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Water Management
GREEN CHEMISTRY AND CHEMICAL ENGINEERING
Series Editor: Sunggyu Lee
Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, USA
Edited by
Iqbal M. Mujtaba
Thokozani Majozi
Mutiu Kolade Amosa
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MATLAB ® software.
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Chapter 1 Water Security and the Rise of Sectarian Conflict in Yemen ...................................... 3
Afshin Shahi and Maya Vachkova
Chapter 6 Effect of the Draw Solution on the Efficiency of Two-Stage FO-RO/BWRO for
Seawater and Brackish Water Desalination ............................................................... 73
Ali Altaee, Adnan Alhathal Alanezi, Radhi Alazmi, Alaa H. Hawari,
and Claudio Mascialino
Chapter 8 Freshwater Production by the Multistage Flash (MSF) Desalination Process ........ 103
Iqbal M. Mujtaba and Salih Alsadaie
vii
viii Contents
Chapter 11 The Removal of Phenol and Phenolic Compounds from Wastewater Using
Reverse Osmosis: Process Modelling, Simulation, and Optimisation ..................... 191
Mudhar A. Al-Obaidi, Chakib Kara-Zaïtri, and Iqbal M. Mujtaba
Chapter 12 Industrial Three-Phase Oxidation Reactor for Wastewater Treatment .................... 231
Aysar T. Jarullah, Saba A. Gheni, Awad E. Mohammed, and Iqbal M. Mujtaba
Chapter 13 Electrolytic Treatment of Wastewater for Reuse Purposes: Case Study of the
New Damietta Harbor Plants ................................................................................... 263
Mahmoud Dahroug
Chapter 14 Inactivation of Waterborne Pathogens in Municipal Wastewater Using Ozone ...... 275
Achisa C. Mecha, Maurice S. Onyango, Aoyi Ochieng,
and Maggy N. B. Momba
Chapter 16 Biosorption of Methylene Blue Dye Using Anise Tea Residue ................................ 305
Khaled M. Hassan, Mamdouh A. Gadalla, and Tamer T. El-Idreesy
Contents ix
Chapter 18 Low-Cost Adsorbent for Ammonia Nitrogen Removal: A Review ......................... 343
A. Y. Zahrim, L. N. S. Ricky, Y. Lija, and I. Azreen
Chapter 20 Mathematical Process Modeling and Biokinetics of Activated Sludge Processes ..... 381
Ibrahim Hassan Mustafa, Asmaa Abdallah Awad, and Hamad Al-Turaif
Chapter 21 Hythane (H2 and CH4) Production from Petrochemical Wastewater via
Anaerobic Digestion Process ...................................................................................403
Ahmed Tawfik and Ahmed Elreedy
Chapter 24 Total Site Water Integration Considering Multiple Water Reuse Headers ............... 443
Ahmad Fikri Ahmad Fadzil, Sharifah Rafidah Wan Alwi,
Zainuddin Abdul Manan, and Jiří Jaromír Klemeš
xi
xii Preface
Section I includes three contributions on social perspective covering security, sectarian conflict,
diplomacy, economic growth, social well-being, socio-political and cultural complexities linked to
water and water management.
Section II includes five contributions on making freshwater and irrigation water by desalination
covering technologies such as hybrid forward and reverse osmosis, multistage flash, multi-effect
evaporator and microbial cells.
Section III discusses membrane and polymer-based processes for wastewater treatment. This sec-
tion includes three contributions covering model-based evaluation of pore-blocking behaviours of
low pressure membranes, Sodalite- and Chitosan-based composite membrane materials for metal
removal, modelling and optimisation of RO process for the removal of phenolic compounds from
wastewater.
Section IV highlights oxidation and electrochemical processes for wastewater treatment. The four
contributions in this section cover industrial three phase oxidation reactor, electrolytic method,
ozone-based method and photocatalytic oxidation method for the treatment of wastewater.
Section V includes three contributions highlighting adsorption process for wastewater treatment.
