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INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY SERIES
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TRADE AND GROWTH: NEW DILEMMAS IN TRADE POLICY
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FEMINISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The Politics of
Economic Reform
in Zimbabwe
Continuity and Change in Development
Tor Skalnes
Research Fellow
Chr Michelsen Institute, Norway
First published in Great Britain 1995 by
MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS
and London
Companies and representatives
throughout the world
A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library.
ISBN 978-1-349-13768-8 ISBN 978-1-349-13766-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-13766-4
First published in the United States of America 1995 by

ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC.
Scholarly and Reference Division,
175 Fifth Avenue,
New York, N.Y. 10010
ISBN 978-0-312-12574-5
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Skalnes, Tor.
The politics of economic refonn in Zimbabwe : continuity and
change in development I Tor Skalnes.
p. em.- (International political economy series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-312-12574-5
I. Zimbabwe-Economic policy. 2. Zimbabwe-Politics and
government. I. Title. II. Series.
HC910.S58 1995
338.96891--dc20 94-43719
CIP
© Tor Skalnes 1995

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1995
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of
this publication may be made without written pem1ission.
No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or
transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with
the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988,
or under the tem1s of any licence pemJitting limited copying
issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court
Road, London WI P 9HE.
Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this
publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil
claims for damages.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 I
04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97 96 95
Contents
List of Tables and Figures vi
Acknowledgements vii
List of Abbreviations viii
Map of Zimbabwe ix
2 Political Institutions, Organised Groups and Economic

Policy 12
3 The Open Economy and Societal Corporatism, 1923-65 35
4 Economic Nationalism during UDI, 1965-79 56
5 Majority Rule: Parties, Interest Groups and the Drive

for 'Unity' 73
6 The Politics of Stabilisation, 1980-6 97
7 The Politics of Liberalisation, 1987-94 118
8 Agricultural Land, Pricing and Marketing Reforms 150
9 The Marginalisation of Labour Unions 183
10 Conclusion 197
Index 211
v
List of Tables and Figures
Tables
3.1 Average real growth rates for the Southern

Rhodesian economy, 1923-60 40
6.1 Gross Domestic Product, 1980-94 (1980 prices) 103
8.1 Distribution of land by sector and Natural
Region (%) 155
8.2 Nominal and real producer prices, 1970/1-1979/80 167
8.3 Nominal and real producer prices, 1980/1-1992/3 168
8.4 Maize intake in '000 tonnes by the Grain
Marketing Board and CA/SSC contribution (%),
197011-199112 173
8.5 Annual crop production, three-year averages
('000 tonnes) 175
Figures
8.1 Real 1980 prices, 197011-1992/3 169

8.2 Maize intake by the Grain Marketing Board and
real 1980 prices (Z$/t) 174
VI
Acknowledgements
In the course of writing this book, I have received help from many
quarters. The Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway and the Depart-
ment of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles,
USA provided very stimulating intellectual environments. The Southern
African Political and Economic Series (SAPES) Trust, Harare, Zim-
babwe, extended practical help during fieldwork in 1991. Thank you.
I would also like to thank the institutions which funded this project.
The Norwegian Research Council for Social Science and the Humani-
ties gave a generous four-year scholarship during 1988-91 as well as
travel grants to the United States and Zimbabwe. Den norske Banks
Jubileumsfond for Chr. Michelsens Institutt funded the writing of a first
draft during 1992. Financial help was also received from the University
of California, Los Angeles.
While the usual disclaimers apply, I wish to express my deep
gratitude to Richard Sklar at UCLA, for offering his unfailing guidance
and friendship. The following individuals also made helpful comments
on the entire manuscript: Edward Alpers, Helge Hveem, Tore Linne
Eriksen, Michael Lofchie, Richard Sandbrook and Timothy Shaw. In
addition, a number of people gave careful and stimulating criticisms of
chapic• Jrafts which I presented at UCLA (December 1990), Uppsala
(May 1992), Bergen (May 1992, October 1993 and February 1994),
Lund (August 1993) and Kampala (April 1994). I want to mention, in
particular, Bjorn Beckman, Nina Byers, Peter Gibbon, Vegar Iversen,
Alhadi Khalaf, Atul Kohli, Guillermo O'Donnell, Lise Rakner, Phil
Raikes, RonalJ Rogowski, Arne Tostensen, and John Toye. Sincere
appreciation is also due to all those Zimbabweans who gave generously
of their time and contributed their valuable insights during confidential
interviews. Inger A. Nygaard did an excellent job turning the manu-
script into a camera-ready copy.
My warmest thanks are nevertheless due to my wife, Gro Beate, and
my three children, Helene, Hakon and Sunniva, for all their love and
support.
vii
List of Abbreviations
ACCOR Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia
ACCOZ Associated Chambers of Commerce of Zimbabwe
ALB African Labour Bureau
AMA Agricultural Marketing Authority
ARNI Association of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Industries
ARnl Association of Rhodesian Industries
BSAC British South Africa Company
CA Communal Area
CAZ Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe
CFU Commercial Farmers' Union
CIO Central Intelligence Organisation
CMB Cotton Marketing Board
COMES A Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
esc Cold Storage Commission
CZI Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries
DMB Dairy Marketing Board
DRC Domestic Resource Cost
EMCOZ Employers' Confederation of Zimbabwe
EPP Extended Export Promotion Programme
ESAP Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FPZ Forum Party of Zimbabwe
FRI Federation of Rhodesian Industries
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GMB Grain Marketing Board
IBDC Indigenous Business Development Centre
ICA Industrial Conciliation Act
ICFA Indigenous Commercial Farmers' Association
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRA Industrial Relations Act
ISA Import Substitution Assurance
lSI Import-Substituting Industrialisation
KADU Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU Kenya African National Union
LRA Labour Relations Act
LSC Large-Scale Commercial
MMCZ Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe
viii
(,/
Zambia
>
a..r-..
L)MASHONALAND
+
,North
CENTRAL _,.
MASHONALANDI-. r-... / ~Q
,... ...... , WEST • 1 Bin~ura ).J ~ ,..
\""/ ' ) Chinhoyi f J'1,...r"' O~~ j
,/ I Har~oi"'IB ~~.-.'1-':1/• ~
1 I I,... ' ~·· V( ~
{. I Chegutu Ch1tungw12a. ~ / ...;
.!> ~ • i • ..~~
1 -..,) 0 ~ Marondera ,J( ~
1...... _______, I._ Kadoma fl' """ - l ~
~
MATABELELAND ( Kwekwe• -....-..j'-' '-, \~ •

NORTH \ •Aedcliff r·,,.I''I-.J Mutare
\, MIDLANDS
\ •
"rc..-, -..,
I
~ Gweru t -,
~----- ,.,.,~- c.1._1 . ,,
1
Key
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'J-, . (
Bulawayo ,;
L.f"""'/
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I
•
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1
- J
•
Masvmgo
I
_ _ International j Zvishavane }
boundary t. \ (
----Province I { MASVINGO l
boundary
MATABELELAND ~,-
L-"'~" '
Iii Capital city
SOUTH <-..,
• Major town I city .....
\...\
0
0
1001kilometres
1001miles
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Map of Zimbabwe
ix
1 Introduction
In mid-1990, Zimbabwe joined the swelling ranks of countries
undertaking to liberalise their trading policies and adopt a programme
of macroeconomic adjustment supported by the World Bank and,
eventually, the International Monetary Fund (IMF). President Robert
Mugabe and the dominant political party, known as the Zimbabwe
African National Union (Patriotic Front)- ZANU (PF) - thus formally
abandoned several economic policies identified with their past
professions of socialism, including extensive price, wage and investment
controls, social service additions, and government intervention
generally. Later that year, ZANU (PF) dropped its proposal for legal
status as the country's sole party. These events occurred only months
after the party had won - on a platform calling for Marxist-Leninist
socialism and a one-party state - an overwhelming majority of seats in
the third parliamentary elections to have been held after the negotiated
dismantling in 1980 of the racially-based Rhodesian regime and the
consequent gaining of formal independence from Great Britain.
Zimbabwe has thus joined the global trend towards more liberal
politics and economics. In Africa, as elsewhere, economic and political
liberalisation is partly a response to the failure of authoritarian regimes
of various ideological hues to promote development and establish
popular legitimacy. Economic crisis has played a large part in
encouraging a fundamental reconsideration of ideological tenets of the
past. In the early 1980s, falling world commodity prices, greatly
increased real interest rates, and the continuing difficulty of access to
new lending all combined to bring the economic problems to a crisis
point. Still, most African countries were slow to respond. But Africa's
economic downturn continued to manifest itself in insufficient per
capita agricultural production, stagnating industrial output, loss of
export market shares, severe balance-of-payments problems, debilitating
debt, occasional hunger and starvation. By the late 1980s and early
1990s, change appeared to be engulfing the continent. Although the
crisis was never as deep in Zimbabwe as in much of the rest of Africa,
that country nevertheless faces the twin challenges of economic and
political restructuring in the 1990s.
The often timid reactions of African leaders to new economic
challenges have prompted many analysts to emphasise external factors
in their explanations of African social change. Consequently, decisions
1
2 Politics of Reform in Zimbabwe
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to involve

themselves heavily in conditional or policy-based lending have
encountered resistance and frequent protests against 'neo-colonialism'.
Numerous observers now cite Africa's aid dependence to account for
the general acceptance by African governments of IMF/World Bank
prescriptions for structural adjustment. Donors are currently also
pushing strongly for democratic reforms, which are seen as necessary
to put governments on a more secure political foundation as well as a
pre-requisite for stemming Africa's economic decline. Recently, many
analysts have pointed to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
as an additional reason for Africa's reorientation towards liberalism.
Military and financial support for ostensibly left-wing rulers has
evaporated. On their part, western countries now have little reason to
support self-proclaimed anti-communist governments on the continent.
Partly as a consequence of this, the National Party in South Africa
inaugurated negotiations with the liberation movement. These
negotiations have resulted in a temporary power-sharing agreement and
in the election of a Constitutional Assembly in April 1994. Hence,
another rationale has been removed in the Southern African countries
for their adherence to old ideas of economic nationalism and political
regimentation.
THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF

