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CULTURE AND RELIGION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Series Editor
Yosef Lapid
Department of Government
New Mexico State University
Las Cruces, NM, USA
Looking at how religion and culture interact with and affect international
relations, this series deals with both theory and case studies.
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Acknowledgments
The volume is the fruit of the efforts of many people who supported
and contributed to the project Legions of the Pope: A Case Study in Social
and Political Transformation. I can only mention a few but would like to
express my gratitude to all of them.
Most of the chapters started their life as conference papers presented at
the Popes on the Rise! Conference in March 2017, which was held at the
Roman Institute of the Görres Society at the Campo Santo Teutonico in
Rome, very close to the Vatican. I would like to thank in particular Prof.
Stefan Heid, Director of the Roman Institute, who was a wonderful host
and co-organizer. Many thanks to all the supporters and contributors who
turned the conference into an impressive event. I would like to mention
in particular my colleagues at the Center for Religion and Modernity of
the University of Munster who supported the project, the conference,
and the book. A special thanks goes to Johannes Löffler for his excellent
assistance.
The conference took place in the same week when, for the first time,
the heads of governments of the European Union met jointly with the
pontiff. This coincidence can be taken as a sign that the ongoing post-
secular transformations of the International and the Public are, indeed,
worth a longer and more focused look. I thank all the presenters at the
conference and those who joined later for their contributions.
Conference and project have been generously funded by the German
Research Foundation (426657443, 288978882). I am very thankful for
v
vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
this support. Many thanks also to the Palgrave editors Anca Pusca and
Katelyn Zingg and the series editors Fritz Kratochwil and Yosef Lapid
for including our manuscript in the Palgrave series Culture and Religion
in International Relations. Many people read and discussed the papers
on various occasions. Many thanks to all of them, in particular to the two
anonymous peer reviewers for their very supportive comments. Errors are,
of course, still mine.
“‘The Papacy’ and ‘modernity’ are two terms that rarely intersect in
international relations, but it will be impossible to ignore the former’s
impact on the latter—and vice versa—after reading this fascinating book.
Through multiple forms of intertextual analysis, from a stroll through
Paris to the Pope’s Twitter feed to examinations of individual Popes
and the Papacy’s impact in radically different parts of the world, this
book reconfigures our conceptions of time and space to foreground the
dynamic nature of Papal politics in contemporary world politics.”
—Cecilia M. Lynch, Professor, University of California, Irvine, USA
“This is not the first IR work paying attention to the Holy See. None,
however, matches this volume, edited by one of the most promising
IR scholars of his generation, Marian Barbato. The volume is multidis-
ciplinary, not ‘monochrome,’ but very colorful with contributors from
many countries with the background not just in IR or political science
but, in the humanities, including among other a philosopher, an art
historian, scholar of religion, literary scholar. Barbato begins by taking
you for a walk through Paris, the city that rose during the long–and
for modern international relations pivotal–19th century to the capital of
secular nationalism showing the undeniable and enduring entanglements
of the public, religion, and world affairs.
The multidisciplinary tesserae the contributors put together into a
mosaic is an alternative to the foundational IR narrative excluding or
vii
viii PRAISE FOR THE POPE, THE PUBLIC, AND INTERNATIONAL …
playing down religion. You are invited to re-think Western history; you
are led to consider new perspectives on the global transformation. The
Holy See is a ‘hybrid actor’ on the world scene, merging religious and
political but also international and transnational elements. In the uncer-
tain fluid 21st century, with the use of media technology, there may be
others.”
—Vendulka Kubalkova, University of Miami, Florida, USA
Contents
ix
x CONTENTS
Index 203
Notes on Contributors
xi
xii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Hispania, and Ayer. He is the author of La Virgen del Pilar dice… Usos
políticos y nacionales de un culto mariano en la España contemporánea
(2014) and he has co-edited with Roberto Di Stefano, Marian Devotions,
Political Mobilization, and Nationalism in Europe and America (2016).
Bernhard Stahl (Ph.D) is Professor of International Politics and
currently Dean of Studies of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities at the
University of Passau. From 2009 to 2011 he was Senior Lecturer in
an M.A. program for Palestinian, Israeli, and Jordanian students at the
University of Düsseldorf. His research areas cover European foreign policy
(German, French, and EU in particular), identity theory, and comparative
regionalism. Recent publications examine domestic legitimation of mili-
tary intervention and identity-related problems in the accession process as
well as the phenomenon of “silencing” of mass atrocities.
