Journal Pone 0294520

PLOS ONE
RESEARCH ARTICLE
How to build a cold chain supply chain system

for fresh agricultural products through
blockchain technology—A study of tripartite
evolutionary game theory based on prospect
theory
Yanhu Bai, Hansheng Wu, Minmin Huang, Jianli Luo ID*, Zhuodong Yang
a1111111111
School of Business, Wenzhou University, Wenzhou, 325035, China
a1111111111
a1111111111 * 00011084@wzu.edu.cn
a1111111111
a1111111111
Abstract
The global cold chain logistics market is witnessing a significant upswing, driven by the ris-
OPEN ACCESS ing demand for perishable food products and increasing shipment volumes worldwide.
Citation: Bai Y, Wu H, Huang M, Luo J, Yang Z Technological advancements are leading to a more intelligent and digitally enabled cold
(2023) How to build a cold chain supply chain chain logistics system. However, the high loss rate of fresh agricultural products in China
system for fresh agricultural products through poses a significant threat to the country’s food security. Therefore, it is imperative to explore
blockchain technology—A study of tripartite
innovative solutions, such as blockchain, to address the challenges of traditional cold chain
evolutionary game theory based on prospect
theory. PLoS ONE 18(11): e0294520. https://doi. logistics. In this paper, inspired by the prospect theory and evolutionary game theory, we
org/10.1371/journal.pone.0294520 propose an evolutionary game model to analyze the behavioral strategies of the tripartite of
Editor: Muhammad Hashim, National Textile n-level cold chain participants, consumers, and government. Using MATLAB software, the
University, PAKISTAN numerical simulation of the game path of this tripartite theory is conducted, and the influence
Received: April 26, 2023 of variable parameters on the evolutionary process and outcomes of the system is analyzed.
The results the following: (1) The development of an effective cold chain supply chain sys-
Accepted: October 31, 2023
tem can be divided into three stages, and blockchain technology plays a pivotal role in creat-
Published: November 29, 2023
ing a seamless cold chain environment. The cost of blockchain adoption, government
Copyright: © 2023 Bai et al. This is an open access rewards, as well as penalties can significantly influence the behavioral choices of the three
article distributed under the terms of the Creative
stakeholders. (2) The behavior of individual cold chain participants has a strong negative
Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in externality, which can impact the behavior of others. We also find that the larger the scale of
any medium, provided the original author and the cold chain, the lower the probability of default by the participants. (3) The government’s
source are credited.
adoption of blockchain technology and the implementation of effective incentive policies can
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are foster the successful development of the cold chain blockchain infrastructure. Our research
within the paper and its Supporting Information
contributes to the theoretical understanding of cold chain logistics decision making and pol-
files.
icy creation for the tripartite stakeholders, including cold chain participants, consumers, and
Funding: Specific Grant Numbers: Soft Science
government. Our findings can serve as a valuable reference for scientific decision making
Research Program Project of Zhejiang Province
(2023C35018); Results of Social Science Planning and policy formulation to encourage the development of a robust cold chain supply chain
Project of Zhejiang Province (20223515). Initials of system.
authors who received each award: Yanhu Bai Full
names of commercial companies that funded the
study or authors: Department of Science and
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0294520 November 29, 2023 1 / 27

PLOS ONE How to build a cold chain supply chain system for fresh agricultural products through blockchain technolog
Technology of Zhejiang Province; Zhejiang 1. Introduction

