Transparent Lobbying and Democracy

Šárka Laboutková
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://textbookfull.com/product/transparent-lobbying-and-democracy-sarka-laboutkov
a/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Lobbying in Europe: Public Affairs and the Lobbying

Industry in 28 EU Countries 1st Edition Alberto Bitonti

https://textbookfull.com/product/lobbying-in-europe-public-
affairs-and-the-lobbying-industry-in-28-eu-countries-1st-edition-
alberto-bitonti/

Solutions Türkiye A1 Student’s Book 10th Edition Tim

Falla

https://textbookfull.com/product/solutions-turkiye-a1-students-
book-10th-edition-tim-falla/

Lobbying and Foreign Interests in Chinese Politics 1st

Edition Stefanie Weil (Auth.)

https://textbookfull.com/product/lobbying-and-foreign-interests-
in-chinese-politics-1st-edition-stefanie-weil-auth/

Transparent Ceramics: Materials, Engineering, and

Applications 1st Edition Adrian Goldstein

https://textbookfull.com/product/transparent-ceramics-materials-
engineering-and-applications-1st-edition-adrian-goldstein/
Human and Machine Learning Visible Explainable
Trustworthy and Transparent Jianlong Zhou

https://textbookfull.com/product/human-and-machine-learning-
visible-explainable-trustworthy-and-transparent-jianlong-zhou/

Focus on Grammar 1 - Student's Book - A1 3rd Edition

Irene E. Schoenberg

https://textbookfull.com/product/focus-on-grammar-1-students-
book-a1-3rd-edition-irene-e-schoenberg/

Transparent Water Management Theory Sefficiency in

Sequity Naim Haie

https://textbookfull.com/product/transparent-water-management-
theory-sefficiency-in-sequity-naim-haie/

Transparent Data Mining for Big and Small Data 1st

Edition Tania Cerquitelli

https://textbookfull.com/product/transparent-data-mining-for-big-
and-small-data-1st-edition-tania-cerquitelli/

Responsible Lobbying Conceptual Foundations and

Empirical Findings in the EU 1st Edition Theresa Bauer
(Auth.)

https://textbookfull.com/product/responsible-lobbying-conceptual-
foundations-and-empirical-findings-in-the-eu-1st-edition-theresa-
bauer-auth/
Transparent Lobbying
and Democracy

Šárka Laboutková · Vít Šimral

Petr Vymětal
Transparent Lobbying and Democracy
 Šárka Laboutková • Vít Šimral
Petr Vymětal

Transparent Lobbying
and Democracy
Šárka Laboutková Vít Šimral
Technical University of Liberec University of Hradec Králové
Liberec, Czech Republic Hradec Králové, Czech Republic

Petr Vymětal
University of Economics, Prague
Prague, Czech Republic

ISBN 978-3-030-36043-6    ISBN 978-3-030-36044-3 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36044-3

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub-
lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the
material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institu-
tional affiliations.

Cover illustration: Marina Lohrbach_shutterstock.com

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Foreword

The book Transparent Lobbying and Democracy is written by a group of

young Czech researchers—Šárka Laboutková, Petr Vymětal, and Vít
Šimral—who belong to new talented academic generation. They aim to
grasp, capture, and really understand hidden dynamics of key political pro-
cesses in Central Europe. They are lead experts on transparency and
accountability in the region, stay very vocal, and shy not away from
involvement into public discourse around it. At their own academic insti-
tutions, they work as real pioneers in lecturing students, publishing and
highlighting importance and direct relation between transparency, lobby-
ing, quality of democracy and integrity of institutions.
In my profession, as head of Transparency International Czech chapter,
my team and myself we face every day dubious political decisions made
behind closed door, in the dark with limited or no accountability. We see
political corruption, opacity in decision-making, and undue influence as
challenges for our political systems that deeply undermine its legitimacy.
However, in order to address that smartly, we rely heavily on analytical
findings and scholarly insights, helping us to frame policy-making and
public debate over transparency and lobbying issues.
There are numerous opponents who deny any need for rules on lobby-
ing and sunshine principles, in every legislative clash. Many still prefer
doing it their “traditional” way (at golf course usually). To win an argu-
ment against such mentality, you need to convince not only decision-­
makers and public officials that public demands disclosure and public
scrutiny, but first you need to talk straight to professional lobbyists and
consultants themselves, representatives of business associations, chambers

v
vi FOREWORD

of commerce, and many other special interests. You need to make it clear
that times are changing, and it is time to come out of the shade. That is
what makes it difficult—as “lobbyists themselves often lobby against regu-
lation of lobbying”. To change that and break through this veil of secrecy,
you need to arm yourself with sound conceptual and methodological
framework, reliable data, and plenty of locally based examples and case
studies. And that is exactly what this book magnificently and elo-
quently provides.
Authors come up with some innovative tools, namely “Catalogue of
transparent lobbying”. They look and evaluate the impact on both key
stakeholders (lobbyists and targets of lobbying), monitoring of lobbying
activities and sanctioning for breaches of rules. This tool holds out bench-
marking capacity of sound framework for understanding of lobbying in
the context of democracy, legitimacy of decision-making, and account-
ability. But it is not dry theory only; in fact it has very practical implica-
tions to policy process and comes up very timely. In most of Central and
Eastern European countries, there is currently lively political debate over
lobby regulations; how to make it workable, sensible, and enforceable; and
how it affects quality of democracy.
This book covers efficiency of pro-transparency rules and lobbying
environment around the world. But specifically, it offers rare insight into
democratic and transparent decision-making in Central Europe. So, if you
want go beyond biased and superficial coverage, read this book. Credible
authors offer to any reader pretty unique level of clarity of this part of
Europe and its political machinery. The research focuses on Visegrad 4
countries plus Austria and Slovenia (one might think of its former Austro-­
Hungarian past). New democracies are fragile, vulnerable, challenged,
and often misunderstood, but at the same time they consist of viable seg-
ments of civil society, educated population and strong yearn for demo-
cratic, liberal and inclusive political environment.

David Ondráčka, member of global Board of Transparency

International, head of Transparency International—Czech Republic
July 29, 2019
Prague
 FOREWORD vii

As a political scientist and civil society expert, I have followed the efforts
of my colleagues Šárka Laboutková, Petr Vymětal, and Vít Šimral with
great interest. They have been intensively engaged in researching the
influence of transparent lobbying on the democratization process in
recent years. I am very pleased that one of the outputs is a comprehen-
sive publication that you are opening right now. Issues related to civil
society, democracy, the public sphere, political culture, and lobbying are
the lifelong interest of my professional career; I am the author of a num-
ber of scholarly books and articles on these issues. Currently, I am the
head of the Department of Political Science at the University of
Economics, Prague. The topic investigated in this book is also close to
my heart because of my active involvement in local politics and a num-
ber of NGOs.
In the past, I collaborated with two of the authors, Šárka and Petr, on
the first Czech scholarly book on lobbying titled Lobbying in Modern
Democracies (2010) to provide an overview of the topic and to fill an
extensive gap in the understanding of lobbying in liberal societies. But we
knew that much more had to be done. All of the authors have participated
in research into other related topics from this area—for example, transpar-
ency in lobbying, corruption, and political parties funding. They all have a
long history of analyzing and interpreting the aspects of transparent
decision-­making and I am convinced that it is their personalities and expe-
rience with the given subject that guarantee the quality of this book. It
should certainly be included in the library of both scientists and practitio-
ners dealing with lobbying and related issues.
This book is another big step forward. Just as we were very careful in
the original book that the message about the legitimacy of lobbying in
modern democracies and the resolute distinction between lobbying and
corruption is unambiguous, the authors of this book are very convincing
in claiming that transparent lobbying is an essential part of responsible
decision-making and contributes to the quality of democracy. The pre-
sented book is of a high quality thanks to the authors’ complex approach
to the issue, as well as a combination of theoretical and empirical investiga-
tion of transparent lobbying rules. The results of such research represent a
fundamental contribution to the theory of democracy, to the process of
democratization, and to the specification of sophisticated factors strength-
ening the institutional quality and the institutional reflexivity.
viii FOREWORD