This section covers bio-sorption of methylene blue dye, laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy
(LIBS) technique for evaluation of water quality, low cost adsorbent for nitrogen removal from
wastewater.
Section VI includes three contributions on the use of biological processes for wastewater treat-
ment and discusses application of natural zeolite in anaerobic digestion system, activated sludge
process, and anaerobic degradation process. This section also adds potential for Hythane (hydro-
gen [H2] and methane [CH4]) production from petrochemical wastewater using anaerobic diges-
tion process.
Section VII discusses water networks for water management and includes three contributions.
Regeneration-recycling of industrial wastewater to minimise usage of freshwater, total site water
integration and water re-use opportunities in dairy industry via process integration are highlighted.
Section VIII highlights issues with water management and includes three contributions discussing
wastewater management modelling for coral reefs protection, multidisciplinary approach for inte-
grated water resources management and water efficiency lapses and sustainable solutions.
MATLAB® is a registered trademark of The MathWorks, Inc. For product information, please
contact:
Thokozani Majozi, PhD, is a full professor in the School of Chemical and Metallurgical
Engineering at Wits University where he also holds the National Research Foundation (NRF)
Chair in Sustainable Process Engineering. Prior to joining Wits, he spent almost 10 years at the
University of Pretoria, initially as an associate professor and later as a full professor of chemical
engineering. He was also an associate professor in computer science at the University of Pannonia
in Hungary from 2005 to 2009. Majozi completed his PhD in Process Integration at the University
of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology in the United Kingdom. He is a member of
Academy of Sciences of South Africa and a Fellow for the Academy of Engineering of SA. He has
served in various senior positions, including Vice-President of the Engineering Council of South
Africa (2009–2012), Director of Pelchem (2007–2010) and Director of Necsa (2010–2013). He is
currently the Chairperson of the Board at Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).
He has received numerous awards for his research including the Burianec Memorial Award (Italy),
S2A3 British Association Medal (Silver) and the South African Institution of Chemical Engineers
Bill Neal-May Gold Medal. He is also twice a recipient of the NSTF Award and twice the recipi-
ent of the NRF President’s Award. Majozi is author and co-author of more than 150 scientific
publications, including two books on Batch Chemical Process Integration published by Springer
in January 2010 and CRC Press/Taylor & Francis in 2015. Majozi is a B1 NRF rated researcher.
Mutiu Kolade Amosa, PhD, is currently a research fellow in sustainable process engineering in
the School of Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering at the University of the Witwatersrand in
Johannesburg, South Africa. He is a trained chemical engineer with bachelor’s and master’s degrees
in chemical engineering awarded by Ladoke Akintola University of Technology and Ahmadu Bello
University, respectively. Dr. Amosa earned his PhD in environmental process engineering from
the International Islamic University Malaysia and won the best doctoral award. He also won the most
highly cited researcher award at the University of the Witwatersrand in 2017. Dr. Amosa is a perma-
nent staff member of the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR)—the Oil and Gas Regulatory
Agency in Nigeria, where he works as a senior chemical engineer at the agency’s headquarters
xiii
xiv Editors
in Lagos, Nigeria. He is also an international research expert and member of the Environmental
Engineering and Management Research Group, Faculty of Environment and Labour Safety, at Ton
Duc Thang University, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.
Previously, Dr. Amosa served as a research fellow between 2011 and 2012 under the Petroleum
Technology Development Fund (PTDF) endowment of the Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria,
where he worked on drilling fluid technologies and development of zeolites and molecular sieves
for petroleum refining applications. He also served as research/teaching assistant between 2012 and
2015 under the Bioenvironmental Engineering Research Centre (BERC) at International Islamic
University Malaysia, where he worked on several research projects related to environmental process
engineering. He currently serves as an editor for Cogent Engineering Journal (Taylor & Francis
Group) and he is an award-winning reviewer (awarded by Publons in 2017) for many reputable
journals and conferences.
