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UKRAINE
and BEYOND
RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC SECURITY
CHALLENGE TO EUROPE

Edited by
JANNE HAALAND MATLARY
and TORMOD HEIER
Ukraine and Beyond
 Janne Haaland Matlary • Tormod Heier
Editors

Ukraine and Beyond

Russia’s Strategic Security Challenge to Europe
Editors
Janne Haaland Matlary Tormod Heier
University of Oslo Norwegian Defence University College
Norway Oslo, Norway

ISBN 978-3-319-32529-3 ISBN 978-3-319-32530-9 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32530-9

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016947982

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to
the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.

Cover illustration: © Joeri DE ROCKER / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank the Norwegian Command and Staff College and
the University of Oslo for their financial and other support for this book
project. Our work matured in discussions at the Staff College about how
Europe and Russia seem to misunderstand each other at a time when there
is a strong requirement to do the opposite.
We would also like to thank Birgitte Grande and Olav Aalberg at the
Norwegian Defence University College for their help with the cover illus-
tration and the editing of our English.
Possible errors remain our own.

Oslo, 17 June 2016

JHM and TH
Oslo, Norway

v
 CONTENTS

Part I Setting the Scene 1

1 Introduction 3
Janne Haaland Matlary and Tormod Heier

2 Europe, Russia and the World of Magical Realism 17

Christopher Coker

3 Realpolitik Confronts Liberal Democracy:

Can Europe Respond? 35
Janne Haaland Matlary

4 Deterrence and Limited Wars: Echoes from

the Cold War? 61
Gjert Lage Dyndal and Øistein Espenes

Part II Strategic Interaction 83

5 Driving Forces in Russia’s Strategic Thinking 85

Igor Sutyagin

vii
viii CONTENTS

6 Could Britain Respond Strategically

To Russian Aggression? 101
Julian Lindley-French

7 Strategic Ability in Europe: The Case of France 129

Øyvind Østerud

Part III The Use of Force 147

8 Russian Operations: Continuity, Novelties

and Adaptation 149
Palle Ydstebø

9 Tools of Russian Influence: Information

and Propaganda 181
Geir Hågen Karlsen

10 Russian and Western Views of International Law:

The Case of Crimea 209
Jacob Thomas Staib

11 Asymmetric Ethics? Russian and Western Perceptions

of War 239
Nils Terje Lunde

Part IV Conclusions: Mapping NATO’s Vulnerabilities 263

12 The Logic of Asymmetry: Russia’s Approach

Towards NATO 265
Tormod Heier

Index 289
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Christopher Coker is Professor of International Relations at the London School of

Economics and Political Science. Coker has done extensive research within the fields
of war, US and British foreign policy, Contemporary Ideas and Ideologies. His lat-
est books include Warrior Geeks: how 21st century technology is changing the way we
fight and think about war (2013), Barbarous Philosophers: reflections on the nature of
war from Heraclitus to Heisenberg (2010) and War in an Age of Risk (2009).
Gjert Lage Dyndal is a Colonel in the Royal Norwegian Air Force and holds a
PhD in Modern History from the University of Glasgow. He is Deputy
Commandant of the Norwegian Command and Staff College at the Defence
University College. He has written extensively on Cold War issues in the High
North within the field of Russian and Western strategies.
Øistein Espenes is Associate Professor at the Airpower Department at the Royal
Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF) Academy. He is a historian and his area is
Norwegian foreign policy and airpower. He was the Dean of the RNoAF Academy
from 2001 to 2009.
Janne Haaland Matlary is Professor at the Institute for Political Science at the
University of Oslo and adjunct professor at the Norwegian Command and Staff
College. She was deputy foreign minister for Norway from 1997 to 2000, and is a
columnist on the major daily Dagens Næringsliv. She was visiting fellow of
Pembroke College, Oxford University, in 2013. Her most recent book is NATO’s
European Allies: Military Capability and Political Will (with M. Peterson, (2013)
and she is currently completing an monograph entitled Hard Power in Hard
Times: Can Europe Act Strategically?

