Article

Jadavpur Journal of
Modi Government and International Relations
21(2) 98–117
Changing Patterns in 2017 Jadavpur University
SAGE Publications
Indian Foreign Policy sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0973598417731241
http://jnr.sagepub.com

Vikash Chandra1

Abstract
This article examines continuity and change in Indian foreign policy since
Narendra Modi took office. It proceeds with analyzing six issues that domi-
nated India’s foreign engagement between the prime ministerial regimes
of Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh as a reference point. To evaluate
the level of change, it defines major change as a major shift in the goals and
strategies of a state’s foreign policy and argues that most often a major
change in foreign policy is a result of changes in the systemic variables
followed by a change in either state- or individual-level variables. Indian
foreign policy under Modi is witnessing a proactive turn infused by a strong
leadership. The new government has redefined India’s foreign policy prior-
ities, and the level of external engagement has also gone up. However,
areas like democracy promotion have not upheld their momentum, and
the government’s regional policy has failed to utilize the opportunities that
were available to it when it began its tenure. Also, foreign policy changes
under the new government cannot be regarded as a major change because
the goals and strategies of Indian foreign policy have not changed.

Keywords
Major change, strategic autonomy, multi-alliances, democracy promotion,
power transition, soft power, proactive foreign policy

1
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Dr B.R. Ambedkar Government
Degree College, Mainpuri, Uttar Pradesh, India.

Corresponding author:
Vikash Chandra, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Dr B.R. Ambedkar
Government Degree College, Mainpuri 205001, Uttar Pradesh, India.
E-mail: vikash06chandra@gmail.com
Chandra 99

The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government led by Narendra

Modi completed three years in office in May 2017. He is among the
few Indian prime ministers who have dedicated much time and energy
to foreign policy. He launched his ‘tenure as prime minister with a
flurry of overseas visits to large and small powers alike’ (Basrur 2017: 7).
As of August 2017, in his thirty-one foreign trips to six continents,
he has visited more than forty-nine states, including eight states twice
and five times the USA.1 To rejuvenate India’s foreign engagement,
the new government has taken several initiatives such as the Act East
policy and Neighbourhood First policy. These initiatives have raised
the hope that Indian foreign policy will witness significant changes.
To tap the dynamics of Indian foreign policy under Modi’s prime
ministership, numerous scholars have studied the different dimensions
of the Indian foreign policy. However, their opinion is divided. Some
have talked about the substantial change and described him as a rescuer
of Indian foreign policy, while others do not see any major shift.
Former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran and former Minister of
State for External Affairs in the United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
government, Shashi Tharoor, for example, maintain that ‘foreign
policy always operates within a framework of continuity and the core
interests of a nation do not change for long periods’ (The Wire 2015).
Rajesh Basrur (2017) has found that ‘foreign policy under Modi picks
up from where his predecessors left off and is characterised by essen-
tial continuity’. Ian Hall virtually concurs with this view and argues
that despite bringing a proactive turn in Indian foreign policy, ‘Modi
has not made major modifications to the aims and methods of Indian
foreign policy’ (Hall 2017: 127). In contrast, another group repre-
sented by C. Raja Mohan sees the changes as ‘so seminal as to mark
the beginning of the “Third Republic”’2 in Indian foreign policy
(Bajpai 2017; The Wire 2015). Kanti Bajpai (2015) has found a ‘new
zeal’ and rebooting of Indian foreign policy under the new regime.
Sumit Ganguly (2015) also maintains that ‘there is little question that
Modi’s foreign policy constitutes a departure from India’s stances of
the past’.
To assess these competing claims objectively, this article takes six
issues that have been the linchpin of Indian foreign policy since the end of
the cold war, namely, (a) alignment pattern, (b) neighborhood policy,
(c) the role of soft power, (d) international power transition, (e) democracy
promotion, and (f) democratization of foreign-policymaking. It traces
the evolution of the issues and evaluates the extent to which they have
100 Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 21(2)

gone changed, if any, under the new regime. The article is divided into
four sections. The first section evaluates the debate and sets a platform.
The second section defines ‘major change’ and examines what variables
lead to it. The third one identifies the six major issues that have dominated
Indian foreign policy between Rao and Manmohan Singh and evaluates
whether these have undergone major changes under the new government.
The last section draws conclusions based on the analysis and seeks to
answer why some scholars think otherwise.

What Is a Major Change?

What is a ‘major’ change and when does it occur? Answers vary signifi-
cantly, especially in the later part of the question. A realist reply will
differ from liberals, constructivists, and Marxists. The answer may differ
to some degree even within a school of thought. In a state’s foreign
policy, a major change is demarcated by a substantial change in goals
and strategies from its existing foreign policy. A major change occurs
when existing goals are significantly redefined, and strategies are recon-
sidered to suit the redefined goals. However, the mere redefinition of
goals and reconsideration of strategies does not constitute a major change
until and unless the foreign policy departs to a good extent in the desired
direction from its earlier position. To qualify as a major change, the
departure should be to the extent that a disjuncture can clearly be
observed. To be recognized as a major change, all these changes must
take place in the concourse of a regime’s policy change.
Such a disjuncture can be caused by a change in forces working at
three levels: a change at the individual or leadership level; changes in
domestic variables such as ideology, ruling party, and economic and
military capabilities; and the systemic or the international system-level
variables (Jackson and Sørensen 2013: 259). While analyzing the rela-
tive impact of the three variables in shaping state behavior, Kenneth
Waltz has concluded that

the third image (system level variables) describes the framework of world
politics, but without the first (individual level) and second images (state-level
variables) there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy;
the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without
the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their
results. (Waltz 2001: 238)
Chandra 101

