Web and Internet Economics 10th International Conference WINE 2014 Beijing China December 14 17 2014 Proceedings 1st Edition Tie-Yan Liu

Web and Internet Economics 10th
International Conference WINE 2014

Beijing China December 14 17 2014
Proceedings 1st Edition Tie-Yan Liu
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://textbookfull.com/product/web-and-internet-economics-10th-international-confer
ence-wine-2014-beijing-china-december-14-17-2014-proceedings-1st-edition-tie-yan-l
iu/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...
Web and Internet Economics 16th International

Conference WINE 2020 Beijing China December 7 11 2020
Proceedings Xujin Chen
https://textbookfull.com/product/web-and-internet-economics-16th-
international-conference-wine-2020-beijing-china-
december-7-11-2020-proceedings-xujin-chen/

Conference WINE 2018 Oxford UK December 15 17 2018
Proceedings George Christodoulou
international-conference-wine-2018-oxford-uk-
december-15-17-2018-proceedings-george-christodoulou/

Conference WINE 2016 Montreal Canada December 11 14
2016 Proceedings 1st Edition Yang Cai
international-conference-wine-2016-montreal-canada-
december-11-14-2016-proceedings-1st-edition-yang-cai/
Information Security and Cryptology 10th International

Conference Inscrypt 2014 Beijing China December 13 15
2014 Revised Selected Papers 1st Edition Dongdai Lin
https://textbookfull.com/product/information-security-and-
cryptology-10th-international-conference-inscrypt-2014-beijing-
china-december-13-15-2014-revised-selected-papers-1st-edition-
Advanced Data Mining and Applications 10th
International Conference ADMA 2014 Guilin China
December 19 21 2014 Proceedings 1st Edition Xudong Luo
https://textbookfull.com/product/advanced-data-mining-and-
applications-10th-international-conference-adma-2014-guilin-
china-december-19-21-2014-proceedings-1st-edition-xudong-luo/
Intelligent Robotics and Applications 7th International

Conference ICIRA 2014 Guangzhou China December 17 20
2014 Proceedings Part II 1st Edition Xianmin Zhang
https://textbookfull.com/product/intelligent-robotics-and-
applications-7th-international-conference-icira-2014-guangzhou-
china-december-17-20-2014-proceedings-part-ii-1st-edition-
xianmin-zhang/
Intelligent Robotics and Applications 7th International

Conference ICIRA 2014 Guangzhou China December 17 20
2014 Proceedings Part I 1st Edition Xianmin Zhang
https://textbookfull.com/product/intelligent-robotics-and-
applications-7th-international-conference-icira-2014-guangzhou-
china-december-17-20-2014-proceedings-part-i-1st-edition-xianmin-
zhang/
Smart Health International Conference ICSH 2014 Beijing

China July 10 11 2014 Proceedings 1st Edition Xiaolong
Zheng
https://textbookfull.com/product/smart-health-international-
conference-icsh-2014-beijing-china-
july-10-11-2014-proceedings-1st-edition-xiaolong-zheng/

Conference WINE 2019 New York NY USA December 10 12
2019 Proceedings Ioannis Caragiannis
international-conference-wine-2019-new-york-ny-usa-
december-10-12-2019-proceedings-ioannis-caragiannis/
Tie-Yan Liu
Qi Qi
Yinyu Ye (Eds.)
ARCoSS
LNCS 8877
Web and Internet

Economics
10th International Conference, WINE 2014
Beijing, China, December 14–17, 2014
Proceedings
123
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8877
Commenced Publication in 1973
Founding and Former Series Editors:
Gerhard Goos, Juris Hartmanis, and Jan van Leeuwen
Editorial Board
David Hutchison, UK Takeo Kanade, USA
Josef Kittler, UK Jon M. Kleinberg, USA
John C. Mitchell, USA Friedemann Mattern, Switzerland
Bernhard Steffen, Germany Moni Naor, Israel
Demetri Terzopoulos, USA C. Pandu Rangan, India
Gerhard Weikum, Germany Doug Tygar, USA
Advanced Research in Computing and Software Science

Subline of Lectures Notes in Computer Science
Subline Series Editors

Giorgio Ausiello, University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’, Italy
Vladimiro Sassone, University of Southampton, UK
Subline Advisory Board

Susanne Albers, TU Munich, Germany
Benjamin C. Pierce, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Bernhard Steffen, University of Dortmund, Germany
Deng Xiaotie, City University of Hong Kong
Jeannette M. Wing, Microsoft Research, Redmond, WA, USA
Tie-Yan Liu Qi Qi Yinyu Ye (Eds.)
Web and Internet

Economics
10th International Conference, WINE 2014
Beijing, China, December 14-17, 2014
Proceedings
13
Volume Editors
Tie-Yan Liu
Microsoft Research
Haidian District, Beijing, China
E-mail: tyliu@microsoft.com
Qi Qi
The Hong Kong University
of Science and Technology
Kowloon, Hong Kong
E-mail: kaylaqi@ust.hk
Yinyu Ye
Stanford University
Stanford, CA, USA
E-mail: yinyu-ye@stanford.edu
ISSN 0302-9743 e-ISSN 1611-3349

ISBN 978-3-319-13128-3 e-ISBN 978-3-319-13129-0
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0
Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London
Library of Congress Control Number: 2014955020
LNCS Sublibrary: SL 3– Information Systems and Applications,

incl. Internet/Web and HCI
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of
the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation,
broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information
storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are brief excerpts in connection
with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and
executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Duplication of this publication
or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Copyright Law of the Publisher’s location,
in ist current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use
may be obtained through RightsLink at the Copyright Clearance Center. Violations are liable to prosecution
under the respective Copyright Law.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication,
neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or
omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the
material contained herein.
Typesetting: Camera-ready by author, data conversion by Scientific Publishing Services, Chennai, India
Printed on acid-free paper
Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
Preface
This volume contains the papers presented at WINE 2014, the 10th Conference
on Web and Internet Economics, held during December 14–17, 2014, at the
Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science (AMSS), Chinese Academy of
Sciences, Beijing, China.
Over the past decade, researchers in theoretical computer science, artificial
intelligence, and microeconomics have joined forces to tackle problems involv-
ing incentives and computation. These problems are of particular importance
in application areas like the Web and the Internet that involve large and di-
verse populations. The Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) is
an interdisciplinary forum for the exchange of ideas and results on incentives
and computation arising from these various fields. This year, WINE was held
in cooperation with the ACM and was co-located with the 11th Workshop on
Algorithms and Models of the Web Graph (WAW 2014).
WINE 2014 received 107 submissions. All submissions were rigorously peer
reviewed and evaluated on the basis of originality, soundness, significance, and
exposition. The Program Committee decided to accept 32 regular and 13 short
papers. We allowed the accepted papers to be designated as working papers.
For these papers, only 1-2 pages of an extended abstract are published in the
proceedings. This allows subsequent publication in journals that do not accept
papers where full versions have previously appeared in conference proceedings.
Of all the accepted papers, four are working papers. The conference program
also included six invited talks by Robert Aumann (Hebrew University), Xiaotie
Deng (Shanghai Jiao Tong University), Noam Nisan (Microsoft Research), Chris-
tos Papadimitriou (University of California at Berkeley), Andrew Chi-Chih Yao
(Tsinghua University), and Peng Ye (Alibaba Group). In addition, WINE 2014
featured three tutorials on December 14: Computation of Equilibrium in Asym-
metric First Price Auctions, by Nir Gavish (Technion),Theoretical Analysis of
Business Models, by Kamal Jain (eBay Research), and Price of Anarchy and
Stability, by Martin Gairing (University of Liverpool).
The successful organization of WINE 2014 is a joint effort of many people
and organizations. In particular, we would like to thank Baidu, Microsoft Re-
search, Google, and Facebook, for their generous financial support to WINE
2014, the Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science and Tsinghua Uni-
versity for hosting the event, as well as the Operation Research Community
of China and National Center for Mathematics and Interdisciplinary Sciences
of China for their great support. In addition, we would like to acknowledge
the Program Committee for their hard work in paper reviewing, Springer for
VI Preface
helping with the proceedings, and the EasyChair paper management system for
providing quality and flexible support during the paper review process.
October 2014 Tie-Yan Liu

Qi Qi
Yinyu Ye
Organization
Program Committee Chairs

Tie-Yan Liu Microsoft Research
Qi Qi Hong Kong University of Science and
Technology, Hong Kong
Yinyu Ye Stanford University, USA
Program Committee
Allan Borodin University of Toronto, Canada
Peter Bro Miltersen Aarhus University, Denmark
Yang Cai University of California, Berkeley, USA
Bruno Codenotti Istituto di Informatica e Telematica, Italy
Jose R. Correa Universidad de Chile, Chile
Nikhil R. Devanur Microsoft Research
Edith Elkind University of Oxford, UK
Qizhi Fang Ocean University, China
Amos Fiat Tel Aviv University, Israel
Nir Gavish Technion-Israel Institute of Technology,
Israel
Dongdong Ge Shanghai University of Finance and Economic,
China
Vasilis Gkatzelis Stanford University, USA
Gagan Goel Google Research
Mordecai J. Golin Hong Kong University of Science and
Technology, Hong Kong
Martin Hoefer Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik, Germany
Krishnamurthy Iyer Cornell University, USA
Kamal Jain eBay Research
Ming-Yang Kao Northwestern University, USA
David Kempe University of Southern California, USA
Peter Key Microsoft Research
Piotr Krysta University of Liverpool, UK
Ron Lavi Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Israel
Mohammad Mahdian Google Research
Azarakhsh Malekian University of Toronto, Canada
Evangelos Markakis Athens University of Economics and Business,
Greece
Nimrod Megiddo IBM Research
VIII Organization
Vahab Mirrokni Google Research

Hamid Nazerzadeh University of Southern California, USA
Cheng-Zhong Qin University of California, Santa Barbara, USA
Aaron Roth University of Pennsylvania, USA
Rahul Savani University of Liverpool, UK
Guido Schäfer Centrum Wiskunde and Informatica,
The Netherlands
Maria Serna Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya,
Barcelona Tech, Spain
Yaron Singer Harvard University, USA
Xiaoming Sun Institute of Computing Technology, CAS,
China
Shang-Hua Teng University of Southern California, USA
Aviv Zohar Hebrew University, Israel
Additional Reviewers
Adam, Elie Garg, Jugal
Alaei, Saeed Gentile, Claudio
Anshelevich, Elliot Haghpanah, Nima
Aziz, Haris Harks, Tobias
Barman, Siddharth Hsu, William
Bei, Xiaohui Huang, Chien-Chung
Bhaskar, Umang Huang, Eric
Bilo’, Vittorio Huang, Zhiyi
Brânzei, Simina Iwasaki, Atsushi
Chen, Po-An Jaimungal, Sebastian
Chen, Zhou Jeż, L
ukasz
Chiang, Chao-Kai Jiang, Bo
Christodoulou, George Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis
Colini Baldeschi, Riccardo Kern, Walter
De Keijzer, Bart Klimm, Max
Dehghani, Sina Kodric, Bojana
Deligkas, Argyrios Kollias, Konstantinos
Ding, Yichuan Kong, Guangwen
Drummond, Joanna Kulkarni, Janardhan
Dworkin, Lili Kyropoulou, Maria
Ehsani, Shayan Lahaie, Sebastien
Elbassioni, Khaled Lai, John
Fanelli, Angelo Lev, Omer
Feldman, Michal Lewenberg, Yoad
Frongillo, Rafael Li, Yuqian
Gao, Alice Liu, Xingwu
Gao, Xi Alice Lucier, Brendan
Organization IX
Ma, Weidong Talgam-Cohen, Inbal

Mahini, Hamid Telelis, Orestis
Malec, David Tong, Chaoxu
Mansour, Yishay Tzamos, Christos
Mehta, Ruta Uetz, Marc
Meir, Reshef Vassilvitskii, Sergei
Morgenstern, Jamie Von Stengel, Bernhard
Moscardelli, Luca Vondrak, Jan
Mu’Alem, Ahuva Wagner, Lisa
Nehama, Ilan Wajc, David
Niazadeh, Rad Wang, Changjun
Nikolova, Evdokia Wang, Chuan-Ju
Nikzad, Afshin Wang, Zizhuo
Okamoto, Yoshio Weinberg, S. Matthew
Oren, Joel Wu, Zhiwei Steven
Oren, Sigal Xiao, Tao
Piliouras, Georgios Zadimoghaddam, Morteza
Qin, Tao Zhang, Chihao
Rahn, Mona Zhang, Hongyang
Rubinstein, Aviad Zhang, Jia
Ryan, Christopher Zhang, Jialin
Röglin, Heiko Zhang, Jie
Seeman, Lior Zhang, Jinshan
Sheffet, Or Zhang, Peng
Singla, Adish Zhang, Xiaodong
Sompolinsky, Yonatan Zheng, Bo
Steele, Patrick Zhu, Ruihao
Sudhölter, Peter
Table of Contents
Regular Papers
Cake Cutting Algorithms for Piecewise Constant and Piecewise
Uniform Valuations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Haris Aziz and Chun Ye
Network Cournot Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Melika Abolhassani, Mohammad Hossein Bateni,
MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Hamid Mahini,
and Anshul Sawant
Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and

Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Matthias Feldotto, Martin Gairing, and Alexander Skopalik
Limiting Price Discrimination When Selling Products with Positive

Network Externalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Luděk Cigler, Wolfgang Dvořák, Monika Henzinger,
and Martin Starnberger
Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Games . . . . . . . . 58

Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Rahul Savani, and Paul Spirakis
Optimal Cost-Sharing in Weighted Congestion Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Konstantinos Kollias, and Tim Roughgarden
Truthful Multi-unit Procurements with Budgets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Hau Chan and Jing Chen
The Shapley Value in Knapsack Budgeted Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Smriti Bhagat, Anthony Kim, S. Muthukrishnan, and Udi Weinsberg
Fast Convex Decomposition for Truthful Social Welfare

Approximation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Dennis Kraft, Salman Fadaei, and Martin Bichler
A Near-Optimal Mechanism for Impartial Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Nicolas Bousquet, Sergey Norin, and Adrian Vetta
Value-Based Network Externalities and Optimal Auction Design . . . . . . . 147

Kamesh Munagala and Xiaoming Xu
Matching Dynamics with Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Martin Hoefer and Lisa Wagner
XII Table of Contents
Truthful Approximations to Range Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

Aris Filos-Ratsikas and Peter Bro Miltersen
Resource Competition on Integral Polymatroids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

Tobias Harks, Max Klimm, and Britta Peis
PTAS for Minimax Approval Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Jaroslaw Byrka and Krzysztof Sornat
Biobjective Online Bipartite Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

Gagan Aggarwal, Yang Cai, Aranyak Mehta, and George Pierrakos
Dynamic Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions: Learning from Bids:

Working Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
Yash Kanoria and Hamid Nazerzadeh
Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Fixed-Price Auctions with Budgets . . . . 233

Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi, Piotr Sankowski,
and Qiang Zhang
A Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanism for the Generalized Assignment

Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Salman Fadaei and Martin Bichler
Not Just an Empty Threat: Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Repeated

Games Played by Computationally Bounded Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass, and Lior Seeman
Concise Bid Optimization Strategies with Multiple Budget

Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Arash Asadpour, Mohammad Hossein Bateni,
Kshipra Bhawalkar, and Vahab Mirrokni
Sampling and Representation Complexity of Revenue Maximization . . . . 277

Shaddin Dughmi, Li Han, and Noam Nisan
Bounds on the Profitability of a Durable Good Monopolist . . . . . . . . . . . . 292

Gerardo Berbeglia, Peter Sloan, and Adrian Vetta
To Save Or Not To Save: The Fisher Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294

Ruta Mehta, Nithum Thain, László A. Végh, and Adrian Vetta
Coalitional Games on Sparse Social Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308

Edith Elkind
The Value of Temporally Richer Data for Learning of Influence

Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
Munther A. Dahleh, John N. Tsitsiklis, and Spyros I. Zoumpoulis
Table of Contents XIII
Randomized Revenue Monotone Mechanisms for Online Advertising . . . . 324

Gagan Goel, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi,
and Mohammad Reza Khani
Learning Economic Parameters from Revealed Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . 338

Maria-Florina Balcan, Amit Daniely, Ruta Mehta, Ruth Urner, and
Vijay V. Vazirani
General Truthfulness Characterizations via Convex Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 354

Rafael Frongillo and Ian Kash
Privacy Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371

Yiling Chen, Or Sheffet, and Salil Vadhan
Simple and Near-Optimal Mechanisms for Market Intermediation . . . . . . 386

Rad Niazadeh, Yang Yuan, and Robert Kleinberg
GSP with General Independent Click-through-Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400

Ruggiero Cavallo and Christopher A. Wilkens
Short Papers
Position Auctions with Externalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
Patrick Hummel and R. Preston McAfee
Quality of Service in Network Creation Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423

Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Alexander Mäcker,
and Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide
The Sequential Price of Anarchy for Atomic Congestion Games . . . . . . . . 429

Jasper de Jong and Marc Uetz
Multilevel Network Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435

Sebastian Abshoff, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung, and
Alexander Skopalik
Coordination Games on Graphs (Extended Abstract) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441

Krzysztof R. Apt, Mona Rahn, Guido Schäfer, and Sunil Simon
On the Existence of Low-Rank Explanations for Mixed Strategy

Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447
Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Federico Echenique,
and Adam Wierman
Congestion Games with Higher Demand Dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453

Max Klimm and Andreas Schütz
Time-Decaying Bandits for Non-stationary Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460

Junpei Komiyama and Tao Qin
XIV Table of Contents
Market Equilibrium under Piecewise Leontief Concave Utilities

(Extended Abstract) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
Jugal Garg
Computing the Least-Core and Nucleolus for Threshold Cardinality

Matching Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
Qizhi Fang, Bo Li, Xiaoming Sun, Jia Zhang, and Jialin Zhang
Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context Congestion

Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
Martin Gairing, Grammateia Kotsialou, and Alexander Skopalik
Nash Stability in Fractional Hedonic Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486

Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini,
Gianpiero Monaco, and Luca Moscardelli
The Role of Common and Private Signals in Two-Sided Matching with

Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 492
Sanmay Das and Zhuoshu Li
Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499

Cake Cutting Algorithms for
Piecewise Constant and Piecewise Uniform Valuations
Haris Aziz1 and Chun Ye2

1
NICTA and UNSW, Sydney, Australia NSW 2033
haris.aziz@nicta.com.au
2
Columbia University, New York, NY 10027-6902, USA
cy2214@columbia.edu
Abstract. Cake cutting is one of the most fundamental settings in fair divi-
sion and mechanism design without money. In this paper, we consider differ-
ent levels of three fundamental goals in cake cutting: fairness, Pareto optimality,
and strategyproofness. In particular, we present robust versions of envy-freeness
and proportionality that are not only stronger than their standard counter-parts
but also have less information requirements. We then focus on cake cutting
with piecewise constant valuations and present three desirable algorithms: CCEA
(Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm), MEA (Market Equilibrium Algorithm) and
MCSD (Mixed Constrained Serial Dictatorship). CCEA is polynomial-time, ro-
bust envy-free, and non-wasteful. Then, we show that there exists an algorithm
(MEA) that is polynomial-time, envy-free, proportional, and Pareto optimal.
Moreover, we show that for piecewise uniform valuations, MEA and CCEA are
group-strategyproof and are equivalent to Mechanism 1 of Chen et. al.(2013). We
then present an algorithm MCSD and a way to implement it via randomization
that satisfies strategyproofness in expectation, robust proportionality, and una-
nimity for piecewise constant valuations. We also present impossibility results
that show that the properties satisfied by CCEA and MEA are maximal subsets
of properties that can be satisfied by any algorithm.
1 Introduction
Cake cutting is one of the most fundamental topics in fair division (see e.g., [7, 17]). It
concerns the setting in which a cake is represented by an interval [0, 1] and each of the
n agents has a value function over the cake that specifies how much that agent values a
particular subinterval. The main aim is to divide the cake fairly. The framework is gen-
eral enough to encapsulate the important problem of allocating a heterogeneous divis-
ible good among multiple agents with different preferences. The cake cutting problem
applies to many settings including the division of rent among housemates, disputed land
between land-owners, and work among co-workers. It is especially useful in scheduling
the use of a valuable divisible resource such as server time.
In this paper, we approach the cake cutting problem from a mechanism design per-
spective. We assume that each cake recipient, which we will refer to as an agent, has
a private value density function over the cake. Throughout the paper we focus on the
fundamental classes of value functions called piecewise constant value density func-
tions.We also consider piecewise uniform valuations which are a restricted class of
T.-Y. Liu et al. (Eds.): WINE 2014, LNCS 8877, pp. 1–14, 2014.

c Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014
2 H. Aziz and C. Ye
piecewise constant valuations. We consider three of the most enduring goals in mecha-
nism design and fair division: fairness, Pareto optimality and strategyproofness. Since
many fair division algorithms need to be deployed on a large scale, we will also aim
for algorithms that are computationally efficient. Strategyproofness has largely been
ignored in cake-cutting barring a few recent exceptions [9, 10, 14, 15, 20]. The main re-
search question in this paper is as follows: among the different levels of fairness, Pareto
optimality, strategyproofness, and efficient computability, what are the maximal set of
properties that can be satisfied simultaneously for piecewise constant and piecewise
uniform valuations? Our main contribution is a detailed study of this question includ-
ing the formulation of a number of desirable cake cutting algorithms satisfying many
of the properties. A few works that are directly relevant to this paper are [8, 9, 10, 11].
Chen et al. [9, 10] presented a deterministic, strategyproof, polynomial-time, envy-free
and Pareto optimal algorithm for piecewise uniform valuations. They left open the prob-
lem of generalizing their algorithm for piecewise constant valuations. Cohler et al. [11]
and Brams et al. [8] formulated linear programs to compute envy-free allocations for
piecewise constant valuations. However, the algorithms are not Pareto optimal in gen-
eral. Two of the algorithms in our paper rely on transforming the problem of allocating
a cake to agents with piecewise constant value density functions to an equivalent prob-
lem of allocating objects to agents where each agent has a homogeneous preference
for each object. The transformation is done by pre-cutting the cake into subintervals
using the union of discontinuity points of the agents’ valuation function. This transfor-
mation allows us to adopt certain well-known results of random assignment and market
equilibrium to the problem at hand.
Drawing the connection between cake cutting and random assignment, we present
CCEA (Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm) for piecewise constant valuations. CCEA
is polynomial-time and satisfies robust envy-freeness and robust proportionality, which
are stronger than the notions of fairness that have been considered in the cake cut-
ting literature. The main idea of an allocation being robust envy-free/proportional is
that even if an agent re-adjusts or perturbs his value density function, as long as the
ordinal information of the function is unchanged, then the allocation remains envy-
free/proportional.1 CCEA depends on a reduction to the generalizations [1, 13] of the
PS (probabilistic serial) algorithm introduced by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [4] in the
context of random assignments.2
If we insist on Pareto optimality, then we show that there exists an algorithm
which we refer to as the MEA (Market Equilibrium Algorithm) that is deterministic,
polynomial-time Pareto optimal, envy-free, and proportional for piecewise constant
valuations. The main computation of MEA lies in solving the Eisenberg-Gale con-
vex program for market equilibrium. Although similar ideas using linear programs
and market equilibria have been used explicitly to compute envy-free allocations in
1
Although full information is a standard assumption in cake cutting, it can be argued that it is
unrealistic that agents have exact vNM utilities for each segment of the cake. Even if they do
report exact vNM utilities, they may be uncertain about these reports.
2
The CC algorithm of Athanassoglou and Sethuraman [1] is a generalization of the EPS al-
gorithm [13] which in turn is a generalization of PS algorithm of Bogomolnaia and Moulin
[4].
Cake Cutting Algorithms for Piecewise Constant and Piecewise Uniform Valuations 3
cake-cutting[11, 8], they do not necessarily return a Pareto optimal allocation. In a

