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The Language of World Trade
Politics
Outcomes in major multilateral trade negotiations are conventionally explained

as resulting from interests weighted by (trading) power. Offering a different
overview of the concepts we use to talk about the international trade regime, this
edited collection puts the ideational foundation of world trade politics centre
stage, and critically examines the terms in which we make sense of world trade
politics.
The concepts used to make sense of world trade politics are often employed
strategically, making some aspects of reality visible and others invisible. Reflect-
ing upon ten key concepts from ‘trade’ itself to ‘protectionism’ and ‘justice’, this
book poses two broad questions: first, how and by whom have the meanings of
different terms used to describe, challenge and defend world trade politics been
constructed? Second, how have the individual terms changed over time, and with
what consequences? The editors and contributors draw on a broad range of
theoretical approaches, from post-structuralism or cognitivism to normative
theory, shedding new light on why certain trade issues and agendas win out over
others, who benefits from the current system of trade governance, and what con-
temporary challenges the World Trade Organization faces. In doing so, the book
speaks to a growing and diverse constructivist literature in International Political
Economy.
This book will be of interest to scholars, students and policy professionals
working within International Relations, International Political Economy and
economics.
Klaus Dingwerth is Professor in Political Science with a Focus on the Political

Theory of the Globalized and Digital Society at the University of St. Gallen,
Switzerland and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute
(GPPi).
Clara Weinhardt is a Lecturer in International Relations at the Hertie School of

Governance and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute
(GPPi).
RIPE Series in Global Political Economy
Series Editors: James Brassett
University of Warwick, UK
Eleni Tsingou
Copenhagen Business School, Denmark
and Susanne Soederberg
Queen’s University, Canada
The RIPE Series published by Routledge is an essential forum for cutting-edge

scholarship in International Political Economy. The series brings together new
and established scholars working in critical, cultural and constructivist political
economy. Books in the RIPE Series typically combine an innovative contribu-
tion to theoretical debates with rigorous empirical analysis.
The RIPE Series seeks to cultivate:
• Field-defining theoretical advances in International Political Economy

• Novel treatments of key issue areas, both historical and contemporary, such
as global finance, trade, and production
• Analyses that explore the political economic dimensions of relatively neg-
lected topics, such as the environment, gender relations, and migration
• Accessible work that will inspire advanced undergraduates and graduate
students in International Political Economy.
The RIPE Series in Global Political Economy aims to address the needs of stu-
dents and teachers.
Transnational Capital and Class Fractions

The Amsterdam School Perspective Reconsidered
Edited by Henk Overbeek and Bob Jessop
The Language of World Trade Politics

Unpacking the Terms of Trade
Edited by Klaus Dingwerth and Clara Weinhardt
Power in North-South Trade Negotiations

Making the European Union’s Economic Partnership Agreements
Peg Murray-Evans
For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/RIPE-

Series-in-Global-Political-Economy/book-series/RIPE
The Language of World Trade
Politics
Unpacking the Terms of Trade
Edited by Klaus Dingwerth and

Clara Weinhardt
First published 2019
by Routledge
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and by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2019 selection and editorial matter, Klaus Dingwerth and Clara
Weinhardt; individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Klaus Dingwerth and Clara Weinhardt to be identified as the
authors of the editorial matter, and of the authors for their individual
chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
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without intent to infringe.
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ISBN: 978-1-138-47983-8 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-351-06466-8 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
Contents
List of illustrations vii

Notes on contributors viii
Acknowledgements xi
List of abbreviations xiii
1 Terms of trade: introduction 1

K laus D in g wert h and C lara W ein h ardt
2 Trade 22
M att h ew E a g leton - P ierce
3 Protectionism 32
Gary W inslett
4 Foreign direct investment 50

L ukas L insi
5 Multilateralism 64
M att h ew L ouis B is h op and V albona M u z aka
6 Democracy 80
K laus D in g wert h
7 Civil society 97
M ic h ael S tran g e
8 Coherence 115
F elix A nderl
vi Contents
9 Development 132
C L A R A W E I N H A R D T A N D A n g ela Geck
10 Environment 152
E mily L yd g ate
11 Justice 176
C lara B randi
Index 193
Illustrations
Figures
8.1 Coherent with what? 125
8.2 Coherent with whom? 126
Tables
4.1 Where in Europe are the US multinationals? 57
8.1 Forms of coherence 123
9.1 Developing country categories in statements at GATT
sessions of contracting parties and WTO ministerial
conferences 144
11.1 Mapping justice-based arguments 177
11.2 Discursive dynamics and meaning-makers 181
Contributors
Felix Anderl is a Research Associate in International Relations at Goethe

University Frankfurt where he focuses on the interaction of protest move-
ments and international organizations, especially in the fields of economic
governance and development.
Matthew Louis Bishop has been Senior Lecturer in International Politics at

the University of Sheffield, UK since 2016. Previously, he worked at the
University of the West Indies in Trinidad and Tobago, and has held visiting
positions at universities in the UK (Warwick, as Transatlantic Fellow), the
Netherlands (Institute of Social Studies and the Royal Netherlands Institute
of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies) and China (Wuhan). Matthew is
also the founding managing editor of the Caribbean Journal of Inter-
national Relations & Diplomacy. His primary area of research interest is
the political economy of development, with a particular focus on small
states in general, and the Caribbean specifically. He also works on trade
politics, democratisation, rising powers, and international drug policy. He
is the author of two books: The Political Economy of Caribbean Develop-
ment, and, with Jean Grugel, Democratization: A Critical Introduction,
both published by Palgrave in 2013; and the co-editor, with Peter Clegg
and Rosemarijn Hoefte, of Post-Colonial Trajectories in the Caribbean:
the Three Guianas (Routledge, 2017).
Clara Brandi is Senior Researcher and Project Leader at the German Develop-
ment Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). As an eco-
nomist and political scientist, she works on global governance questions,
trade and international normative theory, focusing on sustainable develop-
ment and the linkages between trade and the environment with a special
interest in the role of developing countries and rising powers. She has pub-
lished a number of journal articles, book chapters and policy briefs on these
and related topics. She completed her PhD at the European University Insti-
tute, a Master’s in Economics from Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg and
an MPhil in Politics from the University of Oxford.
Contributors ix
Klaus Dingwerth is Professor in Political Science with a Focus on the Political
Theory of the Globalized and Digital Society at the University of St. Gallen,
Switzerland. His research interests lie at the intersection of global governance
and political theory, with his current research focusing on the legitimation of
international organizations in general and the rise of a democratic legitima-
tion narrative in particular. His books include The New Transnationalism:
Transnational Governance and its Democratic Legitimacy (Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2007), Postnationale Demokratie (VS Verlag, 2011, with M. Blauberger
and Ch. Schneider), and International Organizations under Pressure (Oxford
University Press, forthcoming).
Matthew Eagleton-Pierce is a Lecturer in International Political Economy at the
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. His primary
research interests lie at the intersection between political economy and soci-
ology, including the politics of world trade, the history of neoliberalism, and
the conceptual analysis of power and legitimacy. He is the author of Symbolic
Power in the World Trade Organization (OUP, 2013), a book which explores
how the thought of Pierre Bourdieu can shed new light on trade diplomacy; as
well as Neoliberalism: The Key Concepts (Routledge, 2016), a guide to the
vocabulary of contemporary capitalism. He previously taught at the University
of Oxford, the London School of Economics, and the University of Exeter.
Angela Geck is a Research and Teaching Associate at the Institute of Political
Science, University of Freiburg. Her research deals with discourses, practices
and power structures in international institutions. In her PhD, completed in
2015, she analysed practices of strategic arguing in WTO negotiations and
their linkage to north-south power relations. Currently, she works on institu-
tional dynamics in the fields of climate change and human rights.
Valbona Muzaka is Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy at the
European and International Studies Department, King’s College London, UK.
Her research interests include issues related to the governance of intellectual
property rights, trade and global public health, as well as the knowledge
economy, development and the emerging economies, especially India and
Brazil. She is the author of a book on the politics of intellectual property
rights and access to medicines, The Politics of Intellectual Property Rights
and Access to Medicines (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) and of a
number of journal articles and book chapters on these and related topics. She
is currently completing a new book on the politics of biotechnology and
access to medicines in India and Brazil.
Lukas Linsi is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Amster-
dam. His research interests cover the role of narratives in international eco-
nomic affairs, the politics of statistics and the political economy of executive
remuneration. He completed his PhD at the London School of Economics in
2016 and was previously a Visiting Scholar at Harvard’s Weatherhead Center
for International Affairs.
x Contributors
Emily Lydgate is a Lecturer in Law at the Law School of the University of
Sussex. She specialises in the legal dimensions of international trade, and in
particular its interaction with environmental governance and regulation.
Emily is a fellow of the UK Trade Policy Observatory and has consulted at
the United Nations Environment Programme Economics and Trade Branch.
She has published articles in the Journal of World Trade, World Trade
Review and Journal of International Economic Law.
Michael Strange is Reader in International Relations at the Dept. of Global
Political Studies, Malmö University. He has authored Writing Global Trade
Governance – Discourse and the WTO (Routledge, 2013), and his research
has appeared in journals including Critical Policy Studies; Politics; Inter-
national Journal of Public Administration; Global Discourse; Alternatives:
Local, Global, Political; Journal of Civil Society; Media, Culture & Society;
and, Geopolitics. He is a regular reviewer for journals including European
Journal of International Relations, International Political Sociology; and,
Third World Quarterly. He has a background in institutional analysis of both
the European Union and the World Trade Organization, and he is a co-
founder of the IPE Öresund network. His research covers both trade govern-
ance, civil society, social movements, and transnational forms of legitimacy
and democracy.
Clara Weinhardt is a Lecturer in International Relations at the Hertie School of
Governance and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute
(GPPi). She previously held positions as postdoctoral researcher at the
Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences and at the Univer-
sity of St. Gallen. She has also been a Research Associate at GPPi’s Innova-
tion in Development programme. Her research interests combine questions of
global governance with theoretical approaches to international negotiations,
with a particular focus on the issues in the areas of trade and development.
Her empirical research focuses on EU–Africa relations, and emerging coun-
tries, especially China. She completed her PhD in International Relations at
the University of Oxford; her work appeared among others in International
Studies Quarterly and the Journal of Common Market Studies.
Gary Winslett completed his Ph.D. in Political Science at Boston College in
2016 and was a Max Weber Postdoctoral Fellow at the European University
Institute in 2016–2017. In 2018, he joined the Political Science department
and International Politics and Economics Program at Middlebury College.
His research focuses on the political economy of international trade and spe-
cifically on the intersection of trade and domestic regulations pertaining to the
environment, consumer safety, labour standards, and intellectual property. He
also researches the political economy of the relationship between the tech
industry and the U.S. government.
Acknowledgements
It has been a while since our idea for this book first emerged after a workshop
we hosted in St. Gallen in spring 2015. Titled ‘Thinking about Trade: Cognitive
Approaches to World Trade Politics’, the workshop explored how the ways we
imagined, understood and made sense of world trade politics were, at the same
time, forces that shaped how actors behaved in world trade politics. While the
two of us had not approached the workshop with an edited volume in mind, the
many discussions over coffees, lunches, dinner and drinks led us to see some
value in a different kind of product: a book that maps the mind maps we use to
make sense of world politics; that provides insights into how thinking about
trade has developed over time; that values essays as a form of writing in the
social sciences; and that could itself be of value to the efforts of lecturers as well
as students tackling conventional questions of world trade politics from a slightly
different angle.
This book is the outcome of these discussions and the longer process of
writing, rewriting and editing to follow. We hope it delivers on the promises
listed above. Like with any academic project, however, it took more than just us
to get it started, let alone cross the finishing line. In brief, this book could not
exist without the support numerous individuals and institutions have offered.
Starting with individuals, our biggest thanks goes to the contributing authors.
Some of them were part of the initial workshop; others joined the project at a
later stage when we were looking for experts on a particular ‘term of trade’. All
of them had many other commitments besides their contribution to our volume.
And yet, they not only signed up to write one-word titled chapters along the lines
we suggested, but also responded carefully and – most often – quickly to several
rounds of comments from us as well as to the recommendations we received
from two anonymous reviewers. Hence, this book is the product of its contrib-
uting authors as much as it is ours.
Institutionally, the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF ) helped with a
mobility grant that allowed Clara to visit St. Gallen for two months and prepare,
among many other things, the workshop that led to this volume. Our collabora-
tion was further facilitated by a subsequent grant from the University of St. Gal-
len’s Basic Research Fund where Stefan Graf was particularly helpful in figuring
out how to make things possible. The Global Democratic Governance Profile
xii Acknowledgements
Area at the University of St. Gallen provided funding for the initial workshop,
with Hilde Engelen lending a hand in the organisation of the workshop itself.
Finally, the University of St. Gallen (in Klaus’s case), the University of Bremen,
and the Hertie School of Governance (in Clara’s case) provided the institutional
environments in which an edited volume like ours could thrive. We gratefully
acknowledge the support of all these bodies.
Beyond the authors and facilitators, we are grateful to all those who have
commented on earlier drafts of the book or its parts. At the initial workshop,
Carolyn Deere-Birkbeck, Regina Hack, Juan Sebastian Palacio, Ellen Reichel,
Henning Schmidtke, and Silke Trommer provided valuable comments on the
papers that were presented. Subsequently, Felix Berenskoetter provided written
comments on our framework chapter. In addition, two anonymous reviewers
commissioned by Routledge carefully read the entire manuscript and made thor-
ough and very constructive recommendations that helped us to further hone our
arguments. In the final stages of making this book, Pieter Rhynhart provided
valuable research assistance.
Finally, at Routledge, we encountered much enthusiasm and support for our
ideas. We thank Rob Sorsby for his guidance throughout the process; Eleni
Tsingou, James Brassett and Susanne Soederberg for taking our volume under
the wings of the RIPE Series in Global Political Economy; and Claire Maloney
for her advice in the final stages of preparing our manuscript.
Berlin and St. Gallen in March 2018
Abbreviations
ACP group African, Caribbean and Pacific group of countries