ZIMBABWEAN POLICY-MAKING
Although changes in Eastern Europe have weakened the appeal of the

Marxist-Leninist ideology adopted by ZANU (PF) in the 1970s, the
party's policies since independence, in 1980, have borne little
resemblance to Marxist-Leninist practice as it has been seen elsewhere.
Among the country's political elite, firm adherents to Marxism-
Leninism have been relatively few in number. Neither the Soviet Union
nor its satellites were ever a source of funding for Zimbabwe -
development aid has always come mostly from the West, and the
country is rather well integrated into the world economy despite its
legacy of import-substituting industrialisation. During the guerrilla war
against the minority regime of Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front in the
1960s and 1970s, Robert Mugabe's ZANU obtained its main 'anti-
imperialist' ally outside of Africa in the People's Republic of China.
The fall of communism in Eastern Europe, therefore, had few
immediate practical consequences for Zimbabwe.
Introduction 3
The changes elsewhere in Southern Africa, especially in South

Africa, more clearly called for a reconsideration of policy. South Africa
is now unhampered by sanctions and is determined to attempt to revive
its flagging economy. The rationale for nationalising South African-
owned companies in Zimbabwe and for reducing dependence upon
imports from, and trade routes through, the south has disappeared. In
fact, Zimbabwean policy makers are worried that the foreign investment
they once shunned will now not be forthcoming because South Africa
will be seen as more attractive to international capital. South Africa
became a member of the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) in August 1994 and plans have been made to strengthen that
organisation by consolidating economic cooperation and expanding
functions into fields such as human rights, conflict resolution, defence
and security. 1 The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) has been turned into
a Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Calls
have been made for the merger of SADC and COMESA.
One possible Zimbabwean response to this new situation, and the
one largely followed by the authorities, was to welcome South Africa
into the fold, seek areas of cooperation, begin negotiations to reduce
trade barriers and further integrate economies, and improve investment
incentives at home so as to be able to attract, among others, South
African firms. However, many South African businessmen and govern-
ment officials have been keen to discourage what they see as unrealistic
expectations by neighbours that the country can act as an engine of
economic development and investment in the region. South Africa, they
say, needs to concentrate for quite some time on solving domestic
problems of low investment and high unemployment.
Increased isolationism might have been an understandable
intellectual and political reaction on the part of Zimbabweans, too. The
inclusion of South Africa into SADC was not greeted with universal
enthusiasm and fears have been frequently voiced that the country will
come to dominate the region. 2 Furthermore, the practical consequences
of formal changes to SADC and PTA are yet to be felt to any signifi-
cant extent. Bilateral trade relations between South Africa and
Zimbabwe are also problematic because the old 1964 agreement has
been terminated while a new one has yet to be negotiated. This has led
to an effective end to Zimbabwean exports of textiles and clothing to
South Africa. Partly in response to this, Zimbabwe raised its own tariff
barriers to these products. Many have predicted a 'regionalisation' of
the world economy as a result of the end to superpower military rivalry.
That end has led instead, it has been said, to an increased economic
rivalry between Europe, North America and East Asia that has
weakened global arrangements and stimulated regional trade pacts in
many comers of the world. Notwithstanding SAOC and COMESA,
however, this tendency is as yet weak in Southern Africa compared,
say, to Latin America.
Uncertainties about the practical economic consequences for the
region of regime change in South Africa are compounded by the diffi-
culties in ascertaining the drawbacks and benefits of global trade
liberalisation under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade which is being transformed into the World Trade Organisa-
tion. The liberalisation of trade in agricultural products agreed upon
during the Uruguay Round may be beneficial in some ways to countries
such as Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, fears have also been voiced that
gradually doing away with special tariff rates under the General System
of Preferences and the Lome conventions will work in the other
direction. 3 Whatever that case may be, I submit that the global and
regional changes outlined above do not strongly predict recent
Zimbabwean policy reforms.
In many countries around the world, fundamental policy changes
have been made only in the context of immediate problems with the
balance of payments and government finances. In 1990, however,
Zimbabwe did not face a crisis so deep as to clearly compel change.
According to the government's Frameworkfor Economic Reform ( 1991-
1995), the country's trade balance was in surplus over the years 1985-
90 while the current account deficit was a relatively mild US$89
million in 1989 against a surplus of US$78 million the year before.
Between 1985 and 1990, merchandise exports increased from US$1124
million to US$1688 million, while imports rose from US$922 million
to US$1333 million. External debt service peaked at 34 per cent of
export earnings in 1987 and decreased to about 24 per cent as the
Framework was written. The fiscal deficit was high at 10.6 per cent of
GOP in 1990/1, but could be financed out of a 'healthy savings rate of
about 20% per annum'. 4 Real GOP growth was highly erratic during
the 1980s but picked up in 1989-90. Zimbabwe's problems were of a
more long-term character: prospects for future growth were hampered
by the obsolescence of productive equipment and infrastructure, caused
by long-lasting insufficiency of private and public investment.
Consequently, there had been little employment creation and stagnant
or falling real wages. It is my contention, therefore, that it is this
domestic context and the internal political reactions to it which are most
important to explaining the adoption of structural adjustment in
Introduction 5
Zimbabwe. This is not to argue that international economic trends have

not been significant or that international financial institutions have not
exercised political influence in the country. 5 Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will,
quite to the contrary, demonstrate that they have. But comparative
analysis tells us that there is no clear association between the extent of
economic crisis and debt in various countries and the vigour with which
structural adjustment has been pursued by their governments. 6 The
large variations in initial response call for analysis of domestic policy
as do the many later reversals of policy or 'slippages' observed. 7
After having advocated 'self-reliance' for a decade since coming to
power, Zimbabwe's ZANU (PF) government embraced structural adjust-
ment in 1990. The World Bank and the IMP had pressed for economic
reforms since the early 1980s, but without much success. In 1990,
however, World Bank support was welcomed for a new Economic
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). While altered international
circumstances constitute a background to policy change, external factors
are only loosely constraining. Domestic politics is of fundamental
importance in understanding Zimbabwean policy change.
THE DOMESTIC REASONS FOR POLICY CHANGE
Despite its Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, the ZANU (PF) government tried

to preserve the largely white-owned productive structure while it
increased opportunities and benefits for the African population. Private
power remains entrenched in the country's diversified economy and
pluralistic social structure. Robert Mugabe inherited a system of market
controls originally put in place by Ian Smith after the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Great Britain in 1965. These
controls were intended to benefit the Europeans; hence, Smith's
government shielded industry from international competition, subsidised
large-scale agriculture and protected European wages and salaries. After
1980, ZANU (PF) used and extended these controls so as to benefit the
majority: industrial protectionism was maintained, wages and working
conditions were regulated, and agricultural support was given to African
farmers. At the same time, the fundamental structure of ownership was
left intact, although state ownership increased and a limited amount of
previously commercially farmed land was redistributed to smallholders.
ZANU (PF) in reality did little but strengthen an inherited system of
dirigiste capitalism so as to favour its political constituency among
African workers and peasants. This strategy, however, gave rise to a
number of conflicts and discontents which undermined domestic support

for the government's economic policies.
Despite the recent decision by ZANU (PF) to maintain formal multi-
partyism, open political contestation is barely tolerated by the ruling
elite; yet interest groups have been strongly entrenched for decades. In
key sectors, erstwhile supporters of protectionism and economic
controls gradually adopted a favourable attitude towards liberalising
reforms. In conjunction with the World Bank in particular, the various
organisations representing producer interests in the country began to
lobby an originally recalcitrant government for structural adjustment. A
core argument in this study is that Zimbabwe's ESAP represents the
successful outcome of the lobbying efforts of certain domestic interest
groups as well as of the World Bank and other donors. This argument
goes against the grain of important theories in political economy.
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, INTEREST GROUPS AND THE

