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 YOUTH AND
UNCONVENTIONAL
POLITICAL
ENGAGEMENT

Ilaria Pitti
Youth and Unconventional Political Engagement
 Ilaria Pitti

Youth and
Unconventional
Political Engagement
Ilaria Pitti
School of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences
Örebro University
Örebro, Sweden

ISBN 978-3-319-72136-1    ISBN 978-3-319-75591-5 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75591-5

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018935688

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

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publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
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 A Nonna
Fin dall’inizio e per sempre
 Acknowledgements

As one of the many young scholars who daily deal with the increased com-
petitiveness of the academic life and with the consequent need to work in
an efficient, quick, and quantitatively productive way while meeting the
continuous deadlines and managing the uncertainties of expiring con-
tracts, I have spent most of my first years in academia jumping from a
contract to another, from a fieldwork to another, from an article to
another without having enough time to stop and reflect on what I was
doing. Although in these years my “luggage” of personal experience and
professional expertise has intensively grown, I believe research requires
slowness.
This book is my very first attempt to “slow down and take a look around”,
connecting the dots between the different researches I have carried out in
the last years and reflecting on some broader implications of what I have
observed and studied. As any first attempt, it has been frightening and chal-
lenging, and the idea of engaging in this endeavour would have not turned
in something concrete without the encouragements of a series of people.
I am thankful, first of all, to my supervisors: Paolo Zurla (University of
Bologna) who, without even knowing it, has taught me how to not lose
my tenderness in a hard world, and Erik Amnå (Örebro University) who,
without knowing me, has trusted my soul and my brain from the very
beginning.
Thanks to my colleagues at the University of Bologna: Alessandro
Martelli for he has always encouraged me to be what I am (academically
and not) and has taken care of my (many) moments of anguish during the
writing of this book, Nicola De Luigi for he has taught me to think in the

vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

long run, and Maura De Bernart for she has believed in me before anyone
else.
In the last year, the possibility of working within a welcoming and stim-
ulating environment at Örebro University has filled my mind with stimuli
and my hearth with hope: I would like to thank, among others, Sofia
Alexopolou, Viktor Dahl, Jan Jämte, Thomas Denk, and Jan Olsson.
I owe my gratitude to Sharlene Swartz (University of Cape Town),
Howard Williamson (University of South Wales), and Harry Blatterer
(Macquarie University) who—in different moments of my personal and
academic path—have shown me the way.
I feel thankful for the opportunity to work with all the researchers par-
ticipating in the Horizon 2020 project Partispace, from which some of the
data considered in this book are drawn. You are too many to be listed
here, but you all know how much grateful I am to you for these years of
sweat and laughs.
Very special thanks go to my “white flies”: Alessandro Bozzetti, Stella
Volturo, Federica Chiusole, Rebecca Paraciani, Valeria Piro, Yagmur
Mengilli, Berrin Osmalouglu, Harriet Rowley, and Bojan Bilić; young and
talented researchers who are stronger than they know. Throughout by
personal and academic path, Elena Mattioli and Lorenzo Latella have been
more than colleagues and friends: they have been allies and brothers and
deserve all my love and gratitude.
Thanks to my beloved brothers, parents, and uncles, who have been my
roots in these years of nomadism. Thanks to my friends—Anna, Gabriele,
Luca, Renata, Daniel, Alessandra, Annamaria, Benedetta, and Valeria
among others—for supporting me in what I am doing with my life, even
when it looks irrational, senseless, and a bit self-destructive.
Finally, I will never find enough words to thank the young people who
are at the centre of this book. They have given me their time, told me their
stories, reminded me how lucky I am in doing this job, and shown me the
beauty of youth in all its revolutionary strength. No book can do justice to
their efforts, but I hope this one could help a little to give voice to them
and to their struggles.
To these young people, borrowing Pier Paolo Pasolini’s words, I want
to remind this: “They will teach you not to shine. And you shine instead.”
 Contents

1 Introduction   1
References   5

2 Unconventional Political Participation: An Overview   7

On the Concept of Political Participation   8
Unconventional Political Participation: Between “Purist”
and “Vague” Interpretations  10
New, Heterodox, Non-institutionalised Practices and/or Forms
of Protest?  12
Conclusions  17
References  19

3 Young People and Unconventional Political Engagement  23

Youth (Unconventional) Participation in the Academic Debate  24
Relevance and Limits of the Life-Course Approach  26
The Generational Approach: Basic Elements  28
Youth Conditions in Contemporary Society: A Process of Social
Peripheralisation  31
References  35

ix
x CONTENTS

4 “What Do We Want? We Want Everything!”: Young

Swedish Activists and the “Union of Citizens”  39
Introduction  39
Context: Access to Housing in Sweden  40
Case Study: Young Activists and the Social Movement  44
Goals: Defending the Space of Youths in the City  47
Practices: Building Up a Political Platform from Below  51
Reasons: Re-activating Society in Competition with Institutions  55
Conclusions: Beyond Claiming  57
References  59

5 “If Not Now, When?”: Young Italian People

and the Occupied Social Centre  63
Introduction  63
Context: Italian Self-Managed Social Centres and the Crisis  64
Case Study: Young Activists and the Occupied Centro Sociale  67
Goals: Taking Back the Present and the Future  70
Practices: Creating Anomalies  73
Reasons: From a Political Anomaly to a Societal Mutation  76
Conclusions: Beyond Protest  79
References  80

6 “We Will Never Be What You Want Us to Be”: Young

Football Fans and the Ultras Centre  83
Introduction  84
Context: Ultras and Social Stigma  85
Case Study: Young Football Fans and the Ultras Social Centre  89
Goals: A Voice for the “Losers” of Society  92
Practices: No More a “Foreign Body”  97
Reasons: Invading the Political Sphere 101
Conclusions: Beyond Recognition 105
References 107
 CONTENTS
   xi

7 Unconventional Is the New Conventional? 111

Introduction 112
Something More Than Engaged Citizens 113
Elaborating Competitive Alternatives 117
Between Voice and Exit 121
Conventional, Unconventional, Postconventional? 123
References 125

Index 127
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract The introductory chapter clarifies the focus of the book, intro-
duces its analytical perspective, and presents its structure. Taking for
granted the idea that young generations are “naturally” inclined to engage
through non-conventional forms of participation, sociological and politi-
cal science literature have often overlooked the changes emerging within
youth unconventional political practices during the last decades, dismiss-
ing the socio-historical situatedness of political behaviours. In this per-
spective, this chapter argues the need to delve into the relationship
between young people and unconventional participation in contemporary
society in order to clarify and actualise our understandings of unconven-
tional political participation.

