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The Politics of Public
Administration
Reform in Italy
Sabrina Cavatorto
Antonio La Spina
The Politics of Public Administration
Reform in Italy
Sabrina Cavatorto • Antonio La Spina
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
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Contents
4 Fighting Corruption 75
Antonio La Spina
Index145
v
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Public employment in the Italian general government (N). For
obvious problems of definition and measurement, an ensured
level of comparison among OECD countries is that of
“general” government, which comprises state, central and local
authorities (OECD 1997). (Source: Own elaboration based on
https://www.contoannuale.mef.gov.it/)29
Fig. 2.2 Citizens attitudes towards the PA: Italians among Europeans
(%). (Source: Own elaboration based on Eurobarometer
Interactive “PA in [OUR Country]” (11/2018)) 35
Fig. 4.1 Control of Corruption (2017) (percentile rank 0–100).
Country’s rank among all countries in the world: 0 corresponds
to lowest rank and 100 corresponds to highest rank. (Source:
Own elaboration based on http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.aspx#home)78
Fig. 4.2 Favouritism in decisions of government officials (2017 (1–7
best)). In your country, to what extent do government officials
show favouritism to well-connected firms and individuals when
deciding upon policies and contracts? 1 shows favouritism to a
great extent; 7 does not show favouritism at all. Italy’s rank in
2017 was 118/137. (Source: Own elaboration based on
http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-
report-2018/)79
Fig. 5.1 Provision of public services (2017) (%). QA1a. “How would
you judge the current situation in each of the following? The
provision of public services in [OUR COUNTRY]”. Only in
Greece a higher percentage of respondents (85%) believe that
the provision of public services in their country is “total bad”.
vii
viii List of Figures
ix
CHAPTER 1
that red tape is excessive and public bureaucracies are rigid, tardy and
inefficient. In principle, therefore, they could easily attract some consensus
among both citizens and members of the political elite. At the same time,
for the above reasons the decision making processes leading to their
approval could be expected not to be ridden with controversies and con-
flicts. According to the seminal taxonomy of public policies proposed by
Lowi (1970, 1972), administrative reforms seem to belong to “constitu-
ent policies”, which are in fact characterized by remoteness of coercion
and low levels of conflict.1
Gustavsson (1980) combined Wilson’s (1980) and Lowi’s taxono-
mies: administrative reforms can be seen as measures with diffused costs
and diffused benefits, being to some extent able to “determine” (in
Lowi’s vein), like any type of public policy, the way political interactions
(i.e. politics) develop. This would be consistent with their supposed rela-
tive “easiness”. One might guess that all that is actually needed is the
availability of certain technical policy instruments (which could be cre-
atively devised or, more frequently, imitated), whose application can be
credibly expected to reduce or solve certain problems plaguing existing
public bureaucracies. Imitation and learning would therefore be the main
factors in order to explain why certain historical phases apparently exhibit
“waves” of administrative reforms, which expand themselves across many
countries. This is what is supposed to have happened at first with the dif-
fusion of the neo-liberal version of new public management (NPM),
which stressed the need to cut costs and import efficient tools from the
private sector, and then with other more progressive approaches, which
rather emphasized service quality, involvement of citizens/users, open-
ness of governance and participation (the so-called “post-NPM” mod-
els). Such a picture, however, would be overly simplistic, and anyway is
contradicted by several hard facts. When they are really impactful,
1
When Lowi wrote about constituent policies, the examples he made were rather hetero-
geneous. He mentioned “reapportionment, setting up a new agency, propaganda”; then
“constituent or system maintenance policy” (Lowi 1972: 300, 310). Elsewhere, he was more
explicit in subsuming the organization of public bureaucracies under constituent policies
(Lowi 1985). When describing them, Spitzer (1987: 678, 680; see also Tolbert 2002) indi-
cated as an example of constituent policy “administrative/departmental reorganization”, or
a “agency reorganization”. Salisbury (1968) tried to fill the empty fourth cell of the taxon-
omy with self-regulation, which has to do with some of Lowi’s examples of constituent poli-
cies, but not with administrative reform.
1 INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE 3
2
A somewhat similar but actually different threefold distinction is proposed by Bauer
(2018), who sees public administration as surrounded by the three sides of a disciplinary
triangle: law, management and political science (the latter being focused on legitimacy and
unintended consequences). In this respect, Kingdom (1990) warns against the limitations of
managerialism and defines public administration a “peculiarly vulnerable discipline”.