recent paper, Tian [20] characterized a class of strategyproof and Pareto optimal mech-
anisms for cake cutting when agents have piecewise uniform valuation functions. The
algorithm of Tian involves maximizing the sum of concave functions over the set of fea-
sible allocations. It is worth noting that MEA when restricted to the piecewise uniform
valuation setting is a special case of his algorithm. We show that for piecewise uniform
valuations, CCEA and MEA not only coincide but are also group-strategyproof. Pre-
viously, Chen et al. [9, 10] presented a deterministic, strategyproof, polynomial-time,
envy-free and Pareto optimal algorithm for piecewise uniform valuations. We prove
that for piecewise uniform valuations, CCEA and MEA are in fact equivalent to their
algorithm and are group-strategyproof instead of just strategyproof.
Although CCEA and MEA are desirable algorithms, they are not strategyproof for
piecewise constant valuations. This is because the incentive of the agents for the piece-
wise uniform valuation setting is rather limited: each agent only cares about obtaining
as much of their desired pieces of the cake as possible. On the other hand, for piecewise
constant valuations, agents also care about the tradeoff in quantities of having pieces at
different levels of desirability. Another difficulty of obtaining a strategyproof algorithm
via the aforementioned transformation is that the discontinuity points of each agent’s
valuation function is private information for the agent. In particular, unlike the setting
of allocating multiple homogenous objects, where it suffices for an algorithm to output
the fractional amount of each object that an agent will receive, the method of conversion
from fractions of intervals into an actual allocation in terms of the union of subintervals
is also a necessary step of the algorithm, which may be subject to strategic manipula-
tion by the agents. To drive this point further, in the paper we give an example of an
algorithm that is strategyproof in the random assignment setting, but is no longer strate-
gyproof if we implement the conversion process from fractions of intervals to the union
of subintervals in a deterministic fashion.
To tackle this difficulty, we present another algorithm called MCSD (Mixed Con-
strained Serial Dictatorship) which is strategyproof in expectation, robust proportional,
and satisfies unanimity. For the important case of two agents3 , it is polynomial-time,
and robust envy-free. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first cake cutting algorithm
for piecewise constant valuations that satisfies strategyproofness, (ex post) proportion-
ality, and (ex post) unanimity at the same time. MCSD requires some randomization
to achieve strategyproofness in expectation. However, MCSD is deterministic in the
sense that it gives the same utility guarantee (with respect to the reported valuation
functions) over all realizations of the random allocation. Although MCSD uses some
essential ideas of the well-known serial dictatorship rule for discrete allocation, it is
significantly more involved. In contrast to serial dictatorship, MCSD achieves ex post
fairness. Our main technical results are as follows.
Theorem 1. For piecewise constant valuations, there exists an algorithm (CCEA) that
is deterministic, polynomial-time, robust envy-free, and non-wasteful.
Theorem 2. For piecewise constant valuations, there exists an algorithm (MEA) that
is deterministic, polynomial-time, Pareto optimal, and envy-free.
3
Many fair division problems involve disputes between two parties.
4 H. Aziz and C. Ye
Table 1. Properties satisfied by the cake cutting algorithms for pw (piecewise) constant valu-
ations: DET (deterministic), R-EF (robust envy-freeness), EF (envy-freeness), R-PROP (robust
proportionality), PROP (proportionality), GSP (group strategyproof), W-GSP (weak group strat-
egyproof), SP (strategyproof), PO (Pareto optimal), NW (non-wasteful), UNAN (unanimity) and
POLYT (polynomial-time)
Restriction DET R-EF EF R-PROP PROP GSP W-GSP SP PO NW UNAN POLYT

Algorithms
CCEA - + + + + + - - - - + + +
CCEA pw uniform + + + + + + + + + + + +
MEA + - + - + - - - + + + +
MEA pw uniform + + + + + + + + + + + +
MCSD - - - - + + - - + - - + -
MCSD pw uniform - - - + + - - + + - + -
MCSD 2 agents - + + + + - - + - - + +
Theorem 3. For piecewise uniform valuations, there exist algorithms (CCEA and
MEA) that are deterministic, group strategyproof, polynomial-time, robust envy-free
and Pareto optimal.
Theorem 4. For piecewise constant valuations, there exists a randomized implemen-

tation of an algorithm (MCSD) that is (ex post) robust proportional, (ex post) sym-
metric, and (ex post) unanimous and strategyproof in expectation. For two agents, it is
polynomial-time, robust proportional and robust envy-free.
Our positive results are complemented by the following impossibility results. These
impossibility results show that the properties satisfied by CCEA and MEA are maximal
subsets of properties that can be satisfied by any algorithm.
Theorem 5. For piecewise constant valuation profiles with at least two agents, there
exists no algorithm that is both Pareto optimal and robust proportional.
exists no algorithm that is strategyproof, Pareto optimal, and proportional.
exists no algorithm that is strategyproof, robust proportional, and non-wasteful.
Some of our main results are also summarized in Table 1. Some of our results even
extend to more general domains with variable claims and private endowments. As a
consequence of CCEA and MEA, we generalize the positive results regarding piecewise
uniform valuations in [9, 10] and piecewise constant valuations in [11] in a number of
ways such as handling richer cake cutting settings, handling more general valuations
functions, achieving a stronger fairness concept, or a stronger strategyproofness notion.
2 Preliminaries
Cake cutting setting. We consider a cake which is represented by the interval [0, 1]. A
piece of cake is a finite union of disjoint subintervals of [0, 1]. The length of an interval
I = [x, y] is len(I) = y − x. As usual, the set of agents is N = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent
has a piecewise continuous value density
function vi : [0, 1] → [0, ∞). The value of a

piece of cake X to agent i is Vi (X) = X vi (x)dx = I∈X I vi (x)dx. As generally assumed,
valuations are non-atomic (Vi ([x, x]) = 0) and additive: Vi (X ∪Y) = Vi (X) +Vi(Y) where
X and Y are disjoint. The basic cake cutting setting can be represented by the set of
agents and their valuations functions, which we will denote as a profile of valuations. In
this paper we will assume that each agent’s valuation function is private information for
the agent that is not known to the algorithm designer. Each agent reports his valuation
function to the designer.
Preference functions. In this paper we will only consider piecewise uniform and piece-
wise constant valuation functions. A function is piecewise uniform if the cake can
be partitioned into a finite number of intervals such that for some constant ki , either
vi (x) = ki or vi (x) = 0 over each interval. A function is piecewise constant if the
cake can be partitioned into a finite number of intervals such that vi is constant over
each interval. In order to report his valuation function to the algorithm designer, each
agent will specify a set of points {d1 , ..., dm} that represents the consecutive discontinu-
ity points of the agent’s valuation function as well as the constant value of the valuation
function between every pair of consecutive d j ’s. For a function vi , we will refer by
V̂i = {vi : vi (x) ≥ vi (y) > 0 ⇐⇒ vi (x) ≥ vi (y) > 0 ∀x, y ∈ [0, 1]} as the set of density
functions ordinally equivalent to vi .
Properties of allocations. An allocation is a partition of the interval [0, 1] into a set

{X1 , . . . , Xn , W}, where Xi is a piece of cake that is allocated to agent i and W is the
piece of the cake that is not allocated. All of the fairness and efficiency notations that
we will discuss next are with respect to the reported valuation functions. Within the
cake cutting literature, the most important criteria of a fair allocation are envy-freeness
and proportionality. In an envy-free allocation, we have Vi (Xi ) ≥ Vi (X j ) for each pair
of agent i, j ∈ N, that is every agent considers his allocation at least as good as any
other agent’s allocation. In a proportional allocation, we have Vi (Xi ) ≥ 1n Vi ([0, 1]), that
is, each agent gets at least 1/n of the value he has for the entire cake. Envy-freeness
implies proportionality provided that every desirable part of the cake is allocated. An
even stronger condition that envy-freeness is equitability which requires that each agent
is indifferent between his allocation and the allocations of other agents.
An allocation is Pareto optimal if no agent can get a higher value without some other
agent getting less value. Formally, X is Pareto optimal if there does not exists another
allocation Y such that Vi (Yi ) ≥ Vi (Xi ) for all i ∈ N and Vi (Yi ) > Vi (Xi ) for some i ∈ N. In
the case where Pareto efficiency cannot be satisfied, we also consider a weaker notion of
efficiency called non-wastefulness. For any S ⊆ [0, 1], define D(S ) = {i ∈ N|Vi (S ) > 0}.
An allocation X is non-wasteful if for all S ⊆ [0, 1], S ⊆ ∪i∈D(S ) Xi . In other words, an
allocation is non-wasteful if every portion of the cake desired by at least one agent is
allocated to some agent who desires it.
For fairness, we do not only consider the standard notions envy-freeness and pro-
portionality but we also propose the concept of robust fairness — in particular robust
envy-freeness and robust proportionality. An allocation satisfies robust proportionality
1
if for all i, j ∈ N and for all vi ∈ V̂i , X vi (x)dx ≥ 1/n 0 vi (x)dx. An allocation satisfies
i
6 H. Aziz and C. Ye

robust envy-freeness if for all i, j ∈ N and for all vi ∈ V̂i , X vi (x)dx ≥ X vi (x)dx. The
i j
main idea of an allocation being robust envy-free is that even if an agent re-adjusts or
perturbs his value density function, as long as the ordinal information of the function is
unchanged, then the allocation remains envy-free. The main advantages of robust envy-
freeness are less information requirements and envy-freeness under uncertainty. It also
addresses a criticism in cake cutting models that an agent has the ability to ascribe an
exact number to each tiny segment of the cake.4 Note that even equitability does not
imply robust envy-freeness because by perturbing the valuation function, equitability
can easily be lost.
Let us fix a piecewise constant value density function v. Let (I1 , I2 , . . . , Ik ) be the
positively valued intervals induced by the discontinuity points of the value function
sorted in the order of decreasing preference, that is, v(x) is higher on Ii than it is on
I j if i < j. Let x and x be two allocation vectors whose i-th component specifies the
length of Ii that is allocated to the agent, then we say that x stochastically dominates
j j
x with respect to the preference ordering if i=1 xi ≥ i=1 xi for every j = 1, . . . , k.
It can be shown that an allocation x for the agent with valuation function v is robust
envy-free if and only if it stochastically dominates any other allocation x with respect
to the preference ordering. Moreover, it can be shown that an allocation x is robust
j j
proportional if and only if i=1 xi ≥ 1/n i=1 |Ii | for every j = 1, . . . , k. Both robust
envy-freeness and robust proportionality require each agent to get a piece of cake of the
same length if every agent desires the entire cake.
Properties of cake cutting algorithms. A deterministic cake cutting algorithm is a map-

ping from the set of valuation profiles to the set of allocations. A randomized cake
cutting algorithm is a mapping from the set of valuation profiles to a space of distribu-
tions over the set of allocations. The output of the algorithm in this case for a specific
valuation profile is a random sample of the distributional function over the set of alloca-
tion for that profile. An algorithm (either deterministic or randomized) satisfies property
P if it always returns an allocation that satisfies property P. A deterministic algorithm
is strategyproof if no agent ever has an incentive to misreport in order to get a bet-
ter allocation. The notion of strategyproofness is well-established in social choice and
much stronger than the notion of ‘strategyproofness’ used in some of the cake-cutting
literature (see e.g., [6]), where truth-telling is a maximin strategy and it need not be
dominant strategy incentive compatible. Similarly, a deterministic algorithm is group-
strategyproof if there exists no coalition S ⊆ N such that members of S can misreport
their preferences so that each agent in S gets at least as preferred an allocation and at
least one agent gets a strictly better payoff. A deterministic algorithm is weak group-
strategyproof if there exists no coalition S ⊆ N such that members of S can misreport
their preferences so that each agent in S gets a strictly more preferred allocation. A
randomized algorithm is strategyproof in expectation if the expected utility from the
random allocation that every agent receives in expectation under a profile where he re-
ported truthfully is at least as large as the expected utility that he receives under a profile
4
Let us say that a cake is part chocolate and part vanilla. An agent may easily state that chocolate
is more preferable than vanilla but would require much more effort to say that if the vanilla
piece is α times bigger than the chocolate piece then he would prefer both pieces equally.
where he misreports while fixing the other agents’ reports. We say that a cake cutting
algorithm satisfies unanimity, if when each agent has positive valuation for at most 1/n
of the cake and the interval of the cake for which he has positive valuation does not
intersect with intervals of the cake for which other agents have positive valuation, then
each agent is allocated the whole interval for which he has positive valuation.
Relation between the properties of cake cutting algorithms. We highlight some impor-
tant relations between the main properties of cake cutting algorithms.
Remark 1. For cake cutting, a) Envy-freeness and non-wastefulness =⇒ proportional-

ity; b) Robust proportionality =⇒ proportionality; c) Robust envy-freeness =⇒ envy-
freeness; d) Robust envy-freeness and non-wastefulness =⇒ robust proportionality;
e) Group strategyproofness =⇒ weak group strategyproofness =⇒ strategyproof-
ness; f) Pareto optimality =⇒ non-wastefulness =⇒ unanimity; g) two agents,
proportionality =⇒ envy-freeness; h) two agents, robust proportionality =⇒ robust
envy-freeness.
The free disposal assumption. We may assume without lost of generality that every
part of the cake is desired by at least one agent. If that is not the case, then we can
discard the parts that are desired by no one and rescale what is left so that we get
a [0, 1] interval representation of the cake. Notice that this procedure preserves the
aforementioned properties of fairness and efficiency. The free disposal assumption is
necessary to ensure the algorithm of Chen et al. [10], which is a special case of two of
our algorithms, to be strategyproof for piecewise uniform valuations. The existence of a
non-free disposal algorithm that satisfies all of the desirable properties in the piecewise
uniform setting remains an open question. Now we are ready to present our algorithms.
3 CCEA — Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm
CCEA (Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm) is based on CC (Controlled Consuming) al-

gorithm of Athanassoglou and Sethuraman [1]. Since the original PS algorithm is also
known as the simultaneous eating algorithm, we give our algorithm the name Controlled
Cake Eating Algorithm. CCEA first divides the cake up into disjoint intervals each of
whose endpoints are consecutive points of discontinuity of the agents’ valuation func-
tions. We will refer to these intervals as intervals induced by the discontinuity points.
The idea is to form a one-to-one correspondence of the set of cake intervals with a set
of houses of an assignment problem. In an assignment problem, we have a set of agents
and a set of houses. Each agent has a preference ordering over the set of houses. Given
two houses h and h , we will use the notation h i h to indicate that agent i prefers h
over h . In our case, the preferences of agents over the houses are naturally induced by
the relative height of the piecewise constant function lines in the respective intervals.
The technical heart of the algorithm is in CC (Controlled Consuming) algorithm of
Athanassoglou and Sethuraman [1]. Note that even though in the standard assignment
problem, each house has a size of one and each agent has a demand of one house, the
CC algorithm still applies in the case where the intervals corresponding to the houses
8 H. Aziz and C. Ye
have different lengths and there is no constraint on the total length of an agent’s alloca-
tion. Once CC has been used to compute a fractional assignment p, it is straightforward
to compute a corresponding cake allocation. If an agent i gets a fraction of house h j ,
then in the cake allocation agent i gets the same fraction of subinterval J j .
Input: Piecewise constant value functions.