Tassilo Wanner is the VP Global Public & Regulatory Affairs of Lilium,
the global technology leader in the newly evolving air taxi industry.
Prior to joining Lilium, he served as a senior manager at the strategy
consultancy McKinsey & Company, where he focused on client projects
in the areas of strategy, organization, and change management. Tassilo
Wanner had started his professional career in different political planning
and strategic communication roles for the parliamentary leadership in the
German Bundestag as well as for the German Federal Minister of the Inte-
rior in Berlin. He studied at LMU Munich and Georgetown University,
and earned a doctorate in political science and modern history.
Ryszard Zaj˛aczkowski is a literary scholar and philosopher from the
John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. In the years 1997–1999, he
was a lecturer at the Catholic University of Eichstätt and a scholarship
holder at the American universities of Yale (2005) and Harvard (2011),
as well as at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (2015). He is the author
of five monographs as well as many articles devoted to nineteenth- and
twentieth-century literature, editor, contributing editor of the book series
The Literary Dimension of Culture, publicist, and translator of more than
a hundred books.
List of Figures
xv
CHAPTER 1
Mariano P. Barbato
M. P. Barbato (B)
Center for Religion and Modernity, University of Münster, Münster, Germany
e-mail: mariano@barbato.de
It is safe to say that, from the European Reformation onwards, the rise
of the states increasingly pushed the Holy See from the center of medieval
politics to the fringes of the state system. Usually, this displacement of the
papacy from politics and publics is applauded as a progressive step, even
from within the Roman Church. Given the dark side of the entanglement
of the papacy with politics, this perspective has its points. However, the
story could also be told in a different way.
The modern grid plan of politics could be understood as a reaction to
the astonishing rise of the papal actor in the public sphere, which managed
to institutionalize the revolutionary impulse of the so-called Axial Age2 to
free spiritual intellectuals from the domination of warrior lords. From this
perspective, the papacy played a key role in establishing an institutionally
protected public space, beyond kin, tribe, and nation.
It is perhaps risky to call Jürgen Habermas as a witness for this thesis,
as he is still willing to stress the merits of later secularization processes.3
However, his seminal history of philosophy, in which the “papal revolu-
tion”4 of the eleventh century echoes the axial revolution, opens up the
possibility of thinking in this direction.5
A new space emerged when priests, prophets and philosophers no
longer restricted their role to that of a critical counselor to the prince
or a disputing scholar among scholars, but instead started to understand
themselves as facilitators in their own right for the poor and illiterate
masses. In this new re-telling of the story, the pope and his clergy can be
seen as pioneering a full-scale operation to reach out to the masses.6 The
point is not to frame the pope as a liberation theologian who leads the
crowd in the uprising against the oppressor. Instead, a case could be made
that the pope’s claim to independence and supremacy based on theolog-
ical doctrine and canon law secured and enlarged the space of rules and
deliberation beyond the arbitrariness of the noble warrior.7
The papal reforms inspired by Cluny and culminating in the papal revo-
lution of 1075 focused on three points. A precondition was the presence
of institutionalized intellectuals, an independent elite of celibate clerics
who had not bought their ministry for the sake of the sinecure, but had
been chosen to fulfil the mission. The main issue was papal supremacy
over the emperor, which stripped all secular rule—for king and princes
cannot claim what the emperor does not have—of direct religious legit-
imacy. In effect, the juridical system of canon law, with the pope as last
resort, absorbed the Cluniac inspired Peace and Truce Movement to end
noble feud.8
1 THE HOLY SEE, PUBLIC SPHERES AND POSTSECULAR … 3
The papacy was not able to pacify Europe by creating a public space
of deliberation and law, but Habermas seems to see papal efforts in that
direction as being successful.9 He seems to acknowledge the pope as a
forerunner and comrade for those who argue today for a cosmopolitan
public sphere. Such a perspective might answer the question of why
the papacy managed to survive and flourish under the conditions of an
increasingly open, transnational, and global public sphere: the papacy is
flourishing in a re-cultivated habitat.