According to Pollitt (2010), “what unifies public administration is his subject”. Kettl (2000)
shows how several social sciences and theoretical approaches address public administration
and can enhance its rigor. Wright (2011, 2015) speaks of “administrative management’s
nearly exclusive focus on efficiency and effectiveness”, too. In his opinion, an empirical and
4 S. CAVATORTO AND A. LA SPINA
rigorous “science of public administration” is not an easy accomplishment, but much prog-
ress was made in that direction since Dahl’s article (1947). On the one hand, Dahl already
spoke of generalizations, experiments and deduction. On the other, he argued that “the
study of public administration inevitably must become a much more broadly based discipline,
resting not on a narrowly defined knowledge of techniques and processes”. Therefore, it had
to include also societal contexts, cultural traits, historical roots and economic processes.
3
A useful literature review on the use of the “critical juncture” concept was provided by
Capoccia and Kelemen (2007). The potentialities and the limitations of the concept in com-
parative-historical analysis were further described by Capoccia (2015, 2016).
1 INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE 5
4
Explaining the Italian trajectory of administrative reforms during the 1990s, Capano
stressed how ideational variables are essential and argued the “hegemony” of administrative
law as a cultural paradigm governing the institutionalization of public organizations in all
European countries with Rechtstaat traditions (Capano 2003: 785–787).
5
Previous cycles of administrative reform in the Italian republic, immediately after World war
II ended and the democratic constitution was approved in 1948, are discussed by Capano (1992).
6 S. CAVATORTO AND A. LA SPINA
6
In technical governments, parties are in principle largely excluded from the choice of
ministers. That is why, even if at a minimum degree, the Amato cabinet had not been con-
sidered a typical expression of the party government, being the party system substantially
collapsed at that time. More appropriately, the first “technocrat-led-government”, being
served by a non-parliamentarian as prime minister, was the Ciampi one (Ciampi was gover-
nor of the Italian central bank when he was asked by the president of the Republic to form a
government). Then, the Dini cabinet (1995–1996) followed, entirely composed of experts
and officials from outside Parliament. On the empirical variability of the concept applied to
the Italian case, see Verzichelli and Cotta (2018). The constitutional and parliamentary
effects of technical governments have been analysed by Lupo (2015).
7
According to Verzichelli and Cotta (2018: 78), the Monti government formed at the end
of 2011 was the “most extreme case of ‘party abdication’ has happened”. The authors com-
pare the Ciampi, Dini and Monti cabinets considering, on the one hand, the amount of
non-party personnel and, on the other hand, the scope of delegation conferred to the gov-
ernment. The potential of political autonomy granted to Monti and to his ministers resulted
to be much higher than in the two previous cases.
1 INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE 7
8
He took part in the commission that drew up “the Giannini Report” about the reform of
public administration in Italy, prepared in 1979 (Capano 1992; Mele 2010). That report
“remained inoperative” (Cassese 2003: 134), also because it radically overturned the tradi-
tional approach to administrative reform of previous decades (Melis 2003). However, it
sowed those innovative ideas that would be then budded in the policy change of the early
1990s: private management models, concepts of planning and control, performance indica-
tors, unification of measurement methodologies and organization offices (http://www.tec-
nichenormative.it/RapportoGiannini.pdf).
9
In March 1993, seven abrogative referendums out of eight concerned the organization
of the state and a clear majority of voters called for the abolition of part of the administrative
apparatus.
8 S. CAVATORTO AND A. LA SPINA
and was responsible for all tools of reform. He admitted that “the whole
administrative culture” had to be changed (Bassanini 2000: 230), in the
sense of a new focus on results instead of procedures.