AEHT Amazon Europe Holding Technologies
AEU Amazon EU Sarl
AfDB African Development Bank
BEA US Bureau of Economic Analysis
BPM Balance of Payments Manual
CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora
CPB Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
CSOs Civil society organisations
CTE Committee on Trade and Environment
CUSTA Canadian–United States Free Trade Agreement
DFQF Duty-Free Quota-Free
DG Director-General
DG Trade European Commission’s Directorate General for Trade
DMD Doha Ministerial Declaration
EEC European Economic Community
EGS Environmental Goods and Services
EIF Enhanced Integrated Framework
EMIT group Group on Environmental Measures and International
Trade
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FTAs Free trade areas
G20 Coalition of developing countries pressing for ambitious
reforms of agriculture in developed countries
G77 Group of 77 developing countries
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GI Geographical indications
GSP Generalized System of Preferences
xiv Abbreviations
ICSTD International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IP Intellectual property
ISD Investor–state dispute
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ITO International Trade Organisation
LDCs Least Developed Countries
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MEAs Multilateral environmental agreements
MFN Most-favoured nation
MNC Multinational Corporation
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NIEO New International Economic Order
NPR Non-product-related
NTBs Non-tariff barriers
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIE World Organization for Animal Health
PPMs Processes and production methods
RTA Regional Trade Agreements
S&D Special and Differential Treatment
SIDS Small Island Developing States
SPEs Special Purpose Entities
SSM Special Safeguard Mechanism
TBT Technical Barriers to Trade
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
TRIPS Agreement Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UNCHE UN Conference on the Human Environment
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNEP United Nations Environmental Program
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US United States
USTR United States Trade Representative
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
1 Terms of trade
Introduction
Klaus Dingwerth and Clara Weinhardt
Introduction
Each year in fall, before they embark on their journey to warmer places, migra-
tory birds congregate in large numbers in the Northern hemisphere. For some
species, the sites at which they gather remain fixed over the years; other kinds
are more flexible, thus allowing them to choose among several places that offer
a set of specific qualities the birds cherish. Once the birds arrive, however, the
scenes resemble each other: gatherings of pre-migration flocks are not only very
lively, but also full of sound. Chirping and tweeting is heard all over the place,
with some birds quacking aloud while others intone a finer melody.
In a way, the meetings of the international trade policy community are not so
different. Throughout the year, that community also meets regularly, with meet-
ings including quite some posturing and comparing status. Towards the end of
each year, moreover, the world trade calendar brings together the entire com-
munity in one place. Its members meet to take stock, negotiate and formulate an
agenda that will lead them, not to a warmer place, but into a more prosperous
future. For a long time, the place of their gathering has been fixed. Traditionally,
meetings took place in Geneva, the city that hosted the secretariat of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) from the latter’s establishment in 1947.
Once the old GATT gave way to the new WTO in 1995, the rhythm of the meet-
ings changed from annual to biennial. The places of meetings have also become
more diverse; but they, too, need to fulfil certain criteria. While birds appreciate
wetlands, coastal zones or isthmuses, the trade policy community requires the
proximity of an international airport, a large enough congress centre and
effective guarantees for the physical security of the delegates. But most impor-
tantly, like the gathering site of a pre-migration flock, meetings of the inter-
national trade policy community include a lot of chirping and tweeting, with
some delegates raising their voices while others seek to gain attention by
weaving a subtler argument.
Granted, the analogy is a bit of a stretch. But the same could be said of some
of the analogies and metaphors the trade policy practitioners use to argue their
case. To do so, they claim that a ‘conclusion of the Tokyo Round [is] absolutely
essential to the future health of the world trading environment’ or that, on the
2 Klaus Dingwerth and Clara Weinhardt
whole, ‘the system had withstood the shocks to which it had been subjected’.
They hold that the GATT is ‘the guardian of free trade’ and the export sector an
‘engine of growth’ for GATT members. And they maintain that the world
economy is ‘at a crossroads’, that ‘dark clouds are on the horizon’ or that GATT
members need to ‘stem the tide’ when protectionist pressures mount.1
Of course, we all know that the world trading environment can neither be
‘sick’ nor particularly ‘healthy’ in a literal sense; that the export sector is an
‘engine’ only in a figurative way and that ‘dark clouds on the horizon’ are a code
for something else, namely the prospect of something unpleasant happening. But
if this is so, why would the delegates of GATT members wish to use figurative
language at all when seeking to defend the interests of the countries they
represent?
This question is puzzling indeed when seen from the perspective of conven-
tional approaches that explain world trade politics as resulting from interests
weighted by power. If interests and power were all that counted, there would be
no need to package one’s interests in imaginative language. Game theorists
might account for linguistic tricks as tools to deceive the other side about one’s
true intentions, or as a means of publicly tying oneself to a position in a negoti-
ation; but they would not see language as a key dimension of trade politics itself.
In this volume, we take a different route. We start from the assumption that
language, to use yet another image, is the vehicle we use to make sense of trade
politics in the first place: it is the means through which we come to imagine
international trade and its regulation. Language, however, does not only matter
where it is used in a figurative sense to conceive of ‘one kind of thing in terms of
another’ (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 5). In contrast, many of the chapters in
this volume show that language matters as a means to define – and institutional-
ise – ‘what is’ and to draw boundaries (Boltanski, 2011). Based on this assump-
tion, we use this book to unpack the terms of trade in a more literal sense,
namely by examining the concepts through which we have come to make sense
of world trade politics.2
In which different ways is ‘multilateralism’ used and understood in trade pol-
itics? Which images and which other concepts do speakers invoke when they say
that ‘progressive liberalisation’ is a prerequisite for ‘inclusive growth’? Which
roles do these and other concepts play in the politics of world trade? And how
and where does contestation over the terms of trade, literally understood, take
place?
Finally, the concepts we use to make sense of trade politics are not merely
descriptive but also normative. They define not only ‘what is’, but also ‘what has
value’ (Boltanski, 2011). Thus, if someone says the WTO is ‘not democratic’,
competent speakers will recognise that the statement communicates a description
as well as an evaluation: the WTO is not democratic, but it should be! Actors
thus often use a specific term of trade strategically to make sense of world trade
politics in a particular way: concepts make some aspects of reality visible and
others invisible, thereby giving specific meanings to the phenomena that sur-
round us. At the same time, while many things may be said, not all of them will
Terms of trade: introduction 3
be equally persuasive to a target audience. Instead, the concepts trade policy
(and other) actors have built in the past constitute a social structure that shapes
how world trade politics may be represented, what prior beliefs we have about it
and, finally, which policies can be imagined, made and publicly justified.
In short, a further aspect of our initial analogy may be more to the point. For
as bird flocks gather at their pre-migration sites, their chirping and tweeting
remains incomprehensible to most of us, except maybe a few ornithologists.
Nonetheless, we can assume that the birds themselves can ‘decode’ and ‘make
sense of ’ the same chirping and tweeting and put it to use in coordinating their
communities. In the trade world, too, the language that trade policy practitioners
use is full of jargon and often unintelligible to outsiders. Which layperson, for
instance, could decipher and correctly interpret a statement of US trade diplo-
mats that asserts that ‘ “non-violation” complaints are fully appropriate under the
[Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement)]’ (WTO, 2015, p. 37)? For those on the inside of the world trade
discourse, however, terms like ‘non-violation complaints’, ‘special and differen-
tial treatment’ or the ‘Singapore issues’ are not only full of content and history,
but they also fulfil important and often very specific functions as reference points
in a broader discourse.
It is these forms of content, histories and roles in which we are ultimately
interested in this book. In terms of their content, the terms of trade we examine
are linked to particular sets of ideas, ideologies and beliefs that underpin social
order. In terms of their histories, the meaning of specific terms of trade are not
fixed. Instead, they may change depending on the discursive and historical
context and on the power the actors who seek change can summon behind their
position (see Berenskoetter, 2016a, pp. 9–11). Finally, in terms of their roles, the
terms of trade we examine reflect and reify social realities by shaping what kinds
of action are conceivable and desired.
Set against this background, the individual contributions in this volume
respond to three broad questions. First, how and by whom were the meanings of
different terms used to describe, challenge and defend world trade politics
originally constructed? Second, how have the meanings as well as the roles of
the concepts we use to make sense of world trade politics become contested?
And third, how did the changing ‘terms of trade’ create some possibilities for
actions while closing the door on others? In their efforts to answer these broad
questions, our contributing authors study concepts primarily in their socio-
political function rather than as analytical categories that are part of an academic
discourse. As a result, they pay attention to the ways in which political actors
contest and reconstruct the changing meanings of a concept over time, and how
new interpretations shift the boundaries of what is politically possible. The
answers they give provide a fresh perspective on world trade politics. They shed
light on how we have come to think about the trade regime the way we do, on
why certain trade issues and agendas win over others, on who benefits from the
ways trade governance is discursively structured, and ultimately also on why
multilateral trade talks have come to a halt.
In larger perspective, our book contributes to a growing body of literature on
‘concepts in world politics’ (Adler-Nissen, 2012; Berenskoetter, 2016b; Mhur-
chuú and Shindo, 2016). In very general terms, we build on this literature in our
effort to trace ‘ongoing attempts to challenge (reimagine) the possibilities of
state-based international relations’ (Mhurchuú and Shindo, 2016, p. 2). More
specifically, we contribute to this strand of writing by reconstructing particular
instances of concept invention, concept fixation and concept transformation
(Berenskoetter, 2016a, p. 10). Doing so in relation to world trade politics natur-
ally links our effort to others in the field, notably Matthew Eagleton-Pierce’s
(2016) Neoliberalism: Key Concepts and Erin Hannah, James Scott and Silke
Trommer’s (2015) collection Expert Knowledge in Global Trade. We go beyond
this literature, however, by focusing specifically on how a set of concepts have
been or become central terms of trade in recent decades. In doing so, we follow
Koselleck (2011, p. 32) in selecting what we see as key terms of the world trade
regime for pragmatic reasons. Yet, while all terms examined in this volume play
a central role in the socio-political language that has come to characterise our
conceptions of world trade politics, our list is neither conclusive nor exhaustive.
Notably, concepts like ‘trade’ and ‘protectionism’ have been at the core of the
world trade regime for a long time, whereas other concepts like ‘democracy’ and
‘environment’ have gained prominence only recently. As a result, the dynamic
nature of the terms of trade becomes an important part of what we seek to
unpack in this volume.
Finally, a focus on language does not imply that material interests and power
do not matter in trade politics. Such a claim would be silly. What we do claim,
however, is that material interests and trading volumes are not all that matters,
and that one important form of power lies in the ability to define the terms of
trade. If these terms shape how we imagine trade politics, they are not merely
analytical lenses; and if actors are aware of the power of words, they will seek to
employ them to make sense of world trade politics in particular ways: to make
some aspects of reality visible and others invisible, to make some aspects seem
problematic while normalising others, or to make some responses appear reason-
able while others remain ‘incomprehensible’ (Suchman, 1995, pp. 582–584). In
other words, because the terms of trade shape the ‘arena of political possibilities’
(Wilkinson, 2009, p. 600), the language in which world trade politics is made
and imagined reflects but also recreates hierarchies and power relationships.
What concepts do
Concepts, Gregory Murphy (2002, p. 1) states in his Big Book of Concepts, are
‘the glue that holds our mental world together’. Concepts, and the way they
relate to each other – be that in classificatory schemes or in ‘chains of equiva-
lence’ – shape how we perceive the world. It is in this sense that Nicholas Onuf
can argue that, ‘ruled by language and its rules, we make rules and instantiate
rule, thereby making the world what it is for us’ (Onuf, 2013, p. xv). Yet con-
cepts do not only provide the basis to make sense of the world for us. In contrast,
language also plays a role, as Onuf (2013, p. xviii, emphasis added) further elab-
orates, in making the world ‘seem more or less the same for everyone’. As a
consequence, language is inherently linked to power in the sense that ‘the world
thus made will always work to the advantage of some at the expense of others’
(Onuf, 2013, p. xv). It is these three basic ideas – language as a means of world
making for us, language as a means of world making for everyone, and language
as a means of structuring power – that broadly inform our volume.
Language and world making for us

