TRB 2022

नागर विमानन सुरक्षा ब्यूरो – भारत
BUREAU OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY – INDIA
AVIATION SECURITY BASIC COURSE

(AVSEC BASIC)
Trainee Reference Book-2022
This Restricted Document is
Published by
Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS)

Year of Issue: 2022
(Jaideep Prasad, IPS)

Director General,
BCAS, New Delhi.
MODULE -1
COURSE INTRODUCTION AND

ADMINISTRATION
Page 1 of 7
AVSEC BASIC COURSE – MODULE 1
2022
Slide 1
Slide 2
Slide 3
Slide 4
Page 2 of 7
2022
Slide 5
Slide 6
Slide 7
Slide 8
Page 3 of 7
2022
Slide 9
Slide 10
Slide 11
Slide 12
Page 4 of 7
2022
Slide 13
Slide 14
Slide 15
Slide 16
Page 5 of 7
2022
Slide 17
Slide 18
Slide 19
Slide 20
Page 6 of 7
2022
Slide 21
Page 7 of 7
2022
MODULE -2
Overview of
International/National Civil
Aviation Security
Page 1 of 111
2022
Slide 1
Slide 2
Slide 3
Page 2 of 111
2022
Slide 4
Slide 5
Slide 6
Slide 7
Page 3 of 111
2022
Slide 8
Slide 9
Slide 10
Page 4 of 111
2022
Slide 11
Slide 12
Slide 13
Page 5 of 111
2022
Slide 14
Slide 15
Slide 16
Page 6 of 111
2022
Slide 17
Slide 18
Slide 19
Page 7 of 111
2022
Slide 20
Slide 21
Slide 22
Page 8 of 111
2022
Slide 23
Slide 24
Slide 25
Page 9 of 111
2022
Slide 26
Slide 27
Slide 28
Page 10 of 111
2022
Slide 29
Slide 30
Slide 31
Page 11 of 111
2022
Slide 32
Slide 33
Slide 34
Page 12 of 111
2022
Slide 35
Slide36
Slide 37
Page 13 of 111
2022
Slide 38
Slide 39
Slide 40
Page 14 of 111
2022
Slide 41
Slide 42
Slide 43
Page 15 of 111
2022
Slide 44
Slide 45
Slide 46
Page 16 of 111
2022
Slide 47
Slide 48
Slide 49
Page 17 of 111
2022
Slide 50
Slide 51
Slide 52
Page 18 of 111
2022
Slide 53
Slide 54
Slide 55
Page 19 of 111
2022
Slide 56
Slide 57
Slide 58
Page 20 of 111
2022
Slide 59
Slide 60
Slide 61
Page 21 of 111
2022
Slide 62
Slide 63
Slide 64
Page 22 of 111
2022
Slide 65
Slide 66
Slide 67
Page 23 of 111
2022
Slide 68
Slide 69
Slide 70
Page 24 of 111
2022
Slide 71
Slide 72
Slide 73
Page 25 of 111
2022
Slide 74
Slide 75
Slide 76
Page 26 of 111
2022
Slide 77
Slide 78
Slide 79
Page 27 of 111
2022
Slide 80
Slide 81
Slide 82
Page 28 of 111
2022
Slide 83
Slide 84
Slide 85
Page 29 of 111
2022
Slide 86
Slide 87
Slide 88
Page 30 of 111
2022
Slide 89
Slide 90
Slide 91
Page 31 of 111
2022
Slide 92
Slide 93
Slide 94
Page 32 of 111
2022
Slide 95
Slide 96
Slide 97
Slide 98
Page 33 of 111
2022
Slide 99
Slide 100
Slide 101
Page 34 of 111
2022
Slide 102
Slide 103
Slide 104
Slide105
Page 35 of 111
2022
Slide 106
Slide 107
Slide 108
Page 36 of 111
2022
Slide 109
Slide 110
Slide 111
Page 37 of 111
2022
Slide 112
Slide 113
Slide 114
Page 38 of 111
2022
Slide 115
Slide 116
Slide 117
Page 39 of 111
2022
Slide 118
Slide 119
Slide 120
Page 40 of 111
2022
Slide 121
Slide 122
Slide 123
Page 41 of 111
2022
Slide124
Slide 125
Page 42 of 111
2022
Slide 126
Slide 127
Slide 128
Slide 129
Page 43 of 111
2022
Slide 130
Slide 131
Slide 132
Page 44 of 111
2022
Slide 133
Slide 134
Slide 135
Page 45 of 111
2022
Slide 136
Slide 137
Slide 138
Page 46 of 111
2022
Slide 139
Slide 140
Slide 141
Page 47 of 111
2022
Slide 142
Slide 143
Slide 144
Page 48 of 111
2022
Slide 145
Slide 146
Page 49 of 111
2022
Slide 147
Slide 148
Slide 149
Page 50 of 111
2022
Slide 150
Slide 151
Slide 152
Page 51 of 111
2022
Slide 153
Slide 154
Slide 155
Page 52 of 111
2022
Slide 156
Slide 157
Slide 158
Page 53 of 111
2022
Slide 159
Slide 160
Slide 161
Page 54 of 111
2022
Slide 162
Slide 163
Slide 164
Slide 165
Page 55 of 111
2022
Slide 166
Slide 167
Page 56 of 111
2022
Slide 168
Slide 169
Slide 170
Page 57 of 111
2022
Slide 171
Slide 172
Slide 173
Page 58 of 111
2022
Slide 174
Slide 175
Slide 176
Slide 177
Page 59 of 111
2022
Slide 178
Slide 179
Page 60 of 111
2022
Slide 180
Slide 181
Slide 182
Page 61 of 111
2022
Slide 183
Slide 184
Slide 185
Page 62 of 111
2022
Slide 186
Slide 187
Slide 188
Slide 189
Page 63 of 111
2022
Slide 190
Slide 191
Page 64 of 111
2022
Slide 192
Slide 193
Slide 194
Page 65 of 111
2022
Slide 195
Slide 196
Slide 197
Page 66 of 111
2022
Slide 198
Slide 199
Slide 200
Page 67 of 111
2022
Slide 201
Slide 202
Slide 203
Page 68 of 111
2022
Slide 204
Slide 205
Slide 206
Page 69 of 111
2022
Slide 207
Slide 208
Slide 209
Page 70 of 111
2022
Slide 210
End of Module 2
Page 71 of 111
2022
Module 02
Overview of International/National Civil Aviation Security
Aviation Security. Combination of measures, human and material resources intended to

safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference.
Primary objective of Aviation security
To assure the protection and safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel, the general public,
aircraft and facilities of an airport serving civil aviation, against acts of unlawful interference
perpetrated on the ground or in flight.
Basic Principles and Philosophy for Aviation Security

The primary objective of international civil aviation security is to assure the protection and
safeguarding of passengers, crew, ground personnel, the general public and facilities of an
airport serving international civil aviation against “acts of unlawful interference perpetrated on
the ground or in flight.”
The basic principles and philosophy for aviation security are as follows:
• Civil aviation shall operate from a safe and secure environment free from unlawful
interference;
• States shall develop and implement such legislation and procedures as are necessary to
ensure the safe and secure environment;
• The security measures put in place shall be consistent with Standards and Recommended
Practices as promulgated by ICAO, and adequate to meet the threat; and
• States shall either prosecute or extradite any person(s) who unlawfully interfere with civil
aviation of any other State.
Threats to Civil Aviation
Introduction
It is the responsibility of Civil Aviation Security set up in India and International Civil Aviation
Security regime to assure protection and safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel, general
public, aircraft and facilities of airports against act of unlawful interference perpetrated on the
ground or in flight. This is carried out by combination of measures and marshalling of various
human and material resources on international, national and airport level.
Page 72 of 111
2022
The aviation industry is still the most threatened one at present time and would remain so in
future. Airports and airlines are soft targets for terrorist attacks. Any sabotage / explosion at
airports or in aircraft shatter public confidence in the States machinery. Such acts have high
news-value and the terrorist group gains publicity with very low investment.
What is Threat?
It is defined as "the probability of an attack being attempted against a target within a specified
time frame”.
What is Vulnerability?
Vulnerability is those characteristics of a target which could be exploited in an attack.
What is Risk?
Risk is the probability that an attack will be attempted and will be successful
RISK = THREAT x VULNERABILITY
Nature of threats
The Traditional / conventional types of threat to civil aviation are as follows.
• Hijacking of aircraft
• Sabotage of aircraft
• Terrorist attack at airports (Terminal, Concourse, Check-in, Passenger and Baggage
search areas)
• Sabotage of airports
• Attacks against off-airport locations (crew accommodation, national carrier ticket
offices, cargo facilities, vital installations).
New and Emerging threats:
Few example of emerging threat are
• Suicide attack on ground facilities

• Misuse of aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction
• Misuse of nuclear and other radioactive substances.
Page 73 of 111
2022
• Threat from biological weapons

• Threat from chemical and dangerous substances
• Air to air attack by aircraft or by missile
• Ground to air attack by missiles.
• Cyber terrorism
• Attack through electronic systems to misguide the air traffic communications to the
aircraft.
• Attack by magnetic systems.
Terrorism
What is Terrorism?
Terrorism is an act of placing someone in extreme fear. It is the unlawful use of violence against
the Public to intimidate a Government.
Types of Offenders
• Mentally challenged persons
• Persons seeking revenge – disgruntled ex-employees
• Terrorists, individuals and groups
• Criminals, individuals and groups
Factors contributing to terrorism:
• Religious factors
• Economic conditions of a country
• Natural disasters
• Political factors
• Social recognition
The supports needed by the terrorist organizations:
▪ Financial support
▪ Motivated manpower
▪ Support of Public
▪ Arms & Ammunition
▪ Media
▪ Training
Page 74 of 111
2022
Who are the Terrorists?
• Terrorists are generally people who feel alienated from society and have a grievance
or regard themselves as victims of an injustice.
• Terrorists are devoted to their political or religious cause and do not regard their
violent actions as criminal.
• Terrorists are ruthless and show no fear, pity or remorse.
Characteristics of Terrorists
• Target specific individuals on an aircraft, such as Diplomats or VIPs

• Engender fear of flying in the general public and disrupt normal life; and
• Obtain the release of prisoners, perhaps from their own group
• They operate in small groups or complex networks
• They are usually well organized
• Have access to necessary resources such as money, technical expertise, weapons,
explosives and sometimes supported by governments or States; and
• Aims are political in nature
Characteristics of Criminals
Attacks on Civil Aviation by criminal groups or individuals are rare and their motivation is
• Monetary gain or
• Extortion
• Personal gains
• Difficult to classify
• Unpredictable
UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT (HIJACKING)
What are the techniques used for hijacking?

In order to execute a hijack of an aircraft, the perpetrator must be able to coerce the pilot-
in-command. Therefore, it is necessary to:
• Smuggle weapons onto the aircraft (examples of how this has been done ranges from
concealment in toys to false prosthetics)
• Possible collusion with or bribery of airport or airline staff
Page 75 of 111
2022
• Armed assault. This has been used on several occasions
The types of weapons used vary and may include pistols, automatic weapons, explosive
charges, knives, or flammable material.
SABOTAGE
Sabotage techniques
Most sabotage devices targeted against aircraft are either explosive or incendiary devices
and can even be a combination of the two.
The saboteur needs to have access to the aircraft to plant the device or place the device on
the aircraft using passenger baggage, air cargo, catering or other stores loaded onto the
aircraft prior to flight. The most common means of infiltrating sabotage devices in the past
have been:
• Infiltration of device into baggage;

• Collusion with airport or airline staff to place device on aircraft;
• Subterfuge, use of an unsuspecting dupe
Sabotage of airports
Certain critical areas of an airport are vital to the continued operation of an airport, namely:
• Runway;
• Passenger terminal buildings;
• Navigational aids;
• Electrical power supplies;
• Air Traffic Control communications;
• Aviation fuel storage;
• Rescue and fire-fighting services.
Any sabotage to the above facilities can seriously impair the functioning of the airport.
Page 76 of 111
2022
Suicide bomber
While most successful saboteurs move away from the event of the device activation the
suicidal saboteur is ready to kill himself for the cause.
Whether a religious, political, or nationalistic fanatic, these individuals or groups present
a formidable threat to today’s security measures.
These offenders may endeavor to achieve sabotage by:

• Carrying the device on their person; or
• Providing the means to have a device boarded through their checked baggage
Why is aviation an attractive target?
• Instant publicity
• Aircraft possesses inherent mobility
• Different nationalities involved
• Aircraft can be easily taken in control
• Aircraft itself can be used as a missile
• Small amount of explosive is sufficient to cause huge damage
• Adverse impact on tourism thereby furthering the terrorist cause
• Excellent means of extortion
• Economic damage to the country
• Economic damage to the airline
• Carriers are seen as flag bearers
• Large number of people in a confined area
Where can the threats come from?

• Terrorist disguised as a passenger with the intent to hijack the plane
• A terrorist may infiltrate a piece of luggage containing an explosive device directly
onto the conveyor belt
• Using naïve passenger to infiltrate a bomb into their luggage
• Explosive device concealed at the check in area set to explode during the operations
• Direct attack
• Explosive device placed at the boarding gate area
• Passenger used after check-in
• Interline passengers and baggage
• Cargo/Courier infiltration
• Catering infiltration
• Airport employees
Page 77 of 111
2022
• Terrorist disguised as an airport worker

• Explosive device or weapon left on board to be used on the second leg of the flight
Where can the Threats come from?
Historical Reviews of Past Incidents
1 First hijacking in the world The first recorded aircraft hijack took place on February
21, 1931 in Lima, (Peru).
2 1969 Year of maximum Hijackings

First hijacking in India 30th Jan, 1971, Indian Airlines flight from Srinagar to
Jammu taken to Lahore.
3 Outcome Rule 8 A of Aircraft Rule 1937 was being implemented.

{superseded by Rule 21 of Aircraft(Security) Rules 2011}
Second hijacking in India Indian Airlines Aircraft hijacked on 10th Sep, 1976,
Mumbai to Delhi taken to Lahore.
4 Outcome Shri B.D. Pandey committee was formed in 1976
Page 78 of 111
2022
18th Jan, 1978 Formation of DCAS as a cell under DGCA on the

recommendation of Shri B.D. Pandey Committee
2nd August, 1984 A Bomb Explosion at Chennai (Meenabakkam) airport.
5
Outcome Bomb Threat Contingency Plan was Implemented.
23rd Jun, 1985

• Sabotage of Air India aircraft Kanishka Tragedy
over Atlantic Ocean.
• Explosion at Narita airport (Japan) during transfer of
baggage to Air India aircraft.
6 Post Kanishka Tragedy Justice B.N Kirpal, Commission was setup. On 1st April
1987 BCAS was formed as a Regulatory Authority on
Civil Aviation Security under MCA.
Following security measures were introduced
• Identification of baggage-Mandatory
• Reconciliation of baggage was introduced
• Re-identification of registered baggage on interline
station by passenger.
• Checking of baggage manually even after X-ray screening
• Inspection of security arrangements of national air-
carriers at foreign stations by BCAS officers
7 3rd May 1986 Sabotage of Air Lanka aircraft at Colombo airport.

Explosives send through tea consignment in cargo. LTTE
rebels bombed Air Lanka plane at Colombo airport,
killing 16 people
2nd April 1986 Bombing of TWA 840. 04 passengers died while 117
survived. The bomb contained one pound of plastic
explosive. It is suspected it had been placed under the
8 seat cushion on a previous journey by a Lebanese
woman
Outcome Aircraft security check & security search were
improved.
17th April 1986 Attempted sabotage of El Al Israeli Airlines flight 016
from London Heathrow to Tel Aviv. Anne Murphy who
was used by her fiancé Nazer Hindawi of Abu Nidal
Group. She was caught only on the basis of profiling.
Page 79 of 111
2022
9 Outcome Emphasis on Profiling.
29th Nov 1987 Korean Air Bombing resulted in death of 115 persons
on board aircraft. A bomb was planted inside an
overhead storage bin in the airplane’s passenger cabin
10 by North Korean agents.
Outcome Transit Security checks were given high importance.
21st Dec 1988 Pan Am 103 incident resulted in death of 259 persons
on board aircraft, as well as 11 persons on the ground
at Lockerbie (Scotland).
11
Outcome Marking of Plastic Explosive for the purpose of
detection. Golden principle adopted. No passenger no
baggage and all bomb threat calls to be taken
seriously. Procedure for carriage of mishandled
baggage was introduced.
12 24th Dec 1994 Air France aircraft seized at Algerian airport by four
persons dressed as airline staff - three hostages killed.
Aircraft flown to Marseilles (France) where four
hijackers killed.
13 Nov 1996 ET 961 Ethiopian Airlines was hijacked by asylum
seekers. Crashed in Comoros Island due to insufficient
fuel.
24th Dec 1999 Hijack of Indian Airlines (IC-814) operating from
Kathmandu (Nepal) to Delhi (India). Finally taken to
Kandahar (Afghanistan)
14
Outcome • Introduction of CISF as ASG in Feb 2000
• Secondary Ladder point checks (SLPC) introduced in
January 2000
• Introduction of Sky Marshals
• Modernization / up gradation of electronic detection
devices
• Preventing an Hijacked aircraft to take off from Indian
24 July 2001 Colombo
soil, once itAirport
lands (Bandaranaike Airport) attack by LTTE.
• Review of contingency plans
Page 80 of 111
2022
Outcome • Raising of Perimeter wall to the prescribed height

15 • Access control system strengthened
• Security of parked aircraft at night
• Deployment of QRT
11th September 2001 Attack by Al Qaida using 04 Aircrafts as a weapon of
Mass destruction in USA.
16
Outcome • Strengthening of cockpit doors

• Locking of cockpit doors
• Implementation of strict pre-embarkation security
checks
• Deployment of sky marshals
• Ban on steel / metallic cutlery with sharp edges.
22nd December 2001 • Richard Reid (Shoe Bomber), a member of Al Qaeda,
boarded American Airlines from Paris to Miami.
Passenger was on Aerial suicide mission.
17
Outcome • Shoe Scanning through XBIS was introduced.
• Carriage of Lighters & Matchbox in the aircraft is
prohibited.
18 28th November 2002 Arkia Airlines (Israel) shot at by shoulder launched
surface-to-air missiles on departure from Mombasa,
Kenya.
August 2006 Heathrow Airport Attack: Attempt to blow up 11
aircraft with the liquid explosive ( TATP)
19
Outcome Restrictions on carriage of more than 100ml of liquid in
cabin baggage
30th June 2007 Glasgow Airport Attack. A dark green Jeep
Cherokee loaded with propane canisters was driven
cabin baggage
into the glass doors of the Glasgow International
20 Airport terminal and set ablaze.
A second bomb was later found in the car parking.
Outcome Focus on Landside security.
Page 81 of 111
2022
25th December 2009 Northwest Airlines Flight 253 was attacked by a man
21 using a small explosive device hidden in his underwear,
causing only a small fire inside the plane, which is
extinguished by a flight attendant; the man was
subdued by passengers and crew; there were 3 injuries.
Outcome Introduction of Body Scanners
24th January 2011 Moscow Domodedovo International Airport bombing. A
Airport Attack passenger exploded himself in the Moscow airport,
22 International arrival hall, baggage claim area.
Outcome Random screening at the entry gate of the terminal
building. Strengthening
of security towards city side. Landside security was
recommendation.
08th June 2014 Jinnah International Airport (Karachi) was attacked by
10 militants armed with automatic weapons, a rocket
launcher, suicide vests and grenades carried out the
attack. 36 people were killed, including all 10 attackers,
and at least 18 were wounded.
23 Outcome Recommended Practices on landside security, security

awareness training. Proper implementation of security
measures aimed at preventing or minimizing the effect
of ramming vehicle attacks should be incorporated,
such as: physical barriers, for example bollards, crash-
rated planters, speed breakers and chicane to be
placed in curbside and other appropriate areas.
17th July 2014 A Malaysian Airline flight MH 17 flying over Ukraine

and Russia border was bought down by a Buck missile
fired by the militant. Aircraft crashed near Gabrovo in
24 the Donetsk region. Total Passenger 280, crew 15,
Total 295 Pax.
Outcome Annex 17 included provision on attacks against
MANPADs
25 22nd March 2016 Three coordinated nail bombings occurred
in Belgium two at Brussels Airport in Zaventem. Two
suicide bombers, carrying explosives in large suitcases,
attacked a departure hall.
Page 82 of 111
2022
12th June 2016 A man has set off a homemade explosive device at
Shanghai international airport, injuring four people as
well as himself at Pudong International Airport,
Shanghai. The man then took out a knife and stabbed
26 his own neck.
28th June 2016 The Atatürk Airport terrorist attack, consisting of
shootings and suicide bombings. Gunmen armed with
automatic weapons and explosive belts staged a
Outcome simultaneous
Landside attack
security at theainternational
became standard. terminal.
Aviation Security Countermeasures
National regulations on Aviation Security shall comply with the specifications made in the
international conventions and in ICAO's Annex 17.
For example, training programme, quality control programs, airport and airline security
programs can contribute to optimal aviation security on a national level.
The civil aviation industry has developed various countermeasures to counter the
threats.
These countermeasures can be categorized as:

• Legislative
• Technical
• Physical
Legislative Measures
International Conventions (Legal Instruments)

International Conventions are International legal Instruments by which Contracting States
affirm their intention to enforce the terms and provisions contained in these Conventions.
The Chicago Convention of 1944 on International Civil Aviation was instrumental in the
Page 83 of 111
2022
formation of International Civil Aviation Organization on 4th April 1947. The organization
serves as a forum for cooperation in all fields of Civil Aviation among its 192 member states.
th
India became signatory to the Chicago Convention on 04 April 1947.
The ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations and is responsible to promote safe
and orderly development of International Civil Aviation throughout the world. It sets standards
and regulations necessary for Aviation safety, security, efficiency and regularity, as well as
for Aviation environmental protection.
ICAO has legislative powers by means of the SARPs provided by Annex 17. It also organizes
obligatory security audits at States worldwide. The ICAO Security Manual contains guidelines
on how to implement the SARPs as provided by Annex 17.
International Conventions
Chicago Convention1944
The Chicago Convention, officially called the Convention on

International Civil Aviation, was signed on 7 December 1944. In 1947
it led to the establishment of International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO).
The governments that signed this convention agreed on certain
principles and arrangements to allow a safe and orderly
development of International Civil Aviation. Furthermore, this
convention defines that international air transport services
should be established on the basis of equal opportunities.
This convention has 19 Annexes in total. The most important one concerning security issues
is Annex 17, containing a description of Standards and Recommended Practices that apply to
aviation security. Annex 17- Security, Safeguarding civil aviation against the act of unlawful
intervention.
Page 84 of 111
2022
Tokyo Convention 1963
The Tokyo Convention was established in 1963. The official name of the convention is the
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft. The Tokyo
convention only applies to offences that are committed on board an aircraft in flight.
This convention focuses on offences that jeopardize:
• The safety of the aircraft.

• The safety of the persons on board the aircraft.
• The good order on board the aircraft.
• The penal code of the State of registry of the aircraft.
This convention grants certain rights to the Pilot in Command (PIC), in order to ensure the
safety and order on board of his aircraft:
• Lawful commander of the aircraft
• Restrain passengers when they cause problems using reasonable measures.
• Allow the crew to ask assistance from other passengers to overpower unruly passengers.
• Disembark unruly passengers at the next port of call.
This convention also contains some obligations. The State of landing should:
• Restore the control of the aircraft to the pilot in charge.
• Allow the pilot in charge to disembark unruly passengers, disregarding the State's visa
or immigration requirements.
• Take delivery of unruly passengers.
• Take unruly passengers into police custody until the prosecution or extradition is
accomplished.
The Hague Convention 1970
The official name of the Hague Convention, established in 1970, is the

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. This
convention made the unlawful seizure of an aircraft (hijacking) an
international offence.
Page 85 of 111
2022
Contents of the Hague Convention
This convention obliges the States to:

• Make the unlawful seizure of an aircraft punishable by severe penalties.
• Extradite or prosecute offenders without exception. Both the State of landing and the
State of registry of the aircraft can exercise jurisdiction over these offenders.
• Restore the control of the aircraft to the pilot in charge, not allowing the aircraft to take
off to another destination while the offenders are still in control of the aircraft.
• Report every occurrence to ICAO.
The Montreal Convention 1971
The official name of the Montreal Convention, established in 1971, is the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. The primary focus of this
convention was the sabotage of an aircraft.
This convention, established the term aircraft in service, A parked aircraft which is under
surveillance sufficient to detect unauthorized access.
Contents of the Montreal Convention
This convention defines the following offences:

• Violence against a person on the aircraft.
• Destroying or damaging the aircraft, thus endangering the safety of aircraft in flight.
• Placing on board a device likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight.
• Destroying or damaging air navigation facilities, likely to endanger the safety of aircraft
in service.
• Communicating false information, such as a bomb threat, likely to endanger the safety
of aircraft in flight.
Page 86 of 111
2022
• Make attempts and accomplices to offences also punishable by severe penalties.

• Extradite or prosecute offenders without exception. Both the State of landing as the
State of registry of the aircraft can exercise jurisdiction over these offenders.
• Take all practical measures, like pre-board screening of passengers, in order to prevent
offences.
• Restore the control of the aircraft to the pilot in charge, not allowing the aircraft to take
off to another destination while the offenders are still in control of the aircraft.
• Report every occurrence to ICAO.
Protocol to the Montreal Convention 1988
The official name of this protocol, added to the Montreal

Convention in 1988, is the Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation.
With this protocol, the definition of offences is broadened to all unlawful acts against a
person or an airport serving international civil aviation, causing or likely to cause:
• Injury or death at an airport
• The destruction or serious damage to the facilities of the airport
• The destruction or serious damage to an aircraft not in service located in that airport
• The disruption of the airport's services
This protocol was created following a series of attacks on international airports that
occurred after the creation of the Montreal Convention in 1971.
Page 87 of 111
2022
The Marking of Plastic Explosives Convention 1991 (MEX CONVENTION)
The official name of the Marking of Plastic Explosives

Convention, established in Montreal in 1991, is the
Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purposes of Detection
Convention. This convention focuses on the detection of
explosives.
By 1990, a series of explosions on board an aircraft had a taken place, resulting in the loss of
uncountable liv es and the destruction of multiple aircrafts. These explosions were most
probably caused by bombs placed in checked baggage of passengers who finally did not board
the aircraft.
Contents of the Marking of Plastic Explosives Convention
This convention allows the use of existing vapour detection technology to detect
plastic explosives. Marking agents should be added to plastic explosives by the manufacturer.
• Prevent the production of unmarked explosives
• Prevent the movement of unmarked explosives through their territory
Beijing Protocol 2010

In 2010 in Beijing, the Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft was adopted. The Protocol makes amendments and additions to
the original convention.
The Beijing Protocol supplements the Hague Convention, 1970. The Protocol expands the
scope of The Hague Convention to cover different forms of aircraft hijackings, including
through modern technological means.
National Legislations
Enactment of Acts in India to implement International Legal Instruments:-
India is a signatory to all the above conventions. The terms and provisions of international
Page 88 of 111
2022
conventions are given legal backup in India by virtue of following Acts:-
• The Aircraft Act 1934, Section 4 as amended from time-to-time

• The Tokyo Convention Act – 1975
• The Anti-Hijacking Act 1982 and its amendment in 1994 was repealed as new The
Anti-Hijacking Act 2016
• Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Civil Aviation Act, 1982 Amended in
1994
Other National laws related to implementation and enforcement of National

Civil Aviation Security Programme and other related matters are as under:-
• The Aircraft Act, 1934
• The Aircraft Rules, 1937
• The Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003
• The Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011
• The Airport Authority of India Act. 1994
• The Explosive Act
• The Other Minor Acts connected with crimes against civil aviation and related matters.
• Orders and regulations
o Gazette Notifications, AVSEC Orders, AVSEC Circulars and Directions issued
by appropriate authority to implement ‘National Civil Aviation Security
Programme’.
o Airports Authority of India Regulations, 2000
The Aircraft Act, 1934 and it’s Amendment Act 2020

It extends to the whole of India and applies also-
(a) To citizens of India wherever they may be;
(b) To, and to the persons on, aircraft registered in India wherever they may be;
(c) To, and to the persons on, aircraft registered outside India but for the time being in or
over India; and
(d) to an aircraft operated by a person who is not a citizen of India but has his principal
place of business or permanent residence in India.
Page 89 of 111
2022
Aircraft Acts (1934) and it’s Amendment Act 2020
The Central Government may constitute a body to be known as the Directorate

Section 4A
General of Civil Aviation
The Central Government may constitute a body to be known as the Bureau of

Section 4B
Civil Aviation Security
The Central Government may constitute a body to be known as the Aircraft

Section 4C
Accidents Investigation Bureau
Power of Central Government to make rules for Civil Aviation amendment

Section 5
added in “The Aircraft (Amendment) Act, 2020
Power to issue directions (DGCA or any other officer empowered by Central

Section 5A
Govt)
Penalty for failure to comply with directions issued under section 5 (2years
Section 10
imprisonment or fine up to Rs. 01 crore or both)
Penalty for failure to comply with directions issued under section 5A (2years
Section 11A
imprisonment or fine up to Rs. 01 crore or both)
The Aircraft Rules, 1937

The Aircraft Rules 1937, extends to the whole of India and apply also (unless the contrary
intention appears) -
(a) To, and to persons on, aircraft registered in India wherever they may be, expect cases
falling under sub-rule(4);
(b) To, and to persons on, all aircraft for the time being in or over India
Page 90 of 111
2022
Rule 8 Prohibition on carriage of arms, ammunition, explosives, military stores etc.
Prohibition on carriage of intoxicated person entering the aircraft (Operating

Rule 24
Crew)
Rule 24A Carriage of persons suffering from mental disorders or epilepsy in aircraft
Rule 24B Carriage of prisoners in aircraft
Rule 24C Carriage of animals, birds and reptiles in aircraft
Rule 25 Smoking in aircraft
Rule 27 Carriage of persons in unauthorized part of aircraft

Rule 90 Entry into Public Aerodromes
Inspection - (Empowers some of government officials authorized by Central

Rule 156 Government to enter aircraft for inspection, but are not exempted from
frisking/ searching)
Rule 159 Obstruction of Authorized Person
Rule 162 Penalties
Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011
Rule 17 Disembarkation of unruly passenger
Rule 21 Security Checks before embarkation
Rule 23 Prohibition on carriage of certain goods
Rule 26 Deployment of staff –For security Duties
Rule 27 Security Search of Aircraft
Rule 28 Access Control of Aircraft
Rule 29 Closing of Cockpit door
Rule 30 Deployment of In-flight Security Officer
Rule 31 Security control of Hold baggage.
Page 91 of 111
2022
Rule 37 Security control for cargo and courier bags
Rule 40 Prohibition of certain goods (Cargo and Courier)
Technical Measures
Annex 17 Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention was adopted in 1974 by the

Council of ICAO. Its purpose is to safeguard International Civil Aviation
against acts of unlawful interference.
Annex 17 contains Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) that
apply to aviation security
STANDARD PRACTICE: -Specification necessary for the safety and regularity
of international air navigation. ICAO contracting states will conform in
accordance with the Chicago Convention. When they fail to do so, they are
required to inform ICAO about this. In Annex 17, standards always contain the
word shall.
Examples of standard practice:
• Pre-embarkation security checks of passengers, crew, ground
personnel
• Screening of hold baggage’s
• Background checks of personnel
• Each contracting state must have a written NCASP
RECOMMENDED PRACTICE: Specification desirable for the interest of safety
and regulatory of international air navigation. ICAO contracting states will
endeavour to conform in accordance with the Chicago Convention. When a
state does not comply with a Recommended Practice, they are invited to
inform ICAO about this. In annex 17, recommended practices always contain
the word should.
Examples of recommended practice:
• SLPC
• Deployment of IFSO (Sky Marshals)
• Use of Body scanners
Contracting states must notify ICAO about every difference to a standard.

