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The Epochal Event
Transformations in the
Entangled Human,
Technological,
and Natural Worlds
Zoltán Boldizsár Simon
Palgrave Studies in the History of Science
and Technology
Series Editors
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Colby College
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Roger D. Launius
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Preface: On Connective Concepts
Human activity confronts us today with our cognitive limits. The recogni-
tion that human agency achieved a planetary character, that is, the recog-
nition that our activity became a natural force that transforms the condition
of the Earth system, is at the edge of our understanding. Facing the sheer
scale and the immense consequences of human actions and capacities does
not come easy to most of us. Little wonder that the new situation triggers
contradictory responses. Only in the climate context, responses vary from
climate change denial to apocalyptic fatalism, from lifestyle choices of
reducing carbon footprints to large-scale plans of geoengineering, and
from technology blaming to techno-saviorism.
In a cacophony of voices, scholarly responses represent only a fragment
of possibilities. Even if the natural sciences brought the issue to a broader
awareness in the first place, their voice becomes one among the many
when it comes to responding to the situation. Together with humanities
and social scientific responses, they constitute a larger family of responses
with a specific socio-cultural function to fulfill: scholarly responses do not
simply confront us with the limits of understanding; they also try to over-
come the very limits they identify. In other words, scholarly responses aim
at gaining an understanding of that which seems to defy understanding—
especially in situations we experience as crisis.
This book attempts to sketch a specific type of scholarly response. It
aims at developing an understanding of our recent anthropogenic plane-
tary crisis by creating concepts through which we conceive of the world
and ourselves. So far this is nothing surprising. Many would agree that
v
vi PREFACE: ON CONNECTIVE CONCEPTS
theoretically oriented work in what we still call today the humanities and
the social sciences is, to a large extent, conceptual work.
The specificity of this book’s approach lies in the intention to encour-
age developing concepts of a peculiar kind. Let’s call them connective con-
cepts. As our current crisis consists of the collision of human and the
natural worlds through advanced technologies, the adequate concepts
through which we apprehend ourselves and the world must be ones that
somehow capture the collision of worlds or reflect on that collision. Such
concepts are connective inasmuch as they have the potential to link,
bridge, and connect knowledge formations that were originally developed
to study the human and the natural worlds separately. In order to live up
to their potential, they need to travel.
As Mieke Bal pointed out two decades ago, concepts “are not fixed”;
“they travel – between disciplines, between individual scholars, between
historical periods, and between geographically dispersed academic com-
munities.”1 The different forms of travel Bal indicates are supposed to
testify the flexibility of concepts. How do connective concepts relate to
Bal’s traveling concepts and their flexibility? On the one hand, connective
concepts are flexible to the extent that they, too, travel across disciplines
and their meanings are constantly being renegotiated. On the other hand,
connective concepts also gesture toward the opposite end by seeking
points of connection and shared meanings through potentially the entirety
of the scholarly landscape, thereby enabling a broader exchange on the
collision of worlds. As compared to traveling concepts, connective ones
have an extra job to do. Whereas Bal’s notion of traveling concepts is pri-
marily a reflection on the work of the humanities (even if she does not
exclude science from the travels), connective concepts, by definition, may
link not only certain disciplines, but, in the most desirable although sel-
dom cases, also the work of the humanities and the work of the sciences.
At times when we both unintentionally act into and deliberately manip-
ulate and engineer what has previously been thought of as the order of
nature, concepts that merely travel are less useful than concepts that also
connect. To stand a chance to comprehend the big picture, our partial
knowledges must be effectively bridged by certain concepts. In fact, even
the question of how exactly we understand the collision of the human and
the natural worlds—whether it makes up one world, whether we keep
thinking about them as distinguishable (and if yes, the way in which we do
exactly), or whether we somehow manage to think of it as one world with
PREFACE: ON CONNECTIVE CONCEPTS vii
follow. What needs to be noted here is only the fact that the ideal of
mutuality in knowledge transfer can easily fall short in practice. Yet,
the lack of full mutuality does not mean that partial mutuality is of
no value. Under the condition of contested meanings—and con-
cepts discussed across the disciplinary landscape are extremely prone
to such contestation of meanings—partial mutuality is already
a success.