Dr. Amosa is a corporate member of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE);
Nigerian Society of Chemical Engineers (NSChE); Association of Environmental Engineering and
Science Professors (AEESP); International Water Association (IWA); the Society of Petroleum
Engineers (SPE); amongst others. Widely published and cited, he focuses his research on process
design, modelling and optimization; environmental process engineering; sustainable process sys-
tems engineering; less common separation technologies and their wide applications; and develop-
ment of micro- and nano-porous materials.
Contributors
Sulyman Age Abdulkareem Mutiu Kolade Amosa
Department of Chemical Engineering NRF-DST Chair: Sustainable Process
University of Ilorin Engineering
Ilorin, Nigeria School of Chemical and Metallurgical
Engineering
Adewale George Adeniyi University of the Witwatersrand
Department of Chemical Engineering Johannesburg, South Africa
University of Ilorin and
Ilorin, Nigeria DPR Headquarters,
Department of Petroleum Resources
Fatai Alade Aderibigbe Lagos, Nigeria
Department of Chemical Engineering
University of Ilorin and
Ilorin, Nigeria Environmental Engineering and Management
Research Group
Adnan Alhathal Alanezi Faculty of Environment and Labour Safety
Department of Chemical Engineering Ton Duc Thang University
Technology Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
College of Technological Studies
Kuwait City, Kuwait Seth Apollo
Centre for Renewable Energy and Water
Radhi Alazmi Vaal University of Technology
Department of Chemical Engineering Vanderbijlpark, South Africa
Technology
College of Technological Studies Maryam Aryafar
Kuwait City, Kuwait Department of Chemical and Process
Engineering
University of Surrey
Ma’an Fahmi Alkhatib Guildford, Surrey, United Kingdom
Bioenvironmental Engineering Research
Centre (BERC) Asmaa Abdallah Awad
Department of Biotechnology Engineering Chemical Engineering Department
Kulliyyah of Engineering Waterloo University
International Islamic University Malaysia Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
I. Azreen
Salih Alsadaie Universiti Malaysia Sabah
University of Sirte Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia
Sirte, Libya
Santanu Bandyopadhyay
Ali Altaee Department of Energy Science and
School of Civil and Environmental Engineering Engineering
University of Technology Sydney Indian Institute of Technology Bombay
Sydney, Australia Mumbai, India
xv
xvi Contributors
Aoyi Ochieng
Afshin Shahi
Centre for Renewable Energy and Water
Division of Peace Studies & Middle Eastern
Vaal University of Technology
Politics
Vanderbijlpark, South Africa
University of Bradford
Bradford, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom
Olawale R. Olaopa
Department of Political Science
Obafemi Awolowo University Prashant Sharan
Ile-Ife, Nigeria Buildings & Thermal Science Center
National Renewable Energy
Laboratory
Maurice S. Onyango Golden, Colorado USA
Department of Chemical, Metallurgical and
Materials Engineering
Tshwane University of Technology Adel O. Sharif
Pretoria, South Africa Department of Chemical and Process
Engineering
University of Surrey
Maruf Oladotun Orewole
Guildford, United Kingdom
National Centre for Technology Management
Federal Ministry of Science and Technology and
Obafemi Awolowo University
Qatar Environment and Energy Research
Ile-Ife, Nigeria
Institute (QEERI)
HBKU, Qatar Foundation
Benton Otieno Doha, Qatar
Centre for Renewable Energy and Water
Vaal University of Technology Babji Srinivasan
Vanderbijlpark, South Africa Department of Chemical Engineering
Indian Institute of Technology Gandhinagar
Aghaegbuna O. U. Ozumba Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India
School of Construction Economics and
Management Rajagopalan Srinivasan
Faculty of Engineering and Built Environment Department of Chemical Engineering
University of the Witwatersrand Indian Institute of Technology
Johannesburg, South Africa Madras, India
xx Contributors
CONTENTS
1.1 Case Vignette: Yemen............................................................................................................... 3
1.2 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................7
References ..........................................................................................................................................7
In recent years, various explanations have been provided for the rise of sectarianism in the Middle East.