STATE
For the past quarter-century, development studies have been strongly

influenced by analyses which emphasise the structural obstacles to
modernisation. Such impediments are thought to originate in both the
international economic system and domestic political economies.
Consequently, a search has often been made for forms of political
organisation and particular institutional devices which may serve to
break down apparent barriers to change. Many neo-Marxists and neo-
liberals alike have counted on 'state autonomy' to function as such a
device. Yet, many others now claim that where state-centric models of
development have been followed, they have often had strongly negative
consequences. There is no lack of evidence in Africa's post-indepen-
dence experience to support that assertion.
Meanwhile, a 'new institutionalism' has emerged to guide research
in political science and economics. Political institutions, it is said,
should be studied in their own right. They should be seen, to use more
technical language, as independent variables insofar as they structure
the possibilities for access to the portals of power by various ideas and
influences. 8 Hence, public policy cannot be seen as the direct resultant
of various societal pressures. Many scholars use this perspective to give
added refinement to state-centric theories. The concept of political
institutions, however, transcends the analytical state-society divide.
Parties, interest groups, and other political associations, as well as
Introduction 7
informal patron-client networks, are alternative institutional devices by

which the preferences of groups and classes in society may be
channelled with varying degrees of effectiveness into a country's
policy-making bodies: bureaucracies, legislatures, governments. While
governmental policy may not be a simple reflection of the power-
weighted preferences of societal actors, societal organisation is some-
times a potent resource for influencing the actions of bureaucrats and
politicians. An institutional perspective on economic policy-making
might therefore start with an analysis of how societal actors organise to
bring their influence to bear upon government, and proceed to studying
how governments employ their own organisational resources in order
to meet, modify or resist societal demands.
For many of those who have become exasperated with the failures
of statism in Africa, the strengthening of civil society represents a
necessary antidote. They reject the claims of civilian and military
autocrats to represent uniform national aspirations and exclusive
knowledge about how to attain them. Civil society as understood here
denotes a space for organising, in partial or complete autonomy from
governmental influence, interests that are shared among a certain
number of individuals and that transcend bonds of family and their
extensions such as lineage and clan. Organisations which normally do
so include political parties; civic organisations; ethnic associations;
churches; farmers' associations; trade unions; chambers of commerce,
industry and mining; and so forth. In this study, we focus specifically
on economic interest groups and political parties.
Empirical analyses of the effects of interest group politics are
heavily influenced by normative considerations- to a large extent, by
whether or not one believes in the benefit to a country of the policies
which ostensibly result. For much of this century in Europe and North
America, interest group politics has been associated with a form of
managed and regulated capitalism which was subjected to increasing
scrutiny in the late 1960s, the 1970s and 1980s. From both the right and
left of the political spectrum, group politics came under attack for being
but the expression of particular, vested interests inimical to the
legitimate concerns of broader segments of society. For Marxists and
other radicals, pluralist democracy institutionalised the dominance of
capitalists over the workers, of the 'haves' over the 'have-nots', of the
few over the many; for conservatives, it militated against the adoption
of policies deemed to be in the national interest. In the non-Western
world, the perpetuation of policies of economic nationalism is similarly
often explained with reference to the political power of interest groups.
The solutions advocated in response to the purported failings of

interest group politics have been many. Those who profess to be able
to ascertain and act upon the needs of the whole rather than the part -
be that need defined as national self-sufficiency, free-market orientation,
socialised production and distribution, equality or some other goal -
have frequently favoured centralisation of power by the chief executive,
the top-level bureaucracy, the single party, or the vanguard party. Those
who adhere broadly to liberal-democratic ideas but recognise a potential
conflict between certain national goals and private aspirations, have
advocated various institutional changes within the broad confines of
representative democracy. In any case, the institutional arrangements for
dealing with the apparent conflict between particular and general
interests are many and diverse. The means of linking organised econo-
mic interest groups to the national policy-making institutions range from
the authoritarian solution of 'state corporatism' to fragmented
'pluralism', via 'societal corporatism'. This study identifies the Zim-
babwean system as a particular form of societal corporatism in which
producer interests hold sway. Such a system has certain beneficial
consequences for resolving collective action problems and formulating
relatively consistent policies and programmes of fundamental reform.
THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF
In Zimbabwe, a vibrant group politics operates to exert considerable

pressure upon government to alter economic policies, despite govern-
ment attempts to centralise decision-making power and increase state
autonomy in order to pursue a certain vision of the 'national interest'.
As the institutionalised expressions of strongly entrenched and
centralised private economic and political power, Zimbabwean interest
groups engage in the formulation of economic policies of national
significance. The organisational form of Zimbabwean interest groups
and the particular institutional framework within which they operate
differ from the patterns found elsewhere in Africa. This helps account
for the characteristics of public policy-making. Generally, political
authoritarianism in Africa served to repress broad-based organisations
along class and sectoral lines and encourage instead the expression of
narrow and localised interests. In Zimbabwe, in contrast, the politics of
reconciliation among the races has resulted in the maintenance of highly
centralised economic interest groups which command strong and wide-
Introduction 9
spread support in their sectors. These groups take a keen interest in

issues of general economic policy, growth and efficiency (Chapter 2).
In order to trace the development of the brand of interest group
politics found in Zimbabwe, it is necessary to go back to the economic
crisis of the 1930s. During that decade and those following, a particular
structure of state-society interactions developed. Interest groups were
tied to the country's policy-making institutions in a manner akin to that
found in certain European countries, and which can be described as a
form of societal corporatism. The policy outcome resulting from such
government-interest group collaboration varied considerably over time,
as the interests of the different organisations changed with international
political and economic currents. Flexible adjustments within the broad
confines of an 'open economy' defined the resultant economic policies
of Rhodesia until 1965 (Chapter 3).
In Chapter 4, I consider how demands for majority rule were per-
ceived as a threat by the ruling minority, and how this perception
resulted in the Unilateral Declaration of Independence and consequent
changes in the country's political structure and economic policies.
These policies fall within the broad confines of import-substituting
industrialisation.
Chapter 5 outlines some important results of the establishment of
majority rule and the attainment of formal independence from Great
Britain. The resolution of the conflicts between ideological and prag-
matic considerations, the outcome of the struggle over the one-party
state, and the compromises between the aspirations for African advance-
ment and the need for racial reconciliation had important consequences
for the nature of political institutions and the possibilities for various
groups to influence government policy. In general, parties and parlia-
ment never developed as significant institutions for expressing the
interests of the African majority. Interest groups were seen by the ruling
party - ZANU (PF) - as less threatening to its authority; hence they
were able to reassert their autonomy and legitimacy as channels for
influencing government policy.
Chapters 6 and 7 describe the background to ZANU (PF)' s eventual
adoption of structural adjustment in the 1990s. The government's
attempt to extend controls so as to benefit the majority created a
number of strains in the economic system that eventually served to
undermine support for economic nationalism (Chapter 6). The major
erstwhile beneficiary of protectionism, the manufacturing sector,
became the key group lobbying for reform in the late 1980s. That sector
made a large imprint on the particular manner in which reform was
undertaken. The bargaining process amounted to a strengthening of the

system of government-interest group collaboration or societal
corporatism (Chapter 7).
Throughout this study, I try to show ( 1) that interest groups can be
a force for policy change in general and economic liberalisation in
particular, depending on how they are organised and on the distinctive
institutional arrangements for mediating their interests; and (2) that
interests subjectively defined by key actors themselves are open to
considerable modification and change in response to changing economic
circumstances and the perceived adequacy of governmental policy in
meeting new challenges. This may create considerable scope for
government flexibility in economic policy-making over time.
Beyond these issues, however, I am concerned with the particular
constellation of group interests and power in Zimbabwean society that
can be held accountable for the 'fine print' of the structural adjustment
programme. Although ESAP set Zimbabwe off on a course of economic
liberalisation, the actual content of the programme represented to some
degree a compromise among different views and interests. For instance,
some degree of tariff protection continued (Chapter 7). Also, govern-
ment involvement in agricultural pricing and marketing looks bound to
remain large (Chapter 8), and the labour market is only partially
liberalised (Chapter 9). Through an analysis of these issues, I assess the
relative strengths of various interest groups in Zimbabwe and their
consequent potential for influencing public policy. Theories of urban
bias posit an alliance between manufacturing industry, workers and
bureaucrats as the societal basis for protectionism. Primary producers
are seen as the main supporters of liberalisation. In contrast to these
theories, I view structural adjustment in Zimbabwe as a result of the
pressures not only of commercial farmers and primary sector producers,
but also ~and most importantly~ manufacturers. These actors ally with
external actors and certain government officials. Small farmers, labour
unions, and a number of government ministers and bureaucrats have
tended to resist reform. With respect to macroeconomic policies, the
former alliance seems to have won out, while the latter has been
influential in slowing down the extension of reforms to the agricultural
sector.
Introduction 11
Notes
1. Southern African Economist (Harare), August 1994, pp. 7-8.