ix
x NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Tormod Heier is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Norwegian Army and holds a PhD
in Political Science from the University of Oslo. He is a Senior Faculty Advisor at
the Norwegian Command and Staff College at the Norwegian Defence University
in Oslo. He has edited several anthologies on Norwegian security and defence
policy. His latest anthology is Norge og Russland. Sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer i
nordområdene [Norway and Russia. Security Challenges in the High North] (2015).
Geir Hågen Karlsen is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Norwegian Army and
Director for Strategic Communication at the Norwegian Command and Staff
College. He is Lecturer in Russian Strategic Communication and Information
Operations for NATO fora and academies. He served several years in the former
Soviet Union, and also with Russian airborne troops on operations. He is a gradu-
ate from the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College and holds a mas-
ters’ degree in Strategic Communication from the Norwegian Business School.
Julian Lindley-French is Professor and Vice President of the Atlantic Treaty
Association, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Statecraft in London, Director of
Europa Analytica in the Netherlands, Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow at
the National Defense University in Washington D.C., as well as a Fellow of the
Canadian Global Affairs Institute. He is a Member of the Strategic Advisory Panel
of the UK Chief of Defence Staff. In 2015 he was made an Honorary Member of
the Association of Anciens of the NATO Defence College in Rome. His blog,
Lindley-French’s Blog Blast (www.lindleyfrench.blogspot.com), has a world-wide
readership. Among his latest books are The Oxford Handbook of War (Oxford
University Press, 2014) and NATO: The Enduring Alliance 2015 (Routledge,
2015).
Øyvind Østerud is professor in political science, University of Oslo. He holds a
Ph.D. from the London School of Economics. He has been guest researcher in the
UK, Australia and France. He was head of the Norwegian Power and Democracy
Study and has been President of the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters.
He has published extensively in comparative politics and international relations.
Nils Terje Lunde is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Royal Norwegian Air Force and
holds a PhD in Theology from the Norwegian School of Theology. He is Head of
the Department of Education, Norwegian Armed Forces Chaplaincy, and has pre-
viously been Chaplain at the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy, the Norwegian
Command and Staff College, as well as Chaplain to the Norwegian Contingent
Commander, Afghanistan. He is associate editor with the Journal of Military Ethics,
and has co-edited several anthologies on military professional ethics and culture.
Jacob Thomas Staib is a Commander in the Norwegian Navy, and currently Head
of Section for Law and Ethics at the Norwegian Command and Staff College. He
holds a law degree from the University of Oslo, and has served as a military lawyer
in the Norwegian armed forces, in the Ministry of Defence and in NATO. He has
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xi

international experience as Chief for Legal Advisors to the Commander of the

Kosovo Forces, and for Norwegian forces serving in the EU anti-piracy operation
outside the Horn of Africa. He has written numerous chapters and articles in
Norwegian literature on military law, and is also the co-editor with Sigrid Redse-
Johansen on the book “Law and Military power” (Gyldendal 2009).
Igor Sutyagin is Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in
London. His research is concerned with US–Russian relations, strategic armaments
developments and nuclear arms control. He has extensive research on nuclear and
conventional arms control, including naval arms control as well as issues associated
with ABM systems and their stabilising influence upon of the US–Russian relation-
ship. He has authored over 100 articles and books published in the Soviet Union/
Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland. He is
co-author of the book Russian Strategic Nuclear Weapons (2004) edited by Pavel
Podvig.
Palle Ydstebø is Lieutenant Colonel in the Norwegian Army and serves as Head
of Section for Military Strategy and Doctrine at the Norwegian Command and
Staff College at the Norwegian Defence University College. He is currently work-
ing on at PhD project at the University of Glasgow, and has co-edited several
anthologies on Norwegian, German and Russian military thinking. He is a histo-
rian at the University of Tromsø and has given international service in Afghanistan,
Germany and South Sudan.
 PART I

Setting the Scene

 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Janne Haaland Matlary and Tormod Heier

Europe has been faced with an unpredictable relationship with Russia since
at least 2014. 2008 was the source of the current problem that happened
when Russia reacted to the European and US plans of including Ukraine
and Georgia in NATO and used military force to stop this, invading the
provinces South-Ossietia and Abkhazia in Georgia and later recognising
them as republics. The Western reaction then was one of discomfort, dis-
belief, and of mostly turning a blind eye.1
In 2014 Russia responded to the political unrest and subsequent change
of government in Ukraine in similar manner. This time, Russia occupied
and annexed the Crimean Peninsula and assisted rebel groups with weap-
ons support in Eastern Ukraine. As of today, Russia seems to have created
a “frozen” conflict which is likely to persist for a long time. The back-
drop to the Ukrainian crisis was similar to the Georgian case: a promise
of closer ties between a liberal Europe and a former Soviet successor state

J. Haaland Matlary ()

Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
T. Heier ()
Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College,
Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway

© The Author(s) 2016 3

J. Haaland Matlary, T. Heier (eds.), Ukraine and Beyond,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32530-9_1
4 J. HAALAND MATLARY AND T. HEIER

