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 The Policing
of Protest, Disorder
and International Terrorism
in the UK since 1945
 Peter Joyce

The Policing
of Protest, Disorder
and International
Terrorism in the UK
since 1945
Britain in Comparative Perspective Since 1945
Peter Joyce
Department of Sociology
Manchester Metropolitan University
Manchester, United Kingdom

ISBN 978-0-230-54235-8 ISBN 978-1-137-29059-5 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-29059-5

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016949046

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in
accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
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retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
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Cover illustration: Homer Sykes Archive / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

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The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
The registered company address is: The Campus, 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW,
United Kingdom
To my wife, Julie, and my daughters, Emmeline and Eleanor
 PREFACE

This book focuses on political activity that is not conducted through the
formal institutions that are associated with conventional politics and to
which the term ‘extra-parliamentary political activities’ is applied. It exam-
ines the methods through which these activities have been conducted and
the manner in which they have been policed. Its main focus is on the UK
(including Northern Ireland), although it is acknowledged that some
aspects of protest and (in particular) contemporary terrorism take place
in a global setting. Accordingly, this work also considers transnational
protest and global terrorism and the response of the international com-
munity to actions of this nature.
The context within which this book considers protest is the theme of
chapter 1, in which it is argued that in the UK, popular engagement with
conventional political activity since the latter decades of the twentieth
century has declined from the levels that were reached in the period
immediately after 1945. It is argued that protest may thus perform an
important aspect of contemporary political activity, either by providing
alternative ways through which citizens who are disenchanted with the
contemporary conduct of conventional politics can shape decisions that
affect the conduct of their lives or by giving them mechanisms to inaugu-
rate change that supplement their perceived deficiencies of conventional
politics.
Chapter 2 discusses the various state agencies which are involved in the
policing of protest, subversion and national and international manifesta-
tions of terrorism. This entails a consideration of the role of the police
service, but the term ‘policing’ is defined broadly to consider the role

vii
viii PREFACE

played by other agencies. These include the security services which gather
information on those who engage in protest and terrorism and the military
and private organisations which may be called upon to provide a physical
response to such activities, in particular to mitigate the effects of industrial
disputes.
Chapters 3–7 discuss specific forms of extra-parliamentary political
activity that have been conducted in the UK since 1945. These comprise
demonstrations, direct action, industrial disputes, riots and terrorism. The
consideration of these topics takes place under a number of headings – a
definition of the specific activity that is being considered, activism and
involvement (which entails a discussion of those who engage in such
pursuits and the manner in which their activism is organised), and con-
textual issues (which embrace theoretical perspectives derived from crim-
inology, psychology and politics that underpin involvement in extra-
parliamentary political action and the key themes and issues that have
been raised through this activity, accompanied by a timeline that identifies
important examples of demonstrations, direct action, industrial disputes,
riots and terrorism that have occurred in the UK since 1945). Each of
these chapters analyses the tactics employed by those who have engaged in
actions of this nature, a theme that especially seeks to identify the way in
which their methods have changed since 1945. The issues raised in these
discussions provide the context within which the state response and poli-
cing of these protests can then be analysed.
Chapter 8 analyses trends in the policing of the activities that have been
the focus of discussion in chapters 3–7. This evaluation embraces both the
physical response to protest and the surveillance and monitoring of orga-
nisations and individuals who are associated with diverse forms of extra-
parliamentary political activism.
This chapter identifies four main trends associated with the policing of
protest – the period 1945–1970, the period 1970–1990 (which is espe-
cially associated with the emergence of what some observers have referred
to as the ‘strong state’) and the period after 1990 when reforms were
initiated to the framework within which the policing of protest was con-
ducted. The trend that is identified in the final section of this chapter is the
development of state surveillance within the confines of state secrecy,
whereby the need to combat terrorism has been used as a means to
place restrictions on various manifestations of protest and to curtail the
ability of the public to enter into any meaningful debate regarding these
innovations.
 PREFACE ix

The final chapter evaluates the transnational dimension of protest and

contemporary terrorism and the manner in which these activities are
policed by the global community.
The book seeks to place within one volume a broad overview of the
wide array of extra-parliamentary political activities that have taken place in
the UK since 1945 and to evaluate the manner in which these have been
policed and responded to by the state. It is pitched at those who have no
prior knowledge of this subject area and who may wish to develop their
understanding of contemporary current affairs as well as to those who are
studying this topic within Higher Education.
I would like to record my thanks to my commissioning editors at
Palgrave (Jules Willan and Josephine Taylor), without whose considerable
help and guidance it would not have been possible to complete this work.
 CONTENTS

1 Introduction – Conventional Politics and Protest 1

2 The State’s Response to Protest, Subversion and Terrorism 25

3 Demonstrations 53

4 Direct Action 87

5 Workplace Protest 141

6 Riots 179

7 Terrorism in the UK Within a Global Context 237

8 The UK State, Protest and Terrorism 307

9 Policing Global Protest and Terrorism 353

Index 391

xi
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction – Conventional
Politics and Protest

This chapter will consider a range of factors that relate to the role played
by protest in the contemporary politics of the UK. It will argue that there
has been a decline in popular involvement in conventional political
activity since the latter decades of the twentieth century which had
created political space for citizen involvement in a range of other
mechanisms (collectively termed protest or ‘extra-parliamentary political
activities’) in order to bring about policy changes. The chapter will argue
that for some people, this constitutes an alternative to conventional
politics as the mechanism through which to inaugurate change but for
others it acts as a supplement to conventional political activity.