Without concepts, we could not organise our sensual impressions, let alone begin
to reason. So, concepts are a basic ingredient for making sense of the world. In
brief, ‘by relating certain phenomena to each other and keeping others apart, con-
cepts fulfil the central function of ordering and structuring our perception of the
world’. Moreover, by allowing us to generalise, they are also ‘fundamental to indi-
vidual and collective learning processes’ (Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2006, p. 186).
That is a relatively simple idea, but since ‘our conceptual system is not some-
thing we are usually aware of ’ (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 3), we tend to
underestimate how much it shapes how we see the world. Basically, concepts
and conceptual schemes respond to questions such as ‘What is X?’ or ‘What is
X a case of?’, but the role of language also goes further in that it allows us to
draw analogies – responding to questions such as ‘What is X structurally similar
to?’ – or establish metaphorical links between phenomena, responding to the
question like ‘In terms of which other thing could X be conceived?’.
The latter aspect has been emphasised in the work of Lakoff and Johnson
(1980) who argue that many of our concepts are ‘metaphorically structured’: we
conceive arguments in terms of war, time in terms of money, ideas in terms of
objects, and words as containers of such objects. This is not to say that we some-
times say that ‘time is money’ but rather that, in our everyday talking about time,
we make use of a long list of expressions that follow the logic of ‘time is money’
– for instance when we ‘invest’, ‘spend’ or ‘give’ time. As a result, Lakoff and
Johnson (1980, pp. 7–9) argue, our concept – and hence our understanding – of
time is systematically structured in terms of another concept, namely money. In
the social realm of politics, the contributions to Terrell Carver and Jernej Pikano’s
(2008) Political Language and Metaphor underline the relevance of metaphors in
domestic as well as international political debate, while Michael Marks’ (2011)
analysis of International Relations theories reveals how our understanding of
international politics is influenced by metaphorical constructions.
Language and world making for everyone

Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 3) use language as ‘an important source of evid-
ence for what the [conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting] is like’.
Accordingly, their primary focus is on how language in general – and metaphor-
ical structures more specifically – helps us to make sense of the world. Social
scientists, in contrast, have mainly been interested in how language structures
the world for the members of a given community or for those forming part of a
common social order.
The label under which much of this work falls is, of course, ‘social construc-
tion’. Ian Hacking’s (1999) The Social Construction of What? not only reveals
how long the list of things said to be ‘socially constructed’ has become in recent
years, but also what the common structure of arguments about social construc-
tion looks like. According to Hacking (1999, p. 12), a key assumption shared by
many works is that ‘In the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted; X
appears to be inevitable’, with the work then demonstrating how X is, in fact,
contingent rather than inevitable. ‘The economy’, he thus holds, could be exam-
ined as a social construct:
Every day we read that the economy is up or down, and we are supposed to
be moved to fear or elation. Yet this splendid icon, the economy, was hard
to find on the front pages of newspapers even forty years ago. Why are we
so unquestioning about this very idea, ‘the economy’? One could argue that
the idea, as an analytical tool, as a way of thinking of industrial life, is very
much a construction.
(Hacking, 1999, p. 13)
Or, he imagines, social constructivist researchers could unmask the idea of a