Federation of Humanities and Social Sciences
Circles Initials of authors who received salaries or Due to the perishable nature [1] and difficulty in storage [2] of fresh agricultural products,
other financial support from commercial cold chain logistics is required [3] for their picking, packaging, storage, transportation, and
companies: Yanhu Bai URL of sponsor’s websites: distribution [4]. The cold chain is a vital supply chain system that includes upstream agricul-
http://kjt.zj.gov.cn/?id=4317; https://www.zjskw. tural product suppliers and downstream agricultural product retailers [5]. However, informa-
gov.cn/ The funders had no role in study design,
tion asymmetry and other issues in cold chain logistics lead to significant losses of agricultural
data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or
preparation of the manuscript. products, making it imperative to develop and improve the cold chain logistics system to
reduce these losses [6] and promote farmers’ income. According to Statista, the global cold
Competing interests: The authors have declared
chain logistics market was worth USD248.38 billion in 2020 and is projected to reach USD
that no competing interests exist.
410.79 billion by 2028. The total market size of China’s cold chain logistics industry was
USD54.26 billion in 2020 and was expected to increase to USD 65.56 billion in 2022. Despite
the significant advancements made in cold chain logistics monitoring technology, there
remain issues in the data traceability of the fresh produce supply chain [7] that create a high
probability of causing a "broken chain". Individual link participants in the cold chain logistics
process may shut down refrigeration equipment or engage in other violations, which are diffi-
cult to identify through traditional monitoring means. Additionally, mismatches between sup-
ply and demand can cause significant waste of fresh produce [8]. Approximately one-third of
the world’s food is wasted due to inefficient supply chains [9]. China has a relatively high rate
of agricultural product loss during transit, with vegetables and fruits losing as much as 20% to
30% of their weight and meat losing as little as 12%. The loss of vegetables and fruits in China’s
cold chain logistics process can exceed 100 billion yuan annually, resulting in significant losses
for logistics enterprises as well as food waste. In the context of technological progress, cold
chain logistics is moving towards more intelligent digitalization [10]. Therefore, the cold chain
logistics industry urgently needs to establish a cold chain supply chain system (CCSCS) with
traceable information using effective digital technology [11].
The Chinese government attaches great importance to the development of cold chain logis-
tics. In April 2020, to ensure the construction of cold chain facilities for agricultural products
storage and preservation, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs issued the "Implemen-
tation Opinions of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs on Accelerating the Construc-
tion of Cold Chain Facilities for Agricultural Products Storage and Preservation". In
December 2021, the General Office of the State Council issued the "Fourteenth Five-Year Plan
for the Development of Cold Chain Logistics", which sought to ensure the rapid construction
of a modern cold chain logistics system by pressing the "fast-forward button" on the high-qual-
ity development of China’s fresh agricultural cold chain logistics. The government has promul-
gated relevant policies to strengthen regulation, management, and incentives; however, this
has been challenging due to the backwardness of cold chain infrastructure, high logistics costs
[12], extended supply chain of fresh agricultural products, lack of a perfect cold chain logistics
information platform [13], information asymmetry between upstream and downstream enter-
prises [14], and frequent chain breakage [15]. There have also been policies implemented that
focus on the role of consumers in the cold chain [16].
In the current context of imperfect cold chain technology, opaque information and com-
plex relationship among all relevant stakeholders, many scholars have conducted research on
cold chain logistics. And the research method of evolutionary game is heavily applied to the
research in the field of cold chain logistics. Currently, cold chain logistics research is focusing
its efforts on three key areas. First is, the application of digital technologies such as blockchain
in cold chain logistics. Traditional cold chain logistics has problems such as centralized data
storage, low data reliability, and easy data tampering, which leads to the inability to guarantee
consumer rights [17]. Real-time information and the interconnectivity of elements,

