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Wittgenstein, Religion and Ethics
 In memory of Dewi Z. Phillips (1934–2006), who, in a
Wittgensteinian spirit, encouraged us to seek to do conceptual
justice to the world in all its variety and to recognize that doing so
makes ethical demands of the inquirer.
 Also available from Bloomsbury

Beauty, Wittgenstein and the End of Art, by Sonia Sedivy

Contemplating Religious Forms of Life: Wittgenstein and D. Z.
Phillips, by Mikel Burley
Portraits of Wittgenstein: Abridged Edition, edited by F. A. Flowers
III and Ian Ground
Rebirth and the Stream of Life: A Philosophical Study of
Reincarnation, Karma and Ethics, by Mikel Burley
The Selected Writings of Maurice O’Connor Drury: On Wittgenstein,
Philosophy, Religion and Psychiatry, edited by John Hayes
 Contents

Notes on Contributors
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations

Introduction: Wittgenstein, Religion and Ethics: Seeing the

Connections Mikel Burley

1 The Early Wittgenstein on Ethical Religiousness as a

Dispositional Attitude Chon Tejedor

2 ‘The Problem of Life’: Later Wittgenstein on the Difficulty of

Honest Happiness Gabriel Citron

3 Wittgenstein and the Study of Religion: Beyond Fideism and

Atheism Mikel Burley

4 Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard and Chalcedon Rowan Williams

5 On the Very Idea of a Theodicy Genia Schönbaumsfeld

6 Wittgenstein, Analogy and Religion in Mulhall’s The Great

Riddle Wayne Proudfoot

7 Riddles, Nonsense and Religious Language Stephen Mulhall

8 Wittgenstein and the Distinctiveness of Religious

Language Michael Scott
9 Number and Transcendence: Wittgenstein and Cantor John
Milbank

10 What Have I Done? Sophie Grace Chappell

11 Wittgenstein and the Value of Clarity Duncan Richter

Bibliography
Index
 Notes on Contributors

Mikel Burley is Associate Professor of Religion and Philosophy at

the University of Leeds, UK. His publications include Contemplating
Religious Forms of Life: Wittgenstein and D. Z. Phillips (Continuum,
2012), Rebirth and the Stream of Life: A Philosophical Study of
Reincarnation, Karma and Ethics (Bloomsbury, 2016) and a volume
co-edited with Niklas Forsberg and Nora Hämäläinen entitled
Language, Ethics and Animal Life: Wittgenstein and Beyond
(Bloomsbury, 2012). He is currently completing a monograph
entitled Expanding Philosophy of Religion: A Radical Pluralist
Approach.

Sophie Grace Chappell is Professor of Philosophy at the Open

University, UK. Previously known as Timothy Chappell, she began
living openly and officially as a woman in autumn 2014. She was
educated at Magdalen College, Oxford, and Edinburgh University,
and has published widely on ethics, moral psychology, epistemology,
ancient philosophy and philosophy of religion. Her books include
Understanding Human Goods (Edinburgh University Press, 2003),
Reading Plato’s Theaetetus (Hackett, 2005), Ethics and Experience
(Acumen, 2009) and Knowing What to Do: Imagination, Virtue, and
Platonism in Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2014). She has also
edited or co-edited four collections of essays in ethics, most recently
Intuition, Theory, and Anti-Theory in Ethics (Oxford University Press,
2015). From 2017 to 2020 she is a Leverhulme Trust Major Research
Fellow, and a Visiting Fellow in the Department of Philosophy,
University of St Andrews. Her main current research is about
epiphanies, immediate and revelatory encounters with value. She
lives with her family in the north-east of Scotland.

Gabriel Citron is Assistant Professor in Religion and Critical

Thought at Princeton University, USA. His extensive Wittgenstein
editing work includes publishing notes by Rush Rhees and Norman
Malcolm in Mind and co-editing (with David Stern and Brian Rogers)
Wittgenstein: Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1933: From the Notes of G.
E. Moore (Cambridge University Press, 2016). His authored work
includes articles in Philosophers’ Imprint, Philosophical Investigations
and Faith and Philosophy.

John Milbank is Emeritus Professor in Religion, Politics and Ethics

at the University of Nottingham, UK. His many books include
Theology and Social Theory (Blackwell, 1990; second edition, 2006),
The Word Made Strange (Blackwell, 1997), Truth in Aquinas (co-
authored with Catherine Pickstock; Routledge, 2001), Being
Reconciled (Routledge, 2003), Beyond Secular Order (Wiley-
Blackwell, 2013) and The Politics of Virtue: Post-Liberalism and the
Human Future (co-authored with Adrian Pabst; Rowman and
Littlefield, 2016). He has also published two collections of poetry and
co-authored two books with Slavoj Žižek and Creston Davis.