Output: A robust envy-free allocation.
1 Divide the regions according to agent value functions. Let J = {J1 , . . . , Jm } be the set of
subintervals of [0, 1] formed by consecutive discontinuity points.
2 Consider (N, H, , size(·)) where
– H = {h1 , . . . , hm } where hi = Ji for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}

– is defined as follows: h i h if and only if vi (x) ≥ vi (y) for x ∈ h and y ∈ h ;
– size(h j ) = 1 for h j ∈ arg max j∈{1,...,m} (len(J j ));
len(J )
size(h j ) = (max j∈{1,...,m}j(len(J j ))) for all h j arg max j∈{1,...,m} (len(J j ));
3 Discard the houses that give every agent a utility of zero from H to obtain H .
4 p ←− CC(N, H , , size(·))
5 For interval J j , agent i is an allocated subinterval of J j , denoted by J ij , which is of length
pih j /size(h j ) × len(J j ). For example, if J j = [a j , b j ], then one possibility of J ij can be [a j +
i−1
n=1 pih j
/size(h j ) × len(J j ), a j + in=1 pih j /size(h j ) × len(J j )].
Xi ←− j=1 J j for all i ∈ N
m i
6 return X = (X1 , . . . , Xn )
Algorithm 1. CCEA (Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm)
CCEA satisfies the strong fairness property of robust envy-freeness.
Proposition 1. For piecewise constant valuations, CCEA satisfies robust envy-freeness

and non-wastefulness.
Proposition 2. CCEA runs in time O(n5 m2 log(n2 /m)), where n is the number of agents
and m is the number of subintervals defined by the union of discontinuity points of the
agents’ valuation functions.
Although CCEA satisfies the demanding property of robust envy-freeness, we show

that CCEA is not strategyproof even for two agents. Later (in Section 5), we will present
a different algorithm that is both robust envy-free and strategyproof for two agents.
Proposition 3. For piecewise constant valuations, CCEA is not strategyproof even for
two agents.
If we restrict the preferences to piecewise uniform valuations, then CCEA is not

only strategyproof but group-strategyproof. We first show that in this restricted setting,
CCEA is in fact equivalent to the algorithm of [9].
Lemma 1. For piecewise uniform value functions, CCEA is equivalent to Mechanism

1 of Chen et al. [9].
Since the set of valuations that can be reported is bigger in cake cutting than in the as-
signment problem, establishing group strategyproofness does not follow automatically
from group-strategyproofness of CC for dichotomous preferences (Theorem 2, [5]). We
show that that CCEA and hence Mechanism 1 of Chen et al. [9] is group strategyproof
for piecewise uniform valuations.5
Proposition 4. For piecewise uniform value functions, CCEA is group strategyproof.
For piecewise uniform valuations, CCEA is also Pareto optimal. The result follows
from Lemma 1 and the fact that Mechanism 1 of Chen et al. [9] is Pareto optimal.
Proposition 5. For piecewise uniform value functions, CCEA is Pareto optimal.
4 MEA — Market Equilibrium Algorithm

In the previous section we presented CCEA which is not Pareto optimal for piecewise
constant valuations. If we relax the robust notion of fairness to envy-freeness, then we
can use fundamental results in general equilibrium theory to formulate a convex pro-
gram that always returns an envy-free and Pareto optimal allocation as its optimal solu-
tion. For each valuation profile, let J = {J1 , . . . , Jm } be the intervals whose endpoints are
consecutive points in the union of break points of the agents’ valuation functions. Let
xi j be the length of any subinterval of Ji that is allocated to agent j. Then we run a con-
vex program to compute a Pareto optimal and envy-free allocation. Once we determine
the length of J j to be allocated to an agent, we allocate any subinterval of that length
to the agent. We will call the convex program outlined in Algorithm 2 as the Market
Equilibrium Algorithm (MEA). MEA is based on computing the market equilibrium via
a primal-dual algorithm for a convex program that was shown to be polynomial-time
solvable by Devanur et al. [12].
Proposition 6. MEA is polynomial-time, Pareto optimal and envy free.
We mention here that the connection between cake cutting and computing market
equilibria is not completely new: Reijnierse and Potters [16] presented an algorithm to
compute an approximately envy-free and Pareto optimal allocation for cake cutting with
general valuations. However their algorithm is not polynomial-time even for piecewise
constant valuations [21]. MEA requires the machinery of convex programming. It re-
mains open whether MEA can be implemented via linear programming. Cohler et al.
[11] presented an algorithm that uses a linear program to compute an optimal envy-free
allocation. The allocation is Pareto optimal among all envy-free allocations. However
it need not be Pareto optimal in general. Similarly, Brams et al. [8] used a similar con-
nection to a linear Fisher market as MEA to compute a maxsum envy-free allocations.
However the allocation they compute may not be Pareto optimal even for piecewise uni-
form valuations (Theorem 7, [8]). Although MEA is not robust envy-free like CCEA,
it is Pareto optimal because it maximizes the Nash product. What is interesting is that
5
Chen et al. [9] had shown that their mechanism for piecewise uniform valuations is
strategyproof.
10 H. Aziz and C. Ye
Input: Cake-cutting problem with piecewise constant valuations.

Output: A proportional, envy-free, and Pareto optimal allocation.
1 Let J = {J1 , . . . , Jm } be the intervals whose endpoints are consecutive points in the union of
break points of the agents’ valuation functions. Discard any interval that gives an utility of
zero to every agent. Let xi j be the length of any subinterval of Ji that is allocated to agent j.
2 li ←− len(Ji )
3 Solve the following convex program.

n
min − log(u j )
j=1

m
n
s.t. u j = vi j xi j ∀ j = 1, . . . , n; xi j ≤ li ∀i = 1, . . . , m; xi j ≥ 0 ∀i, j.
i=1 j=1
4 Let uj , xi j be an optimal solution to the convex program. Partition every interval Ji into n
subintervals where the j-th subinterval Jij has length xi j .
5 Y j ←− ∪mi=1 Jij be the allocation of each j = 1, . . . , n.
6 return Y = (Y1 , . . . , Yn ).
Algorithm 2. MEA (Market Equilibrium Algorithm)
under uniform valuations, both MEA and CCEA are equivalent. In the next result we
demonstrate this equivalence (Proposition 7). The proof requires a careful comparison
of both CCEA and MEA under uniform valuations.
Proposition 7. For piecewise uniform valuations, the allocation given by CCEA is
identical to that given by MEA.
Corollary 1. For piecewise uniform valuations, MEA is group-strategyproof.
Thus if we want to generalize Mechanism 1 of Chen et al. [9] to piecewise con-
stant valuations and maintain robust envy-freeness then we should opt for CCEA. On
the other hand, if want to still achieve Pareto optimality, then MEA is the appropriate
generalization. In both generalizations, we lose strategyproofness.
5 MCSD — Mixed Constrained Serial Dictatorship Algorithm

Thus far, we presented two polynomial-time algorithms, each of which satisfies a dif-
ferent set of properties. CCEA is robust envy-free and non-wasteful, whereas MEA is
Pareto optimal and envy-free. This naturally leads to the following question: does there
exist an algorithm that satisfies all of the properties that CCEA and MEA satisfy? The
answer is no, as there is no algorithm that is both Pareto optimal and robust proportional
(Theorem 5). Similarly, there is no algorithm that satisfies the properties MEA satisfies
along with strategyproofness (Theorem 6). Lastly, there is no algorithm that satisfies the
properties CCEA satisfies plus strategyproofness (Theorem 7). Consequently, we may
conclude that the properties satisfied by CCEA and MEA are respectively maximal
subsets of properties that an algorithm can satisfy for piecewise constant valuations.
We saw that CCEA and MEA are only strategyproof for piecewise uniform valua-
tions. In light of the impossibility results established, it is reasonable to ask what other
property along with strategyproofness can be satisfied by some algorithm. It follows
from (Theorem 3, [19]) that the only type of strategyproof and Pareto optimal mecha-
nisms are dictatorships. Chen et al. [10] raised the question whether there exists a strat-
egyproof and proportional algorithm for piecewise constant valuations. The algorithm
MCSD answers this question partially.
Before diving into the MCSD algorithm, it is worth noting that there is a fundamen-
tal difference between the setting of assignment objects to agents where the agents have
homogeneous preferences over the objects and the cake cutting setting. In the former
setting, the objects that we are allocating are well defined and known to the public. On
the other hand, in the cake cutting setting, the discontinuity points of each agent’s val-
uation function is private information for the agent. In order to illustrate this difficulty,
consider the uniform allocation rule. The uniform allocation rule (that assigns 1/n of
each house) is both strategyproof and proportional in the random assignment setting.
However it cannot be adapted for cake cutting with piecewise constant valuations since
strategyproofness is no longer satisfied if converting 1/n of each interval (induced by
the agent valuations) to actual subintervals is done deterministically. Chen et al. [10] re-
sorted to randomizing the conversion process from fractions of intervals to subintervals
in order to make the uniform allocation rule strategyproof in expectation.
Proposition 8. No deterministic algorithm that implements the uniform allocation rule
can be strategyproof if it also satisfies the free disposal property.
In order to motivate MCSD, we first give a randomized algorithm that is strate-
gyproof and robust proportional in expectation. The algorithm is a variant of random
dictatorship. Under random dictatorship, if the whole cake is acceptable to each agent,
then each time a dictator is chosen, he will take the whole cake which is unfair ex post.
We add an additional requirement which is helpful. We require that each time a dictator
is chosen, the piece he takes has to be of maximum value 1/n length of the total size
of the cake. This algorithm Constrained Random Serial Dictatorship (CRSD) draws a
random permutation of the agents. It then makes the allocation to agents in the order
that the lottery is drawn. Every time that it is agent i’s turn to receive his allocation,
CRSD looks at the remaining portion of the cake and allocates a maximum value 1/n
length piece of the cake to agent i (breaking ties arbitrarily). Notice that CRSD is strat-
egyproof, as in every draw of lottery, it is in the best interest of the agents to report
their valuation function truthfully in order to obtain a piece that maximizes his valu-
ation function out of the remaining pieces of cake. We will see, through the proof of
Proposition 10, that CRSD is robust proportional in expectation.
MCSD is an algorithm that derandomizes CRSD by looking at its allocation for all
n! different permutations and aggregating them in a suitable manner. The algorithm is
formally presented as Algorithm 3. Although MCSD does not necessarily require n!
cuts of the cake, it is #P-complete to implement [3, 18] and may take exponential time
if the number of agents is not a constant.
Proposition 9. For piecewise constant valuations, MCSD is well-defined and returns a
feasible cake allocation in which each agent gets a piece of size 1/n.
Input: Cake-cutting problem with piecewise constant valuations.

Output: A robust proportional allocation.
1 for each π ∈ Π N do
2 C ←− [0, 1] (intervals left)
3 for i = 1 to n do
π
4 Xπ(i) ←− maximum preference cake piece of size 1/n from C
π
5 C ←− C − Xπ(i) ; i ←− i + 1.
6 end for
7 end for
8 Construct a disjoint and exhaustive interval set J induced by the discontinuity points in
agent valuations and the cake cuts in the n! cake allocations.
9 Yi ←− empty allocation for each i ∈ N.
10 for each J j = [a j , b j ] ∈ J do
11 for each i ∈ N do
count(i,J j )
12 Let pi j = n!
where count(i, J j ) is the number of permutations in which i gets J j .
13 Generate Ai j ⊆ J j , which is of length pi j |J j | according to some subroutine.