The Standards and Recommended Practices are adopted and incorporated as
Page 92 of 111
2022
Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. There are 19

Annexure to the Chicago Convention.
Annex 17 deals with safe guarding civil Aviation against the act of unlawful
interference. The first edition of Annex 17 was being issued on 22nd March
1974. ICAO conducts Security Audit of each contacting state in order to review
the compliance of Annex-17.
Annex 17: Aviation Security.

Annex 18: The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air.
Annex 19: Safety Management System.
ICAO Security Manual
The ICAO Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts of
Unlawful Interference, (Doc 8973) Restricted, is the principal guidance
document developed by ICAO to assist States in the implementation of the
technical specifications contained in Annex 17.
National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP)

Each Contracting State shall establish and implement a written national civil
aviation security programme to safeguard civil aviation operations against acts
of unlawful interference, through regulations practices and procedures which
take into account the safety, regularity and efficiency of flights.
Page 93 of 111
2022
National Civil Aviation Security Training programme (NCASTP)
Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to ensure

the development and implementation of a National Training Programme for personnel of all
entities involved with or responsible for the implementation of various aspects of the
National Civil Aviation Security Programme. This training programme shall be designed to
ensure the effectiveness of the national civil aviation security programme.
National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control programme (NCASQCP)
Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to develop,

implement and maintain a national civil aviation security quality control programme to
determine compliance with and validate the effectiveness of its national civil aviation security
programme.
Aerodrome Security Programme
Each Contracting State shall require each airport serving civil aviation to establish, implement
and maintain a written airport security programme appropriate to meet the requirements
of the national civil aviation security programme
Aircraft Operators Security Programme
Each Contracting State shall ensure that commercial air transport operators providing service
from that State have established, implemented and maintained a written operator security
programme that meets the requirements of the national civil aviation security programme of
that State.
Page 94 of 111
2022
Physical Countermeasures
• Anti-hijacking measures
• Anti-sabotage measures
• Anti-Terrorist measures
• Security of personnel
Anti-Hijacking measures
• 100% screening of passengers and their hand baggage.
• Secondary ladder point Check.
• Security of catering
• Locking/Strengthening of cockpit.
• Deployment of IFSO on flights.
• Revised Anti-Hijacking Contingency Plan.
• Conduct periodical mock up exercise.
• Introduction of CISF as ASG.
Anti-sabotage measures
• Screening of registered baggage.
• Identification/reconciliation of registered baggage.
• Supervision of registered baggage from check-in counter till loading into the aircraft by
airline staff.
• Anti-sabotage check at originating station and guarding of aircraft until take off.
• Security of catering.
• Screen/escorting of other items such as cargo, postal mail up to aircraft.
• Guarding of Aircraft
• Perimeter of standard height.
• Access control to Airport
• Anti-sabotage check at originating station and guarding of aircraft until take off.
Anti-Terrorist measures
• Guarding of aircraft and airport facilities.
• Apron/airport access control.
• Deployment of Quick reaction team (QRT).
• Perimeter wall of standard height.
• Perimeter lighting.
Page 95 of 111
2022
• Perimeter road for Patrolling.

• Watch towers/ Patrolling-Foot or mobile.
• Police station in close proximity of airport.
• Efficient communication system.
Security of personnel
• Airport Entry Permit (AEP) issued after security vetting / Character & Antecedent
verification.
• Co-operate with APSU/ASG while frisking of all AEP holders before entry to airside.
• Display your AEP at airport to detect misuse.
• Never leave your baggage unattended at Airport.
• Never lend your uniform to anyone.
• Never accept a packed gift from anyone.
• If you accept than open, check & confirm it.
• Never discuss the confidential matters relating to AVSEC Rules with unauthorized
personnel.
• On the job supervision/surveillance
Key Responsibilities of States and Appropriate Authority
Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA)
Directorate General of Civil Aviation is an attached office of the

Ministry of Civil Aviation.
The Directorate General of Civil Aviation is the regulatory body in
the field of Civil Aviation primarily dealing with safety issues. It is responsible for regulation of
air transport services to/from/within India and for enforcement of civil air regulations, air
safety and airworthiness standards. It also co-ordinates all regulatory functions with
International Civil Aviation Organization.
The headquarters are located in New Delhi with regional offices in the various parts of India.
Page 96 of 111
2022
Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS)
To meet the primary objective of the country the Government of India

has established a dedicated organization namely the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS)
and is in existence since 01st April 1987. BCAS is the regulatory authority for civil aviation
security in India. It is headed by Director General, Bureau of Civil Aviation (DG, BCAS) under the
Ministry of Civil Aviation for implementation of Annexure 17 to Chicago convention of
International civil aviation organization (ICAO). DG, BCAS is responsible for the development,
implementation, and maintenance of the National Civil Aviation Security Programme to
safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference.
The Aircraft Security Rules 2011 provide legal structure and clearly defines the responsibilities
and methods of implementation.
CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SET UP IN INDIA

History
The BCAS initially set up as Directorate of Civil Aviation Security (DCAS) on 18 Jan, 1978, as a
cell under the DGCA on the recommendation of the B D Pandey Committee, in the wake of the
hijacking of Indian airlines on the 10th Sept 1976.
The BCAS was organized into an independent organization on 01st April 1987 under the
Ministry of Civil Aviation on the recommendation of Justice Kirpal Commission formed to
investigate Kanishka tragedy.
BCAS is the regulatory authority for civil aviation security in India. It is headed by an officer of
the rank of Director General of Police and is designated as Director General, Bureau of Civil
Aviation (DG, BCAS)
DG, BCAS is the appropriate authority for implementation of Annexure-17 to Chicago
convention of International Civil Aviation Organization.
Page 97 of 111
2022
Organization chart of BCAS
Appropriate Authority-DG, BCAS
• Director General, Bureau of Security Civil Aviation (DG, BCAS) is the appropriate
authority
• DG, BCAS is responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of
NCASP.
• DG, BCAS under powers conferred to him by Government of India through MCA
notification number 1797 dt. 03rd July 1997 under section 5A of aircraft act 1934 and
Aircarft (amendment) act 2020, has the authority to issue the AVSEC Orders and
Circulars.
Key Responsibilities of DG,BCAS
• Establish, Develop, implement, maintain, and review the NCASP, NCASTP, NCASQCP in
India in accordance with Annexure 17.
• Issue necessary directions on AVSEC.
• Respond immediately to meet any increased security threat.
• Allocate the responsibilities and ensure coordination amongst various agencies
responsible for implementation of the various aspects of the NCASP.
• Designate an authority at each aerodrome serving Civil Aviation who shall be responsible
for coordinating and implementation of security controls.
• Establish Aerodrome Security Committee (ASC) at each aerodrome serving civil aviation
for coordinating the implementation of security controls and procedures as specified in
the airport / aerodrome security programme.
• Arrange for security audit, test, survey, and inspection to be conducted on a regular basis.
Page 98 of 111
2022
Key Responsibilities of BCAS
• Monitoring
• Training
• Planning
• Coordination
• Conducting surprise / dummy checks
• Advisory Role
• Technical Evaluation
Aviation Security Group (ASG)
CISF/ APSU has been entrusted with security of airports in India. They are termed as ASG.
In February 2000 CISF was deployed at Jaipur.
ASG is responsible for Anti Hijacking, Anti Sabotage and Anti-Terrorist measures
Unit’s or Components of ASG/APSU
• Intelligence and surveillance unit

• Anti-hijacking unit
• Support unit
• Protection unit
Roles:-
• Surveillance and Patrolling of Airport Terminal Areas

• Surveillance of arrival / departing passengers
• Pre-embarkation Security Checks of Passengers
• Access Control of airport.
• Security of Sterile Hold Area
• Prevent contamination of security cleared passengers
• Training.
• Handling of Contingencies.
Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad (BDDS)

The ASG’s BDDS unit is responsible for the following functions
• Detection and disposal of Explosive Devices.

Page 99 of 111
2022
• Attending bomb threat calls of aircraft and terminal buildings

• Handling of unclaimed and suspected baggage.
• Disposal / Demolition of confirm threat / IED.
• Store Explosive used in demolition of IEDs.
• Participate in the BTAC.
Role of Airport Operators:
The authority who provides infrastructure and facilities at airport is called airport operator. It
is their responsibility to provide a secure operating environment to airports as per norms
approved/prescribed by the appropriate authority.
The main roles of airport operators are:
• Issuance of vehicle permits & ADP for access of vehicles in operational areas
• Preparation of various Contingency Plans for the airport which is required to be
approved by Appropriate Authority.
• Provision & maintenance of Perimeter / fencing, Perimeter road, perimeter lighting,
apron, gates / entry points, security hold area, frisking points/booth, Provision of
Security Stamps, hand baggage checking counter, isolated parking bay, Cooling pit etc.
• Provision & maintenance of electronic equipment’s / devices like X-ray BIS, DFMD,
HHMD for passenger screening
• Sign boards for educating the passengers / airport employees
• Co-ordination in the event of any contingency at the airport.
• Inline Screening.(Wherever Applicable)
• All operational and administrative expenses of ASG/APSU
• Issuance of Temporary airport entry passes
Role of Airline Operators:

Airline / Aircraft Operator is responsible for anti-sabotage functions including security
screening of registered baggage passenger baggage reconciliation, checking catering, cargo
etc. They carry out these function based on their security programme.
The main role of airline / aircraft operator is:
• Security of Aircraft
• Aircraft Search (Pre-flight anti-sabotage Checks)
• Security of parked / idle aircraft.
• Screening of Registered Baggage
Page 100 of 111
2022
• For security and surveillance in BMA and for accompanying the screened baggage up to
aircraft.
• Security in Baggage break-up area.
• Screening and escorting of screened cargo / unaccompanied baggage
• Secondary security checks.
• Surveillance in departure hall
• Security of catering items.
Scope of career in the field of Aviation Security:-

• Screening.
• Cyber Security.
• Profiling.
• Drone security.
• Aviation security training.
• Aviation security audits.
Foundation for a Person

• Career progression be linked with successful completion of the training programmes.
• Depending on and according to local organizational structure and career development
programmes.
Need for Security Awareness

• Security is everyone’s business
• Protect assets (people and property)
• Staying alert and vigilant to unusual or suspicious activities
• Comply with all security requirements.
Airline Assets
• Customers
• Staff
• Aircraft
• Other property and facilities
Everyday Question?
“What can be done to ensure that the aircraft, passengers and crew arrive safely at the final
destination?”
Page 101 of 111

2022
Everyday Answer!
• Be alert
• Be vigilant
• Comply with security procedures
• Do not be afraid to challenge and positively identify any person (whether in uniform
or not) who is:
• Within a restricted area
• On board an aircraft
• Near an aircraft
Safeguard at all Times
• Items of uniform
• ID cards/permits
• Accountable documents
• Tickets / boarding cards
Safeguard station documentation
• Security manuals / directives,

• Briefing information sheets,
• Operational checklists and
• Crew Manifests
• Crew Baggage Labels
These items have been used to gain unlawful access and to provide information which has
resulted in cases of unlawful interference.
Security responsibilities
• Police and security staff
• Baggage handlers
• Inspection agencies staff
• Aircraft maintenance staff
• Tenants and concessionaries
• Aircraft equipment maintenance staff
• Cargo handlers
• Ramp services
• Fueling services
• Passenger agents
• Emergency services
• Passengers and Airport visitors
• Other airport staff
****END****
Page 102 of 111

2022
Page 103 of 111

2022
Page 104 of 111

2022
Page 105 of 111

2022
Page 106 of 111

2022
Page 107 of 111

2022
Page 108 of 111

2022
Page 109 of 111

2022
Page 110 of 111

2022
Page 111 of 111

2022
नागर विमानन सुरक्षा ब्यूरो - भारत
MODULE -3
Working at Airport
Page 1 of 24
2022
Slide 1
Slide 2
Slide 3
Slide 4
Page 2 of 24
2022
Slide 5
Slide 6
Slide 7
Slide 8
Page 3 of 24
2022
Slide 9
Slide 10
Slide 11
Slide 12
Page 4 of 24
2022
Slide 13
Slide 14
Slide 15
Slide 16
Page 5 of 24
2022
Slide 17
Slide 18
Slide 19
Slide 20
Page 6 of 24
2022
Slide 21
Slide 22
Slide 23
Slide 24
Page 7 of 24
2022
Slide 25
Slide 26
END OF MODULE 3
Page 8 of 24
2022
A Typical layout of an airport

Arrival / Departure Areas Passenger check-in and departure area
Passenger/baggage screening areas
Baggage make-up area Arrival Hall / Baggage Claim Area
Page 9 of 24
2022
Airport Administration Building Operations Building
ATC Complex Fuel farms
Air Traffic Control Tower (ATC) Fuel storage area
Cargo Complex Cargo Hold
Page 10 of 24
2022
Maintenance area Air Navigation Aids
Catering Establishment
Catering Establishment
Page 11 of 24
2022
Page 12 of 24
2022
Page 13 of 24
2022
Page 14 of 24
2022
Page 15 of 24
2022
Page 16 of 24
2022
Page 17 of 24
2022
Page 18 of 24
2022
Page 19 of 24
2022
Page 20 of 24
2022
Page 21 of 24
2022
Page 22 of 24
2022
Page 23 of 24
2022
Page 24 of 24
2022
MODULE -4
ACCESS CONTROL -
PEOPLE and VEHICLES
Page 1 of 45
2022
Slide 1
Slide 2
Slide 3
Page 2 of 45
2022
Slide 4
Slide 5
Slide 6
Slide 7
Page 3 of 45
2022
Slide 8
Slide 9
Slide 10
Page 4 of 45
2022
Slide 11
Slide 12
Slide 13
Slide 14
Page 5 of 45
2022
Slide 15
Slide 16
Slide 17
Page 6 of 45
2022
Slide 18
Slide 19
Slide 20
Slide 21
Page 7 of 45
2022
Slide 22
Slide 23
Slide 24
Page 8 of 45
2022
Slide 25
Slide 26
Slide 27
Slide 28
Page 9 of 45
2022
Slide 29
Slide 30
Slide 31
Slide 32
Page 10 of 45
2022
Slide 33
Slide 34
Slide 35
Slide 36
Page 11 of 45
2022
Slide 37
Slide 38
Slide 39
Slide 40
Page 12 of 45
2022
Slide 41
Slide 42
Slide 43
Slide 44
Page 13 of 45
2022
Slide 45
Slide 46
Slide 47
Slide 48
Page 14 of 45
2022
Slide 49
Slide 50
Slide 51
Slide 52
Page 15 of 45
2022
Slide 53
Slide 54
Slide 55
Slide 56
Page 16 of 45
2022
Slide 57
Slide 58
Slide 59
Slide 60
Page 17 of 45
2022
Slide 61
Slide 62
Slide 63
Slide 64
Page 18 of 45
2022
Slide 65
Slide 66
END OF MODULE 4
Page 19 of 45
2022
MODULE 04
ACCESS CONTROL PEOPLE AND VEHICLE
THREAT TO CIVIL AVIATION
• Hijacking of aircraft on the ground or in flight or on the ground

• Sabotage of Aircraft
• Sabotage of Airports.
• Armed attacks on / off Airport facilities
Hijacking (Acts of Unlawful seizure of Aircraft): Any person who on board an aircraft in flight: (i)
Unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises
control of that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act, or (ii) is an accomplice of a person
who performs or attempts to perform any such act, commits the offence of hijacking that
aircraft.
Sabotage: An act or omission, intended to cause malicious or wanton destruction of Aircraft or

property, endangering or resulting in unlawful interference with international civil aviation and its
facilities.
Armed attacks on / off Airport facilities :- Terrorist attacks/ shootout outside the Terminal building or at off
airport locations and facilities affiliated with Civil Aviation.
Access Control Challenges
• Size of the airport and boundary

• Number of workers at an airport
• The requirement for people and vehicles to have legitimate access to controlled and security
restricted areas for operational purposes
• Airports are often 24-hour per day operations
Page 20 of 45
2022
Purpose of Access Control
To control the movement of people and vehicles from landside (non-security restricted areas)
into airside (controlled and security restricted areas)
Responsibility of Access Control
The responsibility of controlling people and vehicle movement through gates from landside to airside
is of the ASG / APSU
Access Control Points
• Must be always manned they are open or in use, or otherwise locked or closed.
• All persons working at the airport must use the SRA access points when entering SRA, (includes
aircraft crew and airline employees).
• Access to Airside or Security Restricted Areas must be allowed only to those vehicles with a
clear operational requirement
• The admission of vehicles to Airside areas should be restricted for reasons of security
and safety and to avoid congestion on Aircraft movement areas
SRA Control Points
External Access Control Points
Page 21 of 45
2022
Page 22 of 45
2022
Internal Access Control Points
Page 23 of 45
2022
Access Control Point for Staff
Physical Barriers
Controlled by security guard using Equipment such as a turnstile for People and a drop-arm barrier for
vehicles
Tripod turnstile Drop Arm Barrier
Automated Access Control Systems (AACS)
• Coded card (with or without PIN)

• Proximity card (RF) (with or without PIN)
• Biometric Systems.
• Facial Recognition system.
Page 24 of 45
2022
Access is required by
PEOPLE VEHICLE
Passenger Airport Operator
Airport Employees Airlines Operators
Airlines and Tenant Employees Police Department
Other Organizations like ASG/ Customs and Other Organizations like ASG/ Customs and
Immigration Immigration
Authorized Government Officials Authorized Government Officials
Diplomatic Representatives Authorized Government Officials
Emergency Services Catering Agencies
Visitors Cargo Agencies
Access Control- Passengers
• Require valid Ticket/ boarding card and Travel Identification documents

• Family and friends should NOT be allowed to accompany passengers into the Security
Restricted Area.
Valid document for entry into the aerodrome:

• Passport;
• Voter Photo Identity card issued by Election Commission of India;
• Aadhaar or m-Aadhaar issued by Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI);
• PAN Card issued by Income Tax Department;
• Driving License issued by RTO;
• Service Photo Identity Card issued by State/Central Government, Public Sector
Undertakings, local bodies or Public Limited Companies;
Page 25 of 45
2022
• Student Photo Identity Cards issued by Government Institutions / Government recognized

Educational Institutions;
• Nationalized Bank Passbook with attested Photograph;
• Pension card / Pension documents having photograph of the passenger;
• Disability Photo ID Card/handicapped medical certificate issued by the respective
State/UT Governments/Administrations
Passenger identity checks at Counters
The purpose of identity checks at check-in is to establish that:
• the passport or identity document is genuine and valid.

• name on the booking matches the name on passport or ID document
• photograph in the passport or ID document matches with the passenger
• If doubt about a passenger's identity or the validity of documents presented, inform the
supervisor.
Arrangements around the check-in facilities
The purpose is to establish:

• Suspicious activities of persons and passengers shall be kept under surveillance by CCTV and
ASG surveillance staff
• The Aviation Security Group's armed personnel shall be deployed in the check-in area
• The airlines will conduct profiling of passengers prior to check-in process.
Access Control of Airport Employees- AEP
• Aerodrome Entry Permit” means the photo identity card, smart card or temporary permit
issued by the DG, BCAS authorized by the Central Government for entry into the
aerodrome or part of an aerodrome.
• If used in conjunction with an automated access control system, permits may be
equipped with electronic or other machine-readable codes to allow entry.
Page 26 of 45
2022
Categories of AEP
• AEPs: for a period exceeding 30 days to a of maximum validity upto three years.
• TAEPs: will be for a period of minimum 1 day and maximum 30 days in a year from the date of
issue of first Temporary entry Permit (TAEP)
• Casual Labour: The contractor shall provide the list of casual labours along with their ID cards.
This list shall be treated as appointment letter.
• Visitor Admission Ticket Visitors will have access to the demarked visitor area of respective
airports for a period of four hours' duration.
• Transferable AEP: An AEP without photograph which may be issued to Embassies/ High
Commissions specifically recommended by MEA on the principle of reciprocity. This will be
valid only with the identity card of the holder issued by their concerned organization.
Pre-requisite of issuance of AEP
• Approval of Security Programme /Security Clearance of the entity

• Background Check of individuals.
• AVSEC Training, as prescribed in NCASTP.
TAEP
• All the above except background check. Under escort of a valid AEP holder of the
concerned entity.
AEP holder should:
• Always wear and display AEP in security restricted areas on outer most garment, above
waist level.
• Do not misuse AEP or permits when off duty.
• Cooperate with ASG security staff while frisking of all AEP holders before entry to airside.
Page 27 of 45
2022
• Keep Positive Security attitude.

• Produce I.D. or permits when requested by BCAS, ASG and airport officials.
• Report lost and theft of AEP
• Surrender of AEP.
• All AEPs/TAEPs shall be handed over to the staff/casual labour at the beginning of the
shift by the supervisor/ custodian of permits.
• AEP/TAEP shall not be handed over to persons when they are not on shift.
• At the end of the shift all AEPs/TAEPs shall be collected back and kept in safe custody to
avoid misplacement/ misuse of any permit.
• Handing over/ taking over of AEPs/TAEPs shall be documented by entries in register.
Image of Biometric AEP
ACCESS CONTROL POINT AT AIRCRAFT
Page 28 of 45
2022
Vehicle Access Point Location
• Vicinity of passenger terminal buildings

• Entrance to VIP/Cargo/Maintenance areas and GA.
• Entrance to ATC tower and operations building
• Vicinity of fuel storage areas
• Entrance to air navigation facilities
Vehicle Control
• Entry gates to remain closed

• Glass mirror or inverted mirror required for checks
• Appropriate screening equipment for checking of personnel
• Availability of communication equipment at gate
Access Control Point
• Carry out search of vehicles to detect prohibited articles.

• Apply Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for vehicles.
• Describe the procedures for dealing with irregularities or security incidents.
• Control point record book/log
• Control point Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Equipment for access control
The security personnel taking over duty at an access control point should always make sure of the
operational status of the access point by checking that all equipment at the control post is in
working order.
• Barriers, gates, turnstiles, etc.

• Communication system, such as radio, telephone
• Weapons & Explosive detection equipment e.g. metal detectors, explosive trace detection
• Search for vehicles, e.g., lights, angled mirrors
• Control point log/book and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) including stop lists
Page 29 of 45
2022
Documents required for Vehicle entry to SRA
➢ Drivers
• Aerodrome Entry Pass/ Permit (BCAS)
• Airside Driving Permit
• Driving License
• Undergone a training programme on airport safety rules.
➢ Vehicle Permit
• Issued by Airport Operator
All motorized vehicles and equipment used on the airside in the vicinity of aircraft should be
“safety inspected” prior to the issue of an airside access permit. Permits for vehicles should contain
the following information:-
• Registered number of vehicle

• Name of organization
• Areas to which access allowed
• Period of validity
• Access control points to be used
• Authorized signature
Page 30 of 45
2022
Examining Vehicle Permits
• Vehicle number on permit matches actual vehicle registration number

• Name of organization is correct and bona fide
• Permit is valid and not expired
• Permit valid for access point
• Authorizing signature correct / bona fide.
Airside Driving Permit (ADP)
Only Drivers having ADP are allowed to drive Vehicle in the Airside issued to the Staff by Airport operator.
Access Control Point Equipment
The security personnel taking over duty at an access control point should always make sure of the
operational status of the access point by checking that all equipment at the control post is in
working order.
• Barriers, gates, turnstiles, etc.

• Communication system, such as radio, telephone
Page 31 of 45
2022
• Weapons & Explosive detection equipment e.g. metal detectors, explosive trace
detection
• Search for vehicles, e.g., lights, angled mirrors
• UVSS and UVSM
• Control point log/book and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) including stop lists
EQUIPMENT FOR ACCESS CONTROL
Page 32 of 45
2022
Tyre Killer, Bollards, Boom Barrier
Tyre Killer, Bollards, Boom Barrier
Page 33 of 45
2022
Page 34 of 45
2022
Vehicle Search
• Must have authority for search

• Search is for restricted articles (explosives and incendiary substances and/or devices and other
restricted articles, substances and devices)
• Not searching for contrabands or Narcotics.
(Weapons may be dismantled, and Explosive devices may be disguised or camouflaged.)
• Interior driver / passenger areas
• Trunk, boot or load carrying area
• Engine compartment
• Underside of the vehicle
• Roof
• External apertures
Access Control Point Log Entry
• Time control point was opened or handed over to a new shift

• The status of check point equipment
• Record of incidents at the control point
• An inventory of items and/or equipment kept at the control point for its operation
• Record visits to the control point by Supervisors
• Details of vehicle/ non-pass holders / visitors attempting to gain access at the control point
• Details of vehicles admitted; (depending on frequency and local SOP)
• Nature and brief of the incident
• Responding agencies etc.
Page 35 of 45
2022
Suspicious Activities
• Unknown person trying to gain access as passenger/ staff.

• Unknown person in vehicle trying to gain access to restricted area.
• Carrying parcel which was “suspect”
• Items that may be weapons or explosive devices should be treated as “suspicious”
Action when Prohibited or Suspicious Item Detected (Contents of Local SOP
• Remain calm and polite

• Do not alarm person/ vehicle driver.
• Do not allow the person/ vehicle to enter the airport.
• Do not try to restrain the person/driver or use physical force.
• Immediately notify supervisor.
Suspect Device
DO NOT TOUCH IT
DO NOT TOUCH IT
DO NOT TOUCH IT
Notify Supervisor
DO NOT OPEN
DO NOT UNWRAP
DO NOT SHAKE OR HANDLE
DO NOT TURN OR UNSCREW
DO NOT CUT STRINGS, ETC.
DO NOT LIFT OR REMOVE COVERS
Page 36 of 45
2022
BDDS- Response
Permission of Access of Vehicle up to TARMAC
• Vehicle access up to the Tarmac Area of the Civil Airport in the country.
• On Grounds of Protocol
• On Grounds of Security
• On Medical Grounds
Access of Vehicle up to TARMAC on Ground of Protocol
• Speaker of Lok Sabha

• First Lady (Wife of President of India)
• Wife of Vice President of India
• Foreign Ambassador/ High Commissioner on the first arrival and final departure
Personal Vehicles without escort up to the Tarmac Area of the Civil Airports within their States / Union
Territories:
• Governors
• Lt. Governors of Union Territories
• Chief Ministers
• Governors and Chief Minister, Sikkim at Bagdogra airport in West Bengal
Other Dignitaries / Ministers from abroad
• AAI Vehicles
Page 37 of 45
2022
Access of Vehicle up to TARMAC on Ground of Security
Personal Vehicles with escort during departures / arrivals at all airports in the country:
• President
• Vice President
• Prime Minister
• Visiting Heads of State
• Former President of India
• Former Prime Minister of India
• Chief Justice of India
Access of Vehicle up to TARMAC on Medical Ground

• DALAI LAMA
****END****
Page 38 of 45
2022
Page 39 of 45
2022
Page 40 of 45
2022
Page 41 of 45
2022
Page 42 of 45
2022
Page 43 of 45
2022
Page 44 of 45
2022
Page 45 of 45
2022
MODULE -5
RECOGNITION OF EXPLOSIVE
DEVICES AND OTHER
RESTRICTED ARTICLES
Page 1 of 57
2022
Slide 1
Slide 2
Slide 3
Page 2 of 57
2022
Slide 4
Slide 5
Slide 6
Slide 7
Page 3 of 57
2022
Slide 8
Slide 9
Slide 10
Slide 11
Page 4 of 57
2022
Slide 12
Slide 13
Slide 14
Slide 15
Page 5 of 57
2022
Slide 16
Slide 17
Slide 18
Slide 19
Page 6 of 57
2022
Slide 20
Slide 21
Slide 22
Page 7 of 57
2022
Slide 23
Slide 24
Slide 25
Page 8 of 57
2022
Slide 26
Slide 27
Slide 28
Slide 29
Page 9 of 57
2022
Slide 30
Slide 31
Slide 32
Slide 33
Page 10 of 57
2022
Slide 34
Slide 35
Slide 36
Slide 37
Page 11 of 57
2022
Slide 38
Slide 39
Slide 40
Slide 41
Page 12 of 57
2022
Slide 42
Slide 43
Slide 44
Slide 45
Page 13 of 57
2022
Slide 46
Slide 47
Slide 48
Slide 49
Page 14 of 57
2022
Slide 50
Slide 51
Slide 52
Slide 53
Page 15 of 57
2022
Slide 54
Slide 55
Slide 56
Slide 57
Page 16 of 57
2022
Slide 58
Slide 59
Slide 60
Slide 61
Page 17 of 57
2022
Slide 62
Slide 63
Slide 64
Slide 65
Page 18 of 57
2022
Slide 66
Slide 67
Slide 68
Slide 69
Page 19 of 57
2022
Slide 70
Slide 71
Slide 72
Slide 73
Page 20 of 57
2022
Slide 74
Slide 75
Slide 76
Slide 77
Page 21 of 57
2022
Slide 78
Slide 79
Slide 80
Slide 81
Page 22 of 57
2022
Slide 82
Slide 83
Slide 84
Slide 85
Page 23 of 57
2022
Slide 86
Slide 87
Slide 88
Slide 89
Page 24 of 57
2022
Slide 90
Slide 91
Slide 92
Slide 93
Page 25 of 57
2022
Slide 94
Slide 95
Slide 96
Slide 97
Page 26 of 57
2022
Slide 98
Slide 99
Slide 100
Slide 101
Page 27 of 57
2022
Slide 102
Slide 103
Slide 104
Slide 105
Page 28 of 57
2022
Slide 106
Slide 107
Slide 108
Slide 109
Page 29 of 57
2022
Slide 110
Slide 111
Slide 112
Slide 113
Page 30 of 57
2022
Slide 114
Slide 115
Slide 116
Slide 117
Page 31 of 57
2022
Slide 118
Slide 119
Slide 120
Slide 121
Page 32 of 57
2022
Slide 122
Slide 123
Slide 124
END OF MODULE 5
Page 33 of 57
2022
Restricted / Prohibited Article
“
or substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference against civil aviation,
or which may endanger the safety of the aircraft and its occupants, or installations, or the public.”
Restricted articles are not allowed to be taken into security restricted areas and, if feasible,
prevented from entering public areas of an airport unless their carriage is authorized, and
adequate safety and security measures are in place. Additionally, restricted articles not allowed
be taken inside an aircraft cabin or placed in an aircraft hold without authorization.
For clarification and identification purposes, potential restricted articles are generically grouped as
follows:
A) Dangerous goods listed in Table 3-1 of Doc 9284:
i) prohibited for transport in accordance with Part 8. Unless proper measures are taken, Part 8
dangerous goods cannot be carried in passenger baggage but might be acceptable as cargo.
ii) permitted for transport in accordance with Part 8, but whose carriage in the cabin may be
restricted by a security ban.
iii) permitted for transport in accordance with Part 8, but whose carriage in the cabin may not be
permitted under aircraft operator policy; or
iv) permitted for transport in accordance with Part 8, but whose carriage in the cabin is not
permitted; and
B) Restricted articles:
That are not considered dangerous goods, but whose carriage is nonetheless prohibited in the
cabin and, for security reasons, are not transferable to hold baggage.
Restricted Articles
Some articles though prohibited from carriage in the cabin of an aircraft may be transported by
passengers in their hold baggage so long as the articles will not endanger the aircraft, are properly
packed, and are authorized for carriage by the airline operator concerned.
Persons tasked primarily with the detection of prohibited articles should also be aware that
there are certain articles or substances which are classified as “dangerous good ” by the ICAO
Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air. (Doc 9284).
Page 34 of 57
2022
Some of these articles and substances classified as prohibited articles will also fall under the
classification of dangerous goods. The exception given of a small number of permitted items,
dangerous goods must not be carried by passengers on their person or in their carry-on baggage or
hold baggage.
Any article not normally classified as Prohibited articles shall also be excluded from carriage by
passengers or any other person in the cabin of an aircraft or in hold baggage or carried into the
Security Prohibited Area of an airport based upon the threat assessment done by the Intelligence
bureau.
Handling of Prohibited Items
Many prohibited articles may be carried by the public legally but could be used to commit an act of
unlawful interference or would endanger the safety of the aircraft when carried in the aircraft
passenger cabin, may be transported as hold baggage if they do not endanger the safety of the
aircraft and are properly packed, sealed and authorized for carriage by Aircraft Operator. Such
items should be processed in one of the following ways:
• Placed in the passengers hold baggage unless the item would endanger the safety of the aircraft.
• Confiscated and subsequently properly disposed of or destroyed.
• Confiscated and kept in storage by the airport authorities or relevant aircraft operator for later
return to the passenger.
• Removed and once properly prepared and packaged, transported in the hold of the aircraft for
later return to the passenger at his ticketed destination.
Categories of Restricted Articles
1. Weapons
2. Dangerous Articles
3. Dangerous substances
4. Explosive
Category -1: Weapons
Weapons are articles designed to kill, injure, immobilize, or incapacitate a person.
Page 35 of 57
2022
EXAMPLES OF WEAPONS
Handguns, flare guns, blow guns and darts, electric dart guns, rifles, shotguns pellet guns, spear
guns and dart, knives with blades over 10 cms, mace, tear gas shell, martial arts weapons, pepper
spray, blades or spiked finger rings and wrist bands, sword canes and umbrella swords etc.
Category 2: Dangerous articles
Any article that can be used to threaten the safety of the aircraft.
Any article that can be used to threaten the safety of the aircraft Starter pistols, toy guns, replica
of weapons, sharp pointed scissors and letter openers, chisels, ice picks, large Screwdrivers and
knitting needles, pocketknives with blades over 4cm but less than 10cms, etc.
Category 3: Dangerous Substances
Substances which are capable of posing hazard to the health of passengers and crew or the security
/ safety of aircraft or property.
• Flammable liquid fuel e.g., Petrol / gasoline, diesel, lighter fluid, alcohol, ethanol.
• Gas & gas containers e.g., Butane, propane, acetylene, oxygen - in large volume.
• Non safety matches
• Turpentine & paint thinner
• Acids and Alkalis e.g., spillab ‘ e ’ batteries
• Corrosive or Bleaching Substances - e.g., mercury, chlorine
• Radioactive material. - e.g., Medicinal, or commercial isotopes
• Poisons
• Infectious or biological hazardous material. - e.g., infected blood, bacteria, and viruses
• Material capable of spontaneous ignition or combustion.
• Fire extinguishers
Additional Items Prohibited for Flights assessed at Higher Risk:
A risk assessment made by individual member states may indicate that certain aircraft operations
are at higher risk of an act of unlawful interference being committed against them. In these
Page 36 of 57
2022
circumstances individual member states may wish to include one or more of the following items
in the stat ’ list of Prohibited articles which may not be carried on the person and within cabin
or hold baggage as appropriate.
• Knitting needles
• Knives with blades less than 6 cm
• Metal cutlery
• Scissors with blades less than 6 cm
• Liquid Aerosol and Gels (LAG)- each item not exceeding 100ml, total 1litre allowed.
Category 4: Explosives
Material that causes a sudden, almost instantaneous, release of gas, heat, and pressure,
accompanied by loud noise when subjected to a certain amount of shock, pressure, or
temperature.
Most explosives manufactured are lawfully used. The armed forces use propellants to propel
bullets, shells and rockets and explosives to destroy a target. Pyrotechnic materials are used in
signaling, in safety devices such as car air bags, and for entertainment in the form of fireworks
and theatrical pyrotechnics.
Low explosives
For many years, black powder was the most common low explosive used throughout world. But
black powder or gun powder as it was commonly called, produced a large amount of smoke
Page 37 of 57
2022
and was dangerous to use.
Pyrotechnic materials and propellants are often known as low explosives. The main distinction
between these materials and high explosives is in the way that they produce their effect.
Pyrotechnics and propellants, when initiated by heat, rapidly change from a small volume solid or
liquid to a large volume of hot gases. Pyrotechnic materials and propellants are easily bought
in the form of matches, fireworks or firearms propellants or can be improvised. They are therefore
commonly misused by terrorists in incendiaries and blast bombs. The “pipe bomb” is usually a length
of steel pipe with screw-on end caps, filled with a pyrotechnic material.
High explosives
As far as explosives detection is concerned, most modern high explosives fall into several groups:
• Nitroglycerin based explosives are often called “commercial explosives”. Trade or generic
names for Nitroglycerine explosives include “Dynamite”, “Gelignite”, “Blasting Gelatin”,
“Special ” and “Frangex”, and usually come as paper- wrapped sticks.
• TNT based. TNT (trinitrotoluene) is a hard, yellowish white solid that can easily be melted
and cast. For this reason, it has long been used to fill bombs and shells. TNT is sometimes
found as blocks and is often supplied in the form of flakes. Terrorists have sometimes
disguised TNT by casting it into any shape.
• Plastic explosives. Plastic explosives are usually mixtures of the powerful explosives RDX
(cyclonite or hexogen) or PETN (pentaerythritol tetra nitrate) with oil or grease, making a
puttylike material. Plastic explosives are easily molded into any shape and have many
military and industrial uses. They are commonly used by terrorists. It is well known that
a few hundred grammes of plastic explosives can destroy an airliner. “C4”, “PE4” and
“Semtex H” are well known plastic explosives.
• Fuel/oxidant mixtures. Fuel/oxidant mixtures comprise something that burns, such as oil,
and an oxygen-containing chemical which liberates oxygen quickly on heating, such as
ammonium nitrate. Mixtures of almost any fuel with any oxidant will produce either a
pyrotechnic or high explosive effect.
Most modern commercial explosives are fuel/oxidant mixtures. ANFO (ammonium nitrate and fuel
oil) and “Power gel” are examples.
Identification of explosive
S. No Explosive Color Physical Form
1 RDX White Crystal