The leitmotif, which winds like red thread through the whole book,
are rules of transparent lobbying in connection with transparent decision-­
making. The starting point of this book is on the lack of systematic effec-
tive regulation of lobbying activities and its evaluation so far. The authors
state that “it is not easy to build strong rules that meet the requirement
of transparency and efficiency for all subjects in the industry” and “almost
no studies address the quality lobbying environment in the broader scope
of the means on decision making”. Nevertheless, they argue, it is “neces-
sary to involve more variables for an evaluation of the overall level of
transparent lobbying […] where the transparency in lobbying is concep-
tualized in the broader environment of decision making”. For this pur-
pose, the authors create an innovative catalogue of lobbying transparency
containing four main categories—lobbyist, targets of lobbying, sunshine
principles, and sanctions. I warmly welcome the submission of this cata-
logue as a challenge for further discussion not only in the professional
community and between practitioners but also as a great opportunity for
the general public to realize how complex the transparent decision-mak-
ing environment can be. Every day, decisions influencing the lives of
many are taken by public officials. The opportunity to see them “under
the microscope”, see what standards they use and who influences them, is
in the interest of all citizens. The book also presents a critical view of
rational choice theory, as well as problems related to the failure of the
government in connection with poorly-determined regulation and admin-
istrative burdens.
The significant contribution of this book is also in the empirical analysis
of lobbying in Central and Eastern European countries, with detailed data
for Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia
based on the catalogue created by the authors. The added value is that the
authors also evaluate the results in terms of historical context and in the
context of the development of civil society in the region. The political and
legal culture in this region is influenced not only by several generational
experiences with the totalitarian regime but also by the economic and
social consequences of rapid economic and social liberalization without
properly functioning institutions and rules.
The book Transparent Lobbying and Democracy by Šárka Laboutková,
Vít Šimral, and Petr Vymětal definitely provides a comprehensive view
into the phenomenon of lobbying. Personally, as a well-established scien-
tist specializing in democracy, civil society, and the public sphere, I see it
 FOREWORD ix

as a useful and enriching contribution to the debate on lobbying, its nec-

essary transparency and its role in the democratization process. I am sure
the book has the potential to reach an international audience of experts
and interested lay persons, and both complement and compete with pub-
lications on similar issues.

Karel B. Müller, University of Economics, Prague

July 18, 2019
Prague
 Preface

This book deals with the current, as yet unsolved problem of transparency
of lobbying. In the current theories and prevalent models that deal with
lobbying activities, there is no reflection of the degree of transparency of
lobbying, mainly due to the unclear distinction between corruption, lob-
bying in general, and transparent lobbying.
In the complex world of public policy-making, it is desirable for public
administrations to engage in continuous dialogue with outside stakehold-
ers. All interested parties should be able to have their say, but this should
be done in a transparent way. As lobbying activities can raise risks of cor-
ruption and regulatory capture, it is desirable to have mechanisms in place
to frame such activities. Such mechanisms can help to create both clarity
and transparency in the relationship between public authorities and out-
side stakeholders. As such, they can help to reduce the risk of corruption.
This book provides a perspective on transparency in lobbying in a com-
prehensive and structured manner. Our approach is innovative in its focus
on the factors of transparent lobbying which have never been previously
considered. The book delivers a new solution consisting of both an inter-
disciplinary approach to the topic and especially the effort to create a
methodology for assessing the transparency of lobbying, its role in democ-
ratization process and a methodology for evaluating the main conse-
quences of this transparency.
The text is a result of a four-year-long research project on transparency
of lobbying and democratization, funded by the Grant Agency of the
Czech Republic and carried out at the Technical University of Liberec by
the authors. The particular conclusions were published in several articles

xi
xii PREFACE

in peer-reviewed journals during last three years and presented at interna-

tional conferences and forums. A list of the articles is a part of references
within the first chapter. Findings of these separate works have been synthe-
sized; the particular conclusions and parts of the theoretical basis were
actualized and incorporated to the book. Some theoretical assumptions
were taken from the Czech-language monograph Lobbying in Modern
Democracies (2010), co-authored by Šárka Laboutková, and Petr Vymětal.

Liberec, Czech Republic Šárka Laboutková

Hradec Králové, Czech Republic Vít Šimral
Prague, Czech Republic Petr Vymětal
 Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the Czech Science Foundation, under grant
number GA16-08786S “Impact of Transparency of Lobbying on
Democratization and Its Consequences”, and by the Philosophical Faculty
of the University of Hradec Králové, under grant project “Specific Research
2018—International Conference in Social Sciences on Public and Private
Interest”.

xiii
 Contents

1 Introduction  1

2 Democracy and Lobbying 31

3 Transparency in Democratic Decision–Making 51

4 Methodology of Research on Lobbying Regulation 79

5 A Theoretical Model of Lobbying111

6 Past and Present Practices of Lobbying and Its Regulation143

7 Transparent Lobbying in Central and Eastern European

Countries181

8 Open Government and Its Impact on the Lobbying

Environment in CEE Countries217

9 Conclusion241

xv
xvi CONTENTS

 ppendix A: Components of CPI Index (Revised 2014

A
Version) 259

Appendix B: Components of CII Index263

 About the Authors

Šárka Laboutková works as an associate professor at the Economics

Department of the Faculty of Economics at the Technical University of
Liberec (TUL) and guarantees there the curriculum of the master’s pro-
gram Economic Policy in the Global Environment.
Her research activity is primarily focused on the theory of impact of non-­
economic factors on decision-making in public policy, especially lobbying.
She also deals with the circumstances of transparent environment of
decision-­making as corruption, institutional quality, and so on. She is an
author of many journals’ articles and co-author of the first Czech compre-
hensive publication on lobbying, and constantly cooperates with anti-­
corruption NGOs as well as professional associations of lobbyists.
Vít Šimral serves as a Councilor of the City Prague, responsible for edu-
cation, sports, science, sports, and business development. Previously to
entering politics, he was a member of several anti-corruption bodies in
Europe, both in the NGO and in the public sector. He remains a part-time
member of the Czech academia, carrying out research or teaching at the
University of Hradec Králové and the Technical University of Liberec. His
academic research focuses on issues of corruption, public procurement,
political funding, and lobbying. Among his most recent works are chapters
in the books titled Corruption and Norms: Why Informal Rules Matter
(2018) and Handbook of Political Party Funding (2018).

xvii
xviii About the Authors

Petr Vymětal works as an assistant professor at the Political Science

Department of the Faculty of International Relations at the University of
Economics, Prague. His main field of research is lobbying and interest
representation, political parties’ funding and campaign financing, corrup-
tion, and the political-economic factors influencing economic policy. He is
the co-author of the first Czech comprehensive publication on lobbying.
He collaborates with anti-corruption civil sector organizations and is a
member of working group on lobbying at the Ministry of Justice of the
Czech Republic.
 List of Figures