The third comprehensive reform is dated 2009 and was promoted by
the minister of PA and innovation (professor of labour economics) Renato
Brunetta, under the Berlusconi IV government. The Brunetta reform10
was particularly aimed at improving “the system of incentives and evalua-
tion of performance” by bringing “citizens themselves into the process of
evaluation and preference formation for the correct allocation of resources”
(Brunetta 2009: 351–352).11 Again, so that the competitive system of
incentives (both between individuals and between production units) could
properly realize its full innovative scope, it was evoked a “conceptual tran-
sition from the culture of mere formal compliance to that of substantial
results” (ivi: 361). Therefore the cultural dimension was explicitly con-
firmed as a crucial component of the extant reform strategy. Anti-
corruption through transparency was another dominant foundation. Such
a “revolution”, which was perceived, at least in the short-medium term,
with the appearance of a costly challenge for the recipients, was conversely
prospected by the reformers as a catalyst of more diffuse benefits in the
medium-long run, that is, “the” way for relaunching the economic growth
in Italy. Accordingly, updated e-government plans were mobilized too.
During the same Berlusconi IV cabinet, it is worth mentioning the
decision to delegate—for the first but, for now, even the last time—a spe-
cial minister for legislative simplification, additional to the minister for PA:
Roberto Calderoli,12 a leading member of the Northern league, was
10
The legislative decree 150/2009, implementing the enabling law 15/2009, was aimed
at improving labour productivity as well as efficiency and transparency of PA through the
recognition of the merits and shortcomings of executives and of all government employees
(OECD 2010).
11
Legislative decree 198/2009, also approved to further implement law 15/2009, estab-
lished that, in case of inefficient services, citizens and business may file a collective action
against public administrations and public services’ providers. Brunetta’s own words: “I want
from my side sixty million customers, who are also sixty million controllers, entitled to
express their own preferences, but also their anger” (speech to the students of the National
administration school, Rome, May 2010, http://sna.gov.it/www.sspa.it/wp-content/
uploads/2010/05/Brunetta-spiega-la-riforma-della-Pubblica-Amministrazione-
%E2%80%A6.pdf).
12
He also served as minister for reforms and devolution in the Berlusconi II cabinet
(2004–2006). At that time, administrative reform tasks and responsibilities were split in a
10 S. CAVATORTO AND A. LA SPINA
number of actors, in fact a minister for information and technology was also appointed, and
some lack of coordination emerged.
13
According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2017: 75), a trajectory “is more than a trend (…) is
an intentional pattern—a route that someone is trying to take”. They selected five main
“conventional” components: finance, personnel, organization and performance measure-
ment. Then they added transparency and open government. In Italy, public sector reform
concerned almost all components of public organizations.
14
After many years of debate, a significant wave of devolution started in 1997 with law
59/1997 (the law so called by Bassanini first), which profoundly altered the distribution of
administrative functions across levels of government, reallocating competences from the cen-
tral government to regional and local governments in different policy fields, although it did
not affect the Constitution. Then the notion of “concurrent legislation” between the central
and the regional governments was introduced by a constitutional reform in 2001 (Ongaro
2009, 2011). Bassanini himself described the way the reshaping of the government macro-
structure was pursued in Italy (Bassanini 2000: 232–235).
15
Albeit Capano (2003: 792) argued that “decentralization is one more thing that can
hardly be considered a novelty to Italian PA, and it is interpreted through the hegemonic
paradigm”, losing its meaning of “a strategy to adopt in drawing up public policy”, and just
conceived in terms of “mechanical division of duties” (ibidem). This interpretation confirms
the idea that many of the measures introduced were (reasonably) chosen because they were
compatible with the administrative tradition. The latter defined as “a historically based set of
values, structures and relationships with other institutions that defines the nature of appro-
priate public administration within society” (Peters 2008: 118) and, consequently, composes
elements of explanation for administrative behaviour. Administrative traditions may also be
1 INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE 11
Frattini (law 145/2002). That system was strongly criticized by the former minister Cassese
(2002) and partially mitigated by a number of Constitutional Court’s rulings.
20
Evaluation mechanisms consistent with the new private-sector-type contracts for civil
servants were started by Bassanini through the legislative decree 286/1999. In 2009, the
Brunetta reform tightened the rules to enforce personnel performance rankings.
1 INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE 13
21
http://www.cocops.eu/.
22
Considering how Weber’s conception of the state is basic in the theory of the modern
state, it has been recently observed that “it makes more sense to talk about degrees of webe-
rianism rather than to distinguish between states that are (neo)-Weberian and those who are
not” (Byrkjeflot et al. 2018: 1006).
14 S. CAVATORTO AND A. LA SPINA
and the results of reforms invalidate this position pointing instead toward
a neo-Weberian model” (ivi: 23). Conclusively, Italy has been interpreted
as a neo-Weberian implementer of NPM-oriented reforms. Main failures
in the implementation of the managerial reforms had been therefore traced
back to this specific feature.