line
Page 38 of 57
2022
2 PETN White Crystal

line
3 Sheet Expl White Flexible
4 C–4 White Plastic/Putty like substances
5 TNT Pale Yellow Block (Brick Shaped)
Cartridge/plastic mass
6 PEK Yellow
7 Tetryl/CE Yellow Granular/Powder
8 Cordtex Chocolate / White / Orange Cord
9 LTPE Black Flexible/cartridge
10 Semtex Black/orange Slurry
11 Gun powder Black Granular
Pyrotechnic
S .No Explosive Color Physical Form
1 Safety Fuse Dirty black Yarn/jute bounded
Civil Explosives
1 Gelatin Yellow Stick
2 Dynamites Yellow Cartridge wrapped in paper
3 ANFO Greenish Slurry with white crystal of AN
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Components
An IED is the explosive device designed, fabricated, placed, and activated with an intention of
causing injury/death or to create panic and chaos amongst public or to cause intensive damage to
Page 39 of 57
2022
property. IED’s could be of any size and shape.
IED could be manufactured in any innocuous objects such as Briefc a s e , Suitcase, Tiffin carrier,
Sweet packet, Gift item, Radio, Laptop computer, TV, VCR, Telephone, Cycle, Scooter, Car, Vehicle
etc. It may be operated electrically or mechanically and designed to explode while handling or
by use of any delay mechanism or remote control etc. Its components are:
1. Explosive material (main charge)
2. Detonator
3. Power source
4. Switch/ Mechanism
1. Explosive material
To attack the aviation industry the terrorist will prefer using high explosive as it is safe to
carry, small quantity is sufficient to cause a huge damage, it is also easy to conceal.
2. Detonator
There are various devices used for initiating explosives and connecting charges. These include
detonators, fuses, and shock tube. A detonator is a small cylinder containing an initiating explosive
and, usually, a “booster” charge of high explosive. It is used to initiate the detonation of high
explosives. In blasting and demolition, the detonator is normally stored separately from the high
explosives and inserted only when the charges are placed, and the area is evacuated.
Page 40 of 57
2022
• Non-Electric detonators are open at one end. A fuse is inserted into the open end and the
spark from the fuse impinges on the initiating explosive and fires the detonator. The plain
detonator is sometimes used with percussion caps and other devices which can produce a
flame. This is half filled and half empty for inserting safety fuse.
• Electric detonators have wires emerging at one end. They are fired by passing an
electric current through the wires. In terrorist and criminal use, a battery together with an
improvised electrical delay circuit (timer and power unit) is commonly used to initiate the
detonator.
Page 41 of 57
2022
3. Power Source Power sources of bomb could be from normal batteries such as 1.5V, pencil and
torch cells, 6V, 9V etc. There are flat batteries, which can be used for letter bombs. Latest
batteries manufactured in pure plastic containers, which are difficult to view in machine.
4. IED Initiating Mechanism or Switches used in an IED:

These are also known as Bomb Initiating Mechanism. It normally is based on four principles they
employ such as:
• ANTI HANDLING
• DELAYED
• AMBIENT CONDITION
• REMOTE CONTROL/ COMMAND
ANTI HANDLING
Anti-Handling Bombs when it is inadvertently removed, lifted, or opened it may explode.
Anti-handling switches may vary from a small micro switch to improvised switch such as cloth-peg or
loop made from normal electrical wire. It is otherwise called as “Victim operated switch”.
DELAYED
Delayed Bombs delay was achieved by normal clockwork mechanism like watch or timepiece.
Delay can also be used by chemicals cleverly concealed in ordinary objects and these chemicals
when meet Improvised explosives causes fire or explosion. Chemicals such as sulphuric acid, cupric
chloride, nitric acid slowly eats away the metal, the breaking of metallic wire will trigger the firing
mechanism.
AMBIENT CONDITION
The triggering mechanism is activated by environmental factors such as gas, smoke acoustic,
barometric, humidity, proximity, light, sound etc.
REMOTE CONTROL
Normal remote-control bombs are activated by transmission of electromagnetic waves.
Page 42 of 57
2022
Type of Switches / Mechanism
Anti-Handling Delayed Ambient Condition Remote Control
Pressure Clock Work Proximity Radio control

Pressure release Electronic Gas/ smoke sensitive FM Transmission
Timer PTD Barometric/ humidity Command wire
Pull
Timer Thermal Infra-red beam
X-ray sensitive
Collapsing delay Laser.
Infrared sensitive
Circuit
Water Drip Metal sensitive Cell phone
Tension
Water Add Acoustic sensors Pager
Vibratory
Pyrotechnics Light / Dark sensitive
Lift Satellite Phones
EFFECTS OF EXPLOSION
a) Blast Effect
High pressure -Up to 40, 00,000 PSI.
Velocity of Detonation of TNT -25,000 KMPH.
b) Fragmentation
Speed of fragments may be up to 6000 KMPH.
c) Thermal
High Temperature of 3000 – 4000 0 C.
d) Translation
Bodies are lifted 30 to 60 feet above ground level and thrown 100 mts. away.
e) Concussion
In the air a vacuum or suction effect is created behind the moving blast wave.
f) Earth and water shock
Damage takes place miles away.
g) Secondary effects
Fire, damage to building, vehicles etc.
It is estimated that 50 PSI of pressure cause eardrum to rupture and 250 PSI of pressure applied on
lungs of a human being, can cause his death. The high pressure of 40 lakh pounds per square inch
(PSI) and high velocity of atmosphere moving at thousands of KMPH will cause death to anyone
situated in the blast zone. Therefore, we find many people are killed beyond recognition at the point
of detonation.
Places of Concealment of Explosives
Page 43 of 57
2022
• On the person
• In cabin baggage
• In hold baggage
• In Cargo or Mail
• In vehicles
Methods of Concealment
Ways of concealment can be either Disguised, Dismantled & Camouflaged
• Explosives in Shaving Cream Tubes

• Liquid Explosives in Whisky or Wines Bottles
• Explosives in Birthday Cake
• Blasting Gelatin Embedded in Chocolate
• TNT Cast in Toy Shapes, Doll Head, animals, Wall Painting.
• IED in false Bottom of Baggage.
• Explosive Jacket.
• Preparation of Explosive from Local Material
• Detonator Hidden in Pen, Calculators and Shoe Sole.
******END**********
Page 44 of 57
2022
Page 45 of 57
2022
Page 46 of 57
2022
Page 47 of 57
2022
Page 48 of 57
2022
Page 49 of 57
2022
Page 50 of 57
2022
Page 51 of 57
2022
Page 52 of 57
2022
Page 53 of 57
2022
Page 54 of 57
2022
Page 55 of 57
2022
Page 56 of 57
2022
Page 57 of 57
2022
MODULE -06
PATROLLING AND GUARDING
Page 1 of 16
AVSEC BASIC COURSE-MODULE 06
2022
Slide 1
Slide 2
Slide 3
Slide 4
Page 2 of 16
2022
Slide 5
Slide 6
Slide 7
Page 3 of 16
2022
Slide 8
Slide 9
Slide
10
Page 4 of 16
2022
Slide
11
Slide
12
Slide
13
Page 5 of 16
2022
Slide
14
Slide
15
Slide
16
Page 6 of 16
2022
Slide
17
Slide
18
Slide
19
Slide
20
Page 7 of 16
2022
END OF MODULE 6
Module 6
Patrolling & Guarding
Airports and aircraft are subject to attack. One of the security measures used to protect airport and
aircraft is by carrying out patrolling and guarding of aviation facilities. During increased threat
conditions it may be necessary to increase security of the airport terminal and restrict access to only
those persons who are travelling on a flight that day and authorized airport and airline personnel.
Defence in Depth
Defence in Depth (also referred to sometimes as layers of security) and those layers of security
measures build upon each other to protect aviation and operations. Therefore, if one layer fails or is
deficient, next is designed to prevent the act of unlawful interference being successful.
These layers may consist of:

• Security Restricted areas and Restricted areas
• Airport identification permits for personnel and vehicles.
• Physical Security measures (fences, gates, locks, patrols etc)
• Detection systems for weapons and Explosives
Basic Concept of Security
• DETER
Observable security infrastructure such as fences, lights, sensors and CCTV and the obvious
presence of well trained and technically skilled security personnel, contributes to this profile.
• DELAY
Security fences, anti-climbing devices, installation security, and securing of the aircraft doors can
contribute to delay, sufficient to increase the likelihood of apprehension by security personnel,
other airport personnel.
• DETECT
Preventing acts of unlawful interference by detecting. Detecting attempts by unauthorized
persons to gain access to aircraft, security restricted areas or controlled areas; detecting
prohibited articles on persons and baggage. Deployment of security personnel at static security
posts or mobile security patrols may contribute to the detection process.
• RESPOND
Page 8 of 16
2022
Effective response to a security incident requires the availability of security personnel at short
notice to attend the scene of the occurrence within the time bought by the delay and detection
systems in place.
To deter an unlawful act against civil aviation requires the presentation of a security profile,
sufficient to persuade a would-be perpetrator that the airport, airline, or air cargo is a "hard target"
and that there is a high risk of failure and/or apprehension.
Principles of airport protection based on:
• Controlling movement of people and vehicles

• Dividing airport into non-restricted and restricted areas
• Protecting airport with physical barriers
• Preventing penetration of airport barriers
NON-RESTRICTED AND RESTRICTED AREA SEPARATION ACHIEVED BY:

• Provision of physical barriers such as fences, use of buildings and natural obstacles.
• Limiting authorized access to controlled gates and designated access points
INTEGRITY OF BARRIER CARRYING OUT FOOT OR MOBILE PATROL:

• Search guards protecting access points and vulnerable facilities, building and installations.
• Security personnel carrying out foot or mobile patrols.
PHYSICAL BARRIERS
Objectives of Physical Barriers

• Define area to be protected
• Create physical and psychological deterrent
• Delay intrusion and assist detection/apprehension
• Provide controlled access points for people and vehicles
Elements of a Physical Barrier

• Effective security fencing as per ICAO standard
• Efficient security lighting
• Limited access control points
Page 9 of 16
2022
• Use of building, structures. natural barriers such as water, geographic terrain.

• Any access points must be protected
Integrity of barriers maintained by

• Security guards protecting access points and vulnerable airport facilities, buildings and
installations
• Security personnel carrying out foot or mobile patrols
ADDITIONAL PROTECTION REQUIRED FOR:
Landside/airside storm sewers, ditches

• protected by grilles, bars, railings.
• monitored by surveillance, patrols, inspections, anti-intrusion alarm devices and additional
lighting.
To be effective physical barriers, require guarding and patrolling by security personnel.
• Guarding is basically a static duty.

• Patrolling is a mobile function either by foot or in a vehicle
• Increased threat situations require additional guards and patrols
Security patrolling
OBJECTIVE OF SECURITY PATROLLING IS TO:
• Deter and prevent unauthorized access.

• Detect attacks and attempted attacks against airport buildings, aircraft, installations.
• Ensure effectiveness of physical barriers (door, windows, and openings)
• Respond quickly to attacks and attempted attacks.
SECURITY GUARDING
Page 10 of 16
2022
Objective Of Security Guarding Is to:

• Protect vulnerable areas/vital airport facilities.
• Control movement of people/vehicles
• Deter and prevent attacks against airport facilities.
Vulnerable Points in Barriers Requiring Special Protection:

• Places where natural barriers used as boundary.
• Waterways and storm sewers, service ducts
• Buildings used to form part of boundary.
• Uncontrolled access points for vehicles (e.g., public roadways running through airport areas)
Methods Used to Protect The Airport

• Effective boundary fencing
• Efficient security lighting
• Controlled movement of people/vehicles
• Buildings protected by physical means (door locks, window bars, alarm systems)
• Vulnerable barrier points physically protected (landside/airside sewers, storm drains)
****END****
Page 11 of 16
2022
Page 12 of 16
2022
Page 13 of 16
2022
Page 14 of 16
2022
Page 15 of 16
2022
Page 16 of 16
2022
MODULE -7
Screening and Searching of
Passengers and Baggage

2022
Page 1 of 82
Slide
1
Slide
2
Slide
3
Slide
4

2022
Page 2 of 82
Slide
5
Slide
6
Slide
7
Slide
8

2022
Page 3 of 82
Slide
9
Slide
10
Slide
11
Slide
12

2022
Page 4 of 82
Slide
13
Slide
14
Slide
15
Slide
16

2022
Page 5 of 82
Slide
17
Slide
18
Slide
19
Slide
20

2022
Page 6 of 82
Slide
21
Slide
22
Slide
23
Slide
24

2022
Page 7 of 82
Slide
25
Slide
26
Slide
27
Slide
28

2022
Page 8 of 82
Slide
29
Slide
30
Slide
31
Slide
32

2022
Page 9 of 82
Slide
33
Slide
34
Slide
35
Slide
36

2022
Page 10 of 82
Slide
37
Slide
38
Slide
39
Slide
40

2022
Page 11 of 82
Slide
41
Slide
42
Slide
43
Slide
44

2022
Page 12 of 82
Slide
45
Slide
46
Slide
47
Slide
48

2022
Page 13 of 82
Slide
49
Slide
50
Slide
51
Slide
52

2022
Page 14 of 82
Slide
53
Slide
54
Slide
55
Slide
56

2022
Page 15 of 82
Slide
57
Slide
58
Slide
59
Slide
60

2022
Page 16 of 82
Slide
61
Slide
62
Slide
63
Slide
64

2022
Page 17 of 82
Slide
65
Slide
66
Slide
67
Slide
68

2022
Page 18 of 82
Slide
69
Slide
70
Slide
71
Slide
72

2022
Page 19 of 82
Slide
73
Slide
74
Slide
75
Slide
76

2022
Page 20 of 82
Slide
77
Slide
78
Slide
79
Slide
80

2022
Page 21 of 82
Slide
81
Slide
82
Slide
83
Slide
84

2022
Page 22 of 82
Slide
85
Slide
86
Slide
87
Slide
88

2022
Page 23 of 82
Slide
89
Slide
90
Slide
91
Slide
92

2022
Page 24 of 82
Slide
93
Slide
94
Slide
95
Slide
96

2022
Page 25 of 82
Slide
97
Slide
98
Slide
99
Slide
100

2022
Page 26 of 82
Slide
101
Slide
102
Slide
103
Slide
104

2022
Page 27 of 82
Slide
105
Slide
106
Slide
107
Slide
108

2022
Page 28 of 82
Slide
109
Slide
110
Slide
111
Slide
112

2022
Page 29 of 82
Slide
113
Slide
114
Slide
115
Slide
116

2022
Page 30 of 82
Slide
117
Slide
118

2022
Page 31 of 82
Module – 07 Screening and Searching of Passengers

Module Objectives
• Describe how access control procedures for Security Restricted Areas are applied to
passengers and their baggage
• Understand the procedures that apply to passenger screening areas and the use
of Walk-through Metal Detectors. Know key elements of an effective search of
passengers and baggage
• Describe procedures for discovery of restricted articles on passengers and in baggage
• Rough Metal Detectors & Hand-Held Metal Detectors
• Be familiar with procedures for screening and searching of passengers and baggage
according to local Standard Operating Procedures
Levels of Search
There are various levels of search. The table below details the various types and the
degree of intrusiveness.
Level of Remove Touch Comments

Level 1 NO YES This is a hand search of the outer levels of the persons
clothing (as worn and without removing them) and a
hand
search of the passenger’s body through that clothing. It
may involve the use of a Hand Held Metal Detector
(HHMD) to indicate items which may have caused the
Archway Metal Detector to alarm.
Passengers may request a private search.

Level 2 YES (Outer YES Used after a level 1 search if suspicions till exist that the
layers only) person may still be in possession of a prohibited item, or
there is any other reason to search the person to a
greater depth than a level 1 search allows. May also be
used when person requests a private search. Carried out
in private away from the view of other persons
/passengers. Requires the persons consent and a witness
of the same sex as the person being searched.

2022
Page 32 of 82

Level 3 YES YES This level of search is usually only carried out by
personnel who have had specialist training i.e
Police or customs. It is carried out on persons
suspected of attempting to or committing a
crime. It may involve the removal of all clothes
examination of body orifices and the use of x-ray
or other detection equipment. It may also
include detention of the person and placing that
person under observation for a number of days
to allow the examination of body waste.
SEARCH PRINCIPLES
• All hand carried items must be screened and/or searched. Preferably pass-through x-ray
equipment.
• It is important to adopt a systematic approach so that no part of the body, items of clothing
or areas of the bag are overlooked.
• Search should normally be carried out in open but should not be exposed to public view:
Classified or Private documents. Large amounts of currency, jewellery etc. For female
passenger privacy shall be maintained.
• Private search used when necessary to search in sufficient depth to establish if prohibited
article is present.
• Two searchers of the same sex as person being searched.
• All indications of metal on the person by technical equipment must be resolved.
• Persons who cannot be cleared by normal screening process must be searched by hand.
• Any person who cannot be cleared by the total screening process must be denied access to
the security restricted area and/or not be allowed to board an aircraft.
Passenger Screening Locations Sterile Holding Area concepts / Basic Screening

plans:
• Decentralized, usually at the aircraft boarding Gate.
• Semi-centralized, usually after the duty-free shop area.
• Centralized, usually before the duty-free shop area.
Screening Checkpoint Manpower

• Travel Document Checker / X-ray Load officer/ Profiler
• Passenger Searcher
• X-ray Officer (Operator)

2022
Page 33 of 82
• Bag Searchers / ETD Operators
Equipment required for Screening.

➢ Equipment designed to scan persons.
• - DFMD
• - HHMD
• - Body Scanners
• - ETD
➢ Equipment designed to screen baggage.

• - X-ray BIS
➢ Equipment designed to detect explosives.

• - Explosive Trace Detectors
• - Explosive Vapour Detectors
SCREENING POINT LAYOUT

2022
Page 34 of 82
Door Frame Metal Detector (DFMD)/ Walk Through Metal Detector (WTMD):
The DFMD also known as Walk Through Metal Detector is a screening equipment which is
used to detect metallic items carried by passenger on person. It detects metallic items which
weigh 30gms or above Operators Test Piece is used to check the serviceability of DFMD.
DFMD gives an audio and visual alarm.
Advantages
• Helps to identify metallic item including ferrous and nonferrous metal.
• Gives a rough idea of the location of the metallic item.
• High through-put rate
• Easy to Operate.
• Safe for all passengers including pregnant women, passengers with cardiac
Pacemakers.
Disadvantages:
• Cannot detect any non-metallic prohibited items.
• Cannot Detects any metal less than 30 gm.
• Not portable
• False alarm
Hand-Held Metal Detector (HHMD)

HHMD is used to detect the metallic items on a person’s body. HHMD gives an audio and visual
alarm.
Advantages
• Helps to identify metallic item including ferrous and nonferrous

• metal
• Detects even 0.5 grams of metal
• Gives exact location of the metallic item
• Convenient to passenger since it is touch free concept
• Safe for all passengers including pregnant women,
• passengers with cardiac pace makers.
Disadvantages:
• Cannot detect any non-metallic prohibited items.

• False alarm
Hand Search
Due to limitations of technical equipment additional manual hand search of passengers by
Reasoned Selection may be required.
2022
Page 35 of 82
Advantage of hand search

Hand search of people or baggage has following advantages.
• No special equipment required
• Most senses may be used
• Direct interpretation
Limitations of hand search

• It requires consent and co-operation from person who is being hand searched;
• Electrical, electronic or mechanical items will need to be examined by technical
• equipment such as x- ray or trace detection e.g. mobile phones, laptop computers,
• cameras etc.;
• It can be time consuming compared to technical screening equipment when many
• passengers or bags are involved;
• Hand search is vulnerable to human feelings such as bad habits, inconsistency,
• tiredness etc.; and
• It can be unpleasant and unhygienic for the searcher.
Hand search of passengers is also known as Pat down Search.

There are two types of pat-down searches.
• Whole body pat-down search.
• Pat-down search limited to the area of an alarm.
Procedure for passenger & carryon baggage screening
No person shall board an aircraft unless he along-with cabin baggage has been screened
and cleared by a screening officer, as per the prescribed norms.
• After being screened, the person is allowed by a screening officer, to pass through
the screening point; or
• The person passes through the screening point and the Central Government by
written notice provides that the person may pass through that screening point
without being screened.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SCREENING:
• The basic rule is that all passengers and all their carry-on baggage must undergo
screening before being allowed access to an aircraft, sterile area or security restricted
area.
• Screening of passengers and cabin baggage may be carried out by the use of metal
detectors, X-ray equipment or other explosive detection devices, by manual search or
by a combination of equipment and manual search.
• Technical equipment i.e. X-ray BIS, DFMDs, HHMDs, Explosive trace detector etc. must
2022
Page 36 of 82
be checked by CTP/OTP and be fully operational before commencing of duty in a shift

faulty equipment should not be used.
• Selection of cabin baggage for hand search by X-ray operator should always be made
using the principle of reasoned selection. One out of every Five person will be
randomly searched.
• To compensate the limitations of technical equipment, randomly manual hand search
of passenger and baggage is required.
• Persons who cannot be cleared by the normal screening process should be referred
for manual hand-search.
• Privacy should be assured when manual hand-search of the person is to be carried out
Procedure for screening of hold baggage

In order to prevent weapons, explosives or any other dangerous devices which may be used
to commit an act of unlawful interference with aviation, the carriage or bearing of which is
not authorized, from being introduced by any means whatsoever onto an aircraft engaged in
civil commercial aviation, no item of originating accompanied hold baggage, transfer-
baggage and or interline baggage shall be loaded onto the aircraft unless it has been security
screened and cleared as per the prescribed norms.
It is responsibility of the concerned aircraft operator to ensure that all items of

accompanied hold baggage, unaccompanied hold baggage, transfer-baggage and interline
baggage are subjected to security procedures as per the prescribed norms before loading
such items onto an aircraft engaged in civil commercial aviation.
Screening and clearing of hold baggage.

All items of originating accompanied hold baggage shall be screened and cleared by one of
the following methods:-
• 100% manual hand search; and

• Screening by X-Ray or Explosive Trace Detection system for items, which
cannot be adequately cleared by manual hand search.
• 100% screening by X-Ray BIS; and Manual hand search on a continuous random basis
where the percentage of baggage including suspect baggage so searched within a
particular period shall not be less than 10% of the total baggage during that period.
Technical equipment used for the screening of persons and baggage has limitations.
Walkthrough metal detectors and hand-held metal detectors, for example, cannot detect
non-metallic weapons and explosives and even conventional X-ray equipment has difficulty
in imaging or defining explosive material effectively.
To compensate for such limitations or to introduce a random/ unpredictability element into

the selection process, an additional manual hand search of passengers, cabin baggage and
registered baggage is required after being screened by technical means.

2022
Page 37 of 82
Reasoned selection means that the selection is based on the X-ray image, concentrating the
effort on those bags most likely to conceal a prohibited item.
Random selection should be used for hand searching one out of every ten bags in case of
registered baggage; one out of 15 in case of Cargo and one out of 20 in case of hand bag. You
should take the same methodical approach to searching bags as is required for searching
people.
Cabin baggage of a female passenger will be searched by a female screener only.
Cardinal Rules
• Courtesy
• Tact and
• Caution
Procedures for screening of passengers with special needs and medical

conditions.
Special Category Passengers

There is another type of passenger known as Special Category passengers. These
include:
• Babies and children
• Pregnant women
• Physically challenged person.
• Passengers in wheelchairs
• Persons with medical conditions
• Religious reasons
• Passengers with Diplomatic Status
• VIPs
• Potentially Disruptive Passengers-
• Persons in custody
• Dangerous Prisoners and Persons Suffering from Mental Illness
• Deportees
Dealing with People
• Always be polite.
• Remain calm and friendly.
• Treat people with respect.
• Be professional at all times.
• Always thank them for their cooperation.
Applicability:
The provisions contained in this SOP shall be applicable to the following:
2022
Page 38 of 82
a) All Indian airlines/ carriers engaged in scheduled and non – scheduled air transport
services both domestic and international.
b) All foreign airlines/ carriers engaged in scheduled air transport operating to and from
Indian territory.
c) All airport operators, including private/ Joint Ventures, within Indian territory.
d) Aviation Security Group (CISF/ State Police) deployed at airports.
Definitions:
Person with disability means any individual who has a physical or mental impairment that,
on a permanent or temporary basis, substantially limits one or more major life activities, has
a record of such impairment, or is regarded as having such impairment.
Person with reduced mobility (PRM): A person with reduced mobility (PRM)
means any person whose mobility when using transport is reduced due to any physical
disability (sensory or locomotor permanent or temporary), intellectual disability or
impairment, or any other cause of disability, or age, and whose situation needs appropriate
attention and the adaptation to his or her particular needs of the service made available to
all passengers.
Incapacitated passengers: Incapacitated passengers are those with physical or

mental disability or with a medical condition, who require individual attention or assistance
on emplaning/deplaning during flight and during ground handling which is normally not
extended to other passengers.
General requirements
• All airport operators should make special arrangements to facilitate screening of
persons with special needs so that the process is carried out efficiently, keeping in
mind the dignity and privacy of the passenger in mind while ensuring adequate level
of screening.
• The airport management/ representative of Air carrier shall provide wheelchairs and
render necessary assistance to facilitate the movement of the persons with special
needs, when required.
• In the case of a passenger having difficulty in walking or standing, the way his or her
screening is conducted will depend on his or her ability/disability.
• Medical documentation is helpful but not essential.
• Canes, crutches and other devices which can be separated from the passengers
should be subjected to X-ray screening.
• Wherever testing is done for detection of explosives, in addition to ETD, help of dog
squad may be taken as per need. However, sensitivity of passenger and religious
considerations may be kept in mind.
General principles while screening disabled passengers.
• Focus on the person not the disability, some disabilities may be hidden.
2022
Page 39 of 82
• Treat with dignity and respect.

• Address the person directly.
• Ask how they may assist and listen to the advice offered.
• Explain why a different screening method is necessary.
• Verify that all special needs are correctly identified.
• Never impose help.
• Make special arrangements for the effective screening.
• Ensure the dignity and privacy of the passenger not affected.
• Provide wheelchairs and render necessary assistance.
• Follow appropriate screening methods by considering his/ her ability/ disability.
• No exemption, thorough check is required by following all requirements.
• Follow appropriate methods, use common sense and ensure all doubts are resolved.
Screening Techniques for different categories.