Iran–Saudi rivalry, uneven development, horizontal inequality, top-down ethno-sectarian discrimina-
tion, state propaganda and utilization of sectarian narratives for regime survival, US-led invasion of
Iraq and the failure of Arab Uprising and the Syrian civil war have been highlighted as influential fac-
tors behind the new wave of sectarian violence in the region. Although all these factors are important
in explaining the situation, we believe that often the environmental factors are overlooked in explaining
the emergence of political violence in fragmented societies such as Yemen. There is enough evidence
to suggest that factors such as drought and desertification are instrumental in setting the stage for social
eruption, particularly in societies with fragmented sense of national consciousness.
The link between environmental problems and conflict is already well established and given the
extreme water shortages in the region, the Middle East is particularly vulnerable to environmentally
induced instabilities. The Middle East can be characterized as semi-arid or arid and hence, vulner-
able to climate change [1]. Recurring droughts are by no means a novelty in the region. Climate
change has exacerbated the effects of droughts. The 1998–2012 period was the driest one in the
Levant for the past five centuries [2]. Moreover, severe droughts are expected in the Middle East
within the next few decades [2]. With the current population growth and rates of water consumption,
by 2050 the global water demand may reach 100% of the available supply [3]. A recent study review-
ing water availability and climate change issued a prediction for the driest countries in the next few
decades. According to the World Resource Institute, of the thirty-three countries that are expected
to face extreme water stress by 2040, more than half are situated in the Middle East. Moreover,
seven out of the ten most water-stressed countries are in the Middle East.
This chapter briefly examines how extreme water shortages have paved the way for the escalation
of sectarian violence in Yemen. Although one cannot reduce the complicated conflict in Yemen only
to one factor, water shortages have played a very important role in the instigation and the continuation
of the civil war.
3
4 Water Management
while the Sunnite sects are Shafi, Maliki, Hanbali, and Hanafi, with the Shafi sect constituting the
majority [5]. The northern parts of the country are dominated by the Zaydis, while the south and
southeastern territories are the home of the powerful Shafi Sunnites. In recent years, however, there
has been a wave of Sunnite and a corresponding wave of Shiite radicalisation. These sub-state iden-
tities began to gain more political importance after the unification of the North and the South in
1990, which spawned multitudinous sectarian political parties [6].
Yemen is one of the most water-stressed places in the world [7]. Droughts and scarce water
resources have characterised the Yemeni geography for centuries [8]. The civilisations sustained
by this climate and terrain have relied on ingenious solutions, such as terraced supply and demand
farming. Traditional agricultural practices of those types allowed for sparing consumption of
water resources. The agricultural revolution in the 1970s heralded a significant shift away from
traditional farming practices [7]. After the seventies, the country became more engaged with the
international market. Along with modern technology and investment, foreign water-demanding
crops entered the newly liberalised Yemeni market. Inadequate planning and regulation lead to
over-exploitation of land and water resources. Nonetheless, the rise of cash crops did enrich some
parts of society.
The piping network in the country is not efficient and many households are not supplied by
the state, but use drill wells instead. There have been some efforts towards regulating ground
water use and distribution [9]. There is ample evidence that illegal drilling was common even
after the introduction of a drilling permit system [10]. Ninety per cent of fresh water in Yemen is
used for agriculture. Most of it is groundwater from springs and wells, which is extremely unsus-
tainable [11]. The land degradation and ground water depletion, however, went overlooked and
unaddressed. Decades of water mismanagement left arid Yemen extremely vulnerable to climate
change [10].
Water scarcity fosters not only environmental, but also social vulnerability. Competition over
this vital resource over the past couple of years has cost more lives than the recent civil war [12].