Stephen Mulhall is Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at New College,

University of Oxford, UK. His publications include Inheritance and
Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard (Oxford University
Press, 2001), On Film (Routledge, 2002; second edition, 2008; third
edition, 2016), Wittgenstein’s Private Language (Oxford University
Press, 2006), The Conversation of Humanity (University of Virginia
Press, 2007), The Wounded Animal: J. M. Coetzee and the Difficulty
of Reality (Princeton University Press, 2009), The Self and Its
Shadows (Oxford University Press, 2013) and The Great Riddle:
Wittgenstein and Nonsense, Theology and Philosophy (Oxford
University Press, 2015).
Wayne Proudfoot is Professor of Religion at Columbia University,
USA, with research interests that encompass contemporary
philosophy of religion, conceptions of religious experience and
mysticism, classical and contemporary pragmatism and modern
Protestant thought. His publications include God and the Self: Three
Types of Philosophy of Religion (Associated University Presses,
1976), Religious Experience (University of California Press, 1985), an
edited volume entitled William James and a Science of Religions:
Reexperiencing ‘The Varieties of Religious Experience’ (Columbia
University Press, 2004) and some recent articles on the thought of
Friedrich Schleiermacher.

Duncan Richter is Professor of Philosophy at the Virginia Military

Institute, USA. His publications include Ethics after Anscombe: Post
‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (Kluwer, 2000), Wittgenstein at His Word
(Continuum, 2004), Why Be Good? A Historical Introduction to Ethics
(Oxford University Press, 2007), Anscombe’s Moral Philosophy
(Lexington, 2011) and Historical Dictionary of Wittgenstein’s
Philosophy (Lexington, 2014; first edition, 2004). He has also
published articles on philosophy’s relation to poetry and the
emotions as well as on Wittgenstein and religion.

Genia Schönbaumsfeld is Professor of Philosophy at the

University of Southampton, UK. Specializing in Wittgenstein,
epistemology, Kierkegaard and philosophy of religion, her
publications include Transzendentale Argumentation und
Skeptizismus (Peter Lang, 2000), A Confusion of the Spheres:
Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on Philosophy and Religion (Oxford
University Press, 2007) and The Illusion of Doubt (Oxford University
Press, 2016). From 2003–6 she held a prestigious Hertha Firnberg
research grant awarded by the Austrian Science Fund.

Michael Scott is Reader in Philosophy at the University of

Manchester, UK. He is the author of Religious Language (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2013), co-editor (with Andrew Moore) of Realism and
Religion: Philosophical and Theological Perspectives (Ashgate, 2007)
and has published articles on the philosophy of language, the senses
and action as well as on realism and antirealism in the philosophy of
religion. His current research focuses on faith and on apophaticism
in the context of religious language.

Chon Tejedor is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of

Hertfordshire and Philosophy Research Fellow at Regent’s Park
College, University of Oxford, UK. Specializing in the history of
philosophy (especially Wittgenstein and Hume), philosophy of
language, ethics and epistemology, her publications include Starting
with Wittgenstein (Bloomsbury, 2011), The Early Wittgenstein on
Metaphysics, Natural Science, Language and Value (Routledge,
2014) and a forthcoming collection, Wittgenstein on Science, co-
edited with Adrian Moore.

Rowan Williams is Master of Magdalene College, University of

Cambridge, UK, a position that he took up in 2013 after having been
Archbishop of Canterbury from 2002 to 2012. An accomplished
theologian and poet, his major theological works include Grace and
Necessity: Reflections on Art and Love (Continuum, 2005), Wrestling
with Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology (SCM Press, 2007),
Dostoevsky: Language, Faith and Fiction (Continuum, 2008), A
Margin of Silence: The Holy Spirit in Russian Orthodox Theology
(Éditions du Lys Vert, 2008), Faith in the Public Square (Bloomsbury,
2012), The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language
(Bloomsbury, 2014; based on the author’s Gifford Lectures of 2013–
14) and The Tragic Imagination (Oxford University Press, 2016).
 Acknowledgements

Nine of the eleven chapters in this volume are based on papers

presented at the Eighth British Wittgenstein Society Annual
Conference, which took place at Hinsley Hall in Leeds on the 6th and
7th of September 2016. I am grateful to colleagues of mine at the
University of Leeds who assisted and encouraged me in the
organizing of that conference and to staff at Hinsley Hall who
enabled it to run so smoothly. I am also, of course, obliged to the
speakers and delegates who attended, without whose contributions
it could not have been the success that it was.
Since its founding in 2007 the British Wittgenstein Society (BWS)
has been active in promoting deeper and wider understanding of
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ideas and methods, with a particular focus on
displaying their relevance to major themes not only in philosophy but
also in contemporary society and culture at large. My thanks are due
to the Executive Committee of the BWS, especially its President,
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, and Vice-President, Ian Ground, for their
tireless support of the conference and of this volume. I also thank
them for inviting me to present the Thirteenth British Wittgenstein
Society Lecture at the Bloomsbury Institute, London, in May 2015,
an embellished version of which constitutes Chapter 3 of the present
volume.
The other contribution to this volume that is not based on a paper
presented at the 2016 BWS conference is Chapter 10 by Sophie
Grace Chappell. This is a significantly amended version of a paper
first published in the online journal Diametros (No. 38, December
2013), though not previously available in print. I am sure readers
will agree that the issues addressed in the chapter, including those
of intention and the doctrine of double effect, are highly pertinent to
the present volume’s themes.
The conference was dedicated to the late D. Z. Phillips, who died
slightly over ten years previously. Phillips’ prodigious efforts at
advancing Wittgenstein-influenced approaches to the study of
religion and ethics made him an inspiration to many, and his name
was mentioned numerous times at the conference. It is likely that he
would have taken issue with most, probably all, of the chapters in
this volume to a greater or lesser degree, as Phillips had a sharp eye
for what he saw as weaknesses in others’ arguments. But insofar as
the contributions collected here exemplify that same spirit of critical
engagement, combined with attentiveness to Wittgenstein’s work
and ideas, Phillips would surely have appreciated the project. It is a
pleasure to dedicate this book, like the conference, to Dewi, who is
remembered with enormous affection by those who knew him,
whether they concur with his philosophical ideas or not.
I also here wish to acknowledge the encouragement I received
prior to the conference from Hilary Putnam, who sadly died in March
2016. His work exploring both the significance of Wittgenstein’s
published ‘Lectures on Religious Belief’ (especially in Putnam’s
Renewing Philosophy, Ch. 7) and Wittgenstein’s relation to Jewish
thought (in Putnam’s Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life, Ch. 1)
made an important contribution to contemporary thinking about
Wittgenstein in relation to religious and ethical matters. In email
correspondence prior to his death, Putnam had expressed warm
appreciation that the conference was going ahead. He, too, will be
greatly missed.
At an early stage of the production of this volume two anonymous
reviewers for Bloomsbury Publishing provided helpful comments on
draft material. On behalf of all the contributors, I express my
gratitude to them. And finally, let me thank Colleen Coalter, Helen
Saunders and their colleagues at Bloomsbury, along with the
production team at RefineCatch, for their geniality and efficiency in
seeing this book through to publication. It has, as ever, been a
pleasure working with them; their painstaking efforts are much
appreciated.
 Mikel Burley
Leeds, October 2017
 Abbreviations