• Mobility Impairment
➢ use wheelchair or scooters, have metal joint implants, wear cast, brace or
other support
➢ Persons with Prosthetic limbs
• Intellectual Disabilities
• Developmental Disabilities
• Blind or Low Vision
• Deaf or Hard of Hearing
• Persons with Deaf blindness
• Speech impaired
• Children with Disabilities
• Persons with Medical needs
1. Mobility Impairment.
• Passengers with Mobility Impairment may:
• Use Wheelchair or Scooters
• Use Mobility Devices like canes, crutches or braces
• Have Metal Joint Implants, like artificial knees or hips
• Have a Cast, Brace or Support Appliance
• Have Difficulty Walking or Standing
• Cannot Remove Shoes
Screening Passengers with Mobility Impairment
Do’s Don’t’s
• Use ETD to screen passenger’s • Do not force wheel chair users to
wheelchair/scooter. Removable stand from their wheel chairs.
items need X-ray screening. • Do not attempt to manually lift the
2022
Page 40 of 82
• Screen passengers with thorough wheel chair user as this is against

pat-down. his/her dignity and most of all it
• Conduct screening in private area, jeopardizes his/her safety.
with CISF officer of same gender as • Under no circumstances should the
passenger, with a companion of passenger be asked to remove cast,
passenger’s choice (if requested). brace, calipers, metal implants or
• The passenger’s walker, crutch, cane, supportive alliances and shoes if the
or other assistive mobility device passenger cannot remove shoes.
must undergo X-ray screening,
unless it cannot fit through the X-ray.
If an item cannot fit in the X-ray, or
the passenger cannot be separated
from the item, it must be inspected
with ETD.
• Use ETD to screen passengers who
cannot remove shoes and have
metal joint implants.
• Passengers with cast, brace or
calipers or supportive appliances
should be screened without
removing them with a thorough pat
down process and ETD.
1b. Prosthetic Limbs
Prosthetic limbs are mechanical devices worn by amputees. They can be worn above knee,
below knee, on the elbow or shoulder, depending on the nature of amputation.
Parts of a prosthetic limb:
Pylon - internal frame or skeleton of the prosthetic limb. Provides structural support and
formed of metal rods or lighter carbon-fibre composites.
Foam cover - Pylons are enclosed with a foam-like material, shaped and coloured to match the
person’s skin tone to make the prosthetic limb look lifelike.
Socket - the portion of the prosthetic device where the amputee’s limb stump is fitted in.
Advanced prosthetic limbs can be equipped with a microprocessor (computer chip) and
sensors. They may have a power charging point.

2022
Page 41 of 82
Screening Passengers with Prosthetic Devices

Do’s Don’t’s
• Passengers should be screened without • Do not ask the passenger to remove
removing prosthetic limbs, with his/her prosthesis.
Explosive Trace Detectors (ETD). • Do not ask the passenger to strip to
• Physical pat-down to be done by officer remove prosthesis.
of passenger’s gender to resolve any • Do not make a passenger remove or
alarms of ETD. lift any article of clothing that may
• The passenger can request a private compromise their modesty.
screening at any time and a private • Under no circumstances should the
screening should be offered when the passenger's prosthesis be put
officer must pat-down sensitive areas. through X-Ray machine.
• During a private screening, another CISF
employee of the passenger’s gender
must also be present and the passenger
may be accompanied by a companion of
his or her choosing.
• Provide the passenger with a chair if he
or she needs to sit down.
• Ask the passenger before the pat-down
begins, about any difficulty in raising his
or her arms, remaining in the position
required for a pat-down, or any areas of
the body that are painful when touched.
2. Intellectual Disabilities
Screening Method Etiquette
• Screen along with passenger’s travelling • Speak directly to the passenger when
companions, if required making a request or giving an
• Allow passenger or travelling companions to instruction, eg “Lift your arms” etc.
offer suggestions on the best way to • Passenger might need a minute or so to
approach and screen the passenger, process information and allow the
especially if it is necessary to touch during screening. Wait. A moments patience
screening. will enable successful screening.
• Offer to screen passenger using walk- • Use short sentences giving one piece of
through metal detectors. information at one time.
• If passenger declines this option, then screen • Be prepared to repeat or rephrase the
using a thorough pat down process instead. information.
• Tell the passenger exactly what is going to • Act naturally and maintain eye contact
happen. Eg “I will have to pat you along your • Do not be confrontational or frighten
arms, your body, and legs. I will also use this the individual.
(ETD) to pat you down”. • Focus on the person – not the disability.

2022
Page 42 of 82
3. Developmental Disabilities
• Passengers with developmental • Speak directly to the passenger
disabilities may experience impaired when making a request or giving an
cognition, mobility and/or sensory instruction, eg “Lift your arms” etc.
deficit. They must be screened without The passenger might seem
being separated from their traveling unfocussed, looking away, and not
companions. listening to at all. She/he might just
• If the passenger uses a wheelchair follow have difficulty in looking at you. The
direction provided in the slide on does not mean she/he is not
screening passengers with mobility listening.
impairments • Passenger might need a minute or so
• Allow passenger or travelling to process information and allow the
companions to offer suggestions on the screening. Wait. A moments
best way to approach and screen the patience will enable successful
passenger, especially if it is necessary to screening.
touch during screening. • Use short sentences giving one piece
• Offer to screen passenger using walk- of information at one time.
through metal detectors. • Be prepared to repeat or rephrase
• If passenger declines this option, then the information.
screen using a thorough pat down • Act naturally and maintain eye
process instead. contact.
• Do not be confrontational or frighten
the individual.
• Focus on the person – not the
disability.
4. Passenger with service animals

• The guide dog must be appropriately • Guide dogs are screened using full-
trained, certified and vaccinated as per body scanner or door-frame metal
DGCA guidelines. detector followed by a pat-down
• The animal must be wearing a harness, • Don’t engage with a guide dog
vest, or other identifiers that it is a guide without permission.
dog. • Medication for the guide dog will be
• The passenger must maintain control of subjected to x-ray and additional
the guide dog, always; He or she should screening, if required.
not be separated from the guide dog. • The passenger should not make
• The screening officer should ask for the contact with the guide dog (other
permission of the passenger before than maintaining control of the
touching the guide dog. leash) until the guide dog has been
cleared.

2022
Page 43 of 82
5. Deaf and Hard of Hearing

• Ask the passengers about the type of • Get the person’s attention. You can
assistance needed or technology used, wave or touch the person on the
e.g. hearing aids or cochlear implants, shoulder or back of the arm.
before screening begins. • Have a pen and paper handy.
• Screen passengers by walk-through • Speak directly to the person, clearly and
metal detectors. If a passenger is at a normal speed. Be patient.
unable to, conduct a pat-down. • If you need to speak loudly, do so for
• Do not remove hearing aids or cochlear the entire conversation. Avoid sounding
implant. harsh.
• Do additional screening only if it alarms • Provide a clear view of your face while
walk-through metal detector or looks speaking to enable passenger to lip
unusual in imaging technology. read.
• Do not eat or chew while speaking
• If a particular word is not understood,
try to substitute that word with another
word.
6. Persons with Deaf and blindness

• Ask the passengers about the type of • Get the person’s attention. touch the
assistance needed or technology used, person on the shoulder or back of the
e.g. hearing aids or cochlear implants, arm.
before screening begins. • Communicate by spelling the
• Screen passengers by walk-through alphabets on the passengers palm and
metal detectors. If unable to, conduct a offer your palm for response (Tactile
pat-down. sign).
• Do not remove hearing aids or cochlear • Do not touch the passenger or hand
implant. something to them without prior
• White Canes and other devices like explanation.
Braille note takers may undergo X-ray • Guide the passenger’s hand to objects
screening. by letting their hand rest lightly on the
• If an item doesn’t fit in the X-ray, or the back of yours.
passenger cannot be separated from the • Do not leave without letting the
item, it should be inspected with ETD. passenger know by touch or by signal,
• CISF staff to ask passenger if he/she even for short periods.
needs to be immediately reunited with
the device after X-ray screening

2022
Page 44 of 82
7. Speech Impairments
• Screen passengers by a walk-through Listen, but if you have difficulty
metal detector and ETD. understanding, don’t pretend you
• If unable to be screened by a walk- understand. Be patient.
through metal detector, do a thorough Repeat what you do understand for
pat- down confirmation.
Ask person to spell, rephrase or write down
the information. Have pen and paper handy.
If possible, ask questions that require short
answers or a nod or shake of the head.
Maintain eye contact.
Move to a quieter location if necessary or
possible
8 Ambulance Passenger
Screening Method
• Due to exigencies of their exceptional • In case the ambulance is privately
medical condition/illness some owned, or hospital provided, it must
passengers are directly taken through be led by the “follow me”
the Vehicle-gates to the aircraft for • Such an ambulance will be escorted by
boarding. ASG/APSU.
• The airport operator/airline operator • The ambulance will only have the
should provide its own ambulance (As patient, and attendant/doctor. The
far as possible) relatives of the patient will undergo
• The passenger and all occupants of the pre-embarkation checks at the regular
vehicle should be subjected to pre- screening points in terminal building.
embarkation check as the gate by • The movement of the ambulance
ASG/APSU, under the supervision of an should be coordinated well in advance
officer, not below rank of Inspector. by the airline operator with CASO and
• The ambulance should be permitted to airport operator.
proceed to the aircraft only after the
checks are completed.

2022
Page 45 of 82
9 Passengers with Bandages and Dressings

• If a passenger has dressings or bandages • Do not disturb the patient’s
used to cover wounds from an injury or bandages and dressings that may
surgical procedure, he or she should inform cause injury or inconvenience to
the CISF officer of the location of the the passenger.
dressings and/or bandages and of any need
for assistance before screening begins.
• Passengers with dressings or bandages can
be screened using walk through metal,
detector, ETD or a thorough pat down.
Internal Medical Devices
Passengers with internal medical devices (pacemaker or defibrillator) to inform the screening
officer before screening begins.
Do’s
• Screen passengers with a pat-down
process.
Don'ts
• Do not screen with a metal detector as it can hamper the internal device
Screening of passenger through ETD
The following checks shall be carried out in all cases of passenger with Plaster Cast:
• 10% random check of ETD of passenger is mandatory.
• Any suspicious baggage.
• 100% check of all passengers with Plaster Cast on limb etc. with specific check of the
Plaster Cast through ETD for hidden explosives.
Complete pat down search and luggage inspection must be done

2022
Page 46 of 82
Measures to facilitate transport/Transfer of Organs at Airport.
Purpose:
1. To ensure appropriate conditions are maintained during transport by air within a
security-controlled environment’.
To standardized transfer by air through a well-defined simplified procedure.
Policy:
All Human organs/tissues for transplant shipped or distributed through airlines shall be
packed with proper labeling, maintenance of preservation and biohazard precautions will be
ensured.
Packaging:
• ‘Human Organs/ Tissues for transplant’ shall be carried as an accompanied baggage
provided, they meet the appropriate packaging requirement.
• Infectious substances, as classified in the category A or B vide UN2814/UN 2900/UN
3373 in ICAO technical instructions for the ‘Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by
Air, 2005-2006’ and as per the Aircraft Dangerous Goods Rule 2003 are not permitted
for transport in carry on baggage or checked in baggage and must not be carried on
person.
Screening:
• Such organs/tissues shall be exempted from security screening and will be security
cleared by the means of physical checking of the container.
• Such packages if not accompanied, must be treated as an ‘express cargo’.
• Passenger carrying such container shall not be exempted from Pre-embarkation
security check.
Passenger’s responsibilities:
• Valid ID proof and Valid Travel Documents.
• A certificate in triplicate with signature, name , designation and seal of a competent
authority of Hospital /Medical Institution/EYE bank in its letter head specifically
mentioned that” the Organs/Tissues are free from pathogens.
• Packaging and sealing was done under the supervision of responsible officer from
Hospital/medical Institution/EYE bank, and it does not contain anything other than
human specimens. Carriage of such organs will not endanger the safety of Aircraft
and passengers on board.
• Passengers carrying such Organs/Tissues shall inform the airline at the earliest so that
proper and urgent facilitation may be provided on the day of travel.
• Upon reaching the airport the passenger must inform the airline regarding the
carriage of exempt human organs.

2022
Page 47 of 82
Airline responsibilities:
Airline security staff will check and verify all the documents and being satisfied will act as
under without waste of time:
• If the package is accompanied cabin baggage, Airline security staff will escort the
passenger till his /her the aircraft.
• SHA In-charge of ASG/APSU shall be intimated by the airline security staff regarding
such carriage of human Organ etc. to avoid any delay in security checks.
• Pilot in command and cabin crew will also be intimated so that proper arrangement
can be done for carrying such organs in the cabin of the aircraft.
• Priority Landing and takeoff permission will be obtained by Air traffic control to avoid
any deterioration.
• Airline shall keep the copy of certificate issued by the authorized Hospital/Medical
Institution/EYE bank for future record.
• The container should be kept in the correct position.
• If there is a doubt about the content of the package/box airlines security staff will
inform the supervisor for further action.
ASG/APSU Responsibilities:
• The package/container marked as "Human Organ/Tissue for Transplant" should not
be
security screened.
• ASG/APSU security personnel shall security clear such package by means of physical
check.
• ASG/APS.U security personnel in the SHA shall keep a copy of the certificate issued by
the authorized hospitals/medical institutes for future record.
• If there is any doubt about the contents, Screener will inform it to SHA In-charge for
taking further necessary action.
Diplomatic Mail Bag Procedure
Some States require that passengers granted diplomatic immunity under the Vienna
Convention, be subjected to screening.
Sealed diplomatic pouches in their possession must not be manually or physically searched.
All other carry-on items should be processed in the normal manner.
Diplomatic pouches are exempted from manual search according to Article 27, Paragraph 3
of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (18 Apr 1961). However, Some States
suggest the provisions of that Convention do not preclude the screening of such items by x-
ray devices or other technical methods.
Article 27 of the convention:

The diplomatic bag shall not be opened or detained.
The packages constituting the diplomatic bag must be clearly marked as a diplomatic bag.
2022
Page 48 of 82
The diplomatic courier must have in his/her possession an official document indicating
his/her status and the number of packages constituting the diplomatic bag.
A diplomatic bag may be entrusted to a captain of a commercial aircraft.
The following points must be verified while accepting diplomatic mail bag:
• Visible external marks of their character.

• Contain only diplomatic documents or articles intended for official use.
• Name and address of the consignee as well as that of the Foreign Diplomatic Mission.
Security Controls for Diplomatic Bag:
1. Diplomatic bags to be transported as cargo / registered baggage.
• Screened by X-ray.
• In case of serious doubts / suspicion about the contents of these bags, the matter
shall be brought to the notice of the Protocol Division of the Ministry of External
Affairs who would take appropriate action.
• Such suspicious baggage shall not be transported until and unless the doubts are
cleared to the satisfaction of security staff.
2. Diplomatic bags carried as hand baggage.
• Diplomatic Bags carried as hand baggage is exempted from Security Checks provided
that the Diplomatic Courier (holder of diplomatic passport) produces official
document from foreign diplomatic mission indicating his status and number of
diplomatic packages and a certificate by concerned diplomatic mission stating that
the packages constituting the diplomatic bag do not contain any substance which
would be dangerous and harmful to the aircraft or its passengers.
• Concerned courier / person will be allowed to go till the boarding gate to hand over /
receive the diplomatic bag.
• Pre-embarkation security checks shall be carried out on the person accompanying the
diplomatic bags and other bags carried by him unless exempted.

2022
Page 49 of 82
Exemption from Pre-embarkation check
Certain categories of VVIP/VIPs while travelling by air through the civilian airports in
the country are exempted from security checks as per the directions issued by the
regulatory authorities from time to time.
Boarding procedure for VVIP’s/ VIP are as follows:
• Boarding procedure of VVIP/VIP takes place as per the local SOP of the airport
keeping in mind the sensitivity of the airport and the status of the personnel
exempted.
• Boarding pass of VVIP/VIP will have exempted category stamp on it. Done by
ASG/APSU.
• Exempted category sticker will be affixed on the hand baggage of the VVIP/VIP for
the purpose of identification.
• Spouse of President and Vice president is exempted from pre-embarkation check
even when they are not accompanying them.
• Spouse of all other categories are exempted from Pre-embarkation check only when
they are accompanying the VVIP/VIP.
• Children of VVIP/VIP are not exempted from Pre-embarkation check.
As per BCAS AVSEC Order 06/2015, following are the categories of personnel and their
accompanying spouse are exempted from pre‐embarkation security checks:-
1. President
2. Vice President
3. Prime Minister
4. Former president
5. Governors of States
6. Former Vice president
7. Chief Justice of India
8. Speaker of Lok Sabha
9 . Union Ministers of Cabinet rank
10. Chief Ministers of States
11. Dy Chief Minister of states
12. Dy ChairmanNiti Aayog
13. Leader of opposition in Lok Sabha & Rajya Sabha
14. Holders of Bharat Ratan Decoration
15. Ambassadors of foreign countries, Charge D’ Affairs and High Commissioners and
spouses
16. Judges of Supreme Court
17. Chief Election Commissioner
18. Comptroller/auditor General of India
19. Deputy Chairman Rajya Sabha & Deputy Speaker of Lok Sabha
20. Minister of State of the Union Council of Ministers
2022
Page 50 of 82
21. Attorney General of India

22. Cabinet Secretary
23. Lt. Governors of Union Territories
24. Chiefs of staffs holding the rank of full General or equivalent rank
25. Chief Justices of High courts
26. Chief Ministers of Union Territories
27. Deputy Chief Ministers of Union Territories
28. Visiting Foreign dignitaries of the same status as at Sl. Nos. 1 to 4,7,8,9 above
29. His Holiness the Dalai Lama
30. SPG Protectee
31. Former Prime Minister of India are also exempted from pre‐embarkation checks at all
civilian airports in the country.
Note:
• Spouse of the president of India is exempted from pre‐embarkation security checks
at all civil airports even when he/she is not accompanying the president.
• Chairperson Lokpal is exempted from Pre-embarkation check at all civil airports in
INDIA.
• Shri Ajit Doval, National Security Advisor shall be exempted from Pre-embarkation
check at all civil airports in the country.
• Spouse of Vice President of INDIA is exempted from Pre-embarkation security check
at all civil airports even when he/she is not accompanying the Vice President.

2022
Page 51 of 82
Physical Inspection of Baggage required:

• When an X-Ray examination has not been able to accurately determine the contents
of baggage
• When a prescribed percentage check of baggage is required in the event of the
breakdown of X-Ray equipment
• As prescribed in local Standard Operating Procedures and conducted when higher
level of threat exists either locally or internationally.
When you examine the outside of the bag look for these things:-
1. Are there signs of tampering with, or repair to the outside of the bag?
Look for any loose wires, studs or rings which could be a safety-switch for an IED. Small
holes through which an IED could be armed by pushing a thin rod e.g. a knitting needle
through the shell of the bag.
2. Have the handles been changed or altered?
3. Are all screws, nuts, and rivets used in the construction of the bag the originals or have
they been replaced with other types or altered in some way?
4. Does the bag have more locks than is normal for the type of bag?
2022
Page 52 of 82
Are there any signs of a false bottom?
Make a check on the bag for a false bottom. Use a straight edged rod to check internal and
external measurements. There should not be excessive thickness.
Sequence of Search
In outline, when you search a passenger's bag the correct sequence is:-
1. Start the search with the bag and it’s owner in front of you. During the search the bag
must remain in the view of the passenger.
2. Ask the passenger for permission to search the bag.
3. When given permission to search, ask the passenger to unlock and open the bag.
4. Turn the bag so that it faces you.
5. Check the outside appearance and construction of the bag for signs of interference or
tampering that might indicate the presence of an IED. Also check the contents of any
outside pockets.
6. Check the contents and the inside of bag for prohibited items and dangerous goods.
7. On completion of your search, replace all the contents neatly, close and fasten the
bag.
Return the Return the bag to the passenger and thank them for their cooperation.
Discovery of Explosive Device

• Remain calm
• Call supervisor covertly
• Supervisor to call for police assistance
Discovery of Weapon
• Close the bag
• Remove it from passenger’s reach or

2022
Page 53 of 82
• Keep the bag within the x-ray equipment tunnel.

• Ask for relevant documents.
****END****

2022
Page 54 of 82

2022
Page 55 of 82

2022
Page 56 of 82

2022
Page 57 of 82

2022
Page 58 of 82

2022
Page 59 of 82

2022
Page 60 of 82

2022
Page 61 of 82

2022
Page 62 of 82

2022
Page 63 of 82

2022
Page 64 of 82

2022
Page 65 of 82

2022
Page 66 of 82

2022
Page 67 of 82

2022
Page 68 of 82

2022
Page 69 of 82

2022
Page 70 of 82

2022
Page 71 of 82

2022
Page 72 of 82

2022
Page 73 of 82

2022
Page 74 of 82

2022
Page 75 of 82

2022
Page 76 of 82

2022
Page 77 of 82

2022
Page 78 of 82

2022
Page 79 of 82

2022
Page 80 of 82

2022
Page 81 of 82

2022
Page 82 of 82
MODULE -8
PROFILING AND BEHAVIOUR

DETECTION
Page 1 of 45
2022
Slide 1
Slide 2
Slide 3
Slide 4
Page 2 of 45
2022
Slide 5
Slide 6
Slide 7
Slide 8
Page 3 of 45
2022
Slide 9
Slide 10
Slide 11
Slide 12
Page 4 of 45
2022
Slide 13
Slide 14
Slide 15
Slide 16
Page 5 of 45
2022
Slide 17
Slide 18
Slide 19
Slide 20
Page 6 of 45
2022
Slide 21
Slide 22
Slide 23
Slide 24
Page 7 of 45
2022
Slide 25
Slide 26
Slide 27
Slide 28
Page 8 of 45
2022
Slide 29
Slide 30
Slide 31
Slide 32
Page 9 of 45
2022
Slide 33
Slide 34
Slide 35
Slide 36
Page 10 of 45
2022
Slide 37
Slide 38
Slide 39
Slide 40
Page 11 of 45
2022
Slide 41
Slide 42
Slide 43
Slide 44
Page 12 of 45
2022
Slide 45
Slide 46
Slide 47
Slide 48
Page 13 of 45
2022
Slide 49
Slide 50
Slide 51
Slide 52
Page 14 of 45
2022
Slide 53
Slide 54
Slide 55
Slide 56
Page 15 of 45
2022
Slide 57
Slide 58
Slide 59
Slide 60
Page 16 of 45
2022
Slide 61
Slide 62
Slide 63
Slide 64
Page 17 of 45
2022
Slide 65
Slide 66
Slide 67
Slide 68
Page 18 of 45
2022
Slide 69
Slide 70
Slide 71
Slide 72
Page 19 of 45
2022
Slide 73
END OF MODULE 8
Page 20 of 45
2022
Profiling is described as a systematic observation to categorize each passenger by creating a short

biographical character sketch to study certain characteristic personal manner or attitude, to decide
whether the passenger is a threat to the airline or not.
Behaviour Detection Within an aviation security environment, the application of techniques involving
the recognition of behavioural characteristics, including but not limited to physiological or gestural signs
indicative of anomalous behaviour, to identify persons who may pose a threat to civil aviation.
Unpredictability. The implementation of security measures to increase their deterrent effect and their
efficiency, by applying them at irregular frequencies, different locations and/or with varying means, in
accordance with a defined framework.
Profiling is done to detect the following:
- A terrorist with intent to harm the airline.

- A terrorist with intent to cause damage to the terminal building, aircraft etc.
- Asylum seekers
- criminals
- Detection of fraudulent travel documents
- Traffickers of drugs, contraband, and Human Trafficking
Passenger Classification
Correct classification of passenger is the key element in security system. All passengers can be classified
as non-threatening and Threatening based on the suspicious sign in appearance and behavior displayed
by them.
Non- Threatening: - Are those passengers who does not pose any threat to the flight.
Threatening: - Are those passengers who have/ possess potential threat to the flight. These are the
passengers we need to keep a vigil on.
Threatening passengers are again of two types. The first type is that who does not know that they pose
a threat to the flight. While the other type of passenger are aware of this.
- UNAWARE
- AWARE
Unaware passenger:
- Naïve: - Who is unaware that his/ her baggage is in- filtered with explosives.
- Partly Naïve: - Who does not have any link with the terrorist organization but is not aware that he is
carrying explosives. Example, a passenger carrying an item on behalf of someone without checking the
contents. He knows that the package is not his but is totally unaware that the package given to him is an
IED.
- Framed terrorist: - Is one who has connection with a terrorist organization, is carrying materials for them,
Page 21 of 45
2022
but is not aware what will be the consequences of carrying the same. Instead of the documents, his
organization has given him an IED to carry. He is being used by his own organization.
Aware passenger
- Terrorist/ Hijacker: - is one who will harm by creating unlawful interference and escapes from the
target to save his/ her own life. Example bombing of Kanishka, Pan Am etc.
- Suicidal Terrorist: - is one who is ready to sacrifice his own life while creating unlawful interference.
Example Suicide incident in Moscow airport.
All Passenger
Threatening Non-threatening
unaware aware safe to travel
Unaware
Naive Partly Naive Framed Terrorist
Aware
Terrorist/ Hijacker
Suicidal Terrorist
Five Steps for Profiling
1. The Interviewing processes.

2. Threat assessment.
3. Visual profile of potential terrorist.
4. Knowledge of the information in the accompanying documents of the traveler
5. Knowledge of the average traveler.
Profiling is carried out on
Page 22 of 45
2022
• Passenger
- Business travelers
- Couples
- Traveling alone
- Traveling with Family
- Traveling with group
- Tourists
- Students
- Officials and VIPS
- Unaccompanied
- Pilgrimage
- Mourners
- Sick
- Prisoners
- Immigration deportees
• Baggage
- Carryon Baggage
- Hold Baggage
- Other items.
• Travel documents
- Passport (expired; forged; alterations; etc.)
- Visa,
- Ticket (last minute purchase; one way ticket; uneconomical routing; etc.)
- List of documents permitted for entry into Terminal.
Equipment or tools used for Profiling:
• X-BIS
• Explosive detectors
• Metal detectors
• Machine to check passport.
• Ultra-violet light
• Biometrics (Iris Scan; facial recognition; voice recognition; hand geometry; fingerprint)
Tools essential to the successful performance
a) Deviations from the norm. Any abnormality displayed either by the passenger, his travel
documents and/or his baggage.
b) Lessons from the Past. It is a known fact that terrorist use forged, altered or stolen passports and
tickets to hide their identity. The tickets are mostly purchased in the last minute and in cash.
Page 23 of 45
2022
c) Suspicious Signs. Any deviation from the norm along with lessons of the past is good enough to
’ nce and behavior,
documentation and/or baggage. At times in case, we see a person in possession on a weapon, it
can be for a specific reason for acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation, then it is termed
as critical sign and calls for the passenger to be handed over to the law enforcement.
d) Questioning Guidelines. Is used to confirm or resolve any suspicious sign observed during the
profiling process.
e) Positive Signs.
1. Diplomats have been through a strict security clearance process and are well known to the
Government, therefore, they are unlikely to carry out a terrorist act.
2. Designated VIPs or guests of the airline. These are well known to the airline and the public. They
’ hese people being involved in
a terrorist organization.
3. Direct employees of the Airlines who present a valid employee ID card and a valid ticket. All the
airline employees go through background checks to verify the possibility of being involved with a
terrorist organization prior to begin hired.
4. Military personnel and their families usually live in secure military compounds. They are more
security conscious, and it would be more difficult for ’ groups to have contact with them.
5. Frequent flyers are exposed to the airline security personnel, Immigration and Customs officials
very often. The Company has a lot of information about these people such as addresses, phone
numbers, etc.
6. A child under 12 years is unlikely to be involved with or used by a terrorist organization to carry
out an attack due to their maturity level and lack of experience.
7. Group traveling together. It would be difficult for a terrorist to infiltrate a group without raising
suspicion as they all have a common background, known to each other, ticket issued from the
same agent etc. Terrorists would not want to be part of a group because of the reservations and
information they would have to supply.
f. The Mandatory Baggage Control Questions (MBCQ).

1. Is it your baggage?
2. Did you pack it yourself?
3. Do you know the contents?
4. Was the bag in your custody throughout?
5. Are you carrying any electronic / electrical goods?
- If yes, since how long have you owned it?
- Did you lend it to someone in the recent past?
- Has it ever been repaired?
6. Did you accept any gift / packets etc. from any other person to be carried on their behalf?
7. Note: From now till the time, you board the aircraft, do not leave your hand baggage
unattended or accept any parcel from anyone.
The First step in Profiling starts with interview. When we see someone approaching us, we form a first
impression about the person by the way the person is behaving, just by observing their gestures. This
Page 24 of 45
2022
process of recognition of behavioral characteristics and ascertaining whether a person in question is a

potential threat or not for Civil Aviation is Known as Behavior Detection. Such persons need to undergo
enhanced security screening.
It is not only the passenger who possess threat to aviation industry. Even the non-travelling public are
also a concern. Hence, we also need to consider informally interacting with non-passengers, which
involves interactive dialogue (including security interviews, casual conversation, and targeted
questioning) between trained staff and non-passengers to assess the legitimacy of the non- ’
presence and their activity.
Hence, Behaviour Detection is done of three categories of persons: -
1. Passengers
2. Non-traveling persons
3. Airport staff
Profiling depends on the effectiveness of the “Behaviour ” because most individual(s)

involved or in the process of doing illegal activities are unable to speak the truth and may present
fraudulent documents to mask their true intentions and identity. Its focus on the intention of individuals
instead of prohibited items carried by passengers, behavioural detection potentially allows for the
detection of unknown threats not currently addressed by other measures in aviation security like human
trafficking, smuggling etc.
Behaviour detection is a continuous process. A person may display any abnormal sign in his behavior
while:
a) Entering inside the terminal building.
b) While at screening point.
c) While waiting at the check-in counter queue.
d) While check-in.
e) While waiting at the queue at SHA.
f) At boarding gate.
g) While boarding.
h) Inside the aircraft.
The flexibility inherent in the deployment of security staff for behavioural detection at different locations
makes it an ideal tool when unpredictable security measures are intended to be implemented in various
locations of an airport.
A) At entry gates: - in case a person shows any abnormal sign, the ASG staff shall resolve anomalous
behaviour through targeted conversation with persons and/or through additional screening at the x-
ray machines so installed near the entry gates for the purpose.
B) Any other location: - staff shall resolve anomalous behaviour through targeted conversation with
persons and/or through additional screening at the nearest location.
If anomalous behaviour cannot be resolved, refer those persons to appropriate authorities such as your
supervisor, ASG or local law enforcement.
Page 25 of 45
2022
Steps for Behavior detection

- Threat assessment
- Profile of your passenger
- Profile of potential terrorist
- Interviewing process
Passenger appearance and behavior – Suspicious signs (as mentioned below). The staff needs to ensure
all the signs displayed by the person is resolved.
A passenger who is a possible threat may be identified by the following suspicious signs:
• Sweating Shaky voice

• Nervousness Stammering
• No eye-contact. Deep sighs
• Fumbling ’ teeth
• Curiosity
• Gestures Undue interests in security procedures
• Face turns pale or white Contact with other passengers through signals.
• Shivering Cannot open his baggage.
• Biting lips First pax
• Biting nails Last pax
• Restless Inability to answer a question or reluctance.
SIGNS OF STRESS
- Late for flight

- Avoid eye contact with Security person.
- Yawning
- Excessive fidgeting
- Excessive perspiration
- Face pale from shaving (neck & face different color/ Fresh shaving after long time
- Facial Flushing (on neck & ear (pink &red)
- Faster eye blink rate (increases at stress point more)
- Increased breathing rate (faster/harder /Deeper & mouth opening)
- Adams Apple jump (audible gulp)
- Protruding Neck arteries
- Repetitive face touching
- Strong body odor
- Sweaty palms
- Trembling
- Whistling
SIGNS OF FEAR FACTOR
- Bag appears to be heavier and does not suit the passenger.

Page 26 of 45
2022
- Bag heavier and requires more efforts (Lift/Carrying/Hold or move and suggest or will sag, hang
or stress
- Bulges in clothing
- Cold penetrating stare
- Pure hatred in the eyes towards security personals
- Looking at others traveling associates
- Exaggerated emotions (excessive Laughter or chatter/swings/shift to one another)
- Repetitive grooming
- Hesitation
- Identical dress or Luggage (not traveling together)
- Powerful Grip on bag
- Rigid posture (limited or restricted range of movement or hiding something on torso)
- It may be mentioned that we need to understand that all signs displayed by the passenger may
not be threating.
- Looking for security or ASG
- Unusual Interest on security
- Display arrogance (shows superior)
- Improper attire (does not match with geographical background)
- Widely opening staring eyes (white in eye very much visible)
Signs of DECEPTION
- Appear to be confused or disoriented.