THE DECLINE OF ENGAGEMENT WITH CONVENTIONAL

POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Conventional politics entails activities that are conducted through formal
institutional channels of which Parliament, political parties and voting are
integral features. The role performed by members of the general public is
confined to joining political parties and voting in election contests after
which those elected to public office take decisions on behalf of the general
public from whom they can claim a mandate to act.
There is, however, evidence that public involvement with these aspects
of conventional political activity has been in decline in the latter years of
the twentieth century and the early decades of the twenty-first century.

© The Author(s) 2016 1

P. Joyce, The Policing of Protest, Disorder and International Terrorism
in the UK since 1945, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-29059-5_1
2 THE POLICING OF PROTEST, DISORDER AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN . . .

This is evidenced by declining membership of political parties and reduced

voter participation in national election contests. The reasons for this are
considered below.

Political Party Membership and Party Affiliation

The membership of the main political parties in 2001 was less than 25% of its
1964 level (Kennedy, 2006: 46), leading to the conclusion that ‘Britain now
has one of the lowest political party membership rates in Europe . . . the
public is deeply disenchanted with political parties’ (Hansard Society,
2009: 50).
Current estimates of the membership of the major political parties
indicate that

• The Conservative Party had around 149,800 members, as of

December 2013.
• The Labour Party had around 270,000 members, as of August 2015.
• The Scottish National Party had around 110,000 members, as of
June 2015.
• The Liberal Democrat Party had 61,000 members, as of May 2015.
• UKIP had around 42,000 members, as of January 2015.
• The Green Party (England and Wales) had 61,000 members, as of
June 2015 (Keen, 2015).

Membership of the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats was

stated to be at a historic low – ‘in 2015 1.0% of the electorate was a
member of these three parties and, in 2011, 0.8%. This compares to 3.8%
in 1983’ (Keen, 2015: 3). Additionally, it has been argued that many of
those who did belong to political parties do not play an active role in party
affairs (Kennedy, 2006: 47–48).
This situation reflects a wider issue, that of identification with and
allegiance to political parties. These have also significantly declined: ‘the
proportion that said they identified “very” or “fairly” strongly with a party
fell from 46% in 1987 to 36% by 2010, while, conversely, the proportion
that said they did not support a party at all more or less doubled from 8%
to 17%. Four years later those figures are much the same; 37% claim they
“very” or “fairly” strongly identify with a party, while nearly one in five
(19%) say they do not have an affinity with any party’ (Simpson and
Phillips, 2015: 136–137). Additionally, affinity with a political party was
 1 INTRODUCTION – CONVENTIONAL POLITICS AND PROTEST 3

exerting a reduced influence on the likelihood of voting: only 76% of those

who indicated that they are a strong supporter of a political party stated
that they were ‘certain’ to vote in the 2015 general election (Hansard
Society, 2015: 6).

Voter Participation in Elections

Among the wider general public (i.e. those who are not members of
political parties), affinity to a political party is an important determinant
of political engagement, including voting (Hansard Society, 2014: 26).
Thus, the decline of the first will inevitably result in the reduction of the
second. This section examines the extent to which the general public
engage with election contests.

General Elections
General elections are an especially important indicator of active citizenship
and traditionally a high proportion of citizens felt that they had a duty to
vote. Although the majority of the general public subscribe to this view
(in 2013, 57% accepting that they had a duty to vote), this figure was
considerably lower than the 76% who expressed this opinion in 1987 or
the 68% who agreed with this proposition in 1994) (Simpson and Phillips,
2015: 137).
Popular perceptions of this sense of civic duty are reflected by participa-
tion in general election contests (as measured by voter turnout).
In 1950, the turnout was 83.9% and in 1951 was 82.6%. In subsequent
general election contests held in 1955, 1959, 1964 and 1966, voter
turnout exceeded 75% and although it was reduced to a figure of around
72% in the 1970 general election, it rose to 78.8% in the February 1974
contest. Turnout was reduced to 72.8% in the October 1974 general
election but remained in excess of 75% in 1979, 1987 and 1992 (although
it fell to 72.7% in 1983 Joyce, 2004, passim).
However, towards the end of the twentieth century, voter participation
declined. Turnout in the 1997 general election was 71.4%, the lowest figure
since that of 1945. Subsequently, the 2001 UK general election witnessed
the lowest turnout in national contests since 1918: below 60% (59.4%) of
those eligible to vote exercised their right to do so and the Labour Party’s
alleged landslide victory was based on below one eligible voter in four
supporting them at the polls (Joyce, 2002: 44). The extent of disengage-
ment from conventional politics in this campaign in which almost 5 million
4 THE POLICING OF PROTEST, DISORDER AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN . . .

fewer electors voted than in the previous contest held in 1997 (31,286,284
compared with 26,368,530) (Joyce, 2004: 396 and 407) gave rise to
perceptions of a profound ‘crisis in democratic politics in Britain’
(Whiteley et al. 2001: 786) or what has been termed ‘disengagement from
formal democracy’ (Kennedy, 2006: 16). In later twenty-first-century
contests, voter participation marginally improved – in 2005 (turnout
was 61.4%), in 2010 (65%) and 2015 (66%) – but failed to reach the
high levels of citizen engagement of the 1950s and 1960s. Studies con-
ducted in 2012 and 2013 indicated that the proportion of those who
would certainly vote fell to 41% and that only 42% claimed they were
‘fairly interested’ in politics (Hansard Society, 2014: 33). However, the
imminence of a general election caused an increase in the public’s interest
in politics (whereby 50% claimed they were ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ interested in
politics) (Hansard Society, 2014: 33).
Although reduced levels of voter participation in general election con-
tests might create space for protest to assume a more prominent role in
political activity, it has been observed that membership of the SNP, UKIP
and the Green Party has increased ‘markedly’ in recent years and this was
mirrored by the electoral support obtained by these parties in the 2015
general election: UKIP’s 3.8 million votes substantially outpolled the 2.4
million obtained by the Liberal Democrats (which was the junior partner
in the 2010 coalition government), the SNPs 1.5 million elected 56 of
Scotland’s 59 MPs and the Green’s 1.2 million votes was a record for that
party (figures adopted from BBC News, 2015).
This situation indicated that for many people, political activity was
conducted through what were once regarded as ‘minor parties’ enabling
the 2015 election to be stylised as anti-establishment rather than anti-
political (Flinders, 2015: 242). Electoral support for political parties other
than the traditional ‘main’ ones could be interpreted as an indication of
the continued vitality of conventional political activity as opposed to a
rejection of the concept of representative democracy that had been put
forward of a feature of the 1997 and subsequent electoral contests.