(See the Bibliography for full publication details.)

Works by Ludwig Wittgenstein

BB The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the
‘Philosophical Investigations’, second edition, 1969.
BT The Big Typescript: TS 213, 2005.
CE ‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’, Philosophia, 1976.
CV Culture and Value, 1980.
CVR Culture and Value, revised edition, 1998.
GB ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, trans. John Beversluis,
in Philosophical Occasions, 1912–1951, 1993.
GBM Remarks on Frazer’s ‘Golden Bough’, trans. A. C. Miles,
revised by Rush Rhees, 1979.
LC Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and
Religious Belief, 1966.
LE ‘A Lecture on Ethics’, Philosophical Review, 1965.
LFM Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics,
Cambridge, 1939, 1976.
LW I Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, 1982.
LW II Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2, 1992.
NB Notebooks 1914–1916, second edition, 1979.
OC On Certainty, 1974.
PG Philosophical Grammar, 1974.
PI Philosophical Investigations, second edition, trans. G. E. M.
Anscombe, 1958.
PI4 Philosophical Investigations, fourth edition, trans. G. E. M.
Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, 2009. [The
subscript ‘4’ will be included in citations only when the
translation quoted differs from that in earlier editions.]
PPF ‘Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment’ [formerly known as
Philosophical Investigations, Part 2], 2009.
PPO Public and Private Occasions, 2003.
PT Prototractatus, 1971.
RFM Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, third edition,
1978.
RPP I Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, 1980.
RPP Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2, 1980.
II
TLP Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F.
McGuinness, revised edition, 1974.
TLPO Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden, 1922.
WLC Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge, 1930–1932, 1980.
Z Zettel, second edition, 1981.

Works by Other Authors

EW Rowan Williams, The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of
Language, 2014.
FTH Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling [1843], trans. Alastair
Hannay, 1985.
FTL Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling [1843], trans. Walter
Lowrie, 1994.
GR Stephen Mulhall, The Great Riddle: Wittgenstein and
Nonsense, Theology and Philosophy, 2015.
PF Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments [1844], 1985.
ST Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae [composed c. 1265–
1274], ed. Brian Davies and Brian Leftow, 2006.
WVC Friedrich Waismann, Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna
Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann, 1979.
 Introduction
Wittgenstein, Religion and Ethics: Seeing the
Connections
Mikel Burley

A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have

an overview of the use of our words. – Our grammar is deficient
in surveyability. A surveyable representation [übersichtliche
Darstellung] produces precisely that kind of understanding
which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of
finding and inventing intermediate links.
PI4 §122

Ludwig Wittgenstein was a philosopher and a human being who

evades simple classifications. He ploughed his own furrow in his
work and in his life, coming to eschew general theories in favour of
sustained and rigorous attention to the nuances and intricacies of
particular cases. To say that Wittgenstein was most deeply
concerned with the workings of language in our lives is a legitimate
starting point for considering his approaches to philosophy, but it
only begins to do justice to the prodigious range of his thinking
when one notices how pervasively intermeshed language and human
life are. The intellectual tools that Wittgenstein developed for
investigating our language-pervaded lives lend themselves to being
deployed in relation to an unlimited number of phenomena and
indeed to ‘proto-phenomena’ (PI §654) – to the very conditions of
our being able to do or say anything at all. Thus, regardless of the
fact that he wrote relatively little that makes direct reference to
religion or ethics, Wittgenstein’s ideas have inspired and continue to
inspire an abundance of insightful work in the study of these areas,
among not only philosophers but also practitioners of many other
disciplines, including theology, sociology, anthropology and the
multidisciplinary field known as religious studies.
The present volume brings together new or newly revised pieces
by eleven eminent scholars who work in philosophy or theology or
across these two broad disciplinary areas. Each chapter engages
with or carries forward ideas from Wittgenstein – in most cases
directly, though in some cases more obliquely. Taken together, they
demonstrate something of the diversity of forms that such
engagement is taking in the contemporary period. My task in this
introduction is to set the context for those chapters by providing a
concise overview of the connections between Wittgenstein’s thought
on the one hand and inquiry into religion and ethics on the other. I
shall also, in the final section, offer summaries of each of the
chapters.