- Pax. continued distracted.
- Appear to be in disguise.
- Pax. has taken observable steps to alter his/her appearance.
- Ask security related questions.
- Does not responds to authoritative commands.
- Maintain covert ties with others.
- Pax. Pats upper body with hand
It may be mentioned that we need to understand that all signs displayed by the person may not be
threatening.
A passenger may be displaying a sign of nervousness as he might be a first-time traveller or may not be
feeling well etc. Hence the staff needs to know that all signs displayed by a person may have a threatening
as well as a non-threatening reason.
Sign/ behavior Threatening reason Non-Threatening reason

Passenger or those The terrorist or drug smuggler or Fear of flying. Passenger may
accompanying passenger their accomplices may display be intoxicated or under the
display unusual nervousness this Sign as they know that they influence of drugs.
or fear. are doing something illegal and
do not want to get caught.
Passenger refuses to The terrorist/smuggler is trying Passenger considers the
cooperate with security staff. to pressure or intimidate the screening process to be an
security agent into bypassing invasion of their privacy.
Page 27 of 45
2022
security procedures that might

reveal their identity and purpose.
Passenger maintains covert Large groups generate attention Secret love affair.
ties (secret contact) with therefore terrorists/drug
others. smugglers may split up to draw
less attention to them. If one of
the groups is caught during the
security check the other
members may still be able to
continue with the operation.
Coded signals, such as nodding,
may be used to signal the
progress of the mission.
Passenger rushes security staff The terrorist/drug smuggler is Passenger is late for the flight.
to complete procedures. trying to pressure the security Passenger may also want to
agent into overlooking details make business calls or shop
that may lead to their capture. for duty free items before the
flight.
Passenger displays exceptional In preparation for an attack or First time fliers who are
interest in security. movement of narcotics, the unfamiliar with airline
terrorist/drug smuggler will send security, or possibly
members of the organizations to passengers that are in the
check out the security operation security business themselves.
of an airline. This is designed to
ensure the success of an
operation.
Passenger arrives unusually The terrorist/drug smuggler is Passenger is genuinely late for
late for flight. trying to put pressure on the the flight or is hoping for a
security agent to overlook details last-minute upgrade.
that may lead to their capture.
Passenger insists on boarding a The terrorist has targeted a Passenger is travelling with
specific flight for no valid specific flight or needs to meet others or has an important
reason. with other members of the business meeting that they
operation at a specific time and cannot miss.
place.
Appearance and behavior not Experience has shown that when Company sponsored ticket.
consistent with price of ticket. planning an attack, the ideal
place for the terrorist to be is in
the front of the plane, as near the
cockpit as possible. Due to high
price, assures the passenger a
definite seat in case of
overbooking.
Passenger appears to be lying Maybe he is a partly naïve Asylum seeker.
or withholding information. passenger framed or a terrorist.
Page 28 of 45
2022
Will accompany with 1 or more

signs.
Passenger possesses A terrorist. Definite Hijacker. Bonafide passenger with valid
prohibited items such as license
weapons, ammunition,
explosives etc.
Passenger wearing loose Terrorist planning a hijack. Hiding Maybe not feeling well. May
clothing or clothing weapons. be travelling to a colder place
that can conceal weapons or may be carrying excess
strapped up to body. baggage.
Passenger refuses to The terrorist/smuggler is trying Passenger considers the
cooperate with security staff. to pressure or intimidate the screening process to be an
security agent into bypassing invasion of their privacy.
security procedures that might
reveal their identity and purpose.
Action to be taken in case a suspicious behavior is detected:
• Keep surveillance on the passenger (preferable electronic)

• Inform Supervisor
• Ask questions.
Casual conversation- Interview
• Extended conversation, Voluntarily informal interview

• Resolving anomalies behavior exhibited by high-risk individuals.
• Observe, ask & listen (stress/fear/ deception)
• Ask non-threatening/non coercive question.
• Ask trip story (may be pleasure, business or personal/ originating/coming back)
• Additional casual conversation with Security Officer or ASG.
Purpose of Questioning
A person can be an innocent non- threatening passenger if has a logical reason for the sign. To eliminate
this, we need to ask question. Asking questions will identify signs that are truly suspicious. It is a process
of asking a passenger, questions to determine whether he potentially possess a threat to flight.
RESOLVE To find a logical, legitimate reason behind a suspicious sign which you can believe, therefore
the sign is no longer considered suspicious. The passenger is then classified as regular/ non-threatening
passenger.
Page 29 of 45
2022
CONFIRM Unable to find a logical, legitimate reason behind a suspicious sign, therefore the sign is
considered truly suspicious. The passenger is then classified as selectee or threatening passenger and will
be subjected to enhanced security procedure.
Questioning Techniques
- Use open ended questions.

- Do not ask closed questions.
- Do not ask leading questions.
Building Rapport
- Co-operative
- Positive Interactions
- Ask non-threatening questions.
- Keep a neutral casual tone at the start.
- Listen actively and carefully.
- Practice self-awareness
Behaviour detection Security Officer should refrain from:
- Resolving any behavior.

- Asking for any ID or travel documents.
- Searching Personnel property
- Antagonizing questions.
- Persisting in engaging passenger (If he/she does not speak to you)
Points to remember:
Inconsistencies in behavior
• Are the persons action consistent with his words?
• Place the person’s action in context of the situation.
• Observe changes in behavior.
• ’ .
• Watch the person while posing question and his answers.
• Do not come to conclusion on a single sign / gesture.
He should then handover the passenger/ person in concern to his supervisor, who will then apply
additional security measures like checking of documents, screening of baggage etc. to confirm the
suspicion.
Page 30 of 45
2022
Baggage (Check-in / Hand baggage and any item on person) – Suspicious signs
The baggage of a passenger who is a possible threat may also provide signs for suspicion. These may
be:
- Profile of passenger does not match to the type of baggage.

- Baggage not matching with profession declared.
- Baggage not matching with class of travel or duration of trip.
- Baggage contents are confusing – not matching travel requirements.
- Passenger not having the baggage keys or does not know how to open the baggage.
- Name on the baggage does not match with the name on the ticket.
- Passenger carrying weapons, explosives, prohibited articles & Dangerous goods.
It may be mentioned that we need to understand that all signs displayed by the person may
not be threatening.

Baggage and/or contents of Baggage being carried by a The passenger may have
baggage inconsistent with terrorist/drug smuggler is not borrowed the baggage.
’ always packed by the same
profession, ticket class or person completing the mission. It
description of contents. is therefore possible that the
person carrying the bag is not
familiar with its contents or
dressed in a manner consistent
with the cost of the actual
baggage.
Passenger claims not to have It is not his baggage, may be Might have forgotten the
baggage keys or does not belonging to terrorist or is code number or left the keys
know how to open baggage. carrying an IED. at home.
Name on Baggage does not Baggage belongs to third party May have borrowed a
match name on ticket or i.e., Terrorist baggage from someone.
passport. Maybe the bag belongs to
some family member.
Amount of baggage unusual to This sign indicates the possibility May be transferred or on
ticketed Itinerary. that the passenger is not carrying immigration visa.
his own baggage or is carrying no
baggage at all. His true intentions
Page 31 of 45
2022
and the purpose of journey is to

hijack.
Documents - Suspicious Signs
The travel documents of a passenger may also provide signs for suspicion. The signs may be:
- Last minute purchase of ticket

- One way ticket.
- Unusual / uneconomical routing of the ticketed
- Ticket appears to be corrected forged or stolen.
- Passport appears to be forged, altered or otherwise invalid.
- Name on the passport does not match with the name on ticket.
- Personal identification information does not match with that on Passport.
- Passenger not familiar with the details in travel documents
- Passenger originating from a suspicious country.
- Passenge ’ ionality does not match with his / her profile.
Action to be taken in case a suspicious passenger is detected: -
- Keep surveillance on the passenger (preferable electronic)

- Inform Supervisor
- Check baggage thoroughly.
- Ask questions.
- Verify documents.
- Inform ASG
- Frisk thoroughly
Remember if a person is displaying a suspicious sign, it does not mean that he is of potential threat.

Passenger unable to speak A terrorist/drug smuggler may Some countries recognize
language of country of have been given a stolen foreign several different national
passport. passport to hide their identity languages, and it is possible
but does not know how to speak that the passenger is from a
the national language associated region in the country that
with the document. speaks a dialect different to
the principal one.
Passenger unfamiliar with the A terrorist/drug smuggler may Imposter. Asylum seekers.
ticket and or passport have been given a stolen
information. passport to hide their identity.
Page 32 of 45
2022
Ticket purchased within 24 A terrorist hiding his identity. Maybe traveling on business
hours of travel. Last minute tickets are most meeting planned at the last
expensive, hence will not be minute.
offloaded by airlines. Specific
target.
One way ticket On a specific mission. Maybe a student or traveling
on work permit.
Unusual routing of the ticketed Terrorist wants to hide his Long route tickets are
itinerary identity generally cheaper.
Name on the passport does Terrorist travelling on forged Typo error, name change
not matches with the name on documents. after marriage, middle name
ticket. not included or even in few
countries nick names are
commonly used. Ticket may
be booked by third party so
misspelt name.
A sign may either be resolved or confirmed with the help of interview process, document check and/or
baggage checks. If the sign is resolved, a person may be allowed to travel. However, if the sign is confirmed,
then the person must be made a Selectee and Selectee search procedure may be applied to.
Even if a passenger with positive sign displays any suspicious sign in behaviour, documentations or baggage,
the sign so displayed needs to be resolved first.
Selectee is a passenger when he / she displays at least one confirmed suspicious sign, indicating that he /
she is a threat to the Airline or the Airport in some way or other.
A thorough inspection of the contains of the baggage, screening of empty baggage and frisking of such
passengers would be done in a private screening area. At least 2 screeners of same gender would be
available to conduct such search. After the search is completed until the time the passenger boards the
aircraft, he shall be always in supervision of a security staff.
Characteristics of Profiler
- Alertness
- Awareness
- Experience
- Endurance
- Sufficient knowledge
- Flexible
- Good Interpersonal Skills
- Good Team Member and
- Quick decision maker.
Page 33 of 45
2022
COURTESY AND BEHAVIOUR expected from the profiler.

Courtesy and Behaviour at the airport:
- Image of the organization

- Satisfied customer is the best goodwill promoter.
- High Profile personnel travel through airport
- Larger Media publicity
Personal Presentation:
- Good Appearance
- Posture / gesture while dealing with the passenger.
- Clothing – pressed, neat, and clean (good turnout)
- Facial expression / body language
- Good and effective communication skills.
- Conversation with passenger- Fresh breath, voice tone /voice modulation
- Right staff at right place at the right time.
DOS AND DONTS for staff
- Positive Attitude.
- Well conversation.
- Smiling face
- Honesty
- Cooperation with the passenger
’
- Do not chew, eat during dealing with passenger.

- Do not give wrong information.
- Do not relax during duty.
- Do not irritate on the behavior of pax.
- Do not lose temper.
Never ignore a bad security impression.
****END****
Page 34 of 45
2022
Page 35 of 45
2022
Page 36 of 45
2022
Page 37 of 45
2022
Page 38 of 45
2022
Page 39 of 45
2022
Page 40 of 45
2022
Page 41 of 45
2022
Page 42 of 45
2022
Page 43 of 45
2022
Page 44 of 45
2022
Page 45 of 45
2022
MODULE -09
PROTECTION AND SEARCH OF

AIRCRAFT
Page 1 of 28
2022
Slide 1
Slide 2
Slide 3
Slide 4
Page 2 of 28
2022
Slide 5
Slide 6
Slide 7
Slide 8
Page 3 of 28
2022
Slide 9
Slide 10
Slide 11
Slide 12
Page 4 of 28
2022
Slide 13
Slide 14
Slide 15
Slide 16
Page 5 of 28
2022
Slide 17
Slide 18
Slide 19
Slide 20
Page 6 of 28
2022
Slide 21
Slide 22
Slide 23
Slide 24
Page 7 of 28
2022
Slide 25
Slide 26
Slide 27
Slide 28
Page 8 of 28
2022
Slide 29
Slide 30
Slide 31
Slide 32
Page 9 of 28
2022
Slide 33
Slide 34
Slide 35
Slide 36
Page 10 of 28
2022
Slide 37
Slide 38
Slide 39
Slide 40
Page 11 of 28
2022
Slide 41
Slide 42
Slide 43
Slide 44
Page 12 of 28
2022
Slide 45
Slide 46
Slide 47
End of Module 9
Page 13 of 28
2022
Module 09- Protection and Search of Parked Aircraft
Responsibility of protecting aircraft lies with the aircraft operator (airline).
The Security Principle Défense in Depth

• Levels or layers of security measures build upon each other to protect aircraft and airline
operations.
• First line of defence is the integrity of the airport perimeter and landside / airside boundaries.
• Security Restricted Area measures provide another layer.
• Security staff operating in immediate proximity of aircraft or patrolling the apron provide
another layer.
• Crew and other airline staff on board the aircraft provide another layer.
PROTECTION OF AIRCRAFT
Procedures for normal conditions

• Aircraft crew and maintenance staff to challenge and identify all persons attempting to board the
aircraft to ensure only authorized people allowed on board.
• Where security staff are operating in the on or around the aircraft, they should identify all persons
approaching, or attempting to access the aircraft or any part thereof.
• SRA pass holders are obligated to challenge persons without appropriate identification on display
while in the SRA or attempting to board an aircraft.
• Aircraft not in service should have all access points secured, access stairs or passenger loading
bridges removed. Stairs left near aircraft should be immobilized.
Procedure for Increased threat condition

• Increased threat situation requires the airline concerned to coordinate all security
measures and ensure procedures and measures are properly implemented.
• Dedicated point guards in close proximity to each aircraft
• Increased frequent random foot or mobile security patrols.
• Additional portable security lighting and backup power supply.
Control of Access to the aircraft

• During periods of increased threat, security staff must be positioned to observe, challenge,
identify and authorize access.
• Check the credentials of all persons seeking access to the immediate vicinity or to the interior of
the aircraft and confirming that each has a legitimate requirement for that access.
• Search persons, bags, tools and cleaning equipment to ensure they do not conceal weapons,
explosives and/or their components. Detect and/or deter unauthorized access, and report to
Page 14 of 28
2022
the captain, airline representatives or security authorities any attempted or unauthorized access
and /or discovery of suspect or prohibited items.
Airline Procedures for Unattended Aircraft

• Aircraft are parked in a well-lit area.
• The area should be easily observed.
• All external doors must be closed.
• Aircraft should be parked away from fences or buildings to prevent easy access.
• Access stairs, passenger loading bridges and hold loading equipment must be removed from the
vicinity of the aircraft and immobilized.
Guarding Duties
• Establish the integrity of the aircraft upon taking up duty.
• Search for suspect explosive devices in immediate area.
• Challenge all persons approaching aircraft.
• Check authorization of persons claiming a need to access the aircraft.
• Make visual inspection of the exterior.
Aircraft Intrusion
• A Security Search of aircraft must be conducted.
• Carried out by airline personnel or security staff who are properly trained for aircraft type.
• ’
Aircraft Security Checks / Searches

Why must an aircraft search be carried out?
There are legal and business reasons for carrying out aircraft searches.
What should the Searchers look for?

• That should not be there / out of place.
• That cannot be accounted for
When to search?
There are 4 instances when searches are usually conducted:
• Pre-flight;
• Transit Flight;
• Post flight; and
• When the Aircraft is under increased threat.
Page 15 of 28
2022
Guidelines for Pre-Flight Security Check
• The search should normally be carried out just prior to the time that the aircraft is taken into
service.
• Regular search of aircraft for suspect explosive devices and weapons shall be conducted prior
to commencing each flight. A similar search will be required when an aircraft is suspected of
being the target of an act of unlawful interference.
• Aircraft operators shall conduct pre-flight security checks only after all maintenance and
cleaning staff have vacated the aircraft and prior to passengers embarking; Flight and cabin
crew, besides engineering and security staff, may conduct these checks provided they are
adequately trained.
• A security checklist shall be use by airlines staff during such preflight security checks.
• Aircraft operators shall ensure that an aircraft is protected from unauthorized interference
from the time the aircraft search or check has commenced until the aircraft departs.
Guidelines on Pre-Flight Security Check for Transit Flights
Searches for Transit Flights are necessary when:
• Passengers disembark at the transit station.
• Any catering supplies or stores are loaded.
• Passengers remaining on board must identify their belongings before the search commences.
• If no passengers disembark, remain in a sterile area and access is limited to persons authorized
and supervised by the airline or its handling agent, no search may be required.
Guidelines on Security Check for Post Flights
• Post-flight searches are usually conducted of the areas to which passengers may have had access
to ensure that nothing is left on board that may cause a hazard to the aircraft.
• When an aircraft that has disembarked passengers and has had a post-flight search it may not
need to be searched again before departure provided that access has been controlled throughout
the time it is on the ground. (Local procedures will apply)
When the Aircraft is under increased threat

Page 16 of 28
2022
Apply SOP
Note: The Security Supervisor shall ensure that the Aircraft Release certificate is signed by all the
concerned departments and signature is obtained from the Commander of the flight.
A copy of the signed aircraft release certificate shall be kept for record with the security department
and will be put up for scrutiny during checks and audit by the BCAS officers.
Responsibility for Searches

Searches are to be conducted by the staff members most familiar with the area they are searching,
therefore:
Flight crew and designated airline engineer staff are usually responsible for searching all those areas
that have a direct bearing on the safe operation of the aircraft including:
• Aircraft cockpit.
• Wheel bays
• Exterior of the aircraft and control surfaces.
• Engine nacelles; and
• Technical areas.
Cabin Crew and/or trained Security staff are usually responsible for searching the interior of the
aircraft including:
• Passenger cabins.
• Seats
• Baggage storage lockers
• Lavatories / WC
• Galleys; and
• Other areas such as the baggage hold A Checklist should be employed and samples will be
provided later in module.
Action on locating a SUSPECT ITEM

Action by Searcher:
• Do not touch.
• Notify supervisor.
• Evacuate Aircraft
• Remember description of object/item.
• Mark area where object item is located.
Action by supervisor:
• Inform airline manager.
• Inform crew if already on board.
• Inform airport manager (Airport Operator)
• Inform BDDS.
****END****
Page 17 of 28
2022
Page 18 of 28
2022
Page 19 of 28
2022
Page 20 of 28
2022
Page 21 of 28
2022
Page 22 of 28
2022
Page 23 of 28
2022
Page 24 of 28
2022
Page 25 of 28
2022
Page 26 of 28
2022
Page 27 of 28
2022
Page 28 of 28
2022
MODULE -10
PROTECTION AND SEARCH OF
CATERING STORES, CATERING
SUPPLIES AND INFLIGHT
SUPPLIES
Page 1 of 15
2022
Slide 1
Slide 2
Slide 3
Page 2 of 15
2022
Slide 4
Slide 5
Slide 6
Page 3 of 15
2022
Slide 7
Slide 8
Slide 9
Page 4 of 15
2022
Slide
10
Slide
11
Slide
12
Page 5 of 15
2022
Slide
13
Slide
14
Slide
15
Page 6 of 15
2022
Slide
16
Slide
17
Slide
18
Page 7 of 15
2022
Slide
19
Slide
20
Slide
21
Page 8 of 15
2022
Slide
22
Slide
23
Page 9 of 15
2022
Slide
24
Slide
25
Slide
26
Page 10 of 15
2022
END OF MODULE 10
Security Controls by the Caterer
1. Officer to supervise Security Controls.

2. Perimeter as per BCAS Mandate (8 ft and 1.5 ft wire)
3. Premises secured with CCTV coverage. CCTV room to manned 24X7.
4. Access control
5. Personnel employed for preparation and delivery of catering supplies – regular
employee and should have undergone Security Awareness Training.
6. Deliveries of Raw material and equipment to be X-rayed or physically checked.
7. Chilling rooms and refrigerators under strict control
8. Catering carts should have proper locking systems.
9. Security certificate for each consignment to be loaded in aircraft.
10. HLV’s should be securable.
11. Inventory of all stocks including security sticker/seal and Knives & cleavers.
Page 11 of 15
2022
12. In case of external service provider, it should be security cleared.

13. Items like POS, Credit Card machine etc not a part of Catering stores or
supplies.
No airline operator shall accept any catering items for loading in the aircraft unless
a written contract is signed between both the agencies (Air operator & the caterer)
Stages of Catering Security
1. Preparation
2. Pre-Setting
3. Hi-lift/ Transportation
• The airline security personnel will be present at the catering facility to closely
supervise the pre-setting of the catering uplift and while placing them into the
meal carts / containers.
• They will ensure that no unauthorized personnel have access to the catering
uplift.
• All security checked / cleared catering uplift will be sealed prior to loading into
the hi-lift van/ vehicle.
• Hi-lift van / vehicle will be checked for any prohibited and dangerous item
prior to
• loading of the security cleared catering uplift.
• The HLV should be properly maintained and the rolling shutters on both sides
should have provision for locking arrangements and during an operation the
shutters should be locked and sealed.
• The transportation of the catering uplift from the catering facility to the
airport /aircraft shall be done under escort and strict supervision by the airline
security officials/ catering officials.
• While transferring the catering uplift from the HLV to the aircraft, airline
security official shall check the seals affixed at catering facility for any traces of
tampering and then handover the same to the cabin crew.
• All security stickers/ seals will be always kept under safe custody and a proper
• record of the security seals used for sealing the catering uplift and HLV will be
maintained.
• Record to be maintained for a minimum of 07 Days.
Systematic Search of a Food Trolley
Page 12 of 15
2022
• Search under the food trolley and check locks.

• Open both ends of the trolleys and look for anything unusual inside the
trolley.
• Check the trays for unusual weight.
• Search the top part of the trolley namely the ice tray.
• Seal the trolley once it has been security cleared.
Security Controls for Newspapers and Cleaning supplies etc.
Newspapers, magazines, cleaning stores and supplies or any other item for loading
in the aircraft must be subjected to the following security controls: -
• The stores and supplies have been obtained from an establishment with whom
the air operator has a written contract for the purpose.
• The stores and supplies have been searched by hand or X-ray screened to
prevent the introduction of any prohibited article.
• Before allowing access to the aircraft, the cleaning staff shall be frisked, and all
the articles carried by them checked properly by the airline operator.
• Any other security controls prescribed by the DG, BCAS.
Response to Tampering of Security Seals/ Stickers
• Inform the supervisor immediately.

• Carry out a thorough check of the HLV, catering uplift for any suspicious items.
• Record the incident.
****END****
Page 13 of 15
2022
Page 14 of 15
2022
Page 15 of 15
2022
MODULE -11
PROTECTING CARGO, MAIL

AND COURIERS
Page 1 of 45
2022
Slide 1
Slide 2
Slide 3
Slide 4
Page 2 of 45
2022
Slide 5
Slide 6
Slide 7
Page 3 of 45
2022
Slide 8
Slide 9
Slide
10
Slide
11
Page 4 of 45
2022
Slide
12
Slide
13
Slide
14
Page 5 of 45
2022
Slide
15
Slide
16
Slide
17
Slide
18
Page 6 of 45
2022
Slide
19
Slide
20
Slide
21
Page 7 of 45
2022
Slide
22
Slide
23
Slide
24
Slide
25
Page 8 of 45
2022
Slide
26
Slide
27
Slide
28
Page 9 of 45
2022
Slide
29
Slide
30
Slide
31
Slide
32
Page 10 of 45
2022
Slide
33
Slide
34
Slide
35
Page 11 of 45
2022
Slide
36
Slide
37
Slide
38
Slide
39
Page 12 of 45
2022
Slide
40
Slide
41
Slide
42
Page 13 of 45
2022
Slide
43
Slide
44
Slide
45
Slide
46
Page 14 of 45
2022
Slide
47
Slide
48
Slide
49
Page 15 of 45
2022
Slide
50
Slide
51
Slide
52
Slide
53
Page 16 of 45
2022
Slide
54
Slide
55
Slide
56
Page 17 of 45
2022
Slide
57
Slide
58
Slide
59
Page 18 of 45
2022
Module 11
Protecting Cargo, Mail and Couriers

Definition:
“Any property carried on board an aircraft other than mail, stores and accompanied or mishandled
Baggage.” is termed as Air Cargo
Types of Cargo
• General Cargo
• Perishable Cargo (PER)
• Valuable Cargo (VAL)
• Live animals (AVI)
• Diplomatic mail (DIP)
• Company Stores ( Comail / Comat)
• Human Remains (HUM)
• Transhipment Cargo
• Express cargo / parcel
Consignments that are treated as cargo

• Courier
• Postal mail
IATA codes identifying cargo and mail subject to methods to screening:-
PHS:-Physical Inspection and/or hand search

VCK:-Visual Check
XRY:-X-Ray Equipment
RES:-Remote Explosive Scent Tracing Explosive Detection Dogs.
FRD:-Free Running Explosive Detection Dogs.
VPT:-Vapour Trace
PRT:-Particle Trace
MDE:-Metal Detection Equipment.
SIM:-Subjected to Flight Simulation
AOM:-Subjected to any other means.
Page 19 of 45
2022
New Screening Exemption Codes:-
SMUS:-Small Undersized shipments

BIOM:-Bio-Medical Samples.
DIPL:-Diplomatic Bags or Diplomatic mail.
LFSM:-Life-Saving materials.
NUCL:-Nuclear Materials.
TRNS:-Transfer or Transhipment.
Transportation of Air Cargo

Air cargo may be transported by air, both on passenger and cargo-only aircraft. Many large airlines
have very few cargo-only aircraft in comparison to the size of their fleet. Air cargo may also be transport
by truck/haulier on a pre or post flight sector, depending on regional or national legislation.
Transportation of Air Cargo involves operations at three levels:

• Consigners (individual or companies) who send items of cargo by air,
• Agents who provide a link between consigners and airlines;
• Airlines, which carry the Cargo.
How cargo moves
Page 20 of 45
2022
Why is cargo vulnerable / attractive target for terrorist attacks?

• Volume carried increasing – Aircraft is seen as fastest mode of transportation
• Cargo system well known
• Able to target specific flights
• Difficult to screen – Nature and size of cargo
• Low risk to terrorist – cannot be identified after the attacks.
Need For Cargo Security:

Security standards throughout the civil aviation industry have improved over the years and that the
potential terrorist has had to adjust accordingly, choosing a softer (more vulnerable) point of attack.
Preventive Security
A degree of security can be achieved by a number of complimentary measures including but not
limited to:
• Prevention of explosive devices being placed into consignments at source;
• The maintenance of the security of consignments once declared secure; and
• The devotion of maximum effort to screening cargo consignments whose security cannot be readily
determined.
Cargo Acceptance Procedures:

• Visual inspection of consignment to establish evidence of tampering
• Check of shipping documentation
• Establishing the identity of the consignor/ person delivering
• Protecting the consignment from unlawful interference from the time of acceptance
• Consignment security declaration form to be filled by the consignor delivering the goods.
Protection of Cargo
• Cargo and mail to be carried on an aircraft are protected from unauthorized interference from
the point security controls are applied until departure of the aircraft.
• ’ ty, staff to ensure that no cargo
consignment is allowed unless it has passed through the prescribed security control.
• After security check of the cargo consignments, security sticker to be pasted / affixed.
• Security measures as mentioned above shall be specifically indicated in the cargo manifest
which should signed by Airlines Security & APSU/ASG before it is loaded in the aircraft.
Methods for Screening Cargo:
• Profiling
o Visual Checks of cargo including document checks
• Screen by X-ray
o For prohibited / objectionable items
Page 21 of 45
2022
• Search by Hand
o In case X-ray Machine is not available / cannot be x-ray screened due to size etc.
o Cargo which is segregated from X-ray BIS must be physically examined to confirm that it is
not hazardous
o While the physical check is being carried out and if the security staff notices some explosive
material with allied gadgets, it should not be further examined. Such items must be
segregated and immediate superior must be informed.
• Cooling Off
o In case X-ray & physical checks is not possible then the cargo is required to be cooled off
and adequate entry in register for the same is to be made. Cooling off may also be required
on the cargo consignment which is doubtful. Such consignment is left for 24 hrs cooling off
on ground, before it is sent to the aircraft. If this cargo contains an IED with time/delay
mechanism it explodes on the ground, thus ensuring the aircraft is safe.
NOTE: This will only be resorted to when all the other tests mentioned above could not be carried
out or still doubt exists in the mind of the security staff, even after carrying out the test, that the
consignment could be dangerous.
• Use of ETD / EVD - As per regulation
• Metal detectors
• Flight Simulation chamber (Decompression Chamber)
It is cylindrical vessel mounted on a concrete slab with

chamber walls which can withstand the pressure of
05kgs of TNT. It operates on the principle of activating
explosive device in suspect object by simulating
physical condition in a real journey.
Security Control of Normal / General Cargo (As per Avsec Circular 08/2008)
Cargo can be security cleared by:
- X-Ray Screening
- Physical Checking
- If not cleared by above two methods then to be cooled off for 24 Hours.
Apart from the above security measures staff will also ensure following aspects:
- Affixing of prescribed security sticker on the cleared consignments

- Prescribed Security Declaration from Cargo Agent
- Manifest indicating Security control against each consignment
- Protection of security cleared cargo
Page 22 of 45
2022
- Escorting of cargo consignment.
Security Measures for carriage of Dead bodies/human Cremated Remains
Following security controls will be applied by the aircraft operator for carriage of dead body/Human/
Crematal.
Station Manager/Station Security Manager of the Aircraft Operator will examine and validate
accompanying documents as below:-
In case of movement from a station within India

• Death Certificate from a competent Medical Authority;
• Embalming Certificate by the Hospital/competent Authority;
• Permission by the local Police Authorities for carrying dead body/human remains;
• Any document like Driving licence or Passport or any other Photo ID Card issued by a Govt./semi-
Govt. agency to establish identity of the deceased.
In case of transportation from a Foreign Station

• Death Certificate from a competent Medical Authority;
• Embalming Certificate by the Hospital/competent Authority;
• Certificate by the local Police Authority for carriage of dead body/human remains;
• Permission from the Indian Mission for carriage;
• Copies of cancelled passport of the deceased.
1. Identity of the relative/person who accompanies the dead body/human remains shall be
established.
2. In case no relative/person accompanies the dead body/human remains the consignment will be
screened through X-ray, to ensure that it does not contain any prohibited/dangerous item.
3. In the absence of X-ray machine at a particular station, dead body/human remains shall be
inspected visually by a responsible employee of the aircraft operator to ensure that the
consignment has dead body/human remains only and nothing else which may endanger safety of
the flight.
Security Measures for Mail
Security Controls for Mail bags by Postal Authorities will be as under:

The acceptance, processing and handling of mail to be
carried by air shall be done by regular and duly trained staff
of the Postal authorities
Letters or parcels weighing less than 200 grams
Page 23 of 45
2022
• These may not be X-ray screened or may not be subjected to cooling off period.
• A Certificate to the effect that the postal bag does not contain any letter or parcel which weighs
more than 200 grams, shall be obtained by the airline operator from the Postal authorities.
• Airline Operator will ensure that the postal bags with suspected sign of tampering en-route shall
be segregated and subjected to additional security controls; and
• If the suspicious bag cannot be checked physically it shall not be accepted for carriage.
Letters or parcels weighing 200 grams and above

Duties of the postal authorities
• The postal authorities will screen the postal mail bags by X-ray machine at their premises.
• If X-ray machine is not available, the mail shall be subjected to cooling off for at least 24 hours.
• The Postal authorities shall issue a Certificate to the airline operator certifying that the security
measures have been fully complied with and the mail or speed post, as the case may be, does
not contain any prohibited item.
Airline duties
(a) The mail is handled by the regular and duly trained staff of the airline operator;
(b) The security staff of the airline operator shall check the condition of the mail bags and
accompanied security certificate(s) as specified in these rules. Postal bags with suspected
sign of tampering en-route shall be segregated and subjected to additional security controls;
and
(c) The airline operator shall x-ray screen all the mail bags.
(d) In case of suspicious on such baggage shall be checked physically in the presence of an
official of the postal authority. If the suspicious bag cannot be checked physically due to one
reason or the other, the same shall not be accepted by Aircraft Operator.
(e) If any prohibited article is detected during screening of mail/ speed post, the aircraft
operator shall withhold such mail initiate legal action.
Diplomatic mail bag (Reference Avsec Order 05/2002)
The following points must be verified while accepting

diplomatic mail bag:
• Visible external marks of their character
• Contain only diplomatic documents or
articles intended for official use.
• Name and address of the consignee as well
as that of the Foreign Diplomatic Mission / Consular
Post a sender.
1. Diplomatic bags to be transported as cargo / registered baggage