Change at Individual Leadership Level

Change at the individual or leadership level affects foreign policy. Byman
and Pollack (2001: 109) have contended that ‘the goals, abilities, and
foibles of individuals are crucial to the intentions, capabilities, and strate-
gies of a state’. The state leadership is responsible for reading or misreading
the systemic signals. ‘Based on their perceptions and interpretations, they
(leaders) build expectations … and plan strategies’ (Hermann and Hagan
1998: 126). They play a linchpin role in mobilizing resources, deciding the
course of action and implementing the decisions. In a decision-making
process, a ‘leader’s personality and character can also influence a state’s
response’ because some leaders are keen to take risks while others not
(Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016: 63). Under a qualified and experi-
enced leadership, sometimes a state can achieve more than what its
capability allows. India’s foreign policy achievements under Nehru signify
the role of leadership. The success of Russian foreign policy under
Vladimir Putin can be attributed to his personality. Another example is the
Nixon regime’s policy change toward the People’s Republic of China from
hostility to engagement, led by Henry Kissinger (Wohlforth 2012: 44).
Nevertheless, the role of leadership is circumscribed by the domestic and
international circumstances.

Change in Domestic Variables

Domestic variables are regarded as a primary determinant of foreign
policy. Changes in domestic variables such as regime type, ideology,
ruling party, economic and military capabilities, media, business, and public
opinion, among others, also can decide the degree of continuity and change
in foreign policy. In international relations theory, liberalism and neoclas-
sical realism emphasize over the domestic variables in foreign policy
analysis. According to liberals, the ‘state–society relations—the relation-
ship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in which
they are embedded—have a fundamental impact on state behaviour in
world politics’ because ‘Societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence
state behaviour by shaping state preferences’ (Moravcsik 1997: 513).
The preferences are at the core of driving foreign policy. Moreover, by
assuming that democracies do not fight with each other, democratic peace
theory, a variant of liberalism, stresses the role of ‘regime type’ in foreign
policy analysis. Unlike the structural realism, by recognizing the role of
102 Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 21(2)

domestic variables in foreign policy analysis, neoclassical realists argue

that domestic-level factors such as leader images, state-society relations,
strategic culture, and institutions play an intervening role between
dependent and independent variables (Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell
2016: 58–79). Changes in these variables can lead to a change in goals and
strategy. For instance, the Soviet Union’s decision to introduce Glasnost
and Perestroika in the late 1980s was predominantly shaped by a poor
economic performance at home.

International System-level or Systemic Variables

Pertaining to the impact of system-level forces on a state’s foreign policy,
Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan have observed that ‘the systemic
imperatives of anarchy or interdependence are so clear, leaders can
choose from only a limited range of foreign strategies. If they are to exer-
cise rational leadership and maximise their state’s movement toward its
goals, only certain actions are feasible …’ (Hermann and Hagan 1998:
124). Structural realism maintains that ‘the systemic distribution of
power among states is the most important level for analysing and
explaining foreign policy’ (Jackson and Sørensen 2013: 259). Although
structural realism is not a theory of foreign policy, yet the structure of the
international system, that is, ‘conditions in the international system
compel or pressure states towards acting in certain ways, that is, to follow
a certain foreign policy’ (Ibid.: 257). The distribution of power in the
international system bounds a state’s foreign policy choices. Availability
of choices or lack of it affects foreign policy goals and strategies. In anarchy,
by restricting or providing incentives for specific alliance patterns, the
systemic variables shape the way (and in collaboration with whom) a state
will pursue its national interests. For instance, the post-Second World
War goals of Indian foreign policyensuring the independence of foreign
policy by keeping the country out of the ongoing power politics—and the
strategy to pursue it through the Non-Aligned Movement underlines the
role of systemic variables in shaping foreign policy goals and the strate-
gies of a state. In a bipolar international system, there was a fear that
aligning with any superpower may compromise the independence of
foreign policy.
Although leadership and domestic variables play an important role in
determining foreign policy behavior, the role of structural variables
cannot be ignored. Any of the three factors can bring about change in
Chandra 103

foreign policy, but none of them can bring about a major change on its
own. Even change in more than one variable may bring a major change
but not necessarily. Most often, a major change is a result of a change in
systemic variables followed by a change in either or both of the remain-
ing variables. The post-Second World War and post-Cold War foreign
policy changes of India, among others, throw ample light on the role of
the systemic variables in shaping a state’s foreign policy.

Modi Government and Changing Patterns

Alignment Pattern
Non-alignment, meaning to keep away from power politics was a defining
feature of Indian foreign policy. Being ‘a weak postcolonial state, India
had a strong desire to prevent other powers from limiting its own room for
manoeuvre’ (Mohan 2008). The non-alignment policy was adopted to
ensure the ‘independence’ of Indian foreign policy. But in the post-Cold
War era, where the Non-Aligned Movement was declared dead and
aligning with the USA became a fashion, to provide maximum options to
foreign policymakers, India adopted a strategy called ‘strategic autonomy’
(Gupta and Chatterjee 2015: 104–107; Monsonis 2010: 613–614). The new
strategy led India to ‘emphasis on an institutionalised, classic multilater-
alism’ (Narlikar 2013: 596) at the global level while enhancing India’s
‘capacity to pursue its interests with minimal reference to other major
powers’ at the regional level (Hall 2016: 3). Thus, despite virtually giving
up the policy of non-alignment, by adopting the strategy of strategic
autonomy, India retained its space ‘to manoeuvre at the international stage’
(Wulf and Debiel 2015: 29).
However, India could not go far with strategic autonomy and in the late
1990s adopted a new strategy called ‘strategic partnerships’ (Panda 2013)
or ‘strategic connectedness’ (Brewster 2014). Multi-alignment turn in
Indian foreign policy was a repercussion of the change in foreign policy
strategy. Vajpayee government laid the foundation of a strategic partner-
ship in 1998 when India signed its first strategic partnership agreement
with France. Under the policy, India aligned with status-quo powers such
as the USA, France, and Japan but did not forget to align with ‘revisionist’
states such as China and Russia. It aligned with ‘established powers’ such
as the United Kingdom and France but did not hesitate in aligning with
‘rising powers’ such as Germany, Brazil, and South Africa. Simultaneously,
104 Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 21(2)