that strove to find its own identity—in the “contested zone” between
Russia in the East and EU and NATO in the West.2 The Western reaction
this time was one of strong rhetorical outrage, rather mild economic sanc-
tions, and belated military deterrence in NATO member states close to
Russia’s territorial borders.
The present situation is one of stale-mate: European states seem to
prefer to avoid taking charge of the situation while the US de facto leads
in the deterrent aspects. The EU sanctions continue but are contested,
and as of February 2016 Europeans leaders spoke about lifting the sanc-
tions: The French president ‘expected them to be lifted soon, the leader
of Bavaria and the CSU party, Horst Seehofer, made a controversial trip to
visit president Putin in early February, telling the press that he wanted the
sanctions lifted and then closing trade deals between Russia and Bavaria.
Finally, the Italian, Finnish and most East-European state leaders were all
along very reluctant to impose sanctions.
There is a tense and adversarial relationship between Russia and the
West, marked by enmity and unpredictability. NATO and USA are named
as explicit “threats” in the 2016 Russian security strategy, and there is little
political contact between the West and Russia. A verbal escalation took
place early in 2016 when the US announced further military deployment
in Eastern Europe. Defence Secretary Ashton Carter made it clear that
much more spending on deterrence in Europe is necessary, a commenta-
tor wrote that “one now worries more about Russian actions than at any
time since the collapse of the Soviet Union”.3 Russia replied that it would
take commensurate action, i.e. by reinforcing their military defence with
four new Army Divisions along the Central and Western military districts.4
The timing of this book is therefore—unfortunately—a very good one.
There is a dire need for more knowledge of Russian thinking about poli-
tics and the use of force. But as importantly, there is also a need to under-
stand how the West pursues its own political objectives, particularly within
the institutional frameworks of the EU and NATO. This book explores
and analyses the differences in political culture between Russia and the
West. We concentrate on the Russian-European relationship in particu-
lar: how does Europe’s post-modern politics fare in confrontation with
Russia? How do Russian political norms of using force, international legal
interpretations, ethical, and even religious ideas, contrast with those in the
EU and NATO? As the security dilemma seems to increase on both sides
 INTRODUCTION 5

of the East-West divide, there is obviously plenty of room for misunder-

standing. But is there also more room for mutual understanding?
In the EU and NATO we are mostly familiar with our liberal view of
the world, based on economic and social integration, the postmodern pol-
itics of liberal democracy, and a “perpetual peace”. Although Realpolitik
can be said to be “born and raised” in Europe, the vision of a “Europe
whole and free” with the EU at its core today represents the very antith-
esis of Realpolitik. Russia seems to move according to classical Realpolitik,
like most great powers in international politics. How can EU and NATO
interact strategically with such states? Do post-modern Europeans under-
stand the parameters of Realpolitik? The paradox is that whereas NATO
and the EU enlarged in order to make “Europe whole and free”, in accor-
dance with the logic that those who embraced Western values could join,
Russia interpreted this differently. Even if the Europeans may be empiri-
cally right—that there was and is no “grand strategy” behind EU and
NATO enlargements, it is nevertheless unwise and even dangerous if they
do not properly understand Russia’s objections and security concerns.
This book seeks to unearth how central norms of international politics are
understood and interpreted in Europe and Russia respectively.
The book’s purpose is not to develop policy recommendations for how
Europe should respond to a more assertive Russia, however. Instead it
aims to provide more knowledge on how European responses vis-à-vis
Russia can be explained, how they are generated, what they communicate
in a political and strategic sense, and whether Russia and Europe are able
to interact or merely “bypass” each other. Alexander L. George reminds
us that successful crisis management is never a zero-sum game. Crises are
best resolved through a careful balance between “carrots” and “sticks”—
self-imposed restraints are neatly balanced with credibly imposed deter-
rence.5 It is a context where the opposition’s preferences must be clearly
understood in order to avoid miscalculation, unnecessary escalation, or
in the worst case, war. Comprehending the security environment from
both a Russian and a Western perspective respectively is therefore vital,
especially at times where one-dimensional Western perspectives seem to
prevail in the mass media. To this end it is important to comprehend how
Russia and Europe interpret the rules of international politics and practise
them, especially with regard to the most important norm—the use of
force.
6 J. HAALAND MATLARY AND T. HEIER

ASSERTIVE EAST, REACTIVE WEST?

The conclusions in many chapters relate to the fact that Russia, despite its
many structural deficiencies, stands forth as a more effective and unitary
actor than EU and NATO. The Western security community, despite its
economic preponderance compared to Russia, dithers along in less coherent
manner. Being reactive rather than strategic, Europe’s response to Russia
seems to be carried out by a security architecture that is fragmented, and
now also strained by economic decline and uncontrollable waves of migra-
tion unprecedented in Europe’s modern history. On the civilian side, the EU
seems to wither from within due to a gradual re-nationalisation of member
states’ politics as a response to the Euro-crisis and mass-migration.6 Britain’s
Brexit adds another complication. On the military side, NATO member
states strive to sustain their military credibility within a chain of command
that lacks the necessary “unity of purpose” and “unity of command”.7
In this anthology, four conclusions in particular stand out:
First, with regard to Europe’s ability to shape its own security envi-
ronment: post-modern Europe is not up to the Russian challenge in the
post-Ukraine era. Pursuing visions of “safety” rather than “security” has
improved the quality of life for millions of citizens throughout the con-
tinent, particularly in Eastern Europe. But it has also made it easier for
Russia to bend international rules, most notably in its “near abroad”. As
pointed out by Christopher Coker, the EU in particular is not institu-
tionally ready to run its own foreign policy, much less to act strategically
towards Russia when state borders are changed. Europe’s “soft power
instruments”, i.e. the value of liberal democracy, human rights, and rule by
law, have been instrumental in increasing social welfare on the continent
during the 1990s. The return of geo-politics and “spheres of influence” is
as such inconsistent with the optimistic post-Cold War’s visions of “a new
world order” and a “Europe whole and free”, where a UN-based rule by
law was a hub in Europe’s strategic thinking. As argued by Janne Haaland
Matlary, military force has returned as a natural instrument in a states’
tool box. This is not only true in Europe, but in the entire international
system. NATO’s old worries from the 1950s—the fear of limited wars and
a possible US abandonment—are again relevant. Yet, she underlines that
few politicians in Europe are able to act strategically.
Second, with regard to strategic interaction between Europe’s mili-
tary great powers, Russia’s lack of ideological appeal in Western Europe
leads to serious shortcomings. This is particularly evident in the way
 INTRODUCTION 7