‘deficit’ by showing how it was ‘constructed as a threat, a constraining element
in the lives of many, an instrument of the hegemony of capital’ (Hacking, 1999,
pp. 13–14). The important aspect here is that once the term ‘deficit’ functions in
this way within a social order, it becomes a vehicle for collective world making
that makes certain forms of behaviour more plausible, more appropriate or even
more imaginable than others. These insights on how language, and the meanings
constructed through it, are central to any social order also apply to the realm of
global governance. As Bjola and Kornprobst (2010, p. 1) remind us, ‘global
(in)action amidst collective problems is not just interest-, issue- or inspiration-
driven, but – on a more fundamental level – shaped by the argumentative pro-
cesses that define what the actors’ interests, global issues and political
imagination are in the first place’.
In a related fashion, Luc Boltanski’s pragmatic sociology of critique takes the
uncertainty which results from the fact that ‘each individual can only have one
point of view on the world’ (Boltanski, 2011, p. 59, emphasis in the original) as
its starting point. The means to cope with (rather than overcome) such uncer-
tainty are institutions. Boltanski understands institutions as primarily semantic,
hence comprising definitions as well as classificatory schemes. On this account,
institutions constitute ‘the means it seems necessary to employ to reduce [uncer-
tainty], or at least to diminish the unease it creates, and to get something to hold
together even minimally – that is to say, for there to be some reality’ (Boltanski,
2011, p. 61, emphasis in the original). The way in which institutions accomplish
this feat is by fixing the relationship between states of affairs (which Boltanski
calls ‘the world’) and symbolic forms (which Boltanski calls ‘reality’): institu-
tions state ‘what is’ and ‘what has value’ (Boltanski, 2011, pp. 69–70). As a
result, a strong institution in Boltanski’s use of the term is one that provides for
a particularly ‘robust reality’ – a ‘reality’ that is unlikely to be questioned. This
might be because the ‘reality’ formulated by an institution is so taken for granted
that alternative ways of seeing the world are either hard to imagine or fail to per-
suade a sufficiently large audience. Or it might be because the fixing of meaning
that is associated with institutions produces costs for those who, willingly or not,
ignore the ‘reality’ thus constructed.
Applied to the world of global governance, these insights point to the arbit-
rary nature of some of the ways in which international institutions ‘fix’ a par-
ticular reality – and the consequences such a fixing may have. Nelson and
Katzenstein (2014, p. 379), for example, point out how the financial crisis of
2008 was made possible by the economic conventions the actors adopted to cope
with uncertainty. Banks and credit rating agencies relied on deeply flawed con-
cepts when modelling risks because their risk-management models ‘offered the
illusion that irreducible uncertainty could be transformed into manageable risk’.
But language is not only about ‘fixing reality’. It is also essential for creating
specific realities, notably through ascribing the status that an object or person
holds. Such status ascriptions go hand in hand with certain understandings of
‘what is good, right and permissible to do to others’ (Bjola and Kornprobst,
2010, p. 12), thereby contributing to world making for everyone. For instance,
the collective ascription of a status as a ‘benevolent hegemon’ in international
politics leads to a reality in which it is permissible for the hegemon to carry out
state interventions. This contrasts with a view of the world in which the hegemon
is ascribed the status of a ‘tyrant’. Language thus shapes which status actors or
objects hold within a social order, and it constitutes the most basic frame of
reference in which actors interpret and appraise choices they and others make
(Kratochwil, 1989, p. 11).
Language and power

This latter point provides a natural link to questions of power. For constructivist
scholars ranging from feminists to Foucauldians, it has always been self-evident
that their studies about the ‘social construction of X’ were essentially studies of
power. Yet, other strands of writing tend to associate power more readily with
its material dimension – for example, as the ability to get one’s will by physic-
ally threatening or economically incentivising others to behave in a certain way.
As a result, those adhering to theoretical traditions other than constructivism
have occasionally found it difficult to notice how studies of ‘webs of meaning’,
rather than of the relative size of armies or treasuries, could shed light on the
question of power. It may thus be useful to spell out that link, if only to avoid
the impression that our volume, while possibly comprising some interesting
stories, ultimately says little about how power is exercised in global trade
governance.
As a starting point, notions such as ‘productive power’ (Barnett and Duvall,
2005) or Bourdieu’s ‘symbolic power’ (Bourdieu, 1991) that have been central
to critical IR scholarship draw our attention to the link between language and
power. Fixing meanings is not merely a linguistic exercise. Instead, ‘discourses
are sites of social relations of power because they situate ordinary practices of
life and define the social fields of action that are imaginable and possible’
(Barnett and Duvall, 2005, p. 56) – an insight which draws on Foucault’s ana-
lysis of how discourses normalise particular actor positions (Foucault, 1972,
pp. 50–55). A particular meaning of trade, for instance, defines not only which
social activities count as trade, but also what the identity of a ‘trader’ entails, and
whose knowledge matters in shaping trade relations.
Drawing on Bourdieu, Eagleton-Pierce (2013, p. 49) argues that political lan-
guage – ‘as a pre-eminent symbolic system’ – is essential to creating and main-
taining power relations in world trade politics (see below). Such understandings
of the link between power and language often focus on semantic constructions,
and the ways in which they create ‘orders of justification’. In a way, Boltanski’s
work already entails the claim that semantic institutions are closely connected to
power because they define what is and what has value. By implication, then,
those who have a capacity to affect, shape or even control semantic institutions
wield significant power. Yet power, unless its exercise is effectively masked, is
usually subject to ‘the requirements of justification’ (Boltanski, 2011, p. 2).
Accordingly, those who hold power will usually seek to defend the underlying
asymmetries as legitimate. These defences draw on as well as inform what
Rainer Forst has labelled ‘social orders of justification’: orders that are, once
more, discursively structured. Like Boltanski, Forst holds that power is rooted in
accepted justifications – that it takes, as he calls it, a primarily ‘noumenal’ form
(Forst, 2015, p. 65). To have power, then, means to be able ‘to influence, make
use of, define occupy or even seclude’ the realm of accepted justifications for
others (Forst, 2015, p. 66, our translation). This ability is primarily, though not
exclusively, rooted in language, hence turning the ability to shape language into
a fundamental source of power in social orders.
The role of language in world trade politics

