renegade
[Lord Haw-Haw] in Germany, whose ‘music hall act,’ though
unconsciously funnier than Arthur Askey still makes any
decent stomach revolt?
[. . .] What’s wrong with giving listeners instead plenty of
dance music by plenty of bands?
Why has British radio got to be the world’s worst bore?32
The potential for such criticism to have an impact on BBC policy was
evident from a memorandum written by Godfrey Adams, the Director
of Programme Planning, dated 1 August 1939, which anticipated ‘a
reaction from the public that our purge of dance music has been too
severe. We ought perhaps, therefore, be prepared for some
concession if pressure is considerable.’33 On 20 September, the
Corporation’s West of England Press Officer A. J. P. Hytch reported
‘considerable interest in the dance band situation from specialist
papers such as Melody Maker’ and requested ‘a line on future plans’
with which to feed the media,34 indicating that the BBC was paying
at least some attention to the journal and taking account of its
readers’ views from the outset of the war.
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