• Screened by X-ray
Page 24 of 45
2022
• In case of serious doubts / suspicion about the contents of these bags, the matter shall be brought
to the notice of the Protocol Division of the Ministry of External Affairs who would take
appropriate action.
• Such suspicious baggage shall not be transported until and unless the doubts are cleared to the
satisfaction of security staff.
2. Diplomatic bags carried as hand baggage

• Diplomatic Bags carried as hand baggage is exempted from Security Checks
• Concerned courier / person will be allowed to go till the boarding gate to hand over / receive the
diplomatic bag
• Pre-embarkation security checks shall be carried out on the person accompanying the diplomatic
bags and other bags carried by him should be security checked
• The holder of a diplomatic bag must submit a certificate by concerned diplomatic mission stating
that the packages constituting the diplomatic bag do not contain any substance which would be
dangerous and harmful to the aircraft or its passengers.
Courier and Express Consignments
For acceptance of courier loads by an airline:
• The courier company has been duly registered with the airline operator; and
• It has established and implemented a security programme approved by the Appropriate Authority.
The airline will ensure that:
• the consignment has been handed over personally by a responsible person of the organisation;
• Consignment is accompanied by a Courier Certificate from the authorized signatory of such
organisation.
• The courier bag has been properly marked externally to facilitate identification with the relevant
courier;
• The courier to whom such bag belongs has checked-in for the flight on which it is to be carried ;
• If a courier checked-in for a flight is not on board the aircraft, his bags shall be off-loaded from the
aircraft and shall not be carried on that flight.
Security Measures
• - Screening through x-ray
• - Each baggage/ bag being viewed from two different angles and
• - 15 % Physical check on continuous random basis.
• Unaccompanied courier bags shall be treated as express cargo and shall be subjected to the same
security controls as specified for express cargo.
• If any prohibited article is detected during the course of screening, such consignment shall not be
allowed to be loaded into the aircraft and legal action initiated against the consignor.
• After application of the prescribed security controls, sterility of the cargo/ express cargo/ courier
bags etc, whether inside or outside the aerodrome premises, shall be maintained until such time
Page 25 of 45
2022
that these are placed on board aircraft. The screened items shall not be left unguarded at any
stage until departure of the aircraft.
• Tamper-proof security stickers bearing serial number and date shall be affixed on the screened
cargo/ express cargo/ courier bags, indicating clearly the type of security controls applied to them.
Carriage of High Risk Cargo and Mail (HRCM)
Cargo or Mail which is deemed to pose a threat to civil aviation as a result of specific
intelligence or shows anomalies or signs of tampering which give rise to suspicion.
Security measures for HRCM (Reference NCASP- 7.8.13.1)
A . A combination of X-ray screening with following additional screening methods shall be adopts
• Explosive Detection Dogs (EDD); or
• Explosive Trace Detection (ETD); or
• Physical hand search
B . For mail or cargo below 500 gms

• Dual view x-ray equipment; or
• Single view x-ray equipment, provided that every item is examined from at least two
different by the same screener.
Security Controls for Trans-shipment cargo
Trans-shipment cargo is a consignment of Cargo originating from an airport within or outside India
’
number for carriage on another flight from any airport in India.
For cargo originating from India for a foreign station:

- Consignment Security Declaration
- All security measures to be followed as originating cargo
- Escorted till aircraft
For bonded cargo transiting at an Indian airport for further transportation to a foreign station:
- Appropriate documentation will be examined and confirmed as accurate.
- Escorted to departure aircraft
For cargo originating from a foreign station:

- Appropriate documentation will be examined and confirmed as accurate.
- In case of any discrepancy in the documentation, this will be resolved and a record made of the
discrepancies.
- In case the discrepancies remain unresolved, the consignment will be treated as Unknown Cargo
and screened accordingly.
- Escorted to departure aircraft
Page 26 of 45
2022
- In case the bonded / transhipment cargo moves through landside, it will be treated as originating
cargo and screened accordingly.
Security Measures for Perishable Cargo:
Articles Which Are Liable To Deteriorate Or Perish Due To Changes In

Climate, Altitude, Temperature Or Any Other Normal Exposure
Inherent To Carriage Of Cargo By Air, Or Length Of Time Etc.
Security Measures
• Security Declaration by the consignor
• X-ray Screening
• Physical Checks
• EDS
Security measures for Company mail (Comail) and Company material (Comat)
Comail: Aircraft operator company mail, shipped within the

’
Comat: Aircraft operator company materials, shipped within the

’
Security Measures
• Security Declaration by concerned department signed by a responsible person

• X-ray Screening or
• Physical Checks
Note: Comail / Comat containing Dangerous Goods to be referred to personnel qualified in handling
Dangerous Goods for carriage.
Page 27 of 45
2022
Security Measures for Live animals (AVI)
Live animals may be carried as Cargo or as registered baggage.

Adequate security measures needs to be carried out for
transportation of the same.
• Certificate from Veterinary Doctor – if carried as registered baggage

• Cage / Box to be examined
o Physical / X-ray
• Items attached to the body of animal to be examined
• Live Animals not to be put through X-ray
Security of Cargo Complex at airports
• Entry/Exit to Cargo Complex and Sterile Area beyond cargo screening points at the airports shall
be guarded by ASG / APSU at all airports.
• All airport operators to create a Sterile Hold Area in the Cargo Complex at airports by erecting
concrete walls or wire mesh.
****END****
Page 28 of 45
2022
Page 29 of 45
2022
Page 30 of 45
2022
Page 31 of 45
2022
Page 32 of 45
2022
Page 33 of 45
2022
Page 34 of 45
2022
Page 35 of 45
2022
Page 36 of 45
2022
Page 37 of 45
2022
Page 38 of 45
2022
Page 39 of 45
2022
Page 40 of 45
2022
Page 41 of 45
2022
Page 42 of 45
2022
Page 43 of 45
2022
Page 44 of 45
2022
Page 45 of 45
2022
MODULE -12
RESPONSE TO SECURITY
EMERGENCIES AND
CONTINGENCIES
Page 1 of 90
2022
Slide 1
Slide 2
Page 2 of 90
2022
Slide 3
Slide 4
Slide 5
Page 3 of 90
2022
Slide 6
Slide 7
Page 4 of 90
2022
Slide 8
Slide 9
Slide 10
Page 5 of 90
2022
Slide 11
Slide 12
Page 6 of 90
2022
Slide 13
Slide 14
Slide 15
Page 7 of 90
2022
Slide 16
Slide 17
Slide 18
Page 8 of 90
2022
Slide 19
Slide 20
Page 9 of 90
2022
Slide 21
Slide 22
Slide 23
Page 10 of 90
2022
Slide 24
Slide 25
Page 11 of 90
2022
Slide 26
Slide 27
Slide 28
Page 12 of 90
2022
Slide 29
Slide 30
Page 13 of 90
2022
Slide 31
Slide 32
Slide 33
Page 14 of 90
2022
Slide 34
Slide 35
Page 15 of 90
2022
Slide 36
Slide 37
Slide 38
Page 16 of 90
2022
Slide 39
Slide 40
Page 17 of 90
2022
Slide 41
Slide 42
Slide 43
Page 18 of 90
2022
Slide 44
Slide 45
Page 19 of 90
2022
Slide 46
Slide 47
Slide 48
Page 20 of 90
2022
Slide 49
Slide 50
Page 21 of 90
2022
Slide 51
Slide 52
Slide 53
Page 22 of 90
2022
Slide 54
Slide 55
Page 23 of 90
2022
Slide 56
Slide 57
Slide 58
Page 24 of 90
2022
Slide 59
Slide 60
Page 25 of 90
2022
Slide 61
Slide 62
Slide 63
Page 26 of 90
2022
Slide 64
Slide 65
Page 27 of 90
2022
Slide 66
Slide 67
Slide 68
Page 28 of 90
2022
Slide 69
Slide 70
Page 29 of 90
2022
Slide 71
Slide 72
Slide 73
Page 30 of 90
2022
Slide 74
Slide 75
Page 31 of 90
2022
Slide 76
Slide 77
Slide 78
Page 32 of 90
2022
Slide 79
Slide 80
Page 33 of 90
2022
Slide 81
Slide 82
Slide 83
Page 34 of 90
2022
Slide 84
Slide 85
Page 35 of 90
2022
Slide 86
Slide 87
Slide 88
Page 36 of 90
2022
Slide 89
Slide 90
Page 37 of 90
2022
Slide 91
Slide 92
Slide 93
Page 38 of 90
2022
Slide 94
Slide 95
Page 39 of 90
2022
Slide 96
Slide 97
Slide 98
Page 40 of 90
2022
Slide 99
Slide 100
Page 41 of 90
2022
Slide 101
Slide 102
Page 42 of 90
2022
Slide 103
END OF MODULE
Page 43 of 90
2022
Module 12
Response to Security Emergencies and Contingencies

TYPES OF AIRPORT EMERGENCIES
Emergencies involving aircraft. These include:
• Incident’s involving-Aircraft on airport

• Incidents -Aircraft off airport
• Incident-Aircraft in flight
• Incident-Aircraft on ground
• Sabotage, including bomb threat.
• Unlawful seizure
Emergencies not involving aircraft. These include:
• Fire
• Sabotage, including bomb threat at airport
• Natural disaster
• Terrorist attack of ATC/terminal building
• Terrorist attack of airport
• Breakdown of runway
• Emergencies at airport(fire, collapse of airport building
Medical emergencies. These include:
• Collapsed person
• Sudden death
• Industrial accidents
Page 44 of 90
2022
• Delivery of newborn
• Communicable disease alert
• Collective food poisoning.
Bomb Threat:
Bomb threat can be received to any aircraft which is on ground or in flight, at any
airport, vital installation, or any civil aviation facility like ATC, cargo facility,
navigational aid area or any person. The call received can be genuine, politically
motivated, hoax or malicious call to disturb safe operation of flight .Bomb threat
is also conveyed by any helpful person who informs concerned airline or airport
agencies regarding bomb threat, which he overheard or came to know, etc.
Bomb Threat Calls are made by
• Terrorist in order to check the efficiency of airport security.

• Mentally ill, practical jokers or those who want to play prank.
• Delayed passenger / Disgruntle passenger can give malicious bomb threat
call to civil aviation.
Whenever we receive a bomb threat call for any aircraft or any civil aviation
facility, there are four phases of handling that bomb threat
• Receipt
• Report
• Risk Assessment
• Response
Bomb Threat and its response Action in case of Bomb Threat Call:
Considering that the safety of lives / property under circumstances of a bomb

threat is directly linked to the prompt and appropriate decision of the BTAC, it
shall be the moral obligation on the part of senior most officials within each
agency to attend the BTAC whenever possible. However, also considering that
the senior most official within each agency may not be present at the airport
Page 45 of 90
2022
round the clock due to the nature of official duty / routine work performed,
the next senior most official within such agency authorized as alternate
member of BTAC may attend the BTAC.
We often get b o m b t h r e a t calls at airport. Analysis of these calls reveals

that such calls are given by delayed passengers, those who has been denied
seats by airlines, drunken people, trickster, media crazy people, jilted lovers,
dismissed or suspended employees, love birds, competitors, politically motivated
people etc.
In case if you ask these callers about the details of bomb or reason for
bombing, their name, place or telephone number etc they will immediately put
the receiver down.
It is therefore suggested that telephone operators, Control room staff etc are to be
trained to ask following questions:-
• Where is the bomb?

• When will it go off?
• What does it look like?/ What type of device is used?
• Who are you?
• Why are you doing this?
Actions on Receiving a Bomb Threat Call
• Remain calm
• Ensure caller ID has registered calling number and note it down
• Switch on voice recording facility(if it is not automatic)
• Allow the caller to complete his conversation first without interruption.
• Note exact time of call
• Try to prolong call (if possible) to get maximum information.
• Ask open–ended questions instead of leading questions.
• Alert colleagues and supervisors who can also listen to conversation.
• Observe callers sex, voice, language, approx age, background noise etc.
• Note actual words and Record other details
• Inform all details to supervisor
Page 46 of 90
2022
Supervisor to interview the receiver of threat call in order to complete the bomb
threat report form (BTRF) and relay the information without delay to the
respective BTAC coordinator of the affected airport for which the threat has
been received for.
Other information to be reported by the recipient of a Bomb Threat Call
• The background noise from where the call is been made

• Identification of gender
• Exact time of call
• Actual wording
• Approximate age
The response to the above questions and background details will help the
bomb threat assessment committee members to evaluate the call to “SPECIFIC”
or “NON SPECIFIC”
As per BCAS mandates all publicly advertised telephone number must have: -
a) Caller Line Identification Procedure (CLIP) facility.
b) BTRF
Actions to be taken by the Aircraft Operator.
On receipt of the threat call the air carrier will take immediate actions as under
a) Rush to attend the BTAC meeting after leaving instructions to next senior
official to: execute actions given as under
b) Where passengers have fully/partially boarded, quickly disembark such
passengers/ crew in an orderly manner with hand baggage and bring them
back to SHA through departure hall for further action.
c) Ask crew and ground staff on board / in cargo hold to look for and
report any unidentified article before they themselves finally disembark
due to bomb threat. (The crew and ground staff should be cautioned not to
touch, open or attempt to remove any unclaimed article/device but report
to the coordinator).
Page 47 of 90
2022
d) Ask airline Engineers / staff to keep aircraft in ready to tow position for
removal to Isolation Bay/Area in case BTAC declares the threat call as
specific.
e) Identify passenger joining the check in Queue after receipt of bomb
threat call and refer such passengers to Airport Security for
inquiry/investigation.
f) Mobilize sufficient staff even if it is recess / relief time to ensure their
availability to empty aircraft holds and to layout all unloaded
baggage/stores for their anti-sabotage check as required under specific/
non-specific threat.
g) Actively participate in the evaluation of threat by BTAC and in deciding to
follow up actions.
h) Move to the aircraft under threat and get the tasks performed from the
staff as decided in the BTAC and in a coordinated manner with other
agencies.
Evaluation of Call
The Bomb Threat Assessment Committee (BTAC) shall be established at the

affected airport.
The Bomb Threat Assessment Committee (BTAC)
Bomb Threat Assessment Committee shall consist of the following officials with
respective status as mentioned against each: -
No Officials Agency Status
Airport Director or his

a Airport Operator Co-ordinator
representative
ASG (CISF or State

b CASO or his representative Member
Police)
Security Manager / Station

c Aircraft Operator Member
Manager of affected airlines
d Watch Supervisory Officer (WSO) ATC Member
Page 48 of 90
2022
e Airworthiness Officer DGCA Member
f Representative of local police State Police Member
ASG (CISF\ State

g Officer I/C BDDS Member
Police)
h FRRO/Asst FRRO * Immigration Member
i Deputy Commandant * Customs Member
RD, BCAS or his representative

j BCAS Observer
(Wherever located)
* (Should be present in case threat relates to international terminal, international airlines or

import/export cargo terminal)
EVALUATION OF THREAT CALL

The BTAC uses the “Bomb Warning Assessment Form (BWAF) as a guideline for
systematic and scientific evaluation of the Bomb Threat Call.
The procedure of building of an assessment system to lead the bomb warning

assessors to a logical conclusion to classify the threat is called as POSITIVE
TARGET IDENTIFICATION (PTI)
Accordingly the call is classified as under: -
SPECIFIC THREAT: A warning where the threat permits identification of a specific

target, or where the caller has positively identified himself or the organization
involved and is judged credible.
The BTAC evaluates the call based on the information given by the caller and threat
perception. The call is evaluated as “Specific”, if the information is of serious and
elaborate nature.
NON-SPECIFIC THREAT: A warning that can be related to one or more targets but
where there is doubt about its credibility or about the effectiveness of the existing
counter measures.
The call is evaluated as “Non-Specific”; if the call is of general nature such as there is
Page 49 of 90
2022
a bomb in the evening flight ‘or’ flight going to Mumbai has a bomb.
Action in case of Specific Bomb Threat Call
• The aircraft will be shifted to isolated parking bay.

• ASG will cordon the aircraft from a safe distance of 50m and control
the movement of unauthorized people.
• Deploy airline security staff at ladder point to frisk/check belongings of all
authorized persons entering isolation bay / affected aircraft.
• Airline (GSD) will ensure sufficient loaders; bus trolleys are available for
speedy off- loading.
• All registered baggage, cargo; unaccompanied baggage will be off loaded
and kept 100 meters away from aircraft. The registered baggage will be line
up properly for re-identification by passengers (with sufficient gap for dogs
to move around and for movement of passengers during re- identification)
unclaimed baggage to be opened / kept in cooling off pit by BDDS.
• Offload Catering items/ bonded stores and place them in the catering
vehicle. Catering vehicle to be parked 100 meters away from the aircraft and
searched.
• First aid kits and Engineering stores to be subjected to thorough search.
First aid kit may be opened and resealed by BDDS if doctors are not available for
resealing.
• Detail and ensure that senior airline officials from Security, Flight Crew,
Engineer, Catering Cargo, Commercial, GSD, etc. with sufficient staff are
available to assist anti sabotage check.
• Thorough search of aircraft will be conducted by BDDS, Airline Engineers,
Airline Security, ASG, Airworthiness Officer, etc. They work as a team and
conduct aircraft search with checklist.
• Prevent refueling of aircraft till completion of anti- sabotage check of
aircraft.
• Cargo, unaccompanied baggage, mail will not be reloaded unless it is X-
rayed or sniffed by dog. It will be kept in a protected area.
• Re- issue of fresh boarding cards and hand baggage tags to passengers
who have deplaned and brought back to departure hall.
• Crowding of too many employees and parking of vehicles near aircraft to be
avoided.
• Radios should not be used to transmit within 25 meters of a suspect device.
• Agencies carrying out search will sign a completion certificate, and which is
given to ATC by airline.
Page 50 of 90
2022
• Rescreen passengers and their 100% hand baggage check by airport
security and hold crew/ passengers in security hold until clearance is received
from the coordinator from isolation bay.
• Deploy sufficient staff to cross check baggage tag numbers on hold
baggage, with counterfoils held with crew/ passengers and ensure proper and
uniform marking of identified hold baggage.
• Upon receiving clearance from coordinator at isolation bay, arrange to
escort crew in airline coaches to isolation bay. Ensure crew alights from bus at a
safe distance of 100 M and after identification of hold baggage, crew proceed
towards aircraft for secondary ladder point frisking /100% hand baggage check
by airline security before boarding the aircraft.
• Gets clearance for passenger boarding from the crew.
• Arrange to escort passengers in airline coaches (one coach at a time) to
isolation bay. Ensure passengers alight at a safe distance of 100 M and not
more than 10 passengers at a time should proceed with their baggage
coupons/boarding pass to identify their hold baggage.
• Upon identification of hold baggage, ensure that crew / passengers
proceed to aircraft under airline escort and do not loiter on airside.
• Secondary ladder point frisking /100% physical hand baggage check by
airline.
• Ensure that only identified hold baggage is reloaded in baggage
containers for loading into the aircraft.
• Ensure that hold baggage containers are not released for loading in
cargo hold until passengers / baggage reconciliation is done and head count of
passengers in aircraft matches with those checked in and number of boarding
card stubs collected at the ladder point.
• Make efforts to track the passenger of hold baggage which remain
unidentified from details of passenger on baggage tag and through
announcement inside aircraft.
• Note: Under no circumstance will unidentified baggage be taken inside the
aircraft for identification by the passenger or baggage loaded on aircraft with
verbal reconciliation arrived on board between the passengers and airline staff).
• Report details of baggage finally left unidentified, to the coordinator.
• Detail a security officer to accompany BDDS when unidentified baggage is
decided to be moved to explosive disposal area.
• Suspend loading of unaccompanied / rush tag baggage.
• Cargo, mail, courier, catering, bonded stores, medical / first aid boxes,
company stores etc., which is searched/checked/cleared by anti-sabotage check
team only will be loaded in the aircraft.
• If any of the above-mentioned stores cannot be searched / checked /
cleared the same will not be loaded on the aircraft. Such stores will be
Page 51 of 90
2022
further subjected to 24 hrs cooling off in addition to a thorough
screening/physical check.
• Execute any additional security measure as directed by coordinator / BTAC.
• Arrange to get clearance certificate and get the same signed off by airline
engineer, airline security, ASG, airworthiness (DGCA), BDDS, coordinator and
hand over one copy of the same to coordinator for giving RT/telephone
clearance to ATC. Thereafter, hand over one copy each to ATC, BDDS and
other agencies for their record.
Action of Non-specific threat call to an aircraft
Action in case of Non-Specific Call by Coordinator
• Inform every agency and ask them to search their own area and report.
• Get confirmation from all about the search having been completed.
• Request BDDS and DGCA to stand-by near aircraft / building under threat until
search is over and clearance certificate is signed by all agencies.
By Air Carrier
• Alert staff at X - ray.
• Carry out inspection of aircraft.
• Look for suspected baggage.
• Increase physical inspection of registered baggage / mail / cargo.
• Proper baggage identification by passengers and crew.
• Ground engineering to carry out scheduled anti sabotage checks.
• Ensure proper Gate- no- show drill to be followed.
• Thoroughly screen air mail.
• Suspend airlift of unaccompanied baggage and rush tag baggage.
• Frisk staff / passengers at ladder point.
• Proper passenger baggage reconciliation.
Page 52 of 90
2022
Search of Aircraft under non- specific Bomb Threat
• Airlines Security and Airlines e n g i n e e r s will carry out search of

aircraft under Non- S p e c i f i c Bomb Threat.
• Coordinator, Air carrier and ASG will ensure action as prescribed for their
individual agencies as per Bomb Warning Assessment Form (BWAF).
• Airline will organize clearance certificate and obtain signatures of all
official agencies involved in search.
• Coordinator after ensuring that all officials/agencies have signed the
clearance certificate, will convey the clearance to ATC for release of aircraft.
• BDDS, fire tender and Ambulance must remain stand by near the aircraft
until clearance is conveyed to ATC by the coordinator.
Threat to terminal building
Action on specific threat to terminal building
• Coordinator will make continuous announcement on central PA system

and in different languages for evacuation of the terminal building.
• Announcement made should be deliberate and tactful to avoid panic
ex. “due to security reasons all passengers/staff are requested to evacuate
the terminal building and proceed to safe holding area.”
• All heads of airlines, agencies and departments should evacuate their
passengers/staff quietly to the pre designated safe assembly areas.
• Passengers who are not security checked will evacuate to city side.
• Passengers/staff in Security Hold will evacuate to airside.
• All heads of airlines, agencies and departments will ensure to hold back few
staff who are thoroughly familiar with their work area for subsequent search.
• All passengers/staff will carry their baggage/personal belongings with them.
• Staff will leave all doors and windows open.
• Coordinator will ensure to switch off central AC.
• Coordinator will ensure to open all Emergency doors.
• Unclaimed suspect article if spotted during search shall not be handled but
reported to BDDS.
Page 53 of 90
2022
Action on non-specific threat to terminal building
• Evacuation of terminal building not required.

• All heads of airlines, agencies & departments should inform their staff of
the received bomb threat.
• Search of terminal building to be undertaken by airlines, agencies &
departments in their respective work areas.
• Search of common areas to be undertaken by coordinator through his care
takers, cleaners & watch, and ward staff.
• Upon locating an unclaimed article during search, the terminal building
will be evacuated as in the case of a specific area.
• Unclaimed article if located will not be handled but reported to BDDS.
The contents of the Bomb Threat contingency plan are as follows.
• Airport Director designated as coordinator.

• Establishment of Bomb Threat Control room
• Evaluation of call by Bomb Threat Assessment Committee guided by
Bomb Warning Assessment Form (BWAF)
• Questioning Technique
• Duties and Responsibilities of various agencies bat airport such as AAI,
ASG, Airlines, BDDS, DGCA, Customs and Immigration.
• Search Procedure
• Evacuation of building under threat.
• Procedure to deal with unidentified / suspected baggage.
Bomb Threat Review Committee (BTRC)
To ensure installation / working of necessary infrastructure and smooth

implementation of bomb threat contingency plan each airport is required to
constitute a BTRC. The committee will meet once in three months.
Action to be taken on finding Suspect Explosive Device
All airports are required to have dedicated BDDS and dog squads. The BDDS should
be well equipped with necessary manpower and equipment to deal with any
Page 54 of 90
2022
type of threat.
The four generic steps to be taken by BDDS on finding a suspicious item during a
search is as under:
• CONFIRM that the item found look like a suspicious item and needs
attention of security.
• CLEAR the area by evacuating all persons including search teams to a safe
distance of 100 meters.
• CORDON the area to prevent anyone gaining access to the suspect item.
• CONTROL the situation until specialized staff arrive and take command.
Counters measures for Bomb

Incidents at Airports
• Installation of caller ID (CLIP)
• Give wide publicity in local newspaper if caller is identified.
• Prompt evaluation of call with help of BWAF
• Training of employees
• Conduct periodicals mock up exercise
• Up gradation of EDS / EDDS.
• Centralized monitoring of CCTV by ASG, Customs, Immigration
• Installation of EVD / ETD
Page 55 of 90
2022
Page 56 of 90
2022
Page 57 of 90
2022
Contingency plan to handle aircraft hijack situation
Contingencies related to unlawful seizure of aircraft:
For Hijacking / Forcible seizure of aircraft on ground, a contingency may arise

in one of the following forms: -
• An aircraft registered in India may be hijacked either within India or abroad
and may land in one of the airports in India or abroad.
• A foreign registered aircraft may be hijacked while in India and may land in
India or abroad.
• A foreign registered aircraft hijacked in some other country may land in India
or in one of the neighboring countries, such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Myanmar, China, Nepal, Pakistan, Bhutan, Male and Sri Lanka, raising the
possibility of its take-off and likely landing in India.
Management Occurrences
To deal with acts of interference with Civil Aviation, the following Group/
Committee have been established:
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) Apex Body

Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijack (COSAH) Advisory Role
Central Committee (CC) Executive Authority/
Command
Aerodrome Committee (AC) - Operational Command
Page 58 of 90
2022
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)
The CCS is an apex body headed by the Prime Minister, which decides policies
and takes decisions on strategic issues like response to hijacker’s demands
involving national security, foreign policy, political implications, strategy /
approach to negotiations, forcible termination of hijack etc. Minister of Civil
Aviation would also be included in the CCS for management of aircraft hijack
situations.
Prime Minister : Chairman

Assembles at PMO Office
Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijack (COSAH)
The COSAH is an advisory body, which deliberates on the problems arising out of
the contingency. It will brief and advise CCS about developments and decisions
to be taken, and communicate Govt. decisions / directions/ guidance to the CC.
Cabinet Secretary: Chairman

Addl. Secretary Cabinet Secretariat: Convener
Assembles at Cabinet Secretariat, Rashtrapati Bhawan
Central Committee (CC)
The CC is the executive authority responsible for dealing with the contingency of
hijacking, forcible seizure of the aircraft on ground or any other acts of unlawful
interference with civil aviation.
Director General, Civil Aviation (DGCA) – Chairman

DG, BCAS - Convener
Assembles at CCCR, ATC Building, IGI Airport New Delhi
The Central Committee shall manage the contingency situation till it is terminated.
It is empowered to deal with the situation in all respects and take appropriate
decisions on its own based on the guidelines of the COSAH.
It shall guide the Aerodrome Committee (AC) for handling the situation on ground
including negotiations with the hijackers /terrorists and /or forcible termination
of Hijack in the light of the policy guidelines laid- down by COSAH / CCS.
Page 59 of 90
2022
Aerodrome Committee (AC)
The AC is established at every airport and shall be activated on the occurrence of

the emergency at the affected airport.
The composition of the AC depends upon the situation of the airport.

State Capital- Home Secretary of the state,
District headquarters- District Magistrate
Outside the district headquarters- District Collector
Defense controlled airports- Station Commander.
In all the above cases, Airport Director or his representative will be the Convener.
The AC of the affected airport shall meet at a place earmarked as Aerodrome

Committee Control Room (ACCR). It shall assemble immediately on receipt of
information of a contingency and take appropriate steps as described in the
functions of the AC. The control room of the AC should have a couple of
independent telephone lines, hotline to the Police Control Room / Police
Station and RT facility.
Members of Aerodrome Committee:
Home Secretary of the State/ District Magistrate/ Chairman

District Collector/ Station Commander
Airport Director or his representative Convener
Representative from R&AW (on arrival)
A senior most executive of the affected airline
Page 60 of 90
2022
Contingency Plan – For Indian Registered Aircraft
The National Contingency Plan for various contingencies is prepared by the BCAS.
Each airport is required to develop the under mentioned contingency plans for
managing any acts of Unlawful Interference. The same is required to be
approved by the BCAS.
• Bomb Threat Contingency Plan

• Hijack Threat Contingency Plan
• Counter Terrorist Contingency Plan
The Airport Management will take the following actions for a hijacked aircraft:
On landing, the aircraft is to be directed to the designated isolated aircraft
parking position. Aircraft will not be allowed to take off unless its departure is
necessitated by the overriding duty to protect human life. The aircraft may be
immobilized by:
• Positioning of vehicles / fire tenders on runway

• Deflating tyres.
• Putting of lights of runway / taxi track
Aircraft Operators Responsibilities:
On receipt of threat Call the receiver will immediately inform his / her supervisor.
The Supervisor will in turn inform the Airport Director / Office / senior most
person of airport operator.
The following actions will be taken by the aircraft operator:
For Flights not yet boarded
• Interiors of pax cabin to be checked.

• 100% manual checks of hand baggage.
• 100% physical frisking of pax / crew.
Page 61 of 90
2022
• Access control.
• Frisking of all personnel entering the aircraft.
• Maintenance of Access Control Register.
• Pax reporting after hijack call to be questioned by Aviation Security Group.
For Flights in the process of boarding
• Pax to be deplaned with Hand baggage if already boarded and brought back
to the check-in counter via arrival hall under escort.
• Interiors of pax cabin to be checked.
• 100% manual checks of hand baggage
• 100% physical frisking of pax / crew
• Access control
• Frisking of all personnel entering the aircraft
• Maintenance of access control register
• Pax reporting after hijack call to be questioned by Aviation Security Group
• Pax headcount to be taken.
• No need to offload baggage / cargo etc.
• Pax should not have access to registered baggage.
• Security measures to be supervised by senior most security staff.
For aircrafts in-flight

• Security measures to be reviewed.
• Set up Reception center.
• Documents related to flight to be sealed.
• Pax manifest at reception center.
• Assistance to be provided to the meeters and greeters.
Page 62 of 90
2022
General Principles for Building and Area search
For searches to be effective they should be conducted systematically by staff

familiar with the area concerned. The main reason for this being that outside
personnel will be unlikely to know the layout of the aircraft or terminal building
and the various places in which a device could be concealed and therefore will not
so easily be able to spot anything which is out of place or unfamiliar. Search plans
should be prepared in advance and staff trained to use them. A search
Coordinator must be nominated to provide control of the search process and if
necessary, take the decision to evacuate.
Searches should be briefed on action to be initiated if suspicious object is found.
When a suspect device is discovered the possibility of secondary devices should
not be discounted.
The use of hand-held communications is useful for coordination of the search and is
often the only way of ensuring appropriate and speedy lifesaving procedures for
search and evacuation. However, once a suspect device has been located those
using hand-held communications should immediately move away and ensure
that they and anyone else in the area move outside the cordon as quickly as
possible. Radios should not be used to transmit within 25 meters of a suspect
device.
Before starting the search, strict control of access must be implemented in the area
being searched, this is necessary to ensure devices are not introduced into the
area once it has been cleared.
Effective and systematic searching takes time, if the warning received indicated a
possible detonation time for the device which will prevent a thorough search
being conducted then the best and safest option is evacuation of all personnel
to a safe area and waiting for the arrival of specialist explosive disposal
personnel.
Sterile Holding Area concepts / Basic Screening plans:

• Decentralized, usually at the aircraft boarding gate.
• Semi-centralized, usually after the duty-free shop area
• Centralized, usually before the duty-free shop area
Page 63 of 90
2022
Decentralized
Screening Points at Boarding Gates
TERMINAL
1 2 3
Concourse Pier 4
7 6 5 Screening
Points
Boarding Gates
Decentralized Screening: Screening of passengers is carried out immediately

before boarding at the boarding gate, jet-way or terminal door leading directly
to an aircraft or adjacent apron area. Passenger’s screening takes place when the
passenger boarding process begins.
• Requires screening point at each boarding gate.