2. See, for instance, Nancy Thede and Pierre Beaudet, eds, A Post-Apartheid South
Africa? (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1993).
3. For Zimbabwean perspectives on these issues, see Daily Gazette (Harare), 17
January 1994 and The Herald (Harare), 14 and 21 April 1994.
4. Government of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe. A Frameworkfor Economic Reform (1991-
1995) (Harare: Government Printer, January 1991), pp. 1-5 and p. 25, table 4.
5. For an analysis from a dependency perspective, see Colin Stoneman, 'The World
Bank and the IMF in Zimbabwe', in Bonnie K. Campbell and John Loxley, eds,
Structural Adjustment in Africa (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1989), pp.
37-66.
6. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, eds, The Politics of Economic
Adjustment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
7. Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan and John Toye, Aid and Power Vols I & II (London
and New York: Routledge, 1991). For an analysis that argues that breakdowns in
debt negotiations and adjustment policy programmes result from insufficient
willingness by the IMF and other donors to take domestic political and economic
situations into account, see Matthew Martin, The Crumbling Far;ade of African
Debt Negotiations: No Winners (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991).
8. See, for instance, Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds,
Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); James
G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational
Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989); Peter A. Hall, ed., The Political
Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1989).
2 Political Institutions,
Organised Groups and
Economic Policy
The disciplines of political science and economics have in recent years
been profoundly influenced by a liberal political economy which posits
models of free trade and limited state intervention as normative
standards of rationality in economic policy. Although neo-liberal
economics has gained increasing favour with academics and policy-
makers around the world over the last fifteen years, there is continued
and widespread failure of governments to abide by the maxims of non-
intervention and minimal protection of domestic industries. Presumably,
since both theory and practical experience indicate the economic superi-
ority of freer trade over protectionism, the reasons for persistently high
trade barriers must be sought in the realm of politics.
Within the field of the political economy of development, theories
of policy-making now almost invariably stress the role interest groups
play to maintain a protectionist status quo, while 'state autonomy' is
given pride of place in explanations of liberalisation. 1 State autonomy,
in this literature, connotes the ability of a government to ignore
pressures from domestic groups and classes (such autonomy can go
hand in hand with dependence upon international actors).
Underpinning the view that the free play of interest group politics
will only serve to stall necessary economic reforms are two fundamental
assumptions: (I) that losses resulting from policy change are often
certain and immediately felt while benefits are usually uncertain and,
at best, long-term; and (2) that losers are often spatially concentrated
and well-organised while winners are frequently dispersed and badly
organised. Since people must be expected to follow their own narrow
and short-term interests to the exclusion of broader and more long-term
considerations, this bodes ill for reform. Among Africanists as well as
others, it has become commonplace to argue with Robert Bates that
farmers and rural dwellers in general must be expected to constitute the
main beneficiaries of reform while industrialists, bureaucrats, urban
workers and consumers bear the brunt of adjustment? This argument
follows directly from the idea that reform consists in correcting for the
'urban bias' associated with import-substituting industrialisation. 3
12
Political Institutions and Economic Policy 13
Farmers, however, are often remotely located, have difficulty communi-

cating with each other and the government, and are rarely represented
by strong organisations. They are therefore unreliable political allies for
a government wishing to implement change in the face of vocal and
organised protests from urban constituents. 4
In Zimbabwe, however, many groups in both the urban and rural
sectors are fairly well organised. Furthermore, politically strong urban
groups have argued for liberalisation. In fact, a long-protected manu-
facturing sector represented a major domestic political influence behind
the adoption of structural adjustment. In order to explain this situation,
we need to take a look at the literature concerned with societal corpo-
ratism as practised in Western Europe. This literature contains compara-
tive evidence to suggest that interest groups, under certain institutional
and political circumstances, regularly adopt positions and attitudes
which reflect a willingness to take into account long-term considerations
of national economic growth and well-being in addition to the narrow,
short-term interests of their members. Under such circumstances, com-
promises over economic reform may be easier to fashion, with resultant
beneficial consequences both for the legitimacy of market-oriented
economic policies and for the sustainability of liberal politics in the
longer run.
Compared to the rest of Africa, the political economy of Zimbabwe
is in many ways exceptional. Elsewhere on the continent, excepting
South Africa, formal associations of economic interest are weaker and
much more fragmented. Hence, the views such organisations propound
may perhaps be more narrowly self-interested and shorter-term than
those of the more broadly-based associations found in Zimbabwe.
Differences in levels of development contribute, unsurprisingly, to
understanding why, since the vitality of civil society is, in part, a
function of the development of market exchange and of industrialisa-
tion. However, an equally significant explanatory factor is the role of
governments. In Africa, attempts have been common to restrict and
control the free expression of economic interest through the construction
of 'state-corporatist' structures of state-society interaction. In general,
these attempts have been counterproductive: rather than serving to align
private aspirations with national goals, they have encouraged narrow
and localised pressure-group politics while suppressing sectoral and
class-based conflicts. Long-standing policies of suppression and frag-
mentation constitute, I suspect, an important reason why it is now
difficult for many regimes to mobilise stable support behind coherent
and long-term programmes of economic reform. In such a situation
increasing 'insulation' or 'autonomy' for policy-making organs consti-

tutes one possible response; a democratic opening, so that political
parties may seek to mobilise diffuse and dispersed support for economic
reform, may represent another. 5
ECONOMIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC RATIONALITY
According to a great number of neo-classical economists, most forms

of state intervention, such as protection from external competition,
produce sub-optimal outcomes and tend to reduce overall welfare in an
economy. Not only is it allegedly the case that global welfare would be
enhanced by adherence to the principles of free trade and minimal
intervention; but, with limited exceptions, an individual country has
nothing to gain by departing from such principles, according to this
body of theory. In other words, free-market economic principles consti-
tute models of economic rationality.
There is a great deal of evidence that countries with an orientation
towards world markets have enjoyed higher long-term rates of economic
growth than have countries following a strategy of pronounced
domestic-market orientation. But there is little empirical support for the
contention that outward orientation requires minimal state intervention.
Specifically, there is not much evidence for the thesis that export
success is linked to very low levels of tariff or quota protection. 6 If
that be the case, economic rationality cannot simply be defined as the
pursuit of strict or ideal-typical free-market policies but has to be
defined in a more circumspect manner. This is increasingly recognised
in recent debates.
Certain forms of state intervention may be necessary in some
circumstances to increase efficiency of resource use within a broadly
market-based economy. The literature on 'public goods', for instance,
emphasises the role of government in correcting for 'market failure'.
Government intervention may be required, among other things, to
restrict monopolistic practices and supply credit where private capital
markets are underdeveloped. As Tony Killick argues, 'the concept of
"market failures" has proved quite robust against the criticisms of pro-
market writers' .7 Furthermore, rhetoric has tended to conceal that the
effective implementation of any economic policy, whether of liberalisa-
tion or control, may require a strengthening of the role of public
institutions. 8 A growing body of literature on Africa, some of it highly
cognisant of the need for such reforms as devaluation, deregulation and
trade liberalisation, argue against the idea that this would entail the
establishment of a 'minimal state' .9
The key question for development may not be the optimal extent of
government intervention in the economy, but rather the proper form of
such intervention. 10 Within the context of stabilisation and structural
adjustment, trade and exchange rate policies have been dominant
concerns, as have supporting macroeconomic policies of curbing
inflation through the reduction of excessive government budget deficits.
Setting realistic exchange rates and achieving more uniform levels of
protection imply to a large extent a change rather than a reduction in
the role of government. Limiting government budget deficits through
increased cost-recovery or through cuts in excessive levels of public
employment similarly do not necessarily imply 'rolling back' the state.
Limitation of the government's role is, on the other hand, the issue
where privatisation or liquidation of public enterprises is contemplated
and where producer and consumer subsidies are reduced. Some forms
of such reduced intervention may be propitious for effective market
development, while others may not be. For instance, it may, on the one
hand, be necessary to encourage private trading where agricultural state
marketing boards have become inefficient and exploitative. But on the
other hand, agricultural producer price increases may easily be
cancelled out by input subsidy reductions.
That the form rather than the extent of state intervention may be the
crucial issue is further illustrated by the experience of the East Asian
'newly industrialising countries' (NICs). Not only is it the case that the
governments of South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore have actively
intervened through credit controls, the setting up of public manufac-
turing enterprises and the like, but quantitative restrictions and other
import control measures have been used so as to shield some products
from competition on the domestic market. Price controls and restrictions
on foreign direct investment have also been extensively applied. But the
way policies were used to encourage exports remains a crucial
difference between East Asian NICs and Latin American and African
countries. Outward orientation led to a strong exposure to competition
even in cases where the domestic market was oligopolised. 11 East
Asian governments not only set export targets for firms and channelled
investment towards them, but made it possible for these firms to
compete on world markets through active exchange rate management.
Overall, the trade regimes in East Asia were more liberal than in Latin
America and Africa. According to Sebastian Edwards, 'the successful
outward-oriented countries have generally had lower coverage of prior
licence systems, lower average tariffs, less dispersion in their tariffs,

and less episodes of real exchange rate overvaluation' . 12 Government
budget deficits have also been kept under control. In contrast, many
African and Latin American countries have had overvalued exchange
rates and large government budget deficits which have served to
channel investment away from productive and export activities.
Thus, while East Asian economies have been far from open and the
governments far from non-interventionist, the world market orientation
of these countries did have a highly disciplining effect on key
government policies as well as on the strategic decisions of individual
firms. Nevertheless, both orthodox and non-orthodox economists can
find support for some of their prescriptions in certain aspects of East
Asian policies. Therefore, the debate about the relative importance of
the state and the market in explaining the success of these NICs is still
inconclusive. 13
Economic rationality, then, cannot be easily identified with any clear
and unambiguous model against which the successes and failures of
governments can be measured. Rationality in policy-making should
therefore be identified less with following a set of rigorous standards
than with policy flexibility and government willingness to discard
elements of policy which have obvious deleterious effects on efficiency
and growth. Which political factors contribute to such rationality?
POLITICAL REGIMES AND ECONOMIC POLICY
In the 1970s, harsh political repression of the popular sectors, including

domestic businessmen and workers, was said to be a necessary condi-
tion for a successful strategy of industrialisation in Latin America. An
alliance of the 'bureaucratic-authoritarian' state, international capital and
large domestic firms was said to account for an economic strategy
characterised by the use of a mixture of orthodox and heterodox
policies: macroeconomic stabilisation, selective export promotion by
way of subsidies and increased import-substitution focusing on capital
goods and other industrial inputs. Guillermo O'Donnell called this a
strategy of 'deepening' import-substituting industrialisation (ISI). 14
According to this literature, autonomous states and external actors
drew initial (but not lasting) support from a narrow segment of local
society and forced through a strategy of industrialisation that appeared
to be successful at the time. The posited link between deepening of
import-substitution- that is, the heterodox aspect of the strategy- and
political authoritarianism was criticised by a number of authors. 15