However, over time, implementation gaps were also addressed to limi-
tations of the NPM recipes themselves, especially for the excessive focus
on private sector and competition, ignoring organizational specificities
and the context-dependency of public administrations. Additionally, we
know that implementation always takes place in a dynamic environment
where different factors, even unintentionally, may influence outputs and
outcomes. Thus, between market and hierarchy, governance mechanisms
and the cooperation within complex public–private networks of actors
seemed to offer potential alternative solutions to administrative policy
problems. Indeed, a “more sophisticated understanding of public policy
implementation and public services delivery within a plural (with multiple
interdependent actors) and pluralist (with multiple processes informing
policy-making) state” was then suggested by the New public governance
(NPG) approach (Osborne 2010: 5 ff.).
From a normative stance, NPG-influenced administrative reforms are
inter-organizationally oriented, enhancing coordination between the gov-
ernment and multiple stakeholders. Civil servants are seen as network
managers and partnership leaders: they are crucial actors for change pro-
cesses. The plurality of inter-relations between state, non-state/private,
para-state agencies and civic society become a focal point for “co-
production” and “co-responsibility” of public service delivery and “pro-
duction of public value” (Liddle 2018). As Capano et al. (2015) properly
outlined: “Governments are still very much in charge, in every governance
mode (…) from hierarchical to market and network forms” (ivi: 319).
Hence, empirically, elements of each ideal type (PA, NPM, NPG) are
predicted to occur intertwined, resulting in increased complexity and
hybrid organizational forms, and conceivably producing recurring types of
dilemmas and contradictory effects (Christensen and Lægreid 2011).
These non-linearities would be able to direct the process of implementa-
tion towards failures. Nevertheless, scholars also observed that some con-
tradictions could only be apparent: for example, Pollitt and Bouckaert
(2017) wrote a shortlist which includes “some (seemingly) incompatible
paired statements and some complicated/less obvious combinations” (ivi:
191), such as “give priority to making savings/improving public service
1 INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE 15
References
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Reflections from the Italian Experience. Presentation at the 2nd Quality
Conference for Public Administrations, Copenhagen, pp. 1–88. Retrieved
March, 2018, from http://www.bassanini.it/the-dynamics-of-p-a-reform/.
23
The Conte cabinet rested on a “contract of government” between the anti-establish-
ment M5S (which scored 32% at the general elections held on 4 March 2018, thus becoming
the first party represented in the Italian parliament) and the “souverainist” League. M5S,
which only entered parliament in 2013, experienced, not without contradictions, its first
time in the national government.
24
The crisis occurred very rapidly between August and September 2019, after the
announcement of the League’s leader Matteo Salvini to revoke the confidence in the cabinet
and force early elections.
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Lowi, T. J. (1970). Decision Making vs. Policy Making: Toward an Antidote for
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1 INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE 21
Author: A. M. Mauriceau
Language: English
PREGNANCY,
AND
DISCOVERY TO
PREVENT PREGNANCY;
ITS GREAT AND IMPORTANT NECESSITY WHERE
TO EFFECT MISCARRIAGE.
WHEN ATTENDED WITH ENTIRE SAFETY.
BY DR. A. M. MAURICEAU,
Professor of Diseases of Women.
NEW YORK.
1847.
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1847, by
JOSEPH TROW,
In the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the Southern District New York.
PREFACE.
THE AUTHOR.
INDEX
Page.