supplemented with novel technologies, will revolutionize and improve the way food logistics is
carried out [18]. Blockchain technology uploads the data of each node to be stored in the
server, and any individual block retains the data of the whole blockchain intact. The generated
data cannot be modified, falsified, or deleted, ensuring high trustworthiness [4]. Trollman
et al. [19] examined how blockchain technology can be used to support the ecological embed-
ding of the coffee supply chain. Kim et al. [20] proposed using service level agreements (SLAs)
to produce performance evaluation metrics for contracts to prevent risk factors by using block-
chain technology to measure and share information in real time. Hollands et al. [21] explored
the significance of blockchain technology for the growth of the food industry and the limita-
tions that it currently faces; this method significantly reduced the time to generate blocks and
was suitable for platforms that collect and serve real-time information and apply it in cold
chain logistics. The second key area is the analysis of factors affecting whether and how to bet-
ter facilitate small downstream information interchange among cold chain participants. The
cold chain participants form a node in the cold chain logistics, and whether the cold chain par-
ticipants fulfill their commitment to open cold storage facilities will determine whether the
cold chain will have a "broken chain" or not. Shen et al. [22] used evolutionary game theory to
study the effect of government incentives on information exchange and sharing among cold
chain participating firms. Zhang [23] simulated two different types of fresh products based on
a pricing model, compared two strategies of cooperative and non-cooperative games, and
explored the profit changes of fresh e-commerce and cold chain companies in different price
ranges and using selected pricing strategies. Liu et al. [24] established an evolutionary game
model of cold chain logistics outsourcing for fresh produce enterprises with operational risks
and found that factors such as initial state, cost of default and loss of unfulfilled contracts can
have an impact on cold chain logistics enterprises. The third key factor is the influence of con-
sumer aspects on the cold chain. Consumers’ demand for diversity, nutrition, and taste of food
stimulates the development of the cold chain. In addition, the quality of the product that con-
sumers finally buy will directly affect consumers’ evaluation of that cold chain and determine
whether the cold chain is effective or not. Wang et al. [12] discussed the role of consumers’
food safety awareness and suggested that the government should encourage consumers to
raise their food safety awareness to stimulate cold chain investment and thus ensure food
safety. Rong et al. [25] showed that as China’s income and education levels increase, consum-
ers will become more accepting of paying the cost of cold chain logistics and will pay relatively
higher premiums. Jo et al. [26] analyzed 12 meta-values of consumers and proposed a food
cold chain management strategy to meet consumer perceptions.
In summary, the existing studies have explored in some depth the feasibility of the applica-
tion of blockchain technology in cold chain logistics and which factors of relevant stakeholders
will affect the construction of CCSCS, providing a solid theoretical foundation for this paper
on the research of constructing CCSCS under blockchain technology. Nonetheless, the follow-
ing represent limitations of the current literature. Firstly, the majority of cold chain studies
focus on the connection between one variable (such as consumers or businesses) and the cold
chain. Few studies combine data from many participants into a single analytical framework.
Second, there are few studies on the direct interaction between consumers and cold chain par-
ticipants, particularly the government’s influence on consumers or cold chain participants in
terms of policies. Third, few papers consider the mutual impact caused by the negative exter-
nalities of each node in the cold chain on other nodes and the deviation of the perceived bene-
fits of the game subjects in practice.
To fill the relevant research gap mentioned above, this paper introduces prospect theory to
the current Chinese cold chain situation and uses it to build a tripartite evolutionary model of
n-level cold chain participants, consumers, and government. In particular, we address the

following issues: (1) In a replicative dynamic system including cold chain participants, con-
sumers, and the government, what is the evolutionary stabilization strategy (ESS), and what
are the important elements affecting the ESS? (2) How do the system’s internal variables influ-
ence the system overall? (3) What steps should the government take to build a strong CCSCS?
The following are the paper’s most significant contributions: (1) We propose a new frame-
work for collaborative development that brings together stakeholders from the cold chain,
including n-level cold chain participants, consumers and government. (2) We study the condi-
tions for achieving the optimal steady state of the cold chain supply chain by observing the
effect of their interaction mechanisms on the system. (3) We simulate the system to see how
different parameters would affect it and use these to deduce policy changes that would help
establish a functional cold chain supply system at the national level. (4) In order to further the
science of decision-making for governments, cold chain participants, and consumers, we add
prospect theory and introduce the perceived biases brought about by psychological
considerations.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2: Model building on theo-
retical basis, we lay out the study issue and build an evolutionary model with n-level cold chain
actors, n-level consumers, and n-level policymakers as the three axes. Section 3: Model analy-
sis: Expected payoff and replicator dynamics equation of each participant analyzes the model’s
possible payoff scenarios with respect to the system of replicator dynamics equations. The evo-
lutionary equilibrium and the system stability point of the three parties are analyzed in Section
4: Stability analysis of evolutionary games, which also depicts the modeling method of the evo-
lutionary game. In Section 5: Simulation Analyses of the Evolutionary Game, we simulate the
effects of changing various parameters of the system and analyze the steps the government
should take in response. Section 6: Discussion presents the discussion of simulation results. In
Section 7: Conclusions, we review the paper’s key findings, offer policy recommendations that
follow from those findings, and critically examine the paper’s shortcomings and the outlook
for future investigation.
2. Model building on theoretical basis