3. With respect to their reach, first-order and second-order connective con-
cepts can be distinguished. Given the distance from the ideal situation
of achieving a high degree of mutuality in knowledge transfer, it
makes sense to distinguish between two levels in which connective
concepts may work. On the first level, one can find those first-order
connective concepts that resonate with both the natural and life sci-
ences on the one hand and the human and social sciences on the
other. Such concepts are, I believe, what we need, what we are short
of, what we bitterly contest even when we have them, and what may
be seldom and extremely difficult to intentionally develop. As an
example of a truly transdisciplinary reach, one can think of not only
the Anthropocene but also the notion of anthropocentrism, fiercely
debated in the humanities and the social sciences as well as in the
natural and life sciences.2 Second-order connective concepts have a nar-
rower reach. They work, respectively, within the confines of the
natural and life sciences on the one hand and the human and social
sciences on the other. Arguably, much of the conceptual innovations
that emerge locally in disciplines of the human and social sciences
acquire such reach at best. They may resonate broadly enough
within humanities and social scientific scholarship, but they hardly
find their way to the scientific vocabulary. This is especially true of
concepts put forward as alternatives to the Anthropocene, such as
the Capitalocene or the Chthulucene.3
4. Connective concepts are recognized as such only after the fact and by
being used as connective ones. The above categorization of connective
concepts does not entail that each individual concept must live up to
the fullest possible reach within one of the categories. It means only
that connective concepts are typically made use of within the respec-
tive scopes associated with them. As the phrasing of the previous
sentence already indicates, concepts are defined as connective by
virtue of being used as such. Concepts may or may not be developed
with the explicit intention to function as connective ones, but
PREFACE: ON CONNECTIVE CONCEPTS ix
Bielefeld, Germany
Zoltán B. Simon
Leiden, The Netherlands
Notes
1. Mieke Bal, Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2002), 24.
2. In the larger debate on anthropocentrism, the humanities are typically advo-
cating an anti-anthropocentric stance. Chapter 4 engages with the question
of anthropocentrism in more details.
3. More on these alternatives in Chapter 3.
Bibliography
Bal, Mieke. Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2002.
Acknowledgments
Not many friends knew that I was working on this book. The reason for
this is very simple: neither did I. Around the end of 2018, I started to
work on an article, which, over time, became a long article. Then it became
a very long one—so long, after a while, that at some point I began to
entertain the idea of the book format. And now here we are.
Writing this book coincided with the blossoming of my collaboration
with Marek Tamm on various related projects. I am indebted to Marek
and our discussions of many themes and ideas that feature in the coming
pages. The final shape of the text greatly benefited also from the com-
ments of the reviewers, pointing at potential pitfalls and indicating ways to
strengthen arguments. Very many thanks to Julia Filimonova for drawing
the brilliant picture for the cover and for Megan Laddusaw at Palgrave for
managing this project through all its stages, from proposal to the pub-
lished book.
xi
Contents
Index137
xiii
CHAPTER 1
Notes
1. Donna J. Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 6–7.
2. Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, History in the Discursive Condition: Reconsidering
the Tools of Thought (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), xii.
3. Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin, The Sixth Extinction: Patterns of Life and
the Future of Humankind (New York: Anchor Books, 1996), 223.
4. Tracey Skillington, Climate Justice and Human Rights (New York: Palgrave,
2017), 2. The Anthropocene debate across disciplines—introduced prop-
erly in the next chapters—features countless claims concerning the necessity
of epochal changes in knowledge production. So does this book.
5. For the most influential sociological theory of acceleration, see Hartmut
Rosa, Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity, trans. Jonathan Trejo-
Mathys (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). For a rival sociologi-
cal interpretation—sensing that what is stake is more than acceleration—see
Ulrich Beck, The Metamorphosis of the World (Cambridge: Polity, 2016). The
coda will return to Beck’s theory in the context of discussing endeavors that
share the main imperative of this book and grapple with providing a concep-
tual understanding of an age of epochal transformations. For my more
detailed discussion of Rosa’s theory in the terms outlined above, see Zoltán
Boldizsár Simon, History in Times of Unprecedented Change: A Theory for the
21st Century (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), 181–183.
6. Whether the growing societal and scholarly sense of witnessing epochal
transformations can be confined to Western societies, to the experiences of
the rich, or generally speaking to the experiences of those who can afford to
experience the world in such terms is of course an open question.
Globalization makes it difficult to argue for confining claims concerning
societal tendencies to the Western world, let alone, to certain social groups
within the Western world. At the same time, the categories of the humani-
ties and the social sciences that point to various inequalities within social
worlds make it difficult to advance general claims concerning large-scale
societal tendencies, not to mention extending them over the globe. There is
no easy way out of this trap. I am inclined to leave the issue unresolved by
making peace with the fact that even if I attempted a resolution it would be
bitterly challenged and everyone would situate the outreach of this epochal
sentiment as they themselves would consider it adequate.
7. See also Stuart J. Pimm and Thomas M. Brooks, “The Sixth Extinction:
How Large, Where, and When?,” in Nature and Human Society: The Quest
for a Sustainable World, eds. Peter H. Raven and Tania Williams (Washington,
DC: National Academy Press, 2000), 46–62; Elizabeth Kolbert, The Sixth
Extinction: An Unnatural History (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).
1 PRELUDE TO A NEW EPOCHALITY 9
Bibliography
Beck, Ulrich. The Metamorphosis of the World. Cambridge: Polity, 2016.
Ermarth, Elizabeth Deeds. History in the Discursive Condition: Reconsidering the
Tools of Thought. London and New York: Routledge, 2011.
Haraway, Donna J. Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene.
Durham: Duke University Press, 2016.
Kolbert, Elizabeth. The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History. London:
Bloomsbury, 2014.
Leakey, Richard, and Roger Lewin. The Sixth Extinction: Patterns of Life and the
Future of Humankind. New York: Anchor Books, 1996.
