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Full Chapter The Social Construction of State Power Applying Realist Constructivism 1St Edition J Samuel Barkin PDF
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THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF STATE
POWER
Applying Realist Constructivism
Edited by
J. Samuel Barkin
First published in Great Britain in 2020 by
The right of J. Samuel Barkin to be identified as editor of this work has been asserted by
him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press.
Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted
material.
If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher.
The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the editor
and contributors and not of The University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The
University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to
persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication.
Notes on Contributors
Andreea Iancu has a PhD in Political Science from Alexandru Ioan Cuza
University of Iaşi, Romania. She has also been a research fellow and
Fulbright Visiting Researcher in the Department of Conflict Resolution,
Human Security and Global Governance at the University of Massachusetts
Boston. She currently serves as a diplomat with the Romanian foreign
service. Her research interests include constructivist approaches to
international relations theory, the evolution of norms in the international
system, human security and the responsibility to protect, on which she has
published several papers.
Oppositions
There can certainly be non-constructivist realism and non-realist
constructivism. For example, Kenneth Waltz simply assumes his agents into
existence, and builds his structures from them (Waltz 1979). There is no
intersubjectivity and no co-constitution in his model. Conversely, many
constructivisms assume that a secular normative progress in the construction
of international political institutions is possible (Price 2008). But how
compatible are the assumptions, the scientific ontologies, of constructivism
and realism? Before discussing ways in which they might be compatible, it is
worth debunking briefly arguments that they are incompatible. The first of
these arguments is that realism is necessarily materialist while constructivism
is idealist. The second is that realism focuses on a logic of consequences, and
constructivism on a logic of appropriateness.
An opposition between realist materialism and constructivist idealism
(understood here as being about ideas, not ideals) plays a major role in
arguments distinguishing the two, both in key early works of constructivist
theory (eg Wendt 1999) and in various recent realisms, both of the structural
and neoclassical varieties (eg Mearsheimer 2001 and Ripsman, Taliaferro and
Lobell 2016 respectively). The basic claim underlying this opposition is that
constructivism, grounded as it is in the concept of intersubjectivity, is
necessarily about ideas, specifically about those that political actors hold in
common at any given time. However, realism, so the argument goes, being
grounded in the concept of power, is focused on the capabilities that are the
basis of power, such as military might and economic potential. At the
margins, non-material sources of power, such as morale or diplomatic skill,
might matter a little, but even then primarily via the ability to marshal
material resources.
This argument gets both the relationship between materialism and
idealism and the relationship between materialism and realism wrong. It gets
the relationship between materialism and idealism wrong by positing that
they are categorically distinct and distinguishable. But the purely material is
rarely a source of social power unless embedded in a set of ideas about how
the material can and should be used, and ideas often involve material
referents. Money, for example, need have no particular material
embodiment. It is in a sense a pure exercise in intersubjectivity; it has value
because its users collectively ascribe value to it. And yet financial capabilities
are often taken as indicators of power measured as capability. Phrased
differently, the material bases of power in IR are not separable from the ideas
they embody. To fully understand relational power in IR, one must therefore
understand the relationships between ideas and the material, and the ideas
that make materiel in power capabilities.
It gets the relationship between materialism and realism wrong as well. In
the most direct sense, the reason for this follows from the argument that it
gets the relationship between materialism and idealism wrong. Not all
material capabilities translate equivalently into relational power, and not all
capabilities that support relational power, not least discourse, can be
meaningfully reduced to the material. This observation speaks to realist
arguments against constructivism; the relationship between ideas and power
cannot be dismissed so easily. From the perspective of constructivist
arguments as well, materialism is being blamed for epistemological damage
that it has not caused. Specifically, it is blamed for the propensity of
neorealists to create static models of the international system, which is
incompatible with the constructivist view of political institutions as
historically contingent. But this disagreement about historical contingency is
not in fact directly related to a materialism/idealism dichotomy, and in any
case identifies an incompatibility between constructivism and certain kinds
of neorealist modelling, rather than political realism more broadly.
The second of the two oppositions often used to distinguish between
realism and constructivism is between the logic of consequences and the
logic of appropriateness (Ruggie 1998). The logic of consequences is the
logic of rational choice theory, of homo economicus, in which actors are
assumed to make decisions that maximize their individual utility. The logic
of appropriateness, which comes to IR from organizational theory, assumes
that actors behave in ways that reflect what is expected of them in given
contexts, that they follow institutional norms (March and Olsen 1998). The
dichotomy as used in IR theory is more about distinguishing constructivism
from rationalism than from realism per se, but realism’s frequent invocation
of rationality makes it a target of the argument by association.
This opposition does not effectively distinguish between realism and
constructivism, however, because realist analysis does not require assumptions
that people behave rationally, and constructivism does not require
assumptions that they behave appropriately. Many, if not most, realists speak
of rationality, but they mean a variety of different things by it, and those
meanings are often different from the narrow technical use implied by the
logic of consequences, that individuals can be assumed to be instrumentally
rational. Classical realists, for example, used the term in its colloquial rather
than economic sense, to mean reasonableness. Furthermore, they used it as
exhortation rather than assumption – arguing that statespeople should be
rational to maximize the national interest, rather than that statespeople (let
alone states) can be assumed to be rational (eg Morgenthau 1948). Even in
neorealisms that draw on microeconomic models there is not a necessary
assumption of rationality. These arguments posit that actors (generally
defined in this case as states rather than people) that respond rationally to
systemic incentives are most likely to thrive in an anarchic system, but do not
assume that all actors will necessarily do so (eg Waltz 1979).