DISILLUSIONMENT WITH CONVENTIONAL POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Although large number of citizens in the UK continue to engage with
conventional political activity, the previous section has argued that many
people regard this as an ineffective mechanism through which to get their
 1 INTRODUCTION – CONVENTIONAL POLITICS AND PROTEST 5

views acted upon by those who wield political or economic power. This
section seeks to explore some of the reasons why this is the case.

People Lack Power

The most significant factor accounting for disdain towards conventional
political activity is that it fails to provide citizens with any real power to
influence decisions that shape the conduct of their everyday lives – ‘people
are less likely to vote now compared to two decades ago because they feel
that voting does not make any difference to the issues that matter to them’
(Simpson and Phillips, 2015: 130). It has been suggested that only 31% of
citizens felt that if people like themselves got involved with politics, ‘they
really can change the way that the UK is run’ (Hansard Society, 2014: 23).
This view was underpinned by a perception that ‘only 26% feel they have at
least “some” influence locally and only 14% nationally’ (Hansard Society,
2014: 28).
There are several reasons that might explain this disenchantment with
conventional political activity. During the 1960s, the Liberal Party, then
led by Jo Grimond, sought to court support from ‘the enterprising . . . the
boys and girls who are now coming out of school, technical colleges and
the Universities, knowing that they have the opportunity to do so, longing
for the opportunity to do so’ (Grimond, 1964) but whose best progressive
intentions were thwarted by the ‘establishment’ which he blamed for the
status-conscious society and the British obsession with amateurism (Joyce,
1999: 135). This reserved the top jobs in Britain for those ‘who had the
right father or went to the right school’ (Grimond, 1963).
The perception that power was wielded by powerful groups which
dominated British society and whose key concern was to retain their
positions of dominance has remained a current concern (Jones, 2015)
and contributes to an understanding of the sense of powerlessness that
underpins popular disengagement with conventional political activity,
especially if this is viewed as a mechanism to ‘manage’ popular demands
and ensure they do not threaten the establishment’s bedrock interests
(Jones, 2015: 4).
The view that engagement with conventional political activity is
adversely affected by the perception that power is wielded by an
unaccountable elite is reinforced by arguments that suggest there are
fundamental flaws with the operations of Britain’s system of represen-
tative democracy. It has been argued that the shift from an industrial
6 THE POLICING OF PROTEST, DISORDER AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN . . .

to a post-industrial economy has rendered redundant the British par-

liamentary system of elected representatives which was constructed in
an era ‘of very limited educational provision and in which deference
and rigid hierarchy and static social relations were taken for granted’
(Kennedy, 2006: 19 and 104). The post-industrial economy has led to
the creation of a large section of society which is ‘better educated,
more affluent, expects greater control and choice over many aspects of
life, feels no deference towards those in positions of authority, and is
not bound by the traditional bonds of place, class and institution that
developed in the industrial era’ (Kennedy, 2006: 18 and 103).
A further inadequacy with the operations of conventional politics is that
it marginalises the involvement of citizens to that of voting in election
contests but leaves the task of decision-making to those elected to public
office who may (or may not as was the case of the Liberal Democrats
following the 2010 general election in connection with their stance on
raising fees for students in higher education) base their actions on the
generalised statements that were put forward in election manifestos.
Reference was made in one study to the ‘very widespread sense that
citizens feel their views and interests are not taken sufficiently into account
by the processes of political decision-making’ (Kennedy, 2006: 73) in
particular possessing little or no power in the period between elections
(Kennedy, 2006: 77). A later study suggested that an overwhelming
majority of the country felt that had ‘not very much influence’ or ‘no
influence at all’ over decision-making in their local area (73%) and the
country as a whole (85%) (Hansard Society, 2009: 4). For people such as
this, popular disengagement with conventional politics is ‘really about
having no say. It is about feeling disconnected because voting once
every four or five years does not feel like real engagement’ (Kennedy,
2006: 9).
Accordingly, it has been argued that ‘a system based largely or entirely
in parliamentary representation no longer engages people in the way it
once did’ (Kennedy, 2006: 117). Expressed simply, representative democ-
racy has, to large numbers of people, ‘had its day’ and for some is being
replaced or supplemented by a range of alternative ways through which
citizens can seek to exercise power regarding decision-making by govern-
ments, supranational bodies and commercial concerns and to do so on a
day-by-day basis, not constrained by the relatively infrequent holding of
election contests. Empowerment is thus a central concern of those who
engage in protest (Hertz, 2001d: 202).
 1 INTRODUCTION – CONVENTIONAL POLITICS AND PROTEST 7

Remoteness of Conventional Political Activity

Conventional politics is remote from the lives of ordinary people.
Debates that are conducted in the House of Commons or in Council
chambers using rituals and language not readily understood by average
citizens make conventional politics and politicians seem distant from the
general public (Hansard Society, 2001: 5–6). The preoccupations of
politicians with attendance at Westminster or local authorities means
that their relationship with voters is distant. It was reported that only
23% of the population agreed that Parliament ‘encourages public invol-
vement in politics’ – compared with a figure of 30% in the previous two
annual audits (Hansard Society, 2014: 5).
The relationship between politicians and the general public failed to
improve as the 2015 general election approached, it being reported that
‘two-thirds (67%) of the public believe that politicians don’t understand
the daily lives of people like themselves’ (Hansard Society, 2014: 1 and 6).
The following section seeks to analyse why this is the case.

