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BATTLE OF BRITAIN

“Luftwaffe would destroy enemy’s forces in the air… their mighty forces on the
sea…. and will bring about the final decision. England will be ours”
– Reich-Marshal Goering

“The Germans were out to invade the country I was trying to prevent the
invasion by denying them the control of the Air”
-- Air Marshal Sir Dowding

INTRODUCTION

1. The Battle of Britain was the first major campaign fought in the air. This battle
turned out to be a classic air battle in which victory was achieved mainly by
defensive actions. As such, air campaign planners of today will quote this campaign
as a positive example of good defensive posture.

2. During Second World War, Hitler intended to establish his authority on

Europe. By 1940, only the British stood in his way. Therefore, Hitler decided to
attack Britain immediately after the fall of France. As England was separated from
continental Europe by the English Channel, a massive amphibious landing across
the sea was essential for the German forces to achieve their aim 1. The invasion plan
was developed, and its code name was “Op Sea Lion”. However, before the land
invasion could take place, the Germans rightly assessed the necessity to gain
control of the air by Luftwaffe.

3. On 10 July 1940, Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to destroy the RAF in the
shortest possible time. As the RAF faced a numerically superior Luftwaffe, she was
forced to adopt a defensive posture. The air campaign over the skies of Britain lasted
about thirteen weeks, from July to October 1940 2. Britain’s victory in this defensive
battle not only changed the course of World War II, but left many lessons to be
learnt. The air campaign that was waged came to be known as the Battle of Britain.

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AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to carry out an in depth analysis of the battle by
examining and evaluating the different operations, tactics and technologies
employed, as well as application of air power principles, in the battle.

BACKGROUND OF THE BATTLE

5. In 1919, after the First World War, the Treaty of Versailles was signed
between the victorious Allies and the Germans. This treaty imposed numerous
restrictions on the size and capability of the German Armed Forces, and was seen
by the Germans as a humiliation of their defeat. Morale of the German people was
at its lowest ebb during the period following the war. However, this soon changed
when Adolph Hitler came to power. Having experienced both triumph and defeat in
World War One (WW I) as a soldier in German Army, Hitler promised his people that
he would restore everything that was taken away from Germans, despite the
conditions of the treaty. He reorganised and built up the military, and set about
conquering the whole of Northern Europe. World War Two (WW II) commenced on
01 September 1939 when Hitler's army invaded Poland. The sheer audacity of Hitler
took everyone by surprise. One by one, countries fell to the German Army;
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Holland, Belgium and finally
France.

6. By June 1940, only the British stood in the way of German domination of
Northern Europe. In Britain, whatever precious time was spent putting as many new
fighters and trained pilots into service as possible; to guard against the attack
everyone knew was coming. By the beginning of July 1940, the RAF had built up its
operational strength to 600-700 fighters while the Luftwaffe had total 2250 bombers
and fighters3. The stage was set. In the skies above South East England, the future
of Britain was about to be decided. As the British Prime Minister, Sir Winston
Churchill put it; "What General Weygrand called the Battle of France is over, the
Battle of Britain is about to begin".

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LEADERS AND THEIR ROLE IN THE WAR

Germany

7. Hitler was the supreme commander of Nazi Germany. Given the success of
the German military in the early part of the WW II, he did not envisage a long battle
for the conquest of Britain. He often dictated military strategies to his commanders,
and the Battle of Britain was no different. Reich-Marshal Hermann Goering was
Hitler’s Air Minister and Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe. A much decorated
pilot, in WW I, Goering sketched the plan to achieve victory over Britain by intensive
air assault alone. 3 Generals supported him in the air campaign. General Field
Marshal Hugo Sperrle was assigned to Luftflotte III, which covered central Europe
and the western areas of France. As a veteran of WW I, Sperrle never fully
recognized Goering’s grand strategy. General Field Marshal Albert Kesselring was
given command of Luftflotte II, the largest command in Battle of Britain. Prior to that,
he was the German Air Fleet commander in the invasion of Poland, North Africa and
Italy. Luftflotte V was commanded by General Hans-Jurgen Stumpff another WW I
veteran. He was involved in the Norway campaign prior to the Battle of Britain.

8. It is worth noting that most of these German leaders never appreciated the
need to develop Luftwaffe as an independent force. Rather, they believed that the
Luftwaffe should play a supporting role to the Army. This mind-set was formed as a
result of their experience in the Spanish Civil War. As such, due attention was not
paid to grow Luftwaffe as a strategic force; instead it was conceived as a tactical
force4. In addition, the German leaders were also generally slow to appreciate the
use of technology for air power. For example, Germany had experimented with radar
technology much earlier than the British. However, unlike the British, they did not
appreciate its role in enhancing air power. Instead, they concentrated more on
creating the world's most effective tanks. While this proved to be the right focus for
the land campaigns, the full potential of the Luftwaffe was not developed as a result
of this.