From passing over in silence to the elucidation of

grammar
The famous final proposition of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus –
the only book of Wittgenstein’s to be published during his lifetime –
states that ‘What we cannot speak about we must pass over in
silence’ (TLP 7).1 Regardless of how one interprets the purpose of
the Tractatus as a whole, it is generally agreed that, for Wittgenstein
at that time, the matters about which we cannot speak in any
intelligible manner include the religious and the ethical dimensions of
our lives. ‘[I]t is’, Wittgenstein writes, ‘impossible for there to be
propositions of ethics. | Propositions can express nothing that is
higher. | It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. | Ethics is
transcendental’ (TLP 6.42–6.421). By affirming that ethics exceeds
the expressive capacities of language, Wittgenstein is not, of course,
denying the importance of ethics. On the contrary, by characterizing
it as ‘higher’ and ‘transcendental’, Wittgenstein is declaring ethics to
be of absolute importance in our lives. It is just that one cannot say
anything about it.2
When Wittgenstein returned to academic philosophy over a
decade after having completed the Tractatus, he was invited to give
a lecture by a group at Cambridge called The Heretics. Accepting the
invitation, Wittgenstein presented his lecture on 17 November 1929,
and the text of the lecture was eventually to be published as ‘‘A
Lecture on Ethics’ in 1965. In certain respects, the lecture represents
a moment of transition in Wittgenstein’s thinking. While still tied to
the Tractarian contention that attempts to say anything about ethics
or religion inevitably run up against the limits of language,
Wittgenstein was clearly pulled towards wanting to make space for
ethical and religious locutions. To indicate what he means by a value
that is ‘ethical’ or ‘absolute’, Wittgenstein mentions three of his own
experiences. The first he describes as ‘wonder at the existence of
the world’ (LE 8),3 the second is ‘the experience of feeling absolutely
safe’ regardless of what might happen (LE 8) and the third is the
experience of ‘feeling guilty’ (LE 10). Searching for forms of
language in which such experiences might be expressed,
Wittgenstein reaches for a religious vocabulary. He suggests that
wondering at the existence of the world is ‘exactly what people were
referring to when they said that God had created the world’, ‘the
experience of absolute safety has been described by saying that we
feel safe in the hands of God’ and the feeling of guilt is what ‘the
phrase that God disapproves of our conduct’ is describing (LE 10).
While seeing a place for these forms of words in our lives,
Wittgenstein cannot find a way of formulating them as propositions
with a straightforward correspondence to actual or possible states of
affairs in the world. He therefore feels compelled to call them
nonsensical, despite maintaining a deep respect for them (LE 11).
Over the remainder of his career and life, Wittgenstein came to
see how corresponding to (or picturing) what he had in the Tractatus
regarded as states of affairs is not the only way in which a form of
words can gain a sense. It is, he came to think, precisely by having
a role in a form of life – a role that might, but need not, involve
picturing states of affairs – that our modes of language come to
have the sense that they do. If it is practice that ‘gives the words
their sense’ (CVR 97e), then insofar as a form of words is deployed
within the ‘stream’ or ‘weave’ or ‘hurly-burly’ of human life, it has a
sense to be looked for;4 and the place to look, at least in ‘a large
class of cases’, is how it is used ‘in the language in which it is at
home’ (PI4 §§43, 116). From this revised vantage point, the
philosophical task ceases to be that of driving a sharp wedge
between sense and nonsense in any general sense of these terms,
and becomes instead that of attending to particular cases of things
that are said – whether by oneself or by others – which generate
difficulties of understanding. In struggling to overcome those
difficulties it is not, Wittgenstein thought, a general theory of
language that will help us, but close attention to the problematic
cases themselves. The form of investigation required is ‘grammatical’
in the sense that it seeks to elucidate, by means of description, how
particular words or phrases cohere with the linguistic and
behavioural surroundings in which they have a place: it is a
returning of the words to their rough, often messy, everyday
locations as opposed to the abstracted, decontextualized, rarefied
environments typical of much philosophical theorizing.
There is no reason in principle why ethical or religious uses of
language should be exempt from these grammatical inquiries.
Indeed, if ethical and religious discourse tends often to trip us up, it
may be that precisely these uses are among the ones to which
careful consideration will need to be given.