The weak governance institutions are often unable to resolve these conflicts and to provide basic
water and sanitation to all areas of the country. In the absence of functional services, alternative
forms of government infiltrate the chasm left by the abdication of the state. Unsurprisingly, the most
water-stressed regions in Yemen host the strongholds of extremist organisations. It seems impov-
erished farmers are more likely to succumb to sectarian narratives and to enrol in ethno-sectarian
militias. In the absence of effective state intervention, social groups violently confront each other
to secure water and they use their tribal, sectarian and other ancient identities to frame their griev-
ances. In the climate of struggle over survival, the binaries of “us” versus “them” became stronger
than before.
Yemen is infamous for the weakness of its institutions. State legitimacy is often contested by
tribal law and armed militant groups. Governance in Yemen has continuously relied on a balance
between official and shadow institutions [13]. The conflict in Yemen escalated in response to anti-
government protests. Sectarian extremist groups made their way into the havoc of protest crack-
downs. Finally, at the time of writing, a heavily armed coalition in support of the government,
championed by Saudi Arabia, is bombarding key infrastructure. Since the beginning of the conflict,
6400 people have lost their lives [14]. The fighting and the foreign bombing campaign have severed
basic infrastructure and as of January 2016, 80% of the population was food-aid dependent [15]. As
of 2015, 2.3 million were internally displaced and at least 121,000 were reported to have left the
country [16]. Around 14.1 million people need support to meet basic healthcare needs and about
two million are currently acutely malnourished, including 1.3 million children—320,000 of whom
are enduring severe acute malnutrition. As of October 2015, health services reported 32,307 casual-
ties (including 5604 deaths), an average of 153 injuries or deaths per day [17]. While the conflict
turns into a sectarian bloodbath, with all sides drawing upon sacral narratives of ancient strife, the
country is facing an environmental catastrophe, and more specifically a severe depletion of ground
water resources [18].
Water Security and the Rise of Sectarian Conflict in Yemen 5
The vigour of the so-called “Arab Spring” did not bypass Yemen. In 2011, a group of women,
children and men gathered in “Change Square” in a peaceful demonstration against the authoritar-
ian 33-year rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Protesters hoped to transform the poorest Arab
nation into a modern democracy. The civil society dominated the protests for a few weeks, before
the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated Yemeni organization al-Islah hijacked the protest
with the assistance of General Ali Mohsen al-Amar, commander of an elite militia with strong ties
to armed Sunnite extremists. President Saleh’s violent response to the demonstrations caused a
high death toll within the span of a few months: hundreds of protesters died, while thousands were
injured [19]. After external mediation provided by the Gulf Co-operation Council, Saleh handed
power over to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. The deal was signed in Riyadh and stipulated
that Hadi was to govern provisionally until the next presidential elections, in exchange for immunity
for Saleh [20]. The deal was dismissed by protesters in the capital, who rejected the idea of granting
the ousted president political absolution. Five years later, the country had descended into chaos and
sectarian violence.
The main fight was waged between president Hadi and the Houthis, an armed militia group
founded in the 1990s by Hussein al-Houthi. The Houthis draw recruits from the Northern Zaydi
population who practice a form of Shiite Islam. In 2004, they instigated a rebellion against President
Saleh. This internal conflict lingered, with fluctuations in intensity, until the 2011 revolution rekin-
dled it [21]. The Houthis, who come from Northern Yemen, managed to push the presidential forces
out of the capital Sana’a in February 2015. Alongside other grievances, the Houthis have continu-
ously contested the unfair distribution of water between North and South [22]. Aden, the temporary
capital in the loyal South, quickly became the next Houthi target [23]. Some of the presidential secu-
rity forces defected in order to support the Houthis. The well-connected ex-president, Ali Abdullah
Saleh, was out of power but far from powerless. While initially supporting the new presidential
regime, he switched alliances to the Houthi rebels in 2014, conveniently parading his renewed
Zaydi identity [24]. Despite coming from a Zaydi tribe, some thirty years ago the president rose to
power with the support of powerful Sunnite tribes [13]. Locally, Hadi received support from the
mostly Sunnite south, the al-Islah and internationally from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf regimes. Both
President Hadi and the Houthis were opposed by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which
had strong positions in the Sunnite south and southeast. The conflict became further entangled
due to the emergence a Yemeni Islamic State offshoot that aimed to contest AQAP’s influence and
became the new Sunnite jihadi presence in Yemen.