Keywords Unconventional political participation • Youth conditions

• Youth political engagement

The word “participation” identifies a complex set of relationships between

individuals and society, and it has two main semantic meanings: on the one
hand, it means “being part”, and on the other, it can be interpreted as
“taking part” (Cotta 1979).
In the first case, participation concerns the incorporation of an indi-
vidual in the life of a socio-political solidarity (a society, a community, a
group) as a legitimate member and implies the recognition and acquisition

© The Author(s) 2018 1

I. Pitti, Youth and Unconventional Political Engagement,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75591-5_1
2 I. PITTI

of a status defined by a set of specific duties and rights (Sartori 1984). In

this situation, participation has to do with membership and belonging.
In the second case, participation is intended as the active involvement
of an individual in the processes of decision-making concerning a given
socio-political solidarity and corresponds to active engagement (Kymlicka
and Norman 1994).
Without dismissing the interactive dynamic of mutual influence of the
two meanings of the term, this book is specifically concerned with partici-
pation as referring to “taking part” and it looks at the ways in which young
people “take part” in the life of the communities they belong to, through
unconventional political practices of participation (Barnes and Kaase
1979).
As we are going to discuss in the following chapter, the concept of
unconventional political engagement is used in literature to refer to a vari-
ety of political practices broadly distinguished by their innovative, hetero-
dox, and/or non-institutionalised nature and which are often interpreted
as forms of protest. The concept is commonly applied in reference to
actions ranging from demonstrations to boycotting, from squatting to
engaging in social movements, and much confusion seems to exist around
what “unconventional” really means.
However, when it comes to the analysis of the relationship between
young people and participation, most Western studies on political youth
engagement agree on highlighting a steady preference of youths for
unconventional practices of engagement ahead of a well-documented
decrease of interest in conventional ways of political involvement (Pickard
and Bessant 2018). Since the 1960s, an elective youth affinity for uncon-
ventional practices has started to be taken for granted, and the idea that
young generations are “naturally” inclined to engage through non-­
conventional forms of participation has become a “mantra” in sociological
and political science studies (Dalton 2008).
This analysis does not aim at contradicting this idea, which is largely
supported by analyses and researches, but seeks to delve into the relation-
ship between young people and unconventional participation in contem-
porary society, looking more closely at the forms and meanings that this
“natural elective affinity” takes in contemporary society.
The distinctiveness of the approach proposed in this book comprises
the choice to focus attention on the connections between unconventional
participation and youth conditions in contemporary society, using differ-
ent case studies to explore for what, how, and why today’s young people
 INTRODUCTION 3

choose certain means of engagement. In so doing, the book seeks to bring

back the specificities of contemporary youth at the centre of the analysis of
unconventional practices of participation, highlighting their often over-
looked socio-historical and generational situatedness.
Being aware that the discussed findings tell only the story of an active
minority of young people who decide to engage using these practices
(Marien et al. 2010), the book explores what the conditions of contempo-
rary youth say about the unconventional participation of today’s youths
and what youth unconventional participation tells us about contemporary
youth conditions. In so doing, this volume seeks to contribute to the
existing knowledge of contemporary young generations’ involvement in
the public sphere.
The structure of the book combines a robust theoretical analysis with
an extensive presentation of findings emerging from qualitative research
conducted on different experiences of youth unconventional political
participation.
In particular, Chap. 2 presents a reflection on the concept of unconven-
tional political participation, aimed at exploring the different ways through
which “unconventionality” has been interpreted in academic literature. In
so doing, the chapter argues how literature on unconventional engage-
ment tends to adopt either “purist” definitions (which do not account for
emerging forms of unconventional participation) or “too vague” positions
(which apply the adjective “unconventional” to almost every participatory
action beyond voting). At the same time, the need to clarify on what basis
an action can be defined as “unconventional” is argued, looking at the
relevance and limits of those understandings where the word “unconven-
tional” corresponds to “new”, “heterodox”, “non-­institutionalised,” or
coincides with “protest”.
Chapter 3 specifies the book’s analytical perspective, discussing the
need to look at the aims, forms, and meanings that unconventional politi-
cal participation acquires in the light of the contemporary youth condi-
tions. In consideration of this aim, the chapter looks at the association
between youthfulness and unconventionality, exploring the relevance and
limits of the explanations based on a life-course perspective and discussing
why and how a generational approach of analysis is applied in the present
study. An interpretation of contemporary youth’s “generational location”
(Mannheim 1928) in terms of a process of social “peripheralisation” of
youth is proposed.
4 I. PITTI

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present the stories of three experiences of uncon-

ventional political youth participation: a bottom-up politicisation of a
neighbourhood started by a group of young Swedish people in an attempt
to confront problems of access to housing and urban marginalisation; a
squatted building transformed in a self-managed social centre by a group
of Italian activists dealing with the occupational and existential uncertain-
ties generated by the economic crisis; and a community centre opened by
a group of young Italian ultras to overcome the social stigma that portrays
them as “just hooligans and vandals”.
The case studies were conducted between 2015 and 2017, within the
framework of two European research projects financed by the European
Commission’s Horizon 2020 funding scheme: the project Youthblocs1—
focused on the involvement of young people in “radical” forms of uncon-
ventional political participation in Italy and Sweden, and on the influence
of intergenerational relationships on the paths of youth’s political involve-
ment—and the project Partispace2—that analyses the spaces and styles of
youth participation in eight European cities.
Each case study was conducted using participant observation and bio-
graphical interviews, and intends to exemplify a possible combination
between a given problematic youth subject (such as problems in getting
access to housing, employment difficulties, social stigmatisation, and mar-
ginalisation) and the use of unconventional political practices to find a
solution to that condition while engaging with issues which are relevant to
the community.
In the analysis of each of the case studies, attention will be paid at (a)
the goals young people seek to reach through unconventional forms of
participation, (b) the specific practices through which these goals are
achieved, and (c) the reasons why forms of unconventional engagement
are preferred to conventional practices and ways of participation.
Through an extensive presentation of the three case studies, the book
aims, first and foremost, to give visibility to the stories of participation of
the young people who have being involved in this research, bringing back
their efforts and their voices at the centre of the attention. On a second
level, the book seeks to highlight how contemporary young people are

1
Youthblocs receives funds from the European Commission through the Horizon 2020
Marie Sklodowska Curie Programme (MSCA – IF – 2015 – Grant Agreement n. 701844).
2
Partispace receives funds from the European Commission through the Horizon 2020
Research and Innovation Programme (Grant Agreement n. 649416).
 INTRODUCTION 5

changing unconventional political participation, underlining a series of

general transformations emerging in the way they use these practices of
engagement. Although each case study is embedded in a specific local and
social context, the collected stories are considered as exemplificative of
transferable dynamics concerning the relationship between youth and par-
ticipation in contemporary Western society.
Their analysis constitutes the basis for a general reflection on the con-
temporary features of youth unconventional political participation, which
is presented in Chap. 7.