Centralisation of Power in the Executive Branch of Government

The centralisation of power in the hands of the Prime Minister (which
impacts on the power of the Cabinet and Parliament) is at odds with a desire
by citizens to exercise influence over issues that affect them. It has been
argued that the ‘contemptuous attitude’ of the executive towards Parliament
was marked in Mrs Thatcher’s day and while it receded under John Major, it
subsequently resumed under Tony Blair (Williams, 2006, cited in Kennedy,
2006: 128–129). Conservative parliamentarians accepted this criticism, it
being argued that in government the Conservatives ‘truncated parliamentary
scrutiny, we guillotined bills, we briefed the media before Parliament was
told about important policy developments, and we used the lobby system
which is an enormous source of power and control for the Prime Minister of
the day’ (Bercow, cited in Kennedy, 2006: 129).

Lack of Ideological and Policy Choice

Popular disengagement with conventional politics might also be explained
by issues affecting the underpinnings of the party system.

Founded on Obsolete Ideals

A fundamental issue arising from the shift from an industrial to a post-
industrial economy has been the diversification of the composition of
society whose complex values and interests cannot be catered for by the
8 THE POLICING OF PROTEST, DISORDER AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN . . .

British party system which ‘is based on the dominance of two parties
constructed around the pursuit of the interests and ideological leanings
of the two dominant classes that existed during the industrial revolution’
(Kennedy, 2006: 19).
It has been argued that ‘the shrinkage of the manual working class and the
expansion of the professional classes has greatly increased the number of
individuals who no longer hold a strong class allegiance or, at least, identify
with the cultural and political forms associated with the economic classes once
engaged in social conflicts in the twentieth century’ (Kennedy, 2006: 102).
Additionally, ‘the grand ideologies of the last century, which were based
upon broad-brush approaches to traditional class interests and material con-
cerns, have an inevitably reduced appeal for many citizens today, given the
decline of historical class divisions and identities’ (Kennedy, 2006: 102).

Consensus Politics
One issue influencing low levels of voter participation is a perception that
contemporary mainstream parties are guided by similar objectives, leading
them to promote policies which are much the same. In the UK, ‘the main
political parties are widely perceived to be too similar and lacking in
principle’ (Kennedy, 2006: 17): they are ‘no longer distinct enough and
no longer base their policies on core principles’ (Kennedy, 2006: 110).
The view that ‘all parties are the same’ will not secure widespread public
engagement with a political process in which voters are seemingly offered a
choice between Tweedledum and Tweedledee.
The perception that ideology was no longer the guiding force of political
conduct was especially directed at the Labour Party, whereby its quest to
secure support from ‘middle England’ led to the replacement of its tradi-
tional socialist ideology (enshrined in Clause IV of its Constitution) with
that associated with ‘New Labour’ in which these ideals were substantially
watered down to declare that the Labour Party was ‘a democratic socialist
party’ whose vision was one in which ‘power, wealth and opportunity are in
the hands of the many, not the few, where the rights we enjoy reflect the
duties we owe, and where we live together, freely, in a spirit of solidarity,
tolerance and respect’ (Clause IV of the Constitution of the Labour Party
cited in Adams, 1998: 144–145)
It has been argued that ‘without the restraints of conviction, they
(political leaders) are free to respond to the requests of the powerful
while shifting their media images as the public mood demands’ (Palast,
2003: 299) and that ‘a government without convictions is a government
 1 INTRODUCTION – CONVENTIONAL POLITICS AND PROTEST 9

for sale’ (Palast, 2003: 299). This situation not only opens the door to
policy-making being determined by powerful corporate interests but also
gives rise to the accusation that ‘when politics is a matter of convenience,
not conviction, only the self-interested prosper’ (Monbiot, 2001).

Management as Opposed to Change

A consequence arising from the devaluation of ideology as the guiding
force in politics is the emphasis placed by governments of management, in
particular management of the economy. This gave rise to the targets
regime pursued by ‘new Labour’ governments whereby the micromanage-
ment of the economy and public sector services such as policing replaced
the pursuit of ideals and the desire to inaugurate changes within society.
The replacement of principles and ideas with managerialism (Kennedy,
2006: 9) that elevates efficiency in managing the existing economic system
as opposed to challenging its existence and promoting alternative ideals
fails to fire the popular imagination and effectively made the conduct of
politics boring (Beckett, 2001) so that large numbers of people failed to
engage with the process.

Centralised Control and Stage Management

National election campaigns have been historically the events that moti-
vate citizens to engage with conventional politics. However, recent elec-
tion campaigns have failed to achieve this, one reason for this being that
when ‘in terms of policy, very little divides our parties’ (Bazalgette, 2006:
3–4), the attention of voters is devoted to the personalities of the candi-
dates, and in particular (derived from the presidentialisation of the UK
politics) of the party leaders.
Consequently, politics, especially general election contests, have
become increasingly centrally managed affairs. Party election campaign
managers decide what issues are allowed to be discussed, who can and
who cannot be interviewed and what access the general public are
granted to political leaders. Political speeches are delivered in sound
bites and carefully crafted speeches written by professional speech-
writers, from whose texts political leaders are loathe to stray. Thus,
election contests have effectively been turned into polished advertising
campaigns that are designed to sell a carefully packaged product to the
general public, leading to the perception that ‘it is as though Proctor
and Gamble or Abbey National are running the country’ (Kennedy,
2006: 9).
10 THE POLICING OF PROTEST, DISORDER AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN . . .

The degree of control exerted over election campaigns by political elites is

a disincentive for ordinary members of the public to engage with the process.
To many people, the extent of central control has aggravated boredom in
conventional political activity which is only alleviated when the script accord-
ing to which political leaders are meant to operate is abandoned. The most
(and perhaps only) memorable features of the 2001 general election
occurred when Labour’s deputy leader, John Prescott, responded to being
hit on the head by an egg that was thrown at him by wading into the crowd
to ‘sort out’ the perpetrator and when, to his obvious discomfort, Labour
leader Tony Blair was publicly accosted by a nurse as he entered a building
to made a speech who challenged him about his party’s previous record
regarding the National Health Service (NHS).
This situation was summarised by an editorial in the Guardian newspaper
on 4 June 2001 which commented that 4 years previously, ‘Britain experi-
enced the most tightly controlled and “professional” election campaign in its
history. This year (2001) the control has been even tighter and the “pro-
fessionalism” more intense than ever. It is no coincidence that these cam-
paigns have given less satisfaction and have granted less involvement to the
voters than any in our history’.
Without this popular involvement, conventional politics becomes trans-
formed into a situation in which ‘the political elite is talking to itself’
(Coleman, 2006: 6). However, it also makes for election campaigns which
from the perspective of the general public lack excitement, the 2005 general
election campaign being dubbed ‘one of the dullest campaigns on record’
(Coleman, 2006: 6).

Party Discipline
Although the party system has key advantages (especially in the provision of
organised support for governments within legislative bodies), it also has its
weaknesses, in particular concerning the control that parties exercise over
those of their members who are elected to public offices.
The perception that conventional politics is the concern of elites rather
than of all citizens is thus further compounded by the control exerted over
politicians by their leaders which is a feature of both central and local
governments whereby devices such as the party whip system in the House
of Commons ensure that the views of party leaders (especially when the
party is in government) prevail (Young, 2001). It has been argued that
‘politics and government are increasingly slipping back into the hands of
privileged elites as if democracy has run out of steam’ (Kennedy, 2006: 10).
 1 INTRODUCTION – CONVENTIONAL POLITICS AND PROTEST 11

The role of ordinary members of parliament (MPs) is relegated to that of

lobby fodder who (in the words of W.S. Gilbert in the opera Iolanthe) are
forced (on pain of expulsion from their parliamentary party) into a situation
whereby ‘they’ve got to leave that brain outside and vote just as their leaders
tell ‘em to.’ Accordingly, one response to the problem of disengagement
with conventional politics has been to propose placing limits on the powers
of party whips (Kennedy, 2006: 21).

Sleaze and Abuse of Power in a Public Office

Public support for political parties, politicians and the conventional poli-
tical system has been adversely affected by allegations that those elected to
public office are sometimes motivated by self-interest as opposed to public
service. It has been observed that ‘just 18% of the public think that
standards of conduct for public office holders are high; twice as many
(36%) believe, on the contrary, that standards are low’ (Hansard Society,
2015: 44).
In the UK, the term ‘sleaze’ has been used to describe the exploitation
of public office by politicians for factors such as personal gain, sexual
gratification or party advantage or, more loosely, in connection with any
form of scandal related to the unethical conduct of politicians. The term
also embraces attempts to cover up such behaviour either by those guilty
of misconduct or by their political colleagues.
Accusations of sleaze have affected the conduct of the UK politics since
the 1990s that include the ‘cash for questions’ scandal in 1994 (alleging
that a small number of Conservative MPs had accepted money to table
parliamentary questions) and the 2010 ‘influence for cash’ episode when
three former cabinet ministers were alleged to be willing to use their past
contacts in government to secure changes in legislation at the behest of
lobbying firms.
However, the most significant recent episode in relation to perceived
inappropriate behaviour by politicians arose in connection with the
expense claims of members of both houses of Parliament. It was revealed
in 2009 that the taxpayer was footing the bill for items such as mortgages
on MPs second homes and luxuries that included the cleaning of a moat,
the upkeep of a private swimming pool, the maintenance of a ‘helipad’, the
tuning of a piano, the purchase of horse manure for use as a garden
fertiliser and a contribution towards the wages paid to an housekeeper
(Joyce, 2012: 116). Although in most cases, the politicians had broken no
law (and many cases voluntarily paid back money to which they were
12 THE POLICING OF PROTEST, DISORDER AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN . . .

legally entitled), public opinion was concerned about the conduct of their
elected representatives, leading to a perception that ‘most politicians are in
politics only for what they can get out of it personally’ (Simpson and
Phillips, 2015: 136).
Episodes of this nature have exerted an adverse impact on citizens’ trust
in politicians and governments: in 2013, only about one person in six
indicated that they trusted governments ‘just about always’ or ‘most of the
time’, whereas 32% of people said that they ‘almost never’ trust the
government (Simpson and Phillips, 2015: 135).
Conversely, it has been argued that most of the few detailed academic
studies that had researched this linkage concluded that the causal relation-
ship between trust in politics and political participation was ‘weak and
patchy’ and ‘not at all robust’ (Newton, 2001).

THE DISILLUSIONED AND THE DISENGAGED

Traditionally, non-voting in the UK general elections was viewed as a
phenomenon affecting young people below the age of 25; but in 2001,
this became an issue affecting older people below the age of 35 and
extended towards those aged below 45 (Young, 2001). In 2001, one
third of women under 55 (who had previously been viewed as the most
civic minded) failed to vote (Hansard Society, 2001: 1). However, young
people remain a key group who fail to be engaged with conventional
political activity and for whom political activity may potentially be con-
ducted through other mechanisms.