However, several studies upheld the proclaimed causal link between
political authoritarianism and orthodox policies of macroeconomic
stabilisation. 16 Later, authoritarianism was depicted as a necessary
condition for full-fledged structural adjustment. 17 The collapse of
authoritarian regimes in Latin America and the economic chaos that
many of them left behind led, however, to a reconsideration of these
issues in the late 1980s. In a series of articles, Karen Remmer argued
that Latin American regimes of different types have all experienced
severe problems trying to implement reforms but that the balance of
evidence nevertheless suggests that democracies have handled
macroeconomic policy better than have authoritarian regimes. 18 Others
argue that broad regime types generally explain little and that finer
distinctions need to be made in terms of both regime sub-types and
particular policy outcomes. 19
The failures of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America
undermined to some extent the thesis that a high degree of state
autonomy facilitates economic progress. At the same time, however,
certain highly repressive East Asian regimes continued to achieve rapid
economic growth. This reinforced the popularity of state-autonomy
arguments among certain scholars. Asian successes include not only the
'four little tigers' of Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore,
but also Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Policy flexibility has been
characteristic of them all: various forms of governmental intervention
have been tried over time, from import-substitution in the early days via
state-directed export promotion to the more recent implementation of
a number of the policies that go under the name of structural adjust-
ment. Rhys Jenkins explains Latin American stagnation and East Asian
success in terms of the alleged greater autonomy of the latter's
regimes. 20 Alice Amsden, Stephan Haggard and several other writers
find no evidence of successful pressure by societal groups behind East
Asian economic policies. Indeed, the suppression of societal demands
is seen as a fundamental reason why growth rates have been so high. 21
This unqualified statist explanation of successful economic policies
in East Asia has not gone without challenge. With reference to
countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Peter Evans develops
an analysis of state capacity that 'challenges the tendency to equate
capacity with insulation'. Instead, Evans emphasises the beneficial role
of dense networks linking governments and private sectors.Z2 Other
writers challenge more directly the hypothesis that state autonomy is a
necessary condition for rapid economic growth and successfulliberalisa-
tion, focusing on the 'second-tier NICs' - Indonesia, Thailand and

Malaysia -- where governments are generally believed to have been
much weaker than in East Asia and where it is well documented that
interest groups, notably those representing private business, have
engaged in much successful lobbying. 23
While bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America were
dismal economic failures and while state autonomy did not obtain in all
East and Southeast Asian cases of success, in Africa political authori-
tarianism is almost universally associated with economic stagnation and
decline. Various regimes- whether military or civilian, one-party or no-
party, 'capitalist', 'socialist' or 'Afro-Marxist' - have pursued highly
protectionist and statist economic strategies. According to a number of
writers, authoritarianism in Africa has not facilitated legal-rational
bureaucratic consolidation nor modern capitalism. Quite to the contrary,
authoritarianism has given rise to patrimonial, prebendal or personalistic
forms of rule that undermine the rational policies and predictability
needed for long-term development. Particularism and arbitrariness is the
norm. 24 Hence to many observers it seems logical that one should
focus attention on institutional development and call for enhanced
'governance' or indeed for pluralism and democracy, as the World
Bank and several bilateral donors have done in recent years. 25 Among
academics, C.S. Whitaker sees democratic legitimacy as a necessary
condition for the establishment of the political authority and trust
needed to counter 'rent-seeking' by individuals and groups. 26 But other
authors are highly sceptical of democratisation in the context of
clientelist politics, and predict that competitive party systems will only
exacerbate the tendency to disperse the resources of the state rather than
mobilise a country's capital for productive purposes. 27
Among Africanists, there is widespread scepticism that a political
constituency can be found among the population for structural adjust-
ment and economic liberalisation. Such scepticism is fundamental to the
writings of those who look with favour on the resurgence of 'civil
society' but remain unconvinced of the merits of economic liberalism28
as well as those who see economic liberalisation as vital to the point
where political pluralism should, if necessary, be sacrificed.Z9 At a
time when state-autonomy interpretations of Asian economic successes
are being increasingly challenged, the call for technocratic 'insulation'
is being sounded in African studies. 30 The single case of Ghana under
Jerry Rawlings constitutes the African evidence cited to back the
argument that technocratic insulation from all manner of interest group
pressure is necessary for structural adjustment to take place. 31 The key
argument in this book is that Zimbabwe constitutes a case where struc-

tural adjustment resulted in large part from pressure by domestic
interest groups.
The comparative literature has failed to establish a clear connection
between broad regime type and the capacity to undertake economic
reform. On theoretical grounds, the most one seems to be able to say
is that there is little reason why autocrats should see it in their self-
interest to establish the secure property rights that would underpin long-
term economic growth, 32 while there may be a good rationalist basis
for believing that elected governments would do so. 33 However, the
inconclusiveness of the debate suggests that abstract regime categories
such as democracy and authoritarianism may be insufficiently capable
of capturing the more concrete aspects of social reality which are
relevant to understanding why some societies embark on modernising
thrusts while others do not. With respect to Africa, I suggest that one
key to understanding this is the specific patterning of the relationship
between governments and interest groups.
THE EXPERIMENT WITH STATE CORPORATISM IN AFRICA
Authoritarian rule in Africa has served, in general, to weaken or

suppress broad-based interests, such as those of sectors and classes. The
means for doing so have ranged from outright repression to cooptation
by use of threats and inducements. In any case, African governments
have denied themselves access to information needed for the formula-
tion of public policy and for correcting past mistakes. At the same time,
interest group politics has not been effectively stifled, but only taken
different forms. Rather than building sufficient consensus around a
shared view of the general interest, African military and one-party
regimes have relied on fluid, narrow and often rather localised bases of
support.
Whether they were included in the ruling coalition or banned, rival
parties disappeared soon after independence in the great majority of
African countries. In single-party states, there was a strong tendency for
the party to lose its relevance for policy formulation altogether and for
decision-making to be concentrated to an ever greater extent in the
hands of the president and the top-level bureaucracy. Elections, parties
and parliaments lost their significance as channels for expressing
alternative political programmes and for translating them into govern-
ment policies.
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Röntgen Ray Photograph of British and Foreign
Fountain Pens 240
Bachelet “Flying Train” and its Inventor 272
(a) Cavalry Portable Wireless Cart Set 280
(b) Aeroplane fitted with Wireless Telegraphy 280
ELECTRICITY
CHAPTER I
THE BIRTH OF THE SCIENCE OF
ELECTRICITY
Although the science of electricity is of comparatively recent date,