This re-thinking of Western history provides an alternative to the well-
established narrative of the structural transformation of the public, also
endorsed by Habermas.10 The established narrative tells the formation of
the nation state as a secular enterprise that was enabled by a structural
transformation of the public sphere. According to this version, the reli-
gious representation of legitimate power was replaced, incrementally and
with revolutionary ruptures, by discursive debates and their recourse to
reason. National identity, not religious belonging, was created and backed
by mass mobilization.11
This narrative has long been accepted almost universally. While the
emergence of a global market, transnational migrant communities, and
cosmopolitan circles of communication occurred simultaneously with the
construction of the nation state, which was never the only actor, it took
some time for the Westphalian Myth and the Hobbesian image of the
Leviathan to lose some of their persuasive power. Now, however, in a
world in which the twitter messages of politicians are partly replacing
the international channels of diplomacy, and in which religious extremists
can recruit foreign fighters globally for an instant nation-building project
based on a fusion of archaic cruelty and hypermodern communication,12
there is an enormous and still growing body of literature discussing the
overlaps and mergers of the public and the international.13
The public and political power of religion within these transformations
is often understood as a reactionary force, an unpleasant but limited reac-
tion to progress, in which the power of identity stands up against the
network society.14 While this picture has its points, it is certainly biased
and insufficient. Even the Islamic State was part of the network society,
and the Holy See offers its own vision of universal progress.15 Despite
hostile ruptures and partisan contestations, religion in general and the
Holy See in particular have always been part of the transformations of the
public and of international relations. The Holy See is not returning from
exile, where the papacy has supposedly been since the Peace of Westphalia.
4 M. P. BARBATO
III, Baron Haussmann, who created with his boulevards, view axes and
squares the modern image of Paris, had to tear down a whole quarter
to construct this place as the modern center of Paris and France. This
new center was created in front of the cathedral that saw feudal funerals
and masses but also the vandalism of the French Revolution and the cult
of reason, mockingly worshiping a prostitute on the altar, as well as the
coronation of Napoleon Bonaparte as emperor, in which Pope Pius VI
served only as an extra in the play. To testify the prominence and impor-
tance of the place, it was chosen as the location for the kilomètre zero,
the reference point of all distance indications to Paris of the revolutionary
metric system, which replaced previous units of measurements in conti-
nental Europe. All distance markers in France showing the way to Paris
point in the direction of this square.
Despite public disputes and discussions, the socialist (and gay) mayor
of Paris, Bertrand Delanoë, managed to mobilize a majority in the city
assembly in 2006 to rename the square after Pope John Paul II.19 The
center of Paris and France has since then been called “Place de Jean
Paul II”. Less than a decade later, the Polish Mission of Paris asked
permission to erect a statue of John Paul II, hands folded in prayer, which
had been created and donated by the Russian artist Zurab Tsereteli to
honor the man who had helped liberate millions of people from Commu-
nist rule.20 A public dispute arose over a suitable location for the statue,
and the plan also met resistance from the city administration. Finally, the
new, but still socialist, mayor, Anne Hidalgo, allowed the statue to be
placed in the small park between Notre Dame and the river Seine. The
park was also already named after a pope: John XXIII.21
Shortly before the erection of the papal statue in Paris, these two popes
were canonized in Rome on the same day by their successor, Pope Francis.
An international crowd of more than a million people celebrated the sanc-
tification and filled the streets and bridges from St. Peter’s, where world
leaders and diplomats gathered, to Castel Sant’Angelo and beyond, while
the event was broadcast and transmitted by mass and social media to a
global audience. John Paul II’s funeral saw even more people and heads
of states in Rome, with estimates ranging from two to four million people.
The illustrious list of attendees included 17 kings, queens and princes,
three crown princes, 57 heads of state, 28 heads of government, twelve
foreign ministers, a total of 157 national delegations, 14 delegations from
international organizations, and 14 emissaries from other religions.22
6 M. P. BARBATO
But back to the flaneur in Paris and the statue of John Paul II there.