Russia is marginalised on the international arena. Russia therefore choses

to emphasise its conventional and nuclear forces to compensate for the
influence that e.g. Britain and France can take for granted. Russia’s empha-
sis on military force exploits Russia’s comparative advantage vis-à-vis a EU
that regards such force as an ‘uncivilised’ and old fashioned instrument
of international politics. This has, however left European powers more
exposed to pressure, both from a nuclear and conventional perspective. As
pointed out by Julian Lindley-French, it is hard to believe that a British
political leader would speak about the use of nuclear weapons if faced with
an essentially limited war on NATO’s eastern flank. In France, the point is
not to deter Russia, but to retain France’s position in Europe, sustain close
ties with Germany, and be a major player in the EU. European powers may
be economically resilient, but in military terms many of them have become
“pygmies” that strive to sustain credibility as power politics has returned.
The consequence may be a severe shortage in strategic action when vital
interests are put at stake.
Third, with regard to the practical use of force, the dark side of glo-
balisation (i.e. the hostile use of modern information and communica-
tion technology) has challenged the interface between war and peace.
As a consequence, the uncertainty and unpredictability stemming from
so-called “hybrid warfare” have become more pronounced on European
theatres. This is particularly so among the NATO member states situated
along Russia’s territorial rim; nations with growing nationalistic sentiment
and often with a Russian diaspora inside their borders. These states still
suffer from what may be a severe lack of credible reinforcement arrange-
ments from NATO. To most NATO-members in Eastern-Europe, George
Kennan’s message from “The Long Telegram” in 1946 is therefore more
relevant than ever:

We have been handicapped … by a popular attachment to the concept of a

basic difference between peace and war, by a tendency to view war as a sort
of sporting context outside of all political context, by a national tendency
to seek a political cure-all, and by a reluctance to recognize the realities
of international relations–the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of
war.8

The art of avoiding ambiguous interfaces between war and peace or

between combatants and non-combatants is consequently a high prior-
ity for any state that fears Russia’s re-armament. Kennan’s “perpetual
8 J. HAALAND MATLARY AND T. HEIER

rhythm of struggle, in and out of war” is not a new phenomenon.9 On the

contrary, it is a distinct political fact that has been present on the European
continent throughout history. But with regard to the employment of force
it has often been neglected, particularly so by conventional forces that
prefer to deter and fight other states’ conventional forces on a clearly
defined battlefield.10 Hence, the willingness to employ “hybrid war” also
has juridical and ethical implications in Europe that they do not have in
Russia. Whereas NATO-forces are trained and paid to operate according
to universal (Western) interpretations of international law, Russian forces
act differently. Their juridical interpretation is more “state centric” and
tied to the perception of the world as “anarchic”. Any interpretation of
what is legal or not is thereby seen in the context of how other states—or
rivals—may exploit the situation. This zero-sum logic is also evident in
the ethical sphere. According to NATO’s criterion of “acceptability”, the
use of force has to pass the individual members’ judgement of moral con-
straints and moral necessity. By contrast, the Russian logic does not follow
the same criteria. As Russia strives to protect its national cohesion from
Western liberalism, ideals of “social harmony” and “spiritual unity” are
prominent features for justifying force.
Fourth, NATO faces a Russian challenge that exploits its advantages
in all spheres of strategy—in ends, means, and ways. As long as NATO-
Europe is unwilling to allocate more funding to credible military forces,
the geopolitical game of Realpolitik will allow Russia to define many of the
rules in its “near abroad”. It means carrying on the struggle for geo-polit-
ical influence with all means short of conventional war. Avoiding NATO’s
Article V-clause is of paramount importance. Russia’s strategy can there-
fore be seen as consistently asymmetric: with regards to ends, because
more is at stake outside Russia’s territorial border than for most of the
influential members of NATO or the EU; with regard to means, because
Europe’s military and civilian efforts are not coordinated but rather stove-
piped along institutional channels in NATO and EU, and with regard to
ways, because European methods need to be legitimised through account-
able and transparent procedures inside democratic institutions, whereas
Russia’s methods are less exposed to public scrutiny and criticism. Gaining
asymmetric advantages in all aspects of strategy is therefore increasingly
important for a Russia that is uncomfortable with Western liberal values
on its doorstep.
 INTRODUCTION 9