14 Yi ←− Yi ∪ Ai j
15 end for
16 end for
17 return Y = (Y1 , . . . , Yn )
Algorithm 3. MCSD (Mixed Constrained Serial Dictatorship)
Proposition 10. For piecewise constant valuations, MCSD satisfies robust proportion-
ality and symmetry.
Unlike CRSD, MCSD interprets the probability of allocating each interval to an
agent as allocating a fractional portion of the interval to that agent. Unless the actual
way of allocating the fractions is specified, one cannot discuss the notion of strate-
gyproofness for MCSD because a deviating agent is unable to properly evaluate his
allocation against his true valuation function in the reported profile. Contrary to intu-
ition, MCSD may or may not be strategyproof depending on how the fractional parts of
each interval are allocated.
Remark 2. MCSD is not strategyproof if the fraction of each interval of J is allocated
deterministically.
In light of this difficulty, we will implement a method (Algorithm 5) that randomly
allocates the fractions of intervals to agents. For every interval, the method chooses a
starting point in the interval uniformly at random to make the cut. Agent 1 receives the
left-most subinterval from the starting point with length dictated by MCSD, followed by
agent 2, so on and so forth. To generate this starting point for all subintervals, it suffices
to use a single bit of randomness together with the proper dilation and translation for
every interval. With this implementation, MCSD is strategyproof in expectation.
Proposition 11. MCSD implemented with the aforementioned random allocation rule
is strategyproof in expectation.
Although MCSD is strategyproof in expectation, it fails to satisfy truthfulness based
on group-based deviations no matter how the fractions of each interval are allocated.
1: Generate U j ∼ uni f [a j , b j ].
2: For a j ≤ x ≤ 2b j − a j , let mod (x) = x if a j ≤ x ≤ b j and x − (b j − a j ) if x > b j . Let

i−1
i
Ai j = [ mod (U j + pk j (b j − a j )), mod (U j + pk j (b j − a j ))]
k=1 k=1
i−1 i
if mod (U j + k=1 pk j (b j − a j )) ≤ mod (U + k=1 pk j (b j − a j )) and

i
i−1
Ai j = [a j , mod (U j + pk j (b j − a j ))] ∪ [ mod (U j + pn j (b j − a j )), b j ] otherwise.
k=1 k=1
Algorithm 4. A subroutine that converts fractional allocation into subintervals via randomization
Proposition 12. For cake cutting with piecewise constant valuations, MCSD is not
weakly group-strategyproof even for two agents.
Moreover, for cake cutting with piecewise uniform valuations, MCSD is not weakly
group-strategyproof since RSD is not for random assignment for dichotomous prefer-
ences [5]. On the fairness front, even though MCSD satisfies both proportionality and
symmetry, it does not satisfy the stronger notion of envy-freeness.
Proposition 13. MCSD is not necessarily envy-free for three agents even for piecewise
uniform valuations.
Another drawback of MCSD is that it is not Pareto optimal for piecewise constant
valuations. However for two agents, it is robust envy-free and polynomial-time.
Proposition 14. For two agents and piecewise constant valuations, MCSD is (ex post)
robust envy-free, and polynomial-time but not Pareto optimal.
6 Conclusion
We presented three deterministic cake-cutting algorithms — CCEA, MEA, and MCSD.

We then proposed a specific randomized version of MCSD that is truthful in expecta-
tion. All the algorithms have their relative merits. Some of our results also extend to
the more general cake-cutting setting in which agents do not have uniform claims to the
cake or when agents are endowed with the cake pieces [2]. Cake cutting is a fundamen-
tal problem with numerous applications to computer science. In order for theory to be
more relevant to practice, we envision exciting work in richer models of cake cutting.
Acknowledgments. The authors acknowledge the helpful comments of Simina Brânzei

and Jay Sethuraman. NICTA is funded by the Australian Government through the De-
partment of Communications and the Australian Research Council through the ICT
Centre of Excellence Program. Chun Ye acknowledges NSF grants CMMI-0916453
and CMMI-1201045.
References
1. Athanassoglou, S., Sethuraman, J.: House allocation with fractional endowments. Interna-
tional Journal of Game Theory 40(3), 481–513 (2011)
2. Aziz, H., Ye, C.: Cake cutting algorithms for piecewise constant and piecewise uniform
valuations. Technical Report 1307.2908, arXiv.org (2013)
3. Aziz, H., Brandt, F., Brill, M.: The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship.
Economics Letters 121(3), 341–345 (2013)
4. Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H.: A new solution to the random assignment problem. Journal of
Economic Theory 100(2), 295–328 (2001)
5. Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H.: Random matching under dichotomous preferences. Econo-
metrica 72(1), 257–279 (2004)
6. Brams, S.J.: Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Pro-
cedures. Princeton University Press (2008)
7. Brams, S.J., Taylor, A.D.: Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution. Cam-
bridge University Press (1996)
8. Brams, S.J., Feldman, M., Morgenstern, J., Lai, J.K., Procaccia, A.D.: On maxsum fair cake
divisions. In: Proc. of 26th AAAI Conference, pp. 1285–1291. AAAI Press (2012)
9. Chen, Y., Lai, J.K., Parkes, D.C., Procaccia, A.D.: Truth, justice, and cake cutting. In: Proc.
of 24th AAAI Conference, pp. 756–761 (2010)
10. Chen, Y., Lai, J.K., Parkes, D.C., Procaccia, A.D.: Truth, justice, and cake cutting. Games
and Economic Behavior 77(1), 284–297 (2013)
11. Cohler, Y.J., Lai, J.K., Parkes, D.C., Procaccia, A.D.: Optimal envy-free cake cutting. In:
Proc. of 25th AAAI Conference, pp. 626–631 (2011)
12. Devanur, N., Papadimitriou, C.H., Saberi, A., Vazirani, V.: Market equilibrium via a primal–
dual algorithm for a convex program. Journal of the ACM 55(5) (2008)
13. Katta, A.-K., Sethuraman, J.: A solution to the random assignment problem on the full pref-
erence domain. Journal of Economic Theory 131(1), 231–250 (2006)
14. Maya, A., Nisan, N.: Incentive compatible two player cake cutting. In: Goldberg, P.W. (ed.)
WINE 2012. LNCS, vol. 7695, pp. 170–183. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)
15. Mossel, E., Tamuz, O.: Truthful fair division. In: Kontogiannis, S., Koutsoupias, E., Spirakis,
P.G. (eds.) SAGT 2010. LNCS, vol. 6386, pp. 288–299. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
16. Reijnierse, J.H., Potters, J.A.M.: On finding an envy-free Pareto-optimal division. Mathe-
matical Programming 83, 291–311 (1998)
17. Robertson, J.M., Webb, W.A.: Cake Cutting Algorithms: Be Fair If You Can. A. K. Peters
(1998)
18. Saban, D., Sethuraman, J.: The complexity of computing the random priority allocation ma-
trix. In: Chen, Y., Immorlica, N. (eds.) WINE 2013. LNCS, vol. 8289, p. 421. Springer,
Heidelberg (2013)
19. Schummer, J.: Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange
economies. Social Choice and Welfare 14, 47–56 (1997)
20. Tian, Y.: Strategy-proof and efficient offline interval scheduling and cake cutting. In: Chen,
Y., Immorlica, N. (eds.) WINE 2013. LNCS, vol. 8289, pp. 436–437. Springer, Heidelberg
(2013)
21. Zivan, R., Dudı́k, M., Okamoto, S., Sycara, K.: Reducing untruthful manipulation in envy-
free pareto optimal resource allocation. In: IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on
Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology, pp. 391–398 (2010)
Network Cournot Competition,
Melika Abolhassani1 , MohammadHossein Bateni2 , MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi1 ,

Hamid Mahini1 , and Anshul Sawant1,
1
University of Maryland, College Park, USA,
2
Google Research, New York, USA
Abstract. Cournot competition, introduced in 1838 by Antoine Augustin Cournot,

is a fundamental economic model that represents firms competing in a single mar-
ket of a homogeneous good. Each firm tries to maximize its utility—naturally a
function of the production cost as well as market price of the product—by decid-
ing on the amount of production. This problem has been studied comprehensively
in Economics and Game Theory; however, in today’s dynamic and diverse econ-
omy, many firms often compete in more than one market simultaneously, i.e., each
market might be shared among a subset of these firms. In this situation, a bipartite
graph models the access restriction where firms are on one side, markets are on
the other side, and edges demonstrate whether a firm has access to a market or not.
We call this game Network Cournot Competition (NCC). Computation of equilib-
rium, taking into account a network of markets and firms and the different forms
of cost and price functions, makes challenging and interesting new problems.
In this paper, we propose algorithms for finding pure Nash equilibria of NCC
games in different situations. First, we carefully design a potential function for
NCC, when the price function for each market is a linear function of it total pro-
duction. This result lets us leverage optimization techniques for a single func-
tion rather than multiple utility functions of many firms. However, for nonlinear
price functions, this approach is not feasible—there is indeed no single potential
function that captures the utilities of all firms for the case of nonlinear price func-
tions. We model the problem as a nonlinear complementarity problem in this case,
and design a polynomial-time algorithm that finds an equilibrium of the game for
strongly convex cost functions and strongly monotone revenue functions. We also
explore the class of price functions that ensures strong monotonicity of the rev-
enue function, and show it consists of a broad class of functions. Moreover, we
discuss the uniqueness of equilibria in both these cases: our algorithms find the
unique equilibria of the games. Last but not least, when the cost of production
in one market is independent from the cost of production in other markets for all
firms, the problem can be separated into several independent classical Cournot
Oligopoly problems in which the firms compete over a single market. We give the
first combinatorial algorithm for this widely studied problem. Interestingly, our al-
gorithm is much simpler and faster than previous optimization-based approaches.

Supported in part by NSF CAREER award 1053605, NSF grant CCF-1161626, Google Fac-
ulty Research award, ONR YIP award N000141110662, DARPA/AFOSR grant FA9550-12-
1-0423.

Full version publically available on arXiv since May 8, 2014. See http://arxiv.
org/abs/1405.1794 .