2.1 Evolutionary game theory
Evolutionary game theory [27] explains the phenomenon of mutual learning, competition, and
adaptation in the evolution of organisms. In contrast to traditional game theory, which empha-
sizes static equilibrium, it focuses on the analysis of the dynamic process of system equilibrium,
including the path to reaching equilibrium and the specific developments and changes in the
system. In contrast to traditional game theory, which emphasizes perfect rationality, in evolu-
tionary game theory, participants are assumed to be finitely rational and eventually seek evolu-
tionary stability strategies through continuous trial and error, imitation, and learning [28].
Due to the non-transparent and non-sharing information of the cold chain supply chain
and the information asymmetry of the upstream and downstream cold chain participants, the
behavior of a single cold chain participant may cause massive externalities, which eventually
affect the whole cold chain. Although the Chinese government has prioritized the construction
of cold chains and has formulated a series of policies to promote the establishment of CCSCS,
the behavioral choices of cold chain participants are also influenced by the preferences of con-
sumers and other cold chain participants. The behavioral strategies of governments, cold chain
participants, and consumers are unpredictable, as they do not have complete control over the
information in their environment. They can only make the best judgment under a process of
continuous "learning". Therefore, evolutionary game theory is widely used in cold chain-
related research. Ma [29] established a dynamic game model of a cold chain formed by a milk

manufacturer and two downstream oligopolistic supermarkets. Zhao [30] analyzed the impact
of multiple factors on electric refrigerated truck(ERT) upgrading and penetration strategies by
building an evolutionary game model. The stakeholders involved in establishing the CCSCS
under blockchain technology are cold chain participants, consumers, and the government.
The game is constantly repeated among the three parties. Given that evolutionary game theory
can analyze the strategy and choices of each participant under conditions of cooperation and
conflict, the theory can be used to analyze the behavior and game process of cold chain partici-
pants, consumers, and the government.
Matlab is a powerful numerical computing and scientific programming software that offers
a wide range of features and tools for data processing, analysis, and visualization, as well as
solving various engineering and scientific problems. It is widely used by engineers, scientists,
and researchers in the fields of science and engineering [31].
In this study, we utilized Matlab for simulation analysis based on the replicator dynamics
system to provide theoretical foundations for the model. This method has been widely recog-
nized and applied by numerous scholars in various fields. Evolutionary game theory, based on
the assumption of bounded rationality, can effectively reflect the strategy selection of partici-
pants in real-life situations. Over many years of research, the use of Matlab software has
become increasingly sophisticated, and a well-developed and reasonable analysis methodology
has been established, capable of addressing various analytical problems. In various research
studies, many scholars have applied Matlab for analysis. For instance, Liu et al. [32] used
MATLAB software to numerically simulate the paths of tripartite game. Luo et al. [33] utilized
MATLAB R2018b to primarily showcase the strategic selection trends of logistics companies
in various scenarios, including "government failure," as well as the mutual impact of strategy
selection between the government and environmental non-governmental organizations.
2.2 Prospect theory