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Britain

9. Sir Winston Churchill was the Prime Minister of Britain during the Second
World War. His dynamic leadership and natural instinct played a decisive role in the
Battle of Britain. He was also very effective in keeping the morale of his people high
during their darkest hour. Lord Beaverbrook, Minister for Air Production, was the
man behind Britain’s war-making potential. As a result of his efforts, production of
aircraft was maximised. In fact, Fighter Command possessed more aircraft at the
end of the battle than at the beginning. Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall was the
RAF Chief of Air Staff then. However, it was his subordinate, Sir Hugh Dowding,
AOCinC of Fighter Command, who played a critical role in the Battle of Britain. Prior
to the Battle, during the German invasion of France, it was him who strongly resisted
RAF’s Fighter deployment to France, fearing that country will run out of resources to
defend herself. During the early 30s, he formulated the most effective Air Defence
strategy then, called the Dowding System. 3 key players supported Dowding in
Fighter Command. AVM Keith Park, a New Zealander by birth, had an unblemished
record during WW I. He was the AOC No 11 Group, the most important Group in
Fighter Command protecting the southern coastline of Britain, Southeast England
and London. AVM Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory was the AOC of 12 group. Together
with his group, he formulated the Big Wing tatics used against the Luftwaffe. AVM
Sir Quintin Brand was the AOC of 10 Group. He had a distinguished service order,
military cross and distinguish flying cross.

10. The British were fortunate to have competent leaders who were not only
professional, but also well schooled in the application of Air Power. In addition, they
appreciated and understood how technology could be used as force multipliers.
RAF was also relatively free from interference from the political masters of Britain.
Unlike Hitler, Sir Winston Churchill gave enough freedom to the military commanders
to formulate and execute their plans. The profiles of the prominent commanders of
this war are discussed in Annex A.

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STRATEGY

German Strategy

“Above all, I shall see to it that the enemy will not be able to drop any bombs.”

— Hermann Goering,

11. On 30 June 1940, Reich-Marshal Goering signed an operational directive for

the air war against England. Luftwaffe estimated that it would take four days to
defeat Fighter Command, followed by another four weeks to eliminate the RAF. The
strategy of the Germans for Op Sea Lion was as follows:

a. To neutralize the RAF in the air and on the ground to gain

control of the air;

b. To interdict the British supply lines by attacking ships and ports;

c. To cross the Channel and invade Britain.

British Strategy

“Believe me, Germany is unable to wage war.”

— Former British Prime Minister David LLoyd George

12. After World War I, the British developed a carefully planned integrated air
defence system to defend the homeland from adversaries. While this put her in good
stead to mount an effective defence against the Germans, the RAF was
nevertheless numerically inferior to the Luftwaffe. Thus, the British strategy in the
Battle of Britain was:

a. To fight a defensive battle by means of an integrated AD defence

network.
b. To protect the war potential.
c. To ensure aircraft production is higher than attrition.

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FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE OPPOSING SIDES

The Luftwaffe Command Organisation and Orbat

13. The Luftwaffe had total 1250 bombers and 1000 fighters at the onset of the
battle. Unlike their British counterparts, which had commands based on functions;
the Luftwaffe was arranged into air fleets or Luftflotte. The average strength of an air
fleet was 1000 aircraft. These were self-contained units that had all the fighter,
bomber and supporting elements. For this battle, the following Luftflotte command
was formed.

a. Luftflotte II. Luftflotte II was based in Northern France, Belgium and

Holland, with its Headquarters at Brussels. It was commanded by Field
Marshal Kesselring. The fleet consisted of 13 Fighter, 23 Bomber, 2 Dive-
bomber and 4 Heavy-fighter Groups.

b. Luftflotte III. Luftflotte III occupied bases in the rest of France with its
Headquarters in Paris. It was commanded by Field Marshal Sperrle. The fleet
consisted of 9 Fighter, 15 Bomber, 7 Dive-bomber and 4 Heavy-fighter
Groups.

c. Luftflotte V. Luftwaffe V was based in Norway and was headquartered

at Stavanger. General Hans-Jurgen Stumpff commanded it. It consisted of
two Bomber Wings, two Fighter Groups, and a Long-range Seaplane Wing 5.
The Luftflotte Commands are shown in Annex B.

RAF Command Organization and Orbat

14. The RAF organisation comprised the Fighter Command, Bomber Command,
Coastal Command, Transport Command and Training. In this battle, the Fighter and
Bomber Command basically fought the war.

a. Fighter Command. Fighter Command, led by ACM Dowding,

was divided into four groups. 13 Group covered the North of England and
Scotland, 12 Group the Midlands and Wales, 10 Group covered South West
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England and 11 Group covered South East England and London. In the
summer of 1940, Fighter Command possessed 756 aircraft, out of which 256
were kept in reserve. The active Fighter Command comprised of 20
squadrons of Super marine Spitfire fighters, 22 squadrons of Hawker
Hurricane fighters and 2 squadrons of Bolton-Paul Defiant night fighters. RAF
Fighter Commands are shown in Annex C.

b. Bomber Command. In terms of bombers, British were better

equipped than Germans with the likes of the Blenheim, Wellington, Hampden,
Whitley and Beaufort in their inventory. Although the Whitley and Wellington
possessed longer range than the German types and were fitted with multi gun
turrets for defensive purposes, they were no better at surviving unescorted
daylight raids than German bombers.

c. Coastal Command. Coastal Command was organised in three

groups; these were 18 Group, 16 Group and 15 Group. 165 convoy escort
and 96 reconnaissance (recce) aircraft was given to coastal command for
maritime defence. Their major role was trade and shipping protection from air
attack.

d. Transport Command. It was 1939, when Britain realised the need

to develop her air transportation capability. At the outbreak of the war, Civil
Aviation and Imperial Airways came under military control. Ultimately RAF
Transport Command was formed in March 1943 with the help of USA and
Canada. As such, this command did not have any bearing in Battle of Britain 6.

e. Training. During the Second World War, Britain estimated that

aircraft production would go as high as 2500 aircraft a month. To match such
an output, expansion of the training machinery was necessary. The Empire
Air Training Scheme did this job brilliantly. The scheme started n April 1940,
and by 1943, RAF had 333 flying training schools at different locations7.