In the mainstream literature on world trade politics, language plays only a mar-
ginal role.3 Amrita Narlikar, Martin Daunton and Robert Stern’s (2012) Oxford
Handbook of the World Trade Organization, for example, provides a compre-
hensive overview of what the World Trade Organization (WTO) does, how it
goes about fulfilling its tasks, its institutional evolution, agency in the WTO, and
how it might contend with some critical challenges. An ideational perspective,
however, is not systematically covered, leaving little space for a critical examin-
ation of the role of language in shaping central terms of world trade politics.
Tellingly, while the Handbook’s section on ‘Normative Issues’ deals with fair-
ness, labour standards, human rights and the link between trade and environ-
ment, it remains silent on the normative underpinnings of the very terms that
define the core of the world trading system – including the language used to
define ‘free trade’, ‘multilateralism’ or ‘regulatory measures’.4 On ‘free trade’,
the handbook, for instance, simply assumes that ‘the case in favour of free trade
is theoretically clear and empirically rich’ (Narlikar et al., 2012, p. 2).
This omission reflects a general tendency in the mainstream literature to con-
ceive of world trade politics primarily in terms of interests weighted by power
(see Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009). A growing constructivist body of literature
on International Political Economy (for an overview, see Abdelal et al., 2010),
however, has begun to acknowledge the importance of discourses and the ideas
embedded therein for trade governance. While the existing literature does not yet
provide a systematic overview of key ‘terms of trade’ and their contested nature,
it touches upon several insights about the role of language that the different con-
tributions of this volume build on in diverse ways.
First, constructivist scholars highlight that the historical evolution of the
world trading system cannot be understood without regard to the dominant eco-
nomic ideas and paradigms that have prevailed over time. What John Ruggie
(1982) referred to as ‘embedded liberalism’ – a liberalism that grants govern-
ments some policy space at the domestic level to reduce the social costs of trade
openness – has become a powerful reference point in thinking about the social
purpose and legitimation of the post-war trading order. More recently, Andrew
Lang shows from a legal perspective how the concept of ‘neoliberalism’ gradu-
ally replaced the ‘embedded liberalism’ compromise from in the 1970s onwards
(Lang, 2011; see also Eagleton-Pierce, 2016). These shifts in economic thinking
transformed the purpose of the world trading regime itself. Instead of balancing
the social welfare state with the gains in free trade, the pursuit of ‘progressive
growth’ increasingly became an end in itself.
Neoliberal ideas thus led to a re-imagination of the nature of politics, as it
made it increasingly illegitimate for governments to intervene in the economy to
reduce the social costs of trade liberalisation (Lang, 2011, p. 7). Language mat-
tered for this transformation to take place, because neoliberal narratives provided
a new understanding of the government’s most efficient way to regulate the
economy – an understanding that became dominant ‘by appealing to scientific
generality’ (Blyth, 2002, p. 148). The constructivist literature also points out
some of the key ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) that helped
to establish these new economic ideas in the discourses on trade. They range
from business foundations such as the Scaife Funds and the Olin Foundation in
the US (Blyth, 2002, p. 159), the members of the so-called Chicago school (see
Chwieroth, 2010) to international economic institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund (Best, 2013) or the World Bank (Moretti and Pestre, 2015;
Weaver, 2010).
Some authors among this strand of the literature also point out that the domi-
nance of neoliberal economic ideas in the trade discourse limits the power of
actors who seek to move global trade politics in an alternative direction – one
that is not easily reconcilable with the core tenets of neoliberalism. In the early
to mid-1990s, so-called ‘non-trade values’ were introduced into the debate about
trade politics. In particular, civil society actors claimed that the GATT and the
newly built WTO undermined member states’ efforts to protect ‘the environ-
ment’, keep ‘food safety’ standards intact or secure adequate ‘labour standards’
(O’Brien et al., 2000).
Yet, as Lang (2011) claims, the neoliberal turn imposes severe constraints on
re-imagining trade in ways that may include non-trade values. For instance, the
language of ‘coherence’ that came to dominate the relationship between the trade
regime and trade-related issue areas such as the environment or human rights
shifted debates to questions of institutional design (Lang, 2011, p. 130; see also
Anderl, this volume). Others point out how the ‘liberal and legal epistemic
foundations’ made it more difficult for NGO actors to push for more just and
sustainable trade policies (Hannah, 2011, p. 181), or emphasise the biases inher-
ent in the terms associated with economic liberalism. For instance, government
regulation is discredited as a ‘non-tariff trade barrier’, while the term ‘neo-
liberalism’ is notably absent in the discussions at the WTO’s largest annual out-
reach event, the WTO Public Forum (Hopewell, 2015, p. 1139). Yet, not all
scholars regard the language of world trade politics as a constraint on the power
of certain actors. Cho (2014, p. 689), drawing on a ‘thin’ version of constructiv-
ism, emphasises that the WTO’s legal norms are important for establishing
a shared language among its members, which in turn facilitates interaction by
creating ‘certain stabilized standards or expectations’.
Second, constructivist-leaning scholars shed light on the techniques actors
use to change the dominant ways of talking about trade, often to counteract a
marginalised position they find themselves in. Matthew Eagleton-Pierce (2013),
for example, draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power to explore
the strategies Southern countries adopt in their pursuit of a more equitable
trading order. He shows not only how seemingly technical or neutral terms are
in fact highly political, but also reveals how developing countries make use of
framing and mimicry – a technique of either social adaptation or subversive
appropriation of an opponent’s argument – to legitimate their demands for
‘asymmetrical market opening’ in the WTO’s negotiations over agriculture.
Mlada Bukovansky (2010, p. 88), in turn, examines Southern countries’
attempts to delegitimise the position of Northern countries as a ‘hypocrisy of
the strong’ in which Northern countries are depicted as unwilling to cut their
own domestic trade-distorting subsidies on agriculture, while they demand
others to further liberalise their markets. Similarly, Jane Ford claims that devel-
oping countries (re)defined their identity in ways that became more compatible
with the community of ‘multilateral traders’, thereby enabling them to discredit
the arguments of Northern countries. This worked, notably, by ‘[adopting] the
language of liberal economics to de-legitimate attempts to incorporate labour
and environmental standards in the trading regime’ (Ford, 2003, pp. 5 and 8). In
the context of free trade negotiations, Del Felice (2014) shows how NGO actors
strengthened the West African side’s opposition to signing a free trade agree-
ment with the economically much stronger European Union through discursive
processes of politicisation.
In contrast, actors can also employ discursive strategies to sustain dominant
power positions they already maintain. Rorden Wilkinson’s (2009) work thus
shows how developed countries have strategically used a particular discourse on
the concept of ‘crisis’ of the multilateral trading system to put pressure on devel-
oping countries. Based on a ‘crisis’ discourse, the latter were asked to make
stronger concessions to avoid the alleged possibility of collapse. The use of
metaphors, such as trade as a ‘bicycle’ that needs to be kept in motion, can also
legitimise the ways in which the multilateral system already functions while
diverting attention away from the outcomes it produces (Wilkinson, 2014).
Moreover, Siles-Brügge (2013, p. 599) shows how the European Commission’s
Directorate General for Trade strategically employed narratives on globalisation
to legitimise neoliberal economic programmes that were controversial at the
level of member states and their societies.
Finally, some constructivist-leaning scholars have begun to focus more expli-
citly on the role of ‘experts’ and ‘expertise’ – including its strategic use – in
shaping the discourses of global trade politics. Drawing on Bourdieu’s field
theory, Hopewell (2015, p. 1139) argues that mastering the technical language of
trade is a key ‘expertise’ for trade actors if they want to be regarded as credible.
Hannah, Scott and Trommer (2016) assess in detail the structures that shape the
monopoly over knowledge that trade experts hold, how expert knowledge in turn
shapes trade policy making, and what tensions it leads to as actors seek to chal-
lenge the status quo.
Third, the ‘thick’ constructivist literature that makes use primarily of post-
structuralist methodologies shows how concepts are constitutive of world trade
politics. Mortensen emphasises that legal classifications within the WTO project
introduce a ‘rights’ discourse into global trade politics, which ‘provide[s] a
structuring space, or communicative framework, in which actors debate over
what is legitimate’ (Mortensen, 2012, p. 82). For instance, the reliance on
customs classifications from the World Customs Organization has structured the
field of trade in renewable energy in ways that legitimised the use of subsidies,
despite opposition from developing countries. Michael Strange (2013) advocates
for a theoretical perspective that reveals the discursive character of the WTO. It
allows us, he argues, to examine ‘how something like “trade” can be articulated
– and rearticulated’, including how language (re-)creates the boundaries of the
world trade regime (Strange, 2013, p. 15). Empirically, his study shows that
trade liberalisation was initially understood as a ‘weapon of the free world’
(Strange, 2013, pp. 41–42). Over time, it turned into a tool for development or
an instrument against protectionist pressures, which had implications for the
kinds of actors that were understood to be part of the trade regime. Accordingly,
what trade is defined as being good for also determines who will be able to say
how trade should be regulated. As a result, just how discourses about the terms
of trade are fixed over time defines not only the realm of possible actions (see
Epstein, 2008), but also who counts as a legitimate actor in world trade politics
at a given point in time (see also Strange, this volume).
How concepts change
We have seen that concepts are important tools of world making. They render
certain forms of behaviour plausible and create hierarchies by structuring the
realm of accepted justifications. Yet, as the notions of invention, fixation, trans-
formation, and disappearance suggest, concepts as well as the semantic fields
they are part of are in constant flux (Berenskoetter, 2016a). While the meaning
of words can be fixed, concepts by definition comprise ‘an abundance of mean-
ings’ (Koselleck, 2011, p. 20).5 They are never truly fixed, and their dominant
interpretation may change over time. With this volume, we therefore seek to
shed light on the different ways in which the terms of trade change, how these
changes come about, and how they matter.
As all chapters show, to uncover how concepts change requires us to pay
attention to the linguistic and socio-political contexts in which contestation
occurs. New concepts as well as new meanings of concepts are necessarily built
in relation to existing ones which they can either replace, compete with or com-
plement. First, some meanings of concepts – or entire concepts – may be
dropped because the discourses in which they are embedded become marginal-
ised. Initially, for example, trade was portrayed as a powerful tool for peaceful
cooperation. This discourse receded to the background when other meanings like
sustainable development became more central to the concept. Second, concepts
may also come to mean new things as novel discourses emerge. The concept of
‘protectionism’ is a case in point. Initially referring to conventional tariffs or
quotas as barriers to trade, it came to denote a broader range of ‘barriers’, includ-
ing less tangible ones like labelling requirements or food safety standards (Wins-
lett, this volume). Third, concepts may be linked in new ways. When calls for
‘democracy’ became more prevalent in the recent decades, the WTO Secretariat
justified its decision-making procedures by linking the concepts of ‘democracy’
and ‘consensus’ in new ways. This linkage allowed it to argue that its decision-
making culture based on consensus made it the ‘most democratic’ of all inter-
national economic organisations (Dingwerth, this volume). Similarly, there are
different ways to interpret the assertion in WTO treaties that trade and environ-
ment are ‘mutually supportive’ (Lydgate, this volume).
How meanings change over time is, however, not arbitrary. As the authors
demonstrate, the linguistic fields in which concepts are embedded reflect specific
socio-political contexts. Material changes in the ‘world’ may mean that concepts
become obsolete or acquire new meanings. That the concept of trade has been
broadened from the 1970s onwards was partly a result of the changing nature of
trade, notably the turn towards ‘beyond the border’ regulation (Eagleton-Pierce,
this volume). Similarly, the far greater number of countries with more diverse
interests operating in a context of shifting power relations in the world trading
system means that the concept of ‘multilateralism’ has come under strain in the
world trading system (Bishop and Muzaka, this volume). Likewise, the rise of
new powers like Brazil, India and China has led to contestation of the binary dis-
tinction between developed and developing countries in the world trading
system, including the differential rights they have access to (Weinhardt and
Geck, this volume). In sum, it is therefore important to recall that both drivers of
change – material and discursive changes – go hand in hand. With regard to the
concept of trade itself, we see for instance changing forms of capitalist exchange
interacting with the norms, values and beliefs of trade experts to generate new
understandings of the thing called – and regulated as – ‘trade’ over time
(Eagleton-Pierce, this volume).
In addition, our conceptual apparatus can also change because actors trans-
late, reinterpret and reframe existing concepts or invent new ones – a phenom-
enon that Ronald Krebs and Patrick Jackson (2007) have aptly described as a
contest of ‘twisting tongues’. All chapters therefore emphasise the role of
meaning makers as ‘change agents’. The chapter on ‘democracy’, for instance,
pits the WTO Secretariat and civil society actors against each other in a discur-
sive struggle over how to define what makes the WTO more democratic (Ding-
werth, this volume). Similarly, developed and developing country representatives
make different claims about what it takes for the world trading system to be
‘just’ (Brandi, this volume) or ‘development-oriented’ (Weinhardt and Geck,
this volume). There can be, however, limits to the reinterpretation of concepts
for strategic purposes. For instance, the chapter on ‘coherence’ shows that the
term is probably the wrong argumentative instrument for a radical critique of the
key norms of the world trading system (Anderl, this volume).
Moreover, some of the chapters that follow draw attention to how scholars
themselves are implicated in the ways in which concepts change. As the chapter
on foreign direct investment illustrates, the failure to make transparent the cri-
teria that both scholars and policy-makers rely upon when referring to ‘Foreign
Direct Investment’ reproduces the biases inherent to different measurement tech-
niques that underpin the concept (Linsi, this volume). As scholars, we are also
providers of and – often unconscious – diffusing agents for ‘specific ways of
imagining worlds’ (Mhurchuú and Shindo, 2016, p. 7).
Finally, the chapters show that while all concepts become contested over
time, which leads to changes in the meanings attached to them, their degree of
contestation varies. Walter Bryce Gallie (1956) prominently put forward the
thesis that many concepts that relate to human relations are ‘essentially con-
tested’. Their contested nature is linked not only to particular characteristics of
concepts, such as being ‘open’ in character (Gallie, 1956, p. 172), but also to the
inherent difficulty of fixing the meaning of concepts that relate to human
behaviour rather than the natural world. As John Gray (1977, p. 339) has argued,
‘the major part of what makes a concept essentially contested is that criteria for
its correct application embody normative standards’. The concept of ‘justice’ in
the world trade regime is an example (Brandi, this volume). As universal agree-
ment on its meaning is unlikely in ‘a social environment marked by profound
diversity’ (Gray, 1977, p. 337), contestedness is inherent to the concept itself.
Yet, as the chapter on ‘coherence’ (Anderl, this volume) reveals, even concepts
that are less directly linked to normative standards become focal points for con-
testation, for instance when actors disagree whether to strive for ‘narrow’ or
‘comprehensive’ coherence of trade with other issues (Anderl, this volume). In
conclusion, paying attention to the normative standards that our communities
associate with a concept allows us to account for different degrees of
‘contestedness’.
Outline of the book