References
Barnes, Samuel H., and Max Kaase, eds. 1979. Political action. Mass participation
in five Western democracies. London: Sage.
Cotta, Massimo. 1979. “Il concetto di partecipazione politica. Linee di un
inquadramento teorico.” Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 2: 193–277.
Dalton, Russel J. 2008. The good citizen. How a younger generation is reshaping
American politics. Washington: CQ Press.
Kymlicka, Will, and Wayne Norman. 1994. “Return of the citizen. A survey of
recent work on citizenship theory.” Ethics 104 (2):352–81.
Mannheim, Karl. 1928. “Das Problem der Generationen.” Kölner Vierteljahrshefte
für Soziologie 7: 157–85.
Marien, Sofie, Marc Hooghe, and Ellen Quintelier. 2010. “Unconventional par-
ticipation and the problem of inequality: a comparative analysis.” In New forms
of citizen participation. Normative implications, edited by Erik Amnå. Baden-­
Baden: Nomos Verlag.
Pickard, Sarah, and Judith Bessant. eds. 2018. Young people re-generating politics
in times of crises. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Sartori, Giovanni. 1984. Social science concepts: a systematic analysis. Beverly Hills:
Sage.
 CHAPTER 2

Unconventional Political Participation:

An Overview

Abstract Engaging in an analysis of unconventional political youth par-

ticipation in contemporary society requires a preliminary conceptual effort
to clarify the basic concepts of “political participation” and of “unconven-
tionality”. In this perspective, this chapter specifies the thematic focus of
the present analysis by providing a definition of political participation and
by exploring the different ways in which the concept of “unconventional
political participation” is currently understood in literature. In so doing,
the chapter intends to show how existing definitions of unconventional
political participation swing between “purist” positions (unable to account
for the contemporary phenomenology of youth non-conventional partici-
pation) and “vague” definitions (where the label “unconventional” is
applied to almost every youth political action beyond voting). Reflecting
on the limits of the traditional ways through which the unconventional
nature of a participatory act has been defined (innovative, heterodox, non-­
institutionalised practices, and protest behaviours), the chapter discusses
the need for a conceptual actualisation of the definition of unconventional
political participation.

Keywords Unconventional political participation • Political behaviours

• Protest • Unconventionality • Non-institutionalised participation

© The Author(s) 2018 7

I. Pitti, Youth and Unconventional Political Engagement,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75591-5_2
8 I. PITTI

On the Concept of Political Participation

As argued by Van Deth (2001), the development of a broader understand-
ing of the concept of “political participation” is derived from the recogni-
tion of new styles of involvement, while the increase in the fields of
engagement has progressively given voice to emerging instances and forms
of expression of political interest. However, this evolution also implies
there is a risk that a study on political participation could easily become a
“theory on everything”.
Scholars dealing with political participation need, in fact, to be aware
that political participation is “an umbrella concept” (Huntington and
Nelson 1976, p. 14) and that any analysis of this phenomenon needs to
start with the specification of what is considered to be an act of participa-
tion, and where the boundaries between “political” and “non-political”
acts are set.
With the expression “acts of participation”, this book refers to those
behaviours which are voluntarily carried out by people in their role of citi-
zens (Norris 2002; Van Deth 2014).
For this definition, the component of behaviour stresses the fact that
people can express their feelings of being part of a society through atti-
tudes and/or actions (Van Deth 2014). Attitudes concern people’s orien-
tations towards participation and are usually measured in terms of opinions
on politics, willingness to participate, or participatory potential (Barnes
and Kaase 1979). Actions, instead, exist in the concrete behaviours
through which people take part in society. Although many studies (Brady
1999; Ekman and Amnå 2012) have explored the relation between politi-
cal attitudes and political behaviours, this analysis looks mainly at actions
and practices of engagement. As a consequence, for example, the simple
claim of being curious about politics will fall beyond the scope of analysis
of this book if it does not translate into a concrete political behaviour.
The second element of the adopted definition of an “act of participa-
tion” deals with the issue of voluntariness and specifies that to be consid-
ered as modes of political participation, behaviours should be “optional”,
that is, they “should not be a consequence of force, pressure or threats,
but be based on free will” (Van Deth 2014, p. 354).
The third component concerns citizens, conceived as the main actors of
political participation. While some analyses also consider holding a public
office among the forms of political participation (Milbrath 1965), others
underline that participation consists specifically in the upward influence from
 UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: AN OVERVIEW 9

private citizens on the political system (Verba and Nie 1972; Kymlicka and
Norman 1994). In this study, the second perspective is preferred, and political
participation is considered to be a set of actions put in place by people in their
role of private citizens—both as individual or members of a collective actor—
and not by political representatives, civil servants, political elites, or other paid
political personnel (Brady 1999; Uhlaner 2001; Van Deth 2014).
For what concerns the distinction between the “political” and “non-­
political” nature of an act of participation, a lively debate on the boundar-
ies dividing the political realm from the other spheres of social life has
developed in literature, leading to the emergence of two main positions.
On the one hand, some authors conceive politics in its “narrow” terms,
as the relationship between individuals and the various institutions and
structures of the democratic apparatus. In this perspective, political par-
ticipation occurs through actions which are either located within the
sphere of government/state/politics (such as involvement in political par-
ties and political organisations, voting) or targeted at this sphere (public
demonstrations) (Van Deth 2014). In this case, political participation has
to do with the strict exercise of the political entitlements of the citizen
(Milbrath 1965).
On the other hand, some suggest that the disappearing boundary
between political and non-political spheres, as well as an increasing expan-
sion of the domain of government activities, would imply considering as
“political” forms of participation pertaining to other domains of social life,
such as economic, civic, social, and cultural ones (Putnam 2000; Dalton
2008). This last perspective has led to the inclusion of several forms of
civic engagement—such as volunteering—in the cluster of political partici-
pation and this has fostered a growing reflection on the overlap between
life(styles) and politics (Giddens 1991; de Moor 2017).
While the first understanding appears to be unable to account for rele-
vant processes of politicisation occurring beyond the domain of govern-
ment/state/politics, the second definition can potentially lead to the
conclusion that everything is political (Kuttner 1997).
With the intention to highlight the political aspects also emerging in
civic, economic, social, and cultural realms without considering every
action realised in the public sphere as “political”, in this book political
participation refers to those acts through which an individual, or collective
actor, expresses their political aims and intentions (Sartori 1984; Brady
1999; Teorell 2006) on issues which are relevant for the community
(Norris 2002; Hay 2007; Van Deth 2014), addressing—directly or indi-
10 I. PITTI

rectly—a political authority (McAdam et al. 2001). In this perspective,

political participation is not strictly defined by the arena since other activi-
ties occurring in the cultural or civic sphere can become political if they are
realised with a political motivation, the character of the addressed problem
is collective, and they target a political authority (Van Deth 2014).
For example, in this analysis, volunteering to aid migrants and refugees
is not, per se, considered political participation. However, it is understood
as a mode of political participation if the act of benevolence is addressed
to critique political authorities’ decisions on migration policies and to
show an alternative way of dealing with an issue—that of migrants’ wel-
coming—which is relevant for the community (Chap. 5). Similarly, the
opening of a cultural and leisure centre on behalf of a group of profes-
sional football supporters is not, per se, considered a political action.
However, the action is considered political if it is motivated by the inten-
tion to provide a solution to the lack of services in a given area of the city
questioning the local municipality’s urban policies (Chap. 6).