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PHASES OF THE BATTLE

15. The Battle of Britain was fought in four phases as described in the subsequent
paragraphs. The pictorial representation is in Annex D.

Phase 1 – The Battle for the Control of the Channel (10 Jul 1940 - 12 Aug 1940)

16. The Germans launched their offensive attacks to test the RAF during this
phase. Most of the attacks concentrated on shipping in the English Channel. The
idea was to bring the Fighter Command for battle over sea. This phase of the battle
also saw the Germans probing British defences, and conducting reconnaissance
flights over various airfields. During this phase, RAF lost 96 aircraft whereas
Luftwaffe lost 2078.

Phase 2 – The Battle for the Air Superiority (12 Aug 1940- 06 Sep1940)

17. After the first phase, Goering thought that the British early warning system
had been destroyed. As such, Luftwaffe began the next phase of the battle on 13
August by launching massive raids on the airfields of 11 Group. The aim was to
destroy the RAF, either in the air or on the ground. To keep up the pressure,
Germans began night raids to stop the defenders repairing damage overnight. Just
when the Luftwaffe was beginning to overcome the RAF with the destruction of her
airfields, the RAF was given a much needed break to recover as the Germans
decided to change its strategy from attacking airfields to cities. During this phase,
RAF lost 295 fighters and 171 badly damaged whereas the Luftwaffe lost 380
aircraft9.

Phase 3 - The Battle to Break Britain’s Morale or The Blitz (07 Sep 1940 – 05
Oct 1940)

18. The third phase of the battle came to be known as the Blitz. On one night-raid,
Luftwaffe aircraft bombed London by mistake. In retaliation, the British bombed
Berlin. This enraged Hitler. Because it seemed that the attacks on airfields were not
destroying enough RAF fighters, he ordered a change of targets by attacking cities,
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industries and other strategic targets instead. This gave the British defences the
much needed respite to re-group and re-build. During this phase, RAF lost 216
aircraft and on the other hand, Luftwaffe lost 181 fighters and 194 bombers 10.

Phase 4 – The Night Raids (06 Oct 1940 - 31 Oct 1940)

Strategic air assault is wasted if it is dissipated piecemeal in sporadic attacks

between which the enemy has an opportunity to readjust defences or
recuperate.

— General H. H. 'Hap' Arnold, USAAF

19. As the long, hot summer ran into October, the German daylight bomber
losses became too heavy. Realising the task to be difficult and the toll becoming too
high at daytime, the Germans planned to attack the cities at night. The damage they
caused to Britain's cities was enormous, including 42,000 civilian casualties.
However, as the RAF pilots became familiar with the raiders’ course of action
towards London and other cities and their operational experience increased, the
success in night interceptions also improved. As such, the RAF began to counter
the Luftwaffe’s nightly raids.

20. By late October, the weather began to worsen and the German losses
accumulated. Soon, the Germans realised that the RAF could not be defeated. As
such, they postponed ‘Op Sea-Lion’ indefinitely and concentrated on ‘Op Barbarosa’,
the invasion of Russia. This marked the end of the Battle of Britain.

AIR OPERATIONS CONDUCTED

The sky over London was glorious, ochre and madder, as though a dozen
tropic suns were simultaneously setting round the horizon . . . Everywhere the
shells sparkled like Christmas baubles.

— Evelyn Waugh

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21. The various types of air operations conducted by the Luftwaffe and the RAF
during the Battle of Britain are examined in the following paragraphs. A compilation
of the main aircraft that participated in the battle is attached at Annex E.

Luftwaffe

22. Armed Reconnaissance. In the first phase of the battle, the Luftwaffe
conducted armed recce and attacked shipping in the channel. The aim was to draw
the RAF over the channel so that the fighter could be engaged there. For example,
on 10th July, the Luftwaffe carried out armed recce and attacked British ships in the
channel with Ju 87 dive-bombers. Armed recce was also carried out to locate RAF
airfields. These operations diminished after the 1 st phase when the Luftwaffe began
the battle for air superiority.

23. Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD). To suppress the enemy’s air
defence, the Luftwaffe launched SEAD against radar stations. For example, on 12
August, RAF stations at Kent, Sussex and Isle of Wright were attacked and
damaged badly. But they did not persist with the SEAD missions after the initial days
of Phase-II, as they wrongly assessed that the radar stations were no longer
operational.

24. Airfield Attack. Airfield attacks were done to eliminate the RAF and gain
air superiorty. The Luftwaffe carried out attacks on many airfields. On 15 Aug in
particular, the Luftwaffe made a co-ordinated attack to stretch Fighter Command
along its entire line. This day saw the heaviest fighting of the whole battle. Luftwaffe
lost 75 aircraft flying more than 2000 sorties while RAF lost 34 aircraft flying 974
sorties. These attacks continued into Phase III. However, just when they were
becoming effective, the German leadership decided to switch the attacks to cities
and industries.