Fig. 4.1 CII methodology structure. (Source: Krsmanovic 2014,

p. 105)107
Schema 5.1 Actor-centered model of lobbying. (Source: Own
construction, first used in Laboutková and Žák 2016) 127
Schema 7.1 The Ninefold theory and V4+2 countries. (Source: Build on
Krsmanovic 2014, author’s own calculation) 210

xix
 List of Tables

Table 2.1 Old and new models of democratic government/governance 41

Table 3.1 Institutional quality and transparency of decision-making in
reports of international organizations 63
Table 3.2 Statistics of Delphi method scores of democracy indices 69
Table 3.3 Delphi method scores for individual indicators in democracy
indices71
Table 4.1 Kalniņ š models of lobbying regulation 83
Table 4.2 Summary of standards and measurements for transparent
lobbying84
Table 4.3 Main categories of lobbying transparency 87
Table 4.4 Transparency measures on lobbyists 88
Table 4.5 Transparency measures on targets of lobbying 90
Table 4.6 Sunshine principles affecting transparency in decision-making 93
Table 4.7 Oversight and sanctions 98
Table 5.1 Summary analysis of the described scenarios 129
Table 6.1 An alternative model of lobbying regulation 171
Table 6.2 An extended model of lobbying regulation 172
Table 7.1 Evaluation of transparency in lobbying in Visegrad Group + 2 in
the main categories of the catalogue 192
Table 7.2 Detailed evaluation of transparency in lobbying at the level of
specific measures in V4+2 countries 193
Table 7.3 CPI Index for V4+2 countries  204
Table 7.4 CII Index for V4+2 countries  207
Table 8.1 The potential impact of country’s commitments (title),
relevance to OGP values, starred commitments, and completion
of these commitments (in %) 232

xxi
xxii LIST OF TABLES

Table 8.2 The country’s commitments in terms of Access to information

(AI), Civic participation (CP), Public accountability (PA), and
Technology and innovation for openness and accountability
(TI) (in %) 233
Table 8.3 Number of commitments in surveyed countries with a real
impact to open government, greater transparency, and
reduction of the corruption environment 234
 List of Boxes

Box 3.1 Limits of evaluation of Freedom House’s “Functioning of

Government” indicator: the case of the Czech Republic 66
Box 5.1 Lobbying—A Description of Stakeholders’ Activities—General
Diagram126

xxiii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1   The Recent Growth of Regulation

and the Lobbying Industry

In the last four decades, lobbying has become a universally acknowledged

political and economic activity in Europe, North America, and elsewhere.
Lobbyists are now an accepted part of liberal democratic political systems.
The acknowledgment of lobbying as a legitimate professional field
derives mainly from its real-world usefulness. Lobbyists have their value
both for people outside of governing bodies, as they voice the people’s
concerns to the government, as well as for elected representatives, for
whom they supply expert information and knowledge. There is also a
growing consensus among politicians and practitioners of lobbying as well
as among academic experts that, to ensure democracy legitimacy, lobbying
must be regulated. For instance, the legal scholar Johnson argues that
rules governing lobbyists should ensure (1) that all persons have a fair
opportunity to be heard by the government, (2) that the government
enjoys the confidence of the people, (3) that official decisions are based on
accurate information, (4) that the citizenry knows how the government
operates, and (5) that the performance of public business benefits from
the wisdom of the community (Johnson 2006, pp. 13–14).
The United States has been developing its lobbying regulations since
the nineteenth century. Already in the 1850s, the House of Representatives
in Washington felt the need to protect itself from the influx of lobbyists

© The Author(s) 2020 1

Š. Laboutková et al., Transparent Lobbying and Democracy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36044-3_1
2 Š. LABOUTKOVÁ ET AL.

pushing forward the agendas of various interest groups (Schlozman and

Tierney 1986, p. 318). Despite that, all attempts to pass a lobbying law at
the federal level were unsuccessful and it was only in 1938 that the first,
partial regulation was adopted as the Foreign Agents Registration Act.
The first general lobbying law came after Second World War: the Federal
Regulation Lobbying Act as a part of the broader regulation Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946.
At the state level, the attempts at regulation followed a similar, gradual
path of progress that culminated in the 1940s. In 1953, the legislatures of
29 US states and the territory of Alaska featured a mandatory lobbyists’
register (Zeller 1954, p. 217). After the Watergate scandal, the remaining
states also chose to adopt these registers and other lobbying regulations
and in 1988, Arkansas was the last US state to adopt a state lobbying law
(Blair 1988).
In other countries, regulations are being adopted only in the course of
the last three decades. The adoption of these regulations is accompanied
by a renewed interest in the subject; researchers can finally compare the
long-standing US lobbying regulation with the new measures discussed
and adopted elsewhere.
After the adoption of the 1946 Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act in
the USA, there was a hiatus of four decades before other countries also
started to consider adopting similar law in their own legal frameworks. In
1989, Canada followed suit with its southern neighbor and adopted the
Lobbyists Registration Act. Between 1983 and 1996, Australia attempted
to run a voluntary register of lobbyists at the federal level, which, however,
proved ineffective and was abolished.
In Europe, the first regulation that indirectly regulated some lobbying
activities appeared in 1951 in Germany. Interest groups, formally “associa-
tions”, were invited to official hearings, or rather sector-based commit-
tees, in the Bundestag (Rule 73, Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag).
The first laws specifically aimed at lobbying were adopted in the post-­
communist countries of Georgia (1998) and Lithuania (2000). In the
speed of adoption of lobbying laws, individual European countries were in
fact beaten by the European Parliament, who already, in 1996, introduced
a regulation of lobbyists into their Rules of Procedure (Rule 9(2)). At the
national level in Europe, the trend to adopt separate lobbying laws started
only after 2000; 11 more European countries would, between 2001 and
2017, join Georgia and Lithuania in adopting such rules.
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

These national lobbying laws significantly vary in several aspects: the

goals they want to achieve, the scope of the activities they regulate, the
scope of regulated actors, or the duties they put on these actors. The final
form of these laws is always the result of a political compromise, and thus
the effectiveness of the rules also varies.
While regulators are attempting to properly regulate lobbying, the
simple fact is that reality does not wait for them and the volume of lob-
bying around the globe does not shrink. In 2018, the amount officially
spent on lobbying in just the United States reached the sum of $3.42
billion, thus hitting an eight-year high since the all-time peak in 2010
(Opensecrets.org 2019). In the European Union, the official amount is
unknown, since the regulation does not include financial disclosure, but
the sum is estimated to reach $2 billion (Politico 2017). The number of
lobbyists registered in the EU Transparency register is constantly rising
(Europa.eu 2019). There is a lack of official data from other countries;
at the same time, there is no reason to doubt that lobbying activities,
their intensity, number of agents, and spending sums are grow-
ing globally.
Moreover, official lobbying is only the tip of the iceberg; there is also
“dark money” flowing into politics from unreported links with private
businesses. In the United States, the most widely used tools for undis-
closed financial influence are political non-profit organizations and super
political action committees (super PACs). Given the nature of dark money,
the aggregate sum is next to impossible to estimate, but conservative esti-
mates in the United States reach, in election years, the milestone of $1
billion (MarketWatch 2018).
In other words, there has been a global rise in the amount and intensity
of lobbying activities carried out in the democratic world. It is truly diffi-
cult to show exact numbers, but even conservatives estimates reach bil-
lions that are being spent every year on funding the lobbying industry in
the two most democratic continents in the world: North America and
Europe. The same or even higher amounts are probably spent on lobbying
that is happening outside of the scope of regulation—both in countries
which do not regulate lobbying at all as well as in the gray areas of law in
the countries where lobbying is already regulated. And it is the connection
of lobbying to liberal democracy that is crucial for understanding the cru-
cial importance of lobbying rules in advanced democratic societies.
4 Š. LABOUTKOVÁ ET AL.