it is trying to persuade the established/status-quo powers to give state-of-

the-art technology to enable it to raise its status and seeking accommoda-
tion in the existing international order as well as participating in alternative
institutions such as Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Bank. Thus, as a
consequence of strategic partnerships, Indian foreign policy is moving
from the ‘age of strategic autonomy’ to the ‘age of multi-alignment’.
In the absence of systemic change, the Modi government’s policy
thrust is in continuation with that of its predecessors. Priority has been
given to the West, especially the USA and Israel. But prime minister’s
personal interest has introduced a new rigour. The new government
invited President Barrack Obama to India’s Republic Day event. The prime
minister’s four visits to the USA and seven meetings with the US President
in two years speak of the increasing bond between the two states. A result
of these meetings was an extension of the US support for India’s bid to be
part of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR). Although India bid for the NSG membership could not
succeed, however, it succeeded in joining the latter.
Continuing the tradition to establish a strategic partnership, Modi gov-
ernment has also signed strategic partnership agreements with Seychelles,
Mongolia, Singapore, the UAE, and Rwanda. The rise of China has com-
pelled the USA and India to come together. Therefore, to bring two
‘estrange democracies’ closer, a process started in the post-Cold Ear era
and strengthened by the Singh government through signing of Indo-US
civil nuclear deal, Modi government has signed a deal that will govern ‘the
use of each other’s land, air and naval bases for repair and resupply’
(Deccan Chronicle 2016). For the first time since the establishment
of diplomatic relations in 1991, India’s president and prime minister have
paid a state visit to Israel. All the while, older friends like Russia have
received relatively less attention.

Neighborhood Policy
Since independence, India has pursued a neighborhood policy that was
based on the premise that ‘the Subcontinent is India’s exclusive sphere
of influence and New Delhi must strive to prevent the intervention of
great powers in the affairs of the region’ (Mohan 2003). Indira Gandhi
asserted that ‘India would neither intervene in the domestic affairs of
any states in the region, unless requested to do so, nor tolerate such
Chandra 105

intervention by an outside power; if external assistance is needed to

meet an internal crisis, states should first look within the region for help’
(Devotta 2003: 367–368). India’s regional policy from Rao to Manmohan
Singh evolved around four themes. First, as the Rao government decided
to link the Indian economy with the world economy, it lost the impera-
tive to have an exclusionist regional policy. It remained no longer
feasible to insist on keeping extra-regional powers away from the region.
Therefore, India decided not to protest or publicly express strong reser-
vations against extra-regional powers’ involvement in regional affairs.
Second, intervention—military or non-military (soft)—remains the core
of India’s regional policy. It is believed that the Mahinda Rajapaksa
government adopted a pro-China policy ‘only because India dragged its
feet over sensitive political (Tamil) issues due to coalition partners’
pressure on the previous government in New Delhi led by Manmohan
Singh’ (Sharma 2015). The third is the announcement of the Gujral
Doctrine. The doctrine was aimed at reducing suspicions and generating
goodwill vis-à-vis smaller neighbors through the principle of non-
reciprocity. Lastly, the influence of states in foreign policymaking has
increased. The states are not just directly engaging with other countries
but also shaping India’s relations with other states.
Like its predecessors, the Modi government also pays great attention
to the neighborhood. The positive gesture shown by the West Bengal
government in the settlement of the land boundary dispute with
Bangladesh strengthened the hope. However, India Pakistan relations
have worsened over the period. While cross-border terrorism and the
rise of fundamentalism in Pakistan threaten India’s national security,
India’s alleged involvement in the tribal areas of Baluchistan threatens
Pakistan’s security. Surgical strike carried out by India further deterio-
rated the situation.
India’s relationship with its neighbors is still evolving under the
shadow of intervention. Happymon Jacob has noted that ‘India’s grow-
ing unpopularity in the regional capitals is’ on account of ‘its increasing
tendency to interfere in the domestic affairs of its smaller neighbors,
either citing security implications or to offset the target country’s
unfriendly strategic choices’ (Jacob 2016). Recently there was a wide-
spread perception in Nepal that India had blockaded their country.
Although an overwhelming majority of the Tarai region supported3 the
Constitution in the Constituent Assembly voting, India asked Nepal ‘to
delay the promulgation of the new Constitution so that the Madheshi
parties’ demands on citizenship, and provincial boundaries and their
106 Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 21(2)

demarcation be incorporated’ (Mitra 2016). When Nepal did not fall in

line, India ‘publicly expressed its displeasure’ (Jacob 2016). Nepal saw
it as interference in its domestic affairs. In the case of Sri Lanka, to counter
a pro-China regime, India ‘proactively promoted the coalition led by
Maithripala Sirisena’ against Rajapaksa (Ibid.). With regard to Maldives,
India publicly expressed its concern over the ouster of President
Mohamed Nasheed. Prime Minister Modi cancelled his planned visit to
that country ‘in protest of the subversion of democracy in the island
nation’ (Passi and Bhatnagar 2016: 10). Maldives considered this as
interference in its domestic affairs. When India’s Minister for External
Affairs, Sushma Swaraj, visited the Maldives, the Maldives’ President’s
office issued a statement to the effect that his ‘government will not toler-
ate foreign parties interfering with the country’s domestic issues’ and
that such policies on India’s part ‘pushed Male further towards
Beijing’ (Ibid.).