Unconventional Political Participation:

Between “Purist” and “Vague” Interpretations
Within academic analysis on political participation, the distinction between
conventional and unconventional forms of involvement is by now a classic
one. However, this dichotomy was not so evident in political and socio-
logical researches carried out during the 1950s and 1960s, and its devel-
opment and diffusion mirror a series of quantitative and qualitative
changes which occurred in the phenomenology of participation in post-­
modern societies (Raniolo 2002; Munroe 2002). It is only since the 1970s
that the vocabulary of scholars dealing with political participation started
to include this distinction in order to take into account forms of political
expressions that the classic studies, inspired by the liberal theory of democ-
racy, did not recognise (Norris 2001).
Although some attempts to account for and to name these previously
unrecognised forms of participation can be found, among others, in
Schumpeter (1962), Verba and Nie (1972), and Verba et al. (1978), the
first systematic definition of unconventional political participation is the
one elaborated by Barnes and Kaase (1979) in their seminal work Political
Action. In the words of the two authors, unconventional political
­participation refers to any “non-institutionalised direct political action
that does not aim to disrupt or threaten the stability of liberal democra-
 UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: AN OVERVIEW 11

cies” (Barnes and Kaase 1979, p. 27). The list of practices that Barnes and
Kaase used to define unconventional political participation included sign-
ing petitions, blocking traffic, participating in (lawful) demonstrations and
(un)official strikes, boycotting products, using physical force, damaging
property, occupying buildings, painting slogans, and engaging in a rent/
tax strikes.
Since 1979, academic literature has used the term in two principal ways.
On the one hand, a “purist” or “narrow” use of the concept can be
highlighted in all those researches that recognise only petitions, demon-
strations, boycotts, and occupations of buildings among1 the modes of
actions included in the list of unconventional political practices (Norris
2002; Quaranta 2015). This narrow interpretation of the term appears
mostly in quantitative studies, whose “sensitiveness” to changes and
emerging phenomena is often limited by the necessity to focus on measur-
able and clearly defined behaviours.
On the other hand, the aforementioned broadening of the list of actions
that are commonly considered as forms of participation registered in lit-
erature since the 1970s has also affected the understanding of unconven-
tional forms of participation, and the adjective “unconventional” has been
so generalised to be associated with almost everything which is innovative,
heterodox, non-institutionalised, or used as a synonym for protest.
As fully debated in literature, between the 1980s and the early 1990s, a
series of activities whose “political” dimension was less manifest started to
be included among the practices of participation. This meant paying atten-
tion to a series of micro and daily actions through which the relationship
between individuals and society was lived in a more private and individual
dimension, but also to collective practices of engagement located outside
the governmental sphere, such as volunteering (Verba et al. 1995). This
tendency was confirmed over the ensuing decades, when more and more
non-governmental domains (work, sport, art, and culture) obtained
increasing attention as emerging spheres of engagement (Putnam 2000;
Eliasoph 2013). In the same years, the new opportunities for engagement
deriving from the diffusion of Internet technologies and social media
started to become increasingly considered in studies on political participa-
tion (Burgess 2006). Lastly, a growing level of attention has been paid to

1
In this book, the term “occupation” is used to refer to a specific political strategy used by
social movements which consists in taking control of and holding buildings, public spaces, or
critical infrastructure (Della Porta and Diani 2006).
12 I. PITTI

“passive” modes of political engagement (Ekman and Amnå 2012) in

order to highlight the political value of certain forms of disengagement
(Farthing 2010).
Following this evolution, the label of “unconventional” participation
has been associated with a series of individualistic actions, such as contact-
ing the media, or political consumerism (Micheletti 2003), to activities
enacted in non-governmental domains such as “ecological volunteering”
(Forbrig 2005, p. 66), to political self-expressions through arts and sports,
and to online activism (Della Porta and Mosca 2009).
While the “purist” interpretation seems to diminish the “evoking
potential” of the term, reducing unconventional engagement to a series of
actions which are no longer unconventional (Ekman and Amnå 2012), the
“vague” understanding clusters extremely differentiated phenomena
which are “unconventional” on the basis of different criteria under the
same label and it creates confusion over the “perimeters” of
unconventionality.
In relation to this scenario, it appears necessary to reflect on the differ-
ent ways in which “unconventionality” can be understood.
Considering Raniolo’s warning about the risk of dealing with the prob-
lem of defining the boundaries and contents of unconventional participa-
tion through a “phonebook approach” (Raniolo 2002, p. 153), this
attempt must go beyond a “mere recognition of the multiple and varie-
gated forms of expression of political engagement” (Ivi), engaging in an
analytical exploration of the underpinning elements defining the concept
of “unconventionality”. Hence, the following analysis does not intend to
provide the reader with a(nother) list of unconventional practices of
engagement, but aims at shedding light on the different dimensions
through which unconventionality has been defined in literature, and at
discussing their relevance and limits.

New, Heterodox, Non-institutionalised Practices

and/or Forms of Protest?

Starting with the definition of Barnes and Kaase (1979) and their analysis,
different elements have been considered to distinguish unconventional
forms of participation from the conventional ways of expressing a political
position.
However, the underpinning definition of “unconventionality” used to
cluster conventional and unconventional behaviours is rarely discussed
 UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: AN OVERVIEW 13

and problematised in studies on political participation. As a consequence,

analyses on this topic tend to remain either anchored to narrow interpreta-
tions which appear more and more “out-of-date”, or apply the same label
to differentiated phenomena, producing confusion over what, exactly, we
are looking at (Zukin et al. 2006).
Four main recurring dimensions of unconventionality emerge from the
background of the common understanding of unconventional political
participation.
In most of the existing studies, practices of participation seem to be
labelled as “unconventional” because they (a) employ innovative reperto-
ries of actions, (b) express heterodox values, (c) do not adhere to the norms
regulating a given (political) system, and (d) are forms of protest.
The aim of this paragraph is to highlight the logics and limits of each of
these understandings.
The first dimension of “unconventionality” emerging in the commonly
used definitions is the one focused on the forms or the concrete practices
through which a certain issue is expressed in the public scene. In this case,
the definition of unconventional forms of engagement refers to the use of
a means of political expression which is innovative, that is, previously unseen.
This definition stresses upon the original aspect of a certain style of
participation in relation to the repertories of political engagement existing
in a given time and space, dividing forms of political expressions into “tra-
ditional” and “innovative”, “old” and “new” ones. In this case, the uncon-
ventional feature of a given form of participation focuses on the tools used
to voice the issue, and unconventionality depends on evolutions occurring
in the available set of political possibilities deriving from democratic or
technological changes. A classic example refers to the use of new social
media as a tool of political action: when political blogs and online petitions
are named as unconventional forms of engagement, attention is placed on
the innovation they bring in the existing repertories of political engage-
ment, rather than on the topics they seek to address.
This approach is a useful way to stress upon historical evolution in the
practical ways of expression of political interest. However, much of the
confusion around the concept of unconventional political engagement
appears to be fostered by an unproblematised association between “uncon-
ventionality” and “novelty”, which does not work for many of the political
practices that are usually labelled as “unconventional” (O’Toole and Gale
2013). Indeed, if applied “in a pure way”, this criterion would exclude
demonstrations, occupation of buildings, and other practices which c­ annot
14 I. PITTI