Pimm, Stuart J., and Thomas M. Brooks. “The Sixth Extinction: How Large,
Where, and When?,” In Nature and Human Society: The Quest for a Sustainable
World, edited by Peter H. Raven and Tania Williams, 46–62. Washington, DC:
National Academy Press, 2000.
Rockström, Johan et al. “Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating
Space for Humanity.” Ecology and Society 14, no. 2 (2009): art. 32.
Rosa, Hartmut. Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity. Translated by
Jonathan Trejo-Mathys, New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.
Shanahan, Murray. The Technological Singularity. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2015.
Simon, Zoltán Boldizsár. History in Times of Unprecedented Change: A Theory for
the 21st Century. London: Bloomsbury, 2019.
Skillington, Tracey. Climate Justice and Human Rights. New York: Palgrave, 2017.
Steffen, Will et al. “Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a
Changing Planet.” Science 347, Issue 6223 (2015): 1259855.
Vinge, Vernor. “The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the
Post-Human Era.” In Vision-21: Interdisciplinary Science and Engineering in
the Era of Cyberspace, 11–22. Proceedings of a Symposium Cosponsored by the
NASA Lewis Research Center and the Ohio Aerospace Institute, Westlake,
Ohio, 30–31 March 1993.
CHAPTER 2
climate change, its present effects, and its dire future consequences gain
broader and broader publicity day by day. A new vocabulary consisting of
phrases such as “carbon footprint” is quickly taking root (at least among
those who can afford to care), just as well as a general awareness that fail-
ing to reduce carbon emissions is likely to lead to undesired and even cata-
strophic changes both in the condition of the planet and in human
societies.
Anthropogenic transformations in nature are not the only prospects to
receive growing publicity these days. The perils of artificial intelligence—
both in military or everyday use—and the potential of AI technologies to
turn democratic ways of life into authoritarian regimes already pertain the
wider societal consciousness to one extent or another. Human enhance-
ment technologies are becoming increasingly applied in the medical
domain, and even those who somehow miss public debates on the ethics
of human enhancement are most probably familiar with the even stronger
prospect of a transhuman and more-than-human future due to cinematic
and online streaming experiences. Some technological prospects may look
more plausible than others, while the potential changes triggered by tech-
nology look desirable and apocalyptic at the same time. But all differences
aside concerning the desirability of transformations, hardly anyone doubts
that advanced technologies bring about spectacular changes.
On a larger scale, however, and on the conceptual level, we still need to
come to terms with the big picture of ongoing planetary-scale changes. At
stake is not simply the aggregate of all particular changes in each domain
separately. What we need to grasp is the nature and the specific character
of transformations in the human-technology-nature matrix, which is pre-
cisely what the epochal event intends to achieve as a conceptual category.
Rendering the concept intelligible and feasible is, however, a long journey.
This chapter sets out on the journey by posing the following question: is
there any discipline in our current knowledge regime that could claim
expertise in mapping a world of self-made epochal transformations and
comprehend it as an overall condition framing our lives?
the last century in The Historian’s Craft, the discipline of history is con-
cerned with investigating and understanding human beings in time.2 A
few decades later, Ernst Breisach rather naturally echoed this definition in
his seminal study on the history of historiography, claiming that “history
deals with human life as it ‘flows’ through time,”3 meaning a tiptoeing
between accounting for both change and continuity in the human world.
Or, to have a more recent example that also reflects current trends, in her
book on the constitution of the discipline, Sarah Maza writes that “most
historians would probably agree that their task is twofold: to explain the
unfolding of change in the past, and to make the people and their places
of the time come alive for their readers.”4
On this basis it seems plausible to claim that, inasmuch as the question
of change over time is at stake and inasmuch as the human world is
involved in recent epochal imaginaries, they entail an appeal to history.
Yet, inasmuch as change concerns a more-than-human world in today’s
epochal thought, disciplinary understandings of history become less use-
ful. Due to the emphasis on the human in disciplinary epistemology,
escaping the confines of the human world entails that we also need to
escape the confines of the expertise of historical studies. And the case
remains the same even when bracketing the primacy of change over time
and trying to look for conceptions of historical work other than that of
Bloch, Breisach, and Maza.
In the first half of the last century, Robin G. Collingwood sharply
opposed the idea that historical knowledge is concerned with change over
time. The alternative view he offered was that history is the knowledge of
human thoughts and the human mind (studied through the manifesta-
tions of human thoughts in events and actions).5 In that, Collingwood was
in deep agreement with Giambattista Vico’s foundational insight from the
eighteenth century, according to which humans can have knowledge of
that which is made by humans, and, consequently, history (as the course
of affairs) can be known precisely because it is made by humans and is a
distinctly human history.6 This view of historical knowledge, needless to
say, separates knowledge of the human world and knowledge of the natu-
ral world perhaps even more sharply than the views introduced earlier.
Consequently, it may be even less promising for efforts that try to under-
stand transformations in the entangled human-technological-natural world.
In arguing that recent challenges posed by anthropogenic climate
change mark the collapse of the modern distinction between natural his-
tory and human history—and in briefly reviewing the history of the
2 A PERPLEXING APPEAL TO HISTORY 15
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