Traditional games theorys mostly uses the concept of expected returns to analyze the strategy
choices of game subjects; however, in practice, there are deviations from the perceived returns
of game subjects in practice. Prospect theory, on the other hand, can analyze decision makers’
judgments in light of the uncertainty of payoffs. Prospect theory is a descriptive technique that
originated in psychology and has become an alternative theory to utility theory and other clas-
sical approaches to decision making under risk and uncertainty [34]. Unlike the "rational
man" hypothesis long used in economics, prospect theory explains the influence of irrational
factors on human judgment and decision making according to people’s psychological and
behavioral characteristics [35]. Prospect theory has been applied to economics, evolutionary
biology, and political science [36]. A large number of scholars have analyzed the decision mak-
ing behavior of game subjects in the game process through prospect theory. For example, Li
[37] combined prospect theory to construct an evolutionary game model of vaccination and
studied the role of perception in promoting vaccination.
Government’s policy has an impact on the cold chain construction environment. However,
the government’s interests may deviate from those of other participants, so the gains and losses
brought to the cold chain participants and consumers are uncertain, and their behavioral gains
and losses are subject to perception bias. When faced with risk, individuals compare actual
utility with that of a reference point and make decisions based on the results. Due to limited
rationality, it is difficult for cold chain participants and consumers to find the best strategy in
the game. They can only determine the best strategy gradually through continuous learning.
Both prospect theory and evolutionary game theory are based on the premise of finite ratio-
nality. The combination of these two theories can reflect the decision-making psychology of

government, cold chain participants, and consumers when facing uncertain profit and loss
and can dynamically describe their strategic choice process. In addition, we use simulation to
study the influence of different factors on their strategic choices. Because of this, it is appropri-
ate to introduce prospect theory to construct a game model of CCSCS evolution and adopt
subjective probability weight function and value function to measure perceived benefits, which
can more realistically reflect the actual perceptions of game subjects.
2.3 Problem description

On the whole, the development of China’s cold chain logistics industry started late compared
with that of developed countries, and there remains a great gap in terms of development.
Although China’s cold chain logistics has made apparent progress in terms of industrial scale,
development quality, innovation pace, and market competitiveness. However, development is
hampered by various issues, such as a lack of standards in some areas of cold chain logistics,
the low level of cold chain technology [38], outdated cold chain equipment [39], an unsound
cold chain logistics system in large and medium-sized cities [40], the lack of an agricultural
logistics information platform [13]. Thus, there is no way to guarantee a constant cold temper-
ature along the whole supply chain of cold chain logistics. In addition, decentralized, individ-
ual farmer production is still the norm in the agriculture sector. When it comes to moving and
selling agricultural goods, especially perishables, supply and marketing cooperatives have little
more than a symbolic presence.
Cold chain participants: Cold chain participants at all levels are the essential components of
the cold chain, and different participants correspond to various nodes in the cold chain. Food
producers and retailers rarely collect systematic data [41], and the information is challenging
to trace under the traditional cold chain regulation model. There are high speculative gains for
cold chain participants who do not keep their contracts. The negative externality of cold chain
participants’ default will affect other cold chain participants’ willingness to keep their con-
tracts, which will negatively affect the whole cold chain system.
Government: The government is the decision maker of the CCSCS. A perfect information
traceability system ensures that when problems occur in the cold chain, the problematic links
can be pinpointed and dealt with. Therefore, the government’s adoption of blockchain policy
will also provide oversight for cold chain participants, prompting them to keep their contracts.
The construction of the cold chain blockchain system is influenced by multiple participants,
and the behavioral choices of each party will have an impact on the whole system; how govern-
ment formulates policy to guide this system will play a key role [22]. The reasonableness of the
government’s reward and punishment system [30] will also affect the motivation of consumers
to report and determine whether the cold chain participants are in breach of contract.
Consumers: Whether the cold chain participants fulfill their commitments will affect the
quality of fresh produce as purchased by consumers; thus, consumer reporting can regulate
the behavior of cold chain participants to a certain extent. Consumers’ willingness to report
will be affected by consumers’ basic understanding of the cold chain system [42] and food
safety awareness [43], as well as the soundness of the legal system.
2.4 Model assumptions