• Passengers screened immediately before boarding.
• Staff/equipment must be available to handle optimum passenger load in limited
time.
• Screening point manned only when screening is in progress.
Page 64 of 90
2022
Semi-centralized
Screening Points at Holding Areas
Screening
Points
1 2 3 Mobile
Lounge
Concourse Pier
4
7 6 5
Boarding Gates
Holding area
Semi-Centralized: Screening of passengers is carried out at the entrance to an area

designed to hold all passengers for a particular flight. This holding area is
secured (i.e. made “sterile”) by means of walls or suitable barriers, together with
controlled access points. The holding area may also be a vehicle designed to carry
passengers to a distant aircraft. Screening takes place as passengers arrive at the
holding area and passengers remain within the holding area until the boarding
begins.
Centralized
Screening Point at Concourse
TERMINAL
1 2 3
Pier 4
7 6 5
Screening
Point Boarding Gates
Page 65 of 90
2022
Centralized: Screening of passengers is carried out at the entrance to a concourse
containing several gates, with no specific relationship to a particular flight.
Screening can therefore take place a considerable time before a particular flight is
due to depart Passenger remain in the concourse area until a short time before
their flight commences.
PHYSICAL SEARCH OF A HOLDING AREA FOR PROHIBITED ITEMS
Initiation of a Search
The coordinator can initiate a search by:

• Sending a message to the search teams over a public address system. It
should be coded to avoid unnecessary disruption and alarm to the public.
• Use of personal radios, or mobile/cell phones; or
• A telephone cascade system: the coordinator rings, say, three members, who in
turn each ring a further three members and so on until all the teams have been alerted.
What searchers should look for?

It is difficult to give guidance to search teams about the appearance of suspect
explosive devices as they can be disguised in many ways.
Searchers should be briefed to

• Look for unidentified objects or anything:
 That should not be there.
 That cannot be accounted for
 That is out of place.
• Do NOT TOUCH suspicious objects.
• Notify the Search Coordinator of progress of search and discovery of any
suspicious objects.
• Mark the location of suspicious object with a prominent object (but not
touching the device)
• Withdraw from the immediate area and await further instructions.
Page 66 of 90
2022
Guidance for Searching Terminal Buildings
Search Plans
It is vital to have search plans prepared in advance, and staff trained in them. The
objective is to make sure that the whole terminal building is checked as quickly and
effectively as possible.
Search plans must be always readily available, architect’s drawings, checked for accuracy
and appropriately adapted, are suitable for this purpose. Sufficient spare copies
should be available for use during search operations. Searchers and the Coordinator
can then eliminate sections from the plan as they are declared clear.
Search procedure /technique: -
There are three types of search procedure/technique. Before searching an area,

searcher first should divide the area into three level.
Search Sectors
• The first step in preparing a search plan is to divide the terminal building into
Sectors. The building may already be segregated into various zones and therefore it
may be convenient make these the sectors. Each sector must be of manageable size for
the number of searchers nominated to it. Use 02 searcher per room or an area of 250
Sq.ft. Remember that effective and systematic searching takes time.
The sector may be one large room - such as a check-in area, concourse, baggage reclaim
area, or perhaps several small airline operations offices in an office suite. It is most
important that cloakrooms, stairs, corridors, and lifts are included in the search plans
and also car parks and other areas outside the building.
Page 67 of 90
2022
Search Teams
Search teams should be formed from staff nominated to search those areas with
which they are most familiar. Numbers required will depend upon the size of the
search task. Reserves should be appointed in case of absence. Staff should be
trained and rehearsed.
Search Priorities
Those areas which are to be used as evacuation assembly areas, together with those
areas where the greatest number of the public or staff are likely to be vulnerable,
should be searched first. Consider also, as a priority, those public areas to which
the perpetrator may have had easy access such as restrooms, elevators, stairways,
and hallways. Those areas to which access is normally controlled may be searched
last. Do not overlook car parks, the outside area of the terminal building and the
perimeter.
How to Search
The conduct of searches will depend on local circumstances and local knowledge. The
overriding principle is that they should be conducted in a systematic and thorough
manner so that no part is left unchecked. The searchers need to practice, to get a
feel for the logical progression through their area (whether it be in a terminal
building, baggage reclaim area or administrative or operations office suite) and the
Page 68 of 90
2022
length of time it will take.
The method outlined in this typical example is of a Room Search in a sector, it should be
adapted to reflect the peculiarities of the actual area being searched.
Example Room Search

• A search should begin at the entrance to the room.
• Each searcher or team should first stand still and look around the room.
• They should note the contents of the room and make a quick assessment of those
areas that will need special attention.
• They should look for any unusual lights (including small light sources knows as
Light Emitting Diodes which are often used in the arming circuits of improvised
explosive devices).
• They should also listen carefully for any unusual noises - particularly ticking or
whirring sounds.
If anything, unusual is seen, the searcher or team should alert the Coordinator who will
decide whether to evacuate the building.
If nothing unusual is seen, the search should begin.
The search should be conducted methodically, moving in one direction around the area
to be searched. It should be carried out in three sweeps.
• The first sweep:

- Around the edges of the room,
- Walls from top to bottom and the floor area immediately beneath the wall.
- Look inside fireplaces,
- Behind curtains and window blinds,
- Behind and beside furniture around the edges of the room.
- The sweep should finish at the doorway where it began.
• The second sweep:
- Furniture and the floor.
- Furniture should not be removed but drawers should be opened and searched.
- Gaps in and under furniture should be explored.
Page 69 of 90
2022
- If the floor covering shows signs of recent disturbance, it should be lifted.
• The third sweep:
- Cover the ceiling,
- Light Fixtures
- Removable panels
- Areas in which objects might be concealed.
- Start at one corner and systematically search the whole surface.
After the search has been completed, and if nothing has been found, the coordinator
should be informed immediately so that the sector can be marked ‘CLEAR’ on the
search plans.
Searching should continue until the whole area has been cleared. Do not forget that
secondary devices are not unknown.
If a suspicious object is found, follow the golden rules:

• DO NOT TOUCH OR MOVE THE OBJECT.
• If possible, leave a distinctive marker near (not touching) the object.
• Move away from the device to a designated control point, leaving lights on.
• Inform search team leader or Coordinator.
• The coordinator should implement the evacuation plan.
• Stay at the control point and draw an accurate plan of the location of the
suspicious package or device for the assistance of the police and explosive disposal
experts.
• The person finding the object should be immediately available for interview by
the police or security services.
• Do not use more searcher than necessary.
• Use 02 searcher per room or an area of 250 Sq.fts
• Mark the area after searched.
• Do not assume that only one device is planted.
• Do not trust anything and do not assume the face value of objects.
If the item detected is a weapon:
• Immediately safeguard the item; and
• Notify the search coordinator (supervisor).
If the item located is an explosive device or object that appears to be an explosive
Page 70 of 90
2022
device:
• Do not touch the object.
• Mark the location; and
• Notify the search coordinator (supervisor).
Record the following details in screening point log when an item is found.
• Location of holding area.
• Time and date searched and by whom.
• Result of Search
• Details of item(s) detected.
• Action taken on finding the item(s)/object(s)
• Name of person who found it.
• Time and date of notification
• Action taken for safeguarding/disposal of item(s)/object(s)
Maintaining Sterility Of SHA
• Ensuring doors and entry points to the holding area are physically protected by
locks and windows barred.
• Observing operational holding area and keeping surveillance.
• Search of Sterile holding area using different levels of search.
• Effective screening of passenger and baggage.
• Screening authorized personnel such as airport and airline personnel entering the
holding area
• Inspection/screening of goods and supplies taken into the holding areas
• Strict access control of security hold area.
****END****
Page 71 of 90
2022
Page 72 of 90
2022
Page 73 of 90
2022
Page 74 of 90
2022
Page 75 of 90
2022
Page 76 of 90
2022
Page 77 of 90
2022
Page 78 of 90
2022
Page 79 of 90
2022
Page 80 of 90
2022
Page 81 of 90
2022
Page 82 of 90
2022
Page 83 of 90
2022
Page 84 of 90
2022
Page 85 of 90
2022
Page 86 of 90
2022
Page 87 of 90
2022
Page 88 of 90
2022
Page 89 of 90
2022
Page 90 of 90
2022
MODULE -13
CARRIAGE OF ARMS AND
AMMUNITION
Page 1 of 19
2022
Slide
1
Slide
2
Slide
3
Page 2 of 19
2022
Slide
4
____________________________________
Slide
5
Slide
6
Page 3 of 19
2022
Slide
7
Slide
8
____________________________________
Slide
9
Page 4 of 19
2022
Slide
10
Slide
11
Slide
12
____________________________________
Page 5 of 19
2022
Slide
13
Slide
14
Slide
15
Slide
16
Page 6 of 19
2022
____________________________________
Slide
17
Slide
18
Slide
19
Page 7 of 19
2022
Slide
20
Slide
21
Slide
22
Page 8 of 19
2022
Slide
23
Slide
24
Slide
25
Slide
26
Page 9 of 19
2022
Slide
27
Slide
28
Slide
29
Page 10 of 19
2022
Slide
30
Slide
31
END OF MODULE 13
Page 11 of 19
2022
Module 13
Procedure for Carriage of Arms and ammunition
On person or in hand baggage:
• PSO’s of VVIP’s
Can carry weapon in unloaded condition in the cabin baggage. The weapon and ammunition
should be kept separately.
• SPG’s when accompanying SPG Protectee
Can carry weapon in unloaded condition in the cabin baggage. The weapon and ammunition
should be kept separately.
• Sky Marshals
Can carry weapon on board aircraft. They should possess the Weapon Authorization Card
(WAC) issued by BCAS and ID card issued by NSG. They travel as per scheduled given by BCAS
and issued with all airport AEP. They need to undergo Breath Analysis test conducted by
respective airline medical department at the originating station.
Weapon allowed in registered baggage:
• PSO’s of VIP’s
Can carry weapon in registered baggage. Should produce valid identity card and duty
slip/movement order authorizing them to carry specific weapons and ammunition while on
bonafide duty traveling by air.
• Dignitaries of high risk category
Can carry authorized weapon and ammunition in registered baggage.
• Any person on bonafide duty

Can carry weapon in registered baggage. Should produce valid identity card and travel order
authorizing them to carry specific weapons and ammunition while on bonafide duty traveling
by air.
• Bonafide passenger holding valid license
Page 12 of 19
2022
As per the existing instructions, one licensed firearm (revolver/pistol/shot gun) and/ or 50
cartridges are allowed to be carried by a passenger in his/her hold baggage.
Passenger has to declare carriage of weapon to the airline and fill up a Weapon Declaration
Form.
The airline station manager authorizes the carriage of weapon.
The passengers license will be checked for expiry date, area of jurisdiction, weapon number,
make and model number, number of cartridges allowed etc.
The weapon and ammunition is stowed in area inaccessible to the passengers and crew
members during the flight. In case of an aircraft that does not have separate cargo holds the
airline should inform passengers that the weapons cannot be allowed for carriage in
registered baggage of passenger. However, if the weapon and ammunition is required to be
carried necessary arrangements for a securely locked, tamper proof container for keeping
registered baggage containing weapon / ammunition shall be made by the aircraft operator.
VVIPs like President, Vice President, Prime Minister and SPG protectees:
The Personal Security Officers shall carry their weapons and ammunition on their person or
in their hand baggage in fully unloaded condition.
SPG Personnel are hereby permitted to carry One Pistol with 60 cartridges: and one Sub
Machine Gun/ Assault Rifle with 150 cartridges.
Chief Aerodrome Security Officer of Aviation Security Group (ASG)/ In-charge Airport
Security Unit shall check the Identity Card and Duty Slip/ Movement Order of the PSOs of
VVIP/ SPG protectees and shall ensure their genuineness.
In Flight Security Officers (IFSOs):
To provide adequate security coverage to aircrafts registered in India and engaged in civil
aviation operations to and from all civil airports in India, permission has been granted by the
Central Government to IFSO while on duty in such aircraft, for carriage of weapons and
ammunition on board such an aircraft.
The I F S O shall be in possession of their Identity Cards and authorization, issued by Director
General, BCAS from time to time, for carriage of weapons and ammunition on board an
aircraft.
Page 13 of 19
2022
PSO(s) of other VIP / dignitary of high risk category:
Whenever allowed by the government of India to accompany such a VIP/ dignitary during
his/ her journey by air or any person on bonafide duty with weapon and ammunition while
travelling by air shall carry the authorized weapons and ammunition in his/ her registered
baggage only in the manner specified below:
The Personal Security Officers or the persons on duty mentioned in para above shall carry
with them their valid Identity Cards and Duty Slips / Movement Orders authorizing them to
carry specific weapons and ammunition while on bonafide duty travelling by air and shall
produce the same to the Airport / Airlines Security Officers/ Manager.
In the case of regular passengers, the Station Manager/ Airport Managers of all airlines are
authorized to allow carriage of only one licensed revolver or pistol or shotgun and fifty
cartridges belonging to a bonafide passenger. In case, a passenger is having more than one
weapon and /or 50 cartridges, the passenger must have written approval from DGCA.
The following conditions shall be strictly followed for carriage of weapons and ammunition
in the Registered Baggage by a bonafide passenger, PSOs or VIPs or any dignitary or high risk
category or any person who has been allowed to carry his weapon and ammunition on duty
while travelling by air. Henceforth such categories of persons have been referred to as
passengers:-
o Such a passenger shall declare the carriage of his/ her authorized/ licensed weapon and
ammunition to the concerned air carrier in writing on the prescribed form to be provided by
the airlines operator before security check of his / her Registered Baggage. Original copy of
such declaration shall be retained at the Boarding Station, second copy shall be kept in the
flight’s file and third copy shall be given to the passenger.
o Prior to acceptance of weapon and ammunition from a bonafide passenger having valid
license or authorization issued by the competent authority as mentioned above, the
concerned airlines operator shall ensure that the carriage of weapons and ammunition in
Registered Baggage of such a passenger is allowed only when an authorized and duly
qualified person of the airlines has determined that the weapon is not loaded.
o The Station Manager / Airport Manager of the concerned airlines shall verify all the
relevant documents to ensure that the weapon(s) and ammunition is / are licensed /
authorized in the name of the passenger concerned and shall ensure that only authorized
number(s) of weapon and ammunition are allowed in the Registered Baggage.
o The weapons and ammunition shall be stowed in an area that is inaccessible to any
person including air crew while the aircraft is in flight and shall not be carried in the cockpit
Page 14 of 19
2022
or retained by a member of the crew. Therefore, the weapons and ammunition shall be
carried only in the Registered Baggage of the passenger and such baggage shall be stored in
a securely locked, tamper-proof container which shall be located in the baggage
compartment of aircraft or in aircraft having separate cargo holds so as not accessible to
passengers.
o In case an aircraft does not have separate cargo / baggage hold for safe and secure
storage of a securely locked, tamper-proof container for keeping passengers Registered
Baggage containing their authorized weapons and ammunitions, concerned airlines shall be
responsible to inform their passengers not to carry arms and ammunition with them as the
same shall not be allowed to be carried in the Registered Baggage in such an aircraft.
However, if weapons/ ammunition are required to be carried in such an aircraft which does
not have cargo / baggage hold, necessary arrangements for a securely locked, tamperproof
container for keeping Registered Baggage containing authorized weapons /
ammunition shall be made by the aircraft owner /airlines operator. The Registered Baggage
shall be handed over to the concerned person/ passenger at destination in the arrival hall
only.
Carriage of licensed firearm and / or ammunition by a sportsperson while

traveling by air.
As per the existing instructions, one licensed firearm and/ or 50 cartridges are allowed to be
carried by a passenger in his/ her hold baggage. If a sportsperson is traveling by air in
domestic sectors to participate in some shooting event within India for which he/ she is
required to carry more than one licensed firearms and/ or more than 50 cartridges, such
sportsperson may be allowed by the concerned aircraft operator to carry the required
number of licensed firearms and/ or ammunition in his hold baggage subject to the
following conditions: -
The sportsperson must declare orally or in writing about carriage of the firearms and/ or
ammunition and will produce the following documents at the security check point of hold
baggage for inspection by the screener of concerned aircraft operator:
o Valid license/ authorization of fire arms and ammunition;

o Evidence of identity which can be established by a photo identity card issued by a
government agency or the sponsoring sports club.
o Bonafide for carriage of arms and ammunitions based on a written document issued by
the president or secretary of the sports club sponsoring him/ her for the shooting event.
The fire-arm must be unloaded.
The fire-arm must be carried in a hard-sided container.
The container must be locked.
Page 15 of 19
2022
Transported ammunition must be securely packed in fiber (such as cardboard), wood or

metal boxes or other packaging specially designed to carry small amounts of ammunition.
Fire -arm magazines/clips do not satisfy the packaging requirement unless they provide a
complete and secure enclosure of the ammunition.
The ammunition may also be in the same hard sided case as the firearm, as long as it is
properly packed as described above.
Black powder and percussion caps used with black powder type firearms are not
permitted neither in cabin nor hold baggage.
Authorization for carriage of firearms and ammunition by the sports persons in an aircraft
shall be obtained from DGCA in accordance with provisions of The Aircraft (Carriage of
Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003.
Procedure for dealing with cases wherein arms and/ or ammunition are
detected during screening of a passenger or his baggage.
The following procedure shall be followed for dealing with cases wherein arms and/ or
ammunition are detected during screening of a passenger or his baggage.
There may be following possibilities regarding carriage of arms and ammunition together or
separately:
Arms and/ or ammunition are detected in the registered baggage of a passenger at the
time of X-ray screening and the passenger has failed to declare the same to the Airlines
Security staff.
Arms and/ or ammunition are detected in the hand baggage or on the person of a
passenger at the time of frisking / x-ray screening of hand baggage in the Security Restricted
Area (SRA) or at the ladder point.
Course of Action:
Authorized arms and/ or ammunition are allowed to be carried only in the hold of an
aircraft.
Even if the arms and/ or ammunition are detected in the hand baggage or on person with
valid license/ authorization, the carriage of the same shall be allowed in the hold baggage
only and the following course of action shall be followed by the ASG (CISF/ State Police)/
Airline operator/ Airport operator (wherever ILBS installed) as the case may be, shall deal
with the situations as mentioned in paras above:
If the passenger is having a valid license with him, the ASG (CISF/ State Police)/ Airline
Operator/ Airport operator security staff, as the case may be, shall examine the weapon.
physically to see that it is unloaded and packed as per the prescribed norms, obtain
declaration from the passenger as required under the Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous
Goods) Rules 2003 and thereafter allow him to proceed for check-in etc. There is no need to
Page 16 of 19
2022
detain the passenger. However, a complaint shall be made about the incident to the
Director General, DGCA for necessary action at their end. Local police shall also be informed.
If the passenger does not have a valid arms license with him at that time but claims to
possess the same, he cannot be allowed to proceed. The passenger shall be detained and
handed over to local police for necessary legal action in this regard.
If the passenger claims that he is a serving Police/ Defence Services/ Central Armed
Forces personnel and is entitled to carry his service arms and ammunition, the ASG (CISF/
State Police)/ Airline operator / Airport operator security staff shall confirm his identity
through a
valid photo identity card issued by the Department/ Ministry concerned and movement
order/ authority slip. If his identity and bona fides are beyond doubt, the ASG (CISF/ State
Police)/ Airline operator/ Airport operator security staff can obtain necessary declaration
from him as required under the Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003 and
thereafter allow him to proceed for check-in etc. There is no need to detain the passenger.
However, a complaint shall be made about the incident to the Director General, DGCA for
necessary action at their end under the Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003.
Local police shall also be informed and a copy of such complaint shall also be forwarded to
the controlling authority of such person.
In case the passenger neither has a valid arms license with him nor claims to possess the
same, the ASG (CISF/ State Police)/ Airline operator / Airport operator security staff shall
hand him over to the local police along with the arms and ammunition with a complaint
about the incident for taking necessary legal action under the Arms Act 1959 and Aircraft
Act 1934 and the rules framed there under.
Page 17 of 19
2022
Page 18 of 19
2022
Page 19 of 19
2022
MODULE -15
EMERGING THREATS TO CIVIL
AVIATION
Page 1 of 57
2022
Slide 1
Slide 2
Slide 3
Page 2 of 57
2022
Slide 4
Slide 5
Slide 6
Page 3 of 57
2022
Slide 7
Slide 8
Slide 9
Slide 10
Page 4 of 57
2022
Slide 11
Slide 12
Slide 13
Page 5 of 57
2022
Slide 14
Slide 15
Slide 16
Slide 17
Page 6 of 57
2022
Slide 18
Slide 19
Slide 20
Page 7 of 57
2022
Slide 21
Slide 22
Slide 23
Slide 24
Page 8 of 57
2022
Slide 25
Slide 26
Slide 27
Page 9 of 57
2022
Slide 28
Slide 29
Slide 30
Page 10 of 57
2022
Slide 31
Slide 32
Slide 33
Slide 34
Page 11 of 57
2022
Slide 35
Slide 36
Slide 37
Page 12 of 57
2022
Slide 38
Slide 39
Slide 40
Slide 41
Page 13 of 57
2022
Slide 42
Slide 43
Slide 44
Page 14 of 57
2022
Slide 45
Slide 46
Slide 47
Slide 48
Page 15 of 57
2022
Slide 49
Slide 50
Slide 51
Page 16 of 57
2022
Slide 52
Slide 53
Slide 54
Page 17 of 57
2022
Slide 55
Slide 56
Slide 57
Slide 58
Page 18 of 57
2022
Slide 59
Slide 60
Slide 61
Slide 62
Page 19 of 57
2022
Slide63
Slide 64
Slide 65
Page 20 of 57
2022
Slide 66
Slide 67
Slide 68
Slide 69
Page 21 of 57
2022
Slide 70
Slide 71
Slide 72
Slide 73
Page 22 of 57
2022
Slide 74
Slide 75
Slide 76
Page 23 of 57
2022
Slide 77
Slide 78
Slide 79
Page 24 of 57
2022
Slide 80
End of Module 15
Page 25 of 57
2022
After the attack of 9/11, using civil aircraft as a weapon and using dangerous materials to
attack aircraft or other targets on the ground was treated as an offence. The illegal transport
of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons is also criminalized. The Beijing Protocol
supplements the Hague Convention, 1970. The Protocol expands the scope of The Hague
Convention to cover different forms of aircraft hijackings, including through modern
technological means.
The following are the new emerging threats to Civil Aviation: -
A. Landside attacks and its mitigation measures

B. CBRN
C. Insider Threat and its mitigation measures
D. Cyber Threat and its mitigation measures
E. Drone Attacks
A. Landside attacks and its mitigation measures
Security in the landside area is difficult to monitor and control due to public accessibility and
the limitations of implementing security measures. There are many obstacles to overcome
while keeping focused on terminal design, passenger throughput and the generation of
revenues from sources like retail operations. When considering basic requirements for
airport security, all landside area operations remain as vulnerable targets and yet basic
tenants of physical security are applicable. Improved technologies and prudent use of
CCTV have been considered for airport security in coordination with airport law enforcement,
airport operations and the cooperation of tenants.
The physical security measures and the operational security measures described in this
chapter shall be implemented to protect the landside, public areas of the airport.
The development and implementation of appropriate security measures shall be based on a
security risk assessment process carried out by the relevant authorities and/ or entities, in
collaboration with national and local authorities and the airport operator, to detect, deter
and mitigate the risk in landside areas.
Landside security measures should be adapted to the airport environment by States and
relevant entities and implemented by the relevant local entities in accordance with national
requirements. These measures should be commensurate to the threat and risk and should
be described in the Counter Terrorist Contingency Plan (CTCP).
Page 26 of 57
2022
Random Screening of passenger and baggage at entry gates based on behaviour detection and
risk assessment.
A coordinated approach - The Appropriate Authority, in coordination with all stakeholders

including law enforcement agencies (e.g., police, port authority and border control), aircraft
operators, security service providers, local public transport and retail representatives shall
include all concerned stakeholders when developing and implementing landside security
measures.
Landside mitigation measures — key elements
Attacks on landside may be carried out on public areas of an airport where attackers may not
need to defeat the security measures normally in place prior to entering security
restricted areas. Potential modes of attack may include, but are not limited to, the following:
a) Person – Borne IED (PBIED) and MANPADS.
b) IED placed inside or near airport key points (non – suicide attack).
c) Armed assault at a public area of an airport.
d) Vehicle – Borne IED (VBIED) attacks and terminal ram-raiding; and
e) An attack by means of chemical, biological and/ or radiological agents.
Landside security arrangements:
It is necessary to ensure that security measures are established for landside areas to mitigate
the risk of and to prevent possible acts of unlawful interference in coordination with
relevant departments and agencies; and in accordance with risk assessments carried out
by the relevant authorities or entities. The following aspects will be implemented by airport
operator, ASG (CISF/ State Police), State/ UT administration and other entities concerned: -
a) The identification of landside/ airside barriers.
b) CTCP, the mock drill frequencies, participation, and appropriate responsibilities of
all concerned for coordination of landside security measures between relevant
departments, agencies.
c) Airport – level training programme to impart required security training for securing
landside areas.
d) Provision of physical security measures like check points/ barriers on the access road
to airport terminal and Bullet resistant equipment.
Page 27 of 57
2022
e) CCTV surveillance on the landside areas – coverage and recording system.

f) Security arrangements in the funnel area, particularly landing and take – off points.
g) Appropriate security measures for landside areas to mitigate the risk and to
prevent possible acts of unlawful interference in accordance with risk assessments
carried out by the relevant authorities.
Surveillance and patrols of the public areas of the terminal:
Securing the public area from terrorist attack to provide safe and secure environment at
the airport is of paramount importance to ensure safety and security of public, passengers,
employees, and materials. The following tasks shall be carried by the concerned entities
at the airport for the purpose: -
1. Regular patrols of public areas by airport security, police (overt and covert) and/or
other law enforcement agencies, as a means of deterrence and detection.
2. Explosive Detection Dogs Squad for effective detection of explosives on both the
Airside and landside.
3. A component of CISF/ local police personnel shall be deployed for patrolling on the
cityside.
4. Deployment of armed patrols on the city side of the terminals.
5. Deployment of QRT to strengthen protection level and to react in the event of any
contingency.
6. QRT Vehicles shall be provided for the QRT of ASG duly equipped with VHF sets.
7. Sufficient RT Sets shall be provided to the QRT/ sentries at Morchas and pickets for
effective communication.
8. Patrolling in the parking lots.
9. Only authorized vehicles allowed parking after vehicle checks.
10. Parking area will be secured by patrolling and barrier checking.
11. CCTV and vehicle check system installed at the entrance lane to Parking.
12. Bollards & Tyre killers have been provided at all the roads leading to terminals.
13. The vehicles cleared from the road outside Terminals by local Traffic Police &
assisted by the ASG patrolling parties.
Possible mitigating measures - Landside security measures should be proportionate to the

risk while remaining operationally sustainable in the long run-in order to ensure a reasonable
balance between aviation security, safety and operational requirements, and passenger
facilitation.
Page 28 of 57
2022
Ground procedures to Mitigate risk of Missiles attach:

Missiles are easily transportable and can be operated from any open area, including the flat
roof of a building. Consequently, landing, and to a greater extent, take-off paths, which are
frequently over open terrain, are the areas from which attacks are likely to be launched.
Contingency plans should therefore include:
1. A requirement for detailed surveys of probable launch sites to be conducted from time
to time and for similar inspections to be carried out immediately prior to landing or
take-off.
2. Surveillance of probable launch sites by irregularly scheduled security patrols.
3. Prior identification of high-risk flights for which special procedures will be required
on take-off and landing; and
4. Clearance of areas from which attacks may be launched to eliminate places of
concealment for launch sites.
Arrangements to mitigate the risk of vehicles being used to crash into the terminal building with
improvised explosive devices.
i. Manned vehicle inspection stations to control access in and around the airport
terminal during elevated threat levels are necessary at the airport to provide a
location at a safe distance in which to inspect vehicles that are approaching the airport
terminal on the access roadway. In some instances, vehicle inspection stations are
also necessary at vehicle parking locations if they are located within the proximity
to the terminal building. Consideration has been given to including the following
features at vehicle inspection stations:
ii. Turnstiles roll gates, or vehicular crash barriers that will stop or impede “gate crashing”.
A sheltered checkpoint station has been provided on each vehicle gate to permit
maximum visibility over the immediate area of the gate and to provide easy access
for the guard to carry out inspecting duties.
iii. Sufficient space has been provided to direct a person or vehicle to one side for
further inspection without blocking access for those following. Sufficient space has
also been provided for emergency vehicles and other authorized vehicles to by-pass
the vehicle inspection stations.
iv. Communications, including emergency and duress alarms, between any sheltered
security checkpoint station and the airport security services office, as well as a
duress alarm by which emergency assistance may be summoned shall be provided
at the vehicle entry points on the landside.
v. Vehicle check system with License Plate Reader (LPR) have been installed on the
approach road to the terminals.
vi. Armed personnel at alighting and boarding point shall be deployed by ASG.
vii. Crash Rated bollards have been installed on the approach road to the airport
terminals.
Page 29 of 57
2022
Arrangements to protect and police the passenger drop-off and pick-up areas and terminal
frontages to prevent vehicles being left unattended.
i. Roads to the terminal shall allow for un-congested flow during peak hours to ensure
law enforcement personnel can effectively monitor and move vehicles.
ii. Drop off and loading zones have been set as far away from the terminal as practical
to minimize the blast effects of a vehicle bomb. The use of moving sidewalks or
access to luggage carts to help Passengers Bridge the gap shall be essential.
iii. Emergency Vehicle (Fire and Police) Parking / staging areas near the terminal,
potential inspection areas, and congested areas have been provided.
iv. During periods of heightened security, it shall be ensured that vehicles cannot gain
access to the terminal by bypassing inspection area. It will also be ensured to evaluate
the ability of the potential to “jump curbs”, travel across open landscaping, or drive
the wrong way down a road.
v. To minimize traffic to the terminal, alternative routes to non-terminal- b a s e d
operations, such as access to the Air Cargo operations, Rental Car agencies, hotels,
etc. have been provided. Clear signage and sufficient dedicated driving lanes to permit
drivers unfamiliar with the airport to find their destinations quickly and easily.
vi. During periods of heightened security, exit points with alternate routes have been
provided to enable customers to choose other options or means to access the
terminal (such as buses or pedestrian). This will help in de-congestion and inspection
requirements. The security arrangement is vested with ASG.
vii. CISF will ensure that No vehicle shall be left unattended at any point of time in front
of the terminal building. Immediately after drop-off and pick-up the vehicle shall be
removed from the frontage zone of the terminal.
viii. It shall be the responsibility of CISF and local police to protect the passenger drop-
off and pick-up areas and terminal frontages to prevent vehicles being left unattended
which can be used to commit an act of unlawful interference.
ix. NAKAS on approach road of the airport terminals shall be established for checking
of vehicles at these points.
Page 30 of 57
2022
Procedures for the protection of tickets, boarding passes, baggage tags and other documents
The following procedures shall be followed:
i. Responsibility of checking of travel documents and establishing the bonafide of

passengers, their baggage and cargo consignment to be transported by air rests with
the aircraft operator.
ii. Documentation: Tickets presented by passengers shall be examined to confirm they
are genuine, in date and appropriate to the intended flight and destination. Where
there are doubts about the validity of any document produced by a passenger,
check-in is to be discontinued until the matter has been resolved satisfactorily.
iii. Passenger identity checks: Each passenger’s passport or identity document shall be
examined at check-in for normal security procedures, for immigration obligations
and for the prevention of fraud. The purpose of identity checks at check-in is to:
a) Establish the passport or identity document is genuine and that its period
of validity covers the period of the intended journey.
b) Confirm that the name on the booking matches the name on passport or
ID document.
c) Match the photograph in the passport or ID document with the passenger
and establish that any necessary visa is present (instructions on the checking
of visas are issued separately)
d) When there is any doubt about a passenger's identity or the validity of
documents presented, check-in is to be discontinued until the doubt has
been cleared.
Arrangements around the check-in facilities to protect passengers on flights deemed to be of

higher risk: -
a) Suspicious activities of persons and passengers shall be kept under surveillance by
CCTV and CISF surveillance staff and prompt action shall be taken to check such
activities to prevent any unlawful interference at the airport.
b) The Aviation Security Group's armed personnel shall be deployed in the check-in area
to keep an eye on the movement of passengers and staff in that area and react to a
situation.
c) The airlines will conduct profiling of passengers prior to check in and any suspicion
will be reported to ASG personnel.
Page 31 of 57
2022
Security awareness public announcements ( e.g., warning passengers not to leave articles
unattended).
For Public
a) Passengers and public awareness is very essential for effective implementation of
civil aviation security in the country. Therefore, frequent public announcement and
display of security signage shall be done by the airport operator concerned.
b) The passengers shall be advised not to leave the baggage unattended and not to
touch any unidentified object. If any unidentified object is observed by the
passengers, employees, workers at the airport, they shall report the same to the nearest
ASG personnel.
c) Signage about Police Post and Control Room details shall be displayed conspicuously on
the city side of the terminals of the airport and same is established by the Airport
Operator.
For Staff:
As Airport staff is the eyes and ears of security department, security awareness training is
provided to all Non-Security Staff for recognizing suspicious behavior and reporting the
concern immediately. They must be made aware that Security is everyone’s responsibility. If
they see something, they must inform immediately.
B. CBRN
CBRN is an acronym for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high yield Explosives.
The weapons classified under this acronym all can create extremely hazardous conditions
that can lead to mass casualties and disrupt society completely as it has toxic and hazardous
chemical agents. CBRN events are commonly comprised of deliberate or aggressive acts, with
the malicious intent of inciting fear or causing grave harm to humans and the environment.
The characteristics of CBRN weapons are found below.
• Chemical Threats: Chemical threats consist of weapons that utilize a hazardous

chemical that is designed to cause intentional death or harm through its toxic
properties. The four different types of chemical agents include choking agents,
blister agents, blood agents, and nerve agents. This chemical threat has a direct
effect on many human organs and systems including the respiratory system, lungs,
heart, and skin. Symptoms that can occur upon exposure to a chemical agent
includes watery eyes, itching, coughing, difficulty swallowing, difficulty breathing,
chest pain, dizziness, nausea, and potentially death.
Page 32 of 57
2022
• Biological Threats: A biological weapon, also called germ weapon, is any number of
disease-producing agents such as bacteria, viruses, fungi, toxins, and other
biological agents, that can be used as a weapon against humans. Lethal biological
weapons can cause mass deaths upon humans and have been responsible for
more deaths than from those employed by combat. There are five different
categories of biological agents including bacteria, rickettsia, viruses, fungi, and
toxins. The symptoms a human may experience from a biological threat can range
depending on the different category of biological agent.
• Radiological Threats: Radiological threats are weapons that disperse radioactive
agents to inflict injury or cause contamination and damage. A commonly used
radiological threat is the dirty bomb, which utilizes a conventional explosion to
disperse radioactive contaminants into an environment. The effects of radiological
threats upon the health of an individual can vary depending on the intensity,
duration, and type of radiation. Symptoms from this classification of warfare can
include nausea, vomiting, fatigue, fever, diarrhea, infection, bleeding,
gastrointestinal symptoms, and even death.
• Nuclear Threats: Nuclear weapons are devices designed to release energy in an
explosive manner because of nuclear fission, nuclear fusion, or a combination of
the two. This classification of weapon can lead to extreme danger to human health.
• Explosive Threats: An explosive weapon generally uses high explosives to project a
blast and fragmentation from the point of detonation. Explosive weapons can lead
to mass casualties in the affected area.
What is a CBRN Attack?