Thinking about religion and ethics in Wittgenstein’s

wake
The majority of the remarks of Wittgenstein’s that refer most directly
to religious or ethical matters are scattered throughout his
notebooks, lectures and conversations. Many of them have appeared
in edited collections published subsequent to Wittgenstein’s death,
some of these being based on students’ partial transcriptions of his
lectures or on notes of informal conversations written down by his
friends. Notwithstanding the fragmentary nature of the remarks,
they, along with the general orientation of Wittgenstein’s methods,
have provided inspiration to many philosophers, theologians and
other thinkers who have inherited and pursued those methods along
their own particular trajectories.
Among the themes characteristic of Wittgenstein’s work that have
been influential upon inquirers into religion and ethics are those of
family resemblance, language-games and forms of life, plus the
importance of the instinctive (‘primitive’, ‘animal’) sources of much of
our bodily and verbal behaviour. From the 1950s onwards, for
example, philosophers and other scholars of religion began to see
the value in viewing the concept of religion in terms of the ‘family
resemblances’ between its multiple uses. In other words, it was
noticed that terms such as ‘religion’ and ‘religious’ apply to a diverse
range of human phenomena not by virtue of those phenomena all
possessing some essential set of shared properties, but rather by
virtue of the complex overlapping similarities that they collectively
comprise.5 Adopting such a perspective helps to free the scholar
from the grip of a twofold assumption: first, that wherever a single
word or cluster of words is in play (such as ‘religion’, ‘religious’,
‘religiosity’, etc.), there must be some core or essence to which the
words in question apply; and second, that the relevant concept must
therefore be definable in terms of individually necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions for its correct application. Being freed from the
grip of this craving for definitions has repercussions for many areas
of philosophy, including but far from limited to philosophizing about
religion and ethics. Nor should it be construed as a rejection of
definitions tout court: there is a world of difference between, on the
one hand, defining one’s words when necessary or useful to do so,
and on the other hand assuming that unless and until we have
precisely defined our terms, we cannot possibly proceed with any
inquiry into the phenomena to which those terms are applied.
The notions of language-games and forms of life have been
appropriated and adapted in various ways. Some appropriators have
got into trouble for making apparently sweeping claims, such as that
religion is both a form of life and a language-game that can be
contrasted with others such as science.6 As Peter Winch came to
recognize, this way of putting things can be simplistic, as it not only
implies that these different aspects of human life do not overlap, but
it neglects the fact that ‘they are frequently internally related in such
a way that one cannot even be intelligibly conceived as existing in
isolation from others.’7 More recently, Stephen Mulhall, a contributor
to this volume, has highlighted the danger of turning terms such as
‘language-games’ and ‘forms of life’ into pieces of jargon that might
just as readily serve to obscure as to illuminate the phenomena that
lie before us.8 The solution is to retain a critical self-awareness about
our use of vocabulary, whether that vocabulary be borrowed from
Wittgenstein or from anywhere else. When that is done, the
concepts of language-games and forms of life – or perhaps other
concepts that develop or modify them in particular context-sensitive
ways – can, as Wittgenstein intended, serve to remind us of the
extent to which our life with language is integrated into our lives and
activities more generally, with all their religious and ethical and
multifarious other dimensions. While it would be mistaken to
conflate the grammar of one form of language with that of another –
to suppose, for example, that talk of hearing God’s call (in religiously
relevant circumstances) is not significantly different from talk of
receiving a call from one’s mother – so too is it erroneous to
assume, in advance of any inquiry, that one area of human discourse
is entirely unrelated to others. The Wittgensteinian trick is to
cultivate sufficient attentiveness to the particularities of different
discursive situations to appreciate where the continuities and where
the discontinuities obtain.
With regard to the instinctive basis of much of what human beings
do, one of the principal contexts in which Wittgenstein ruminates
upon this theme is the notes that he wrote in response to reading
portions of James Frazer’s great work of comparative anthropology,
The Golden Bough. In those notes Wittgenstein criticizes Frazer for
assuming too hastily that the ritual activities he is describing must be
explicable in terms of theories held by the participants, or by the
participants’ forebears, concerning how the performance of the ritual
will expedite some instrumental effect (GB, esp. 119–25). To
counteract such an assumption, Wittgenstein encourages us to
reflect upon the many actions we perform not because we possess a
theory or even a belief about how they will engender a desired result
but merely because, as it were, ‘this is what human life is like’ (GB
121) and is simply what we do (cf. PI §217; LC 25). Others have
developed Wittgenstein’s suggestion in relation to their own
examples. Frank Cioffi, for instance, reminds us that someone’s
speaking to a dead relative at the graveside of the deceased is
intelligible to us without our needing to impute to the person any
theory of an afterlife.9 D. Z. Phillips, meanwhile, has noted how
distaste at the thought of sticking pins into a picture of a loved one
need have nothing to do with a belief that the pins will cause
physical harm to the person depicted; rather, the distaste is apt to
be part of a moral reaction.10 Such reactions or forms of behaviour
are not universal, and may in many instances be culturally inflected.
But neither Wittgenstein nor those who have been influenced by him
are proposing a general theory of the origin of religious and moral
attitudes. On the contrary, they are recommending caution in the
face of any would-be general theory, inviting us always to look for
exceptions and alternative possible accounts. Occasionally an
eagerness to resist general theories might prompt an excitable
author such as Wittgenstein to deploy incautious wording himself,
thereby implying that he does wish to advocate a rival theory of his
own. Critical readers of Wittgenstein, alert to these slips, will
endeavour to go beyond them rather than becoming mere apologists
for Wittgenstein even in his most ‘un-Wittgensteinian’ moments.11
Wittgenstein’s thoughts about the instinctive or animal depths of
our nature are part of a sensibility that seeks to disabuse us, and
especially those of us with a certain academic bent, of an overly
intellectualistic picture of what human beings are. ‘I want to regard
man here as an animal’, Wittgenstein writes in one of his final
notebooks, ‘as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not
ratiocination’ (OC §475). In particular he wants to draw attention to
the variegated panoply of dispositions and commitments – the
‘inherited background’ (OC §94) – that constitutes the precondition
for having any intellectual life at all. Contrary to those philosophers
who suppose that we could in principle suspend all our beliefs
without exception, Wittgenstein insists that such a supposition
overlooks the deep-rootedness of the kinds of beliefs without which
we simply could not function in the world. Indeed, ‘beliefs’
(Glauben), for Wittgenstein, fails to capture the depth at issue,
though the idea of ‘religious belief’ comes closest (OC §459). For
what is really at issue are the ways of acting that are logically prior
to, and make possible, the ratiocinative activities that include
surmising, speculating, doubting, deciding between alternatives and
so on. It is this emphasis in Wittgenstein’s thought that has spurred
some philosophers to ponder the extent to which our moral lives
might be grounded in ‘basic moral certainties’ that are themselves
groundless, not in the sense of lacking a foundation that really ought
to be in place if the moral commitments in question are to be
justified, but rather in the sense that there is absolutely nowhere
deeper to go: the basic (moral) certainties are simply ‘there – like
our life’ (OC §559).12
All that I have alluded to above barely scratches the surface of the
rich resources available in Wittgenstein’s work for thinking through
and about the religious and ethical aspects of human life. As will be
seen from the contributions to this volume, the variety of ways, both
constructive and critical, in which one might explore and utilize those
resources eludes neat encapsulation. The following concise chapter
summaries should thus be regarded as little more than invitations to
read and engage with the chapters themselves.