1.2   How is Lobbying Connected to Democracy?

For their proper functioning, modern advanced democracies need to fulfill
and constantly improve on several requirements; one of them is free and
open access to the government for everyone. Today, regulated lobbying is
a recognized, legitimate point of access and an activity necessary for qual-
ity decision-making. Lobbying helps politicians to deliver adequate poli-
cies; it enables participation in the decision-making process and is a tool
for the provision of information. De facto, it is a constant interaction
between all stakeholders, based on a formalized consultation process or
within informal contacts and human relations.
That being said, in practice, some individuals or organizations often
have greater and better access to policy-makers than others. The reasons
for this disparity vary; the evidence, however, suggests that there is a
strong correlation between access and economic power (Dahl 1961;
Salamon and Siegfried 1977, etc.). There are many invisible stakeholders
in society that are difficult to organize for collective action. In a proper
democracy, all their interests must be taken into an account. The power of
private actors, their role in political acts, and the balance between indi-
vidual interests and the public good is a central question of democratic
theory. Democracy means balance of interests.
This approach is based primarily on the theoretical assumptions of lib-
eralism, which place particular emphasis on individual freedom. Social sci-
entists have looked at the freedom of the individual, equality with others,
and the legitimacy of individual or group interests in different ways. The
most important are undoubtedly the representatives of European liberal-
ism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which formulated the
ideological basis of modern democracy. The call for state authority was
primarily the result of the political theory of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679)
and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1755), although their initial assump-
tions are quite different (Klokočka 1991, p. 21).
Hobbes was characterized by skepticism of interest clashes, and he for-
mulated his pessimism about human nature, often with the reminiscence
of the “man of the wolf”. He considered particular interests to be extremely
egoistic and basically directed against a sovereign people. Hobbes did not
believe that confrontation of interests could result in some beneficial solu-
tions. The inequality of individual forces and interests, their egoism and
“overgrowth of pluralism”, which is negatively reflected in the process of
creating the state will, was replaced by Hobbes with a strong state a­ uthority
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

(Hobbes 1651). Hobbes believed that the state could rule impartially
over society.
Rousseau, on the other hand, had an optimistic view of human nature
and believed in man as an individual who, by his own volition, based on an
active exchange of opinions and social attitudes, was able to free himself
from his egoistic interests and came to the knowledge of the common
good. While the state was the guarantor of morality for Hobbes, it repre-
sented a rogue of the natural order for Rousseau. He found the starting
point in the fiscal conclusion of the so-called social contract, which gener-
ates the enforcement of the general will by integrating the will of all indi-
vidual members of society (Rousseau 1755).
However, John Locke’s liberal democratic political theory (1632–1704)
was most prominent in the West. His conception of society was pluralistic.
The social contract is not in Locke’s conception of converting heteroge-
neous interests into interests fully homogeneous or beneficial (as Rousseau
thought), but is the result of competition interests and their refinement
based on social consensus. There is no need for superior authority (state)
to reach consensus in society, but the means to achieve it can be found
within society itself (Locke 1689).
The functioning of society from the perspective of various forms of
political association was examined by the French political thinker Alexis de
Tocqueville (1805–1859). Contrary to Hobbes, he argued that associat-
ing in order to achieve a common goal, whether specific or public, is more
important than simple egoism. General and private, according to
Tocqueville, is something that can never be severely separated. Tocqueville
believed in the balance of freedom and equality (political and economic)
and in the balance of the interests of the individual and society. However,
governments tend to override the general interest over particular interests.
Therefore, according to him, it is necessary to establish the subject of
general interest in advance and to strictly define the powers of the govern-
ment, since it has the tendency to expand its power and powers itself.
Tocqueville thought that ultimately government should not be about pre-
venting citizens from pursuing their interests or activities and forcing them
to do something for the common good, but showing that justice is the
common good, if everyone wants to promote their individual interests
safely (according to Müller 2003, p. 60).
In 1959, Lipset defined democracy as “a social mechanism for the reso-
lution of societal decision making among conflicting interest groups,
which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these
6 Š. LABOUTKOVÁ ET AL.

decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for

political office”. (p. 71). Free and open access to the government is there-
fore one of the prerequisites for a well-functioning democracy. In reality,
however, some individuals or organized groups have greater access to
policy-makers due to their economic or political power. This power and
the balance between individual and public interests are central to the dem-
ocratic theory. Scholars following Lipset have sought not only to define
the core of democracy, but also to find ways to measure its quality and its
real-world presence.
Since Dahl (1971) suggested his minimalist concept of quality of
democracy—contestation and participation—more relevant dimensions
have been identified to measure the quality of democracy; for example,
Collier and Levitsky (1997) expanded the root concept of quality-of-­
democracy indices for the link between citizens and their representatives;
Diamond and Morlino (2004) pointed out eight categories: rule of law,
vertical and horizontal accountability, participation, competition, respon-
siveness, freedom, and equality; Pickel et al. (2015) added the public
sphere, mutual constraints of constitutional powers, governmental capa-
bility, transparency, and representation, which further specify the core
dimensions. Bühlmann et al. (2012) and Marshall et al. (2014) have sug-
gested a wider range of procedures and structures that drive elite decision-­
making between elections. Lauth (2016) pointed out three core dimensions
of democracy—freedom, equality and control—in which citizens/civil
society groups play a crucial role, although the conceptualization of the
citizen component of democratic quality is severely underdeveloped in
existing research (Mayne and Geissel 2016, p. 635). The dimension of
freedom means both demonstrating individual preferences in free and fair
elections and the opportunity for continuing political participation (Lauth
2016), which is based on free competition of different interests. From the
political equality point of view, Lauth (2016, p. 608) stresses that “it
enables all citizens to participate in a fair and effective way in all formal
institutions needed for the democratic process”. According to him fairness
means “the equal and effective exercise of civil and political rights—
regardless of social status, gender, or ethnicity”; it is necessary to add
regardless of economic power. And he asks: “Do all citizens have the same
opportunity to exercise their rights?” To be able to answer the question, it
is important to fulfill the third core dimension of democracy—control—
which integrates both vertical and horizontal accountability.
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

1.3   The Present-Day Relevance of Transparent

Lobbying
This brief overview of the relationship between lobbying and democracy
shows that it is indeed necessary to identify in more precise terms the spe-
cifics of that relationship. If we are to move from the classics of the demo-
cratic theory and their assumptions and theorems based more on
philosophy than on empirical data, we need to answer a battery of analyti-
cal questions. While the concept of democracy itself is also discussed in the
present book, the main research focus lies in transparent lobbying.
Despite the theories mentioned elsewhere and prevalent models that
deal with lobbying activities, there is no reflection of the degree of trans-
parency of lobbying, mainly due to an unclear distinction between corrup-
tion, lobbying in general, and transparent lobbying. It is important to
stress the transparency in association with the phenomenon of corruption
on the one side and democratization on the other side and ask the ques-
tion: Under what circumstances can transparency be an effective tool in
reducing corruption, improving the institutional quality, and enhancing
the quality of democracy?
The present book deals with the current, as yet unsolved, problem of
transparency of lobbying. So far, the process of explicit direct measuring
of the transparency of lobbying remains unsolvable until lobbying is regu-
lated. Although governments in advanced democracies have started wide
discussions on the importance of implementing lobbying regulations to
reduce the risks of corruption and support a level playing field for stake-
holders in the policy-making processes (Chari et al. 2010; Holman and
Luneburg 2012), countries with no regulation prevail. In reality, the
problem is the reluctance of political representation to enforce statutory
regulation and the differing approach to regulation of lobbying across
countries. This ranges from no regulation, through “soft” regulation (vol-
untary systems, self-regulation) to “hard”, legislative rules. Post-­
communist countries are characterized by less institutional effectiveness,
and most of them are faced with the problem of a weak (and large) state,
underdeveloped civil society, and a weak liberal tradition (Müller and
Skovajsa 2009). Yet only three of them (Poland, Lithuania, and Slovenia)
have statutory regulation of lobbying; for example, in the Czech Republic
a bill to regulate lobbying was rejected three times in the past 10 years.
There are, however, a number of other measures—besides direct regu-
lation—that contribute to the transparency of lobbying: arrangements for
8 Š. LABOUTKOVÁ ET AL.