CBRN attacks can happen either accidentally or intentionally – but no matter the
circumstance the effects are bound to be grave. An accidental CBRN attack is typically caused
by human error, natural, or technological reasons. This can include spills, accidental releases,
or leakages that cause the incident to occur. When an accident occurs with these weapons it
is usually referred to as DG or a HAZMAT accident.
Whereas intentional CBRN incidents involve criminal acts, maliciously motivated poisoning of
an individual, or a terrorist attack or act. An intentional CBRN attack can leave great
devastation after deployment, with a calculated plan to harm a large area with many
individuals present when the attack occurs. These weapons are usually described as ‘low
probability, high risk’, because of the relatively low risk of a CBRN attack occurring but the
high threat risk to public health upon an attack taking place in the environment.
The Risk of a Chemical Attack
The severity of an attack is dependent upon several different factors, particularly the toxicity
of the chemical and its concentration when it reaches people. The release of a chemical agent
or a chemical attack in an enclosed space (such as a subway, airport, or an office space) could
Page 33 of 57
2022
deliver lethal doses, high enough to severely hurt or kill a large group of people. In
comparison, when a chemical attack is deployed in an open area, a toxic chemical cloud, or
plume, would become less concentrated as it spreads and would have to be released in a
large quantity to produce significant casualties.
Immediate health impacts can start to effect humans upon exposure to a chemical agent that
has been deployed during a chemical attack. Symptoms from exposure to toxic chemicals will
start to appear quickly, sometimes a couple hours or even a couple minutes following
exposure. The health risks alone from a chemical attack solidify the strength and devastation
that a chemical attack can wreak over an environment.
CBRN Terrorism
Terrorism or terrorist attacks that involve the use of CBRN materials pose a very real and
dangerous threat to public health and safety. Terroristic threats utilizing CBRN weapons can
also impact national security, economic, and political stability on a global level. When these
types of weapons are deployed in an act of terrorism, the complete destruction could be
insurmountable – leading to unrepairable effects on the human population and environment.
Preventing the risks of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons has
been a priority for a long period of time. The main used devices for terrorist attacks include
chemical, biological, and radiological weapons.
What are Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Devices?

CBR (Chemical, Biological, and Radiological) devices are without a doubt dangerous threat to
public health and safety. Chemical, Biological, and Radiological devices produce airborne
hazardous contaminants that can be in the form of gases, vapors, or aerosols. These types of
airborne contaminants can be very dangerous as they enter the body rapidly and impact
health within hours or even minutes after exposure.
To Mitigate the threat from Radiation, VMS and LMS have been installed at Indian Airports.
Implementation of dedicated, continuous nuclear and radiological monitoring systems for

identifying and tracking nuclear materials out of regulatory control is associated with high
operational burdens. Although video and images from cameras are helpful in assessing
threats, the raw, unstructured data require time-intensive human interaction to extract the
relevant actionable information for adjudicating a threat. A solution to this is to automatically
combine spatiotemporal information from radiological sensors and cameras with video and
data analytics within a computing platform such as a Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), to
produce structured, annotated video information that allows security staff to adjudicate
potential threats rapidly. The purpose of the proposed work is to exploit video/data analytics
and camera control solutions of VMSs to support the detection, identification, and tracking
of nuclear/radiological objects moving within the monitored environment, as well as to
Page 34 of 57
2022
generate actionable information about the object that is carrying/conveying the threat
materials.
The LMS (Limb Monitor Scanner) system is installed at the gas infrastructure facilities and
determines lowest gas concentrations at up to 1093 yards (1 km). If a leak is detected along
the scanning laser path, the system records this fact, gas concentration at the leak, leak
coordinates and time. System behavior at the time of leak detection can also
be programmed — record data and continue scanning, send a message to the duty control
panel, or stop scanning and turn on the alarm.
C. Insider Threat and its mitigation measures
Although fatal hijackings and attacks on aircraft have been occurring since long 9/11 sparked
the international community into launching new aviation security, procedures, regulations,
and operations. There are political, economic, and social implications that act as motives of
terrorism. Some terrorists claim that acts of violence are the better alternative to other forms
of political protesting and promotion. Some join terrorist groups for financial reasons, such
as providing for their families. Other people join terrorist groups because they are otherwise
outcasts and lack a place in society.
The insider is rising as one of the key threats to the aviation industry in relation to terrorism.
Motives for malicious and intentional insider activity can be political, economic, social,
cultural, and personal. Malicious insiders seeking revenge, sabotage, or espionage, and
intentional insiders seeking a self-benefiting profit are aware that their access to materials,
systems, networks, and infrastructure is valuable to terrorists. They can provide terrorists
with access to information about a company or significant building that would aid in an attack,
such as the layout of an airport. Terrorists can also recruit insiders to act on their behalf or
attempt to become the insider to carry out an attack by gaining authorized access to facilities,
systems, and data.
To define the Insider Threat more clearly, we first need to understand what constitutes an
‘insider’ within an aviation context. Essentially in an airport environment, an insider is an
individual who exploits their knowledge or access to their airport, airline, or organization’s
assets, for unauthorized purposes. So, the insider could be virtually anyone, including an
employee, contractor, consultant, or anyone else who has legitimate access to their
organization’s information or assets. This problem is especially difficult to manage when you
consider the interdependencies and wealth of information that moves around an airport.
Insider threat One or more individuals with access, and/or insider knowledge that allows them
to exploit vulnerabilities of the transportation domain.
Insider threat is the risk posed by workers with inside access and knowledge to exploit
vulnerabilities in the Civil aviation systems.
Page 35 of 57
2022
Why are insiders so dangerous?

The danger presented by an aviation insider is that they already understand the external
security of airports and aviation assets and will be able to exploit their knowledge of these
security measures. Many aviation insiders potentially also have access to the most critical and
sensitive parts of an airport. They are already in a position of trust and might hold an access
card to an airport’s airside, for example. Given this enhanced level of access, they are more
likely to be able to identify vulnerabilities and target the weakest areas within their airport.
Insiders pose a great risk to security and safety of the aviation industry by challenging security
countermeasures, exploiting potential vulnerabilities and increasing their knowledge of
security procedures for nefarious purposes.
Potential Insider Threats within the Aviation Industry include a wide variety of individuals
involved with the aircraft and passengers, including, but not limited to, the following
categories:
– Airline employees
– Concession and restaurant employees
– Cleaning and catering crews
– Construction and maintenance crews
– Law enforcement, military and/or security personnel
– Taxi, cab, shuttle bus and/or other transportation specialists
– Current and/or former employees
– Current and/or former contract government employees
– Air Traffic Controllers
– Ground Handling Agency staff
What is the intent behind an Insiders act?

Historically, the insider threat is a malicious insider or group who seeks to do harm; however,
it is important to remember that the insider threat can be unintentional as well. Personality,
behavioral, and lifestyle indicators may alert us to the malicious insider; however, the
unwitting or complacent insider could go undetected by peers and supervisors.
• Malicious: Insider seeks to aid or conduct an act that is malicious and intentional in
nature to cause damage
• Complacent : Insider takes a lenient/relaxed approach to policies, procedures, and
potential security risks
• Unwitting : Insider is not aware of security policies, procedures and protocols which
expose the organizations/agency to external risks.
Page 36 of 57
2022
Types of Insider Threats
The insider threat to the aviation sector spans across all realms of the threat vector to include
cyber, criminal, and terrorism. Some of the more notable examples of aviation insider threat
across the globe include terrorism/sabotage, security compromise, and physical property
theft.
Terrorism Use of insider access to facilitate an act of violence as a

means of disruption or coercion for political purposes.
Espionage Use of insider access to obtain sensitive information for

exploitation.
Security Compromise Use of insider access to facilitate and circumvent security
controls.
Sabotage Use of insider access to destroy equipment or materials.
Physical Property Theft Use of insider access to steal material items.

Information/Intellectual Use of insider access to steal information or intellectual
Property Theft property.
Workplace Violence Use insider access to conduct violence in the workplace.
What motivates an insider?
The motives of an insider can be varied and can include gaining financial advantage through
low-level or organized crime activities. They can be issue-driven (e.g., environmentalist
groups), terrorism focused, or an individual may become an insider simply because they are
disgruntled or unhappy with the way they have been treated by their organization. However,
the motivation may also be due to a combination of the above factors. Motivation is a
complex issue, as two employees may be faced with an identical situation, while only one
may decide to act against the interests of their organization. The following factors motivates
and Insider threat: -
– Financial Gain- Some insider threat activity has been motivated by greed or financial
need.
– Anger/Revenge- Insider threat activity has been conducted by employees who were
disgruntled to the point of wanting to retaliate against the organization.
– Problems at work- Some insider threats have been individuals who felt a lack of
recognition at work, has disagreements with co-workers or managers and were
dissatisfied with the job, or upset by a pending layoff.
Page 37 of 57
2022
– Divided loyalty- Insider threat activity has also been conducted by individuals who
have pledged allegiance to another person or company or to a country besides India.
– Blackmail/Extortion- Blackmail is when a person is easily manipulated due to fear of
sensitive information getting out such as gambling, fraud, or illicit relationships.
– Extortion is when a person is coerced through force or threat.
– Destructive Behaviour- On occasions individual threat activity was related to an
individual’s problems with substance abuse.
– Adventure/Thrill Seeker- A person who wants more excitement in life and who in
intrigued by covert or sneaky activity is probably motivated by fame. He or she
generally has an inflated ego.
– Radicalization- The process by which people come to support terrorism and violent
extremism and, in some cases, then join terrorist groups.”
– Family Problems- In the past, there also have been incidents when a person who was
experiencing the stress of family or marital conflicts, or separation from loved ones
became involved in insider threat activity.
MITIGATING INSIDERS’ THREAT: Proposed Solution
The advantage of someone working at an airport possessing sufficient knowledge of routine

security systems may be significantly reduced if unpredictable measures are in place like
random screening of staff, Surprise check of AEP.
Security measures also contribute towards mitigating the risk associated with the insider
threat, and include background checks, selection procedures, security awareness training for
airport identification holders and training of staff implementing other security controls, as
well as perimeter security, access controls, surveillance, aircraft security and quality control.
In all cases, screening and other security controls carried out in a random and unpredictable
manner should achieve outcomes to combat the insider threat.
• Proactive approach to reporting suspicious activities.
• Pre‐employment background checks: Comprehensive background check of all
personnel selected for hiring/ employment at the airport should be carried out by
the relevant State’s security agencies base on the risk assessment.
• The policy should focus on preventing the recruitment of a person who is not able to
provide a background check which is compliant with the operator’s requirements.
• Criminal records, detailed review of employment history, travel history, correct
identification etc. can provide a reasonable picture of a potential employee.
Operators should have a process to ensure that all new entrant staff complete the
requirements of the vetting process prior to employment. These measures may be
varied depending on the level of risk that is posed by the person’s role and the access
to the operator’s sensitive areas.
Page 38 of 57
2022
• Spot and Stop measures: Operators should consider what measures exist to identify an
insider at the earliest stage and to stop or deter him.
SPOT measures: measures aim to identify behaviour or activities of concern, and to identify
any changing or suspicious behaviour patterns that might help to detect a potential insider.
STOP measures: should aim to prevent or deter an insider from exploiting or intending to
exploit their role for unauthorized purposes.
Due to changing circumstances in their lives, every person may potentially become vulnerable
to being an insider, and if so, their attitudes or behaviour are significantly affected.
Such circumstances range from stressful personal crises to deliberate targeting and
recruitment by malicious third parties. Circumstances leading to vulnerability might be
subtle and difficult to recognize.
However, the reality would suggest that most such circumstances are caused by financial
difficulty, undue pressure from peers and family, perceptions of unfairness at work, or other
inducement or coercion from third parties.
Governance: Within the insider threat policy the operator should consider identifying a
summary of the roles and responsibilities of relevant departments.
D. Cyber Threat and its mitigation measures
Cyber Threat can be defined as the possibility of a malicious attempt to damage or disrupt a
computer network or system.
In Aviation Industry it has been categorized as new and emerging threat.
What is Cyber Security?
Cyber security is the practice of protecting systems, networks, and programs from
digital attacks. These attacks are usually aimed at accessing, changing, or destroying
sensitive information, extorting money from users or interrupting normal business
process.
Page 39 of 57
2022
Why Aviation Information & Communication Technology System needs to be protected?
1) Rapid growth of civil aviation and significant use of data and use of new technologies.
2) Manual processes are shifting to more efficient automated processes.
3) Paperless and environment friendly approach
4) Huge number of stakeholders
5) Cyber-attack can endanger the safety of an aircraft.
6) Hackers, cyber criminals, “hacktivists” and terrorists are focused on malicious intent,
theft of information, profit, and disruption.
GOI is implementing Digital experience for Air Travelers through “DigiYatra” Platform. The
'DigiYatra' is a digital processing of passengers at the airports. Passengers will be
automatically processed based on facial recognition system at check points like; Entry point
check, Entry into Security Check, Aircraft Boarding, additionally this will also facilitate self-Bag
Drop and Check-in, using facial recognition to identify pax and data recall. Digi Yatra will
facilitate paperless travel and avoid identity check at multiple points.
Governance and responsibilities:

States, governments, Airport Operator, and relevant entities should work collaboratively
towards the development of an effective and coordinated framework for civil aviation
stakeholders working at the airport to address the challenges of cyber threats and increase
the resilience of the global aviation system to cyber threats that may jeopardize the safety
of civil aviation operation at the airport.
The confidentiality, integrity and availability of all Information and Technology systems of
the airport shall be maintained.
Each entity involved in Civil Aviation is responsible for keeping the industry safe from Cyber
Threat:
1. Access control and alarm monitoring system.
2. Departure control systems
3. Passenger and baggage reconciliation system
4. Screening system and/or explosive detection system
5. Regulated agent and/or known consignor.
6. Air Traffic Management systems
7. Reservation and passenger check-in system
8. CCTV surveillance systems
9. Security Command, control, and dispatch system
Page 40 of 57
2022
Identification of critical information

DG, BCAS shall define criteria for identification of critical information systems. An information
system is critical when it contains or uses sensitive or privacy data and/or assets; or its
operation is indispensable for the safe and secure operation and availability of aviation
activities. The identification of critical systems should be conducted through classification of
all data and/or assets according to a predefined data policy or classification, and the
development of a business impact analysis on the criticality for each of the individual system.
Airport Operator, ATS, aircraft operators, communications service providers, ground
handling agents, maintenance, repair and overhaul service providers, and Security service
providers should identify additional critical data and information systems software and
hardware used in their operation, which may include, but are not limited to:
a) Systems and data identified as critical from an aviation safety perspective, such as:
i) Air traffic management systems,
ii) Departure control systems,
iii) Communication, navigation, and other safety-critical systems of an aircraft,
iv) Aircraft command, control, and dispatch systems,
b) Systems and data identified as critical from an aviation security perspective, such as:
i) Regulated agent and/or known consignor databases,
ii) Access control and alarm monitoring systems,
iii) Closed-circuit television surveillance systems,
iv) Passenger and baggage reconciliation systems; and
v) Screening systems and/or explosive detection systems, whether
networked or operating in a stand-alone configuration,
c) Systems and data identified as critical from an aviation facilitation perspective, such as:
i) Aircraft operator reservation and passenger check-in systems,
ii) Flight information display systems,
iii) Baggage handling and monitoring systems; and
iv) Border crossing and customs systems.
Each stakeholder working in aviation industry needs to identify critical information vital to
their operations and the consequences of its being misused.
Risk Assessment
When applying security considerations in airport design, it will be necessary to conduct an
airport threat and risk assessment. The Airport Operator shall be responsible to ensure
threat and risk assessments of a particular airport and shall approach the Director General,
BCAS well in time.
Page 41 of 57
2022
Factors to be considered: -
a. Threat assessment and risk management

b. Extent of Airport Operation
c. Frequency and volume of aircraft operations
d. Volume of cargo and mail or catering operations
e. Likelihood of an act of unlawful interference
f. Outcome of previous monitoring activities
g. Finding of internal quality control measures
h. New and emerging needs
Protection of critical information
The objectives of these measures should be, at a minimum, to:

a) protect the systems and data against unauthorized access, modification, and use,
b) prevent lack of availability and integrity due to flaws in software compilation and/or
misuse of configurations; and
c) prevent tampering with the systems and their data.
Protection of data against
• Data Breach: - A data breach is the intentional or unintentional release of secure or

private/confidential information to an untrusted environment.
• Hacking: - Hacking refers to a variety of techniques that are used to compromise or
gain access to a digital system. This can be a computer, mobile phone or tablet, or
an entire network.
• Cyber Incidents: - Cyber incident means actions taken using computer networks that
result in a compromise or an actual or potentially adverse effect on an information
system and/or the information residing therein.
• Cyber-attacks: - In computers and computer networks an attack is any attempt to
expose, alter, disable, destroy, steal, or gain unauthorized access to or make
unauthorized use of an asset.
Page 42 of 57
2022
Most common Cybersecurity threats:

1) MALWARE: - is sending a code with malicious intents which may seals the data or
destroys the computer. It can be done by 3 ways.
a) Virus – Virus when enters a computer system/software can clean files or infect
files. Virus attaches itself to an existing executable program. It can spread very
fast. It may enter the system by sampling downloading a file.
b) Trogan- a program that appears desirable but contains something harmful. It
may be a legitimate software that can be tampered with.
c) Worms it is a code which infects one computer and can spread to the entire
network (network interface). It targets the operating system vulnerabilities.
2) PHISHING: - the fraudulent practice of sending emails purporting to be from

reputable companies to induce individuals to reveal personal information, such
as passwords and credit card numbers. The moment you furnish your details,
they will steal the data. Messages look authentic however, the email received
will not be from not a very reliable source (the e-mail ID would be fictitious, not
a company ID).
3) PASSWORD ATTACKS: - the hackers will try to enter the system by cracking the
password of the computer. They will repeatedly try to check the passwords
stored in the computer algorithm, by applying combinations. There are 3 ways
of password attacks.
a) Brute force attack: - In case the name list of employees is available to the
hacktivists, they will have combination of name and numbers like ABC123.
b) Dictionary attacks possibilities: - using short and easy words used in
dictionary as passwords.
c) Keylogger attacks: - they will try all the keys which the user has used during
a day on the keyboard to crack the password.
4) DISTRUBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDoS) ATTACK: - When you hear about a website
being “brought down by hackers,” it generally means it has become a victim of a
DDoS attack. In short, this means that hackers have attempted to make a website
or computer unavailable by flooding or crashing the website with too much traffic.
5) MAN-IN THE-MIDDLE: - if using non-Encrypted files/links and pirated software/

videos a person in the middle can have access to the flow of information between
2 parties/entities without their knowing. Example. When 2 persons are talking on
the phone a third person picks up the parallel line and listens to your conversation.
This 3rd person is the man-in the -middle he can impersonate your information/data
to the best of his advantage.
6) THREATS BY DOWNLOADS: - when you download any app or files from a

Page 43 of 57
2022
compromising website a malicious code can be downloaded in the background to

your device. Unintentional download of virus or malicious software in your
computer. Same is the case when you use external device like pen drive unknown
virus can be transferred without knowing.
7) MALVERT ICING: - advertisement may look like authentic but has been placed by
criminals. These advertisements have small code when you click on them, you
would be redirected to some criminal server and the codes connect to the server
of the company system and get the sensitive information.
8) ROGUE SOFTWARE: Scareware, Ransomware: - makes to believe that there is virus in

your system and make to pay you ransom money to release the data. The sender would
make use of various temptations to ensure that you download an app or file like giving
free vacation or trial versions of software. The moment you click a POP-UP warning will
show stating that your computer is infected and to clean/remove the virus by clicking
on the programme. The Scareware Software will then either steal your data or corrupt
your files and even stop you from sending any data/file.
Mitigation measures Response: Planning and Readiness
To overcome the threat from cyber-attacks, all stakeholders should ensure that the software
computer installed are ISO certified. There is a proper supply chain for purchase and
installation of software and hardware. Apart from having a proper selection, recruitment,
background check policy to prevent possibility of any data leakage, all companies must also
ensure that the critical sensitive is shared with only people in leadership on need -to- know
basis. All employees must be informed: -
a) Avoid clicking on links and attachments sent by unknown source or person.
b) Stay away from pirated software. Install only original and authenticated software/
hardware.
c) Report such emails to your company.
d) Only use Encrypted wireless point, security of connection https to be used. If not
on https website, your credentials can be stollen.
e) No use of external drive
Page 44 of 57
2022
All entities must have strict IT Policies which must include the following: -
a) deployment of Firewalls: - will help such emails or attachments from reaching the
server of the company.
b) Frequent software security updates. Install only original and authenticated
software/ hardware only.
c) To have Controlled advertisements have advertisement blocker installed. Any
advertisement of free lottery or trips should not be opened.
d) Updated firewall.
e) Install trusted antivirus software and spyware software which can prevent such
mails, threats from entering your systems.
f) Regular software updates, online monitoring, monitoring of data flow to identify
any unusual or threatening spikes traffic before it becomes a problem/ bigger
threat.
g) Only HTTPS websites to be given permission into the company’s server to keep
away the Spam mails.
h) Password Protection Policy: -
i. Avoid using your name, Date of birth. etc.
ii. Short and easy words used in dictionary should be avoided.
iii. Multifactor authentication is must.
iv. Update regularly.
v. Use words not in dictionary.
vi. Combination of Alpha numeric and character
vii. Password Protection: -
1. NEVER SHARE YOUR PASSWORD WITH ANYONE
2. Do not leave your computer in unlocked condition unattended.
3. If going away from computer, please lock it so that no one can
use it and steal any information.
Page 45 of 57
2022
Reporting
Any act or breach in the protection of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
critical information and communications technology systems and data used for civil aviation
purposes from interference that may jeopardize the safety of civil aviation shall be
immediately reported to the DG, BCAS by the concerned entity.
E. Drone Attacks
Drone” means an unmanned aircraft. Authorized “Unmanned Aircraft System Operator” means a
person authorized to engage in or offering to engage in operation of an unmanned aircraft system
under The Unmanned Aircraft System Rules, 2021.
Each UAS shall be equipped with the following–
• Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver(s) for horizontal and vertical position fixing ;
• Autonomous Flight Termination System or Return To Home (RTH) option;
• Geo-fencing capability;
• Flashing anti-collision strobe lights;
• Flight controller with Flight data logging capability;
• No Permission – No Takeoff (NPNT) compliant;
• Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) transponder
• Reliable Command and Control Link;
• Real-time tracking system;
• Barometric equipment with capability for remote sub-scale setting;
• Detect and Avoid capability;
• Manufacturer Serial Number;
• Fire resistant identification plate for engraving the UIN;
• Two-way communication system; and
• 360 degrees collision avoidance system.
Page 46 of 57
2022
Flying Restrictions
No unmanned aircraft shall fly in a restricted area unless specifically permitted by the Director General.
No unmanned aircraft, except Nano unmanned aircraft, shall be flown by a person who is not a
licensed remote pilot.
No Unmanned Aircraft belonging to small, or medium or large class shall be permitted to fly in
enclosed premises.
No unmanned aircraft shall be flown

(a) Within 5 kilometers from the perimeter of international airports at Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai,
Kolkata, Bengaluru and Hyderabad.
(b) Within 3 kilometers from the perimeter of any civil, private or defense airports, other than those
mentioned in clause(a);
(c) Above the Obstacle Limitation Surfaces (OLS) or Procedures for Air Navigation Services
(g) Within 3 kilometer from perimeter of military installations/ facilities/ where military activities/
exercises are being carried out unless clearance is obtained from the local military installation/facility;
(h) Within 5-kilometer radius from Vijay Chowk in Delhi. However, this is subject to any additional
conditions/ restrictions imposed by local law enforcement agencies/ authorities in view of the security.
(i) Within 2 kilometer from perimeter of strategic locations/ vital installations notified by Ministry of
Home Affairs unless clearance is obtained from Ministry of Home Affairs;
Counter Drone System
The composition of Counter Drone System
1. Primary Drone Detection Radar;

2. Radio Frequency (RF) Detector and Direction Finder;
3. Electro Optical (EO) and Infra-Red (IR) Sensor;
4. Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and RF Jammer;
5. Hard-kill options such as Laser and Fire Control locking system (FCS); and
6. Command & Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence management
systems
BCAS Policy
• Drones are not allowed in hand baggage of the passengers.

• Drones are allowed in the registered baggage without the batteries.
****END****
Page 47 of 57
2022
Page 48 of 57
2022
Page 49 of 57
2022
Page 50 of 57
2022
Page 51 of 57
2022
Page 52 of 57
2022
Page 53 of 57
2022
Page 54 of 57
2022
Page 55 of 57
2022
Page 56 of 57
2022
Page 57 of 57
2022
MODULE -16
Closing Activity
Page 1 of 8
2022
Slide 1
Slide 2
Slide 3
END OF MODULE 16
Page 2 of 8
2022
Page 3 of 8
2022
Page 4 of 8
2022
Page 5 of 8
2022
Page 6 of 8
2022
Page 7 of 8
2022
Page 8 of 8
2022

TRB 2022

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

TRB 2022

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

नागर विमानन सुरक्षा ब्यूरो – भारत

BUREAU OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY – INDIA

AVIATION SECURITY BASIC COURSE

Trainee Reference Book-2022

This Restricted Document is

Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS)

(Jaideep Prasad, IPS)

COURSE INTRODUCTION AND

Overview of International/National Civil Aviation Security

Aviation Security. Combination of measures, human and material resources intended to

Primary objective of Aviation security

Basic Principles and Philosophy for Aviation Security

Threats to Civil Aviation

Vulnerability is those characteristics of a target which could be exploited in an attack.

RISK = THREAT x VULNERABILITY

The Traditional / conventional types of threat to civil aviation are as follows.

• Suicide attack on ground facilities

• Threat from biological weapons

Who are the Terrorists?

• Target specific individuals on an aircraft, such as Diplomats or VIPs

UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT (HIJACKING)

What are the techniques used for hijacking?

• Armed assault. This has been used on several occasions

• Infiltration of device into baggage;

These offenders may endeavor to achieve sabotage by:

Where can the threats come from?

• Terrorist disguised as an airport worker

Where can the Threats come from?

Historical Reviews of Past Incidents

2 1969 Year of maximum Hijackings

3 Outcome Rule 8 A of Aircraft Rule 1937 was being implemented.

4 Outcome Shri B.D. Pandey committee was formed in 1976

18th Jan, 1978 Formation of DCAS as a cell under DGCA on the

23rd Jun, 1985

7 3rd May 1986 Sabotage of Air Lanka aircraft at Colombo airport.

9 Outcome Emphasis on Profiling.

Outcome • Raising of Perimeter wall to the prescribed height

Outcome • Strengthening of cockpit doors

Outcome Focus on Landside security.

23 Outcome Recommended Practices on landside security, security

17th July 2014 A Malaysian Airline flight MH 17 flying over Ukraine

Aviation Security Countermeasures

These countermeasures can be categorized as:

International Conventions (Legal Instruments)

The Chicago Convention, officially called the Convention on

Tokyo Convention 1963

• The safety of the aircraft.

The Hague Convention 1970

The official name of the Hague Convention, established in 1970, is the

Contents of the Hague Convention

This convention obliges the States to:

The Montreal Convention 1971

Contents of the Montreal Convention

This convention defines the following offences:

This convention obliges the States to:

• Make attempts and accomplices to offences also punishable by severe penalties.

Protocol to the Montreal Convention 1988

The official name of this protocol, added to the Montreal

• The disruption of the airport's services

The Marking of Plastic Explosives Convention 1991 (MEX CONVENTION)

The official name of the Marking of Plastic Explosives

Contents of the Marking of Plastic Explosives Convention

• Prevent the movement of unmarked explosives through their territory

Beijing Protocol 2010