The aggressive foreign intervention supports the claim that the Yemeni conflict is now a proxy
war with a sectarian character. The proxy conflict is waged between the two oil and religious colossi
in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia and Iran. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia declared war on Yemen,
calling on the support of a broad military coalition. In partnership with Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain,
Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United States, the European
Union, and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia began bombing Yemeni territories. The aim of that campaign
is the eradication of the Houthi threat [25]. Although the conflict has been portrayed as a sectarian
conflict with regional dimensions, its causes are mainly rooted in the drastic ecological problems
that were devastating the national economy. The primary trigger for this conflict is water security.
In the pre-war period, the Yemeni government regularly struggled to tackle annual budget short-
falls [26]. The country has suffered groundwater depletion that inspired many grim forecasts—for
instance that the groundwater in the capital Sana’a would be completely exhausted by 2025 [27]
or even by 2015 [28]. Despite the inaccuracy of the latter, it is undeniable that water in Yemen is
scarce. The issue of water scarcity is multi-faceted and may be traced back to a number of causes.
Hydro-management was never a public priority. After the 1970s, Yemen experienced an agricultural
revolution, spearheaded by deep tube wells—an innovation that helped expand land cultivation. In
addition, farmers switched from traditional crops to water-intensive cash crops [8]. A weak, poorly
managed system was used to deliver water to the commercial farms. The piping infrastructure is poor,
leaks often, and is thus wasteful; in addition, illegal wells are drained to pump groundwater [10].
6 Water Management
Farmers use up 90% of the ground water resources to irrigate crops and 37% of it flows into the
very water-demanding qat crops [8]. Qat is a plant with stimulating properties whose soft upper
leaves are chewed by some 72% of Yemeni men and 35% of women [13]. Lastly, climate change
plays a crucial role in water depletion. Due to recurrent droughts, aquifers struggle to recharge [13].
Insufficient effort has been expended on conservation. The government seems to have made a tenta-
tive commitment to water conservation in 2010; however, the tumultuous start of 2011 cancelled all
ecological plans, if there truly had been any [29].
Yemen is among the leaders in population growth. Simultaneously, it is the most drought-
affected country in the Middle East [10]. Yemen is the most populous country on the Arab peninsula
and its population is predicted to double by 2033 [30]. Two-thirds of Yemenis are under the age
of 24 and each Yemeni woman bears an average of six children [31]. Rapid population growth
has intensified pressure on natural resources—especially water—as well as on public services.
In 2011, water consumption from the Sana’a Basin exceeded the rate of annual recharge [32].
Moreover, in 2011 the Yemeni economy plummeted, weakened by fuel shortages, power outages
and extreme water scarcity. During the month of Ramadan, water prices escalated by 200% and
fuel prices by 900% [4]. To poor families, this turn of events meant they could no longer afford
bare necessities. Juxtaposed with the bleak prospects of starvation, militia recruitment became
ever so palatable.
Environmental scarcity exacerbates social tensions and allows the penetration of sectarian
narratives, which reinforce the binaries of “us” versus “them.” In the south, tribal formations have
reportedly already been sheltering extremist figures and symbolically approving their zeal for social
change through jihad [13]. In the north, both the perceived relative deprivation of Zaydis and the
restrictions on worship and religious expression in general have already fomented dissent against
the government.
It is undeniable that water shortages played a significant role in the militant rise of the Houthi
movement, which have contributed to the sectarian tensions in the country. Indeed, the Houthi
homeland, the Sa’dah Plain, was already suffering ground water depletion in the nineties [33].