Supported in part by ARO grants W911NF0910206, W911NF1160215, W911NF1110344,
ARO/Penn State MURI award, Israel Ministry of Defense Grant 4440366064.
T.-Y. Liu et al. (Eds.): WINE 2014, LNCS 8877, pp. 15–29, 2014.
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014
16 M. Abolhassani et al.
1 Introduction
In the crude oil market the equilibrium price is set by the interplay of supply and de-
mand. Since there are several ways for transporting crude oil from an oil-producing
country to an oil-importing country, the market for crude oil seems to be an oligopoly
with almost a single worldwide price1 . In particular, the major portion of the market
share belongs to the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). The worldwide price for crude oil is mainly influenced by OPEC, and the few
fluctuations in regional prices are negligible.
The power of an oil-producing country, in market for crude oil, mainly depends on
its resources and its cost of production rather than its position in the network. 2
The market for natural gas behaves differently from that for crude oil and matches
our study well. Unlike the crude oil market with a world-wide price, the natural gas
market is segmented and regional [40, 35]. Nowadays, pipelines are the most efficient
way for transporting natural gas from one region to another. This fragments the market
into different regional markets with their own prices. Therefore, the market for natural
gas can be modeled by a network where the power of each country highly depends
on its position in the network. For example, an importing country with access to only
one exporting country suffers a monopolistic price, while an importing country having
access to multiple suppliers enjoys a lower price as a result of the price competition. As
an evidence, EU Commission Staff Working Document (2006) reports different prices
for natural gas in different markets, varying from almost 0 to C300 per thousand cubic
meters [15].
In this paper we study selling a utility with a distribution network—e.g., natural gas,
water and electricity—in several markets when the clearing price of each market is de-
termined by its supply and demand. The distribution network fragments the market into
different regional markets with their own prices. Therefore, the relations between suppli-
ers and submarkets form a complex network [11, 39, 10, 18, 15]. For example, a market
with access to only one supplier suffers a monopolistic price, while a market having
access to multiple suppliers enjoys a lower price as a result of the price competition.
Antoine Augustin Cournot introduced the first model for studying the duopoly com-
petition in 1838. He proposed a model where two individuals own different springs of
water, and sell it independently. Each individual decides on the amount of water to sup-
ply, and then the aggregate water supply determines the market price through an inverse
demand function. Cournot characterizes the unique equilibrium outcome of the market
when both suppliers have the same marginal costs of production, and the inverse de-
mand function is linear. He argued that in the unique equilibrium outcome, the market
price is above the marginal cost.
Joseph Bertrand 1883 criticized the Cournot model, where the strategy of each player
is the quantity to supply, and in turn suggested to consider prices, rather than quantities,
as strategies. In the Bertrand model each firm chooses a price for a homogeneous good,
and the firm announcing the lowest price gets all the market share. Since the firm with
the lowest price receives all the demand, each firm has incentive to price below the
1
An oligopoly is a market that is shared between several sellers.
2
However, political relations may also affect the power of a country.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
is to say, four-fifths of all these steamers will belong to England. This
will give to us a fleet of ocean steamers outnumbering those of all
the rest of the world combined; and these will always be at our
disposal for, to say the least, the transport of troops, and of the
materials of war. Of the remaining fifth a large proportion will be built
in this country, as our resources and arrangements for the
construction of iron ships and marine engines are superior to those
of any other country.
If, then, it should prove that this forecast of the advantages of the
Canal to us in war is correct, it would seem to follow that, in time of
war, we should be under the necessity of holding it ourselves; or, at
all events, of occupying its two extremities. We should be obliged to
take care that neither an enemy blocked it up, nor a friend permitted
it to go out of repair.
CHAPTER LX.
CONCLUSION.
Beatus qui intelligit.—Book of Psalms, Vulg.
No one can see anything in Egypt except what he takes with him
the power of seeing. The mysterious river, the sight of which carries
away thought to the unknown interior of the great Continent, where
solar heat, evaporation, and condensation are working at their
highest power, giving birth abundantly to forms of vegetable and
animal life with which the eye of civilized man has yet to be
delighted, and instructed; the lifeless desert which has had so much
effect in shaping, and colouring, human life in that part of the world;
the grand monuments which embody so much of early thought and
earnestness; the contrast of that artistically grand, morally purposed,
and wise past with the Egypt of to-day; the graceful palm, and the
old-world camel, so unlike the forms of Europe; the winter climate
without a chill, and almost without a cloud; all these are certainly
inducements enough to take one to Egypt; but how differently are
they seen and interpreted at the time by the different members of the
same party of travellers; and with what widely different after-thoughts
in each!
And just as many of us are dissatisfied with life’s journey itself, if
we can find no object in it, so are we with the travel to which a
fraction of it may have been devoted, if it be resultless. Should we,
when we look back upon it, be unable to see that it has had any
issues which reach into our future thought and work, it seems like a
part of life wasted. For, whatever a man may have felt at the time, he
cannot, afterwards, think it is enough that he has been amused,
when the excitement of passing through new scenes is over, and he
is again in his home,—that one spot on earth where he becomes
most conscious of the divinity that is stirring within and around him,
and finds that he must commune closely with it.
But as to particulars: that which is most on the surface of what
Egypt may teach the English traveller is the variety of Nature. It has
not the aspects of the tropics, in which the dark primæval forest, and
tangly jungle, are the predominant features; yet its green palmtufted
plain, and drab life-repelling desert, are a great contrast to our still
hedge-divided corn-fields, and meadows; to our downs, and heaths,
and hills, and streams; and so are its clear sky, and dry atmosphere
to our clouds and humidity. To see, and understand something about
such things ought, in these days, to be part of the education of all
who can afford the time and money requisite for making themselves
acquainted with the riches of Nature; which is the truest, indeed the
only, way to make them our own. In saying this, I do not at all wish to
suggest the idea that in variety, and picturesqueness of natural
beauty, the scene in Egypt is superior to what we have at home. The
reverse is, emphatically, the case. Every day I look upon pleasanter
scenes than any Egypt can show: scenes that please the eye, and
touch the heart more. Nature’s form and garb are both better here.
So, too, is even the colour of her garb. To have become familiar,
then, with the outer aspects of Egypt, is not only good in itself, as an
addition to our mental gallery of the scenes of Nature, but it is good
also in the particular consequence of enabling us to appreciate more
highly the variety and the beauty of our own sea-girt home.
Of course, however, the source of deepest interest in any scene is
not to be found in its outer aspect, but in its connexion with man. If
we regard it with the thought of the way in which man has used,
modified, and shaped it, and of how, reversely, it has modified, and
shaped man, how it has ministered to his wants, and affected the
form, and character of his life; or if we can in any way associate it
with man, then we contemplate it from quite another point of view,
and with quite different feelings. Indeed it would almost seem as if
this was the real source of the interest we take even in what we call
the sublime and beautiful in nature. Man was only repelled from
snow-capped mountains, and stormy oceans, till he had learnt to
look upon them as the works of Intelligent Mind akin to his own.
Conscious of intelligence within himself, he began to regard as grand
and beautiful, what he had at length come to believe Supreme
Intelligence had designed should possess these characteristics. This
is, perhaps, the source of the sentiments of awe, and admiration,
instead of the old horror, and repugnance, with which we now
contemplate cold and inaccessible barrier Alps, and angry dividing
Seas. To Homer’s contemporaries, who believed not that the gods
had created the visible scene, but that, contrariwise, they were
posterior to it, and in some sort an emanation from it, the ocean was
only noisy, pitiless, and barren. And the modern feeling on these
subjects has, of late, been greatly intensified, and become almost a
kind of religion, since men have come to think that they have
discovered that these grand objects were brought into being by the
slow and unfailing operation of certain general laws which they have
themselves ascertained. So that now, to some extent, they have
begun to feel as though they had themselves assisted at their
creation: they stood by, in imagination, as spectators, knowing,
beforehand, the whole process by which Alps and Oceans were
being formed. That they were able to discover the laws and the steps
by which Omnipotent Intelligence had brought it all about, alone and
sufficiently demonstrates the kindredness of their own intelligence. It
is the association of these ideas with natural objects that causes the
present enthusiastic feeling—almost a kind of devotion—they
awaken within us, and which would have been incomprehensible to
the ancients, and even, in a great measure, to our forefathers. They
seem like our own works. They were formed by what is, in human
degree and fashion, within ourselves. We know all about them;
almost as if we had made them ourselves.
Regarded, then, in this way, it is not the object itself merely that
interests, but the associations connected with it. Not so much what is
seen, as what is suggested by what is seen. The object itself affects
us little, and in one way; the interpretation the mind puts upon it
affects us much, and in quite a different way. In this view there are
reasons why the general landscape here, at home, should be more
pleasing to us than it is in Egypt. It is associated with hope, and with
the incidents and pictures of a better life than there is, or ever has
been, in Egypt. I have already said that the natural features are not
so varied and attractive there as here; their value to us, in this
respect, consisting in their difference. But what I now have in my
mind is the thought of the landscape as associated with man; and in
this other respect also I think the inferiority of Egypt great.
The two pre-eminently grand and interesting scenes on this kind in
Egypt, where our Egyptian associations with man’s history
culminate, I have already endeavoured to present to the imagination
of the reader. They are the scene that is before the traveller when he
stands somewhere to the south-east of the Great Pyramid, looking
towards Memphis, and commanding the Necropolis in which the old
Primæval Monarchy is buried, the green valley, the river, and the two
bounding ranges; or, to take it reversely, as it appears when looked
at from the Citadel of Cairo; and the scene, for this is the other one,
which is presented to the eye, again acting in combination with the
historical imagination, from the Temple-Palace of the great Rameses
at Thebes, where you have around and before you the Necropolis,
and the glories of the New Monarchy.
What, then, are the thoughts that arise in the mind at the
contemplation of these scenes? That is precisely the question I have
been endeavouring to answer throughout the greater part of the
preceding pages. My object now, as I bring them to a close, is
somewhat different; it is to look at what we have found is to be seen
in Egypt from an English point of view; with the hope that we may
thus be brought to a better understanding, in some matters, both of
old Egypt and of the England of to-day. This will best be done by
comparing with the Egyptian scenes, which are now familiar to us,
the English scene which in its historical character, and the elements
of human interest it contains, occupies, at this day, a position
analogous to that which they held formerly. These are subjects that
are made interesting, and we may say intelligible, more readily and
completely by comparisons of this kind than by any other method.
Anatomical and philological comparisons do this for anatomy and
philology, and historical comparisons will do the same for history. We
shall come to understand Egypt not by looking at Egypt singly and
alone, but by having in our minds, at the time we are looking at it, a
knowledge of Israel, Greece, Rome, and of the modern world. Each
must be set by the side of Egypt.
We will come to ourselves presently. We will take Israel first. It
proposed to itself the same object as Egypt, that of building up the
State on moral foundations, only it had to do its work under
enormous disadvantages. Considering, however, the circumstances,
it attained its aims with astonishing success. We must bear in mind
how in the two the methods of procedure differed. So did their
respective circumstances. Egypt had the security which enabled it
freely and fully to develop and mature its ideas and its system. This
precious period of quiet was no part of the lot which fell to Israel. It
had to maintain itself and grow up to maturity under such crushing
disadvantages as would have extinguished the vitality of any other
people, except perhaps of the Greeks, the periods, however, of
whose adolescence and manhood were also very different from
those of Israel. At those epochs of their national life they had
freedom, sunshine, and success. Israel, on the contrary, had then,
and almost uninterruptedly throughout, storm and tempest;
overthrows and scatterings. The people never were long without
feeling the foot of the oppressor on their necks. Still they held on
without bating one jot of hope or heart; and by so doing made the
world their debtors, just as did the Egyptians, the Greeks, and the
Romans. Regarding the point historically, we cannot say that one did
this more than another; for, where all are necessary, it would be
illogical to affirm that one is greater or less than another. Neither the
seeing nor the hearing, we are told, can boast that it is of more
importance than the other; for, were it not for the seeing, where
would be the hearing? and, were it not for the hearing, where would
be the seeing? In the progress of man the ideas, and principles, and
experience contributed by each of these constituent peoples of
humanity were necessary: and if the contribution of any one had
been wanting, we should not be what actually we are; and that
something that we should be then would be very inferior to what we
are now. We could not dispense with the gift of any one of the four.
Egypt gave letters, and the demonstration of the fact that morality
can, within certain limits, be deliberately and designedly shaped and
made instinctive. Greece taught the value of the free development of
the intellect. Rome contributed the idea of the brotherhood of
mankind, not designedly, it is true, but only incidentally, though yet
with a glimmering that this was its mission. Without Rome we might
not yet have reached this point. Israel taught us that, if the aims of a
State are distinctly moral, morality may then be able to maintain
itself, no matter how great the disadvantages, both from within and
from without, under which the community has to labour; and even
when morality is unsustained by the thought of future rewards and
punishments: a lesson which has thrown more light on the power the
moral sentiments have over man’s heart than perhaps any other fact
in the history of our race.
I bow down before the memory of the old Israelite with every
feeling of the deepest respect, when I remember that he abstained
from evil from no fear of future punishment, and that he laid down his
life for truth and justice without any calculation of a future heaven. In
this view the history of the world can show no such single-minded,
self-devoted, heroic teachers as the long line of Hebrew Prophets.
They stand in an order quite by themselves. Socrates believed that it
would be well with him hereafter. They did not touch that question.
Sufficient unto them was the consciousness that they were
denouncing what was false and wrong, and that they were
proclaiming and doing what was true and right.
We will now turn to the Greeks. The interest with which they
contemplated the antique, massive, foursquare wisdom of Egypt is
well worthy of consideration. It is true they did not get much from
Egypt, either in the sphere of speculation or of practice: still for them
it always possessed a powerful attraction. The reason why it was so
is not far to seek. The Egyptians had done great things; and they
had a doctrine, a philosophy of human life. This was that
philosopher’s stone the Greek mind was in search of. And they
inferred from the great things done by the Egyptians (and this was
not a paralogism) that there must be something in their doctrine. In
fact, however, they learnt little from Egypt: for if it was the cradle,
Greece itself was the Holy Land of Mind. Nor was it possible that
they could learn much from it, for the two peoples looked upon
society and the world from quite different points of view. Greece
acted on the idea that in political organization, and in the well-being
of the individual, man is the arbiter and the architect of his own
fortune. Egypt acted on the supposition that these things rested on
an once-for-all heaven-ordained system. Greece believed that truth
was to be discovered by man himself, and that it would, when
discovered, set all things right; and that freedom, investigation, and
discussion were the means for enabling men to make the needed
discovery. Egypt thought that truth had been already communicated;
and that freedom, investigation, and discussion could only issue in
its overthrow. What Greece regarded as constructive, Egypt
regarded as destructive. It could not therefore learn much from
Egypt.
Rome we will now set by the side of Egypt. It will bring the two into
one view sufficiently for our purpose, if we endeavour to make out
what Germanicus must have thought of old Egypt, when he was at
Thebes. He must often have compared it with Rome; in doing which
he could, of course, only view it with the eyes of a Roman. And the
time for such a comparison had arrived, for the work of Rome, and
the form and pressure of that work upon the world, were then
manifesting themselves with sufficient distinctness. What he was in
search of was light that would aid him in governing the Roman world.
Probably he came to the conclusion that the wisdom of Egypt could
be but of very little use to him. The aim of Egypt had been all-
embracing social order, maintained by morality, compacting the
whole community into a single organism, in which every individual
had his allotted place and work, neither of which he could see any
possibility of his ever abandoning, or even feel any desire to
abandon. Egyptian society had thus been brought, through every
class and member, to do its work with the regularity, the smoothness,
the ease, the combined action of all its parts, and the singleness of
purpose of a machine. I need hardly repeat that they had understood
that the morality by which their social order was to be maintained
must be instinctive, and that they had made it so. The difference
between them and other people in this matter was, that they had
understood distinctly both what they wanted for their purpose, and
how to create what they had wanted. Germanicus must have been
aware, if he had seen this point clearly, that no government could
frame the general morality of the Roman Empire; and that the single
moral instinct upon which he would have to depend, if he could
create it, must be the base and degrading one of obedience and
submission brought about by fear. No attempt could be made, in the
world he expected to be called to govern, to cultivate an all-
embracing scheme of noble and generous, or even of serviceable,
morality. Much, indeed, of what was best would have to be
repressed, and stamped out, as hostile and subversive; as, for
instance, the sentiment of freedom, and the consciousness that the
free and full development of a mans inner being (in a sense the
Athenian and the Christian idea) is the highest duty. He would have
to provide not for what would encourage his future subjects to think
for themselves, and to make themselves men, but for what would
indispose them to think for themselves, and would make them only
submissive subjects. He had to consider how many abundant and
virulent elements of disorder, discontent, and corruption could be
kept down: under such a system an impossible task. These evil
growths of society had, each of them, been reduced to a
manageable minimum, spontaneously, by the working of the
Egyptian system; but, under the circumstances of the Roman world,
they were inevitably fostered and developed. The application,
however, of the Egyptian system to that world was out of the
question and inconceivable. So, here, Egypt could give him no help.
It could not show him how he could eliminate or regulate these evils.
He would not be able to get rid of the elements of discord and
discontent in the Egyptian fashion, by creating such instincts of order
and submission as would dispose every man to accept the position
in which he found himself as the irreversible appointment of Nature.
Nor, again, would he be able to counteract social corruption, in the
Egyptian fashion, by making virtue the aim of the state, of religion,
and of human life.
There were also two other problems to the solution of which he
would have to attend. How was the ring of barbarians that
beleaguered the Empire to be kept in check? and how was the
enormous military force that must be maintained for the internal, as
well as the external, defence of the Empire to be prevented from
knowing, at all events from using for its own purposes, its irresistible,
unbalanceable power? For doing every thing of every kind he had to
do, he had but one instrument, and that was force, law being
degraded into the machinery through which that force was to act;
and being also itself at discord with much that was becoming the
conscience of mankind, that is, at discord with its own proper object.
He could make no use of the Egyptian instruments, those, namely, of
general morality, of religion, and of fixed social order. The task,
therefore, that was before him, however strong the hand and clear
the head might be which would have to carry it out, was ultimately
hopeless. For one of two things must happen: either men must rebel
against the order he would have to maintain, and overthrow it, or it
must corrupt and degrade men. For, in the long run, nothing but law
and religion, both in conformity with right reason, and aiming at
moral growth, can govern men; that is to say, government must aim
at human objects, to be attained by human means. Men, of course,
can be controlled otherwise, as, for instance, by armed force, the
only means that would be at the disposal of Germanicus; but then
the product is worthless. Egypt, therefore, could give him no
assistance. It could only tell him that the task before him was to him
an unattainable one. It was not the one the Egyptians had taken in
hand, nor could it be carried out by Egyptian means. A great fight
had to be fought out in the bosom of Roman society, and under such
conditions that its progress and issue would be the ruin and
overthrow of society, as then constituted.
We all know that the man who, in a period of dearth, withholds his