25. Escort. The Germans employed a large number of Me 109 and Me 110
as sweeps and escorts of the bombers to their bombing missions. But these escorts
faced a problem of range, which was shorter than the bombers. As such, most of
the bombers were left unprotected during the final phase of the missions.
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26. Strategic Air Offensive. The Luftwaffe conducted persistent strategic air
offensive campaign against British centres of gravity, aircraft factories and cities,
particularly during Phase III of the battle. While these operations caused heavy
destruction, the Luftwaffe suffered heavy attrition. For example, by 18 August, the
losses of the German Junker 87 “Stuka” dive-bombers were so severe that they had
to be withdrawn from the battle forever. As such, these operations petered out by
the end of Phase IV, when overall bomber losses were too high for the Luftwaffe to
sustain. The conclusion of the strategic air offensive also signalled the end of the
campaign.

RAF

27. Limited Strategic Air Offensive. Despite Britain’s full defensive

posture, she launched a limited strategic air offensive on Berlin. This was done in
retaliation against the bombing of London. However, it ignited the emotion of the
German leaders, with Hitler saying, “If they bomb ours, we will bury theirs”.

28. Active Air Defence. During the entire battle, RAF could successfully
intercept the raiders both during the day and night as a result of the integrated air
defence system. This system will be discussed subsequently. The following are the
active air defence operations conducted by the RAF:

a. Day Interception. Luftwaffe aircraft used to be intercepted on both

ways by the RAF fighters; the enemy was an easier prey on their way back as
they had no weapons left to fight.

b. Night Interception. RAF carried out a series of night

interceptions during the 3rd and 4th phase. This became progressively easier
as the battle progressed as the RAF became familiar with the raiders’ course
of action towards London and other cities11.

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29. Passive Air Defence Measures. RAF Passive Air Defence (PAD) measures
used to deceive the Luftwaffe raids were unique in those days. Significant ones are
discussed here.

a. Use of Decoys. Germans were thoroughly misled over the target

by the British innovative ideas. British evolved a spectacular decoy system to
make an impressive but controlled blaze. The flames and smoke would make
an impression that a refinery was already ablaze. This misled Germans into
thinking that their raid was successful, which made them call off the attack. In
addition, to deceive the Germans, the RAF constructed 100 night and 60 day
dummy airfields. However, it proved not to be a cost effective effort.

b. Camouflages and Concealment. British devised excellent

camouflage techniques and concealment measures to deny Germans any
information that could be used against them. As such, the Germans could
never gather accurate picture of damage inflicted by their own Bomber force.
This made German forces repeat their missions, thus, depleting their
resources.

MAJOR TACTICS THAT EVOLVED DURING THE BATTLE

30. While carrying all these offensive and defensive operations during the Battle
of Britain, many new tactics were evolved by both the air forces. Some important
tactics are discussed below:

a. Big Wing. Big Wing was a tactic developed by Squadron Leader

Bader of 12 Group. He suggested that the aircraft of five or more fighter
squadrons be flown together to engage the enemy en-masse.

b. Jabo (Jagd bomber). The tactic was developed by the Germans

to carry out nuisance raids during the day. Modified Me 109 fighters, loaded
with 250 lbs bombs, were made to cover as much area as possible before a
full fledged night operation to stretch the RAF fighter pilots during the day.
The aim was to tire the RAF pilots before the night attacks.
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c. High level Bombing. Luftwaffe changed their tactics of bombing

from medium level to high level to minimize attrition. RAF fighters faced much
difficulty intercepting these bombers at higher altitude because of less
reaction time to climb. However, this Germans had to trade off accuracy as a
result of this tactic.

DOMINANT FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR

31. Several important factors influenced the outcome of the war. They are:

a. Integrated air defence network of Britain

b. Effective use of Intelligence means
c. Technological Innovations
d. Aircraft support and repair

Integrated Air Defence Network of Britain

Figure 1: Schematic Diagram of the Dowding System

32. Organisation. Named after its chief architect, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh
Dowding, it is an intricate system of detection, reporting and placing of defence units
into action (see Figure 1). Monitoring and control of the entire battle was done at the
Fighter Command HQ. Based on the progress of the battle, commands would be

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issued to the Group HQs. The Group areas were further subdivided into Sectors.
Each Sector had under its command between two to four squadrons. Comprising an
aerodrome with a command post, these Sector stations would form the critical nodes
in the air defence network. Group HQs would pass filtered and processed
information to the sector stations, along with instructions for the scrambling of
fighters to engage enemy aircraft.

33. Chain Home and Chain Home Low Radar. By 1940s the British
constructed a permanent network of radar stations called Chain Home (CH). This
system could detect enemy raid as high as 10,000 feet and at a distance of 50 to
120 miles. To detect the low level threat, the British also constructed low looking
radar stations called Chain Home Low. These could pick up incoming raids at an
altitude below 5000 feet and 30 miles.

34. Anti Aircraft Artillery. Britain employed about 4000 AAA, which claimed
to have shot down approximately 300 German aircraft. The British also employed
around 4000 searchlights to aid tracking of the AAAs at night.

35. RAF Balloon Command. The British employed balloon barrages strategic
areas. It forced German aircraft to fly higher thereby reducing bombing accuracy.
Balloons were particularly effective against dive-bombers.

36. The Observer Corps. A network of civil volunteers formed the observer
corps in 1925. There were 30000 observers against 1000 observation posts. They
complemented the radars as a tool for early warning, and helped Fighter Command
track enemy aircraft when they were flying in-land.