Summary of chapters
In Chapter 1, ‘The Early Wittgenstein on Ethical Religiousness as a
Dispositional Attitude’, Chon Tejedor discusses some of the shifts in
Wittgenstein’s early thinking on religion and ethics, as he transitions
from the views rehearsed in his Notebooks 1914–1916 to an
altogether different approach in the Tractatus. During this period
Wittgenstein moves away from the view that ethics and religiosity
are conditioned by a transcendental subject and comes to endorse
an understanding of the ethical-religious attitude as non-
transcendental. The attitude, Tejedor argues, is dispositional rather
than emotive: it is bound up in language, thinking and action and
yet, at the same time, ineffable.
Chapter 2, ‘ “The Problem of Life”: Later Wittgenstein on the
Difficulty of Honest Happiness’, sees Gabriel Citron examining
Wittgenstein’s battles with the profound anxiety that can arise in
response to a sense of the radical contingency of everything one is
and everything one cares about. By giving particular attention to
entries in Wittgenstein’s ‘Koder Diaries’ from the 1930s, Citron
discusses the nature of ‘the problem of life’ both as it manifested in
Wittgenstein’s own life and as a universal problem. He also reflects
on how Wittgenstein might respond to questions about whether life
really is as problematically precarious as many of his most self-
revealing remarks seem to presume.
Chapter 3, ‘Wittgenstein and the Study of Religion: Beyond
Fideism and Atheism’, takes as its starting point the observation that
there remains confusion over the implications of Wittgenstein’s work
for the study of religion. On the one hand Wittgensteinians and
sometimes Wittgenstein himself are lambasted as ‘fideists’ seeking to
isolate religion from legitimate critique; on the other hand
Wittgenstein’s naturalistic tendency is said to result in atheism.
Interrogating the assumptions underlying these interpretations, I
aim in the chapter to clarify existing debates and make space for a
reinvigorated utilization of Wittgenstein’s ideas. I argue, first, that
the charge of ‘Wittgensteinian fideism’ conflates two distinct
principles – one acceptable to Wittgensteinians, the other not – and
second, that Wittgenstein’s invocation of instinctive aspects of
human life threatens to undermine faith only if one begins with an
unnecessarily secularized conception of the natural. The chapter
ends with remarks on the terrifying (and wondrous) phenomenon of
radical epistemic contingency that Wittgenstein’s approach
highlights.
In Chapter 4, ‘Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard and Chalcedon’, Rowan
Williams reflects both sympathetically and, at times, with a critical
eye upon the various remarks in which Wittgenstein refers either
directly or indirectly to the Christian gospels. Drawing connections
between these remarks and Wittgenstein’s thinking about ethics and
aesthetics, Williams considers both the similarities between
Wittgenstein’s and Kierkegaard’s thought and the ways in which
each of these thinkers helps to identify the error of treating the
divinity of Christ as being merely one further ‘item of information
about him’. Coming to see Christ as truly divine as well as truly
human – as stated in the Definition of Chalcedon – involves not
perceiving an additional fact in the world, but undergoing a
transformation of, as Wittgenstein puts it, one’s entire ‘system of
reference’ (CV 64e).
In Chapter 5, ‘On the Very Idea of a Theodicy’, Genia
Schönbaumsfeld brings the themes of religion and ethics vividly
together by highlighting the moral implications of a pervasive
assumption in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, that it
makes sense to try to justify the ways of God to humankind by
devising a theodicy. Arguing that this assumption is erroneous,
Schönbaumsfeld contends that theodicies worsen rather than
alleviate the purported ‘problem of evil’. In addition to
conceptualizing God in unduly anthropomorphic terms, theodicies
turn out to be morally pernicious on account of their efforts to
vindicate the existence of evil and suffering. Schönbaumsfeld thus
proposes that instead of constructing putative theoretical
justifications for the state of the world, the lesson should be learnt
from Wittgenstein that the solution to the ‘problem of evil’ lies in the
‘vanishing of the problem’, and from Kierkegaard that faith consists
not in excusing the world’s predicament but in accepting it in a
joyous spirit.
Chapters 6 and 7 closely complement each other, with Chapter 6,
‘Wittgenstein, Analogy and Religion in Mulhall’s The Great Riddle’,
comprising a sustained examination by Wayne Proudfoot of key
themes from recent work by Stephen Mulhall, some of which are
reiterated and developed further by Mulhall himself in Chapter 7. Of
the issues that emerge out of Mulhall’s engagement with
Grammatical Thomist theology, notable among those that Proudfoot
illuminates and perceptively questions are: first, the idea that
austere nonsense may be motivated by a refusal to assign available
kinds of sense to language about God; second, the contention that
the analogical projection of words into new contexts is guided not by
rules but by a natural projective trajectory; and third, the relation
between philosophy and theology. All of this is not only apt to
prompt further thinking about the issues themselves, but also
helpfully sets the scene for the subsequent chapter.
In Chapter 7, ‘Riddles, Nonsense and Religious Language’, Stephen
Mulhall, after summarizing the distinction that he, following Cora
Diamond, draws between riddles and great riddles, fruitfully explores
the relation between his own concerns and certain of those
articulated in Rowan Williams’ Gifford Lectures, which were
published in 2014 under the title The Edge of Words. A first or even
a second glance at Williams’ book may suggest an antagonism
between, on the one hand, Williams’ conception of God-talk as a
mode of representation and, on the other hand, Mulhall’s insistence
that such talk is radically discontinuous with both descriptive and
representational discursive practices. Ultimately, however, Mulhall
sees a significant consonance between Williams’ willingness to
endorse certain versions of negative theology and his own
contention that great riddles, far from being solvable, serve to open
up a space in which we are called to ‘absolutely or unconditionally
cede control of our speech and forms of living’.
In Chapter 8, ‘Wittgenstein and the Distinctiveness of Religious
Language’, Michael Scott investigates why it might be that
Wittgenstein’s ideas about religious language have endured but not
prevailed in the philosophy of religion. Drawing especially upon
Wittgenstein’s 1938 lectures on religious belief and on notes
published in Culture and Value, Scott identifies four key themes in
Wittgenstein’s thinking. By locating those themes in relation both to
the dominant philosophical view of religious discourse – a view that
Another random document with
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of And miles to go
before I sleep
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
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Title: And miles to go before I sleep