corn for a time, is thinking only of himself, though it eventually turns
out that what he did was done unintentionally for the benefit of the
community: a law, above and beyond him, had been working through
him, and shaping his selfish act so that it should contribute to the
general good. So was it with the Roman Empire. It subjugated and
welded together all people merely to satisfy its own greed, but in so
doing it had further unfolded and advanced the world-drama of
human history. When it had played out its part, it was seen that that
part could not have been dispensed with, because, though so hard
for those times, it was essential to the great plot, for it was that that
had given birth to, and brought to maturity, the sentiment of the unity
and brotherhood of mankind.
And now at last we come to ourselves. All, including Egypt, have
become teachers to us. We are the inheritors of the work of all. To us
—and how pleasant is it to know this—the wisdom even of old Egypt
is not quite a Dead Sea apple, something pretty to look at, but inside
only the dust of what had been the materials of life. We can feel our
connexion with Egypt, and that we are in its debt; and we shall not
be unworthy of the connexion, and of the debt (a true debt, for we
are benefited through what they did), if we so make use of them as
that those who shall come after us shall have reason to feel that
they, too, are, in like manner, debtors to ourselves. Inquiries of this
kind enable us to discover what are the historical, which means the
natural and actual, bases of our own existing civilization.
What we now have to do is to compare ourselves with old Egypt.
Things of this kind become more intelligible when made palpable to
sense by being taken in the concrete. We have looked on the scenes
in Egypt which are invested with an interest that can never die,
because it is an interest that belongs to the history of humanity. By
the side of them we must set the scene in the England of to-day,
which holds the analogous position. Of course it must be in London.
And as it must be in London I know no better point at which we can
place ourselves than on the bridge over the Serpentine, with our
back upon Kensington, so that we may look over the water, the
green turf, and the trees to the towers of the old Abbey and of the
Palace of Westminster. The view here presented to us is one which
obliges us, while looking at it, to combine with what is actually seen
what we know is lying behind and beyond it. It is not a scene for
which an otiose glance will suffice, because it is precisely the
connexion between what is before the eye, and what is to be
understood, that gives it its distinguishing interest.
What is immediately before you, in its green luxuriance of turf and
leaf, is peculiarly English; you might imagine yourself miles away
from any city, and yet you are standing in the midst of the largest
collection of human beings ever brought together upon the earth:
what is around you is hardly more the capital of England than of the
world. Strange is it to find yourself in the midst of such an
incomprehensible mass of humanity, and yet at the same time in the
midst of a most ornate scene of natural objects—water, trees, turf.
Just as in the Egyptian scenes, where the interests of its history are
brought to a focus, the preponderant objects presented to the eye
are graves and temples in the desert, which tell us of how religious
and sombre a cast was the thought of the Egyptians, who could see
nothing in the world but God, and could regard life only in connexion
with death; so here, too, we find, as we take our stand in the midst of
this English world-capital, that we can see nothing of it; that it is hid
from our eyes by the country enclosed within it. This alone tells us
something about the people. It intimates to us that those who have
built this world-wonder have not their heart in it; that it is against the
grain for them to be here: they do not love it: they do not care to
make it beautiful: that, unlike their Latin neighbours, they are not a
city-loving people; that the first and strongest of their affections are
for the green fields, the wavy trees, and the running streams; and
that they have, therefore, reproduced them, as far as they could, in
the midst of the central home of their political life, to remind them of
what they regard as the pleasanter and the better life. But it is
strange that this very fondness for rural life is one of the causes that
have contributed to the greatness of this city. It has been the love of
Nature, and the hardihood of mind and body the people have
acquired in their country life, which have disposed them to go forth to
occupy the great waste places of the earth; and so have helped in
enabling the Nature-and-country-loving English race to build up an
Empire, out of which has grown this vast, but from the spot where we
are standing in the midst of it invisible, city.
Each also of the two great buildings, whose towers are seen
above the trees, has much to tell us about ourselves. There is the
old Abbey, reminding us of the power religion has had and will ever
have over us, though not now in the Egyptian fashion of something
that has been imposed upon us, but rather of something that is
accepted by us; and of our determination that it shall not be
constructed out of the ideas and fixed for ever in the forms which
belong to ages that, in comparison with our own really older and
riper times, had something to learn, and not everything to teach. It is
precisely the attempt to invest Christianity with Egyptian aims and
claims, fixity and forms, which is arraying men’s minds and hearts
against it; and, in some parts of Christendom, making the action of
society itself hostile to it. It is this attempt which is in a great measure
depriving it of the attractiveness and power it possessed in its early
days when it was rightly understood: though then it was, necessarily,
not only a private care, but one that had also to strive hard to
maintain its existence against the fierce and contemptuous
antagonism of the collective force of the old pagan form and order of
society. If men are now turning away from what they once gladly
received, it can only be because what is now offered to them has
ceased to be what it was then—the interpretation, and expression,
and the right ordering, of all that they knew, and of the aspirations of
their better nature. The phenomenon is explained, if we have reason
for believing that men then regarded Christianity as an honest
organization of knowledge, thought, and morality, for the single
purpose of raising and bettering human life, but now regard it as, in
some measure, their priestly organization for the purpose, primarily,
of maintaining priestly domination, through the maintenance of a
system which was the growth of widely different times and
circumstances.
It cannot be seen too clearly, or repeated too often, that
Christianity did not originate in any sense in priestly thought, but
was, on the contrary, a double protest against it, first in its own actual
inception, which included a protest against priest-perverted Judaism,
and antecedently in the primary conception of the previous
dispensation, which included a protest against priestly Egyptianism;
so that neither in itself, nor in its main historical source, could it
originally have had any priestly or ecclesiastical, but only broadly
human and honestly moral aims.
This will, by the way, assist us in forming a right estimate of the
character of that argumentum ad ignorantiam we have heard so
much of lately, that Protestantism is only a negation of truth, and an
inspiration of the Principle of Mischief. Looking back along the line of
our own religion, we find that Moses, speaking historically, was the
first Protestant; and that the Saviour of the World was, in this respect
also, like unto him. As, indeed, have been, and will be, more or less,
in the corrupt, but though corrupt, yet still, on the whole, advancing
currents of this world, all who are wise and good, and who have the
courage of their wisdom and goodness. It will also assist us to
understand that religion does not mean systematic Theology and
organized priestly domination, which are its degeneration, and into
which the ignorance and carelessness of the mass of mankind, and
the short-sightedness of some, and self-seeking of others, of its
constituted expounders are tending always to corrupt it; but that it
means, above all things, the ideal theory of perfect morality and
virtue, combined with the attempt to work it out practically in human
life, so far as is possible, under the difficulties and hindrances of this
world, supported by the good hope of its actual complete realization
in a better world to come.
The history of old Egypt is very much the history of the character,
working, and fate of the priestly perversion (as we must regard it
now) of religion, even when the attempt is made, as it was in that
case, honestly, and without any violation or contradiction of the
original principles and aims of the religion. As respects the modern
world, the lamentable and dangerous consequences of this
perversion of religion are to be traced, in some form or other, in the
actual moral and intellectual condition of perhaps every part of
Christendom. We see indications of them amongst ourselves in
individuals, and even in classes. The legitimate action of religion has
been in many cases not merely neutralized and lost, but directly
reversed. It ought to generate the instincts that contribute to the
order, the unity, the building up of society; whereas, by aiming at
ecclesiasticism, and endeavouring to retain what is at variance with
its own true purpose, it has given rise to unavowed repugnances, to
fierce antagonisms, to repulsion of class from class, and even
among some of hatred to the very order of Society; that is to say, it
has produced instincts that contribute, and that most energetically, to
disorder, disunion, and the overthrow of Society; proving the truth of
the saying that nothing is so bad as the corruption of that which is
best. Religion is the summa philosophia which interprets,
harmonizes, systematizes, and directs to the right ordering of
Society, and of the individual, all knowledge from whatever source
derived, all true and honest thought, all noble aspirations, all good
affections. Development and growth ever have been, and ever must
be, a law of its existence: nothing else can maintain its continuity.
And as, notwithstanding this necessity of development, its end and
aim must all the while, and for ever, be one and the same,
development and growth do not and cannot mean the overthrow of
religion, as some have told us, and will continue to tell us, but, on the
contrary, the enlargement and strengthening of its foundations, and
the better ordering and furnishing of the superstructure.
The very name of the building before us—The Abbey—reminds us
that, as far as we ourselves are concerned, we have accepted and
acted on the principle of development, adaptation, and correction in
our religion. The old name, belonging to a past order of things, is
evidence that this principle has once been applied; and so it supplies
us with a ground for hope that it will be applied again, whenever a
similar necessity may arise. History, indeed, assures us that this
must be done always, sooner or later, for in all ages and places the
religion of any people has ever been, in the end, what the knowledge
of the people made it; but it makes a great difference whether what
has to be done be done soon, or whether it be done late. If the
former, then the continuity of growth and development is not
interrupted. If the latter, then there intervenes a long period of
intellectual and moral anarchy, of religious and irreligious conflict.
The consequences and the scars of the conflict are seen in what is
established eventually. It is found that some things that were good
have perished; and that some that are not good have become
inevitable.
By the side of the old Abbey rise the towers of the Palace of
Westminster—a new structure on an old site. That which first occurs
to the beholder, who has old Egypt in his thoughts, is its inferiority in
artistic effect to the stupendous but simple grandeur of the Egyptian
Priests’ House of Parliament in the hypostyle Hall of Karnak, with its
entourage of awe-inspiring temples, its vast outer court, and its lofty
propylons. In that hall he had felt that its great characteristic was not
so much its grandeur as its truthfulness to its purpose, of which there
is not one trace to be found in the home of our great National
Council, which one might survey carefully, both internally and
externally, without obtaining the slightest clue for enabling him to
guess for what purpose it was designed. But how grand, I hesitate to
say how much grander, is the history which the site, at all events, of
the building we are looking at brings into our thoughts. It has not
indeed numbered the years of the Egyptian Panegyries. They might
have counted theirs by thousands, while our Assembly counts its by
hundreds. And we must also remember that they assisted at the
birth, and watched by the cradle, of political wisdom. True they
swathed the infant in the bands of a fixed religious system; but, then,
they could not have done otherwise; and what they did, under the
restrictions and limitations which times and circumstances imposed
upon them, was, notwithstanding, good and precious work; and we
comparing that work of theirs with much that has since been done,
and is now doing, see that, though it was crippled and distorted at
every step by their evil necessities, it was done wisely, and well, by
men who clearly understood what they wanted to do, and how it was
to be done. Our Parliament had to do its work under very different
and even opposite conditions. This island—indeed, this part of the
world—was not an Egypt where none but corporations of priests and
despotic rulers could be strong. We could not, on the contrary, be
without chieftains’ strongholds, and strong towns, too. While,
therefore, with us the armed possessors of these strong places
accepted religion, they could resist and forbid ecclesiastical
encroachments, and could thus save Society, through saving the
State, from ecclesiastical domination. They were strong and free,
and so could nurture freedom, instead of standing by and looking on
while it was strangled and buried out of sight. They were, too, the
heirs of Israelite, Greek, Roman, and German traditions; and these
they could keep alive, even without quite understanding them, until
the day came when they might be carried out more fully and
harmoniously; and more might be made of them than had been
possible even in the days, and in the countries, which had given
them birth. That has been the slow but glorious rôle in human history
of these English Parliaments, of which that Palace of Westminster at
which you are looking is the shrine: a spot most sacred in human
history, and which will be closely interesting to the generations that
are to come when time shall have forgot the great Hall of the
Panegyries of Egypt; for the History of the freedom of Religion, of
Speech, and of the Press, of Commerce, and of political and almost
of human freedom itself, is the History of these English Parliaments.
The History, then, of these two buildings throws much useful light
on the history of the later phases of the progressive relations to each
other of the State and of the Church; and of the rights, the duties, the
proper field, and the legitimate work of each. The questions involved
in these points have been answered very differently at different
times, in accordance with the varying conditions of society: but the
answers given have, on the whole, been such as to assist us in
understanding two particulars of importance: first, that the character
of the relation of the two to each other among any given people, and
at any given time, is dependent on the conditions of society, then
and there; on the point knowledge has reached; the degree to which
it has been disseminated; and on the course antecedent events have
taken. (The relation, at any time established, does, of course, re-act
on the conditions which gave rise to it, and so has some effect in
shaping, and colouring, their character in the proximate future.) And,
in the second place, that there is observable, throughout History, if
its whole range be included in our view, a regular evolution and ever-
growing solution of the great question itself.
All the peculiarities, and particulars of the history, of these two
buildings, such, for instance, as that they stand side by side, and yet
are quite distinct from one another; that the Ecclesiastical building is
very old, very ornate, and imposing, and was very costly; and that
the Civil building is modern, but on an old site; that it too was costly,
and is very ornate and imposing, and in its ornamentation and
aspects affects somewhat the Ecclesiastical style; that they are in
the hands of distinct orders of men belonging to the same
community; that the work carried on in them is quite distinct, and yet
that ultimately their respective work is meant to contribute, by
different paths, and with different sanctions, to the same end, that is
to say, the bettering of man’s estate—all this symbolizes with
sufficient exactness the history and character of the conflicts, and of
the relations, past and present, of the Church and of the State
amongst ourselves.
I am here taking the word Church in its widest, most intelligible,
and only useful sense—and which is the interpretation history puts
on the phenomena the word stands for—that of the conscious
organization of the moral and intellectual forces and resources of
humanity for a higher life than that which the State requires and
enforces. It is untrue, and as mischievous as untrue, to talk of
Religion—that is, the effect on men’s lives of the doctrine which the
Church has elaborated—as if it were something apart, something
outside the natural order of things, something up in the air,
something of yesterday, which has no root in man’s nature, and the
history of which is, therefore, not coincident with the history of man.
Like every thing else of which we have any knowledge, it is the result
of certain causes. And in the case of this effect, of which the Church
is the personal embodiment, the affiliation is distinct and palpable.
Poetry and Philosophy are as much manifestations of it, as what we
call Religion, when we are employing the word in its popular,
restricted signification. They do, indeed, so entirely belong to it that
there could be no advance in Religion, I might almost say no
Religion at all, without them. And, conversely, Religion supplies to
the bulk of mankind all the Poetry and Philosophy that will ever be
within their reach. Poetry (which uses Art as one of its instruments of
expression), dealing with things both objectively, as they appear to
address themselves to us, and subjectively, as they are seen
through the medium of our own sentiments; and Philosophy, dealing
with the ensemble of things as they are in themselves—the two,
working in these ways, and endeavouring to organize sentiment and
knowledge, or, in other words, human thought and the world of
external facts, for the sovereign purpose of nurturing and developing
our moral being, if they do not give rise to Religion, yet have, at all
events, largely contributed towards expanding, purifying, and
shaping it. Every one can see how Philosophy and Poetry
contributed each its part to the construction of the Old Dispensation.
It is equally plain that Christianity originally rested on a profoundly
philosophical view of the Old Dispensation, considered in connexion
with the then new conditions of the world. And it was, precisely,
because the view taken was so profound, because it went so
completely to the bottom of all that then and there had to be dealt
with, that it was felt and seen to be thoroughly true. For the same
reason it was as simple as it was true. And it was because it was so
entirely in accord with man’s nature and history, and with the
conditions on which the world had then entered, that it was
understood to be, and received as, a Revelation from God. This was
the internal evidence. And in the old Classic world, which we can
now contemplate ab extra, and without prepossession, we see that
the only teachers of Religion were first Poetry, and then Philosophy:
at first mainly the former, and afterwards mainly the latter. And thus
were they the means by which the outer world, at all events, was
prepared for Christianity.
If, then, we take the word Church in the sense I am now proposing
(and I am concerned here only with the interpretation History gives of
the phenomenon), it will help us to understand how it happens that
every Church, at certain stages in its career, comes into conflict with
the State, or the State with the Church; and, too, how it happens
that, at certain conjunctures, the action of the State, as it is, is to
restrict and to thwart the action of the Church, as it should be; and
why it is that, in the end, the latter must always carry the day. It will
also lead us to think that in the future the Clergy will not have the
entire decision of religious questions; but that, strange as it may
sound to us, the Poet, the Historian, and the Philosopher will, sooner
or later, be able to make their ideas felt in the discussion and
shaping of these matters. It has been so in the past; and we may
suppose that it will be so again in the future. Even now the lay
Prophet has no insignificant auditory, and it is one that it is growing
rapidly in every element of influence. We have no reason for
believing that the world will be content to leave, for ever, its own
highest affair in the hands of those only whose function, as
understood and interpreted, at present, by the majority of
themselves, is to witness to what were the thoughts of their own
order, in an age when that order thought for mankind; and did so,
sometimes, not in complete accordance with the common heart,
conscience, and aspirations of mankind, certainly not with what they
are now, but rather with what the Church supposed would complete
and strengthen its own system; at all events, always in accordance
with the insufficient knowledge, sometimes even with the mistaken
ideas, of times when the materials supplied by the then existing
conditions of society, and by the then state of knowledge, for the
solution of the problem, were not the same as those supplied by our
own day.
In old Egypt—under the circumstances it could not possibly have
been otherwise—the Church administered, and was, the State: the
State was contained within it. The distinction between things civil and
things religious had not emerged yet. This fact deeply modified the
whole being of the Church. Its resultant colour thus came to be
compounded of its own natural colour and of that of the State. This
primæval phase can never again recur. The increase and
dissemination of knowledge; the idea and the fact of civil as opposed
to ecclesiastical, we may almost say of human as opposed to divine
legislation, and the now thoroughly well ascertained advantage of
the maintenance of civil order by civil legislation, have made the
primæval phase, henceforth, impossible among Europeans, and all
people of European descent. We may add, that it has, furthermore,
become impossible now on account of the higher conception that
has been formed of the duty and of the work of the Church itself.
The Middle Ages present to our contemplation the curious and
instructive picture of a long-sustained effort, made under
circumstances in many respects favourable to the attempt, and
which was attended by a very considerable amount of success, to
revert to and to re-establish the old Egyptian unspecialized identity of
the two. This effort was in direct contradiction to the relation in which
the early Christian Church had placed itself to the State; though, of
course, it was countenanced, apparently, by the early history of the
Hebrew Church, which, like that of Egypt, had necessarily embraced,
and contained within itself, the State, in the form and fashion that
had belonged to the requirements of those times. That it had been
so with it, however, only shows, when we regard the fact, as we can
now, historically, that society, there and then, was in so rudimentary
a condition, that its two great organs of order, progress, and life had
not yet been specialized; the ideas and means requisite for this
advance not having been at that time, among the Hebrews, in
existence.