The Role of Soft Power

Indian culture and religious thought, especially Buddhism, Bollywood, and
Indian cuisine were popular across the globe for ages. But for a long time,
they were not seen as an asset of foreign policy. However, ‘since the early
2000s it [India] has been actively promoting its soft power credentials
around the globe …’ (Chandra 2017: 344; Suri cited in Mukherjee
2014: 48). For the first time, the Vajpayee government started injecting
‘democracy into India’s international engagement’ (Mohan 2014). In 2000,
‘his government constituted a High-Level Committee on Indian Diaspora’
(Chandra 2017: 344). Institution building was defining a feature of
the Singh government’s policy in this regard. To reach non-resident Indians,
Singh government established Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (Hall
2015: 250). Going a step further, the government created a Public Diplomacy
Division in the Ministry of External Affairs in 2006 and thereafter was
active in promoting India in the old and new media (Ibid.). A key goal of
the new division was to explain on a day-to-day basis the background
of policy decisions in Indian foreign policy, to promote a positive image of
India as well as to engage scholars, think-tanks, and media through its
outreach activities. He also ensured India’s participation in the ‘commu-
nity of democracy’, strengthening democracy promotion bodies like the
UN Democracy Fund, and assisted neighbors passing through a transition
phase to adopt democracy. A major success to India’s efforts came in 2007,
Chandra 107

when the United Nations declared to observe 2nd October, Mahatma

Gandhi’s birth, as International Day of Non-Violence.
It seems that individual preferences have significantly shaped India’s
approach to soft power. Under Modi, ‘the government and the Prime
Minister are actively involved in cultivating and spreading India’s influ-
ence abroad’ (Tandon 2016: 59). Unlike Singh government, which
refused to sponsor the World Sanskrit Forum in Bangkok, Modi partici-
pates in programs on religion, culture, and heritage. In contrast to Singh,
Modi believes that ‘if we keep criticising ourselves, why would the
world look at us’ (Indian Express 2016). Therefore, he participated in
the World Cultural Festival organized by the Art of Living Foundation in
New Delhi in March 2016 and described the event like the Kumbh Mela
of culture. In the same month, he also participated in the World Sufi
Forum organized by the All India Ulama and Mashaikh Board. In May
2017, he participated as chief guest in the 14th United Nations Day of
Vesak Celebration, a Buddhist festival organized in Sri Lanka. Moreover,
the government’s effort aimed at recognition of Indian culture and politi-
cal values succeeded in 2014, when the UN decided to celebrate 21 June
as International Day of Yoga (United Nations 2014).
Unlike Singh government’s emphasis on institutionalization, the dias-
pora is an integral part of the Modi government’s soft power promotion
strategy. Unlike previous governments, the Modi government ‘has been
more direct … in engaging with overseas Indians’ (Parameswaran 2015).
Consequently, he has addressed Indian diaspora at several places such as
Madison Square Garden, the USA; Allphones Arena in Olympic Park,
Sydney; Wembley Stadium, the UK; Dubai Cricket Stadium, the UAE;
and SAP Center in San Jose, California.
However, the rise of Hindu outfits and increasing cases of attack on
religious minorities, their worship place and mob lynching under Modi
regime have posed challenges to India’s image abroad. Several people,
mostly Muslims have been killed by the mob on the mere suspicion
that either they were carrying or have kept beef in their homes. Such
developments have significantly damaged India’s image abroad.4

International Power Transition

In the twenty-first century, as a consequence of the redistribution of
power, the international system is undergoing a transition. In the emerging
scenario, regarding military power, the international system is still unipolar,
108 Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 21(2)

but as regards economic power, it is multipolar (Nye 2015: 95–96).

Primarily, because of the rise of China and India, the pivot of international
politics is shifting from the Euro-Atlantic zone to Asia-Pacific.
India’s traditional strategy of balancing power aimed at securing
‘access to the material and political support of its major partners without
compromising its freedom of action’ (Okoth 2010: 36) has been ceding
way to a new tendency to balancing threat. The balance of threat theory
is based on the assumption that ‘states ally to balance against threat
rather than power alone’ (Walt 1990: 5). In this process, ‘geographical
proximity, offensive capabilities and perceived intentions’ of the source
of threat are crucial variables (Ibid.). Given China’s geographical proxi-
mity and its offensive military capability vis-à-vis India, China is consi-
dered as the largest threat to India’s national security. The history supports
this surmise.
However, India’s new dispensation claims that it does not aim to
balance any state, but its facts speak otherwise. Under the multi-alignment
policy, India is developing close relations with China’s archrivals such as
the USA and Japan. The momentum is extending and deepening under
Modi. Controversies over India’s NSG membership and Masood Azhar
have underlined the ongoing tensions. The Doklam dispute has brought
militaries of both states face to face. The signing of a Logistics Exchange
Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the USA, which facilitates
‘mutual basing facilities … on a case-by-case basis may deteriorate the
situation (Narayanan 2016). India’s increasing engagement with the
USA after ‘pivot to Asia’ policy and the USA’s extension of support
to India’s membership in various multilateral bodies is generating a
perception, especially among the Chinese population, that the USA
and Japan are helping India to balance China in Asia. India’s joint
military exercises with the USA, Japan and other rivals of China have
further cemented the belief.
Despite all, India’s response to China seems to be caught in a dilemma:
whether to balance or bandwagon China. The dilemma has deepened
under Modi regime. India’s act of entering in close cooperation with
China’s archrival indicates toward India balancing act, but some strategic
decisions seem to be questioning India’s balancing act. For example,
even though China had put on hold, if not blocked, India’s proposal in
the 1267 Committee of the United Nations to ban Jaish-e-Mohammed
Chief Masood Azhar (India Today 2016), India refused to give visa to
Uighur leader Dolkun Isa, wanted by China in terrorism-related activi-
ties (Bhattacherjee 2016). Later on, two more people were also denied
Chandra 109