Effective Use of Intelligence Means

37. Like any other campaigns, intelligence played a key role in Battle of Britain.
The British possessed a superior intelligence service. The code name for the British
effort to crack the German military Enigma cipher machines was called Ultra. It was
one of the most closely guarded secrets of the War. It was conducted at a country
estate called Bletchley Park. With the help of the Polish intelligence, the British

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began working on the Enigma code machines that the German military used for radio
communications. The RAF intelligence agency was responsible for covering two
specific aspects of Luftwaffe; firstly, the German ORBAT and Organization and
secondly, immediate intelligence on Luftwaffe operation. British intelligence could
easily extract information from R/T conversation of Luftwaffe and knew exactly where
they were heading for and at what number. This information helped Fighter
Command to plan the scramble in time.

38. In contrast, the German intelligence was ineffective. Although there were
eight Luftwaffe intelligence agencies, they were fractured as a result of rivalries. By
1940, there were few or no German agents operating in Britain. As a result, the
Luftwaffe did not possess recent knowledge of the workings of the RAF's air
defences, particularly on the critical command and control system that ACM Dowding
developed before the war. Thus, more often than not, the Luftwaffe was caught by
surprise. For example, for the period of 12 – 19 Aug, German intelligence claimed
that RAF lost 644 aircraft but actual figure was 141 aircraft. Even on those
occasions when intelligence was fairly accurate, the Luftwaffe higher command
would choose to ignore it if it does not conform to what they would like to believe.
This severely hampered the Luftwaffe’s ability to prosecute an effective air campaign
against the RAF, particularly a well-entrenched defensive force.

Technological Innovations

39. Battle of Britain is the first air campaign where the offensive and defensive
counter air operation concepts were shaped by the development of new
technologies.

40. War in Electronic Spectrum. Both British and Germans exploited the
electromagnetic spectrum to a great extent to deceive each other. The British built
an invisible electronic wall as part of their defence, and the Germans tried to break it.
Churchill termed this electronic spectrum as “The Wizard War”. Significant electronic
warfare (EW) measures included:

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a. Knickebein. Knickebein was a blind bombing aid of Germany. A

steerable beam was projected over the target. The pilot then flew along the
beam using the audio tones to stay on the centreline until a second
intersecting beam was heard and this indicated that the aircraft was now over
the target. The British countered this by sending a false signal called
masking beacons.

b. Triangulation Method . The German pilots used to tune to BBC radio

stations to find their fix course by calculating relative bearings from to two or
three BBC radio stations by triangulation method. Discovering this, British
ordered all stations to use same frequency for transmission to confuse
German pilots.

c. Airborne Cigar. The Airborne Cigar was a jamming device used by

RAF. This equipment could interfere with enemy RT Channel in the 20 – 30
MHZ and 48 – 52 MHZ at a range of 50 miles.

d. DUPPEL. DUPPEL was a German ECCM method. Strips of silver

paper were dropped to confuse the British radars, which is similar to present
day chaff.

e. Radio Paris. Another radio station used for military purpose was Radio
Paris. This was transmitted by the Germans in occupied France, and it
offered round-the-clock program of songs interspersed with Nazi propaganda.
The Radio Paris transmission was through highly directional antenna aimed at
the city to be bombed. The German pilots would thus be directed to London
or Liverpool simply by listening to French songs transmitted by Radio Paris.
The British took long time to detect the system. When they did, they came up
with a counter measure called “BROMIDE”. This consisted re-transmitting of
Radio Paris programme on the same frequency using Omni-directional
antenna. With this ECM German bombers got disoriented and flew
haphazardly over Britain bombing at random.

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f. Radar. In the 30s, the Air Ministry engaged scientists to look for
means to ‘see’ the enemy before they arrive at the coast. One such scientist,
Robert Watson-Watt, suggested the possibility of using radio signals that were
bounced back from aircraft to detect their presence. Hugh Dowding, who was
then Air member for Research and Development, was enthusiastic for the
idea. On 26th Feb 1935, a full test was arranged, and this gave birth to what
we know today as ‘radar’. After further developments and refinements, a
network of radar stations was built along the English coast in 1939. Known as
Chain Home (CH), the system consisted of transmitting and receiving towers
250 to 350 feet high. Operating in the frequency band of 22 to 30 MHz, the
system had a range of about 120 miles. To complement these tall towers, a
more complicated Chain Home Low (CHL) system was also installed. This
provided the RAF with low-level detection of 5000 feet and below.

g. IFF/High Frequency Direction Finding System. In order to have

an effective air defence system, one must not only be able to detect enemy
aircraft but also be able to accurately assess the position of friendly aircraft.
Hence, the idea of an IFF system was born. This soon evolved into the High
Frequency Direction Finding system (HFDFS), also known by its codename
as ‘Pip-squeak’. All British fighters had a TR9D transmitter receiver installed in
this system. The unit had two channels; one for voice communication with the
Sector command station and the other for the IFF system. By transmitting on
this second channel at regular intervals, the Sector command station could
automatically track the movement of the friendly aircraft.

h. Computers. The Battle of Britain also saw the use of computers for
quick calculation of the compass course on which to send fighters for accurate
interception, as well as breaking of Enigma coded messages. The use of
computers for these purposes cannot be over-stated. Without these
machines, the timeliness of response to the threats presented to Fighter
Command would not have been there. As such, one can argue that they
helped the RAF to achieve economy of force when engaging the enemy, and
concentrate her forces at decisive points of the battle. This was extremely

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crucial for the RAF, since they were numerically inferior to the Luftwaffe. A
further detail on electronic war is shown in Annex F.