The pedestal of the papal statue deserves a closer look. The pope’s name
and dates on the front as well as the famous quote from his first papal
address about fearlessness and openness to God on the back might be
expected, but the quotes on the left and right side of the pedestal sound
more like a political program. Taken from the 2003 New Year address
to the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Holy See during the build-
up to the Iraq invasion that had been opposed by the pope, the quote,
there in French, and here in the official English translation, says: “‘NO
TO WAR’! War is not always inevitable. It is always a defeat for human-
ity”.23 The other quote is the motto of the annual peace message of
January 2002, months after 9/11 and shortly after the initially successful
campaign of the invasion of Afghanistan: “No Peace Without Justice–No
Justice Without Forgiveness”.24
Across the river Seine, a short walking distance from the statue, the
flaneur can reach the Collège des Bernardins, where John Paul II’s
successor, Pope Benedict XVI, gave an address in 2008 to representa-
tives from the “world of culture”, including the minister of culture and
two former French presidents, in which he claimed that the search and
longing for God was the foundation of culture, and applied the rules of
Biblical exegesis to public discourse:
With the word of Spirit and of freedom, a further horizon opens up, but
at the same time a clear limit is placed upon arbitrariness and subjectivity,
which unequivocally binds both the individual and the community and
brings about a new, higher obligation than that of the letter: namely,
the obligation of insight and love. This tension between obligation and
freedom, which extends far beyond the literary problem of scriptural
exegesis, has also determined the thinking and acting of monasticism and
has deeply marked Western culture. This tension presents itself anew as
a challenge for our own generation as we face two poles: on the one
hand, subjective arbitrariness, and on the other, fundamentalist fanati-
cism. It would be a disaster if today’s European culture could only
conceive freedom as absence of obligation, which would inevitably play
into the hands of fanaticism and arbitrariness. Absence of obligation and
arbitrariness do not signify freedom, but its destruction.25
Going down the lively Boul’Mich, the flaneur walks through the
Quartier Latin, the quarter of the Latin-speaking scholars who gathered
here from all over medieval Europe, among them many great historical
figures, including St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Ignatius of Loyola. After a
short walk, the flaneur passes the National Museum of the Middle Ages,
housed in the former residence of the abbots of Cluny, who were prob-
ably the most powerful abbots of the European medieval period. The next
impressive building is La Sorbonne, or more precisely its chapel façade.
The impact that the theologians of the previous Collège de Sorbonne
had on Christian thinking was so great that the name became synony-
mous for all scholars at the University of Paris. The name survived all
revolutions and transformations as a brand for higher education. On the
lively square in front of the university stands a small statue of Auguste
Comte, who founded sociology as a substitute for theology and who had
in vain asked the papacy to join forces in establishing a new religion for
modernity. Nothing on the square reminds us today either of the medieval
scholars or the Marxist students and their occupation of the university in
the unrests of May 1968. The third and last building that the interested
flaneur cannot ignore is the Pantheon, the mausoleum for national heroes
of the French Republic, like Voltaire, Rousseau and Zola. It was originally
the church that housed the Patron Saint of Paris, Saint Genevieve. The
legendary woman of the fifth century managed to defend Paris against the
Huns by inspiring the women to perpetual prayer. She remained popular
enough throughout the ages for a new and triumphant church for her
remains to have been erected only decades before the French Revolu-
tion. Her decline was steep, however. The revolutionaries destroyed her
relicts, at least partly, and smelted her sarcophagus before transforming
her church into a revolutionary shrine.
This walk down Boulevard Saint Michel confirms what secularization
theory tells us. The religious past of Western civilization was consumed
by the new enlightened spirit of Voltaire and Rousseau, whose bodies
replaced the relicts of the saints. Religion disentangled from politics left
the public square and faded away into the niches of the private life of
some. If we remember the encounters with emperors, angels, and popes
along the way, we know, however, that this is only part of the picture.
José Casanova showed in his seminal study how religious mobilization
defended its role in the public square.27 Casanova argued that, while there
has indeed been a separation of state and church on the political level,
religion is still alive and kicking on the public level. Why has the papacy
1 THE HOLY SEE, PUBLIC SPHERES AND POSTSECULAR … 9
been successful? Looking at Casanova’s levels, one can see that the pope
is indeed successful on the political and the public level, performing on
the diplomatic stage of international relations and of transnational public
spheres.28 If one looks at the numerous discussions inside the Catholic
Church, however, the pope is less successful on the private level. Not
too many Catholics, for instance, organize their sex lives around Saint
Paul VI’s encyclical Humanae vitae.29 Church attendance is in decline
and polls about private beliefs in Western countries are, from a Christian
point of view, devastating when self-declared Christians are not so sure
whether Jesus is the Son of God and rose from the dead, or whether
God created the universe. But why was the return of the archangel, the
emperor, and the pope possible? Why is the pope nevertheless successful
in public life and on the diplomatic level? How can the doctrinal faith of
the pope spill over onto the public discourse in Paris and in world society?