the visa on a similar ground. Vivek Katju, a former Indian diplomat, has
called this decision the ‘biggest foreign policy mistake’ (Katju 2016).
In his view, this can be interpreted as recognition on India’s part that
China’s terrorist is India’s terrorist, but not vice versa. Second, tradition-
ally, India followed One-China policy and refused to recognize Taiwan
(Sikri 2009: 126). But since 2010, ‘India has refused to endorse the “one-
China” policy’ (Bagchi 2014). India has put a condition that it will con-
sider One-China policy if China recognizes one-India policy. Taking a
harder position, in 2014, India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma
Swaraj asserted that ‘for India to agree to a one-China policy, China
should reaffirm a one-India policy’ (Panda 2014). But when the oppor-
tune moment came to exert psychological pressure on China, at the last
moment, India cancelled the plan to send a delegation to attend Taiwan’s
new president’s swearing-in ceremony (Patranobis 2016). This can be
interpreted as a de facto recognition of the Chinese claim over Taiwan.
These incidents indicate an ongoing balancing-bandwagoning dilemma
in the Indian foreign policy establishment.

Democracy Promotion
India ‘believes that democracy and human-rights-abiding democracies
are the best regime types’, but it has ‘no missionary zeal to promote
democracy abroad’ (Stuenkel and Jacob 2010: 27). After ignoring for a
long time, the Ministry of External Affairs’ annual report 2000–2001
mentioned for the first time democracy as a goal of Indian foreign policy
(Muni 2012: 10). Although India does not currently have any official
democracy promotion doctrine (Destradi 2010: 11; Rizal 2015: 316),
however, on the basis of India’s foreign policy activities, three modes of
democracy promotion can be identified: (a) participation in democracy-
promoting organizations, (b) democratic assistance to transitional and/or
conflict-affected societies, and (c) extending cooperation with democracy-
promoting countries.
When the United Nations launched the UN Democracy Fund to
provide democratic assistance in July 2005, Manmohan Singh was a
co-launcher of the fund. India is also a founding member of the
‘Community of Democracies’ (Choedon 2015: 162). India’s electoral
and democratic infrastructure-building assistance support is based on the
assumption that ‘India had a responsibility to help other states in transition
to open economic policies and democratic politics’ (Baru and Mohan,
110 Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 21(2)

cited in Hall 2016: 6). The nature of support varies from country to country.
In Nepal, India ‘contributed to the training of the Nepalese election
observers and provided computers, 200 electronic voting machines, and
75 vehicles to the government of Nepal’ (Destradi 2010: 21–22).
In Bhutan, India is helping to ‘forge royal democratic institutions. It has
provided support to draft the royal constitution, built the judiciary building,
given parliamentary training, and provided electronic machines’ (Rizal
2015: 319). In Afghanistan, India is building the infrastructure critical for
sustaining democracy.
The Modi government has so far been ‘less reticent than his predece-
ssor in promoting the virtues of democracy in India’s immediate neigh-
bourhood and beyond’ (Hall 2017: 128). Democracy promotion seems to
have lost the momentum generated under Singh government. The failure
maybe caused by the endorsement of the ideology of Hindu nationalism
by Modi and his party (BJP) because Hindu nationalism has hardly
any original thought on democracy promotion (Ibid.). The current prime
minister’s effort is limited to making references to democracy in various
speeches. However, in a notable exception, ‘in protest of the subversion
of democracy’ in the Maldives, the prime minister called off his planned
visit in March 2015 (Passi and Bhatnagar 2016: 10).
Meanwhile, the problem is how to explain why does India promote
democracy in Nepal, Bhutan, and Afghanistan but not in Myanmar?
It can be explained while keeping in mind that democracy promotion is
not a core goal of Indian foreign policy. Principles such as non-intervention
in domestic jurisdiction and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity
constitute the core of Indian foreign policy (Bass 2015: 292). In India’s
opinion, these principles can be breached only if there is explicit consent
of the host state or proper authorization from the Security Council (Ibid.).
India went for democracy promotion in Nepal and Bhutan because a
formal request was made while hardly pressed for democratization in
Myanmar because such request was not available.

Democratization of Foreign Policymaking

Nehru’s reliance on the inner circle5 and Indira Gandhi’s on her kitchen
cabinet6 had made foreign policymaking an elite affair. It is no more an
exclusive enterprise of the central government and top-ranked bureau-
crats. Even at the governmental level, various stakeholders are claiming
their say. Consequently, there is a ‘shift away from “quasi-federalism”
Chandra 111

