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Theological
Anthropology in
the Anthropocene
Reconsidering Human
Agency and its Limits

Jan-Olav Henriksen
 Theological Anthropology in the Anthropocene

“In this thought-provoking monograph, Jan-Olav Henriksen tackles a very urgent

issue by asking what wisdom the Christian tradition can offer that may help us to
‘become human’ in the Anthropocene. Now that we can break planet Earth, which
ways of thinking in theological anthropology are harmful and which are support-
ive? There is much to be learned from this very timely and lucid book.”
—Gijsbert van den Brink, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

“Dr. Henriksen’s exhaustively researched and compelling book tackles one of the
most pressing questions of our age: how to understand human agency in the
Anthropocene. Incorporating diverse sources in theology, the environmental
humanities, and the sciences, he articulates a vision of humans as imaging God
without falling into arrogant exceptionalism, anthropocentrism, or alienation from
nature. The result is an Anthropocene theology that decenters humanity: we grasp
that we are fundamentally created beings whose agency is conditioned by agencies
and forces that preceded humans’ arrival on Earth. Theological anthropology
starts with the recognition that everything does not start with us.”
—Lisa H. Sideris, Professor of Environmental Studies, University of California,
Santa Barbara; author of Consecrating Science: Wonder, Knowledge,
and the Natural World (2017)

“We are in a midst of global collective trauma and suffering due to the converging
pandemics, ecological disasters, and failures of economic and political systems.
This moment is neither predetermined nor accidental, and it is called the
Anthropocene with good cause. But where, and what, is the (or a) Theology for
this moment? In this insightful book Jan-Olav Henriksen offers a forceful call for
a Theological Anthropology of (and for) the Anthropocene. Weaving a narrative
that draws from diverse intellectual threads, Theology, Anthropology, Ecology,
Evolutionary studies, Philosophy, and more, Henriksen offers an innovative, novel,
framework not bounded by the particulars of a given faith, but enriched via
Christian Theology, focused on human agency, human practice and their co-­
constructive relationships with faith, hope, and love.”
—Agustín Fuentes, Professor of Anthropology, Princeton University; Author
of Why We Believe: Evolution and the Human Way of Being (2019)
“In this ground-breaking book, Jan-Olav Henriksen begins from what humans
have in common, irrespective of their differing faith commitments (or none). The
emerging theological anthropology is thereby the result of an interdisciplinary
enquiry that seeks to explore the conditions of human agency in these ecologically
distressed times. Although Christian theology often stresses human activity as a
counterpart to the activity of God, Henriksen foregrounds human restraint and
passivity and so makes an important contribution to theological discourse in the
Anthropocene. Highly recommended.”
—Peter Scott, Samuel Ferguson Professor of Applied Theology and Director
of the Lincoln Theological Institute at the University of Manchester; author
of A Theology of Postnatural Right (2019)

“The climate crisis presents us with a huge theological challenge. How can we
continue to talk about God, imago dei, creation, stewardship, etc., and at the same
time take seriously what is going on around us? In his most urgent book about
theological anthropology in the Anthropocene, Henriksen makes a critical reread-
ing of what it means to be created in God’s image, and a part of creation which is
faced with disastrous prospects in the imminent future. This book is an important
theological response to the climate crisis, the most serious challenge of our time.”
—Arnfríður Guðmundsdóttir, Professor of Systematic Theology,
University of Iceland, author of Meeting God on the Cross.
Christ, the Cross and the Feminist Critique (2010)
 Jan-Olav Henriksen

Theological
Anthropology in the
Anthropocene
Reconsidering Human Agency and its Limits
Jan-Olav Henriksen
MF Norwegian School of Theology, Religion and Society
Oslo, Norway

ISBN 978-3-031-21057-0    ISBN 978-3-031-21058-7 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21058-7

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2023
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
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translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
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electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
I said to the tree, speak to me of God, and it blossomed (Sufi)—Quoted from
Heather Eaton, Introducing ecofeminist theologies (New York; London:
T&T Clark International, 2005), 2.
 Acknowledgments

Crises cause reflections. Theology is no exception in that regard. The

reflections that follow are the result of the contemporary climate crisis that
increasingly affects all life on the planet but also my participation in the
research group on Religion and the Natural Environment, convened by
the Center of Theological Inquiry, Princeton, New Jersey, in the academic
year 2021–22.
However, these lines are not primarily about a crisis but about grati-
tude. I am grateful to the staff at CTI, and especially Director Will Storrar
and Associate Director Joshua Maudlin, for selecting such an excellent
group of scholars and colleagues with whom I have had the benefit of
presenting and discussing some of the material prepared for the present
book: William Barbieri, Mark Douglas, Kanaan Kitani, Wolfgang Palaver,
Peter M. Scott, Lisa Sideris, Elaine Rutherford, Frederick Simmons, and
Andy Wightman. In addition to the research group, I continue to be
grateful for conversations with Agustin Fuentes, John Bowlin, and Arne
Johan Vetlesen on this and related topics. My gratitude also includes the
staff of the Wright Library at Princeton Theological Seminary, who
received me to a site that is among the best in the world for theological
scholars and assisted me whenever I needed it.
Thanks to my home institution, MF Norwegian School of Theology,
Religion, and Society, for giving me the resources necessary to participate
in the research group at CTI and thereby continue to support my research.
Moreover, I am grateful to Amy Invernizzi at Palgrave Macmillan, who
approached me and suggested I should publish with them, and to other

vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

staff members at Palgrave, as well. The cooperation has been excellent

from start to finish.
Hilde Marie, my wife, is well accustomed to accompanying her hus-
band to universities around the world. She still does so with her combina-
tion of good spirits and some forbearance due to my occasional
absent-mindedness and prioritizing of writing and thinking. I am grateful
for her continued company, and we have both enjoyed life in Princeton for
some months after being confined to our home in Norway due to the
global pandemic. Regrettably, the world has not turned much better as the
pandemic receded—as I write this, war rages in Europe and civilization is
under threat from more than climate change. It confirms my pessimistic
conviction that the only thing we learn from history is that we are unable
to learn from history.
Despite that gloomy note, I hope this book may inform readers about
ways to think about human agency and contribute to re-thinking our rela-
tionship with other living beings and the planet on which we all depend. I
remain convinced that there is still wisdom and resources in the Christian
tradition that may contribute to that task.
Princeton, New Jersey, end of May 2022

Jan-Olav Henriksen
 Contents

1 The Task  1

Part I Preliminaries   7

2 The
 “Before” in Theological Anthropology  9
It Does Not Start with Us: And Why We Forget It  10
What Comes First? On Realms of Experience Prior to Agency  12
Is Creation a Gift? Or a Given? Or Both?  21

3 The
 Anthropocene as a Heuristic Concept and the Role
of Experience in Theological Work 25
The Anthropocene’s Perfect Storm  25
The Spiritual Awareness of the Anthropocene  30

4 Nature
 in Focus: For Various Purposes—Why a Notion
of Creation Is Needed for Theological Anthropology 35
Nature: Contextualized and Historicized  35
More Than Human Agency: Latour  41
Creation Instead of Nature? The Gains from a Theological
Concept  45

ix
x Contents

5 On
 Producing Theological Anthropology in the
Anthropocene 49
A Pragmatist View  49
The Symbols and Metaphors of Tradition: And Their Present Use  52
Religion: Practices of Orientation, Transformation, and
Normative Reflection  55
The Theological Vision and the Present Predicament  56

Part II Theological Anthropology in the Anthropocene  63

6 The
 Conditions for the Symbol Image of God 65
Belief as the Result of Evolutionary Processes  67
To Make the World a Home: Niche Construction  71
The Theology of Niche Construction  76
Agency as Constitutive for Stewardship?  82

7 T
 he Symbol Imago Dei Reconsidered 89
Basic Traits in the Human Capacity for Using Symbols  89
Image of God—An Alternative Interpretation  91
God as Represented  94
The Desiring and Vulnerable Imago Dei  95
On Vulnerability  97
Desire—Basic Features 101
To Live Lovingly as Imago Dei 107
Conclusion: Love as the Fulfillment of Desire and Vulnerability 110

8 We
 Are Not in Control. The Limits of Stewardship113
“Stewardship” and Its Problems 114
Concluding Remarks on Stewardship 120
Excursus: The Limitations of Kantian Ethics in Light of the
Anthropocene 122

9 Erotic
 Attention to the Whole: The Spirituality of the
Imago Dei125
 Contents  xi

10 Relation
 and Separation: Gendered Diversity and
Patriarchy in the Anthropocene129
On the Need for Recognition of Diversity 129
The Separative Self and Nature: Elements from
Catherine Keller 132

11 A Self-Centered Species139

Anthropocentrism’s Natural Origin 141
Narcissism: A Gateway for Understanding the Sinful
Relationship Between Humans and Nature 145
Displacement of Trust: A Contextual Interpretation
of Løgstrup 155