ABORTION—
„ Symptoms of, 169
„ Causes of, 171
„ Treatment of, 171
„ Prevention of, 175
„ When dangerous, 168
„ When necessary to effect, 177
„ When attended with no danger, 169
AFTER-PAINS—
„ Causes of, 203
„ Treatment of, 204
AFTER-BIRTH—
„ Caution respecting, 199
„ Mode of extracting, 199
ARTIFICIAL DELIVERY, 180
BARRENNESS, OR STERILITY—, 223
„ Causes of, 225
„ Treatment of, 230
„ Remedy for, 232
CONCEPTION—(See Pregnancy), 36
„ Signs of, 37
„ Prevention of (See Pregnancy), 104
CHILDREN—Management of, 210
CONCLUDING REMARKS, 237
DELIVERY—Artificial, 180
DISEASES OF PREGNANCY, 61
Desomeaux’s Prevention to Pregnancy, 142
FALSE PAINS IN PREGNANCY, 187
FALSE Conception, 30
FAINTING, during Pregnancy, 87
„ Treatment of, 87
FLOODING, 174
„ Causes of, 23
„ Treatment of, 174
FRENCH SECRET, 144
„ For what purpose used, 144
„ Its use in France, 144
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, ix
INFANTS, still-born, 202
„ Treatment of, 203
INFLAMMATION OF THE BREASTS, 205
„ To prevent inflamed or broken Breasts, 208
Index, v
LABOUR—Signs of, 182
„ Management of, 185
„ Ordinary or natural, 186
„ Preternatural or Cross-Births, 201
„ Laborious, or difficult, 202
„ Directions during, 198
„ Directions after, 99, 203
MALFORMATION of the Pelvis, 180
MENSTRUATION, or Monthly Turns, 1
„ Retention of, 8
„ Description, 8
„ Causes, 8
„ Symptoms, 9
„ Treatment, 10
„ Suppression of, 11
„ Description of, 11
„ Causes, 12
„ Symptoms, 12
„ Treatment of, 13
„ Specific certain to effect a cure, 16
„ Painful and Imperfect, 18
„ Symptoms, 19
„ Causes, 19
„ Treatment, 20
MENSES—
„ Immoderate Flow of, 22
„ Symptoms, 22
„ Causes, 23
„ Treatment, 23
„ Prevention, 27
„ Decline of the, 28
„ Symptoms, 30
„ Causes, 30
„ Treatment, 33
MISCARRIAGE—See Abortion.
MORAND’S “ELIXIR,” 232
„ Its success in effecting Cures, 233
NAVEL CORD—
„ Manner of tying, 198
NURSING, 204
PORTUGUESE FEMALE PILLS, 16
PREFACE, iii
PREGNANCY, Signs of, 36
„ How it may be determined, 37
„ Ceasing to be unwell, 38
„ Morning Sickness, 49, 62
„ Shooting Pains through, Enlargement of and other Changes of the Breasts,
50
„ Changes of the Nipple, 51
„ Presence of Milk, 54
„ Quickening, 57
PREGNANCY,—Diseases of, 61
„ Being unwell during, 96
„ Costiveness, 72
„ Diarrhœa, 76
„ Enlargement of the Veins of the Legs, 82
„ Fainting Fits, 87
„ Heart-Burn, 70
„ Headache, 98
„ Inconvenience from size, 95
„ Painful and distended condition of th Breasts, 90
„ Pains in the Legs, &c., 92
„ Palpitation of the Heart, 85
„ Piles, 78
„ Salivation, or Discharge of Saliva, 89
„ Swelling of the Feet and Legs, 84
„ Soreness and Cracking of the Skin of the Abdomen, 94
„ Toothache, 88
„ Violent movement of the Child, 93
PREGNANCY—Prevention of, 104
„ When unnecessary, 110
„ When indispensable, 107
„ Practicability of, 141
„ Morality of, 146
„ Social importance of, 114
„ Mode of prevention, 142, 143, 144
„ Healthiness of, 145
„ Reasons for prevention, 144
„ Objections answered, 146
„ Proofs of success, 150, 152, 154
„ Use of in France and other parts of Europe, 149
SEXUAL WEAKNESS,
„ Symptoms, 157
„ Causes, 158
„ Treatment, 158
„ Regimen, 163
WOMB, falling down of the, 163
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.
OF
FEMALE COMPLAINTS.
MENSTRUATION.
Description.
The menstrual discharge is liable, from many causes, to become
obstructed at the period when it ought to appear; when this takes
place it is attended with very painful or serious effects; and, if nature
is not assisted, the health is impaired or the constitution
undermined, inducing consumption or some other complaint.
Causes.
The remote cause of this complaint is most frequently suppressed
perspiration; and it may arise, in part, from an inactive sedentary
life, and such habits as are peculiar to the higher classes of society,
particularly in cities and towns. The proximate cause of it seems to
be a want of power in the system, arising from inability to propel the
blood into the uterine vessels with sufficient force to open their
extremities and to allow a discharge of blood from them.
Symptoms.