be considered innovative, unseen, or unusual (at least in Western demo-

cratic societies).
The second definition of unconventional political participation is con-
cerned with innovation in values. A given value, idea, or issue expressed
through political engagement can be considered heterodox or illegitimate
in relation to existing social norms and values (Munroe 2002).
In this instance, a political behaviour is defined as “unconventional”
because it expresses an idea which is not yet recognised as legitimate by
society. The focus of attention shifts from the specific means of expressions
to the issues and contents which are communicated through those tools.
In this case, a given political action is deemed “conventional” or “uncon-
ventional” depending on whether its values and proposals are approved or
disapproved by society. As suggested by Tarrow (2011), for example,
although largely implying a range of actions which could be not be con-
sidered “innovative”, such as demonstrations and petitions, the cycle of
mobilisations challenging the Italian political system during the 1970s
were unconventional in relation to socially accepted values.
As specified by Raniolo (2002), the use of the criterion of “social legiti-
macy” to define unconventionality implies a reflection on the dynamic
nature of culture in society, as political ideas which can be considered
illegitimate or heterodox in a given society can be, with time, normalised
and approved of by the population. Moreover, by defining unconvention-
ality on the basis of the reaction of “society” to a specific political claim,
this criterion assumes the idea of society as an entity sharing a homoge-
nous and clearly defined set of values. This understanding is rather difficult
to apply to post-modern societies, which are characterised by a pluralisa-
tion of competing values and lifestyles (Berger and Luckman 1967; Beck
et al. 1994). Lastly, it appears that this interpretation labels as “unconven-
tional” something which is actually the very basis of any socio-political
dialectic: the competition between different ideas and positions. In saying
that a form of political participation is unconventional because its contents
are heterodox, this understanding entails the risk of depicting conven-
tional forms of participation as the mere defence of traditional values, for-
getting how very “heterodox” positions can also be expressed through
tools which are commonly considered as “conventional”—such as elec-
tions and referenda.
The third underpinning definition of “unconventionality” is the one
based on the institutionalised or non-institutionalised nature of political
practices. This criterion does not look directly at the innovation in forms
 UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: AN OVERVIEW 15

or at the heterodoxy of the expressed contents, but at the relation between

the practices of involvement and the norms regulating a given political
system. In so doing, this definition places at the centre of the attention the
institutions’ position towards different forms of participation, which are
considered unconventional when they do not adhere “to the norms of
laws and customs that regulate political participation in a particular
regime” (Kaase and Marsh 1979, p. 40). The application of this criterion
leads one to define the (un)conventionality of specific practices of involve-
ment on the basis of their institutionalised or non-institutionalised nature,
and a political action can thus be conventional or unconventional depend-
ing on whether it is authorised/approved/guaranteed or unauthorised/
disapproved/non-guaranteed by institutional laws and norms. Although
this definition of unconventionality seems to rely on a “sounded” crite-
rion, such as that of the norm, it does not properly consider that the
“detachment” from the norms can take different forms.
For example, the activities of those citizens who decide to autono-
mously take care of commons are often neither explicitly authorised/regu-
lated/guaranteed nor explicitly unauthorised/unregulated/sanctioned by
the laws and customs that define political participation in a given regime.
Sometimes, institutions have created agreements to regulate these prac-
tices, but in many cases the issue is not disciplined at all. If the (un)con-
ventional nature is determined by the position of these practices in relation
to their institutionalisation, these citizen’s political actions could be
labelled as “conventional” in those regions where an agreement exists, but
their position would be difficult to define in those contexts where they are
not explicitly disciplined.
Similarly, since the 1990s, in Italy, social movements have started to
occupy buildings with the aim of creating the so-called centri sociali, that
is, self-managed social centres where several political projects are carried
out. Since then, these social centres have become key political actors in the
national context and are used by extra-parliamentary groups as laborato-
ries of contentious politics2 (McAdam et al. 2001). The political positions
expressed by social centres are highly confrontational and their relation-
ship with political authorities is commonly marked by strong contrasts
(Mudu 2012; Altieri and Raffini 2014). However, according to the crite-
rion which defines unconventionality on the basis of the institutionalised

2
A more detailed presentation of the role of social centres in the Italian political scene is
provided in Chap. 5.
16 I. PITTI

or non-institutionalised nature of the practices, many of the Italian self-­

managed social centres could not be considered “unconventional”
because, in many cases, the centri sociali have eventually been regularised
by the local political authorities and occupants authorised to remain in the
place.
In other words, this third underpinning definition of “unconventional-
ity” seems unable to consider that beyond violent and non-violent activi-
ties which explicitly violate the law, and are clearly unauthorised (illegal
activities), there are actions that are not explicitly disciplined by the law
(a-legal actions) and practices which do not violate the existing norms,
while still expressing conflictual positions towards the law (pseudo-legal
actions) (Raniolo 2002).
Lastly, common definitions tend often to associate unconventional politi-
cal participation with protest. Intending protest as a defining component of
unconventional political engagement comes back to the issue of claim of
entitlements that are not recognised. However, in comparison with the
component of heterodoxy/illegitimacy, the element of protest does not
look at the perception that society, public opinion, or other loosely defined
actors have in relation to the citizen’s claim. Protest pays attention, instead,
to the perception that citizens have of their complaints as requests that have
not received adequate answer and recognition from institutions.
Protest was mentioned as a basic trait of unconventional political actions
by Kaase and Marsh (1979) in their analysis of the shift in citizens’ percep-
tions of forms of political engagement lying behind the boundaries of
electoral, institutionalised political activities. Although expressing their
preference for the adjective “unconventional”, the authors explicitly stated
that unconventional participation was “rather closely related to what in
colloquial as well as scholarly discourses is frequently referred to as protest
behaviour” (1979, p. 45). Moreover, many scholars (Arendt 1965; Fanon
1986; Goodwin et al. 2000; Tilly and Tarrow 2012; Della Porta 2015)
have underlined how unconventional political practices are the means of
expression preferred by individuals and groups that want to voice com-
plaints and grievance concerning claims they perceive as neglected or
unheard by institutions.
With some significant exceptions (Goodwin et al. 2000; Jasper 1997;
McAdam et al. 2001; Quaranta 2015; Gupta 2017) the relationship
between unconventional political practices and protest has rarely been
­systematically addressed in recent academic research, now becoming an
unproblematised, taken-for-granted equation.
 UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: AN OVERVIEW 17

This has subsequently led to the reduction of unconventional political

participation to a very short list of practices, such as refusing to pay rent or
taxes, boycotts, signing a petition, occupying a building, unofficial strikes,
obstructing traffic, and non-violent demonstration. Limiting the explora-
tion of the different, emerging ways in which feelings of discontent can be
expressed, this understanding has often silenced the conflictual nature of a
series of actions that, despite not involving the use of physical or verbal
violence, can be used to express discontent, complaints, and grievances
(Della Porta and Diani 2006; Jasper 1997). In other words, the lack of
attention to the relationship between unconventional practices of engage-
ment and protest has led, in many cases, to forget that protest is the feeling
behind the action more than a specific type of political action (Gurr 1970;
Alberoni 1984; Flam 1990); a feeling which can be also voiced through
very conventional forms of engagement.
Moreover, the association between unconventional political participa-
tion and protest entails an interpretation of unconventional political par-
ticipation as a “necessarily dissenting” type of engagement. In this
understanding, the pars destruens of the political action—what people
want to discard, what they complain about—is often over-emphasised at
the expenses of the pars construens—what people create, what they are
looking for, what they appreciate—and the use of this discourse in the
analysis of unconventional political participation has sometimes supported
interpretations explaining unconventional political participation as “just”
one of the many faces of the widely reported “young people’s escape”
from politics (Farthing 2010).