Web and Internet Economics 10th International Conference WINE 2014 Beijing China December 14 17 2014 Proceedings 1st Edition Tie-Yan Liu

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Web and Internet Economics 10th International Conference WINE 2014 Beijing China December 14 17 2014 Proceedings 1st Edition Tie-Yan Liu

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Web and Internet Economics 10th

International Conference WINE 2014

Web and Internet Economics 16th International

Web and Internet Economics 14th International

Web and Internet Economics 12th International

Information Security and Cryptology 10th International

Intelligent Robotics and Applications 7th International

Intelligent Robotics and Applications 7th International

Smart Health International Conference ICSH 2014 Beijing

Web and Internet Economics 15th International

Web and Internet

Advanced Research in Computing and Software Science

Subline Series Editors

Subline Advisory Board

Web and Internet

ISSN 0302-9743 e-ISSN 1611-3349

Library of Congress Control Number: 2014955020

LNCS Sublibrary: SL 3– Information Systems and Applications,

October 2014 Tie-Yan Liu

Program Committee Chairs

Vahab Mirrokni Google Research

Ma, Weidong Talgam-Cohen, Inbal

Network Cournot Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and

Limiting Price Discrimination When Selling Products with Positive

Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Games . . . . . . . . 58

Optimal Cost-Sharing in Weighted Congestion Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Truthful Multi-unit Procurements with Budgets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

The Shapley Value in Knapsack Budgeted Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Fast Convex Decomposition for Truthful Social Welfare

A Near-Optimal Mechanism for Impartial Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Value-Based Network Externalities and Optimal Auction Design . . . . . . . 147

Matching Dynamics with Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Truthful Approximations to Range Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

Resource Competition on Integral Polymatroids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

PTAS for Minimax Approval Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Biobjective Online Bipartite Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

Dynamic Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions: Learning from Bids:

Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Fixed-Price Auctions with Budgets . . . . 233

A Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanism for the Generalized Assignment

Not Just an Empty Threat: Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Repeated

Concise Bid Optimization Strategies with Multiple Budget

Sampling and Representation Complexity of Revenue Maximization . . . . 277

Bounds on the Proﬁtability of a Durable Good Monopolist . . . . . . . . . . . . 292

To Save Or Not To Save: The Fisher Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294

Coalitional Games on Sparse Social Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308

The Value of Temporally Richer Data for Learning of Inﬂuence

Randomized Revenue Monotone Mechanisms for Online Advertising . . . . 324

Learning Economic Parameters from Revealed Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . 338

General Truthfulness Characterizations via Convex Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 354

Privacy Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371

Simple and Near-Optimal Mechanisms for Market Intermediation . . . . . . 386

GSP with General Independent Click-through-Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400

Quality of Service in Network Creation Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423

The Sequential Price of Anarchy for Atomic Congestion Games . . . . . . . . 429

Multilevel Network Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435

Coordination Games on Graphs (Extended Abstract) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441

On the Existence of Low-Rank Explanations for Mixed Strategy

Congestion Games with Higher Demand Dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453

Time-Decaying Bandits for Non-stationary Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460

Market Equilibrium under Piecewise Leontief Concave Utilities

Computing the Least-Core and Nucleolus for Threshold Cardinality

Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context Congestion