The city that masterminded revolutionary secularization might also add
some pieces to the puzzle of desecularization.30
One answer could be found in a less prominent street in a walking
distance of fifteen minutes, a few streets away from the Pantheon. The
flaneur might not resist taking a detour through the Jardin de Luxem-
bourg, where the Queens of France watch over the children playing
with their vintage toy boats. A more direct way leads over Saint Sulpice
at Rue Bonaparte, the seminar in which the revolutionary clerics Abbe
Sieyès and Talleyrand were educated. The street is called Rue du Bac
and its name stands for a Marian devotion in a backyard church of a
nunnery. There occurred the first post-revolutionary Marian apparition,
which was accepted by the pope as authentic and which was followed by
many other apparitions like at Lourdes and Fatima. Marian apparitions
with a public appeal, often entangled with political implications, if not
directly aiming at political ends, are a modern mass phenomenon.31 In
the apparitions of Rue du Bac, the Virgin revealed herself to a young
nun, thereby linking Marian apparitions experienced as part of a monastic
life to public apparitions experienced by lay seers. These lay seers, like
in Lourdes and Fatima, were usually children or young people with little
or no religious education in remote areas, which then became sites of
mass pilgrimage due to the messages spread by the seers on behalf of
the Virgin. Usually, these apparitions were initially suppressed by political
authority, then accepted by the local clergy, and finally granted authen-
ticity by the pope who is the final authority within the Catholic universe
who can decide whether the Virgin Mary had actually appeared or not.
10 M. P. BARBATO
In order to reach the pope, the apparition must have already attracted
massive public interest. The apparition need not necessarily require the
seer to have a saintly life, either before or after the apparition, but many of
the seers have indeed been canonized. Examples are Catharine Labouré,
the nun of Rue du Bac, and, most recently, Jacinta and Francisco Marto,
the children of Fatima, who were canonized by Pope Francis in 2017.
Decisive, however, is the backing by the masses, which shows not only
their curiosity, but also that they have been publicly, and sometimes polit-
ically, influenced by the messages of the apparitions. The preconditions
for an acceptable apparition are that nothing must be stated in the appari-
tion message that stands against doctrinal norms, and that public miracles
must have been witnessed. Beyond that, being in tune with the theolog-
ical and political agenda of the pope is certainly an advantage. Bernadette
Soubirous’ visions in Lourdes were approved after she could introduce
the beautiful lady of her apparition to the local pastor as the Immacu-
late Conception. That traditional but contested title of the Virgin Mary,
which at the time had just been granted dogmatic status by the pope,
had already been associated with the apparition of Rue du Bac. Before
the pope backs the apparitions, the apparitions back the pope. The masses
who were interested in the apparition looked at the pope and expected
his consent. Events, mobilizations, and the expectations of the masses,
like those related to Marian apparitions, maintained the pope as a figure
of public discourse.
The apparition in Rue du Bac never reached the public uncontrolled.
The nun told her confessor and later her superior of her experiences in
1830. She remained anonymous and dedicated her life to serving the
poor until her death at an old age. What nevertheless made this the first
modern apparition was the message that the public was told in a very
specific way. The Virgin Mary not only consoled the nun, but asked her
to distribute the image of the apparition imprinted on a medal. Billions
of these medals showing the Virgin Mary have since been made in gold,
silver and copper (and later in various other metals) and distributed across
the world. The immediate and enormous success of the medal was caused
by the Virgin Mary’s healing powers in the midst of the cholera epidemic
of 1832, which soon gave the medal the name by which it became
famous: Médaille Miraculeuse. Not medicine, science, or human agency
attracted the hopes of the masses, but a miraculous medal. Monastery and
Médaille became a hotspot of anti-secularism. Pope Gregory XVI as well
1 THE HOLY SEE, PUBLIC SPHERES AND POSTSECULAR … 11
has been famous since the nineteenth century for its artists and nightlife,
but also for the church: Sacré Cœur.36
The construction of the church was decreed by the French national
assembly of the Third Republic on 24 July 1873. The story of Sacré
Cœur can serve as a kind of prism or ideal type to show the entangle-
ments of the Holy See, the public, and the international sphere. In 1870,
the regular and irregular Italian troops had reduced the Papal States to
its Roman core. The final conquest to turn Rome into the capital of the
new Italian state was only prevented by a transnational legion of Catholic
volunteers37 and, crucially, by French troops. After the outbreak of the
Franco-Prussian War, the French troops were relocated to the German
front. Pius IX did not use his remaining troops but surrendered after
a symbolic show of resistance to demonstrate that Rome was taken by
force. In 1870, the Papal States ceased to exist. In the following year,
the French Empire was defeated, too, and Paris saw the uprising and
short reign of the Commune. Due to the French withdrawal from Rome,
these two defeats were constructed and memorized as one, which boosted
the Catholic revival in France in favor of the papal “prisoner in the Vati-
can”.38 The incoming bishop of Paris (his predecessor had been executed
by the communards) launched the idea of a church of repentance for
Paris. Public opinion supported the decision of the national assembly
to build the church as a symbol of the national vow that the revival
of France should also be a Catholic revival based on an alliance with
the papacy. The Catholic revival was shipwrecked by the Dreyfus affair
and, finally, in 1905, by the law on the separation of church and state,
which established laicism as state doctrine. The construction of the Sacré
Cœur continued despite growing resistance, and was completed in 1919.