Each of the following chapters engages with a specific term of trade. The authors
build their arguments on a systematic analysis of texts, ranging from annual
reports of the GATT or WTO to international trade agreements, government
statements on trade policy issues, and media representations of trade politics.
Their analyses reveal the historical as well as the contemporary usage of the
respective concepts in international trade politics, and they provide a contextual-
isation and theoretical reflection of the specific terms of trade they look at.
At the beginning of each chapter, the authors provide a critical conceptual
history of the specific term in the world trade regime. This overview addresses
questions related to the mind maps, the discursive dynamics and the meaning
makers of international trade politics. In relation to the mind maps, we ask: What
precise role do concepts and ideas play in the world trade regime? How have
they come to play these roles? And how exactly do they function in these roles?
In view of the discursive dynamics, we examine: How has the meaning of the
term evolved historically? How did change become possible? And what pre-
vented change when it seemed possible? Finally, in response to the meaning
makers, we ponder: Which trade actors have sought to coin the terms of trade?
What explains their successes and failures? And what are distributional con-
sequences of their more successful efforts to change our conception of inter-
national trade politics?
In the second part of each chapter, authors zero in on a specific aspect of that
conceptual history they find particularly noteworthy. While part one of each
chapter thus serves to make the volume coherent, part two of each chapter brings
the different theoretical perspectives of our diverse set of authors to the fore-
front. Combining a common ground in part one with a more creative and diverse
approach in part two, we hope, makes explicit how we have come to see the pol-
itics of world trade in a very particular way, but also to imagine what alternative
understandings might possibly look – or have looked – like.
The order in which we present our terms of trade follows the logic of the
policy field. We first present concepts that are fundamental to the very substance
of the world trading system: ‘trade’, ‘protectionism’ and, as an example of an
economic concept that relates to but goes beyond the notion of trade, the term of
‘foreign direct investment’. What follows are concepts that speak more directly
to the institutional dimension of the world trade regime, its ‘multilateral’ nature
and presumably ‘democratic’ decision-making procedures, as well as the ques-
tion of whether or not ‘civil society’ counts as an actor that may participate in
them. Finally, we focus on concepts that link trade politics to other issues,
including ‘development’, the ‘environment’ and ‘coherence’ as a more recent
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Antonio (flanken, al Sebastiano).
Hodiaŭ ni, vespere, tion faros;
Ĉar ili tiam estos lacigitaj
Per siaj marŝoj tie ĉi kaj tie,
Kaj ili ne singardaj povos esti,
Dormante tiel . . .
Sebastiano (flanken, al Antonio).
Bone, . . . jes, . . . vespere.
(Solena kaj stranga muziko aŭdata).
Alonzo.
Ho, kia belsoneco! kareguloj, aŭdu!
(Venas Prospero, nevidebla, supre—Venas multaj strangegaj
formoj kiuj alportas nutraĵon kaj festenilaron: ili dancas ĉirkaŭe
kun ĝentilaj salutoj, invitas la Reĝon k.t.p. por manĝi, kaj tiam ili
foriras).
Gonzalo.
Mirinde dolĉa sonas la muziko!
Alonzo.
Ĉielo gardanĝelojn al ni donu!
Strangegaj tiaj formoj kiaj estas?
Sebastiano.
Ridinda estas viva petolaĵo:
Nun kredos mi pri la unukornuloj,
Ke Arabujo naskas tronan arbon,
Sidejon de l’ Fenikso; ke la birdo
Nun reĝas tie.
Antonio.
Certe, mi mem kredos
Eĉ ion ajn,—se vi ne kredos ĉion—
Al mi do diru kion vi bonvolos,
Mi ĵuros ĝin kredinda—Ĉar neniam
Vojaĝemul’ mensogis—kvankam, dome,
Idiotuloj ridas.
Gonzalo.
Se mi dirus
En Neapolo ke ĉi tie loĝas
Kreitoj tiel formaj kiel tiuj,—
(Ĉar certe ili estas insulanoj)—
Kaj, kvankam monstroformaj, ilin notu:
Ilia ĝentileco eĉ superas
La nian, kaj aliajn.
Prospero (flanken).
Honestulo,
La veron diris vi: pli ol diabloj
Malbonaj kelkaj inter vi nun estas.
Alonzo.
Je tio mi ne povas tro miregi:
Esprimas formoj, gestoj, sonoj ĉion
(Parolon kvankam ili ne posedas)
Bonege, kion ili volas.
Prospero (flanken).
Laŭdo,
La malaperon sekvas.
(La strangaj formoj malaperas).
Francisko.
Stranga sveno!
Sebastiano.
Ne grave estas: ili nutron lasis,
Kaj ni malsatas. Kiu volas manĝi?
Alonzo.
Neniam mi.
Gonzalo.
Ne timu, nobla Reĝo.
Ĉu en knabtempo kredis ni, ke homoj
Ekzistas bovlaringon posedantaj
Kun viandpoŝ’ pendanta, aŭ aliaj
Kun kapo en la brusto? Nun, ni vidas,
Ke ĉiu revenanta rakontisto
Al ni la pruvon donos. Do, ne timu.
Alonzo.
Nu! staros mi por manĝi, spite ĉio:
Se por la lasta fojo, ne signifas . . .
Ĉar mi jam la plej bonan tempon perdis . . .
Vi, frato, kaj vi, Duko, nin imitu.
(Fulmotondro. Venas Arielo harpiforma, malfaldas flugilojn kaj
per ili kovras la tablon: la festeno malaperas).
Arielo.
Vi, tri pekuloj estas, kiujn sorto
(La granda reĝo de l’ subluna mondo)
Igis la maron, ĉiam malsategan,
Vin vomi sur ĉi tiun landinsulon;
Vin, inter homoj, plej malindajn vivi!
Vi freneziĝas kaj blindiĝas kiel
Mempendigontoj aŭ memdronigontoj.
(Alonzo, Sebastiano, kaj Antonio eltiras siajn glavojn).
Ho, malsprituloj, mi kaj kunsekvantoj
Ministroj sortaj estas: elementoj,
El kiuj glavojn viajn homo faris,
Pli taŭge laŭtan venton povus vundi,
Mortigi la marakvon per ponardo,
Ol eĉ flugilplumeron—mian blovi!
Kaj estas el ni ĉiu nevundebla.
Eĉ se vi vundi povus, tiuj glavoj
Tro pezaj estas nun por brakoj viaj,
Kaj ne leviĝi volas. Sed memoru—
(Ĉar tio estas mia nunafero)—
Ke vi Prosperon el Milan’ forpelis,
En maro lin lasante, kun filino.
Nun, al vi tri, la maro venĝis ilin.
Se vian hontindaĵon la Povegoj
Prokrastis puni, ne forgesis ili:
Marondojn, teron ili kolerigis,
Ke ĉiu kreitaĵ’ vin kontraŭstaru.
Alonzo, vi, pro tio filon perdis, . . .
Kaj mi malbonon al vi tri anoncas
Ol morta kondamnego pli teruran;
Ĉar paŝo ĝi post paŝo vin renkontos
Sur tiu ĉi dezerta terinsulo:
De l’ venĝo vin nenio povas ŝirmi,
Krom via korĉagreno pro la krimo,
Kaj, de nun, vivo pura.
(Malaperas en fulmotondron; tiam kun dolĉa muziko aŭdata,
denove venas spiritaj formoj, kiuj, moke grimacantaj, dancas
ĉirkaŭe kaj forportas la tablon).
Prospero (flanken).
Ho, mia Arielo, vi bravege
Plenumis vian rolon de harpio,
El l’ instrukci’ forgesis vi nenion;
Eĉ vivaj ŝajnis gnomoj kaj koboldoj,
Fantomoj, kiuj servas min fidele!
Nun, kunligitaj, tiuj malamikoj
Senspritaj staras en la povo mia.
Mi iros tuj—lasante ilin tiel—
La bravan princon Ferdinandon vidi
Kaj ankaŭ de ni du la karulinon. (Foriras supren).
Gonzalo.
En nom’ de io sankta, Reĝo mia,
Vi kial staras tiel mirigita?
Alonzo.
Ho, monstra! monstra estas la apero!
Parolis al mi la teruraj ondoj!
Pri tio la blovado eĉ kantadis . . .
Al mi la tondro, de l’ ĉiel’ orgeno,
La nomon de Prospero elparolis,
Min surdigante per profunda baso,
Kaj kantotem’ nur mia krimo estis!
En mara ŝlimo, tial, filo kuŝas,
Kaj pli profunde ol sondilo iam
Fundiros mi kun li. (Foriras).
Sebastiano.
De malamikoj
Malkune mi legiojn batalados!
Antonio.
Vin helpi mi tuj iros!
(Foriras Sebastiano kaj Antonio).
Gonzalo.
Frenezuloj!
Ilia kulp’, veneno malrapida,
Post longe mordas kaj turmentas ilin.
Vi, kiuj povas kuri, mi petegas,
Junuloj, sekvu ilin kaj malhelpu
Malbonon ian kiun eble farus,
Triope, koleruloj.
Adriano.
Kun mi venu! (Ĉiuj foriras).
Akto IV.
Sceno 1.—Antaŭ la ĉambreto de Prospero.
(Venas Prospero, Ferdinando, kaj Mirando).
Prospero.
Se tro severe mi kun vi agadis,
Kompenso tuja vin ĝojigos plene,
Ĉar de memvivo mi al vi fadenon
Oferas: ŝi, por kiu mi nur vivas,
Fariĝu via! . . . Sole de patramo
Devenis la punŝajna humilego
Per kiu vi suferis; l’ amon vian
Traprovi mi deziris, kaj, Reĝido,
Vi noble, eĉ fortege submetiĝis
Al laborego. Antaŭ la Ĉielo,
Tre riĉan donon al vi mi certigas,
Ho, Ferdinando! Tial, ne ridetu
Se mi, fiera je filin’ karega,
Prilaŭdas ŝin, ĉar donas mi trezoron,
Donante idon indan je feliĉo
Pli ol mi povus diri.
Ferdinando.
Vin mi dankas
Kaj fidas pli ol ian orakolon!
Prospero.
Donacon mian, vian feliĉecon
Gajnitan brave, de mi nun ricevu:
Mirando’n prenu; sed virgecon ŝian
Ol vian vivon pli respektu, Princo,
Ĝis de l’ edziĝo l’ unueco sankta
El vi du faros unu; ĉar, alie,
Malbono anstataŭus dolĉan pacon
Kaj superegan benon: via lito
Ne konus amon, sed malpacon akran,
Sovaĝan frukton de malpura vivo.
Atendu ĉaste ĝis himenaj lampoj
Vin al l’ altar’ kondukos.
Ferdinando.
Ĉar mi preĝas
Por edza feliĉec’, idaro nobla,
Kaj paca, longa vivo, puran amon
Mi tiel en mi sentas, ke nenio,
Eĉ penso nemalkulpa loĝi povus
En brusto plena je edzin’ anĝela
Karega tiel! La mallum’ ereba
Ne povon por min malvirtigi havus
Kun ŝi apuda. Forte do mi staras:
Nek tento, nek okazo min submetos
Ĝis venos kroni la feliĉon nian
Himena festo.
Prospero.
Bone vi ĵus diris.
Sidiĝu kune, ŝi nun estas via.
(Vokas) Ho! Arielo, agemulo, venu!
(Venas Arielo).
Arielo.
Povestro mia, kion vi deziras?
Prospero.
Vi kaj sekvantoj agis ĵus bonege,
Kaj mi bezonas, por alia servo,
La helpon vian. Iru, alkonduku
Ĉi tien viajn ĉiujn subspiritojn,
(Mi super ili al vi donis povon),
Vigligu ilin, per rapida movo,
Ĉar al ĉi tiuj junaj gefianĉoj
Mi volas fantazion nun prezenti;
Kaj ili ĝin atendas.
Arielo.
Baldaŭ, mastro?
Prospero.
Tuj, nun, en palpebruma daŭro.
Arielo.
Bone!
Antaŭ ol vi venu! diros,
Aŭ dufoje iru! spiros,
Obeante vin, ni iros,
Piedfingre eĉ deiros,
Supreniros, aŭ subiros,
Laŭ ke vi mem ekdeziros. . . .