Aircraft Support and Repair

41. Germany had been forced to quickly establish a new network of air bases
across northern France for the Battle of Britain. Some French airfields were used,
but they too needed new supplies of food, oil and spare parts to be able to function
effectively. The repair organisation, vital for maintaining a large air fleet capable of
launching attacks on Britain, was a‘sost impossible to organise locally; many
damaged aircraft were transported by road back to Germany in order to be repaired.
This meant that the Luftwaffe turn-around time for damaged aircraft would be
considerable longer than the RAF. The Luftwaffe, which started the Battle of Britain
with 1,011 fighters in August 1940, compared with Britain's 1,032, had, by
September, only 533 serviceable single-engined fighters, and by 1st October, only
275. Britain, on the other hand, had established airfields prepared for the conflict,
and Fighter Command was able to maintain its strength at around 700 aircraft
throughout the battle because of the high aircraft repair and production rate. Another
important point concerns the SAR of RAF pilots. As RAF pilots would typically bail
out in the Channel or over Britain, they could be easily rescued by their own forces.
So efficient were the British at this that the pilots were able to fly the next sortie. This
not only helped the RAF maintain her pilot strength, but increased the morale and
mental strength of the aircrew many fold.

AIR POWER ASPECTS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS

42. Air power employment is based on the principles of the war and the tenets of
airpower. Although all had some impact one way or the other on the battle, 3 of the
principles of war and 5 of tenets have been selected for discussion given their
relative importance to the outcome of the battle. These are:

a. Principles of war.

(1) Selection and maintenance of aim

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(2) Maintenance of morale

(3) Administration

b. Tenets.

(1) Centralized control and decentralized execution

(2) Flexibility/Versatility
(3) Priority
(4) Synergy
(5) Concentration

Principles of war

1
Tom Hutchison, Battle of Britain,
2
Ibid. p 27.
3
Dean Sir Maurice, The Royal Air Force and Two World Wars, p 138.
4
Maurice, p 110
5
Battle of Britain Roll of Honour, http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/roll.html
6
Maurice, p 178.
7
Maurice, p 148.
8
Sommerville Donald, World War II Day by Day.
9
Ibid
10
Ibid
11
http://physicsweb.org/article/review/13/5/1
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43. Selection and Maintenance of Aim. While the RAF persisted to the end in
her goal to cause maximum attrition, the same cannot be said for the Luftwaffe. They
failed miserably in this regard, and many have argued that failure to comply with the
principle of maintaining with the aim probably cost them the battle. Apparently, Hitler
was enraged by the retaliatory attack on Berlin by the RAF on 25th/26th Aug. The
political masters of Germany believed that by attacking cities and industry, they
could break British morale. The change of plan was a turning point in the Battle of
Britain for several reasons. Firstly, it gave Group 11 the need opportunity to repair
damaged airfields and radar sites. Secondly, the German raids now came within the
range of 12 Group, and their large formation tactics known as ‘Big Wings’. Thus, by
changing tactics and targets, the Germans had actually helped Fighter Command to
deal with raids. In addition, because of the limited range of the Me109 fighters, they
had to turn back after only 10 minutes over the cities. This left many bombers
completely undefended and at the mercy of the RAF fighters. “The result was a
series of disastrous raids, climaxing on 15th Sep when the RAF was able to inflict its
greatest number of casualties on the enemy”.

44. Maintenance of Morale. Although the British was facing one of its darkest
hour in its history, the state of moral in the country was still high. This was because
they had confidence in their leaders and the RAF. When the Germans bombed
London, Churchill found that the Londoners were ready to take the pounding; he
remarked, “London can take it “. In fact, he had great skill in maintaining the morale
of the people with his memorable speeches. The morale of the RAF pilots was also
high, given that they were fighting for their homeland. RAF rotated the combat
squadrons to and from the battle area at a regular basis, and this helped maintained
the morale of the men. The German aircrew, on the other hand, probably suffered
from lower morale. The probable reasons are:

a. They expected the battle against Fighter Command to last 4 days.

Instead, the battle persisted, with the RAF continuing to hold its own. This
frustrated the Germans.

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b. Because of poor intelligence, the Luftwaffe was often surprised in

battle. Thus, instead of facing a numerically weaker opponent, the pilots often
had to contend with formidable defences against their attacks.

45. Administration. Sound administration is a pre-requisite for success in any

operation. This includes the ability to appreciate and overcome logistics and
resource constraints. For example, the Luftwaffe had to send the damaged aircraft
over wide distances to Berlin by road while the RAF used their railways to get the
aircraft to the factory for repair. In addition, the British were also able to mobilise
their aircraft industry to produce aircraft at a high rate despite attacks from the
Luftwaffe. This demonstrated Britain’s ability to muster the entire resource of the
country in the face of war – a clear indication of the high administrative efficiency in
the British war machinery.

Tenets of Air Power

46. Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution. The Dowding system

was a classic example of centralized control/decentralised execution. ACM Dowding
centrally controlled, monitored and issued commands to the group HQs from the
Fighter Command HQ. Execution of the plans were then decentralised to the Sector
HQ controllers, who would direct the aircraft to intercept the enemy. This concept
developed by Dowding is still practised today. In contrast, there was no apparent
system of centralised control/decentralised execution within each Luftflotten. For
example, no system of plotting and tracking the positions of enemy aircraft existed in
the Luftflotten. The squadrons also did not have any means of ground-to-air control
of its fighters and bombers. As such, Luftwaffe always lacked in air appreciation.