Author: William F. Nolan

Illustrator: Richard Kluga

Release date: November 4, 2023 [eBook #72030]

Language: English

Original publication: New York, NY: Royal Publications, Inc, 1958

Credits: Greg Weeks, Mary Meehan and the Online Distributed

Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AND MILES

TO GO BEFORE I SLEEP ***
AND MILES TO GO BEFORE I
SLEEP

By WILLIAM F. NOLAN

Illustrated by RICHARD KLUGA

He knew, to the exact minute, when he was

going to die. And Earth was too far away to reach....

[Transcriber's Note: This etext was produced from

Infinity August 1958.
Extensive research did not uncover any evidence that
the U.S. copyright on this publication was renewed.]
Alone within the humming ship, deep in its honeycombed metal
chambers, Murdock waited for death. While the rocket moved
inexorably toward Earth—an immense silver needle threading the
dark fabric of space—he waited calmly through the final hours,
knowing that the verdict was absolute, that hope no longer existed.
Electronically self-sufficient, the ship was doing its job perfectly, the
job it had been built to do. After twenty years in space, the ship was
taking Robert Murdock home.
Home. Earth. Thayerville, a small town in Kansas. Clean air, a
shaded street, and a white, two-story house at the end of the block.
Home—after two decades among the stars.
Sitting quietly before the round port, seeing and not seeing the
endless darkness surrounding him, Murdock was remembering.
He remembered the worried face of his mother, her whispered
prayers for his safety as he mounted the rocket ramp those twenty
years ago; he could still feel the final, crushing handshake of his
father moments before the outer airlock slid closed. His mother had
been 55 then, his father 63. It was almost impossible to believe that
they were now old and white-haired.
And what of himself?
He was now 41, and space had weathered him as the plains of
Kansas had weathered his father. He, too, had labored as his father
had labored—but on strange, alien worlds, under suns far hotter than
Sol. Murdock's face was square and hard-featured, his eyes dark and
deep under thrusting ledges of bone. He had changed as they had
changed.
He was a stranger going home to strangers.
Carefully, Murdock unfolded his mother's last letter, written in her
flowery, archaic hand, and received just before Earth take-off.
Dearest Bob,
Oh, we are so excited! Your father and I listened to your
voice on the tape over and over, telling us that you are
coming home to us at last. We are both so eager to see
you, son. As you know, we have not been too well of late.
Your father's heart does not allow him out much any more,
and I have had a few fainting spells over the past month.
But Doctor Thom says that we are all right, and you are not
to worry. Just hurry home to us, Bob. We both pray God
you will come back safely.