electricity itself has existed from the beginning of the world. There
can be no doubt that man’s introduction to electricity was brought
about through the medium of the thunderstorm, and from very early
times come down to us records of the terror inspired by thunder and
lightning, and of the ways in which the ancients tried to account for
the phenomena. Even to-day, although we know what lightning is
and how it is produced, a severe thunderstorm fills us with a certain
amount of awe, if not fear; and we can understand what a terrifying
experience it must have been to the ancients, who had none of our
knowledge.
These early people had simple minds, and from our point of view
they had little intelligence; but they possessed a great deal of
curiosity. They were just as anxious to explain things as we are, and
so they were not content until they had invented an explanation of
lightning and thunder. Their favourite way of accounting for anything
they did not understand was to make up a sort of romance about it.
They believed that the heavens were inhabited by various gods, who
showed their pleasure or anger by signs, and so they naturally
concluded that thunder was the voice of angry gods, and lightning
the weapon with which they struck down those who had displeased
them. Prayers and sacrifices were therefore offered to the gods, in
the hope of appeasing their wrath.
Greek and Roman mythology contains many references to
thunder and lightning. For instance, we read about the great god
Zeus, who wielded thunder-bolts which had been forged in
underground furnaces by the giant Cyclops. There was no doubt that
the thunder-bolts were made in this way, because one only had to
visit a volcano in order to see the smoke from the furnace, and hear
the rumbling echo of the far-off hammering. Then we are told the
tragic story of Phaeton, son of the Sun-god. This youth, like many
others since his time, was daring and venturesome, and imagined
that he could do things quite as well as his father. On one occasion
he tried to drive his father’s chariot, and, as might have been
expected, it got beyond his control, and came dangerously near the
Earth. The land was scorched, the oceans were dried up, and the
whole Earth was threatened with utter destruction. In order to
prevent such a frightful catastrophe, Jupiter, the mighty lord of the
heavens, hurled a thunder-bolt at Phaeton, and struck him from the
chariot into the river Po. A whole book could be written about these
ancient legends concerning the thunderstorm, but, interesting as
they are, they have no scientific value, and many centuries were to
elapse before the real nature of lightning was understood.
In order to trace the first glimmerings of electrical knowledge we
must leave the thunderstorm and pass on to more trivial matters. On
certain sea-coasts the ancients found a transparent yellow
substance capable of taking a high polish, and much to be desired
as an ornament; and about 600 years b.c. it was discovered that this
substance, when rubbed, gained the power of drawing to it bits of
straw, feathers, and other light bodies. This discovery is generally
credited to a Greek philosopher named Thales, 941–563 b.c., and it
must be regarded as the first step towards the foundation of
electrical science. The yellow substance was amber. We now know it
to be simply a sort of fossilized resin, but the Greeks gave it a much
more romantic origin. When Phaeton’s rashness brought him to an
untimely end, his sorrowing sisters, the Heliades, were changed into
poplar trees, and their tears into amber. Amongst the names given to
the Sun-god was Alector, which means the shining one, and so the
tears of the Heliades came to have the name Electron, or the shining
thing. Unlike most of the old legends, this story of the fate of the
Sun-maidens is of great importance to us, for from the word
“electron” we get the name Electricity.
Thales and his contemporaries seem to have made no serious
attempts to explain the attraction of the rubbed amber, and indeed so
little importance was attached to the discovery that it was completely
forgotten. About 321 b.c. one Theophrastus found that a certain
mineral called “lyncurium” gained attractive powers when rubbed, but
again little attention was paid to the matter, and astonishing as it may
seem, no further progress worth mention was made until towards the
close of the sixteenth century, when Doctor Gilbert of Colchester
began to experiment seriously. This man was born about 1543, and
took his degree of doctor of medicine at Cambridge in 1569. He was
very successful in his medical work, and became President of the
College of Physicians, and later on physician to Queen Elizabeth. He
had a true instinct for scientific research, and was not content to
accept statements on the authority of others, but tested everything
for himself. He found that sulphur, resin, sealing-wax, and many
other substances behaved like amber when rubbed, but he failed to
get any results from certain other substances, such as the metals.
He therefore called the former substances “electrics,” and the latter
“anelectrics,” or non-electrics. His researches were continued by
other investigators, and from him dates the science of electricity.
Leaving historical matters for the present,
we will examine the curious power which is
gained by substances as the result of rubbing.
Amber is not always obtainable, and so we will
use in its place a glass rod and a stick of
sealing-wax. If the glass rod is rubbed briskly
with a dry silk handkerchief, and then held close
to a number of very small bits of paper, the bits
are immediately drawn to the rod, and the same
thing occurs if the stick of sealing-wax is
substituted for the glass. This power of attraction
is due to the presence of a small charge of
Fig. 1.—Suspended
electricity on the rubbed glass and sealing-wax,
pith ball for or in other words, the two substances are said to
showing electric be electrified. Bits of paper are unsatisfactory for
attraction. careful experimenting, and instead of them we
will use the simple piece of apparatus shown in
Fig. 1. This consists of a ball of elder pith, suspended from a glass
support by means of a silk thread. If now we repeat our experiments
with the electrified glass or sealing-wax we find that the little ball is
attracted in the same way as the bits of paper. But if we look
carefully we shall notice that attraction is not the only effect, for as
soon as the ball touches the electrified body it is driven away or
repelled. Now let us suspend, by means of a thread, a glass rod
which has been electrified by rubbing it with silk, and bring near it in
turn another silk-rubbed glass rod and a stick of sealing-wax rubbed
with flannel. The two glass rods are found to repel one another,
whereas the sealing-wax attracts the glass. If the experiment is
repeated with a suspended stick of sealing-wax rubbed with flannel,
the glass and the sealing-wax attract each other, but the two sticks of
wax repel one another. Both glass and sealing-wax are electrified, as
may be seen by bringing them near the pith ball, but there must be
some difference between them as we get attraction in one case and
repulsion in the other.
The explanation is that the electric charges on the silk-rubbed
glass and on the flannel-rubbed sealing-wax are of different kinds,
the former being called positive, and the latter negative. Bodies with
similar charges, such as the two glass rods, repel one another; while
bodies with unlike charges, such as the glass and the sealing-wax,
attract each other. We can now see why the pith ball was first
attracted and then repelled. To start with, the ball was not electrified,
and was attracted when the rubbed glass or sealing-wax was
brought near it. When however the ball touched the electrified body it
received a share of the latter’s electricity, and as similar charges
repel one another, the ball was driven away.
The kind of electricity produced depends not only on the
substance rubbed, but also on the material used as the rubber. For
instance, we can give glass a negative charge by rubbing it with
flannel, and sealing-wax becomes positively charged when rubbed
with silk. The important point to remember is that there are only two
kinds of electricity, and that every substance electrified by rubbing is
charged either positively, like the silk-rubbed glass, or negatively, like
the flannel-rubbed sealing-wax.
If we try to electrify a metal rod by holding it in the hand and
rubbing it, we get no result, but if we fasten to the metal a handle of
glass, and hold it by this while rubbing, we find that it becomes
electrified in the same way as the glass rod or the sealing-wax.
Substances such as glass do not allow electricity to pass along
them, so that in rubbing a glass rod the part rubbed becomes
charged, and the electricity stays there, being unable to spread to
the other parts of the rod. Substances such as metals allow
electricity to pass easily, so that when a metal rod is rubbed
electricity is produced, but it immediately spreads over the whole
rod, reaches the hand, and escapes. If we wish the metal to retain its
charge we must provide it with a handle of glass or of some other
material which does not allow electricity to pass. Dr. Gilbert did not
know this, and so he came to the conclusion that metals were non-
electrics, or could not be electrified.
Substances which allow electricity to pass freely are called
conductors, and those which do not are called non-conductors; while
between the two extremes are many substances which are called
partial conductors. It may be said here that no substance is quite
perfect in either respect, for all conductors offer some resistance to
the passage of electricity, while all non-conductors possess some
conducting power. Amongst conductors are metals, acids, water, and
the human body; cotton, linen, and paper are partial conductors; and
air, resin, silk, glass, sealing-wax, and gutta-percha are non-
conductors. When a conductor is guarded by a non-conductor so
that its electricity cannot escape, it is said to be insulated, from Latin,
insula, an island; and non-conductors are also called “insulators.”
So far we have mentioned only the electric charge produced on
the substance rubbed, but the material used as rubber also becomes
electrified. The two charges, however, are not alike, but one is
always positive and the other negative. For instance, if glass is
rubbed with silk, the glass receives a positive, and the silk a negative
charge. It also can be shown that the two opposite charges are
always equal in quantity.
The two kinds of electricity are generally represented by the
signs + and -, the former standing for positive and the latter for
negative electricity.
The electricity produced by rubbing, or friction, is known as
Static Electricity; that is, electricity in a state of rest, as distinguished
from electricity in motion, or current electricity. The word static is
derived from a Greek word meaning to stand. At the same time it
must be understood that this electricity of friction is at rest only in the
sense that it is a prisoner, unable to move. When we produce a
charge of static electricity on a glass rod, by rubbing it, the electricity
would escape fast enough if it could. It has only two possible ways of
escape, along the rod and through the air, and as both glass and air
are non-conductors it is obliged to remain at rest where it was
produced. On the other hand, as we have seen, the electricity
produced by rubbing a metal rod which is not protected by an
insulating handle escapes instantly, because the metal is a good
conductor.
When static electricity collects in sufficient quantities it
discharges itself in the form of a bright spark, and we shall speak of
these sparks in Chapter III. Static electricity is of no use for doing
useful work, such as ringing bells or driving motors, and in fact,
except for scientific purposes, it is more of a nuisance than a help. It
collects almost everywhere, and its power of attraction makes it very
troublesome at times. In the processes of textile manufacture static
electricity is produced in considerable quantities, and it makes its
presence known by causing the threads to stick together in the most
annoying fashion. In printing rooms too it plays pranks, making the
sheets of paper stick together so that the printing presses have to be
stopped.
Curiously enough, static electricity has been detected in the act
of interfering with the work of its twin brother, current electricity. A
little while ago it was noticed that the electric incandescent lamps in
a certain building were lasting only a very short time, the filaments
being found broken after comparatively little use. Investigations
showed that the boy was in the habit of dusting the lamp globes with
a feather duster. The friction set up in this way produced charges of
electricity on the glass, and this had the effect of breaking the
filaments. When this method of dusting was discontinued the trouble
ceased, and the lamps lasted their proper number of hours.
CHAPTER II
ELECTRICAL MACHINES AND THE LEYDEN
JAR
The amount of electricity produced by the rubbing of glass or