and “centralised federalism” to federalism, in which states perform a

significant role, particularly in the areas of economics and investment’
(Saez 2002: 5). Due to shared ethnicity, religion and stages of economic
development, border states have an incentive to undertake foreign policy
activities. For instance, West Bengal has significantly affected India–
Bangladesh relations. During Manmohan Singh’s regime, it refused to
follow the central government’s line on issues such as illegal migration,
land-boundary agreement, Teesta River water sharing, and exchange of
enclaves (Nanda 2014: 9). Similarly, some observers believe that there
was pressure from Tamil Nadu to vote against Sri Lanka in the Human
Rights Council because ‘India’s vote against Sri Lanka came days after
the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party withdrew from a coali-
tion led by the ruling United Progressive Alliance government’ (Pratyush
2013). Under pressure, Singh had to drop the idea of attending the
Commonwealth summit in Colombo (Nanda 2014: 9).
As a consequence of changes in state-level variables, the non-
governmental actors such as business, think-tanks, media, civil society,
and public opinion have started playing an important role in formulating
foreign policy. Singh experienced that ‘in the modern world the relation-
ship between governments is increasingly mediated through and influ-
enced by the relationship between civil society and the business
community’ (Singh quoted in Baru 2009: 266). However, business has
left other non-governmental actors far behind. Although Rajiv Gandhi
started a tradition to invite business persons to follow his foreign trips,
yet Manmohan Singh ‘was perhaps the first Indian Prime Minister’ who
‘so clearly articulate(d) the rising influence of civil society and business
in the making of Indian foreign policy’ (Baru 2009: 01). As a conse-
quence of the involvement of multiple actors, foreign policy-making ‘no
longer continues to be as centralised and autonomous as it was thought
to be earlier …’ (Chakrabarti 2014: 216).
Given his previous credential as chief minister of Gujarat, Prime
Minister Modi was supposed to further democratize the process. But the
processes of centralization and democratization are going side by side.
Before becoming prime minister, he criticized the UPA foreign policy
as ‘a mockery’ and ‘Delhi-centric’ (Nanda 2014: 10). He expressed
the view that ‘India is not just Delhi’, therefore, ‘foreign policy should
be decided by the people and not by some politicians sitting in Delhi’
(Ibid.). When he became prime minister, instead of hosting the Chinese
President in New Delhi, he hosted him in Ahmedabad. By introducing
para-diplomacy, he has tried to make states partners in his foreign policy.
112 Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 21(2)

The process of democratization registered a milestone in 2015 when

the Ministry of External Affairs decided to hire consultants from
academia and think-tanks on a contract basis. Handling of the India–
Bangladesh enclave issue and hosting the Chinese President in
Ahmadabad also raise hope that the government will further decen-
tralize the foreign policymaking process. On the other hand, the Prime
Minister’s Office has substantially increased its control in foreign
policymaking. It seems that the institution of the Ministry of External
Affairs has become simply a facilitator or manager of the Prime
Minister’s foreign visits. Moreover, like the previous National Security
Advisors (NSAs), Ajit Doval, the current NSA is also playing a signi-
ficant role in the process. Amidst increasing centralization, it can be
said that India has to do a lot on democratization of the foreign policy
decision-making.

Conclusion
The 2014 General Elections brought change in the leadership and certain
elements of state-level variables like the ideology of the ruling elites. But
most of the state-level variables remained constant. Similarly, there was
no major change in the systemic variables. In the absence of major change
in state and systemic variables, what makes the Modi government’s foreign
policy distinct is Modi’s leadership style. Under his leadership, Indian
foreign policy has turned Indian foreign policy from reactive to proactive.
A proactive foreign policy, according to Rajiv Bhatia, a former diplomat,
is characterized by ‘re-prioritisation, emphasis, and nuance, sharper
communication, strategic boldness, vigour, and activism’ (Bhatia 2016).
He brought India closer to the USA. Pertaining to soft power, he has
emphasized on culture and direct link with the diaspora. No doubt these
changes are important, but not to the extent to be regarded as a major
departure. On the other side of the spectrum, democracy promotion hardly
could register any development. On India’s response to international
power transition, like earlier, dilemma persists. Pertaining to the neighbor-
hood, Act East Policy and Neighbourhood First policy are still waiting for
any substantial achievement.
So far change in goals is concerned, Dhruva Jaishankar (2016)
underlines five goals of Indian foreign policy: prioritizing an integrated
neighborhood; leveraging international partnerships to promote India’s
domestic development; ensuring a stable and multipolar balance of
Chandra 113

power in Indo-Pacific; dissuading Pakistan from supporting terro-

rism; and advancing Indian representation and leadership in matters
of global governance. Instead of indicating any significant change,
these show continuity. For a long time, the neighborhood has been at
the focal point of Indian foreign policy. Ensuring economic develop-
ment through diplomacy and reform of global governance have been
at the core of Indian foreign policy even before Modi took office.
Thus, Modi government cannot introduce any major change in foreign
policy goals.
The evolution of Indian foreign policy shows that change in strategy
is introduced by the change in the international system. In response to
the unipolar international order, India adopted ‘strategic autonomy’ as
its preferred strategy in the 1990s. By the end of the twentieth century,
when multiple centers of power started emerging (at least Indian policy-
makers perceived so), a consensus about need of a new strategy
emerged. Thus, with the change in the international system from unipo-
larity to an era of decentralization of power, the strategic autonomy
made way for ‘strategic partnership’. Following the line of strategic
partnership and multiple alignments initiated by the Vajpayee govern-
ment, the Manmohan Singh government has taken India’s strategic
partnerships to a new height as out of the first twenty-seven agreements
signed, more than fifteen were signed during his tenure. Following the
tradition, the Modi government has signed new strategic partnership
agreements with Mongolia, Singapore, the UAE, and Rwanda. No change
in systemic variables, real or perceived, has occurred since Modi has
assumed the office.
Those scholars, who have concluded that the Modi government has
brought a major change or ‘third republic’, excessively concentrate on
individual-level variables. To a large extent, they ignore the impact of
systemic and state-level variables in shaping foreign policy. Instead of
locating things in a broader context, they take a particular dimension
of the new government’s foreign policy, especially alignment with the
USA and leadership style, and analyze them in isolation. Even in areas
like alignment pattern and emphasis on soft power, Modi government
has rejuvenated the works of previous governments though with a new
zeal. Thus, in the absence of bringing a major change in goals and
strategy as well as a remarkable departure from the past foreign policy,
any attempt to give credit for bringing about a major change in Indian
foreign policy to Modi will be unfair to the Rao, Vajpayee and Singh
governments.
114 Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 21(2)