Some constructivist analyses, meanwhile, do concern themselves more
with appropriate than consequentialist behaviour. This is particularly the case
for norms-based constructivisms and is true perhaps to a lesser extent for
habit- and practice-based constructivisms. But this concern is particular to
those constructivisms, rather than conceptually inherent in constructivism. A
focus on a logic of consequences, on strategic behaviour, is in no way
incompatible with intersubjectivity and the study of the co-constitution of
agents and structures in international politics. Political actors can recognize
socially constructed norms and rules and employ those norms and rules for
strategic ends that are themselves constituted by social institutions. They can
rhetorically deploy discourses to frame and reframe political context for their
own purposes, purposes that again are themselves constituted by social
institutions. Constructivist analysis, in other words, is not necessarily biased
to the logic of either appropriateness or consequences; both are features of
the social construction of international politics.
The failure of these two oft-cited dichotomies to establish a clear
conceptual disjuncture between constructivism and realism suggests that they
do not live on opposite ends of any particular spectrum. The conceptual
underpinnings of constructivism and realism are orthogonal to each other;
they are neither necessarily incompatible nor necessarily compatible. This
suggests that conceptual combinations of realisms and constructivisms are
viable when both sets of conceptual underpinnings are relevant to a
particular research question. The next issue, then, is under what
circumstances this is likely to happen.
Columba fasciata, Say, in Long’s Exped. to Rocky Mountains, vol. ii. p. 10.
Band-tailed Pigeon, Columba fasciata, Ch. Bonaparte, Amer. Ornith. pl.
viii, fig. 3, vol. i. p. 77.
Columba fasciata, Bonap. Synops. p. 119.
Band-tailed Pigeon, Nuttall, Manual, vol. i. p. 64.
It was omitted to mention that the minute spots on the eggs are
white.
Nuttall’s Dog-wood.
Length to end of tail 13 1/2 inches, to end of wings 11 1/2; wing from
flexure 7 10/12; tail 4 1/2; bill along the ridge 7/12; tarsus 1 2/12; middle
toe 1 1/2/12, its claw 6/12.
Turdus montanus.
PLATE CCCLXIX. Male.
Of this beautiful Thrush, of which a figure not having the black band
running quite across the breast, as is the case in the adult male, is
given by Mr Swainson, in the Fauna Boreali-Americana, Dr
Richardson speaks as follows:—“This species was discovered at
Nootka Sound, in Captain COOK’S third voyage, and male and
female specimens, in the possession of Sir Joseph Banks, were
described by Latham: Pennant has also described and figured the
same male. The specimen represented in this work was procured at
Fort Franklin, lat. 65 1/4°, in the spring of 1826. We did not hear its
song, nor acquire any information respecting its habits, except that it
built its nest in a bush, similar to that of the Merula migratoria. It was
not seen by us on the banks of the Saskatchewan; and, as it has not
appeared in the list of the Birds of the United States, it most probably
does not go far to the eastward of the Rocky Mountains in its
migrations north and south. It may perhaps be more common to the
westward of that ridge.”
Dr Richardson’s conjecture as to the line of march followed by it
has proved to be correct, Dr Townsend and Mr Nuttall having
found it abundant on the western sides of the Rocky Mountains. The
former of these zealous naturalists informs me that he “first found
this Thrush on the Columbia River in the month of October, and that
it becomes more numerous in winter, which it spends in that region,
though some remove farther south. It there associates with the
Common Robin, Turdus migratorius, but possesses a very different
note, it being louder, sharper, and quicker than those of the latter,
and in the spring, before it sets out for its yet unascertained
breeding-place, it warbles very sweetly. It is called Ammeskuk by the
Chinooks.”
Mr Nuttall’s notice respecting it is as follows:—“Of this bird, whose
manners so entirely resemble those of the Common Robin, we know
almost nothing. They probably breed as far north as Nootka, where
they were first seen by the naturalists of Cook’s expedition. On the
Columbia they are only winter birds of passage, arriving about
October, and continuing more or less frequently throughout the
winter. At this time they flit through the forest in small flocks,
frequenting usually low trees, on which they perch in perfect silence,
and are at times very timorous and difficult of approach, having all
the shy sagacity of the Robin, and appearing at all times in a very
desultory manner.”
The numerous specimens of this Thrush in my possession have
enabled me to compare it with Turdus migratorius, and another new
Thrush from Chili. On examining the tail, from the shape of which Mr
Swainson considers this species allied to our Mocking Bird, I found
its form, length, and extent beyond the wings, to correspond almost
exactly with those of the tail of our Robin; and, if it proves true that
the Varied Thrush forms a nest bedded with mud, it will strengthen
my opinion that both these and the Chilian species are as nearly
allied as possible, and therefore ought to be considered as true
Thrushes, of which, to assume the language of systematic writers,
Turdus migratorius is the type in America, whilst Turdus Merula is
that of Europe.
The two figures in my plate were taken from adult males shot in
spring. You will find a figure of the female in Plate CCCCXXXIII.
Turdus nævius, Gmel. Syst. Nat. vol. i. p. 817.—Lath. Ind. Ornith. vol. i. p.
331.
Orpheus meruloides, Thrush-like Mock-bird, Richards. and Swains.
Fauna Bor.-Amer. vol. ii. p. 187.