sealing-wax rods is very small, and experimenters soon felt the need
of apparatus to produce larger quantities. In 1675 the first electrical
machine was made by Otto von Guericke, the inventor of the air-
pump. His machine consisted of a globe of sulphur fixed on a
spindle, and rotated while the hands were pressed against it to
provide the necessary friction. Globes and cylinders of glass soon
replaced the sulphur globe, and the friction was produced by
cushions instead of by the hands. Still later, revolving plates of glass
were employed. These machines worked well enough in a dry
atmosphere, but were very troublesome in wet weather, and they are
now almost entirely superseded by what are known as influence
machines.
In order to understand the working of influence machines, it is
necessary to have a clear idea of what is meant by the word
influence as used in an electrical sense. In the previous chapter we
saw that a pith ball was attracted by an electrified body, and that
when the ball touched that body it received a charge of electricity.
We now have to learn that one body can receive a charge from
another body without actual contact, by what is called “influence,” or
electro-static induction. In Fig. 2 is seen a simple arrangement for
showing this influence or induction. A is a glass ball, and BC a piece
of metal, either solid or hollow, made somewhat in the shape of a
sausage, and insulated by means of its glass support. Three pairs of
pith balls are suspended from BC as shown. If A is electrified
positively, and brought near BC, the pith balls at B and C repel one
another, showing that the ends of BC are electrified. No repulsion
takes place between the two pith balls at the middle, indicating that
this part of BC is not electrified. If the charges at B and C are tested
they are found to be of opposite kinds, that at B being negative, and
that at C positive. Thus it appears that the positive charge on A has
attracted a negative charge to B, and repelled a positive one to C. If
A is taken away, the two opposite charges on BC unite and
neutralise one another, and BC is left in its original uncharged
condition, while A is found to have lost none of its own charge. If BC
is made in two parts, and if these are separated while under the
influence of A, the two charges cannot unite when A is removed, but
remain each on its own half of BC. In this experiment A is said to
have induced electrification on BC. Induction will take place across a
considerable distance, and it is not stopped by the interposition of
obstacles such as a sheet of glass.
Fig. 2.—Diagram to illustrate Electro-static Induction.
We can now understand why an electrified body attracts an

unelectrified body, as in our pith ball experiments. If we bring a
positively charged glass rod near a pith ball, the latter becomes
electrified by induction, the side nearer the rod receiving a negative,
and the farther side a positive charge. One half of the ball is
therefore attracted and the other half repelled, but as the attracted
half is the nearer, the attraction is stronger than the repulsion, and so
the ball moves towards the rod.
Fig. 3 shows an appliance for
obtaining strong charges of electricity
by influence or induction. It is called
the electrophorus, the name coming
from two Greek words, electron,
amber, and phero, I yield or bear;
and it was devised in 1775 by Volta,
an Italian professor of physics. The
apparatus consists of a round cake,
A, of some resinous material Fig. 3.—The Electrophorus.
contained in a metal dish, and a
round disc of metal, B, of slightly
smaller diameter, fitted with an insulating handle. A simple
electrophorus may be made by filling with melted sealing-wax the lid
of a round tin, the disc being made of a circular piece of copper or
brass, a little smaller than the lid, fastened to the end of a stick of
sealing-wax. To use the electrophorus, the sealing-wax is electrified
negatively by rubbing it with flannel. The metal disc is then placed on
the sealing-wax, touched for an instant with the finger, and lifted
away. The disc is now found to be electrified positively, and it may be
discharged and the process repeated many times without recharging
the sealing-wax. The charge on the latter is not used up in the
process, but it gradually leaks away, and after a time it has to be
renewed.
The theory of the electrophorus is easy to understand from what
we have already learnt about influence. When the disc B is placed
on the charged cake A, the two surfaces are really in contact at only
three or four points, because neither of them is a true plane; so that
on the whole the disc and the cake are like A and BC in Fig. 2, only
much closer together. The negative charge on A acts by induction on
the disc B, attracting a positive charge to the under side, and
repelling a negative charge to the upper side. When the disc is
touched, the negative charge on the upper side escapes, but the
positive charge remains, being as it were held fast by the attraction
of the negative charge on A. If the disc is now raised, the positive
charge is no longer bound on the under side, and it therefore
spreads over both surfaces, remaining there because its escape is
cut off by the insulating handle.
We may now try to
understand the working of
influence machines, which are
really mechanically worked
electrophori. There are
various types of such
machines, but the one in most
general use in this country is
that known as the Wimshurst
machine, Fig. 4, and we will
therefore confine ourselves to
this. It consists of two circular
plates of varnished glass or of
ebonite, placed close together
Fig. 4.—Wimshurst Machine.
and so geared that they rotate
in opposite directions. On the
outer surfaces of the plates
are cemented sectors of metal foil, at equal distances apart. Each
plate has the same number of sectors, so that at any given moment
the sectors on one plate are exactly opposite those on the other.
Across the outer surface of each plate is fixed a rod of metal carrying
at its ends light tinsel brushes, which are adjusted to touch the
sectors as they pass when the plates are rotated. These rods are
placed at an angle to each other of from sixty to ninety degrees, and
the brushes are called neutralizing brushes. The machine is now
complete for generating purposes, but in order to collect the
electricity two pairs of insulated metal combs are provided, one pair
at each end of the horizontal diameter, with the teeth pointing inward
towards the plates, but not touching them. The collecting combs are
fitted with adjustable discharging rods terminating in round knobs.
The principle upon which the machine works will be best
understood by reference to Fig. 5. In this diagram the inner circle
represents the front plate, with neutralizing brushes A and B, and the
outer one represents the back plate, with brushes C and D. The
sectors are shown heavily shaded. E and F are the pairs of combs,
and the plates rotate in the direction of the arrows. Let us suppose
one of the sectors at the top of the back plate to have a slight
positive charge. As the plates rotate this sector will come opposite to
a front plate sector touched by brush A, and it will induce a slight
negative charge on the latter sector, at the same time repelling a
positive charge along the rod to the sector touched by brush B. The
two sectors carrying the induced charges now move on until
opposite back plate sectors touched by brushes C and D, and these
back sectors will receive by induction positive and negative charges
respectively. This process continues as the plates rotate, and finally
all the sectors moving towards comb E will be positively charged,
while those approaching comb F will be negatively charged. The
combs collect these charges, and the discharging rods K and L
become highly electrified, K positively and L negatively, and if they
are near enough together sparks will pass between them.
Fig. 5.—Diagram to illustrate working of a Wimshurst Machine.
At the commencement we supposed one of the sectors to have

a positive charge, but it is not necessary to charge a sector specially,
for the machine is self-starting. Why this is the case is not yet
thoroughly understood, but probably the explanation is that at any
particular moment no two places in the atmosphere are in exactly the
same electro-static condition, so that an uneven state of charge
exists permanently amongst the sectors.
The Wimshurst machine provides us with a plentiful supply of
electricity, and the question naturally arises, “Can this electricity be
stored up in any way?” In 1745, long before the days of influence
machines, a certain Bishop of Pomerania, Von Kleist by name, got
the idea that if he could persuade a charge of electricity to go into a
glass bottle he would be able to capture it, because glass was a non-
conductor. So he partly filled a bottle with water, led a wire down into
the water, and while holding the bottle in one hand connected the
wire to a primitive form of electric machine. When he thought he had
got enough electricity he tried to remove his bottle in order to
examine the contents, and in so doing he received a shock which
scared him considerably. He had succeeded in storing electricity in
his bottle. Shortly afterwards the bishop’s experiment was repeated
by Professor Muschenbrock of Leyden, and by his pupil Cuneus, the
former being so startled by the shock that he wrote, “I would not take
a second shock for the kingdom of France.” But in spite of shocks
the end was achieved; it was proved that electricity could be
collected and stored up, and the bottle became known as the Leyden
jar. The original idea was soon improved upon, water being replaced
by a coating of tinfoil, and it was found that better results were
obtained by coating the outside of the bottle as well as the inside.
As now used the Leyden jar consists of a glass jar covered
inside and outside with tinfoil up to about two-thirds of its height. A
wooden lid is fitted, through which passes a brass rod terminating
above in a brass knob, and below in a piece of brass chain long
enough to touch the foil lining. A Leyden jar is charged by holding it
in one hand with its knob presented to the discharging ball of a
Wimshurst machine, and even if the machine is small and feeble the
jar will accumulate electricity until it is very highly charged. It may
now be put down on the table, and if it is clean and quite dry it will
hold its charge for some time. If the outer and inner coatings of the
jar are connected by means of a piece of metal, the electricity will be
discharged in the form of a bright spark. A Leyden jar is usually
discharged by means of discharging tongs, consisting of a jointed
brass rod with brass terminal knobs and glass handles. One knob is
placed in contact with the outer coating of foil, and the other brought
near to the knob of the jar, which of course is connected with the
inner coating.
The electrical capacity of even a small Leyden jar is surprisingly
great, and this is due to the mutual attraction between opposite kinds
of electricity. If we stick a piece of tinfoil on the centre of each face of
a pane of glass, and charge one positively and the other negatively,
the two charges attract each other through the glass; and in fact they
hold on to each other so strongly that we can get very little electricity
by touching either piece of foil. This mutual attraction enables us to
charge the two pieces of foil much more strongly than if they were
each on a separate pane, and this is the secret of the working of the
Leyden jar. If the knob of the jar is held to the positive ball of a
Wimshurst, the inside coating receives a positive charge, which acts
inductively on the outside coating, attracting a negative charge to the
inner face of the latter, and repelling a positive charge to its outer
face, and thence away through the hand. The electricity is entirely
confined to the sides of the jar, the interior having no charge
whatever.
Leyden jars are very often fitted to a Wimshurst machine as
shown at A, A, Fig. 4, and arranged so that they can be connected or
disconnected to the collecting combs as desired. When the jars are
disconnected the machine gives a rapid succession of thin sparks,
but when the jars are connected to the combs they accumulate a
number of charges before the discharge takes place, with the result
that the sparks are thicker, but occur at less frequent intervals.
It will have been noticed that the rod of a Leyden jar and the
discharging rods of a Wimshurst machine are made to terminate not
in points, but in rounded knobs or balls. The reason of this is that
electricity rapidly leaks away from points. If we electrify a conductor
shaped like a cone with a sharp point, the density of the electricity is
greatest at that point, and when it becomes sufficiently great the
particles of air near the point become electrified and repelled. Other
particles take their place, and are electrified and repelled in the same
way, and so a constant loss of electricity takes place. This may be
shown in an interesting way by fastening with wax a needle to the
knob of a Wimshurst. If a lighted taper is held to the point of the
needle while the machine is in action, the flame is blown aside by the
streams of repelled air, which form a sort of electric wind.
CHAPTER III
ELECTRICITY IN THE ATMOSPHERE
If the Leyden jars of a Wimshurst machine are connected up and the