A perpetual adoration of the Holy Eucharist has been held at the shrine
since 1885. In 1899, in preparation for the papal Holy Year of 1900 (the
popes celebrate a regular Holy Year every 25 years to remember the incar-
nation and to grant a special indulgence), Pope Leo XIII consecrated the
whole human race to the Sacred Heart of Jesus Christ. Leo XIII was
the pope who started modern Catholic social doctrine with his encyclical
Rerum Novarum (1891). He also developed the mass mobilization for
the public role of the papacy that had been initiated by his predecessor,
Pius IX. The altarpiece of Sacré Cœur shows Leo XIII donating the whole
globe to the Lord. A walk through the interior of the church, while in the
center the adoration continues, passes various papal traces, among them
1 THE HOLY SEE, PUBLIC SPHERES AND POSTSECULAR … 13
relicts of Saint John Paul II and a mock gate, a remnant of the Extraor-
dinary Holy Year of Mercy, decreed by Pope Francis for 2015/2016,
symbolizing the mercy of God. The gate is decorated with a newer version
of the Sacred Heart iconography, an image inspired by the Polish nun
Faustyna Kowalska and promoted by John Paul II, which quickly gained
the status of a global but also contested icon. Apart from its alleged clas-
sification as kitsch, opinion on the image is also divided because it links
the mercy of God with a strong call for individual and public repentance
and threats of punishment.
John Paul II visited Paris twice. First, in 1980 to meet various political
representatives and diverse groups in society. Notre Dame, Rue du Bac,
and Sacré Cœur were key sites of his public encounter with the masses.
The second visit was for the 12th World Youth Day in 1997, a festival of
Catholic youth and friends initiated under the pontificate of John Paul II
to mobilize young people and turn whole cities into a public stage for
prayer, celebration, and papal preaching. Despite expectations that such a
format would not work in a secularized city like Paris, 1.2 million young
pilgrims gathered at the final mass in the field of the Longchamps race-
course, famous for its horse races but also the site of the 14 July military
parade from 1880 to 1914 and the biggest public square in Paris. Public
mass mobilization continues to maintain the pope’s public profile.
Within the context of social and political change, mass mobilizations
have continued to provide a public landscape in which the pope can
appear and raise his public voice. That social mass base, which manifested
itself even in the capital of the secular revolution, was strong enough
to keep the pope, in the juridical garments of the Holy See, in the
game of the society of states, too. The contributions in this volume will
add examples from various interdisciplinary perspectives to illustrate this
thesis. Before offering its empirical cases, the book should integrate at
least briefly the Parisian panorama of the flaneur (or was she a pilgrim?)
into a conceptual framework.
— Herra, sanoi hän, — tämä mies ei tahdo tulla, sillä hän tottelee
ainoastaan eräitä jumalia, joita sinun armosi ei tunne.
Ja hän sanoi, että Valkean Vuohen pojat eivät kuole, sanoi toinen.
— Herra, olet ollut kuin isä, sanoi vanhus, ja hänen kätensä vapisi.
— Herra isäntä, nyyhkytti hän, — tein sen pelosta, sillä eräs mies
sanoi minulle, että ellen pettäisi herraani, niin kuolisin, ja herra,
kuolema on vanhoille kauhistus, sillä heidän sydämensä elää siinä
alituisesti.
— Ja?
Sanders oli vaiti. Hän seisoi katsellen kantta, sitten hän kääntyi
mennäkseen hyttiinsä.
— Kuollut!
Tällainen oli hänen asemansa, kun hän viiletti myötä virtaa eräälle
Isisin joelle, jossa hän odotti saavansa uutisia.
— O ai!
— O ai!
— O ai!
— Sillä sen terävät jalat viiltävät heitä luuhun asti, ja sen sarvet
pistävät heidät verille.
— O ai!
— Syleillen heitä, niin kuin Vuohien tapa on? kysyi Bosambo vielä
lempeämmin.
Bosambo nyökkäsi.