BOOK OUTLINE AND MAIN FINDINGS

In examining Europe’s challenges with regard to Russia, the book opens
with three chapters that define the political and historical context.
In Part I—Setting the Scene—Christopher Cooker starts by describing
Europe’s “social imaginary” in Chap. 2. Defined as a community that is
first of all consumed by delivering “public goods” to its citizens, Coker
argues that Europe has lost the ability to think strategically. Two decades
of military disarmament has been justified by a cosmopolitan democratic
view; a view that has stirred a liberal and naïve perception of how inter-
national politics works and of how hard power once again has returned
as a natural instrument in states’ security policy. The EU therefore is less
capable of responding strategically as Russia changed the rules of the game
with the Crimean annexation. The EU has over the past decades devel-
oped norms that define standards of so-called “appropriate behaviour”.11
In the words of Ulrich Beck, Europe has become a “risk aversive soci-
ety”,12 a community of states that regards the use of force more as an
act of imposing international law than armed conflict for the purpose of
policy. This may work as long as Europe’s strategic surroundings are char-
acterised by likeminded states that share the same liberal beliefs and value
systems. It becomes less useful, however, when state’s interests differ, and
values across the European continent become mutually incompatible.
This logic is analysed even further in Chap. 3 by Janne Haaland Matlary.
Claiming that Europe is not ready for a new era of Realpolitik, Russia’s
annexation of Crimea demonstrated the military forces’ utility for the pur-
pose of policy, particularly so for states that have the political will and the
military ability to create a fait accompli on the European continent. In her
chapter she dissects the Western reaction to Crimea in detail, including
the EU and NATO reactions proper. While deterrence is now in place
and sanctions continue, there are shortcomings in both. The European
response to Russian assertiveness has been reactive and not strategic, she
concludes.
In Chap. 4 Gjert Lage Dyndal and Øistein Espenes put the Crimean
case into a historical context. Taking NATO’s limited war-debate as a start-
ing point, lessons from the 1950s and 1960s are used to extract lessons of
relevance for European allies today. This is particularly so with regard to
questions of so-called limited wars along Russia’s territorial perimeters and
the United States’ resolve to reassure NATO’s member states. From the
10 J. HAALAND MATLARY AND T. HEIER

early stages of the Cold War onwards this has been an enduring concern for
numerous dependent allies in NATO. This transatlantic concern was well
recognised among Soviet leaders who spent much time figuring out how
limited wars could be launched without risking the use of nuclear weap-
ons. The phrase “political war”, as used by George Kennan in the “Long
Telegram” from 1946, illustrates the timeless logic of limited wars.13
Creating intra-allied ambiguity and uncertainty through Soviet deception,
subversion, and surprise therefore resemble the new buzz-words of today,
such as “hybrid warfare” or “Asymmetric Operations”. Using Norway as
a case, Dyndal and Espenes explore the details in the strategic analysis
accomplished by a small dependent ally that frequently considered itself
isolated on NATO’s Northern Flank. Security concerns today and during
the Cold War are therefore not necessarily very different; “hybrid wars”
can still create scenarios that might be too large for individual NATO
member but too small for NATO as a whole.
In Part II—Strategic Interaction—the post-Crimean challenges to
European security are explored from Russian, British and French perspec-
tives respectively. In Chap. 5, Igor Sutyagin discusses the Russian percep-
tion of being marginalised in international politics, and how the logic of
Realpolitik and the use of force have helped Russia to regain some of
its influence. In particular, Russia’s abandonment of international norms
combined with its political and military assertiveness in Soviet successor
States inevitably raises concerns about the implications for international
security in Eastern Europe. To comprehend the increased tension between
Russia and Europe, the mismatch between Russia’s foreign policy ambi-
tions and its access to the resources needed to carry out Moscow’s policies
is explored. Russia’s gap between its ends (i.e. the ambitions of being a
leading power in world politics) and its means (i.e. a GDP at the size of
Spain in 2016) presents the most compelling contradiction. The gap not
only manifests itself in a more offensive and intimidating posture vis-à-
vis its Western neighbours it is also spelled out in a reinvigorated vari-
ant of the 1945 Yalta Conference between the victorious powers from
World War II. By re-inventing a new “zone of privileged interests”, Russia
can more easily compete on its own terms. Without restrictions posed
by a rule-based framework defined by the West, international relations in
Eastern Europe can more easily be shaped according to Russian interests.
In Chap. 6, Julian Lindley-French presents a British perspective. He
claims that Britain’s shrinking force coupled with a US military over-
 INTRODUCTION 11