12 Sin
 as Estrangement or Alienation?163
Alienation and the Human-Nature Relationship 164
From Alienation to Sin: Tillich 169

13 The
 Consumer Society and Sin175
Consumer Culture as a Pervasive Influence on Civilization 176
Consumer Culture: The Moral and Spiritual Dimensions 180

14 The
 Destruction of Authentic Agency: The
Contemporary Relevance of Romans 7189
Causes Behind Denial: Norgaard’s Analysis 191
Subjectivity as Bound to Sin: The Consequences of Idolatry 194

15 Sin, Violence, and Death—And Alternatives203

16 From Sin to Sins and Back211

Part III Human Agency Revisited and Suggestions for a

Faithful Response 219

17 Basic
 Elements to Consider About Agency and Its Limits223
On the Personal Agent: Ricœur’s Contribution 228
Agency and Self-understanding: Charles Taylor 234
Agency, Structures, and Practices 247
xii Contents

18 Christian
 Practices Guided by Faith, Hope, and Love257
On Christian Practices 257
Revealed Conditions for Agency and Its Relevance for the
Anthropocene 269
Divine Agency as Human Practice: Relation, Passivity, and
Participation 273

References279

Index293
 CHAPTER 1

The Task

How can theological anthropology respond to the current predicament

given with the Anthropocene? What does this predicament entail for
understanding human agency and its limitations? The task of this book is
to develop fundamental elements necessary to provide an answer to these
questions. However, this cannot be an isolated theological task but must
be done by considering insights from other scientific disciplines. Theology
has its limits:

The ecological crisis is creating a new context for theology… It is crucial to

grasp that the ecological crisis cannot simply be added to the current prob-
lems and religious reflections. The prevailing frameworks are not adequate…
[A]n ecological crisis of this magnitude and with such enigmatic causes
within human ideologies and worldviews has never existed previously. The
biblical and Christian traditions, or other religions for that matter, are not
equipped to respond to such a crisis. They did not arise from, nor address in
any depth, ecological issues. To expect abundant ecological resources from
religious traditions in their current form is mistaken.1

Hence, although all religion is, directly and indirectly, related to the
natural world and ecological practices, the experiences they ponder are not
similar to those presently facing humanity and all life on this planet Earth.

1
Eaton, Introducing Ecofeminist Theologies, 67–68.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
J.-O. Henriksen, Theological Anthropology in the Anthropocene,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21058-7_1
2 J.-O. HENRIKSEN

All accessible sources of insight and wisdom must be employed to address

the challenges posed by the Anthropocene. Theology as a mode of know-
ing the world—engaging, relating to, structuring, and manifesting power
over the world—is closely connected with our subjectivity as humans and
how we understand ourselves as responsible subjects. This responsibility is
among the modes that characterize and condition human agency.
The reason for addressing agency and its limits within the context of
theological anthropology is related to the fact that the Anthropocene is
the result of human action. It is the era when humans impact all that hap-
pens on planet Earth.2 Accordingly, “[a]gency is not something that
humans have or possess but unfolds in the movement of life and its set of
actions and relationships.”3 Human agency is the exercise or manifestation
of the capacity for action. This understanding instantly raises the question
about the conditions for agency, including the fundamental features pres-
ent in human self-understanding and motivation. Self-understanding is
the presupposition for most of our intentionally directed projects and per-
formances and our willing.4 Accordingly, agency is closely connected to
ethics and morality. Theological anthropology provides a framework for
developing an understanding of these features.5 Theological anthropology
must be understood as more than a mere descriptive task: it is also about
how we should consider human life and human agency normatively from
the vantage point of the Christian faith.

2
Further on the definition and content of the concept “Anthropocene,” see Chap. 3.
3
Celia Deane-Drummond, “Evolution: A Theology of Niche Construction for the
Twenty-First Century,” in Theology and Ecology Across the Disciplines: On Care for Our
Common Home, ed. Celia Deane-Drummond and Rebecca Artinian-Kaiser, Religion and the
University (London: T&T Clark, 2018), 255.
4
“At the core of the standard conception [of agency] are the following two claims. First,
the notion of intentional action is more fundamental than the notion of action. In particular,
action is to be explained in terms of the intentionality of intentional action. Second, there is
a close connection between intentional action and acting for a reason.” Markus Schlosser,
“Agency,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford:
Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019), Section 2. https://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/win2019/entries/agency/. For more on different aspects of agency, see
below, Part III.
5
This point entails that the present is not a book on morality as such or on ecological eth-
ics. It nevertheless aims at providing fundamental elements for ethics and moral agency, and
hence, references to works in these areas will be found in the following.
 1 THE TASK 3

The understanding of theological anthropology as developed in the

present work is in accordance with how other scholars understand it.
David Cunningham formulates it as follows:

The primary task of theological anthropology is not to give an account of

universal human nature, nor to provide supposedly universal definitions of
the image of God. Its task is not to define the image of God but to image
God; to be commentary on and participant in God’s active seeking of
humanity in its full flourishing, focused on those places where humanity and
its flourishing are counterfactual. This makes the image more like a verb
than it is a noun; more dynamic than it is static; more performative than
indicative.6

Furthermore, Alastair McFadyen emphasizes the relational character of

humans, and as Cunningham, also the notion of flourishing, which will be
a recurring aspect in the following:

Instead of a fixed and inalienable human nature or essence that secures dig-
nity and identifies where we might speak of humanity, dehumanisation and
rehumanisation, I suggest we do not look first towards the human as an
independent existent or a universal essence. Rather, I suggest we turn our
attention first to the God in active movement towards the full flourishing of
humanity (full humanisation), and so towards biological human beings in
their particularity as the loci of God’s active movement towards us creatively,
redemptively and eschatologically.7

In McFadyen’s definition, humanity is depicted within what Willis

Jenkins would call a cosmological narrative. Jenkins addresses the cos-
mologies that shape Christian attitudes to environmentalism as unhelpful.
They contribute to an underdetermination of the practical problems at
hand.8 Jenkins, instead, argues that our approach to ethical problems must
be prior to the development of worldviews. Hence, the main bulk of the

6
David S. Cunningham, “The Way of All Flesh: Rethinking the imago dei,” in Creaturely
Theology: On God, Humans and Other Animals, ed. Celia Deane-Drummond and David
Clough (London: SCM Press, 2009), 120.
7
Alistair McFadyen, “Redeeming the Image,” International Journal for the Study of the
Christian Church 16, no. 2 (2016): 122.
8
Willis Jenkins, The Future of Ethics—Sustainability, Social Justice, and Religious
Creativity (2013).
4 J.-O. HENRIKSEN

present work develops an understanding of the human condition or pre-

dicament that tries to steer clear of any story about humanity leading
toward salvation.9 This approach also has the consequence that I bracket
several tropes that one would normally expect to find in full-fledged theo-
logical anthropology. As indicated, the aim is to concentrate on relevant
aspects for understanding human agency in the Anthropocene.10
Accordingly, there are good reasons to hold that “the topic of theological
anthropology is not limited to questions of salvation and redemption.
More generally, theological anthropology includes religious reflection on
the formation of human beings in the midst of the tensions of human
existence. The concrete impact of theological anthropology, therefore, is
to serve as a framework through which to interpret any human mediation
of the world.”11
Accordingly, the present book’s profile is distinct from contributions to
theological anthropology that start with claims about the special character
of Christian theology. Instead, the focus is on what humans have in com-
mon, irrespective of their faith. It is against the backdrop of what is com-
mon to humanity that the Christian message about God’s creative and
redemptive work, as developed in Christology and ecclesiology, can be

9
However, this does not mean that all notions of salvation are irrelevant for topics like the
one discussed here. See Willis Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian
Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
10
This means that the present book focuses on issues that others have developed in a wider
and also more detailed manner. For other contributions in the field, see especially
E. M. Conradie, An Ecological Christian Anthropology: At Home on Earth? (Aldershot, UK;
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005); Celia Deane-Drummond, Sigurd Bergmann, and Markus
Vogt, Religion in the Anthropocene (2018); Celia E. Deane-Drummond, Theological Ethics
Through a Multispecies Lens: The Evolution of Wisdom, Volume I (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2019); Adam Pryor, Living with Tiny Aliens: The Image of God for the Anthropocene
(Baltimore, MD, 2020); Celia Deane-Drummond, Shadow Sophia (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2021); as well as more general and extensive works, such as David H. Kelsey,
Eccentric existence (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009); Wolfhart
Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1985);
Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993); and Edward Farley, Good and Evil: Interpreting a
Human Condition (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990).
11
Forrest Clingerman, “Geoengineering, Theology, and the Meaning of Being Human,”
Zygon 49, no. 1 (2014): 15.
 1 THE TASK 5