All our love,

Mother
Robert Murdock put the letter aside and clenched his fists. Only brief
hours remained to him, and the small Kansas town of Thayerville was
an impossible distance across space. He knew he would never reach
it alive.
The lines of an ancient poem by Robert Frost whispered through his
mind:

But I have promises to keep,

 And miles to go before I sleep

He had promised his parents that he would come home—and he

meant to keep that promise.
The doctors had shown him that it was impossible. They had charted
his death; they had told him when his heart would stop beating, when
his breathing would cease. Death, for Robert Murdock, was a
certainty. His alien disease was incurable.
But they had listened to his plan. They had listened, and agreed.
Now, with less than a half-hour of life remaining, Murdock was
walking down one of the ship's long corridors, his boot-heels ringing
on the narrow metal walkway.
He was ready, at last, to keep his promise.
Murdock paused before a wall storage locker, twisted a small dial. A
door slid smoothly back. He looked up at the tall man standing
motionless in the darkness. Reaching forward, Murdock made a quick
adjustment.
The tall man stepped down into the corridor, and the light flashed in
his deep-set eyes, almost hidden behind thrusting ledges of bone.
The man's face was hard and square-featured.
"My name is Robert Murdock," said the tall figure in the neat patrol
uniform. "I am 41 years of age, a rocket pilot going home to Earth."
He paused. "And I am sound of mind and body."
Murdock nodded slowly. "Indeed you are," he said.
"How much longer do you have, sir?"
"Another ten minutes. Perhaps a few seconds beyond that," replied
Murdock.
"I—I'm sorry," said the tall figure.
Murdock smiled. He knew that a machine, however perfect, could not
experience the emotion of sorrow, but it eased him to hear the words.
You will be fine, he thought. You will serve well in my place and my
parents will never suspect that their son has not come home to them.
"It must all be perfect," said Murdock.
"Of course," said the machine. "When the month I am to spend with
them is over they'll see me board a rocket for space—and they'll
understand that I cannot return to them for another twenty years.
They will accept the fact that a spaceman must return to the stars,
that he cannot leave the service before he is 60. Let me assure you,
sir, it will all go well."
Yes, Murdock told himself, it will go well; every detail has been
considered. My voice is his voice, my habits his own. The tapes I
have pre-recorded will continue to reach them at specified intervals
until their death. They will never know I'm gone.
"Are you ready now, sir?" the tall figure asked gently.
Murdock drew in his breath. "Yes," he said, "I'm ready now."
And they began to walk down the long corridor.

Murdock remembered how proud his parents had been when he was
finally accepted for Space Training—the only boy in Thayerville to be
chosen. But then, it was only right that he should have been the one.
The other boys, those who failed, had not lived the dream as he had
lived it. From the moment he'd watched the first moon rocket land he
had known, beyond any possible doubt, that he would become a
rocketman. He had stood there, in that cold December of 1980, a boy
of 12, watching the great rocket fire down from space, watching it
thaw and blacken the frozen earth. He had known that he would one
day follow it back to the stars, to vast and alien horizons, to worlds
past imagining.
He remembered his last night on Earth, twenty long years ago, when
he had felt the pressing immensity of the vast and terrible universe
surrounding him as he lay in his bed. He remembered the sleepless
hours before dawn, when he could feel the tension building within the
single room, within himself lying there in the heated stillness of the
small, white house. He remembered the rain, near morning,
drumming the roof, and the thunder roaring powerfully across the
Kansas sky. And then, somehow, the thunder's roar blended into the
deep atomic roar of a rocket, carrying him away from Earth, away to
the burning stars ... away ...
Away.

The tall figure in the neat patrol uniform closed the outer airlock and
watched the body drift into blackness. The ship and the android were
one; two complex and perfect machines doing their job. For Robert
Murdock, the journey was over, the long miles had come to an end.
Now he would sleep forever in space.

When the rocket landed, the crowds were there, waving and shouting
out Murdock's name as he appeared on the silver ramp. He smiled
and raised his hand in salute, standing there tall in the sun, his
splendid dress uniform reflecting the light in a thousand glittering
patterns.
At the far end of the ramp two figures waited. An old man, bowed and
trembling over a cane, and a seamed and wrinkled woman, her hair
blowing white, her eyes shining.
When the tall spaceman reached them they embraced him feverishly,
clinging tight to his arms.
Their son had returned. Robert Murdock had come home from space.

"Well," said a man at the fringe of the crowd, "there they go."
His companion sighed and shook his head. "I still don't think it's right
somehow. It just doesn't seem right to me."
"It's what they wanted, isn't it?" asked the other. "It's what they wrote
in their wills. They vowed their son would never come home to death.
In another month he'll be gone anyway. Back for another twenty
years. Why ruin it all for him?" The man paused, shading his eyes
against the sun. "And they are perfect, aren't they? He'll never know."
"I suppose you're right," nodded the second man. "He'll never know."
And he watched the old man and the old woman and the tall son until
they were out of sight.
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AND MILES TO
GO BEFORE I SLEEP ***

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