Conclusions
From the analysis of the principal ways in which “unconventionality” is
usually conceived in research, it is possible not only to notice the limita-
tions that each criterion has in providing a satisfying definition of uncon-
ventional political participation, but also to highlight how these dimensions
can be used to produce very different typologies of unconventional politi-
cal actions. The same political behaviour could be considered “conven-
tional” or “unconventional” depending on the particular dimension
considered for its labelling. Moreover, despite these understandings refer-
ring to different ways of marking the boundaries between the realms of
conventionality and unconventionality, they have often been used inter-
18 I. PITTI

changeably in literature, producing considerable confusion about what we

are actually looking at.3
This book intends to contribute to the existing knowledge and under-
standing of unconventional political participation through the in-depth
analysis of three stories of young people’s engagement in unconventional
political participation.
In particular, Chap. 4 focuses on the bottom-up mobilisation carried
out by a radical-left-wing social movement around the issues of access to
housing, gentrification, and urban marginalisation in a Swedish city.
Chapter 5 looks at the story of a self-managed social space created within
an occupied barrack by a group of young Italian activists seeking solutions
for their economic and occupational difficulties. Lastly, Chap. 6 analyses
the occupation of an abandoned bowl-court on behalf of a group of Italian
professional football supporters (ultras) and its transformation into a com-
munity centre for the local inhabitants.
The case studies have been chosen because, on a basic level, they con-
stitute “classic” examples of unconventional forms of engagement, that is,
three political experiences that would be considered “unconventional”
also in relation to the narrowest definition of the term (Barnes and Kaase
1979). In this perspective, their exploration aims at “looking inside” the
box of “unconventionality” in order to show the limits of the existing defi-
nitions of unconventional political behaviour in accounting for what these
experiences really are, as well as to highlight and discuss what unconven-
tional political participation is becoming today.
The choice to look at experiences of engagement by young people is
not accidental. Since the late 1960s, young people have been recognised
as the main actors of the various political transformations which have
occurred in Western countries, and many analyses have shown how
younger generations have progressively broadened the range of political
action, introducing new tools and means of political expression (Pickard
and Bessant 2018). Analysing young people’s engagement through prac-
tices that literature already recognises as forms of unconventional political

3
It must also be noted that the highlighted dimensions of unconventionality are often
linked to each other and it is sometimes difficult to untangle their intertwining. The experi-
ence of the movements for civil rights highlights that the attempt to protest about political
issues which are considered heterodox in relation to commonly accepted social norms often
implies the use of innovative forms of action which are not recognised by the institutions and
(may) entail an infringement of the law.
 UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: AN OVERVIEW 19

participation, this book seeks to discuss how the new generation of young
people is fostering change within this cluster of political actions.
In this perspective, the next chapter looks at the relationship between
youth and unconventional political participation, introducing the genera-
tional perspective of analysis “framing” this book’s argumentation.

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Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Sexual ethics
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the
United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.

Title: Sexual ethics

Author: Auguste Forel

Author of introduction, etc.: C. W. Saleeby

Translator: Ashley Dukes

Release date: October 18, 2023 [eBook #71898]

Language: English

Original publication: United Kingdom: The New Age Press, 1908

Credits: Produced by Tim Lindell, Donald Cummings, and the Online

Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net
(This file was produced from images generously made
available by The Internet Archive)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SEXUAL

ETHICS ***
SEXUAL ETHICS
 SEXUAL ETHICS
BY

AUGUST FOREL, M.D., PH.D., LL.D.

FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF PSYCHIATRY AT
AND DIRECTOR OF
THE INSANE ASYLUM IN ZURICH (SWITZERLAND)

WITH INTRODUCTION
BY

Dr. C. W. SALEEBY, F.R.S. Edin.

LONDON
THE NEW AGE PRESS
140 FLEET STREET
1908
Translated from the German by Ashley Dukes
 INTRODUCTION
By Dr. C. W. SALEEBY, F.R.S. Edin.

T here is something absurd, as such, in a request for an

introduction by any one to the work of one of the greatest of
living thinkers, and something still more absurd in the fact that
Professor Forel should, at this date, need an introduction to any
intelligent audience in any civilised country, as it seems he does to
English readers; but if compliance with that request is at all likely to
increase, even by one, the number of his readers, it is a duty to
comply with it.
Not to consider his treatises on philosophy and psychology, nor his
long series of original and important researches on the senses and
lives of the social insects, Professor Forel has already given to the
world a volume entitled Die Sexuelle Frage—this has now been
published in English[A]—which is by far the best work on the sex
question in any language, and has actually received on the
Continent something like the recognition which is its due. The gist of
its teaching is to be found in this little treatise on Sexual Ethics, and
the reader who may find himself or herself unconvinced, or even
repelled, by the brief and dogmatic theses of the following pages,
may be earnestly counselled to read the larger work. Here, and in
that, Professor Forel deals—always from the loftiest moral
standpoint, the interests of human life at its highest—with the
question which must remain fundamental for man so long as he is
mortal, and with which the statesmen of the future will primarily
concern themselves, realising as they will, and as the “blind mouths”
called statesmen to-day cannot, that there is no wealth but life, that
the culture of the racial life is the vital industry of any people, and
must so remain so long as three times in every century the only
wealth of nations is reduced to dust and raised again from helpless
infancy. Professor Forel sees this question from the only standpoint
that is worthy of it. The sexual question is concerned with nothing
less than the life of this world to come. It is for this reason that every
productive sexual union should be a sacrament; it involves nothing
less than the creation of a human life—the most tremendous act of
which man or woman can be capable. It is the no less than sacred
cause of Eugenics or Race-Culture that gives the sexual life its
meaning and the dignity which it may rightly claim, and it is just
because the Swiss thinker sees this and never loses sight of it that
his work is so immeasurably raised above the ordinary discussions
of marriage, prostitution, venereal disease, and the like. His claim for
posterity on the ground of our debt to the past may be amplified by
the reflection that, in serving the racial life, and in making its welfare
the criterion of our sexual ethics, we are serving human beings as
real as we are ourselves, and tens or hundreds for units whom we
can serve to-day. There is always an interval—nine months at least
—and no one expects babies or politicians to associate cause and
effect over such abysses of time; but there are others who are
learning to think in generations, and Professor Forel will yet add to
their number.
[A] The Sexual Question. Rebman, Ltd.
In his criticisms of alcohol and the abuse of capital, Professor
Forel opposes himself to the most powerful of vested interests. Well,
if you invest your interests in any other bank than that of the laws of
life, you or your heirs will find that theirs is but a rotten concern. The
history of organic evolution is proof enough that the higher life and
the things which buttress it, “sagging but pertinacious,” will always
win through in the long run. As a direct enemy of human life, and
notably through its influence upon the sexual instinct, alcohol is
certainly doomed. If life is the only wealth, the manufacture of illth is
a process too cannibal to be permitted for ever.
Professor Forel speaks of subduing the sexual instinct. I would
rather speak of transmuting it. The direct method of attack is often
futile, always necessitous of effort, but it is possible for us to
transmute our sex-energy into higher forms in our individual lives,
thus justifying the evolutionary and psychological contention that it is
the source of the higher activities of man, of moral indignation and of
the “restless energy” which has changed the surface of the earth. As
directly interfering with this transmutation, the extent of which
probably constitutes the essential difference between civilised and
savage man, alcohol is the more to be condemned.
In what Professor Forel has to say regarding prostitution and the
ideal of marriage, he will win assent from all except the profligate
and those medical men who, in hideous alliance with the protozoon
of syphilis and the coccus of gonorrhœa, defend prostitution and
even acclaim it as the necessary complement to marriage. If there is
a stronger phrase than most damnable of lies to apply to such
teaching, here is certainly the time for its employment. On this
subject of prostitution, Professor Forel has said the last word in a
masterly chapter of Die Sexuelle Frage. In his praise of monogamy,
he is only echoing the stern verdict of the ages—delivered a
thousand æons before any existing religion was born or thought of,
and likely to outlast a whole wilderness of their dogmas. The
essence of marriage I would define as common parental care of
offspring, and its survival-value as consisting in the addition of the
father’s to the mother’s care. In the absence of parenthood, a sexual
association between man and woman is on the same plane as any
other human association; it means neither more nor less, and must
be judged as they are judged. It is when the life of the world to come
is involved that new questions arise—questions as momentous as is
the difference between the production of human life at its best and of
a child rotten with syphilis, or permanently blinded to the light as it
opens its eyes for the first time, or doomed to intelligence less than a
dog’s.
I, for one, have no shadow of doubt that the ideal of sexual ethics
will some day be realised, that pre-eminently preventable—because
contagious—diseases like syphilis and gonorrhœa will be made an
end of, that prostitution will disappear with its economic cause, that
we shall make parenthood the privilege of the worthy alone, and thus
create on earth a better heaven than ever theologians dreamed of in
the sky. “There are many events in the womb of Time which will be
delivered.” Individuals are mortal, and churches, and creeds, but Life
is not. Already the gap between moss or microbe and man is no
small one, and the time to come is very nearly “unending long.”
Uranium and radium will see to that.
C. W. SALEEBY.
 SEXUAL ETHICS