Ĉu vian amon, mastro, mi akiros?
Prospero.
Spirito kara, certe, aerido!
Ne venu nun, ĝis mi alvokos. . . .
Arielo.
Bone! (Foriras).
Prospero (al Ferdinando).
Ho, Princo, zorgu ĉiam esti vera:
Ne ludu kun la ĉarma via ravo,
Aŭ sanktaj ĵuroj pajlo nur fariĝus
Por bruli en la brusto. Vin detenu,
Aŭ al promesoj diru tuj adiaŭ.
Ferdinando.
Sinjor’, ne timu, ĉar la virga neĝo
Jam koron mian tuŝis, kaj malhejtas
La flamon ĉe l’ hepato.[14]
Prospero.
Prave, bone!
(Alvokas) Nun, venu, Arielo, spiritaron
Ĉi tien alkonduku! Estu viglaj!
Nenian vorton! Nur okulojn! Vidu!
(Dolĉa muziko aŭdata; venas Iriso).
Iriso.
Cereso, venu, ho, belegulino!
Foriru el kamparo kiun kovras
Tritik’, sekal’, horde’, aveno, pizoj,—
El montoj, kie paŝtas sin la ŝafoj,
El la herbejo, kiu donas fojnon,
Brutaran nutron,—Bordoj ornamataj
Per peonioj, verda kunplektaĵo,
Sur kiuj ŝprucis la Aprila spongo,
Por fari ĉastajn kronojn al la nimfoj;—
El stiparbaro kies ombron serĉas
De amantino fraŭlo forpelita;—
El riĉa vinberejo, el marbordo
Malfrukta, ŝtona, kie vi vagadas. . . .
Ĉar, per Iriso, reĝa senditino,
Ĉiela Juno vin alvokas: venu! . . .
Kortegaj pavoj flugas tra l’ aero. . . .
Ĉi tien venu premi la herbejon;
Gracie, baldaŭ la estrin’ mem venos. . . .
Alproksimiĝu! festu la Reĝinon!
(Venas Cereso).
Cereso.
Iris’, saluton, multe-kolorita
De Juno fidelega heroldino!
Flugilo flava via sur la floroj
Dissemas mielgute dolĉan pluvon;
Per ambaŭ finoj de l’ arkaĵo blua
Ĉirkaŭprenante arbajn ebenaĵojn,
Kaj ankaŭ krutan senarbetan randon.
De tero mia skarpo brila, diru,
Tuj diru kial la Reĝino via
Venigis min sur tiun ĉi herbejon?
Iriso.
De amo vera por kontrakton festi,
Kaj ankaŭ por donacojn fari kelkajn
Al karaj geamantoj.
Cereso.
Ĉielarko,
Ĉu sekvas nun Venero kaj Kupido
Reĝinon nian? Diru. De la tempo
En kiu ili kune konspiradis
Por min senigi je filin’ amata,
Veneron kaj Kupidon mi evitas.
Iriso.
Ne timu ŝin renkonti: mi ĵus vidis
Trenatan per kolomboj, tra la nuboj,
La veturilon kie ŝi, kun knabo,
Rapidas nun al Pafos. Vane ili
Ekpensis tie ĉi malbonon fari
Al niaj geedzontoj, kiuj volas
Atendi ĉaste la himenan torĉon:
Marsamistinon venkis gevirtuloj;
Eĉ ŝia vespa filo sagojn rompis,
Kaj ĵuris ke de nun li plu ne pafos,
Sed, simpla knabo, ludos kun paseroj.
Cereso.
Reĝin’ altega, pova Juno venas:
Ŝin konas mi per l’ iro majestega!
(Venas Juno).
Juno.
Fratino malavara, kun mi iru
Por beni tiujn ĉi du noblajn korojn;
Ke ili ambaŭ estu prosperegaj,
Feliĉaj per edzeco kaj idaro!
Juno.
(Kanto).
Honor’, riĉec’, edziĝbeno,
Longa daŭro, idarpleno,
Horoj ĝojaj per alveno
Benu vin, de Juno l’ beno!
Cereso.
Terplenego, sufiĉego
En garbejo kaj grenejo,
Fruktoplena vinberejo,
Arba, planta rikoltego,
Kun printempa ĝoja daŭro,
Benu vin ĝis lasta horo!
De Ceres’ la beno estu:
Ĉe vi ke ne manko restu!
Ferdinando.
Ĉi tio estas vido majestega
Kaj ĉarme rava! Ĉu mi nun eraras
Pensante ke spiritoj estas ĉiuj?
Prospero.
Spiritoj, vere, kiujn povo mia
El propraj regnolimoj ĵus alvokis
Por fantazion al vi doni.
Ferdinando.
Ĉiam
Kun vi, miriga patro, kaj Mirando,
Mi vivu en ĉi tiu Paradizo!
(Juno kaj Cereso mallaŭte kunparoladas kaj sendas Irison
for).
Prospero.
Karulo, nun, silentu: la diinoj
Kunparoladas grave, do, atentu,
Muteme vidu, aŭ la ĉarmo svenos.
(Iriso revenas).
Iriso.
Najadoj, nimfoj de river’ vagista,
Kun junkaj kronoj kaj mieno ĉasta,
Forlasu akvan la kuŝujon vian;
Alkuru sur ĉi tiun verdan lokon.
Obeu Junon, kiu vin alvokas;
Rapidu, dolĉaj nimfoj, kaj nin helpu
L’ unuon de du koroj por ĝojigi.
(Venas akvonimfoj).
Vi, rikoltistoj lacaj per somero,
Ĉi tien venu, el la garba kampo,
Kun pajlĉapelo ĉiu kapvestita,
Por gaje danci nimfan manon prenu,
Kaj kune saltu en vilaĝa rondo.
(Venas Rikoltistoj konforme vestitaj; ili alligiĝas kun la nimfoj en
ĉarma danco, ĉe l’ fino de kiu Prospero ektremas subite kaj
severe parolas, kiam ĉiuj, meze de stranga, mallaŭta kaj
malorda bruo, peze malaperas).
Prospero (flanken).
Ha! mi forgesis pri l’ konspir’ infera
De besta Kaliban’ kaj kunkrimuloj
Por min mortigi: preskaŭ la minuto
Tuj venos. (Laŭte al la spiritoj) Bone! Ĉiuj nun disiĝu!
Ferdinando.
Pasie kiel via patro agas!
Mirando.
Neniam antaŭ tiel li koleris.
Prospero.
Vi, filo, ŝajnas al mi konsternita:
Nu, estu gaja. Nia magiludo
Nun ĉesas. La spiritoj ĝin farintaj
Aer’ maldensa tute refariĝis . . .
Kaj, kiel tia malfortika revo,
Eĉ turoj nubkronataj, eĉ palacoj,
Solenaj la sanktejoj, ja, terglobo
Kaj ĝia tutenhavo malaperos . . .
Simile al ludsceno nesubstanca,
Ne lasos ili strekon.—Nur sonĝaĵoj
Ni estas, kaj mallongan vivon nian
Ĉirkaŭas dormo.—Princo, nun, mi sentas
Interne ĉagreniĝon: min pardonu;
Kompaton pro la mia maljuneco
Mi petas, ĝis klariĝos mia cerbo.—
Pri la okazo ne maltrankviliĝu:
Se plaĉos al vi, iru en ĉambreton.
Ripozu tie. Paŝoj kelkaj donos
Al mi sentecon.
Ferdinando kaj Mirando.
Paco kun vi estu! (Ili foriras).
Prospero.
Kun penso venu, Arielo, dankon! (Venas Arielo).
Arielo.
De penskunul’ vi mastro, kion volas?
Prospero.
Spirit’, kontraŭbatali Kalibanon
Ni devas tuj. Preparu!
Arielo.
Mastro mia,
Cereson kiam ĵus mi personigis,
Tre volis mi al vi pri tio diri,
Sed tim’ je vin ofendi min haltigis.
Prospero.
Rediru kie vi kanajlojn lasis.
Arielo.
Jam, kiel mi ekdiris, la drinkuloj
Kuraĝe bataladis kun l’ aero,
Ĉar ĝi sur ilin kompreneble blovas,
Kaj, ĉar la tero kisas la piedojn,
Severe ili frapis ĝin—Neniam
Forgesis ili tamen la konspiron—
Mi tiam tambureton ludis, kiam
Ŝajnante ĉevalidoj neselitaj,
Orelojn ili streĉis, palpebrumis,
Flarantajn al muziko levis nazojn.
Mi ĉarmis ilin tiel, ke, bovide,
Forsekvis ili blekimiton mian
Tra dornstiparoj, kaj kreskaĵoj pikaj,
Tibiojn kiuj ŝire difektegis:
Kaj, mastro, fine, ilin mi forlasis
En marĉa, ŝlimpleniĝa starakvejo—
Ĝis la menton’ trempiĝas la drinkuloj
Malpuraj—
Prospero.
Brave, bone, mia birdo!
En groton mian iru nevidebla,
Alportu brilajn senvalorajn vestojn
Kaj falsan juvelaron por, ĉi tie,
Ŝtelistojn ruze kapti.
Arielo.
Tuj mi iras. (Foriras).
Prospero (Sola).
Diablo li naskiĝis, laŭ deveno,
Instruo monstron ne refari povas.
Humane volis mi lin ekbonigi,
Sed vane, ĉar kreskigas lin la jaroj,
En korpo kaj animo, pli malbelan.—
Mi tiel punos tiujn tri kanajlojn
Ke ili blekos!
(Ekvidante Arielon, kiu revenas portante brilŝajnan vestaĵon,
k.t.p.).
Ĉio ŝnure pendu!
(Prospero kaj Arielo restas nevideblaj).
(Venas Kalibano, Stefano, kaj Trinkulo, tute malsekaj).
Kalibano.
Mi petas, dolĉe paŝu, ke ne aŭdu
Eĉ blinda talpo, ĉar ni proksimiĝas
Al lia grotĉambreto.
Stefano.
Monstro, via feino, laŭ via diro, kiu estas tiel senkulpa, verŝajne agis
fripone kun ni.
Trinkulo.
Monstro, mi tute flaras malpuraĵon, kaj mia nazo tre indignas je tio.
Stefano.
Mia simile sentas sin. Ĉu vi aŭdas, monstro? Se okazos ke vi min
malkontentigos, gardu vin, ĉar. . . .
Trinkulo.
Vi tiam estos pereinta monstro.
Kalibano.
Sinjor’, daŭrigu vidi min favore;
Trankvila restu, ĉar premio via
La malfeliĉon mokos. Do, mallaŭte
Parolu. Ĉio, tie ĉi, silentas
Al noktomez’ simile.
Trinkulo.
En ŝlimejo
Botelojn niajn perdis ni hontege.
Stefano.
Tio estas ne nur malhonora kaj malbonfama, sed ankaŭ senlima
perdo.
Trinkulo.
Estas por mi pli grave ol la malsekaĵo. Pro ĝi, tamen, monstro, ni
devas danki vian naivan feinon!
Stefano.
Tuj mi iros serĉi mian botelon, eĉ se tio kostos al mi superorelan
subŝmiriĝon.
Kalibano.
Mi petas, Reĝo mia, kvietiĝu.
Ĉu vi ne vidas tie l’ enirejon
Al la grotĉambro! Nun, silente iru
Por tiun bonan malbonaĵon fari,
Per kiu via estos la insulo,
Kaj Kaliban’ al vi piedlekanto.
Stefano.
Donu al mi la manon. Mi eksentas en mi sangavidajn pensojn.
Trinkulo.
Ho, Reĝo Stefano! Nobelo, inda Stefano! Rigardu, kia vestejo tie
estas por vi!
Kalibano.
Ne tuŝu la ĉifonojn, malsaĝulo!
Trinkulo.
Ho, ho! monstro, ni bone konas tion, el kiu konsistas ĉifonejo. Ho,
Reĝo Stefano!
Stefano.
Trinkulo, tiun robon tuj demetu:
Per mia mano, nur mi ĝin posedos.
Trinkulo.
Ĝin havos l’ insulestra Via Moŝto.
Kalibano.
Azen’, ke akvoŝvelo vin dronigu
Mirantan je l’ falsaĵo! Kun mi venu.
Tuj ni mortigu lin. Se li vekiĝos,
De piedfingro ĝis krani’ je pinĉoj
Li turmentege kovros niajn haŭtojn,
Kaj igos nin hundbleki.
Stefano.
Ho, silentu,
Silentu, monstro. Ĉu la ŝnurlinio
Ĉi tiun jakon por mi ne intencas?
Ĝin tuj mi prenos, ĉar ĝi certe taŭgas.
Trinkulo.
Pravege, ŝnurlinie, nivelile!
Stefano.
Dankon al vi pro tia ŝerco: jen estas vesto pro ĝi: spriteco ne estos
senpremia dum mi staros reĝo de tiu ĉi lando. Ŝnurlinie, nivelile
ŝteli, estas bonega spritludo; jen estas alia vesto pro ĝi.
Trinkulo.
Venu, monstro, metu iom da gluo sur viajn fingrojn kaj forportu la
ceterajn.
Kalibano.
Ne tuŝos ilin mi; ni tempon perdos;
Li bernikligos aŭ nin simiigos
Kun fruntoj bestaj, tre malsupreniĝaj.
Stefano.
Monstro, uzu viajn fingrojn: helpu nin por ke ni tion forportu tien, kie
kuŝas mia barelo da vino, aŭ alie mi tuj forpelos vin el mia
reĝlando. Vigle! portu tion ĉi.
Trinkulo.
Kaj ĉi tion.
Stefano.
Jes, kaj tion ĉi.
(Ĉasa bruego aŭdata. Alvenas diversaj hundformaj Spiritoj kiuj
dispelas ilin ĉirkaŭe, incitataj de Prospero kaj Arielo).
Prospero (laŭte).
He! Monto, he!
Arielo (laŭte).
Arĝento! tien ĝi kuras, Arĝento!
Prospero.
Furio, Furio! tien! Tirano, tien! aŭdu, aŭdu!
(Kalibano, Stefano, kaj Trinkulo estas forpelitaj).
Al miaj koboldetoj tuj ordonu
Ke de l’ ŝtelistoj pinĉu ili haŭton,
L’ artikoj kaj la muskolaron premu
Per teruregaj streĉoj; ke makuloj
Tramarku ilin kiel leopardojn,
Aŭ eĉ sovaĝajn katojn.
Arielo.
Aŭdu blekojn!
Prospero.
Malŝpare ilin for de ĉie pelu.
En la nunhoro malamikoj miaj
Sin sentas tute sub la mia povo:
Finiĝos por mi laboregoj baldaŭ;
Spirito, vi tuj havos liberecon—
Dum nur mallonge sekvu kaj min servu.
(Foriras).