Notes
1. Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_international_prime_
ministerial_trips_made_by_Narendra_Modi (accessed on September 7, 2017).
2. Regarding republic, Indian foreign policy can be divided into two republics.
The cold war period was the ‘first republic’, while the post-cold war changes
demarcated the ‘second republic’. Here Raja Mohan regards the starting of
Modi’s tenure as the beginning of the ‘third republic’.
3. Out of 120 Constituent Assembly members, a 105 of the Tarai region voted
in favor, while 11 abstained in the adoption of the new constitution.
4. For detail of how the rise Hindutva forces in India have posed challenges to
India’s soft power, see Chandra (2017: 348–355).
5. Members of the circle included Lord Mountbatten, G.S. Bajpai, K.M.
Panikkar, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, V.K.
Krishna Menon, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, and Indira Gandhi.
6. It was a name given by the media to an informal group consisting of Dwarka
Prasad Mishra, Ashok Mehta, Inder Kumar Gujral, Nandini Satpathi, Uma
Shankar Dikshit, and Dinesh Singh.

Acknowledgements
The author owes thanks to anonymous reviewers of the journal for their useful
comments and suggestions. He is also thankful to Firoz Alam, Chandramoni
Bhattarai, Resham Lal, Deepak Bhaskar, Pankaj Kumar and Mithilesh Kumar
for their comments on earlier drafts of the article.

References
Bagchi, Indrani. 2014. ‘India Talks Tough on One-China Policy, Says Reaffirm
One-India Policy First’, Times of India, September 9.
Bajpai, Kanti. 2015. ‘Continuity—But with Zeal’. Seminar, vol. 668, no. April,
pp. 23–27.
———. 2017. ‘Narendra Modi’s Pakistan and China Policy: Assertive Bilateral
Diplomacy, Active Coalition Diplomacy’, International Affairs, vol. 93,
no. 1, pp. 69–91.
Baru, Sanjaya. 2009. ‘The Growing Influence of Business and Media on Indian
Foreign Policy’. Insights No. 49. Singapore: ISAS. Retrieved from https://
www.files.ethz.ch/isn/96448/50.pdf
Basrur, Rajesh. 2017. ‘Modi’s Foreign Policy Fundamentals: A Trajectory
Unchanged’, International Affairs, vol. 93, no. 1, pp. 7–26.
Bass, Gary J. 2015. ‘The Indian Way of Humanitarian Intervention’, Yale Journal
of International Law, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 227–294.
Bhatia, Rajiv. 2016. ‘A Review of Narendra Modi’s Foreign Policy’, Newslaundry.
com, May 30.
Chandra 115

Bhattacherjee, Kallol. 2016. ‘Home Ministry Confirms Cancellation of Uighur-

Chinese Leader’s Visa’, The Hindu, April 25.
Brewster, David. 2014. ‘End of Strategic Autonomy’, The Indian Express,
November 18.
Byman, Daniel L. and Kenneth M. Pollack. 2001. ‘Let Us Now Praise Great
Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In’, International Security, vol. 25, no. 4,
pp. 107–146.
Chakrabarti, Shantanu. 2014. ‘India’s Evolving Foreign Policy in a Regional
Perspective’, in Jakub Zajaczkowasci, Jivanta Schottli, and Manish Thapa,
eds, India in the Contemporary World: Polity, Economy and International
Relations. Oxon: Routledge.
Chandra, Vikash. 2017. ‘Challenges to India’s Soft Power under Modi Regime’,
in S.K. Singh, ed., Indian Foreign Policy: Continuity with Difference under
Modi Government. New Delhi: Manak.
Choedon, Yeshi. 2015. ‘India and Democracy Promotion: Cautious Approach
and Opportunity’, India Quarterly, vol. 71, no 2, pp. 160–173.
Deccan Chronicle. 2016. ‘US, India Sign Agreement to Share Military Assets
and Bases’, Deccan Chronicle, August 30.
Destradi, Sandra. 2010. A Regional Power Promoting Democracy? India’s
Involvement in Nepal (2005–2008), Working Paper No. 138. Berlin: German
Institute of Global and Area Studies.
Devotta, Neil. 2003. ‘Is India Over-extended? When Domestic Disorder
Precludes Regional Intervention’, Contemporary South Asia, vol. 12, no. 3,
pp. 365–380.
Ganguly, Sumit. 2015. ‘Hindu Nationalism and the Foreign Policy of India’s
Bharatiya Janata Party’, Paper Series No. 2. Washington, DC: Transatlantic
Academy.
Gupta, Surupa and Shibashis Chatterjee. 2015. ‘Indian Foreign Policy and
Coexistence: Continuity and Change in the Post-Cold War Era’, in Cedric
de Coning, Thomas Mandrup, and Liselotte Odgaard, eds, The BRICS and
Coexistence: An Alternative Vision of World Order. Oxon: Routledge.
Hall, Ian. 2015. ‘Is a “Modi Doctrine” Emerging in Indian Foreign Policy?’,
Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 69, no. 3, pp. 247–252.
———. 2016. ‘Multialignment and Indian Foreign Policy under Narendra Modi’,
The Round Table, vol. 105, no. 3, pp. 271–286.
———. 2017. ‘Narendra Modi and India’s Normative Power’, International
Affairs, vol. 93, no. 1, pp. 113–131.
Hermann, Margaret G. and Joe D. Hagan. 1998. ‘International Decision Making:
Leadership Matters’, Foreign Policy, vol. 110, no. 110 (Spring), pp. 124–137.
India Today. 2016. ‘China Blocks India’s Bid to Ban JeM Chief Masood Azhar,
Says He’s Not a Terrorist’, India Today, April 2.
Indian Express. 2016. ‘PM Modi at World Culture Festival: When You Look at
a Country Through Prism of Art, You Realise Its Internal Strength’, Indian
Express, March 12.
116 Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 21(2)