stretch may undermine NATO’s credibility in Eastern Europe. This

may not only create instability among NATO-members that experience
unchecked Russian forces along their borders, but may also de facto de-
couple NATO’s conventional forces from its nuclear deterrent role. Clearly,
Britain may react decisively to Russian threats aiming to realise such a de-
coupling, but never alone. Only in concert with the United States and
other member states in NATO can Britain act strategically. Russia knows
this, which is one of many reasons why the buzz word “hybrid warfare”
has again come to the fore, not necessarily as a recipe for waging war but
as a concept for pursuing the Russian art of maskirovka: Western pow-
ers should preferably believe that Russia is more dangerous and power-
ful than it actually is. Against this backdrop, the real problem is not that
Britain cannot act strategically. The key challenge is that Britain, like many
other post-modern European governments, has fostered a new genera-
tion of liberal politicians. Even though they are accustomed to the use of
force under a US command in many humanitarian interventions abroad,
they have nevertheless been more preoccupied with other undertakings:
to find common ground with the United States, France, and increasingly
Germany in the realm of an extended version of state security. In this con-
text, the distinct art of combining various political means into a coherent
“grand strategy” for the purpose of policy is hardly associated with the
British leadership.
In Chap. 7 Øyvind Østerud elaborates on many of the same themes
through the lens of French priorities. In contrast to the British perspective
of sustaining a credible deterrent towards Russia, the French approach
seems to be more attuned towards pragmatism. Close coordination with
Russia in the Syrian “war against ISIL”, domestic concerns for its defence
industry, and the mutual effort to negotiate a sustainable peace in Ukraine
(in the so-called Minsk-agreement) give French policy makers stronger
incentives to balance the “carrot” and the “stick” vis-à-vis Russia. This
delicate balance is more common to France and Germany compared to
Poland, Great Britain or the United States, which have taken a more reso-
lute stance towards Russia in the wake of the Ukraine-crisis. Hence, while
France’s nuclear weapons had a strong rationale during the Cold War’s
existential threat from the Soviet Union, Russia is not regarded as a major
opponent but as a partner. To France, therefore, the East-West tension
over Ukraine is a diplomatic quarrel that should be solved as soon as pos-
sible. Despite the importance of retaining the norm of territorial integrity,
the French ability to retain its dominant position in Europe matters more,
12 J. HAALAND MATLARY AND T. HEIER

Østerud argues. An integral part of this strategy is to nurture close ties to

Germany and to sustain French influence in the European Union. Within
this context, disagreements with Russia should be solved diplomatically
and confrontation should be avoided. Moreover, Russia is a key partner
with France in the fight against ISIL.
In Part III—The Use of Force—strategic imperatives are analysed from a
military perspective at operational level. In Chap. 8, Palle Ydstebø exam-
ines how Russian military operations have developed from the Soviet
period to the Ukraine crisis. The operations signify both continuity and
innovation; new elements comprise adaptation of existing tactics, but
also new and more effective organisational structures. Russia’s inter-
pretation of “hybrid warfare” can be understood in two ways: On the
one hand, it builds on NATO’s strategy of “Comprehensive Approach”
from Afghanistan (2002–2012), where the military instrument—at least
in theory—should be integrated with other political instruments. In this
perspective, NATO’s “concealment” of brute force into a more civilised
“whole of government” approach is used as an analogy to legitimize a
similar Russian modus operandi in Eastern Ukraine. On the other hand,
“hybrid warfare” is also interpreted as a mirror image of what NATO is
doing: to conceal its intentions, to create ambiguity with regard to who
the enemies are, and what capabilities they possess. This approach is both
logical and understandable, and is just as relevant for the West as it is for
Russia’s own security paradigm.
In Chap. 9, Russian operations are scrutinised from a “soft-power” per-
spective. As pointed out by Geir Haagen Karlsen, Russia’s government
has at its disposal a huge and complex propaganda apparatus. It is part of
a broader range of “influence tools” applied to promote Russian interests.
This apparatus consists of media, social media, political communication,
and diplomacy. In addition, so-called “covert active measures” are increas-
ingly used. They are all tied together in coordinated manner, and the range
and complexity of such operations indicate the existence of high-level
coordination. This propaganda capability is an integrated part of Russia’s
political culture, involving a range of activities that would often be legally
unacceptable in Europe. Russia´s government, however, unfazed by free
press, liberal debate, or active opposition, can play by other rules. In par-
ticular, Russia inherited substantial capabilities from the Soviet era, particu-
larly so for covert influence activities—or “active measures”. Its techniques
include disinformation to discredit opponents, use of front groups, out-
reach to sympathising political groups, and political influence operations.
 INTRODUCTION 13