Heaviness, listlessness to motion, fatigue on the least exercise,
palpitation of the heart, pains in the back, loins, and hips, flatulence,
acidities in the stomach and bowels, costiveness, a preternatural
appetite for chalk, lime, and various other absorbents, together with
many other dyspeptic symptoms. As it advances in its progress the
face becomes pale, and afterward assumes a yellowish hue, even
verging upon green, whence it has been called green sickness; the
lips lose their rosy color; the eyes are encircled with a livid areola;
the whole body has an unhealthy appearance, with every indication
of a want of power and energy in the constitution; the feet are
affected with swellings; the breathing is much hurried by any great
exertion of the body; the pulse is quick, but small; and the person is
liable to a cough, and to many of the symptoms of hysteria.
Sometimes a great quantity of pale urine is discharged in the
morning, and not unfrequently hectic fever attends. In cases of a
more chronic character there is a continued, though variable, state of
sallowness, yellowness, darkness, or a wan, squalid, or sordid
paleness of complexion, or ring of darkness surrounding the eyes,
and extending perhaps a little toward the temples and cheeks.
Treatment.
As this disease proceeds from debility, it is evident that the great
object to be fulfilled will be to give tone and energy to the system;
and if this debility has arisen from a sedentary life, the patient must
begin immediately to exercise in the open air, and, if practicable, to
change her residence. The tepid or warm bath should be used in
preference to the cold. The first medicine given may be the
pulverized mandrake root, combined with a little cream of tartar.
This, as well as other medicines, should be taken upon an empty
stomach: after it has been given, motherwort, pennyroyal, and other
herb teas may be freely drunk. After the exhibition of the purgative,
which may be occasionally repeated, gum aloes may be taken,
combined in such a manner as to prevent the piles. This medicine,
from its action upon the uterus through the medium of the rectum, is
very useful in retention of the menses. Emmenagogues, or “forcing
medicines,” should not be used to bring on the menses, except there
be a struggle or effort of nature to effect it, which may be known by
the periodical pains and pressing down about the hips and loins.
When this occurs let the feet be bathed, and perspiration promoted,
by drinking freely of diluent teas, such as pennyroyal, motherwort,
and garden thyme. Should considerable pains attend the complaint,
eight or ten grains of the diaphoretic powders may be given, and
fomentations of bitter herbs applied over the region of the womb.
Desomeaux’s Portuguese Pills are now recommended as the best
specific, especially if the disease proves obstinate.
The female should be very careful not to expose herself to the
vicissitudes of the weather, and not suffer the feet or clothes to
become wet: warm clothing must be worn, and particularly flannel.
For pain apply a heated brick, covered, to the bowels.
The diet should be light, nutritious, and easy of digestion.
SUPPRESSION OF THE MENSES.
Description.
In this disease there is a partial or total obstruction of the menses
in women from other causes than pregnancy and old age. The
menses should be regular as to the quantity and quality; that this
discharge should observe the monthly period, is essential to health.
When it is obstructed, nature makes her efforts to obtain for it some
other outlet; if these efforts of nature fail, the consequence may be,
fever, pulmonic diseases, spasmodic affections, hysteria, epilepsy,
mania, apoplexy, green sickness, according to the general habit and
disposition of the patient. Any interruption occurring after the
menses have once been established in their regular course, except
when occasioned by conception, is always to be considered as a case
of suppression. A constriction of the extreme vessels, arising from
accidental events, such as cold, anxiety of mind, fear, inactivity of
body, irregularities of diet, putting on damp clothes, the frequent use
of acids and other sedatives, &c., is the cause which evidently
produces a suppression of the menses. This shows the necessity for
certain cautions and attentions during the discharge. In some few
cases it appears as a symptom of other diseases, and particularly of
general debility in the system, showing a want of due action of the
vessels. When the menses have been suppressed for any considerable
length of time, it not unfrequently happens that the blood which
should have passed off by the uterus, being determined more
copiously and forcibly to other parts, gives rise to hemorrhages;
hence it is frequently poured out from the nose, stomach, lungs, and
other parts, in such cases. At first, however, febrile or inflammatory
symptoms appear, the pulse is hard and frequent, the skin hot, and
there is a severe pain in the head, back, and loins. Besides, the
patient is likewise much troubled with costiveness, colic pains, and
dyspeptic and hysteric symptoms.