Jacob, Happymoon. 2016. ‘Losing the Neighbourhood’, The Hindu, May 18.
Jackson, Robert and Georg Sørensen. 2013. Introduction to International
Relations. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Jaishankar, Dhruva. 2016. ‘India’s Five Foreign Policy Goals: Great Strides,
Steep Challenges’, The Wire, May 26.
Katju, Vivek. 2016. ‘Modi Government Made Biggest Foreign Policy Mistake
by Revoking Uighur Activist’s Visa’, The Wire, April 26.
Mitra, Devirupa. 2016. ‘China’s Freight Train to Nepal Is No Threat, But Indian
Border Infrastructure Needs Fast Upgrade’, The Wire, May 18.
Mohan, C. Raja. 2003. ‘Beyond India’s Monroe Doctrine’, The Hindu, January 2.
———. 2008. ‘India’s Great Power Burdens’, Seminar (January).
———. 2014. ‘Modi’s Diplomacy: Yoga, Democracy and India’s Soft Power’,
Indian Express, December 15.
Monsonis, Guillem. 2010. ‘India’s Strategic Autonomy and Rapprochement with
the US’, Strategic Analysis, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 611–624.
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of
International Politics’, International Organization, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 513–553.
Mukherjee, Rohan. 2014. ‘The False Promise of India’s Soft Power’, Geopolitics,
History, and International Relations, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 46–62.
Muni, S.D. 2012. India’s Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension. New Delhi:
Foundation Books.
Nanda, Prakash. 2014. Indian Foreign Policy under Modi, The Fearless Nadia
Occasional Papers on India–Australia Relations. Melbourne: Australia–India
Institute.
Narayanan, M.K. 2016. ‘Merely a Logistics Pact?’ The Hindu, September 5.
Narlikar, Amrita. 2013. ‘India’s Rise: Responsible to Whom?’ International
Affairs, vol. 89, no. 3, pp. 595–614.
Nye, Joseph S. 2015. Is the American Century Over? Cambridge: Polity Press.
Okoth, Pontian Godfrey. 2010. USA, India, Africa During and After the Cold
War. Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press.
Panda, Ankit. 2013. ‘Why Does India Have So Many ‘Strategic Partners’ and No
Allies?’ The Diplomat, November 23.
———. 2014. ‘New Delhi Will Recognize “One China” When Beijing Recognizes
“One India”’, The Diplomat, September 9.
Parameswaran, Prashanth. 2015. ‘A New ‘Proactive’ Indian Foreign Policy under
Modi?’, The Diplomate. Retrieved from http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/
is-india-advancing-a-new-proactive-foreign-policy-under-modi/
Passi, Ritika and Aryaman Bhatnagar. 2016. ‘India, India’s Neighbourhood
and Modi: Setting the Stage’, in Aryaman Bhatnagar and Ritika Passi, eds,
Neighbourhood First: Navigating Ties under Modi. New Delhi: Vinset
Advertising.
Patranobis, Sutirtho. 2016. ‘India Backtracks on Sending MPs to Inaugural of
New Taiwan Prez’, Hindustan Times, May 19.
Pratyush. 2013. ‘The Democratization of India’s Foreign Policy’, The Diplomat,
March 22.
Chandra 117

Ripsman, Norrin M., Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell 2016.

Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Rizal, Dhurba. 2015. The Royal Semi-authoritarian Democracy of Bhutan.
London: Lexington Books.
Saez, Lawrence. 2002. Federalism Without a Centre: The Impact of Political
and Economic Reform on India’s Federal System. New Delhi: SAGE
Publications.
Sharma, Rahul. 2015. ‘India May Not Like It, but Sri Lanka Can’t Move
Completely Away from China’, The Wire, August 31.
Sikri, Rajiv. 2009. Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy.
New Delhi: SAGE Publications.
Stuenkel, Oliver and J.T. Jacob. 2010. ‘Rising Powers and Future of Democracy
Promotion: A Case of Brazil and India’, Portuguese Journal of International
Affairs, vol. (Autumn/Winter), no. 4, pp. 23–30.
Tandon, Aakriti. 2016. ‘Transforming the Unbound Elephant to the Lovable
Asian Hulk: Why is Modi Leveraging India’s Soft Power?’ The Round Table,
vol. 105, no. 1, pp. 57–65.
The Wire. 2015. ‘Seminal Shift or Continuity: Book Launch Sees Sharp Debate
on Modi’s Foreign Policy’, The Wire, July 19.
United Nations. (2014). ‘International Day of Yoga’, United Nations General
Assembly, Sixty-ninth session, Resolution no. A/RES/69/131, Agenda item
124. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=
A/RES/69/131
Walt, Stephen. 1990. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 2001. Man, State and War: A Theoretical Explanation. New York,
NY: Columbia University Press.
Wohlforh, William C. 2012. ‘Realism and Foreign Policy’, in Steve Smith,
Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, eds, Foreign Policy: Theory, Actors and
Cases. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Wulf, Herbert and Tobias Debiel. 2015. ‘India’s “Strategic Autonomy” and the
Club Model of Global Governance: Why the Indian BRICS Engagement
Warrants a Less Ambiguous Foreign Policy Doctrine’, Strategic Analysis,
vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 27–43.