understood.12 This methodological approach allows for an interdisciplin-

ary informed theological approach that can display the relevance of a
Christian interpretation of what it means to be a human in the present
context. It also means that the book engages with other sources than
theological ones. These sources are used to understand and explicate the
contextual conditions for and contents of contemporary theological
anthropology (e.g., in the references to the Anthropocene, global warm-
ing, and the climate catastrophe). They point to central elements in
humanity that allow us to understand the role of religion in human life
better and see how it is conditioned by, and related to, our natural condi-
tions and our current state of living. Against the backdrop of insights from
these extra-theological sources, it is possible to demonstrate the relevance
of and the challenges to central topics in the Christian tradition’s under-
standing of what it means to be and become a human being.
Moreover, the book builds on the principle formulated in pragmatism
that there is no view from nowhere. Its character is unavoidably both pre-
liminary and explorative. These characteristics include its understanding of
humanity as well as nature. It also means that the “somewhere” in which
humanity finds itself is nature and that nature and humanity should not be
seen as separate and that it needs localized specifications. This point con-
tradicts much established theological anthropology and calls for a radical
reassessment of the internal relationship between humanity and nature.
Theological anthropology that wants to serve Christian communities and
contribute to a deeper understanding of the present situation must speak
from and about the challenges to human agency posed by the Anthropocene
in ways that observe the different contexts. The Anthropocene is manifest
in a variety of ways. Thus, there are obvious limitations to what the claims
and analyses in this book may entail. These limitations are also manifest in
my acknowledgment of the ever-growing contributions to the field in
which this book places itself. Although I am informed by and make refer-
ences to a selection of these contributions, I have tried to restrict discus-
sion of others to present my overall argument as clearly as possible.

12
The profile here is part of the so-called Scandinavian Creation theology, which has some-
thing in common with other works that focuses on commonalities with all humans as the
horizon within which the Christian message can be understood (e.g., W. Pannenberg,
S. McFague). Cf. Niels Henrik Gregersen, Trygve Wyller, and Bengt Kristensson Uggla,
Reformation Theology for a Post-secular Age : Løgstrup, Prenter, Wingren, and the Future of
Scandinavian Creation Theology, Research in Contemporary Religion (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017).
6 J.-O. HENRIKSEN

As for the construction of the following, the separate chapters build on

and presuppose each other in a way that should preclude them from being
read as separate. The argument that follows starts with some preliminary
sketches of what is given prior to the existence of the concrete and indi-
vidual human (Part I), before entering into the two main tropes of theo-
logical anthropology: the human being as created in the image of God,
and the human being as a sinner (Part II). These two topics constitute the
ambiguous character of human existence and must be seen as rooted in
the diverse dimensions of human existence and its concomitant deteriora-
tion. It is only against the backdrop of the different elements in these that
it is possible to consider what the implications are for our understanding
of human agency in the Anthropocene (Part III).
 PART I

Preliminaries
 CHAPTER 2

The “Before” in Theological Anthropology

To be human is to be intertwined with that which comes before us and our

concrete and individual existence. Hence, there are some given conditions
from which we come, with which we participate, and to which we unavoid-
ably relate. From a theological perspective, humanity emerges out of
God’s creative work, as this work manifests itself in nature, and social
interaction, psychological development, and, sometimes, the realm of reli-
gion. Human life starts when we are born, but we are not isolated being.1
Accordingly, when humans start to act, they rely on given conditions.
Human agency cannot be seen as a primary condition but is related to,
and dependent upon, already existing elements that determine, condition,
and shape its orientation, practices, and tasks.
Christian teaching considers this fundamental point insofar as the state
of humans in their constructive relationship with God is not determined
primarily by their actions but by their faithful reception of the grace of
God—sometimes despite their actions. This grace is manifest in both
creation and God’s redemption from our sinful state.2 However, this does
not render human agency irrelevant to the relationship with God: what

1
For the importance of the social dimension for the evolution of and maturation of human
beings, cf. Melvin Konner, The Evolution of Childhood: Relationships, Emotion, Mind
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).
2
Cf. for example, Ian A. McFarland, “Rethinking Nature and Grace: The Logic of
Creation’s Consummation,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 24, no. 1 (2022).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 9

Switzerland AG 2023
J.-O. Henriksen, Theological Anthropology in the Anthropocene,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21058-7_2
10 J.-O. HENRIKSEN

humans do and do not impact God’s creation. Against this backdrop, a

critical assessment of notions like freedom, responsibility, and stewardship
is necessary. The subsequent parts of this book will deal with those. In this
chapter, the focus is on the pre-given conditions.

It Does Not Start with Us: And Why We Forget It

Theological anthropology starts by recognizing the above point that
everything does not start with humans and their activity. God’s creative
work comes first. When Genesis describes God’s creation of the world,
most things happen before humans enter the stage. This theological claim
is supported by what we know about evolution, and it points to a funda-
mental point in human experience: Humans enter a world that already
exists—not a world of their making, but one that offers all the conditions
for human life. The experience of this world as one into which one enters,
and which is not dependent upon one’s agency is a fundamental aspect of
the doctrine of creation. It is the experience on which this doctrine builds,
and the doctrine of creation offers resources that can interpret this
experience.
When theology speaks about God as Creator, its aim is to de-center
humans and point to how that which is before and beyond us makes us
dependent on something else than our own agency. In a world that increas-
ingly appears as the result of, or impacted by, human agency, speaking of
the world as God’s creation may provide a critical point of departure for
addressing the current crisis in which we find ourselves. The crisis affects
humans and other living beings, species, plants and vegetation, water and
Earth, streams, and soil. Presently, God’s creation is increasingly compro-
mised by unrestricted human agency centered around humans and pre-
supposing that we are the only species that matter and have value. Being
reminded of God’s creative work should serve to orient human practices
and how we relate to, participate in, and cooperate with the rest of cre-
ation. Much of this book’s content will elaborate on different aspects of
what this entails for a contemporary theological understanding of what it
means to be human.
To become de-centered, one must first be “centered.” And have a point
of departure in oneself. Humans need such centering, and it is the natural
and immediate point from which we live and act. But we are never merely
existing in and by ourselves—we find ourselves in situations that call for
our understanding and entangled in networks or relationships that direct
 2 THE “BEFORE” IN THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 11

us to what matters and has significance. Moreover, we exist as intentional

beings, that is, as beings that have concerns, interests, purposes, and prob-
lems to solve. All of this makes us focus on who we are in the given situa-
tion and what we need to do.
The fact that we are “centered” and that our self-understanding circles
around what we need to do, make human activity stand out as the most
significant mode in which we experience ourselves—even if we consider
the fact that we, as relational beings, are also experiencing ourselves by
how other humans respond to what we do. Our activity teaches us about
ourselves and the world in which we participate. As we grow up, we
become accustomed to how others respond to our activities and actions,
and consequently, what we do shapes the foundation of our identity. This
interplay of agency and response is crucial for developing identity and
self-understanding.3
Two fundamental points emerge from this self-centeredness and its role
in the development of identity: First, the constant need to act to shape our
situation, solve our problems, respond to challenges, and do something
that others can respond to and recognize as us by offering positive affirma-
tion, makes it easy to forget that it all does not start with us. There are
networks, beings, and environments prior to our agency that condition us
and which we can neither control nor see as the result of our activity.
Second, and relevant for the present study: we depend on responses from
others to develop our identity. The role of other humans is crucial for
developing our self-understanding and what it means for the continued
agency on our part. However, given that humans can create a world cen-
tered around symbols, culture, and social connections, this world, that is,
the specific mode of human life given with society and culture might over-
shadow the “responses” coming from other dimensions of our life, such as
the impact our actions have on nature. The ways humans in the modern
world have developed society and culture tend to put in the shadows the
more silent but still pertinent “responses” of the natural world to what we
are doing to a large extent. As we shall see later, the Western consumer
society culture hides its ecological consequences even when they may be
seen as responses to human activity.
That other living beings and phenomena exist prior to us is necessary to
acknowledge to uphold the experiential relevance of the belief in God as

3
This point is crucial in self-psychology and also in recent philosophy of recognition, as,
for example, in H. Kohut and A. Honneth.
12 J.-O. HENRIKSEN

the Creator. It is also required to develop the ecological sensitivity and

literacy that are needed to relate to God’s creation under the present cir-
cumstances. The ability to experience how our activity as humans impacts
other dimensions of the world and the need to deepen our understanding
of how everything hangs together are part of the human task to live
responsibly together with the rest of creation.4

What Comes First? On Realms of Experience Prior

to Agency

The pre-existing conditions every human enters present us with different

realms of experience.5 These realms are interconnected and interdepen-
dent, and to fully understand what it means to be human implies that we
must consider all of them. All these experiential realms have their origin in
the creative work of God. The following is a sketch of constitutive ele-
ments in these realms. They can only be distinguished analytically from
each other and are deeply interconnected.