the funding of political parties, laws on conflicts of interest, the so-called

“revolving door” rules, legislative footprint, and the statements of officials
and politicians. These measures are found also in public procurement:
electronic auctions, all public contracts published on the web, ethical
codes of corporate or interest groups, a public guestbook at public institu-
tions, public service acts, the use of RIA (Regulatory Impact Assessment)
and the CIA (Corruption Impact Assessment) in the legislative process,
public consultation and publication of the list of consultants on govern-
ment policies, a code of practice, the quality of the legislative process
(unjustified amendments, wild-riders, etc.), fully and comfortably fur-
nished budgets, and so on. In other words, transparent lobbying exceeds
the efficiency of a single law: it should be part and package of a wider
approach to governance, based on the principles of openness, transpar-
ency, participation, and disclosure.
The problem of lack of transparent lobbying is closely related to cor-
ruption. According to the latest report made for the EU Commission
named “Corruption” (TNS 2017), over two-thirds of Europeans think
that corruption is widespread in their country, and the majority of
Europeans believe that bribery and the abuse of positions of power for
personal gain are widespread within political parties (56%) and among
politicians at national, regional, or local level (53%). In all countries, only
a minority of respondents say that there is sufficient transparency and
supervision of the financing of political parties. High proportions of
respondents—two-thirds and more—in countries of Southern and South-­
Eastern Europe think that favoritism and corruption hamper business
competition in their country. This is also the case to some extent in Eastern
Europe. The same report says that nearly eight in ten Europeans (79%)
agree that there are too close links between business and politics in their
country, just under three-quarters (73%) agree that it is present in national
public institutions, and a very similar proportion of respondents (72%)
think that there is corruption in the local or regional public institutions of
their country. Only around three in ten of respondents think that govern-
ment efforts to combat corruption are effective (30%) or that there is suf-
ficient transparency and supervision of the financing of political parties
(29%) (for more see Special Eurobarometer 470, TNS 2017). According
to previous report (2014), corruption costs the European economy
around €120 billion per year (EC 2014). EU member countries have
taken many initiatives in recent years, but the results are uneven and more
should be done to prevent and combat corruption.
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

The actual decision-making process of economic policy needs both the

qualitative knowledge of economic theory, focusing on the economic
causes and factors supporting the operation of markets, as well as the
knowledge of other, mainly political, factors that could influence both the
subject’s behavior and the final shape of policies and markets, particularly
in relation to the dominant reality of the redistribution process and pro-
cess of democratization. In this context transparency of decision-making
plays a crucial role. Transparency, for the purpose of the book, is defined
as the “increased flow of timely and reliable economic, social and political
information, which is accessible to all relevant stakeholders” (Vishwanath
and Kaufmann 2001; Kaufmann and Kraay 2002). Transparency may help
in ensuring that the benefits of growth are redistributed and not captured
by the elite. Transparency is important because it increases efficiency in the
allocation of resources. In democratic societies, the access to information
and transparency can also be considered a human right (Bellver and
Kaufmann 2005). Finally, transparency is also critical for human develop-
ment as it provides incentives for redistribution and inclusiveness.
North (1990) defined institutions as man-made restrictions that frame
all human behavior. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws,
and constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behavior, habits, and
rules of conduct applied by the individuals themselves), and ways of
ensuring compliance. Taken together, they define the incentive structure
of individual companies in particular economies. Institutions are not nec-
essarily, or even usually, created to be efficient. On the contrary, they, or
at least their formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those who
have sufficient bargaining power to create those rules. In this context,
several international organizations (World Bank, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, Institute for Management
Development, World Economic Forum, European Commission,
Commission for the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social
Progress, etc.) devote considerable attention to reviews of institutional
quality. The main idea of these evaluations is that a good institutional
framework supports the democratic, economic (market), and social pro-
cesses. Now there is an increased focus on associations and interest groups
because of their participation in public debate and decisions, which allows
citizens to make a rational and informed choice in public services, such as
health, education, environment, civil rights and responsibilities that
enhance the quality of life. Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) constructed an
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
„Jongens, een beetje kalmte,” gebiedt de onderwijzer, op wien het
geval diepen indruk gemaakt heeft. „Die man is geen serpent, die
man met [200]z’n armoedig winkeltje kwam voor z’n goed recht op en
ik vind ’t heel treurig, dat jongens door hun snoeplust tot zooiets
komen. Er zullen misschien velen onder jullie zijn, die met
minachting op den dief, zooals Mijnheer Brashuis hem noemde,
zullen neerzien, maar die mogen wel bedenken, hoeveel fouten en
gebreken ze zelf hebben en ze moeten, als straks de dader weer in
hun midden zal zijn, hem niet beschouwen als een dief, maar als
één, die door zwakheid een misstap beging, waar hij zeer zeker voor
zal moeten boeten en dien we allen de helpende hand moeten
toesteken.”

De onderwijzer was zeer bemind bij de jongens en zijn woorden

lieten niet na, grooten indruk op hen te maken.

’t Was goed, dat hij zoo gesproken had, want velen onder hen
hadden na die gebeurtenis het gevoel alsof zij nu brave jongens
waren en tot zooiets zeker niet in staat zouden zijn.

„Wat zou er nu met hen gebeuren?” vraagt Paul bedeesd.

„Hij krijgt levenslang,” roept Chris, op wien een ernstig feit nooit veel
indruk maakt.

Maar de onderwijzer vervolgt: „Laten we hopen, dat het ditmaal met

een strenge berisping afloopt. Ik denk wel, dat ze allebei reeds
genoeg gestraft zijn en het hun een harde les is geweest. Ik denk
tenminste niet, dat ze in het vervolg zoo gemakkelijk zullen toegeven
aan dergelijke slechte neigingen. Nu jongens, we gaan weer aan ’t
werk.”

Deze heele gebeurtenis had echter vrij wat tijd [201]in beslag
genomen en eer ze ’t wisten, was het twaalf uur.
„Nou gaan we naar de Hooge Brug,” zei Puckie. „Ambro en Wim
zullen er zeker zijn.”

„Wat zullen ze opkijken, als we ze vertellen van ’t hoog bezoek op

school,” zei Karel.

„Ik vind ’t tòch een vuile streek,” zei Piet.

„Ja,” zegt Chris. „Dat je nou één pijpie wegneemt is nog daaraan toe,
maar ze waren met niet weinig tevreden.”

„Neen Chris,” vond Paul. „Dat maakt geen verschil, gappen is

gappen. En als ze iederen dag zoo’n pijpie stelen, hebben ze er in
één maand dertig.”

„Ja,” vielen de andere jongens Paul bij. „Hij heeft gelijk.”

„Zouden ze de kast nou in kunnen draaien?” vraagt Piet.

„Minderjarigen komen niet in de kast,” merkt Karel op. „Die gaan

naar een tuchtschool.”

„Jongens, wat ben jij op de hoogte van de wet. Of heb je al es in de

bajes gezeten,” lacht Puckie.

„Ik niet,” zegt Karel ernstig. „Maar ik weet van een jongen, die tot
driemaal toe schoenen gegapt had en die toen in een tuchtschool
werd opgeborgen.”

„Dan had ie er vast gebrek aan,” zegt Paul nadenkend. „Want wie
van ons zou ’t nu in z’n hoofd krijgen om een paar laarzen te
gappen.”

„Ja, ’t is gek,” filosofeert Piet. „Meestal gappen ze waar ze behoefte

aan hebben.” [202]
„Ja, da’s waar,” merkt Chris droogkomiek op. „Koos had zoo’n
behoefte aan een appeltje!”

De jongens schieten in een lach.

„Wat zat ie ’m anders te knijpen, die brave broek.”

„Zeg nou eens eerlijk,” zegt Chris plotseling. „Wie van jullie heeft nog
nooit wat gegapt?”

„Gegapt, gegapt!” bromt Puckie.

„Neen,” zegt Chris. „Geen smoessies, gappen, wegnemen, ’t is

allemaal hetzelfde en of ’t een pijp kaneel of een kner is, of een
koekje uit de trommel van je moeder, ’t is allemaal één pot nat.”