Young People and Conventional Politics

Persons below the age of 18 (who numbered 11 million in 2001) are not
eligible to vote in elections. The exclusion of this large group from the liberal
democratic political process may help explain why young people traditionally
play a limited role in conventional politics when they reach voting age – they
have not been sufficiently socialised into voting habits when they formally
acquire the right to do so.
At the 1997 general election, only 44% of those aged 18–24 voted and
this pattern was repeated at the 2001 general election when six out of ten
young people failed to vote (Hansard Society, 2001: 1) and also at the 2005
general election, when it was estimated that four out of ten first-time voters
 1 INTRODUCTION – CONVENTIONAL POLITICS AND PROTEST 13

did not bother to vote and around 16% of that age group were not even
registered to vote (Coleman, 2006: 7).
In the run-up to the 2015 general election, it was reported that certainty to
vote among the 18–24-year olds stood at 16%, with a larger figure of 30%
indicating that they were certain not to vote (Hansard Society, 2015: 48 and
13). Post-election analysis broadly confirmed this situation, it being observed
that those aged 18–24 were about half as less likely to have voted as those
aged 65 or over (the figures being 43%: 78%) (Flinders, 2015: 247–248).
It has thus been argued that for the 16–34-year-old generation, politics
has become a ‘dirty word’ and that such citizens ‘are less likely to vote, to
join a political party or to be politically active’. Under 25s are four times
less likely to be registered than any other group (findings quoted in
Wilkinson and Mulgan, 1995: 17).
The disconnection of young people with conventional political activity
is underpinned by their perceptions of government as remote, arrogant
and unresponsive, especially when their behaviour is stigmatised for poli-
tical purposes. Post-war governments of all political complexions have
been willing to pursue populist rhetoric to mobilise a consensus condemn-
ing the behaviour of young people. By focusing on this and stressing the
urgent need to address it in order to recreate a society in which people ‘feel
safe in their own environment’ (Kaulingfreks, 2015: 17), governments
have ignored the deeper rooted causes of social malaise which caused the
behaviour to manifest itself. The tendency for politicians to stigmatise the
behaviour of young people is a disincentive for them to engage in con-
ventional political activity and an important explanation as to why large
numbers of them are unwilling to do so.

POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT THROUGH PROTEST

Disillusionment with conventional political activity does not imply
apathy towards politics, political issues or civic society. It has been
observed that nearly two thirds of the general public follow political
news on a daily basis, about half indicate that they sometimes talk
about politics to family and friends and that that 32% of the electorate
state that they have ‘quite a lot’ or ‘a great’ deal of interest in politics
(Simpson and Phillips, 2015: 122). Statistics of this nature suggest
that a considerable proportion of the electorate are political spectators
as opposed to political activists (in the sense of being engaged with
14 THE POLICING OF PROTEST, DISORDER AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN . . .

the formal political process) but for these people, protest is an alter-
native vehicle through which they can voice their concerns.
It has been argued that the percentage of the British population who had
signed a petition rose from 23% in 1974 to 81% in 2000 (Inglehart and
Cattenberg, 2002: 302), and that those who had taken part in a demonstra-
tion rose from 6% to 13% in the same period. Those who indicated they
would be prepared to demonstrate increased from 20% of respondents in
1979 to 33% in 2000 (Whiteley, 2003: 611) (a finding that seemed
authenticated when an estimated 1.5 million people took to the streets of
London in 2003 to voice their opposition to the war with Iraq (Whiteley,
2003: 611). It was further claimed that in 2000, 20% had donated money to
a charity or a campaigning organisation, 16% had created or signed a paper
petition, 15% had signed an e-petition, 10% had boycotted products for
political, ethical or environmental reasons and 7% had taken an active part in
a campaign (Hansard Society, 2014: 4 and 46–47).
Volunteering has been viewed as a further illustration of political
engagement:

People in Britain still volunteer; they run in marathons for charity; they hold
car boot sales to raise funds for good causes; they take part in Red Nose days
and wear ribbons for breast cancer or AIDS. They sit as school governors, do
prison visits, read with children who have learning difficulties. They take part
in school races and run the school disco (Kennedy, 2006: 12).

It has also been observed that organisations which make use of protest
as a campaigning technique have seen considerable increases in their
membership – Friends of the Earth grew from 1000 members in 1971
to 119,000 in 2002, Greenpeace increased from 30,000 members in
1981 to 221,000 in 2002 and membership for the Royal Society for
the Protection of Birds expanded from 98,000 in 1971 to 1,020,000 in
2002 (Haezewindt, 2003: 19). It was estimated that of those who did
not vote in general elections, ‘37 per cent were members of, or active in,
a charity, community group, public body or campaigning organisation’
(Kennedy, 2006: 42).
However, although protest may be attractive to people not pre-
viously involved in conventional political activity (as was argued to be
the case with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) during
the early years of its existence) (Carter, 1992: 55), it remains the case
that participation in extra-parliamentary forms of political activity other
 1 INTRODUCTION – CONVENTIONAL POLITICS AND PROTEST 15

than conventional politics remains a minority interest. Recent studies

have also suggested that people’s willingness to participate in campaigns
related to issues about which they feel strongly had declined in 2015 to
69% (compared to 80% and 78% in the preceding 2 years) (Hansard
Society, 2015: 29).
Statistics such as these have led to the conclusion that there was nothing
to suggest that ‘amongst the public as a whole . . . the decline in turnout is
being accompanied by greater involvement in other forms of political
action’ (Simpson and Phillips, 2015: 127).