T he two conceptions of morality and sexual life are frequently

confounded and expressed by the same term in the popular
usages of speech. The word “moral” is commonly used to mean
sexually pure, that is to say, continent; while the word “immoral”
suggests the idea of sexual incontinence and debauch. This is a
misuse of words, and rests upon a confusion of ideas, for sexuality
has in itself nothing to do with morality. It points, however, to the
undoubted fact that the sexual impulse, since it has other human
beings as its object, easily leads to moral conflicts within the breast
of the individual.
It will be convenient to discuss our subject under the two heads: I.
Of ethics in general; and II. Of sexual ethics in particular.
 I. Ethics
Ethics is the science of morals. Morals may be said to consist of
two very distinct factors, which we will attempt to analyse:—
1. An instinctive sense, the conscience, sense of duty, or ethical
impulse, which says to us: “This shalt thou do, and that shalt thou
leave undone.” A person in whom it is highly developed experiences
satisfaction if he obeys the “voice of conscience,” and remorse if he
fails to do so.
2. The second factor of morals includes the objects of conscience,
that is, the things which conscience commands or forbids.
The great philosopher Kant founded upon the instinct of
conscience his Categorical Imperative, and held the further
investigation of its causes to be unnecessary. If the conscience says
“Thou shalt,” one must simply act accordingly. This is, in Kant’s
opinion, the absolute moral law, which bids or forbids an action
independently of any other consideration.
The further they progress, however, the more do reason and
science rebel against the conception of the Categorical Imperative.
Kant, great as he was, was not infallible. The imperative of the
conscience is in itself no more categorical and absolute than that of
the sexual impulse, of fear, of maternal love, or of other emotions
and instincts.
In the first place daily observation shows us the existence of
people born conscienceless, in whom the sense of duty is lacking,
who are aware of no “Thou shalt,” and in whose eyes other
individuals are merely welcome objects for plunder or inconvenient
hindrances. For these “ethically defective” persons there can be no
categorical imperative, because they have no conception of duty.
The ethical sense may exist in varying degrees of intensity. In
some persons the conscience is weak, in others strong; and there
are cases in which it is developed to an exaggerated and morbid
extent. People of this type suffer pangs of conscience over the
merest trifle, reproach themselves for “sins” which they have never
committed, or which are no sins at all, and make themselves and
others miserable. How can all this be reconciled with the absolute
moral law as stated by Kant?
The theory of the Categorical Imperative becomes even more
absurd when we consider the actions to which men are guided by
their consciences. The same habit—the drinking of wine, for instance
—may be for one man a matter of duty (for a Christian at the
Eucharist or for an officer at the toast of the King); for another (the
Mohammedan) it may be forbidden as a deadly sin. Murder, which is
certainly almost universally prohibited by conscience, is a “duty” in
time of war, and even for certain persons in the duel. Such instances
could be multiplied indefinitely.
We will presently state the profounder reasons which prove Kant’s
error; but we must first mention another source of pretended ethical
commandments. The religions exhibit a remarkable medley of
various products of human mystical phantasy and human emotions
which have crystallised and formed themselves into legends and
dogmas, and these latter have become interwoven with human
morals in such a fashion that they seem at first inextricable.
The instinct of fear and the lust for power, the hypertrophy of the
Ego and the ethical sentiments have here intermingled in a thousand
different ways. More especially we may mention the fear of the
unknown, of darker powers, and of death; the expansion of the
beloved Ego, which becomes idealised in the conception of
godhead, and then immortalised; the feelings of sympathy, antipathy
and duty towards other individuals, and so forth. The mysterious
powers which move the universe are then conceived as
anthropomorphic (personal) gods, or as one such God.
The next stage is the attribution of godlike qualities to man, which
flatters his vanity considerably, and gives him a sense of satisfaction.
As a result of this habit of thought, and assisted by the
hallucinations of highly imaginative, hysterical, or insane individuals,
there have developed the various conceptions of a direct intercourse
between the Godhead and man. Hypnotism and psychiatry, in the
respective cases of the sane and the insane, teach us how
extraordinarily sensitive the human brain is to such impressions.
In this way the legendary revelations, according to which God has
manifested himself directly and personally to certain individuals, and
dictated to them commandments for the guidance of Humanity, have
resulted.
In this, and in no other way, has come into existence the social
tyranny of religious dogmas. Certain men have made God in their
own image, and have, in the course of centuries, imposed their own
handiwork upon whole nations, mainly by means of the organising
ability of their more ambitious successors. Even to-day such
prophets frequently arise, both within and without the walls of lunatic
asylums. Each one declares that he alone possesses the true
revelation.
The divine injunctions vary considerably according to the different
religions, and are often mutually contradictory. Among them are
commandments relating to the Godhead which have nothing to do
with natural moral law, and yet are amalgamated with it. Some of
these are from the human point of view frankly immoral. Many, on
the other hand, represent the precepts of a more or less suitable
moral code, which varies according to the personal views of the
founder of the religion.
The Koran ordains polygamy and forbids the use of wine, while
modern Christianity allows the latter and ordains monogamy. Both
Moses and Mohammed, however, regard woman as subordinate to
man, and as his private property; a view which contradicts a higher
and at the same time a more natural moral law.
Mental science has now the hardihood to maintain, Kant and the
religious dogmas notwithstanding, that the moral law is completely
accessible to its investigations; that true human ethics can be
founded upon human nature alone; that the dogmas and
commandments of pretended revelation serve only to check a
progressively higher development of morals; and that the dogma
which holds out promises of heaven or threats of hell in the hereafter
is in its effect actually immoral, inasmuch as it seeks to regulate the
moral conduct of men by purely selfish motives—by the aid of a bill
of exchange upon the future life, so to speak.