4
Underlying this critical consideration about making human agency the point of departure
for our identity is another theological trope, as well: the doctrine of justification. A funda-
mental point in Christian theology is the belief that we are saved by God’s grace, that is, by
what God offers us, and by what God has done for humanity, and not by our own works or
efforts. The tendency to rely on our own agency and put our trust in it runs counter to the
trust humans are called to have in God, prior to any activity on our own. The self-justifying
human who does not recognize his or her dependence on God’s works in creation and
redemption. An exclusive focus on human agency prevents us from seeing God’s grace as the
most fundamental element in our lives. The problem addressed here has also been identified
in G. Kaufman’s theology. In her criticism of Kaufman, A.K. Stricker argues that by conflat-
ing evolution and nature with creation, “his concept is built on a radically active understand-
ing of taking on responsibility, which seems to be exclusively linked to acting. This might
prove to be difficult from a Lutheran perspective and its stress on the creation as something
humans receive from God to support them in their daily life.” See Stricker Anne Katrin,
“Creation versus Nature?—Gordon Kaufman and the Challenge of Climate Change,”
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 37, no. 3 (2016): 291, https://doi.org/10.5406/
amerjtheophil.37.3.0279.
5
A more comprehensive presentation of these realms, but not with emphasis on the pre-­
given elements, is developed in Jan-Olav Henriksen, Life, Love, and Hope: God and Human
Experience (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2014), 35–54. For other ways of acknowledg-
ing the impact of different realms on human life, see Wolfhart Pannenberg and Matthew
J. O’Connell, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, 1st ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1985)., and Farley, Good and Evil: Interpreting a Human Condition.
 2 THE “BEFORE” IN THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 13

Humans have evolved from nature and would not exist unless the evo-
lutionary process had worked in our favor.6 We emerge from nature and
continue to be dependent on it. The most obvious example of this is our
dependence on water, nourishment, and oxygen, without which we can-
not live. But we are also dependent on other conditions in biology, ecol-
ogy, and physics. We have to adapt to conditions given by seasons and
cycles. Ignoring these can be fatal. The fact that people sometimes are
ignorant of or choose to ignore their fundamental dependence on these
elements or live in a social world that continues to estrange them from
nature contributes to the problems we face today concerning our place in
the total ecology of the Earth.7
To overcome willed ignorance, we need ecological sensitivity and eco-
logical literacy. Ecological sensitivity is not a mere intellectual task. It
implies being willing to become exposed to, experience, and engage with
nature in ways that allow for the development of intellectual, sensual, and
emotional experiences. Contrary to those who see human “instinct-­
reduction” as a hallmark of humanity,8 one may argue that developing
sensitivity by instinctual responses to what goes on in nature might con-
tribute to ecological sensitivity and widen the conditions for our response
to what is going on. This sensitivity may also contribute resources and a
context for the ecological literacy needed to understand and relate ade-
quately to the problems at hand.
The experience of our dependence on nature and how we are ourselves
biological and physical entities is immediately present in our experience of
ourselves as embodied. As embodied, we are both subject and object of

6
Cf. Martin J. Rees, Just Six Numbers: The Deep Forces That Shape the Universe (New York:
Basic Books, 2000).
7
For more on estrangement, see below Chap. 12.
8
See for this Pannenberg and O’Connell, Anthropology in Theological Perspective.
Pannenberg builds on the insights in philosophical anthropology (Portmann, Plessner,
Gehlen) to make a case for the specific openness to the world that constitutes a condition for
human religiosity and the human relationship with God. Although this might be argued with
regard to the cognitive conditions for religious belief, it is nevertheless a reduction of the
human ability to respond to and experience the world as God’s creation. It needs supplement
from insights articulated by Celia Deane-Drummond: “the cognitive should go hand in hand
with the affective and spiritual modes of human being in the world: they are bound up
together in human being and becoming, and our futures will be poorer if any one element is
left behind.” Deane-Drummond, “Evolution: A Theology of Niche Construction for the
Twenty-First Century,” 256.
14 J.-O. HENRIKSEN

our experience of being a bio-physical being,9 thus also related to the envi-
ronment in which we live and participate. This embodied awareness con-
stitutes the experience of being part of a larger and interconnected world
in which God’s creative powers are constantly present—and a world we
have not created ourselves. “The body is an indicator of environmental
and social alterations: It embodies the sentiments, emotions, norms, and
narratives that accompany socio-ecological changes, and resonates with
the world, others, and nature according to this knowledge. This knowl-
edge is by no means only cognitive knowledge but to a far extent ‘knowl-
edge’ in the bones acquired through informed and learned experience.”10
Accordingly, the body, and not only the mind, is a source of wisdom nec-
essary for human agency. To acknowledge the embodied sources of wis-
dom for agency entails a more holistic approach to human agency.11
To experience oneself as part of and dependent on nature represents an
experientially based alternative to modern, atomistic individualism and to
notions of freedom that entail the delusion of a human ability to make
unconditional choices independent of anything else than one’s own given
preferences.
Furthermore, by being born, we enter a social and cultural world in
which we need to orient ourselves. Such orientation involves interacting
with others in ways that allow the world to appear meaningful and valu-
able.12 The social and cultural worlds represent several different features,

9
Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (New York,: Humanities
Press, 1962).
10
Claudia Jahnel, “The Created, Lived, and Vulnerable Body Reasonating with the
World – Perspectives for a Non-anthropocentric Anthropology and a Body-Sensitive Eco-­
theology,” in KAIROS FOR CREATION: Confessing Hope for the Earth – The “Wuppertal
Call”– Contributions and Recommendations from an International Conference on Eco-­
Theology and Ethics of Sustainability Wuppertal, Germany, 16–19 June 2019, ed. Louk
Andrianos et al. (Solinen: Foedus, 2019), 225.
11
This point is also underscored in Deane-Drummond, Theological Ethics Through a
Multispecies Lens: The Evolution of Wisdom, Volume I, 249. She argues for an approach “that
focuses on the deep roots of core virtues of justice, love, and wisdom, and by doing so gener-
ally avoids foregrounding rights language. Further, wisdom puts stress on an interlaced,
relational approach, while including rather than rejecting reason. It is the narrowly pro-
scribed and disembodied reasoning that fails to gain traction. The evolution of wisdom is
therefore holistic, inclusive, and open to the transcendent.” (ibid.)
12
“Culture … is the context, the framework, the milieu that embodies and gives meaning
to our experiences of the world. … [I]t is what makes the human mind possible.” Agustin
Fuentes, Why We Believe: Evolution and the Human Way of Being (New Haven; West
Conshohocken, PA;: Yale University Press, 2019), 79.
 2 THE “BEFORE” IN THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 15

among which language is perhaps the most fundamental.13 It is linked

closely to the ability to use signs and symbols, which we will consider in
detail later.14 We communicate through language, and thereby, we consti-
tute a world of understanding shared with others. Language is not some-
thing we invent. We acquire it by participating in communicative social
processes already practiced by others. Such participation means that lan-
guage opens up a world of experience that we would not have access to
without it. The only way to learn a language is to practice it by speaking,
listening, or reading. Language skills are non-existent apart from practice.
The world-constitutive character of language serves different purposes in
different contexts.15
Among language’s fundamental performances is that it constitutes our
subjectivity. Subjectivity is our ability to experience ourselves as distinct
selves and as the source of action. Subjectivity is the structure of a being
able to thematize itself in the medium of conceptions given in conscious-
ness, language, and communication. It allows us to partake in a commu-
nity and simultaneously develop a sense of self as distinct from others.
Thus, subjectivity is constituted—a subject does not constitute itself but
does so by means of pre-given conditions offered by culture.16
Two benefits emerge from understanding subjectivity along these lines:
Firstly, it makes it possible to articulate different ways in which the subject
establishes herself: she need not understand herself as totally separated
from the world in which she finds herself, as, for example, in the rigid
subject-object dichotomy. She may, instead, thematize herself in her rela-
tionship with and dependence on nature. To contribute to other ways of
shaping subjectivity than the modern, separated-self mode of

13
Many theories exist about language. The following is still a sketch of basic features,
emphasizing selected pragmatic elements.
14
See Chaps. 2 and 5.
15
For these different purposes, see Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative
Action, 2 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984); Jürgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Social
Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action, Studies in contem-
porary German social thought, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001).
16
This definition of subjectivity is important over against philosophical doctrines that see
it as self-constituting. I follow the definition by Ingolf U. Dalferth, “Subjektivität und
Glaube. Zur Problematik der theologischen Verwendung einer philosophischen Kategorie,”
Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 36, no. 1 (1994): 21.
16 J.-O. HENRIKSEN

understanding oneself is among the crucial tasks in the present.17 It fol-

lows from this, secondly, that a subject need not understand herself as an
isolated “I” separated from an environment that is the field of her autono-
mous self-realization and which represents the mere object subjected (sic!)
to her reification.18 The alternative is to speak of participation, which is
the notion I will continue to use in this book.
Language points in the direction of another feature of the social world
as well: the existence of practices. Practices are already in place when we
are born (mothering being the immediate example). They are part of the
social world we need to appropriate. Because practices structure human
action, understanding their role as pre-existing conditions for human
agency is crucial.19 Practices emerge out of the fact that we understand the
world in ways that make certain actions have a specific meaning, structure,
and aims. Accordingly, they presuppose a horizon of intelligibility that
structures human agency.
T. Schatzki identifies four main elements in practices: (1) a practice
presupposes some practical understanding—“knowing how to X, knowing
how to identify X-ings, and knowing how to prompt as well as respond to
X-ings”; (2) guiding rules that direct the performance of specific actions;
(3) a teleo-affective structure—“a range of normativized and hierarchi-
cally ordered ends, projects and tasks, to varying degrees allied with