„Ja,” zegt Paul. „Uit de provisiekast heb ik wel eens gesnoept.”

„En ik heb rozen van de buren gekaapt,” zegt Piet.

„Met voorbedachten rade?” vraagt Karel deskundig.

„Jawel Edelachtbare,” lacht Piet.

Al pratende zijn de jongens de Hooge Brug genaderd en Piet geeft

een krijgskreet, die onmiddellijk beantwoord wordt.

„Ja jongens, ze zijn er.”

En in een drafje gaat het nu op ’t doel af.

Op dit uur is het in den Dierentuin zeer stil; bezoekers zijn er niet en
de werklieden zijn aan ’t schaften.

De Hooge Brug is dus veilig voor hen.

„Is er niemand in de buurt,” vraagt Karel.

Ze speuren allen rond.

„Niets te zien,” zegt Chris. „Kom, vlug er onder.”

En allen wippen over de grasstrook die zich [203]onder de Brug

voortzet en vinden Ambro en Wim in hun nieuwe vergaderplaats.

Ambro, die statig wilde opstaan, maar bijtijds bedacht, dat hij bij die
beweging hevig z’n bol zou stooten, begroette ze met een plechtig
handgewuif en sprak op verheven toon:

„Hoofden van Lebak, ik groet u allen zeer en ik zeg u, dat er vreugde

in mijn hart is, u allen hier bijeen te zien, luisterende naar de
woorden van mijn mond.”

„Val in drieën op den grond,” dolt Chris.

„Laat me uitspreken,” zegt Ambro verontwaardigd. „Hebben we hier

een fijn plekkie, of niet? En kijk hier es, overal struiken, die heb ik
vanmorgen hier neergezet, ze kunnen ons nooit ontdekken, maar
jullie moeten nou es probeeren je muil te houden.”

„Wat kan Ambro z’n woorden toch mooi kiezen,” merkt Paul op, die
nog onder den indruk is van de plechtige begroeting.

„Och, jôh! dat heeft ie uit ons taalboekie, al die flauwe kul kent hij uit
z’n kanes,” zegt Chris, daarmee Ambro allen roem ontnemend.

„Laten we hun nou vertellen van vanmorgen,” zegt Puckie, die

brandt van verlangen om het verhaal op te disschen.

Ze laten hem dan ook dat genoegen en Wim en Ambro krijgen in

kleuren en geuren het drama van dien morgen te hooren.
„Vertroost-me, wat ’n jammer, dat ik er niet bij was,” zegt Ambro.
„Alle ochtenden zijn even [204]saai en als er een lolletje is, ben ik er
niet.”

„Nou, een lolletje was ’t niet,” zegt Paul.

„Nee, jij hebt tranen met tuiten gehuild,” plaagt Piet. „Je oogen zien
nòg rood.”

Ambro en Wim gaan er echter niet verder op in, vol als ze zijn van
een nieuw plan.

„We hebben wat fijns uitgevonden,” zegt Ambro. „We komen na

vieren weer hier en dan gaan we visschen.”

„Visschen, hier! Dat hebben ze toch zoo in de smiezen,” zegt Karel.

„O, neen, man!” zegt Wim. „Dat zal je gewaar worden. Ambro, hoe
zouden we ook weer doen?”

„Nou, we hebben niks anders noodig, dan een touwtje met een
kromme speld, een kadetje en een krant.”

„Ik snap er niks van,” zegt Chris.

„Dat is een manier van lik-me-vessie,” zegt Puckie. „Daar vang je

immers niks mee.”

„Niet meedoen, hoor!” zegt Ambro korzelig. „Vooral niet! Jullie zijn
ezels. Eerst afwachten en dan keffen.”

„Nou, dan zullen we maar geduld hebben,” zegt Paul. „Wat Ambro
voorstelt mislukt haast nooit.”

„Ik mot ’t eerst zien,” houdt Chris vol.

„Dat zal je, zuurdeesem,” lacht Ambro. „Maar nou gaan we naar
huis, want ik heb trek in me „kuchie”.”

—————————————

Prompt kwart over vieren komt de bende terug bij de Hooge Brug
waar Ambro’s plan volvoerd moet worden. [205]

Wim wacht hem reeds op.

„Zei de oude niks, dat je er vanmorgen niet was,” informeert Wim bij
Ambro.

„Nee hoor, hij schijnt er langzamerhand aan te wennen. Heb je touw

bij je?”

„Ja, een heele dot.”

„Goed zoo, ik heb al ’t andere. Nou zal ik jullie uitleggen, hoe we ’t

’m lappen. Zien jullie dit touwtje? Daar gaat aan ’t eind een kromme
speld aan, die dient als vischhaakje, snappez-vous? Nou een pilletje
brood er aan en ik wil met jullie wedden, dat ik binnen drie minuten
een voren bij jullie breng.”

„Wat een opschepper,” begint Chris weer. „Ja, die laat zich nemen
met een kromme speld! Maar niet heusch!”

„Wachten jullie nou maar even. Van onder de brug uit kunnen jullie
me ’m eruit zien trekken. Maar ik moet eerst even koekeloeren of er
niemand in de buurt is. Hou de krant klaar, Wim, daar moet de heele
buit in. En dan gaan we ze bakken op ’t weiland bij den
Provenierssingel.”

„Tsjonge, jonge, wat zulle we smulle!” sart Puckie. „Ik mot

vanmiddag geen eten, ik krijg gebakken voren.”
„Nou, weg ben ik!” en met springt Ambro behoedzaam van onder de
brug, wipt de grasstrook over en wandelt de brug op, terwijl hij overal
rondspeurt of er geen onraad is. Als hij alles veilig bevonden heeft,
zien de jongens kleine stukjes brood in ’t water vallen. [206]

„Kijk es, hij lokt ze,” roept Karel vol spanning.

„Dat kost ’m z’n heele kadetje en hij vangt er geen een,” zegt Piet.

In minder dan geen tijd zien ze aan de kringetjes op het water dat de
visschen, die gewoon zijn aan een dergelijke tractatie, van alle
kanten komen toezwemmen. Af en toe zien ze een zilverwit vischje
in dartelen sprong even boven het water uitkomen.

„Wat een zooi zijn d’r,” zegt Chris. „Dat wordt wat, hoor!”

„Zie je wel,” zegt Paul. „Je kunt Ambro, heusch, altijd gelooven.”

Ambro is intusschen opgehouden met brood strooien en laat nu zijn

touwtje met de speld zakken.

De jongens kijken vol belangstelling toe. Niet zoodra heeft het

touwtje de oppervlakte van het water bereikt, of de argelooze
visschen loopen er in en een hapt er in het stukje brood.
Vliegensvlug trekt Ambro met een hevigen ruk het touw in en jawel!
hij slaat een voren op den kant. De jongens kunnen niet nalaten
luidkeels een hoeratje aan te heffen.

Maar Ambro, die zoo gauw hij kon, met z’n buit bij hen onder de
Brug is gekomen, beveelt onmiddellijke stilte.

„Zóó moeten jullie maar doen, boerenhengsten, dan zijn we dit

plekkie ook gauw kwijt.”
„Reusachtig,” zegt Chris. „Ik trek me woorden in, Ambro. Hij is
alweer reusachtig! Heel deftig [207]en bedaard slaat ie me daar een
visch aan den haak en wat een kokkert!”

„O, ben je bijgedraaid, ongeloovige Thomas! Wanneer zal jij nou es

gelooven aan de magische kracht van den beroemden toovenaar
Hadschi Baba!”

„Mag ik ’t eens probeeren, Ambro?” vraagt Puckie.

„Probeeren mag je ’t, maar nou geloof ik op mijn beurt, dat ’t je nog
niet zoo glad zal afgaan.”

„Poeh! Ik heb nou gezien hoe ’t moet. Geef maar gauw het touwtje.”

„Alsjeblieft majesteit! Toon nou je kunsten. Maar kijk uit!”