discharging balls placed at a suitable distance apart, the electricity
produced by rotating the plates is discharged in the form of a brilliant
zigzag spark between the balls, accompanied by a sharp crack. The
resemblance between this spark and forked lightning is at once
evident, and in fact it is lightning in miniature. The discharging balls
are charged, as we have seen, with opposite kinds of electricity, and
these charges are constantly trying to reach one another across the
intervening air, which, being an insulator, vigorously opposes their
passage. There is thus a kind of struggle going on between the air
and the two charges of electricity, and this keeps the air in a state of
constant strain. But the resisting power of the air is limited, and when
the charges reach a certain strength the electricity violently forces its
way across, literally rupturing or splitting the air. The particles of air
along the path of the discharge are rendered incandescent by the
heat produced by the passage of the electricity, and so the brilliant
flash is produced. Just as a river winds about seeking the easiest
course, so the electricity takes the path of least resistance, which
probably is determined by the particles of dust in the air, and also by
the density of the air, which becomes compressed in front, leaving
less dense air and therefore an easier path on each side.
The connexion between lightning and the sparks from electrified
bodies and electrical machines was suspected by many early
observers, but it remained for Benjamin Franklin to prove that
lightning was simply a tremendous electric discharge, by actually
obtaining electricity from a thunder-cloud. Franklin was an American,
born at Boston in 1706. He was a remarkable man in every way, and
quite apart from his investigations in electricity, will always be
remembered for the great public services he rendered to his country
in general and to Philadelphia in particular. He founded the
Philadelphia Library, the American Philosophical Society, and the
University of Pennsylvania.
Franklin noticed many similarities between electricity and
lightning. For instance, both produced zigzag sparks, both were
conducted by metals, both set fire to inflammable materials, and both
were capable of killing animals. These resemblances appeared to
him so striking that he was convinced that the two were the same,
and he resolved to put the matter to the test. For this purpose he hit
upon the idea of using a kite, to the top of which was fixed a pointed
wire. At the lower end of the flying string was tied a key, insulated by
a piece of silk ribbon. In June 1752, Franklin flew his kite, and after
waiting a while he was rewarded by finding that when he brought his
knuckle near to the key a little spark made its appearance. This
spark was exactly like the sparks obtained from electrified bodies,
but to make things quite certain a Leyden jar was charged from the
key. Various experiments were then performed with the jar, and it
was proved beyond all doubt that lightning and electricity were one
and the same.
Lightning is then an enormous electric spark between a cloud
and the Earth, or between two clouds, produced when opposite
charges become so strong that they are able to break down the
intervening non-conducting layer of air. The surface of the Earth is
negatively electrified, the electrification varying at different times and
places; while the electricity of the air is usually positive, but
frequently changes to negative in rainy weather and on other
occasions. As the clouds float about they collect the electricity from
the air, and thus they may be either positively or negatively
electrified, so that a discharge may take place between one cloud
and another, as well as between a cloud and the Earth.
Lightning flashes take different forms, the commonest being
forked or zigzag lightning, and sheet lightning. The zigzag form is
due to the discharge taking the easiest path, as in the case of the
spark from a Wimshurst machine. Sheet lightning is probably the
reflection of a flash taking place at a distance. It may be
unaccompanied by thunder, as in the so-called “summer lightning,”
seen on the horizon at night, which is the reflection of a storm too far
off for the thunder to be heard. A much rarer form is globular or ball
lightning, in which the discharge takes the shape of a ball of light,
which moves slowly along and finally disappears with a sudden
explosion. The cause of this form of lightning is not yet understood,
but it is possible that the ball of light consists of intensely heated and
extremely minute fragments of ordinary matter, torn off by the
violence of the lightning discharge. Another uncommon form is
multiple lightning, which consists of a number of separate parallel
discharges having the appearance of a ribbon.
A lightning flash probably lasts from about 1/100,000 to
1/1,000,000 of a second, and in the majority of cases the discharge
is oscillatory; that is to say, it passes several times backwards and
forwards between two clouds or between a cloud and the Earth. At
times it appears as though we could see the lightning start
downwards from the cloud or upwards from the Earth, but this is an
optical illusion, and it is really quite impossible to tell at which end
the flash starts.
Death by lightning is instantaneous, and therefore quite painless.
We are apt to think that pain is felt at the moment when a wound is
inflicted. This is not the case however, for no pain is felt until the
impression reaches the brain by way of the nerves, and this takes an
appreciable time. The nerves transmit sensations at a speed of only
about one hundred feet per second, so that in the case of a man
killed by a bullet through the brain, no pain would be felt, because
the brain would be deprived of sensibility before the sensation could
reach it. Lightning is infinitely swifter than any bullet, so life would be
destroyed by it before any pain could be felt.
On one occasion Professor Tyndall, the famous physicist,
received accidentally a very severe shock from a large battery of
Leyden jars while giving a public lecture. His account of his
sensations is very interesting. “Life was absolutely blotted out for a
very sensible interval, without a trace of pain. In a second or so
consciousness returned; I saw myself in the presence of the

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The Politics of Economic Reform in

Zimbabwe: Continuity and Change in

The Zimbabwe Council of Churches and Development in

Politics and Policies in Upper Guinea Coast Societies

Stasis in the Medieval West?: Questioning Change and

Economic Management in a Hyperinflationary Environment:

The pursuit of development economic growth, social

The Politics of Public Administration Reform in Italy

The Revised European Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity

The myth of the crime decline exploring change and

General Editor: Timothy M. Shaw, Professor of Political Science and Inter-

Recent titles include:

Manuel R. Agosin and Diana Tussie (editors)

Jerker Carlsson, Gunnar Kohlin and Anders Ekbom

Edward A. Comor (editor)

Steen Folke, Niels Fold and Thyge Enevoldsen

Anthony Tuo-Kofi Gadzey

Paul Mosley (editor)

Stephen P. Riley (editor)

Ann Seidman and Robert B. Seidman

Timothy M. Shaw and Julius Emeka Okolo (editors)

Arno Tausch (with Fred Prager)

Nancy Thede and Pierre Beaudet (editors)

First published in the United States of America 1995 by

© Tor Skalnes 1995

2 Political Institutions, Organised Groups and Economic

3 The Open Economy and Societal Corporatism, 1923-65 35

4 Economic Nationalism during UDI, 1965-79 56

5 Majority Rule: Parties, Interest Groups and the Drive

6 The Politics of Stabilisation, 1980-6 97

7 The Politics of Liberalisation, 1987-94 118

8 Agricultural Land, Pricing and Marketing Reforms 150

9 The Marginalisation of Labour Unions 183

3.1 Average real growth rates for the Southern

8.1 Real 1980 prices, 197011-1992/3 169

MATABELELAND ( Kwekwe• -....-..j'-' '-, \~ •

of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to involve

THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF

Although changes in Eastern Europe have weakened the appeal of the

The changes elsewhere in Southern Africa, especially in South

Zimbabwe. This is not to argue that international economic trends have

THE DOMESTIC REASONS FOR POLICY CHANGE

Despite its Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, the ZANU (PF) government tried

number of conflicts and discontents which undermined domestic support

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, INTEREST GROUPS AND THE

For the past quarter-century, development studies have been strongly

informal patron-client networks, are alternative institutional devices by

The solutions advocated in response to the purported failings of

THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

In Zimbabwe, a vibrant group politics operates to exert considerable

spread support in their sectors. These groups take a keen interest in

undertaken. The bargaining process amounted to a strengthening of the

1. Southern African Economist (Harare), August 1994, pp. 7-8.

Farmers, however, are often remotely located, have difficulty communi-

increasing 'insulation' or 'autonomy' for policy-making organs consti-

ECONOMIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC RATIONALITY

According to a great number of neo-classical economists, most forms

licence systems, lower average tariffs, less dispersion in their tariffs,

POLITICAL REGIMES AND ECONOMIC POLICY

In the 1970s, harsh political repression of the popular sectors, including

political authoritarianism was criticised by a number of authors. 15

tion, focusing on the 'second-tier NICs' - Indonesia, Thailand and

argument in this book is that Zimbabwe constitutes a case where struc-