17
A constructive criticism of the denial of fundamental relationality and the ideal of “sepa-
rate selves” is found in Catherine Keller, From a Broken Web: Separation, Sexism, and Self
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1986). Later, Keller has developed her insights into relationality in
directions that address the current problems.
18
The problems with the latter way of understanding subjectivity are also addressed by
Dalferth when he writes about “Die Folgen dieser Verdinglichung der Welt und der ihr kor-
relierenden Subjektivität des Ichs sind bekannt. Doch dieser Doppelprozeß wirft nicht nur
ökologische und soziale Probleme auf, die wir kaum mehr zu bewältigen vermögen, sondern
er hat auch seine dialektischen Tücken. Horkheimer und Adorno haben sie in der Dialektik
der Aufklärung als Rückfall der Aufklärung in den Mythos thematisiert: Je autonomer sich
das Subjekt gebärdet, desto mehr gerät es in den Sog unbeherrschbarer Abhängigkeiten.
Und je ausschließlicher die Welt nur noch als Objekt subjektiver Begierden und Betätigungen
wahrgenommen wird, desto un- abweislicher erweist sie ihre Souveränität, der wir uns in
keiner Weise entziehen können.” Dalferth, “Subjektivität und Glaube. Zur Problematik der
theologischen Verwendung einer philosophischen Kategorie,” 19.
19
Practice theory attempts to overcome some of the shortcomings in the agent-structure-­
debate about conditions for agency by introducing practices as a middle term that points to
phenomena that involve both an agent and a structure. It comes in different forms, as in
Giddens, Bourdieu, Foucault, Nicollini, and Schatzki, to name a few important figures.
 2 THE “BEFORE” IN THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 17

normativized emotions and even mood”; and (4) a general understand-

ing.20 Thus, practices presuppose both intentions, emotions, and cognitive
elements. We can also say that practices contribute to the structuration of
agency.21
Among the structuring elements for the human agency are the different
institutions: Family, school, state, marriage, and so on. Institutions have
different aims and are usually linked to various practices that serve to
achieve these purposes. Institutions are not fixed. They are relatively stable
structures under which different types of agency can be learned, taught,
and performed.22 Institutional differentiation represents both rationaliza-
tion (incl. modernization) and the danger of fragmentation concerning
various aspects of human life. This point is essential to observe in relation
to the need for an overarching and comprehensive view of the phenomena
involved in the current climate crisis and other problematic elements in
the Anthropocene.
A final element in the socio-cultural dimension of human experience
important to consider is the notion of social mindscapes, a notion coined
by sociologist Eviatan Zerubavel.23 I will return to this notion repeatedly
in the following analyses. It overcomes the impasse arising from under-
standing cognition exclusively on the individual or the universal level.
Zerubavel provides a comprehensive understanding of the social realm of
mind, enabling a focus on how the social world impacts the conventional,
normative aspects of the way we think. He points to the social foundation
of mental actions such as perceiving, attending, classifying, remembering,
assigning meaning, and reckoning the time. All these elements are deeply

20
See Theodore R. Schatzki, The Site of the Social: A Philosophical Account of the Constitution
of Social Life and Change (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 77–80.
21
Cf. for structuration as another middle term between agent and structure, see Anthony
Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1986).
22
That institutions are relatively stable and therefore might be undergoing needed and
legitimate changes due to negotiation of aims, content, and structure is important to under-
score in light of the present need for a dynamic response to the changing natural and societal
conditions emerging under Anthropocene circumstances.
23
Eviatar Zerubavel, Social Mindscapes: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
18 J.-O. HENRIKSEN

affected by our social environments, and they affect the way we perceive
our relationship with the environment.24
In studying such relationships, Kari Norgaard relies on Zerubavel’s
notion of mindscapes to explain the social organization of denial of the
climate crisis. Thereby, the role of social cognition in the reproduction of
power appears as a pre-given condition that determines agency because
“through the various norms of focusing we internalize as part of our ‘opti-
cal’ socialization, society essentially controls which thoughts even ‘cross’
our minds.”25 Denial or acceptance of climate change depends not only on
the accessibility to information but also on how the social mindscapes
teach people what to notice and what can be ignored of the (sometimes
limited) information they are provided. “Zerubavel’s analysis prompts us
to notice how much information is available but goes unnoticed due to
systems of perception and attention, how people forget this information
when they do hear it (due to socially shaped systems of memory), how
information is not considered morally offensive (being outside socially
defined limits of concern), and finally how information on climate change
is not connected to other environmental problems or to personal life (due
to socially shaped systems of organization).”26
Language and social mindscapes mediate how we experience the world
we share with others. However, the social world also determines the expe-
riential dimension of our personal, inner world. Our emotions, feelings,
needs, and desires, in short: our psychology is not a given but is shaped by
our interaction with those around us, and especially our significant others.
How we are recognized by others, mirrored by them, affirmed and
soothed, rejected or scorned, shape our mode of being in the world and
the ways in which we experience ourselves and others, emotionally and
cognitively.27 Thus, the psychologically charged experiences we have or
24
Hence, this notion has been used in different studies that identify the complexities and
contradictions inherent in how people relate to climate change. See, for example, Robin
Globus Veldman, The Gospel of Climate Skepticism: Why Evangelical Christians Oppose Action
on Climate Change (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2019); Kari Marie
Norgaard and Muse Project, Living in Denial: Climate Change, Emotions, and Everyday Life
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2011). https://go.exlibris.link/M3XfPG35.
25
Zerubavel, Social Mindscapes: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology, 51.
26
Norgaard and Project, Living in Denial: Climate Change, Emotions, and Everyday
Life, 212.
27
I have developed these points more extensively from the point of view of their relevance
for the philosophy of religion in Jan-Olav Henriksen, Relating God and the Self: Dynamic
Interplay (Ashgate, 2013).
Another random document with
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 "Vai niin", sanoi presidentti; "jatkakaa".

"Hänellä oli — en saanut nähdyksi enempää", mutisi madame

heikosti.
"Oli pimeä."

"Ja odotatteko meidän uskovan tätä?" vastasi presidentti

kiivastuen, todella tai näön vuoksi. "Odotatteko meidän uskovan
tuollaista juttua? Tai että te ainoastaan tuon pojan kehoituksesta —
pojan, josta te ette tiennyt mitään, jota te ette kykene kuvaamaan,
jota te ette ollut koskaan ennen nähnyt — että te ainoastaan hänen
kehoituksestaan annoitte rohdon miehellenne ettekä nauttinutkaan
sitä itse?"

Syytetty horjahti hiukan, tavaten kiinni aidakkeesta. Oikeussali

pyöri hänen silmissään. Hän näki, kuten tutkija tarkoittikin, asemansa
täydellisen toivottomuuden, kohtalon kietoman verkon lujuuden,
oman voimattomuutensa, avuttomuutensa. Kuitenkin hän pakoittausi
tekemään ponnistuksen. "Olen puhunut totta", hän sanoi särkyneellä
äänellä. "Minä rakastin miestäni."

"Kas vain!" vastasi presidentti ivallisesti. Hän tyynnytti

kädenliikkeellä pikku häiriön, jota ilmeni salin perällä. "Niin,
luonnollisesti. Se kuuluu juttuun, muutoinhan lemmenjuomasta ei
olisi puhettakaan. Mutta ettekö näe, madame", hän jatkoi rypistäen
kulmiansa ja puhuen sellaisella äänenpainolla kuin kuulustellessaan
tavallisia pahantekijöitä, "että kaikki Parisin vaimot voisivat myrkyttää
miehensä ja ilmitullessaan sanoa: 'Se oli lemmenjuomaa', jos te
vältätte rangaistuksen? Ei, ei; meidän tulee saada joku parempi juttu
tarjolle."
 Syytetty katseli häntä kauhuissaan ja häpeissään. "Minulla ei ole
muuta", hän huusi tuskastuneesti. "Olen puhunut totta. Jollette usko
minua, niin kysykää Notredamelta."

"Te pyysitte äsken ristikuulustelua hänen kanssaan", vastasi

presidentti katsahtaen virkaveljensä, jotka nyökkäsivät. "Haluatteko
sitä vieläkin?"

Kuivin huulin mutisi toinen: "Kyllä."

"Kutsuttakoon hänet siis", sanoi tuomari juhlallisesti. "Kutsuttakoon

Solomon Notredame asetettavaksi vastakkain syytetyn kanssa."