Puckie gaat nu op zijn beurt aan ’t werk, doch telkens ondervindt hij,
dat de visschen wel in het brood happen, maar niet in de speld.

„Hij is te langzaam, ik wist het wel,” zegt Ambro op stelligen toon.

„Ja, ze zijn gek, ze zullen op hèm wachten!”

Puckie geeft het eindelijk op en komt met beschaamde kaken bij ze

terug.

„Kijk die visch es springen,” hoont Chris. „Nou maar jij ken ’t. Als je
nog even doorgegaan hadt, was de vijver leeg geweest.”

„Stik,” is ’t eenige antwoord van Puckie, die zichzelf overschat had.

„Nou, jongens, nog een paar dagen en dan gaan we ze bakken.”

„Vang jij ze dan maar,” zegt Wim. „Wij zullen er toch wel geen slag
van hebben en anders zitten we hier morgenochtend nog.” [208]
Het blijkt alweer, dat de visschen Ambro goed gezind zijn, want van
de viermaal, dat hij het touwtje liet zakken, sloeg hij er driemaal een
uit.

De buit werd in de krant gepakt en de bende passeerde met het

braafste gezicht van de wereld den niets kwaads vermoedenden
portier.

„Nou naar het weiland, vooruit, jongens, loopen! ’t kan nog best voor
zessen,” en in vollen draf hollen ze naar het nieuwe doel.

Daar gekomen, vragen ze zich af, hoe ze die visschen nu gebakken

krijgen.

„We hebben niet eens boter,” zegt Karel.

„We laten ze in d’r eigen vet gaar smoren,” zegt Piet.

„Die spreekt al van bakken! Hê-je wat om ze in te doen?”

„In Puckie z’n pet!”

„Ja, da’s waar,” zegt Ambro.

„Daar hebben we niet aan gedacht, maar aan den slootkant liggen
meestal oude ketels en pannen, wie weet is er niks bij.”

Ze gaan nu met z’n allen zoeken. ’t Is er een rommelig zoodje daar

aan dien slootkant, je vindt er alle mogelijke voorwerpen die er door
de bewoners van den achterkant neergegooid zijn; ’t is een formeele
vuilnisbelt; aardappelschillen, koolstronken, leege flesschen, oude
schoenen, stukken tapijt en vooral ook leege inmaakbusjes en ketels
zonder bodem.

Puckie houdt triomphantelijk een leeg inmaakbusje omhoog. [209]

„Kijk es, jongens, is dat niks?”

„Ja, dat zal wel gaan,” zegt Ambro.

„Een oude koekenpan was beter.”

„Die heb ik hier,” roept Piet plotseling en hij rent op een plat ijzer
voorwerp af, dat half boven het water uitsteekt. Maar bij het uit ’t
water halen blijkt, dat ’t geen koekenpan, maar een oud vuilnisblik is.

„Toch beter dan een busje,” roept Ambro op beslisten toon.

„Daar kunnen ze plat in bakken.”

„Maar hoe krijgen we dat boven het vuur?” vraagt Karel. „Ik houdt ’t
niet vast, want dan brand ik m’n klavieren.”

„Ik heb al wat,” roept Paul verheugd en hij komt met een eind
prikkeldraad aandragen.

„Juist,” zegt Ambro. „Nou zijn we klaar. Daar hangen we ’t blik in, en
binden ’t aan drie stokken boven een vuurtje; zal je dat effetjes fijn
zien branden.”

Drie lange stokken zijn gauw gevonden. Ambro heeft met zijn
beroemd zakmes drie wilgentakken afgesneden. Die worden
kruislings op den grond geplaatst en van boven met een touwtje
verbonden. Na veel moeite hangt het vuilnisblik te bengelen aan het
ijzerdraad.

„Nou houtjes zoeken voor ’t fikkie, jongens,” zegt Wim.

Alles komt aandragen met houtjes en papieren en Ambro maakt

daarmeê het vuurtje aan.
„We hebben nog lang niet genoeg,” zegt hij. „Zoo krijgen we ze maar
half gaar.” [210]

„Moet het blik niet eerst schoon gemaakt?” vraagt Paul bezorgd.

„Hoor zoo’n viesneus! Wie d’r vies is krijgt niks!”

Piet merkt heel gewichtig op, dat alle schadelijke bestanddeelen

door het vuur vernietigd worden.

„Prefester Piet zal ’t weten,” dolt Ambro.

„Die eene leeft nog,” zegt Puckie terwijl hij de krant opendoet waarin
de visschen opgeborgen zijn.

„Dat zal niet lang meer duren,” merkt Chris op. „Z’n laatste uur heeft
geslagen.”

„We zullen ’m Jeanne d’Arc noemen, die werd immers ook gebakken
boven een houtvuurtje.”

Intusschen laaien de vlammen onder het vuilnisblik hoog op en

Ambro heeft al aan zijn hand ondervonden, dat hij het blik niet
ongestraft beet kan pakken.

„Vertroost me, wat is dat heet!” zegt hij, terwijl hij twee vingers in z’n
mond steekt. „Vooruit, Puckie, geef op ’n visch, we zullen met één
beginnen, dan zien we wat er van komt.”

Een der slachtoffers wordt netjes op het blik gelegd en begint hevig
te sissen.

„Gelukkig maar, dat ie er niks van weet,” zegt Paul.

„De vissche hebbe geen wetenskap, jongeheer,” zegt Chris.

„Dat zei onze vischboer laatst.”

„Ik geloof, dat er niks van overblijft,” zegt Ambro, die met een
bezorgd gezicht de visch steeds kleiner ziet worden.

„’t Is net een sigaar,” zegt Chris. [211]

„Hij gaat in asch op.”

„Je moet hem keeren,” raadt Piet aan.

Die raad wordt onmiddellijk opgevolgd en Ambro tracht met een

houtje de zwarte massa om te keeren, maar deze blijkt één te zijn
geworden met het vuilnisblik.

„Ik heb ’t je wel gezegd,” verwijt Karel.

„D’r hoort boter bij, de bodem moet eerst vet gemaakt”

„Kok in de keuken,” galmt Ambro.

„Maar hoe komen we nou aan vet?”

„Uit Chris z’n haar,” roept Puckie.

„Die heeft toch zoo’n pomadekoppie.”

„Hij is jaloersch op me scheiding, met de meeste zorg gekweekt. Die

is meer waard dan die kaaskop van jou!” lacht Chris terug.

„Als we nou es probeeren, met één vischje de pot vet te maken om

de rest daarin te bakken,” zegt Piet.

„Ja, dat moet kunnen,” vindt Ambro.

Wéér wordt een der gevangenen opgeofferd, in de hoop, dat
daarmee het gewenschte doel bereikt zal worden.

Schijnbaar lukt ’t dezen keer nu beter en inderdaad zijn er plekjes,

hoewel heel klein, aan te wijzen die eenigszins den indruk geven van
gebakken visch.

Ambro is de eerste die het waagt zijn tanden in de lekkernij te zetten.

Maar het gezicht, dat hij daarbij trekt toont den jongens voldoende,
hoe afschuwwekkend de smaak ervan is. [212]

Met een onverstaanbaren uitroep spuwt hij het lekkere hapje uit.

„Zooiets heb ik m’n leven nog nooit geproefd, dat is je reinste

vergift!”

„Dan zullen we ’t met den laatsten maar niet meer probeeren,” zegt
Puckie.

„Zonde, dat we ’m nou voor niks uit het water hebben gehaald,” vindt
Paul.

„Hij is niet verloren,” roept Karel.

„Ze kunnen ’m thuis bakken.”

„Ja, ze zullen je zien aankomen, met één katvischje!”

„Voortaan moeten we de spullen in orde hebben en voor een

koekenpan en boter zorgen. Er zit nog visch genoeg,” zegt Ambro.