In Chap. 10, Thomas Staib analyses Russia’s interpretation of inter-

national law. In contrast to a NATO interpretation, which regards
international law as a universal recipe for global peace and stability,
Russia’s long standing tradition of Realpolitik provides an alternative tem-
plate for interpretation. Through an analysis of Russia’s interpretation of
international law of the Crimean annexation, it is argued that the context
for interpretation of international law first and foremost relates to how
Russia perceives its strategic surroundings. In a world that throughout
history has been perceived as a threat to Russian territorial integrity and
security, the constant struggle for geopolitical power and influence inside
and outside its borders has created a context for interpretation that dif-
fers significantly from that in NATO. In this chapter, Staib concludes that
great powers sometimes use force to further national interest, regardless
of UN mandate, and this applies not only to Russia, but also to the US.
In Chap. 11, Nils Terje Lunde analyses the ethical differences between
Russia and NATO when it comes to the use of force. Lunde argues that
due to different developments in the societal, political and theological
context, Russia regards the use of force differently than the North Atlantic
Council. These differences are also manifested in the way Russia justifies
its use of military force in moral terms. Norms are crucial, also to the
world’s largest state. NATO’s extensive use of military force outside mem-
ber states’ territories has affected Russia’s interpretation. NATO member
states’ participation in the 1999 Kosovo war, in Afghanistan from 2002,
and in Iraq in 2003 or against Libya in 2011 is interpreted as a violation
of the norms of international law in Russia. The impact is a bigger divide
between Russia and NATO in the way wars are justified; where NATO
clings to liberal ideals of humanitarian intervention and a “Responsibility
to Protect”, Russian interpretations are more related to principles of
Realpolitik. In a Russian context, moral criteria such as “order”, “territo-
rial integrity”, and “stability” make more sense than ethical considerations
related to “proportionality” or “necessity” in war.
In Part IV—Conclusions: Mapping NATO’s Vulnerabilities—Tormod
Heier explores some of the key themes that have been elaborated through-
out the book. In Chap. 12, it is argued that NATO’s fundamental short-
coming is the absence of a broader civil-military strategic framework; a body
that can synchronise allied capabilities in a mutually reinforcing effort with
other civilian instruments of power such as diplomacy, economic assistance,
reconstruction, and development. In contrast to NATO, Russia stands
forth as a more coherent, organised and dedicated strategic actor. Russia’s
14 J. HAALAND MATLARY AND T. HEIER

stakes in Eastern Europe are higher than those of NATO he argues, and
Russia’s register of political instruments is also broader. The way Russia
synchronises them seems to be more coherent than among NATO member
states. NATO’s strength however lies in its core values: liberal and transpar-
ent societies tend to generate more resources and creativity as compared to
more authoritarian ones.

NOTES
1. See the brilliant analysis of this in Ron Asmus’ book A Little War that Shook
the World. Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West, Palgrave Macmillan,
UK, 2010.
2. Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine. Crisis in the Borderlands (London:
I.B. Tauris, 2015), pp. 26–49.
3. Roland Oliphant, “Cold War returns as US increases Europe military spend-
ing”, The Telegraph, 5 February 2016.
4. See UAWire.org on http://uawire.org/news/russia-and-the-west-a-new-
cold-war.
5. Alexander L. George, Avoiding War. Problems of Crisis Management
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991).
6. See among others Stephen Blank, “Wake Up Europe. Peace Doesn’t
Preserve Itself”, 1 July 2015, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-
atlanticist/wake-up-europe-peace-doesn-t-preserve-itself; and Matthew
Holehouse, “Migrant crisis: European Council president Tusk warns
Schengen on brink of collapse”, The Telegraph, 13 November, at http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/11991098/Migrant-
crisis-Donald-Tusk-warns-that-Schengen-is-on-brink-of-collapse-latest-
news.html.
7. See transcripts of former U.S. Secretary on Defence, Robert Gates address
on NATO’s future, at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/06/10/
transcript-of-defense-secretary-gatess-speech-on-natos-future/.
8. George Kennan, “Policy Planning Staff Memorandum”, Washington, DC,
4 May 1948, http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/
65ciafounding3.htm.
9. For a brilliant account of the perennial logic of asymmetry in war, see
Beatrice Heuser (2010), The Evolution of Strategy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), and Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers (eds.), The
Changing Character of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
10. Hew Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy”, Survival, 47(3), Autumn
2005, pp. 33–54.
11. Peter Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996), 19.
 INTRODUCTION 15

12. Ulrich Bech, “Critical Theory of World Risk Society: A Cosmopolitan

Vision”, Constellations, 16(1) 2009, pp. 3–22.
13. George Kennan, “Policy Planning Staff Memorandum”, Washington, DC,
4 May 1946, http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65cia
founding3.htm.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Asmus, Ron. 2010. A Little War that Shook the World. Georgia, Russia, and the
Future of the West. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bech, Ulrich. 2009. Critical Theory of World Risk Society: A Cosmopolitan
Vision. Constellations 16(1): 3–22.
George, Alexander L. 1991. Avoiding War. Problems of Crisis Management.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Heuser, Beatrice. 2010. The Evolution of Strategy. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Katzenstein, Peter. 1996. Cultural Norms and National Security. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Sakwa, Richard. 2015. Frontline Ukraine. Crisis in the Borderlands. London:
I.B. Tauris.
Strachan, Hew. 2005, Autumn. The Lost Meaning of Strategy. Survival 47(3):
33–54.
Strachan, Hew, and Sibylle Scheipers, eds. 2011. The Changing Character of War.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 CHAPTER 2

Europe, Russia and the World of Magical

Realism

Christopher Coker

In the 1960s a new term entered the world of literary fiction: magical
realism. It described the works of certain Latin American writers and had
a very specific meaning that made it useful for critics. It was not, as many
imagined, a description of escapist literature. The literature concerned was
always serious, though it tried to convey the reality of one or several world
views that actually exist or have existed. It was a kind of realism, but one
different from the realism that most other cultures experience. It told its
stories from the perspective of people who live in our world but experi-
ence a different reality from the one we call objective. It endeavoured to
show the world through other eyes and in allowing the reader to inhabit
this other reality so thoroughly, the ‘unreal’ element of the story became
frighteningly real long after the novel had been read.
The three main effects of this genre can be summed up as follows. Time
does not march forward in a magical realist world view. The distant past
is present in every moment. Time is a great repetition rather than a pro-
gression. Second the common is transformed into the awesome and the
unreal; subjective experience is more important than the objective. Third,