Experts conclude that overexploitation of groundwater resources is the main problem in the Sa’dah
Plain, a semi-arid highland basin of Yemen. Groundwater-irrigated agriculture is the predominant
livelihood in the area: hence, water depletion imperils food security and threatens the socioeco-
nomic balance. In the past three decades, qat became a staple crop for the northern Zaydi highlands
and, while it did bring economic prosperity, qat farming worsened groundwater depletion [30]. Due
to poor institutional arrangements, there has been no adequate government intervention and the
water crisis of the nineties has remained unaddressed. What is more, the Houthis have continuously
reported unfair water distribution and have gained support from the North based on this grievance
[22]. Indeed, this pressing ecological problem has intensified divisive identity politics, solidified the
politics of othering and hardened the socio-religious boundaries of desperate collectivities who have
to compete tirelessly for vital resources in their struggle for survival.
While the northern highlands are a Shiite/Zaydi Houthi domain, the southern highlands and
lowlands are under the control of AQAP. Not surprisingly, water scarcity plays a key role in
AQAP’s legitimacy—the group governs water distribution and resolves disputes over water, which
are extremely common in the country. Reportedly, around 4000 Yemenis die every year in small-
scale water disputes [12]. The central role of water in AQAP’s strategy is evident in a document
discovered by the Associated Press in 2013 that states, “by taking care of their daily needs like
water . . . [w]e will have a great effect on people, and will make them sympathise with us and feel
that their fate is tied to ours” [12]. In partnership with tribes, AQAP also provides drinking water,
electricity and a form of protection for the regions under its control, thus utilising water as a politi-
cal tool [34]. Reportedly, many Yemenis have supported various extremist organisations because
they provide better governance, relative to the central government, such as education and water
provision [35]. This is the case for the Houthis, as much as for AQAP [36]. The Saudi-led forces
also utilise water as a weapon by strategically destroying hydro infrastructure [37]. The strategic
Water Security and the Rise of Sectarian Conflict in Yemen 7
blockade of humanitarian aid on behalf of both extremists and the Saudi-led interventionist forces
further exacerbated the water plight of Yemenis caught in the middle [38].
Although sub-state actors such as AQAP may have some success in hydro management in certain
areas, their ideological mission only feeds into the further fragmentation of Yemeni national con-
sciousness. AQAP’s religio-political mandate, coupled with their short-term practical success, has
reinforced the sectarian narratives and deepened the sense of distrust towards the state and other
competing groups who also want a share of the remaining water recourses. Thus, water insecurity
feeds identity politics and fosters conflict.
1.2 CONCLUSION
Yemen is one of the most water-stressed countries in the world. Droughts and scarce water resources
have characterised the Yemeni climate for centuries. Pressing environmental problems coupled with
water mismanagement have made Yemen one of the most unstable countries in the region. Although
extreme water shortage has been part of life for centuries, the country embarked on an unsustainable
agricultural revolution in the 1970s that undermined traditional farming practices suitable for that
dry environment. In this light, water-demanding crops entered the newly liberalised Yemeni market
and started to change the agricultural landscape and destroy underground water resources beyond
recognition. Hence, gradually water became scarcer and securing it became even more costly. Even
before the start of the civil war, water disputes were a permanent feature of social life. Struggle over
securing water became responsible for thousands of micro conflicts across the country. As the state
was unable to respond to these serious environmental problems, the right conditions were created
for the emergence of sub-state actors. Some of these extremist groups such as Al Qaeda thrived in
this environment because they could offer a more effective water distribution model. Whoever could
control water, could control hearts and minds.
At least partly, the rise of the Houthi movement can be seen as a reaction to the extreme water
shortage and water mismanagement. The Sa’dah Plain, the Houthi homeland has been suffering
from drought for many years. In the past three decades, qat became a lucrative crop for the north-
ern Zaydi highlands, which significantly aggravated groundwater depletion. This was coupled with
what the Houthis regarded as “unfair” water distribution by the state. These pressing issues and
grievances played a very important role in mobilising the Houthi farmers, which at least partly
led to the destructive war. The rise of the northern Houthi farmers who happened to be Shia rein-
forced sectarian binaries of “us” versus “them.” These sectarian binaries were strengthened by the
prolongation of the war and the involvement of regional actors such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. The
seemingly sectarian nature of their regional policies turned Yemen to another arena for rivalry and
proxy confrontation.