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The Language of World Trade Politics

Unpacking the Terms of Trade 1st

Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms 6th Edition Walter

The year of voting dangerously the derangement of

Trade, Commerce, and the State in the Roman World

Animal Trade Histories in the Indian Ocean World Martha

World Trade and Local Public Interest: Trade

Modern Law of International Trade: Comparative Export

American opinion on trade : preferences without

Economics of the International Coal Trade Why Coal

Outcomes in major multilateral trade negotiations are conventionally explained

Klaus Dingwerth is Professor in Political Science with a Focus on the Political

Clara Weinhardt is a Lecturer in International Relations at the Hertie School of

The RIPE Series published by Routledge is an essential forum for cutting-­edge

• Field-­defining theoretical advances in International Political Economy

Transnational Capital and Class Fractions

The Language of World Trade Politics

Power in North-­South Trade Negotiations

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/RIPE-

Edited by Klaus Dingwerth and

ISBN: 978-1-138-47983-8 (hbk)

List of illustrations vii

1 Terms of trade: introduction 1

4 Foreign direct investment 50

Felix Anderl is a Research Associate in International Relations at Goethe

Matthew Louis Bishop has been Senior Lecturer in International Politics at

ACP group African, Caribbean and Pacific group of countries

Language and world making for us

Language and world making for everyone

Or, he imagines, social constructivist researchers could unmask the idea of a

Language and power

The role of language in world trade politics

Outline of the book

You might also like

The RIPE Series published by Routledge is an essential forum for cutting-edge

• Field-defining theoretical advances in International Political Economy

Power in North-South Trade Negotiations

List of illustrations vii

1 Terms of trade: introduction 1

4 Foreign direct investment 50