Määräys herätti yleistä kohua, uteliasta ja jännittynyttä

liikehtimistä. Lehtereille ahtautuneet nojasivat eteenpäin,
nähdäkseen paremmin, huoneen perällä istujat nousivat seisaalle.
Madame, huulet avoinna ja nopeasti hengittäen — madame, kaiken
huomion keskus — tuijotti koko sielunvoimansa pinnistäen ovea
kohti, jota hän näki muiden pitävän silmällä. Hänen kohtalonsa
riippui tästä miehestä, joka oli nyt tulossa hänen näkyviinsä.
Valehtelisiko tähdistälukija, syyttääkseen häntä? Vai puhuisiko hän
totta, vahvistaen hänen kertomuksensa — myöntäen hänen tulleen
ostamaan lemmenloihtua eikä myrkkyä? Tokihan hän myrkyn
ostamisen kieltäisi? Sitähän vaati hänen oma etunsa?

Mutta hänen sitä tuskallisesti tuijottaessaan sulkeutui hänen

pettymyksekseen jälleen ovi, joka jo oli avattu raolleen. Samassa
syntyi hänen ympärillään yleistä liikettä ja kahinaa, kaikkialla
suojamassa noustiin seisomaan. Ihmeissään, melkein
kärsimättömänä, hän kääntyi tuomareihin päin ja huomasi heidänkin
nousseen. Sitte hän näki heidän takanaan olevasta ovesta kuuden
herrasmiehen astuvan sisälle ja värikkäillä loistoasuillaan
kirkastavan kolkkoa tuomion paikkaa. Ensimäinen oli kuningas.

Ludvig oli silloin noin viidenneljättä vanha — tummaverinen,

kelmeä mies, yllään musta puku, jonka leveälieriseen hattuun oli
kiinnitetty kallisarvoisella timantilla valkoinen sulkatöyhtö. Hänellä oli
kädessään kävelykeppi, ja hän tervehti tuomareita tullessaan. Kolme
herrasmiestä — kaksi jokseenkin kuninkaan ikäistä, kolmas noin
kuudenkymmenen vanha vanttera, soturin näköinen mies — saattoi
häntä ja istuutui kuninkaalle varatun, kunniakatoksella peitetyn
istuimen taakse. Viides tulija astui tuomarien taitse istuimen luo, joka
oli heidän vasemmallaan; hänellä oli yllään turkiksilla reunustettu
punainen kauhtana ja päässään punainen pieni lakki. Hän oli
keskimittainen ja hipiältään vaalea, hänellä oli terävät italialaiset
kasvonpiirteet ja, kirkkaat läpitunkevat silmät. Tuossa kaikessa ei
ollut mitään merkillistä. Mutta hänellä oli myöskin sysimustat viikset
ja poskitupsut sekä maidonvalkea tukka, ja tämä vastakohta teki
hänet tunnettavaksi kaikkialla. Hän oli Armand Jean du Plessis,
herttua ja kardinaali Richelieu, soturi, pappi ja näytelmäseppo sekä
kuudentoista vuoden aikana Ranskan valtias.

Madame katsoi heihin pamppailevin sydämin; väkisinkin heräsi

hänen mielessään huimia toiveita. Mutta, voi taivas, kuinka
kylmäkiskoisesti he silmäsivätkään häntä! Heidän järkkymättömässä
tuijotuksessaan näkyi pelkkää uteliaisuutta, välinpitämättömyyttä,
halveksimista! Voi, he olivat tulleet sitä varten! He olivat tulleet
tähystelemään. Tämä oli heidän joulunviettoaan — numerona
joulukarkeloissa. Ja hän — hän oli tuomittavaksi joutunut nainen,
myrkyttäjätär, kehno hylkiö, joka oli alistettava kuulusteluun,
kidutettava ja laahattava häpeälliseen kuolemaan!
 Kuningas puheli hetkisen tuomarien kanssa. Sitte hän jälleen
istuutui.
Presidentti antoi merkin, ja ovenvartija huusi kaikuvalla äänellä:
"Solomon Notredame! Tulkoon Solomon Notredame esille!"
X.

Kaksi todistajaa.

Madame de Vidoche kuuli nimen ja reipastausi jälleen, kääntyen

ovea kohti kuten muutkin ja odottaen kuivin huulin ja kuumeisin
silmin miestä, jonka piti pelastaa hänet — pelastaa kuninkaan ja
hovin uhallakin. Eikö hän milloinkaan tule? Ovi oli auki, pysyi auki!
Hän näki sen läpi käytävän alastomat seinät ja tomuttuneen laen ja
kuuli syvässä hiljaisuudessa laahustavien askeleitten tömistystä.
Vähitellen melu kävi äänekkäämmäksi, vaikka se vielä oli niin
etäinen, että oikeussalissa, missä jokainen odotti äärimäisilleen
jännittyneenä, kuului vähäisinkin hisahdus, hiljaisinkin kuiskaus. Kun
ovenvartija jälleen huusi: "Solomon Notredame esille!" vilkaisi
useakin häneen vihaisesti. Hän häiritsi heidän odotustaan.

Haa! viimeinkin! Mutta he kantoivat häntä. Madame värähti

nähdessään neljän miehen tulevan vitkallisesti pitkin käytävää,
kantaen tuolia välissään. Ovella he kompastuivat ja pysähtyivät, jotta
hän sai aikaa ajatella. Miestä oli siis kidutettu, ja hän ei kyennyt
kävelemään; sen olisi voinut arvatakin. Madamen ennestään
valkoiset posket kävivät harmahtaviksi, ja hän kouraisi lujemmin
aidakkeen laitaa.

He toivat hänet hitaasti alas kolme porrasaskelmaa ja pitkin kaitaa

käytävää häntä kohti. Kantajat olivat katsojan tiellä, mutta piankin
hän näki miehen pään suhteen jotain kummallista. Heidän
laskiessaan hänet alas, kolmen askeleen päähän, hän näki mitä se
oli. Miehen kasvot oli peitetty. Hänen päänsä yli oli heitetty irrallinen
vaate, ja hän nojautui omituisesti eteenpäin.

Mitä se merkitsi? Syytetty alkoi vapista, tähystäen häntä

epämääräisin aavistuksin. Ja Notredame ei liikahtanutkaan.

Presidentin juhlallinen ääni keskeytti äkkiä hiljaisuuden.

"Madame", hän sanoi, mutta syytetystä tuntui ääni tulevan kovin
kaukaa, "tässä on todistajanne. Te pyysitte häntä saapuville, ja
oikeus suostui siihen siinä toivossa, että tämä saattaa olla
säälivämpi tapa taivuttamiseksenne tunnustamaan rikoksenne.
Mutta minä varoitan teitä, että hän ei todista teidän puolestanne,
vaan teitä vastaan. Hän on tunnustanut."

Hetkisen silmäili syytetty mykkänä puhujaa; sitte hänen katseensa

palasi hunnutettuun istujaan — tällä oli kamala vetovoima häneen.

"Onneton nainen", pitkitti presidentti vakavasti, "hän on

tunnustanut.
Tahdotteko te nyt tehdä samoin, ennen kuin katselette häntä?"

Syytetty pudisti päätänsä. Hän olisi kieltänyt, väittänyt vastaan,

huutanut olevansa viaton, mutta hänen kurkkuaan kuroi — hän oli
menettänyt äänensä, toivonsa, kaikkensa. Suojamassa kuului
humisevaa melua, tai kenties tohisi hänen päässään. Alkoi myös
pimetä.

"Hän on tunnustanut", hän kuuli presidentin pitkittävän, mutta ääni

oli nyt enää aivan etäistä kaikua, "panemalla itse toimeen sen
rangaistuksen, jonka muutoin olisi laki tuottanut, Oletteko yhä
uppiniskainen? Otettakoon siis verho pois kasvoilta. Nyt, onneton
nainen, katsokaa rikoskumppanianne."

Kenties hän puhui säälistä ja valmistaakseen syytettyä, sillä tämä

ei katsoessaan heti pyörtynyt, vaikka noiden elottomien keltaisten
kasvojen näkeminen jäykkine silmineen ja avoimine huulineen johti,
monenkin kirkaisemaan. Itsemyrkyttäjä oli tehnyt työnsä hyvin.
Kolkoilla piirteillä oli kuolemassakin ivallinen irvistys, suupielissä
voitonriemuinen myhäily. Mutta tämä oli pinnalla. Lasittuneissa
silmissä, tylsissä ja himmentyneissä, piili kauhua, kuten näkivät
kaikki, jotka tähystivät tarkoin; niissä kuvastui äkillistä heräämistä,
ikäänkuin olisi katala sielu eriämisensä hetkellä tullut näkemään
tuomionsa ja maallisista vihollisistaan voitolle päästyänsä kohdannut
toisen maailman kynnyksellä haamun, joka jähmetytti hänet
hirmustuksella.