Since the Saudi-led intervention, the environmental state of Yemen has deteriorated. Twenty
million Yemenis do not have access to clean drinking water. The intervention of regional actors not
only physically destroys the already weak water infrastructure, it cements the sectarian divisions
within the country. Although the Saudi-led coalition may withdraw from the country in the near
future, the water scarcity will continue to breed violence and conflict. Although Yemen requires a
conclusive political solution to end the war, water security remains the most fundamental challenge
facing the country. It is extremely hard to envisage a stable future for Yemen without a comprehen-
sive solution for water scarcity.
REFERENCES
1. R. T. Watson, M. C. Zinoyawera, R. H. Moss, Eds., IPCC Special Report for Policy Makers, The
Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1997).
2. B. I. Cook, K. J. Anchukaitis, R. Touchan, D. M. Meko, E. R. Cook, Spatiotemporal drought variability in
the Mediterranean over the last 900 years, Journal of Geophysical Research 122(5), 2060–2074 (2016).
8 Water Management
Ja kun voisi uskoa, että lapsi, jota Anna kantoi, on oma lapsi, olisi
helpompaa ja elämä vieläkin voisi muuttua, sammua kirvelevä suru
edes hetkiseksi, mutta sitäkään ei voinut.
Tähän saakka oli häntä pitänyt yllä heikko toivo siitä, että
jotenkuten saattaisi kaikki vielä selvetä ja muuttua. Oli syntynyt
sairaalloinen mielikuva, joka saattoi joskus ajattelemaan, että kaikki
olikin ehkä vain leikkiä, keksitty kiusaksi hänelle. Pikku Matti voi olla
hänen samoin kuin toinenkin. Anna vain kiusaa häntä sanoakseen
joskus, että se onkin ollut vain leikkiä, pilaa kaikki tyyni.
— Kenelle?
— Sinä olet ollut aina hyvä toveri ja ystävä minulle, virkkoi hän
tukahtuneesti Jannelle. Etkö tekisi minulle vielä yhtä palvelusta?
— Ja sitten…
— Ja sitten?
— Niin teenkin.
— Sitten?
Tuomas pysähtyi.
— Onkohan tämä nyt vaan kaikki oikein, että sinä näin…? arveli
Kustaava veljelleen.
— En minä sitä tarkoittanut. Sitä minä vain, että kun sinä näin
vapaaehtoisesti…
Siihen se nyt jää kaikki, toiselle. Parhaiksi kun ehti kiintyä, täytyy
siitä luopua.
Itsemurha!
Laine repäisi irti venheen ja pyörre alkoi sitä vetää alas, mutta nyt
tunsi Tuomas jo voiman käsivarsissaan jännittyvän. Venhe kääntyi
ylös ja ponnistaen äärimmilleen sai hän sen nousemaan.
Hetkiseksi tuli painava ajatus, että hän oli aikonut häpeäänsä vain
lisätä, eikä miehen tavalla sitä kantaa, mutta se häipyi yhtä pian kuin
painajainen äsken. Hän tunsi yöllä taistelleensa suuren taistelun,
käyneensä kuoleman läpi. Ja niin kuin uudestaan aloittaisi hän nyt
elämänsä.
Hän oli pyrkinyt. Pimeys oli ympäröinyt hänet joka puolelta. Miten
hän oli niin saattanutkaan…?
*****
Janne nyökkäsi.
— Nyt minä vasta lähdenkin, virkkoi hän hiljaa. Tule sinä sitten,
kun joudut. Ehkäpä siellä toisessa maailmassa voimme aloittaa uutta
elämää.
Anna nyyhkytti.
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be renamed.