47. Flexibility/Versatility. From the strategic point of view, both the RAF and
Luftwaffe exploited this tenet to the fullest. For example, the assets were used in
strategic and tactical operations, and many facets of the enemy’s air power were
attacked. To a certain extent, the Luftwaffe was able to exploit this more than the
RAF because it adopted a more offensive stance compared to the RAF. However, it
can be argued that, at the tactical level, the Luftwaffe was less flexible and versatile
than the RAF. This is due to the fact that the Luftwaffe was engaged primarily as a

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supporting force to land operations i.e. “to be used as a close support weapon to
move forward in concert with ground troops”. As such, it was not designed for a
strategic bombing campaign. For example, the Me110, a long-range heavy fighter,
fared very badly during the Battle of Britain. Due to its inferior performance, it
suffered badly against the more nimble Hurricanes and Spitfires. As such, the
Me110 was not useful for its primary role of escorting and defending the bombers.
Indeed, it had difficulties defending itself, leading to a farcical situation in which these
escort fighters had themselves to be escorted by the Me109s. This situation
severely limited the flexibility and versatility of the Luftwaffe tactics.

48. Priority.

a. RAF. Throughout the Battle of Britain, the RAF focused on inflicting as

much damage on the Luftwaffe as possible to the extent that the Luftwaffe
became unable or unwilling to pay the price. All resources at Fighter
Command were dedicated for this sole purpose. No unneces
ry raids were launched against the Luftwaffe. By Oct 1940, the Luftwaffe suffered
heavier losses compared to the RAF, whose attrition rate was being matched
by the aircraft production.

b. Luftwaffe. Selection of target priorities by Luftwaffe can be

evaluated comparing the John Warden’s 5 strategic ring. In first phase, the
priorities were attacking convoys in the Channel, radar stations and the
coastal towns. Thus, except the radar stations, the rest of the targets fall
mainly in the outer rings. In phase two, the airfields came under heavy attack.
In the next phase, the priority shifted to London and other major cities, as well
as strategic targets such as aircraft factories. Finally, in phase 4, heavy
bomber raids on the cities continued. Luftwaffe could never attack any
leadership or command, control and communication centre, which is at the
hub of the model. Thus, based on John Warden’s Strategic Rings model, the
set of priorities selected by the Luftwaffe was poor indeed. This allowed the
RAF to continue prosecuting the war against the Luftwaffe.

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Figure 2: COL John Warden’s 5 Strategic Rings

49. Synergy. The Dowding system is a good illustration of the RAF’s use of
this tenet. By building an integrated system of early warning radar stations, observer
posts, and sector command stations – all centrally controlled at Fighter Command
HQ, the RAF was able to produce an effective defence system well beyond the
proportion of each individual element’s contribution to the system. In addition, the
RAF was also able to exploit intelligence from decoded Enigma messages received
from all sources, including those outside of the air force. This is unlike the Luftwaffe,
which flew its mission blind for most of the time, unaware of their enemy's true
strengths, capabilities and deployments.

50. Concentration. Both sides paid due attention to this tenet of air power.
For example, in the first bombing raid on the British cities, the Luftwaffe amassed
some 1100 aircraft for the operation, including 300 medium-heavy bombers, 200
Me110s with bomb loads, and 600 Me109s as escorts. In response, the RAF flew
using the ‘Big Wing” tactics, where squadrons would be converged in the air to form
large formations to attack the enemy en masse.

GERMANY’S DEFEAT AND BRITAIN’S VICTORY : ANALYSIS OF OUTCOME

Reasons for Germany’s Defeat

51. After an in depth review of the Battle of Britain; the root causes for Germany’s
defeat may be identified as follows;

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a. False sense of victory and overconfidence on the part of the German

Leaders as a result of unchallenged and speedy mastery in Northern Europe.

b. Poor intelligence, compounded by the belief that their aircraft was

superior in performance and range.

c. Shifting of the aim by Hitler and Goering 12, particularly after the
Germans were beginning to gain ground on the RAF.

Reasons for Britain’s Victory

12
Maurice, p 139.

Bibliography

1. The Flight at Odds, Denis Rechard

2. The Air War 1939-1940, R J Overy
3. The Battle of Britain,John Ray
4. History of Luftwaffe
5. Battle for the skies, Karen Farrington
6. Article “ Great Britains Deception Campaign Against the German Invader
During WWII,Charls Crick Shank
7. www. battle of britain/ second war 1939-1945.htm
8. www.Inside the battle of britain .com
9. www.stable.demon.co.uk/general/glossary.htm
10. www.great air battle. battle of britain.htm
11. www. standlab/roof/ac/atm
12. www.iwn.org.uk/online/Battle of britain radar.com
13. Article “ A comparative analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe intelligence in the Battle
of Britain 1940”, Mr JS Cox
14. www. air force history. battle of britain.htm
15. Article “ Battle of Britain Day,” Dr Alfred price FR hists
16. www. battle of britain. air wpns.htm
17. www. battle of britain. home.htm
18. www.luftwaffe.org.htm
19. Article “ Thus perished Operation Sea Lion,” Sir Winston Churchil
20. AP 3000 2nd Edition
21. www.stable.demon.co.uk
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52. The main reasons for the British victory can be summarised as follows;

a. Superior leadership at all levels - from Sir Winston Churchill to the men
and women of the RAF, with the persistent aim of defending England at all
cost.

b. Effective and efficient Air Defence system that provided the RAF with
enough early warning to surprise and counter the enemy at decisive points in
the battle.