„Laten we dan Zaterdag nog eens gaan,” stelt Chris voor, „En laten
we dan eerlijk een pan en een stukje boter te leen vragen, want als
we ’m gappen, komt de inspecteur ons kookgerij op school halen.”
„Afgesproken, ik zorg voor boter,” zegt Ambro. „En ik wou, dat ik dien
vuilen smaak kwijt was!”

„En dan zal ik moeder een koekenpan vragen,” zegt Wim. Ze

aanvaarden nu de terugtocht en laten hun hoogst modern kookstel
op de weide staan.

De voorbijgangers zullen het zeker aangezien hebben voor de

overblijfselen van een Indianenkamp. [213]
[Inhoud]
 DE KERMIS.

„Hoeveel heb jij al?” vroeg Ambro.

„Een gulden vier en twintig cent. En dan krijg ik er een rijksdaalder

bij van oom Koos, als ik jarig ben,” zei Chris.

Ambro en Chris zaten te zamen onder de Hooge Brug, in afwachting

van de komst der kameraden.

„Een rijksdaalder,” vroeg Ambro ongeloovig. „Nou, nou, jij hebt een
goeien oom, die heeft zeker geen kinderen.”

„Ja, van de getrouwde Oom’s en Tante’s krijg ik niet zooveel,

hoogstens een maffie. Dat cadeau van Oom Koos noemen we „de
koude handdruk”, omdat ie tegelijk met de felicitatie een rijksdaalder
in je hand duwt.”

„Nou, bij mij is armoe troef, ik heb pas drie en veertig spie, maar ik
ga weer drie dagen voor gids spelen in den Dierentuin, dat heeft me
verleden jaar ruim ’n riks opgebracht. Dat waren royale boeren!”

„’n Mooie verdienste,” zegt Chris.

„Mij hebben ze es afgescheept met een apennootje.”

„Ja, maar jij hadt ook geen lint om je pet.—’t Is jammer, dat we niet
met de heele bende de kermis op kunnen,” zegt Ambro.

„O, ja, da’s waar, er gaan er een paar uit de stad. Wie gaan er
eigenlijk?”
„La’s kijken, Wim gaat naar ’t Ginniken, Paul, [214]zooals altijd naar
Vlaardingen, wat je daar nou an hebt, ik weet ’t niet, haringstank en
verder geen nieuws.”

„Nou, Piet zal ook wel de kermis niet op gaan, want die spaart al z’n
centen op voor een nieuwe fiets.”

„Nog twee weken, jôh! Zal me een reuzen-lol worden!”

Plotseling weerklinkt een signaal. Puckie is in aantocht en vlak

achter hem verschijnen Piet en Paul.

„Waar is Karel?” vraagt Ambro.

„Die is aan ’t voer zoeken voor z’n konijnen.”

„O, leven die mormels nog?” vraagt Chris.

„Of ze leven!” zegt Ambro. „Hij heeft ze gedresseerd. Een kan ’n pijp
rooken en de andere kan praten.”

„Als-je me nou,” zegt Puckie.

Paul keek nog even verbaasd op, als hechtte hij geloof aan de
woorden van Ambro, maar ’t geval schijnt hem toch wel wat
wonderbaarlijk toe.

Als de jongens de gezamenlijke kas opmaken, blijkt er zeven gulden

drie en zestig centen te zijn.

„Een vette kermispot,” zegt Ambro. „En er komt nog een boel bij.”

De jongens zijn gewoon, bij dergelijke vermakelijkheden, „botje bij

botje” te doen en vooraf maken zij steeds het programma op.

„Waar zullen we nou ’t eerst naar toe gaan,” vraagt Ambro.

„Eerst zuurballen koopen,” zegt Puckie. [215]

„O, daar heb je Puck de snoeper! Als je al je centen aan snoep

verteert, blijft er niks voor de pret over.”

„Dàt weet ik vast,” zegt Chris. „We moeten naar ’t hippodrôme. Dàt
moet zoo eenig zijn!”

„En ik moet „de dikke dame” zien,” zegt Ambro. „Die heeft ’n paar
armen en beenen, zoo dik als een olifantspoot. En echt hoor! Je mag
er in prikken.”

„Ik ga naar ’t vlooien-theâtre, dat heb ik nog nooit gezien en ’t moet

prachtig zijn. Daar loopen ze als paardjes voor een wagentje.”

„En ze maken een dubbele saltormortale op mekaars schouders,”

zegt Chris.

„Neen, nòg sterker,” zegt Ambro.

„Je hebt er een tandarts bij, die ze de tanden uittrekt, dan kunnen ze
niet meer bijten.”

„En ik heb er in Peking een piano hooren spelen, een klein stukje,
maar ’t was toch heel mooi voor zoo’n klein beestje.”

„Ben jij de lolligste thuis?” vraagt Karel.

„Ja, op de poes na,” zegt Chris.

„Hè, laten we nog een beetje doorgaan met onzin praten,” zegt Paul.
„Ik vond ’t juist zoo leuk.”

„Paul denkt, nou ie niks van de kermis ziet, moeten wij maar kermis
voor hem maken,” zegt Chris.
Plotseling geeft Ambro Chris een tik op zijn hoofd.

„Au!” roept Chris.

„Sla op den kop van Jut,” zegt Ambro. [216]

„Dat zouden we heelemaal vergeten, daar moeten we ook heen.”

„Wat een lefschopper! Dat zou jij nooit halen, daar moet je nogal
geen kracht voor hebben,” zegt Puckie.

„Zal je gewaar worden, Vader! Met één vinger mep ik ’m de lucht in.”

„Zouden we ’s avonds ook naar de kermis mogen,” peinsde Karel.

„Ik vraag in zoo’n tijd niet wat mag,” zei Ambro. „Ik ga!”

„Maar ’t is gevaarlijk,” zei Paul.

„Ze steken met messen.”

„Nou, juist emmes om te kijken.”

„Mot je ’n peut in je ribben krijgen,” zegt Karel.

„Als je klein bent, loop je nooit gevaar bij zooiets en ik geloof niet,
dat ’t zoo erg zal zijn,” zegt Ambro.

Plotseling roept Chris: „Stil, jongens, hou-je gedekt!”

„Wat dan?” schrikken allen op.

Deze uitroep heeft de aandacht getrokken van den niets kwaads

vermoedenden man, die zijn bootje onder de Hooge Brug door
boomt.
Hij krijgt de jongens nu in de gaten en stuurt zijn bootje hun kant uit.

’t Is Kees, wiens werk het is, den vijver uit te baggeren en die lang
geen vriend van de jongens is, daar deze ’t hem meermalen lastig
hebben gemaakt.

Hij kent ze dan ook op een prik en ’t lag al [217]lang in zijn

voornemen, bij de eerste de beste gelegenheid wraak te nemen op
„die kleine niksnutters”.

Ambro hoopte den toestand nog met een grap te kunnen redden en
zei:

„Waar gaat de reis heen, Kees? Mogen we niet mee? We zullen niet
snoepen van de chocoladevla in je bootje.”

„Ja, hou je gebbetjes maar voor je, kwaje aap,” snauwde Kees hem
toe. „Hoe komme jullie hier?”

„Met een extra trein uit New-York,” zegt Chris, die, als ie ziet, dat de
zaak tòch verloren is, brutaal wordt.

„Ik zal rapport van jullie make en je name hoef ik niet te wete, want
die weet ik als te best. Jullie benne bekend als de bonte hond, en as
je nou denk, ons altijd te glad af te zijn, dan bin je d’r naast. Jullie
binne nou zuur, reken maar!”

Ambro valt nu in theâtrale houding op zijn knieën en smeekt op

zonderlinge wijze om genade: „Kees, Kees, Kees, je hebt er water bij
gedaan!”

„Maar wil ik je nou es in ernst vertellen, waarom we hier zitten,” zegt

Chris.