C. Coker ()
Department of International Relations, London School of Economics,
London, UK

© The Author(s) 2016 17

J. Haaland Matlary, T. Heier (eds.), Ukraine and Beyond,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32530-9_2
18 C. COKER

the miraculous is described with a precision that fits it into the ordinari-
ness of human life. When looked at closely the miraculous in fact becomes
mundane. What most works of magical realism have in common is an
implicit rejection of western literary conventions.
It may seem strange to say so, but both Europe and Russia have been
living in a magical realist world for some time. It now threatens to catch
up with both of them. What magical realism actually is in the world of
international politics is simply stated—it is spinning a tale that is believable
only thanks to a suspension of disbelief.
In both cases, magical realism feeds on what philosophers calls a social
imaginary, the concept associated perhaps most with the Canadian aca-
demic Charles Taylor. Taylor employs the term to describe the way people
imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others and what
normative expectations they have of each other.1 A social imaginary, in other
words, involves common stories, narratives and myths which make possible
common practices which in turn, bind people to certain norms of behaviour.
Institutionally, human beings come together with the aim of forming politi-
cal entities with certain ends in view, including the primary end, security.
In other words, a social imaginary involves a common understanding
of how the world works that makes possible common practices. It offers
people a perspective on their own history; it explains where they stand in
space and time, especially their relation with other societies. And every
social imaginary offers a sense of how things work, interwoven with how
they ought to, and from this derives a sense of disappointment when things
go differently from what we expect.

COSMOPOLITANISM AS MAGICAL REALISM

From the beginning the European Union saw itself as a distinctively new
entity in history: a “civilian power”. And whereas the Americans continue
to see war in Clausewitzian terms, “a continuation of politics by other
means” the Europeans have tended to see the use of force (when applied
at all) as the continuation of international law. America’s criteria for “just
war” are essentially ethical in nature and their application is not subject to
verification by international courts. The European preference writes the
German philosopher Jurgen Habermas, is for “cosmopolitan law enforce-
ment”.2 In opposition to America’s “moralisation” of war, the Europeans
prefer its “juridification”: the use of force is largely seen as policing. The
Europeans would seem to prefer “lawfare”to “warfare”—to pursue tradi-
tional strategic objectives by using legal manoeuvres, and when the use of
 EUROPE, RUSSIA AND THE WORLD OF MAGICAL REALISM 19

force becomes unavoidable, to constrain it within legal norms. What the

Americans complain about most is that the Europeans talk the language of
ultimate causes but practice the art of minimum risk.
None of which is to deny real successes when NATO and the EU
work together. P. J. O’Rourke, as always provocative, may have lambasted
the Kosovo War (1999): “Kosovo certainly taught the world a lesson.
Whenever there is suffering, injustice and oppression, America will show
up six months late and bomb the country next to where it’s happening.”3
But the US did show up, and was responsible for 80 % of the air strikes.
More impressive, if equally belated, was the success of the Bosnian opera-
tion. Bosnia-Herzegovina has been demilitarised: a million refugees have
returned, and the main instigators of ethnic cleansing have been rounded
up and sent to the International Criminal Court.
The European social imaginary is more normative than the American,
less value-affirming, for it is derived from trans-national values and
translated into specific norms of behaviour. Norms acquire particular
importance, writes Peter Katzenstein, when they crystallise through insti-
tutionalisation. Once institutionalised, they do not simply express indi-
vidual preferences; they also become part of an objective reality. The social
imaginaries of Europe and the US happen to differ significantly. To quote
Katzenstein, the US too has norms, but they impact on identity formation
(they are constitutive); the EU’s norms, by contrast, are regulatory; they
define standards of appropriate behaviour.4
The European Union as a community embraces global governance as
a way of syndicating its values across the world. It seeks to bind coun-
tries through associative agreements, and has tried to promote norms
such as anti-corruption, the rule of law, the application of international
labour organisation standards when hiring locals. These are all deemed
to be “public goods”. The Europeans have also endeavoured to invent
a system of overlapping power networks, involving partnership between
states, social advocacy groups and pressure groups. These can be seen as
the building blocks of a cosmopolitan democratic view, which is not with-
out criticism from outside Europe; NGOs and non-western governments
often see it as a form of “regulatory imperialism”. The point about cosmo-
politanism is that it is, by definition, a very specific European understand-
ing of power and its ‘miraculous’ element was that it airbrushed out of the
account altogether the importance of collective defence.
The result is that the EU has not been able to construct a security com-
munity. Europe, writes Barry Posen, has been ‘infantilised’ by American
military dominance. Its members have preferred to spend only an average
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