Young People and Protest

Young people have been previously identified as a group that is especially
disengaged with formal political activity. A key issue is whether their sense
of disillusionment towards conventional political activity translates itself
into active involvement in a wide range of events that this work describes
as ‘protest’ (and which have alternatively been described as a ‘changing
sense of civic duty’) (Kennedy, 2006: 58) or whether it simply results in
apathy towards all forms of civic involvement and political conduct.
It has been observed that although a number of young people ‘no
longer want to . . . join a party or get involved in formal politics’
(Kennedy, 2006: 12), they may view participation in extra-parliamentary
forms of political activity as an alternative form of civic engagement. It has
been suggested that 18–34-year-olds express an interest in specific political
issues and were prone to active involvement in voluntary organisations
(Gaskin et al., 2006) and that at the 2001 general election, 24% of those
aged 16–24 who were defined as active citizens (e.g. by participating in
a demonstration or march or attending a political or interest group
meeting) failed to vote (Hansard Society, 2001: 8).
One explanation that might be put forward for this situation is that at
election times, parties put forward a range of policies not all of which are
endorsed by individual electors. ‘The fact that you can only see yourself
fitting 30 per cent of a party’s political position is very unfortunate . . . it
looks as if the younger you are the less likely you’ll feel that you’re prepared
to box yourself in like that’ (Tyler, evidence to Kennedy, 2006: 86–87).
For those not prepared to be ‘boxed in’, single-issue politics may be a
more attractive proposition and ‘may go some way towards explaining the
popularity of informal pressure politics over formal party politics’ (Kennedy,
2006: 87). Campaign groups ‘are much more focused and require only that
16 THE POLICING OF PROTEST, DISORDER AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN . . .

an individual supports change in one area or, at most, a bundle of related

areas for which they feel sympathy’ (Kennedy, 2006: 106).
However, other studies have painted a different picture by suggesting
that those aged 18–24 are the least likely (4%) to be activists (as identified
through a wide range of indicators that included signing a petition,
engaging in consumer boycotts and taking part in a demonstration,
picket or march along with a range of other actions associated with
conventional politics such as contacting a councillor or an MP or attend-
ing a political meeting) and that people aged 45–54 were the most likely
(18%) to engage in such activities (Hansard Society, 2009: 27).
Below, the involvement of formal education on the propensity of young
people to engage in protest since 1945 will be considered.

Young People and Formal Education

Factors which have included the extension of higher education, and
especially the development of the social sciences, have been cited as
being responsible for constructing ‘a fundamental change in political
socialisation of a significant minority of young people which has attracted
them towards radical activism’ (Benewick and Smith, 1972: 306) and a
study conducted in America concluded that more educated people were
found to be more likely to tolerate or grant legitimacy to collective action
on behalf of a cause which they themselves did not support (Hall et al.,
1986: 564).
There are numerous historical and contemporary examples of educated
young people being involved in protests. Radical British students were at
the forefront of protests which took place during the 1960s to express
opposition to American policy in Vietnam (Waddington, 1992: 35) and
educated young people have been involved in a wide range of protests that
have taken place since the 1970s. These have included the involvement of
students in the campaign against the financial stake held by Barclays Bank
in South Africa’s apartheid regime in the 1980s and, more recently, in
protests in 2010 to voice opposition to the raising of student tuition fees
in England and Wales.
More recently, educated young people have been associated with cam-
paigning groups such as Earth First! and the anti-capitalist movement.
Counterculture protests have frequently involved young people from
middle-class backgrounds, which has been expressed in various formats.
In the 1960s, university students were involved in the establishment of
communes or other alternative social units and formally educated young
 1 INTRODUCTION – CONVENTIONAL POLITICS AND PROTEST 17

people were attracted to the counterculture press that included publications

such as Oz, Other Scenes, Berkeley Barb and, in France, L’Idiot liberté.
Later studies have added confirmation to the involvement of young
educated persons in various forms of protest. It has been suggested
that those likely to be involved in protests tended to be middle class, younger
and more highly educated than those who were not likely to be involved in
events of this nature. It was estimated that 19% of the middle class compared
with 15% of the working class were quite likely to be protesters. About 21%
of persons educated beyond the age of 19 were likely to be protesters
compared with 14% of those who left school at 16 (Whiteley, 2000).
Attempts have been made to ascertain the motives of educated young
people in engaging in protest. It has been observed that activists in
campaigning movements such as Earth First! were mainly young white
persons from middle-class backgrounds who were well-educated and were
also ‘decommodified’ in the sense that they could not expect security of
employment or guaranteed access to welfare provision or accommodation
(Purkis, 1996: 200). These persons were dubbed the ‘educated under-
class’ in that they possessed ‘cultural capital’ but subsisted on very low
incomes (Bourdieu, 1984) and were sceptical of the existing political and
economic structures to solve individual or global problems. These persons
were not necessarily heirs of the middle-class radical tradition but instead
consisted of those who were attracted to protest movements either
because they rejected the success goals of Thatcher’s Britain or because
they perceived they were unlikely to attain them.

Young People Lacking Formal Education

One artefact of the post-industrial economy has been the creation of a
‘permanently marginalised group in society which live in persistent
poverty, with low educational attainment, poor working and living
conditions and a multiplicity of other deprivations associated with life
on low or very low incomes’ (Kennedy, 2006: 18). The consequences
of multiple deprivations on those who experience these social problems
‘leads to an inability or prevention from taking part in the wider social,
economic, and cultural facets of our society but also . . . an exclusion
from the political life of the nation’ (Kennedy, 2006: 105). Political
marginalisation may further result in disengagement from political
activity for reasons that include it has ‘failed to bring about funda-
mental improvements in the lives of the most disadvantaged’
(Kennedy, 2006: 19).
18 THE POLICING OF PROTEST, DISORDER AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN . . .

Those at the lower end of the social ladder may therefore feel con-
strained to articulate the lack of social justice through alternative means,
one of which is rioting. Disorder based upon frustration and pent-up
feelings of anger without necessarily having any explicit political agenda
has been described as ‘unruly politics’ (a term which is discussed in
chapter 6).