In order to understand natural human ethics we must consider its

natural source, that is to say, the origin of the sense of duty or social
conscience.
The sense of duty is, as an inclination, inborn, and therefore
hereditary. It can indeed be developed or dulled by education, but it
cannot be acquired; and only diseases of the brain can destroy it
where it once clearly exists. What is actually inculcated or acquired,
as the case may be, is not the conscience, but the object towards
which it is directed, as is the case with the feeling of shame or
modesty. Just as the European woman is ashamed to exhibit her
bare legs, but not her face, while with the Turkish woman the reverse
holds true, so the objects of the conscience, according to acquired
local customs, can be absolutely opposed to one another, or at least
very different in their nature. They have, however, for the most part
certain features in common, which are suited to the requirements of
human nature. The reason for this we shall see below.

From what does conscience, or the sense of duty, arise? First of

all from a conflict between two groups of instinctive emotions allied
with instinctive impulses: (1) the group of so-called egoistic feelings
and impulses, directed towards self-preservation and self-
gratification; and (2) the group of sympathetic or altruistic impulses
directed towards the preservation and well-being of others.
If I feel sympathy or love for a person, an animal, or an object, I
suffer personally and feel displeasure as soon as the object of my
sympathy suffers or is endangered. Hence the words compassion
and sympathy (suffering with). I therefore seek to help the object of
my sympathy, to save him even at the risk of personal injury; and
thence the conflict arises. If my egotism triumphs I do not come to
his aid, or at most only do so if I risk nothing thereby. If, on the other
hand, my sense of sympathy is victorious, I sacrifice myself.
 In the former instance I experience a feeling of dissatisfaction, the
feeling of neglected duty and of remorse; in the latter I have the
pleasurable sensation of duty fulfilled. And yet the nature of the
object matters little. Only the intensity of the sympathy, together with
the individual development of the conscience, determine the intensity
of the sense of duty in any given case. An insane person can feel the
most vehement sense of duty or remorse without any real object, or
as the result of entirely perverted conceptions.
As every living creature, particularly if it possesses a separate
nervous system, has the instinct of self-preservation, the conscience
therefore results directly from the conflict between this instinct and
the secondary emotions of altruistic sympathy. These latter are of
later origin, and have for the most part been evolved from the
attraction between the sexes (sexual love), or from the relationship
of parents to the offspring dependent upon them (parental love).
The first feelings of duty and of sympathy in the animal kingdom
are therefore confined to the family, and adapted to the preservation
of the species. They are also exclusive, and may only persist for a
short time (as in the case of cats), but frequently they are of lifelong
duration. The conjugal fidelity of certain apes and parrots is
exemplary.
But the necessity of protection against common foes brought
about in the case of many animals a ripening of the sense of
sympathy, and it became extended to whole groups, so that here
and there free communities (swallows, buffaloes, monkeys) have
resulted. Finally certain species have developed the senses of
sympathy and duty to such an extent that they have led to a
complete anarchistic Socialism, as is the case among wasps, bees,
and ants. Here the social sense has so far overcome both egotism
and altruism limited to a few individuals that it wholly dominates
them. The individual devotes his whole energy and labour to the
communal existence, and even sacrifices his life for this object. He
never, however, sacrifices his life for another single member of the
community, unless the latter is of primary importance for the
maintenance of the species. One worker-bee does not immolate
itself for another, but does so without hesitation for the queen and
the hive. It will even empty the whole contents of its stomach into the
queen bee’s mouth and starve in order to save her. The altruism of
the ants and the bees knows nothing of family affection or sexual
love; it is confined absolutely to the hive or nest. Different beehives
or ants’ nests are either inimical or indifferent to one another.
Nearer to man stand the higher mammals. Every one is aware of
the sentiments of sympathy and duty in the dog, for instance. In man
himself these affections are pre-eminently domestic, as may be seen
in the love of mother and child, husband and wife, father and son,
and in all the obligations thus contracted. But they also have a
considerable tendency to extend to other intimate objects or persons
with whom the individual frequently comes into contact—to friends,
animals, etc.
We can also observe this inclination among bees and ants, where
strangers are received into the hive or nest after a short period of
familiarisation. But among mankind the tendency always maintains a
strongly individual character. The result is on the one hand a
grouping into communities, such as castes, tribes, and nations; and
on the other a host of individual friendships and enmities.
This fundamentally individual character of the human sense of
sympathy rests primarily upon the fact that our nearest ancestors in
the animal world, the parents of the existing anthropoid apes, were
domestic and solitary, while our primeval ancestors lived in
numberless tiny communities, inimical to one another.
In this way there appeared among mankind instinctive and
exclusive impulses of sympathy and of duty, combined with intensely
selfish predatory desires. The extraordinary complexity of the human
brain is responsible for the strange many-sidedness of character
which resulted. For example, crime and heroism developed side by
side; child murder, parricide, rapine and robbery, slavery, war, and in
particular the vilest subjugation of woman as an article of commerce
or a beast of burden—these represent the fruits of egotism and its
attendant cunning and meanness. On the other hand we see self-
sacrifice, valour, heroic martyrdom, patriotism, sense of justice,
asceticism, pity for the weak, and persistent labour for the family and
the State, resulting as the fruits of the instinct of sympathy and the
social sense.
The primitive sense of duty, which arose from direct assistance
rendered to the object of sympathy, is now being enlarged by a
higher racial and individual development, and is, indeed, resolving
itself into a universal inclination to subdue egoistic instincts and
passions.
If from a sense of duty I do something which is wearisome or
dangerous, it is for the most part no longer out of direct sympathy
with the particular object. The primeval impulse (which led to conflict)
is becoming independent, and is taking the form of a higher and
secondary instinct, tending towards the suppression of baser desires
and weaknesses. And yet it is necessary, in order to prevent the
degeneration of this instinct, that the objects towards which it is
directed shall be ever more adequately and better suited to the
social welfare of the community.

From the above brief sketch, which is based upon the theory of
evolution and the researches of science, it is clear as the day that
moral laws can only be relative. They were always relative to the
family, to the tribe, to the fatherland; they must become relative to
mankind. The racial (that is, inherited and instinctive) social sense in
man is unfortunately very variable in individual cases. In the average
it is extremely weak and chiefly directed towards a few individuals.
Moreover, as the result of centuries of bad habits and ancient
prejudices, its objects are falsely or unsuitably taught in process of
educating children. Instead of the child’s sense of duty being
directed to the necessity of labour and social sacrifice for mankind as
a whole and posterity in particular, it is directed towards false codes
of honour, local patriotism, family exclusiveness, private property,
pretended divine commandments, and so forth.
The Earth is small, and human intercourse becomes more
extensive every year; the union of all civilised peoples into a single
great civilised community is inevitable. Ethics must, therefore, as far
as reason permits, be directed towards this object. We require