Oli katkeraa ivaa, että mies, joka oli niin kauvan urheillut kuoleman
kanssa ja hieronut sillä kauppoja, tuotiin itse tänne kuolleena,
paljastettavaksi ja tuijoteltavaksi! Vähänpä nyt oli hyötyä hänen
kujeistaan ja kemiallisista sekoituksistaan, hänen kamalista
tiedoistaan ja siitä salaperäisyydestä, johon hän oli verhoutunut.
Manala oli saanut hänet kolkon pään, mustan sydämen ja kaikki.

Tuokion tähysti madame, kuten sanottu, Sitten valkeni hänelle

vähitellen kaamea totuus. Mies oli kuollut! Hän oli tappanut itsensä!
Sen kauhu yllätti hänet viimein. Kamalasti huudahtaen hän kaatui
pyörtyneenä lattialle.

Kun hän jälleen tointui — tietämättä kuinka pitkän ajan kuluttua —

ja likekkäin sulloutuneet kasvot ja tuomioistuimen jäsenten
reunapiirteet alkoivat selitä esiin usmasta, oli hänen ensimäisenä
ajatuksenaan muistin palatessa tuo aavemainen istuja. Ponnistaen
— joku pyyhki sienellä hänen otsaansa ja tahtoi pidättää häntä —
hän käänsi päätänsä ja katsoi. Hänen huojennuksekseen se oli
poissa. Hän huokasi ja sulki silmänsä, maaten tovin voimattomana ja
kuullen äänten sorinaa, mutta omistamatta sille mitään huomiota.
Pian valtasi hänet kuitenkin jälleen asemansa kurjuus, ja heikosti
voihkaisten hän katsoi ylös.

Samassa hän alkoi vapista ja itkeä hiljaa, sillä hänen katseensa

kohtasivat naisen, joka kumartui hänen ylitseen, ja lukivat tämän
silmistä jotakin uutta, outoa, ihmeellistä — ystävällisyyttä. Nainen
taputti hänen kättänsä leppoisasti ja supatti hänelle, että hänen piti
olla hiljaa ja kuunnella. Hän kuunteli aina välillä itsekin, ja hetkisen
kuluttua seurasi madame hänen esimerkkiään.

Niin tylsinä kuin hänen aistinsa vielä olivatkin, huomasi hän, että
kuningas istui kumartuneena eteenpäin, omituinen terävä ilme
kasvoillaan,— että tuomarit näyttivät hämmästyneiltä, että
kardinaalinkin kalvaat piirteet olivat hieman punehtuneet. Ja
yksikään heistä ei katsonut häneen. He olivat kääntyneet poikaan,
joka seisoi pöydän päässä papin vieressä. Ikkunasta osui kalsea
valo hänen kasvoilleen, ja hän puhui. "Minä kuuntelin", kuuli
madame hänen sanovan. "Niin."

"Ja kuinka pitkä aika kului ennen kuin madame de Vidoche tuli?"
kysyi presidentti, nähtävästi pitkittäen kuulustelua, jonka alkuosasta
syytetty ei tiennyt mitään.

"Puolisen tuntia", vastasi poika lujasti ja rohkeasti,

"Olet varma siitä, että hän pyysi nimenomaan myrkkyä?"

"Varma olen."

"Ja madame?"

"Lemmenjauhetta."

"Kuulit molemmat keskustelut?"

"Molemmat."

"Olet varma Vidochen ja tuon miehen tekemästä sopimuksesta,

josta olet meille kertonut? Että myrkky annettaisiin madamelle
lemmenjauheena? Että hänen piti nauttia se itse?"

"Niin."

"Ja sinä juoksit madame de Vidochen perässä ja sanoit hänelle,

että juoma olikin annettava hänen miehelleen?"

"Niin."

"Myönnätkö siis", pitkitti presidentti hitaasti, "että sinä oikeastaan

surmasitkin hra de Vidochen?"

Ensi kertaa poika häilyi ja hämmentyi; hän katseli ympärilleen

ikäänkuin etsien pelastuksen mahdollisuutta. Mutta sitä ei ollut, ja
laskemalla kätensä hänen käsivarrelleen näytti isä Bernard antavan
hänelle urheutta.
 "Myönnän", hän vastasi matalalla äänellä.

"Minkätähden?" kysyi presidentti luoden nopean katseen

virkaveljiinsä. Hän puhui keskellä vastustamatonta mielenkiinnon
sorinaa. Juttu oli kerrottu kertaalleen, mutta sitä kannatti kuulla
toistamiseen.

"Sentähden että — kuulin hänen suunnittelevan vaimonsa

kuolemaa — ja minä pidin sitä oikeana", sopersi poika kauhuisin
katsein. "Tahdoin pelastaa madamen. Minä en tiennyt. En ajatellut."

Presidentti katsoi kuninkaaseen päin, mutta äkkiä tuli

odottamattomalta taholta keskeytys. Madame nousi vapisten
jaloilleen ja seisoi pidellen kiinni edessään olevasta aidakkeesta.
Hänen silmänsä välkkyivät kyynelten läpi. Vieressä seisova nainen
tahtoi pidättää häntä, mutta hän ei antanut hallita itseään. "Mitä tämä
on?" hän huohotti. "Sanooko hän, että mieheni oli — siellä?"

"Kyllä, madame, niin hän kertoo", vastasi presidentti suopeasti.

"Ja että hän tuli ostamaan myrkkyä — minua varten?"

"Niin hän sanoo, madame."

Syytetty katsoi häneen tovin sekavasti, vaipui sitte takaisin ja alkoi

nyyhkyttää. Hän oli kokenut niin monia mielenliikutuksia; rakkaus ja
kuolema, häpeä ja pelko olivat niin vaihdellen pitäneet ilvettänsä
hänelle niinä päivinä, että hän ei kyennyt tuntemaan mitään
täydellisesti nyt, ei suloista eikä katkeraa. Niinkuin elämän ja toivon
kajastus oli jättänyt hänet pikemmin huumaantuneeksi kuin
kiitolliseksi, samaten tämä pisto, joka olisi vähää aikaisemmin
lävistänyt hänen sydämensä, vain nirhasi häntä nyt. Jälkeenpäin
saattoi tulla kiitollisuus ja tuska — ja parannus. Mutta täällä kaikkien
näiden ihmisten nähden, missä hänelle oli tapahtunut niin paljon,
hän kykeni vain nyyhkimään heikosti.

Presidentti kääntyi jälleen kuninkaaseen. Ludvig nyökkäsi, ja puhui

vaivaloisesti ponnistaen, sillä hän änkytti kamalasti. "Kuku—kuka on
tä—tämä poika?" hän sanoi. "Ky—kysykää häneltä."

Tuomari kumarsi ja kääntyi todistajaan. "Nimität itseäsi Jehan de

Baultiksi?" hän sanoi hieman tylysti. Nimi, ja etenkin sen
aatelislisäke, närkästytti häntä.

Poika myönsi.

"Kuka siis olet?"

Jehan avasi suunsa vastatakseen, mutta isä Bernard puuttui

puheeseen.
"Kerro hänen majesteetilleen", hän sanoi, "mitä kerroit minulle".

Hetkisen epäröittyään poika totteli, puhuen nopeasti, alla päin ja

tulistunein poskin. Kuitenkin kuului jokainen sana huoneen
hiljaisuudessa. "Minä olen Jehan de Bault", hän lasketti kimeällä
äänellä, "en tiedä minkä läänityksen omistaja ja seitsemäntoista
kartanon herra Perigordin kreivikunnassa —" ja niin edelleen koko
sen omituisen kaavan, jonka olemme jo parikin kertaa kuulleet.

Melkein jokainen kuulija kuunteli häntä epäuskoisen

kummastuneesti ja piti tarinaa temppuilijan laverruksena, vaikka se
laverrus oli uudenlaista, näppärästi keksittyä ja hyvin lausuttua. Pari
kolme rohkeampaa nauroi. Vähänpä oli siinä jutussa ollut
naurettavaa tähän asti. Kuningas liikahteli levottomasti istuimellaan,
sanoen: "Pyh! M—mi—mitä roskaa se—se on? Mi—mitä hän sa—
sanoo?"

Presidentti rypisti kulmiansa, ja omaksuen kantansa kuninkaan

sävystä alkoi hän nuhdella poikaa tuimasti, kun asiaan sekaantui
ääni, joka ei ollut vielä virkkanut sanaakaan, mutta vaiensi heti sekä
ylhäiset että alhaiset. "Se juttu kuulostaa todelta!" sanoi kardinaali
sävyisästi. "Mutta Perigordissa ei ole mitään Bault-sukua, vai
kuinka?"

"Hänen majesteettinsa luvalla sanoen, ei!" vastasi reipas, karhea

ääni, ja samassa se vanhanpuoleinen soturi, joka oli saapunut
kuninkaan kanssa, siirrähti askeleella herransa istuimen sivulle.
"Minä olen Perigordista kotoisin ja tiedän, teidän ylhäisyytenne", hän
jatkoi. "Vielä enemmänkin. Kaksi kuukautta takaperin näin tämän
pojan — tunnen hänet nyt — Fécampin markkinoilla. Hän oli silloin
toiseen tapaan puettu, mutta juttu hänellä oli sama, paitsi että hän ei
maininnut Perigordia."