LESSONS LEARNT AND ITS PRESENT DAY APPLICABILITY

53. There are many lessons from the Battle of Britain. Though most of the
lessons highlighted below are strategic in nature, there are a few which could have
some relevance in the operational and tactical fields. Majority can also be applied to
Bangladesh as well.

General

54. Selection of Centre of Gravity (C.G) and Maintenance of Aim . It is

important to correctly identify the C.G. of the enemy and attack those at the onset of
the campaign. More importantly, these C.G.s should be constantly attacked so that
they remain ineffective. In the case of the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe did not
consider the C2 system as a C.G. of the RAF, and hence did not put too much
emphasis on attacking the radars and Fighter Command HQ. If Germans had
targeted the early warning radars, they would have managed to suppress the RAF’s
air defences early in the battle. However, what really cost the Germans the battle
was their decision to stop their attacks on airfields. Emotional feelings got the better
of the leaders, and the unnecessary interference of Hitler led to changes to the
strategy. Needless to say, the outcome of battle would have been quite different if
the Luftwaffe had continued with its original strategy to attack the airfields.

55. Importance of Intelligence. The importance of intelligence cannot be

overstated. The Luftwaffe paid a high price for not being able to effectively employ
their intelligence assets. More importantly, when faced with reports that contradicted
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with the perceptions, they chose to ignore the reports instead of verifying them. As
such, they were often needlessly surprised by the RAF. Intelligence is and will
continue to be critical for military operations. It is vital to identifying the enemy's
vulnerabilities, weaknesses and strengths, which in turn helps to determine their
C.G.s.

Bangladesh Specific

56. Importance of a Balanced Force Structure. In the Spanish civil war,

medium day bombers proved to be key tactical weapons for ground attack.
However, they were not as effective in the Battle of Britain. In this battle Germans
actually required long-range bombers and fighter escorts. Lack of long-range heavy
bomber weakened the German offensive power to a great extent. As such, it is
essential for any air force to have a good mix of aircraft, so that it is able to
effectively prosecute the air campaign at both the strategic and tactical levels.

57. Importance of Technology Appreciation. Improvement to Air Power is

closely tied to improvements in technology. In this case, radar became a huge force
multiplier, which allowed the RAF to defeat a numerically superior force. Thus, it is
important for leaders and operators alike to appreciate technology, and understand
how it can be used to enhance air power. This will become increasingly important in
the wars of the information age.

58. Importance of Indigenous Capabilities for Aircraft Support and Repair.

The RAF benefited immensely from having indigenous capabilities to support and
repair damaged aircraft. It allowed them to maintain a sizeable fighter aircraft
strength throughout the battle. This is an important lesson for air forces of today.
Because of the high probability of embargoes, etc. during times of war, it is essential
that some indigenous capabilities for aircraft support and repair be developed so that
turn-around time for damaged aircraft can be minimised.

59. Importance of Night Attack Capabilities. Germans resorted to night

attacks to reduce attrition. Though they achieved their aim, accuracy of the attacks
was greatly hampered. Thus, in order to exploit the night window and not pay the
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price in terms of weapon delivery accuracy, night attack capability is necessary. Not
only would this help reduce attrition rate, operating during the night would also tax
the enemy’s air defence system to the maximum by forcing it to operate on a 24-hour
basis.

CONCLUSION

60. After the fall of France, Britain became isolated from continental Europe. At
that time, Britain was the only country fighting against Germany. The British had to
organise all her resources to prevent the Germans from delivering a decisive blow
from the air. The British kept their strategy very simple; that is to attrite the Luftwaffe
to the point that it became to high a price for the Luftwaffe to continue.

61. In the first phase of the Battle, the Germans attacked the shipping in the
English Channel with an aim of drawing RAF fighters over the sea. Then, they
launched the second phase to gain air superiority and attacked British radar stations
and airfields. At the end of the second Phase when British losses were great, the
Luftwaffe suddenly changed their strategy and started bombing London and other
major cities. This emotional decision by Hitler to switch targets was the turning point
of the battle. If Luftwaffe had continued the bombing of airfields in the same scale,
history would have been different. Changing the objective gave the RAF the
opportunity to rebuild their resources. In the third and fourth phase the Germans tried
to concentrate firepower to crush the British morale. But bombing the cities did not
break the morale. Instead, it made the British more defiant. The exhausted Luftwaffe
failed to secure the command of the air and Hitler finally cancelled “Operation sea
Lion” on 12 Oct 1940.

62. Many lessons have been learned from this battle, both at the strategic and
tactical levels. These are:

a. Importance of selecting and maintaining the aim

b. Importance of intelligence.
c. Importance of a balanced force structure.

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d. Importance of technology appreciation

e. Importance of having indigenous capabilities for aircraft support and
repair
f. Importance of night attack capabilities

63. Overall, it is not surprising that Britain won the Battle of Britain; a battle for
which it was the best equipped and best prepared.

SM NAZMUL ANAM
Dhaka Squadron Leader
June 2004 Team Leader

List of Annexes:

A. The Commanders of the Battle.

B. Pictorial illustration of Luftwaffe Command.
C. RAF Fighter Commands.
D. Pictorial illustration of Battle phases.
E. Primary aircraft used in the Battle of Britain.
F. War in electronic spectrum.

Distribution:

Directing Staff

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End Notes

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