Globalisation and Protest

A wide range of supranational bodies emerged post-1945. Supranational
bodies consist of bodies composed of representatives drawn from a num-
ber of individual nations whose role is to take decisions which are then
required to be implemented by the member countries. Examples of this
include the United Nations (which was set up in 1945) and the European
Union (which emerged out of the European Economic Community
whose origins date to the 1957 Treaty of Rome). These organisations
have eroded the sovereignty of individual nation states (in the sense of
them being able to be the sole determinants of their domestic and foreign
policies) and this trend has been accelerated by the globalisation of
capitalism.

The Globalisation of Capitalism

What has been termed economic ‘global integration’ emerged during
the nineteenth century (Schirato and Webb, 2003: 89) and its pace
significantly picked up towards the latter decades of the twentieth
century which gave rise to the global spread of capitalism – ‘a project
being carried out by core capitalist states in support of the interests of
the capitalist system as a whole and multinational corporations in
particular’ (Bowles, 2013: 116).
The globalisation of capitalism has been advanced in association with
neo-liberalism – ‘neoliberal policies include privatizing public industries,
opening markets to foreign investment and competition, creating fiscal
austerity programmes to curtail government spending, removing controls
on capital flows, reducing tariffs and other trade barriers, and ending
government protections for local industry’ (Engler, 2007: 151).
The policies that derived from neo-liberalism were promoted by supra-
national institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), the World Bank (WB), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
 1 INTRODUCTION – CONVENTIONAL POLITICS AND PROTEST 19

It has thus been concluded that Globalisation means that ‘the locus of
power and decision-making is shifting from the nation state to multinational
bodies such as the European Union, the International Monetary Fund or the
World Trade Organisation (Hertz, 2001a). These organisations, along with
multi-national companies and global financial markets increasingly control
the policy agenda in the key area of the economy’ (Whiteley, 2003: 612).
Accordingly, one reason for the decline in the public’s engagement with
conventional political activity has been ‘the loss of power experienced by the
nation state in an increasingly globalized world’ (Whiteley, 2003: 612).

Power Wielded by Multinational Companies

Multinational companies (most of which are American-owned) are a parti-
cular beneficiary of the global economy which have benefitted from the
neo-liberal policies driven by a wide range of supranational bodies, leading
to the accusation that bodies such as the WTO, WB and IMF operate in the
interests of American-owned multinational companies (Palast, 2003: 3).
Privatisation is depicted as an important aspect of the neo-liberal
agenda which is favoured by multinational companies and promoted by
a range of supranational bodies. It has been depicted as a policy driven by
the large corporations (Hertz, 2001b) who become able to exploit the free
market in order to maximise their profits. These results in public sector
services being tailored to meet the requirements of corporate demand
rather than public need (Monbiot, 2001: 4).

Securing Political Influence

One important issue relates to how multinational companies succeed in
securing political influence within individual countries. The influence that
is wielded by multinational companies can be constructed in a number of
ways and has given rise to accusations that politicians and political parties
are in league with corporate interests. This reinforces perceptions that
conventional political activity is an ineffective method of exercising control
over corporate decisions and commercial practices.
Politicians within particular countries may actively seek to secure busi-
ness contacts, in the belief that the investment and jobs that this will
bring will also be of benefit to their own political interests. This accusa-
tion was levelled at New Labour (Palast, 2003: 297 and 310) which was
accused of opening up ‘secret routes of special access to allow selected
corporate chiefs to bargain, alter or veto government’s key decisions’
20 THE POLICING OF PROTEST, DISORDER AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN . . .

(Palast, 2003: 297). It was argued that Tony Blair ‘giving over Britain’s
high streets to WalMart, jails to Wackenhut, power plants to Entregy, is
convinced that he’s sold the nation’s soul to Santa Claus. The Americans
will sprinkle the fairy dust of commerce know-how over his laggardly
island and – presto! – Enterprise will take flight’ (Palast, 2003: 315).
The relationship between corporations of politicians is often constructed
via intermediaries such as lobbyists who act as the link to introduce repre-
sentatives of corporate interests to sources who were able to secure for them
access to politicians and policymakers. This situation gives lobbyists a crucial
role in the processes of globalised government, being depicted as ‘the
engines of Britain’s globalization’ (Palast, 2003: 307). It may, however,
lead to bribery and corruption, one UK example of which was the 1998
‘cash for secrets’ scandal.

Corporate Power, Conventional Politics and Protest

It has been argued in previous sections that the economic and industrial
policies of individual nations are often dominated by large business corpora-
tions which possess considerable political and economic clout, important
aspects of which are providing employment and their ability to withdraw
from nations who take decisions which are detrimental to their ability of
maximise profits.
The power wielded by such commercial concerns is widely recognised. It
has been argued that ‘67% of the population . . . now believe that big inter-
national companies have more influence over their daily lives than do their
own governments’ (Hertz, 2001c). However, this situation is to the detri-
ment of conventional political activity since accusations that politicians now
‘jump to the commands of corporations rather than their own citizens’
(Hertz, 2001d: 5) is alleged to have created a cycle of cynicism towards
conventional political activity (Hertz, 2001d: 198).
It has been asserted that protest is the only effective way to oppose
corporate power (Hertz, 2001d: 11). This not only may arise in the countries
experiencing what amount to economic colonisation but may also trigger
protests in developing nations, especially to highlight environmental con-
cerns or to promote global justice in developing nations where it has been
argued that:

Unregulated or under-regulated by governments, corporations set the terms

of engagement themselves. In the Third World we see a race to the bottom:
multi-nationals pitting countries against each other to provide the most
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