"J—jo—joku on opettanut sen hänelle", arveli kuningas.

"Teidän majesteettinne on epäilemättä oikeassa", vastasi

presidentti nöyrästi. Sitte hän kääntyi poikaan: "Puhu, poika — kuka
opetti sen sinulle?"

Mutta Jehan vain pudisti päätänsä ja näytti olevan ymmällä.

Viimein hän ahdistettuna virkahti: "Baultin linnassa Perigordissa."

"Ei ole mitään semmoista paikkaat" huusi hra de Bresly lujasti.

Isä Bernard näytti huolestuneelta. Häntä alkoi kaduttaa, että oli

johtanut lapsen kertomaan tarinansa; hän alkoi peljätä, että siitä
saattoi koitua vahinkoa eikä apua. Kenties hän oli lopultakin ollut
liian herkkäuskoinen. Mutta taaskin puuttui kardinaali puheeseen.

"Onko Perigordissa mitään sukua, joka voi ylpeillä kolmesta

marskista, hra de Bresly?" hän tiedusti ohuella katkonaisella
äänellään.

"Ei minun tietääkseni. Monetkin voivat ylpeillä kahdesta."

"Rolandin verestä?"

Hra de Bresly kohautti olkapäitänsä. "Se on yhteistä meille

kaikille", hän sanoi hymyillen.

Suuri kardinaali hymyili myös — vilahdukselta. Sitte hän kumartui

eteenpäin ja tähtäsi poikaan läpitunkevat mustat silmänsä. "Mikä oli
isäsi nimi?" hän kysyi.

Jehan pudisti päätänsä, hervottomasti, surkeasti.

"Missä asuit?"

Sama tulos. Kuningas heittäysi taaksepäin ja mutisi: "Ei kelpaa."

Presidentti liikahteli istuimellaan. Lehtereillä alettiin supattaa.

Mutta kardinaali kohotti kätensä käskevästi. "Osaatko lukea?" hän

tiedusti.

"En", vastasi Jehan hiljaa.

"Entä sukusi vaakuna?" Kardinaali puhui nyt nopeasti, ja hänen

kasvonsa alkoivat käydä tuimiksi. "Se oli portin päällä, oven päällä,
tulisijan otsassa. Ajattele — muistele — mieti. Mikä se oli?"
 Tovin tuijotti Jehan häneen hämmentyneenä, luimistellen noiden
terävien silmien tähystyksestä. Sitte pojan kasvot äkkiä sävähtivät
tulipunaisiksi. Hän nosti -kätensä kiihkeästi. "Or, mount vert!" hän
huusi innoissaan — ja pysähtyi. Mutta seuraavana hetkenä hän
lisäsi hitaasti, muuttuneella äänellä: "Se oli puu mäellä."

Voitonriemuisesti vilkaisi kardinaali hra de Breslyyn. "No", hän

sanoi, "se kuuluu —"

Soturi nyökkäsi melkein jurosti. "Se on madame de Vidochen",

hän vastasi.

"Ja hänen nimensä oli —"

"Martinbault. Mademoiselle de Martinbault!"

Hämmästyksen sorina kohosi kaikkialta suojamasta. Tuokioksi

hupeni kuninkaan, kardinaalin, presidentin, hra de Breslyn, kaikkien
puhelu. Ilma tuntui olevan täynnä huudahduksia, kysymyksiä,
vastauksia; se kajahteli sanoista: "Bault — Martinbault!" Kaikkialla
nousivat ihmiset katsomaan poikaa tai kuroittausivat eteenpäin ja
luiskahtelivat rymyten. Seurasäännöt, säädyllisyys, kuninkaan
läsnäolo eivät merkinneet mitään tässä kiihtymyksen purkauksessa.
Kesti kauvan ennen kuin ovenvartijat saivat edes ääntänsä kuuluviin,
saati hiljaisuutta palautumaan.

Sitte hra de Bresly, joka näytti yhtä kiihtyneeltä ja punehtuneelta

kuin kukaan, havaittiin haastavaksi. "Pardleu, sire, niin saattaa olla!"
kuultiin hänen sanovan. "Se on kylläkin totta, niinkuin nyt muistan.
Siitä perheestä katosi lapsi noin kahdeksan vuotta takaperin. Mutta
se tapahtui Rochellen sota retken aikana; maakunnassa oli paljon
häiriöitä, ja hra ja madame de Martinbault olivat vastikään kuolleet,
joten tapaus syrjäytyi vähällä. Tämä saattaa kuitenkin olla se poika.
Ei, onpa tuhannen mahdollisuutta yhtä vastaan, että hän on sama!"

"M—mi—mikä hän s—si—siis on m—madame de V—Vidochelle?"

kysyi kuningas työläästi. Hän oli niin kiihtynyt kuin suinkin.

"Veli, sire", vastasi hra de Bresly.

Se sana puhkaisi viimein madamen aisteja kiehtovan tylsyyden ja

häivytti hänestä kaiken edellisen. Hän nousi hitaasti, kuunteli, katsoi
poikaa — katsoi yhä enemmän ihmetellen, kuin unesta havahtuva.
Kenties sillä hetkellä viime vuodet kaikkosivat hänen mielestään ja
hän näki itsensä jälleen lapsena — pitkänä, solakkana tyttönä
leikkimässä vanhan linnan puutarhassa pienen pojan kanssa, joka
juoksi taapertaen ja sammalsi, hosui häntä urheasti lihavilla paljailla
käsivarsillaan tai kapusi hänen helmaansa suudeltavaksi. Hän
nimittäin levitti äkkiä sylinsä ja huusi kaikuvalla äänellä: "Jean! Jean!
Se on pikku Jean!"

*****

Tuli tavaksi, jota kesti ainakin puolikymmentä vuotta, nimittää sitä

joulua Martinbault-jouluksi — niin äänekkäästi ne kaikki, jotka olivat
saapuvilla tuossa kuuluisassa tutkimuksessa ja siihen liittyneessä
keksinnössä, vakuuttivat sen vieneen voiton kaikista muista vuoden
huvituksista, ottaen lukuun Kardinaalipalatsin suuret tanssiaisetkin,
joista jokainen naisvieras sai mukaansa vuoden neularahoja
vastaavan uudenvuodenlahjan. Kertomus siitä oikeudenkäynnistä
herätti tavatonta hälyä. Mukana olleet kiusasivat vähemmän
onnellisia ystäviänsä ihan hulluiksi. Hovista levisi juttu markkinoille.
Siitä tehtiin arkkiviisu, jota kaupattiin kaduilla — Touchet-kujassa ja
Montfauconin mestausmäen juurella, missä Solomon Notredamen
ruumis hirsipuuhun vedettynä valkeni kevätsateissa. Jos madame de
Vidoche ja lapsi olisivat jääneet Parisiin, niin sen olisi täytynyt
loukata heidän korviansa kymmenesti päivässä.

Mutta he eivät viipyneet. Niin pian kuin madame jaksoi matkustaa,

hän vetäysi pojan kanssa vanhaan sukulinnaan neljän leaguen
päähän Perigueux'sta, ja siellä, hiljaisessa maakunnassa, missä
Martinbaultin nimi oli yhtä suuressa arvossa kuin kuninkaan, hän
yritti unohtaa avioelämänsä. Hän otti takaisin tyttönimensä, ja pojan
kasvatuksessa, hyväntekeväisyydessä, sadoissa taipumustensa
mukaisissa ylväissä ja kiitettävissä hommissa hän sai rauhaa ja
piankin onnellisuutta. Mutta yhtä seikkaa ei aika, ei olosuhteiden
muuttuminen eikä sittemmin rakkaus kyennyt häivyttämään hänen
mielestään, nimittäin voittamatonta kammoa sitä suurta kaupunkia
kohtaa, jossa hän oli kärsinyt niin paljon. Hän ei milloinkaan palannut
Parisiin.

Vuoden verran oikeudenkäynnin jälkeen kierteli viekassilmäinen

mies Perigueux'n tienoilla, apina olallaan. Hän näki jonkun matkan
päässä maantieltä — kuten hänen kova onnensa osutti — vanhan
linnan kohoavan puiden keskeltä. Paikka näytti lupaavalta, ja hän
meni pihalle esittämään temppujansa palvelijoille. Tovin kuluttua tuli
ulos häntä katsomaan maahovin isäntä, nuori poika.

Enempää ei ole tarvis mainita, paitsi että tuntia myöhemmin

puolialaston liejukasvien ryvettämä mies ryömi maantielle kolottavin
jäsenin ja laahusti matkoihinsa murhemielin — syytäen suun täydeltä
sadatuksia, ja että sitte Tarasiksi puhuteltu apina vuosikausia
kiusoitteli koiria ja riuhtoi muurinvihreätä ja kisaili mielinmäärin
Martinbaultin suurella eteläisellä pengermällä.
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