The logical relationship between the tripartite evolutionary game subjects of building the
CCSCS constructed in this paper is shown in Fig 1. The fresh produce supply chain is com-
posed of various participants. This includes the production, processing, transportation, storage
and sales of agricultural products, etc. Through the cold chain logistics, fresh produce will be
provided to consumers, while consumers will have the right to choose to report problems in

Fig 1. Logical diagram of the interrelationships between the entities in a tripartite evolutionary game.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0294520.g001
the fresh produce provided, and the government will accept the report entrusted by consumers
and identify them, and the government can choose whether to use blockchain technology,
which will have an impact on whether it can be successfully identified.
Assumption 1: The game participants are n-level cold chain participants (x), consumers (y),
and government (z), and all three parties are finite rational.
Assumption 2: The strategy space of n-level cold chain participants is (default (x), no default
(1-x)); the strategy space of fresh produce consumers is (report (y), no report (1-y)); the strat-
egy space of government is (adopt blockchain technology (z), no adopt blockchain technology
(1-z)).
Assumption 3: The three subjects make strategic choices based on their perceived benefits,
and two models from prospect theory are cited as the basis for measuring perceived benefits.
Prospect theory was jointly proposed by Tversky and Kahneman [44] to explain decision-mak-
ing behavior in the case of limited rationality. The theory converts probabilities into weights
based on expected returns using a subjective probability weight function and replaces the util-
ity model with a value function. The expected value in the prospect theory is shown in Eq (1).
X
U¼ wðpÞvðDpÞ ð1Þ
where p represents the objective probability of event i, and w(p) means the decision weight of
the decision maker’s subjective measure of event i, as a monotonically increasing function, as
in Eq (2). Usually, one assigns a weight of 1 to very high probability events and a weight of 0 to

shallow probability events, then one has w(1) = 1 and w(0) = 0. While medium and high prob-
ability events are easily underestimated, and low probability events are overestimated, one has
w(p) < p when Pi is large and w(p) > p when Pi is tiny. V(Δπ) represents the subjective value
perceived by the decision maker, as in Eq (3).
pg
wðpÞ ¼ g 1=g
ð2Þ
ððpg þ ð1 pÞ Þ
( )
Dpa ; Dp � 0
VðDpÞ ¼ b
ð3Þ
lð DpÞ ; Dp < 0
The function of Eq (2) is an inverted "S" shape, and the smaller γ is, the more curved the
function graph is. In Eq (3), the parameter Δπ represents the difference in returns before and
after the game. The parameters α, β 2 (0,1) represent the risk preference coefficients of deci-
sion-makers, and the larger the value, the higher the sensitivity to loss and gain. λ (λ � 1) is the
loss avoidance coefficient, and the larger the value, the higher the sensitivity to loss than gain.
Assumption 4: The participants in the cold chain constitute the entire chain and are present
at every stage, making their number quite large, which makes them an ideal subject for repli-
cating dynamic research. Many studies have used companies as subjects for replicating
dynamic research in numerous literature. Shan et al. [45] establish a tripartite evolutionary
game model of PV enterprises, poor households, and the government. The revenue that n-
level cold chain participants can obtain by selling units of fresh agricultural products is Pr, and
the total quantity of agricultural products transported in the cold chain is Qu. The probability
of default of participants at the previous levels is α, the loss rate of fresh agricultural products
caused by the default of the earlier participants is β, and the quantity of fresh agricultural prod-
ðn 1Þ∗a
ucts finally obtained by the nth-level participants is Qx ¼ Qu ∗ð1 bÞ . The cost of turning
on the cold storage equipment of the n-level cold chain participants is Co, and the default of
the participants The existence of speculative gain is Sp. When the default of the participant is
reported, a fine of Fc will be imposed on the defaulting cold chain participant, and the total
number of penalties for the first n-1 level participants is Fx ¼ Fc ∗a∗ðn 1Þ. Meanwhile, if the
government does not adopt blockchain technology will provide a favorable environment Gb to
the cold chain participants.
Hypothesis 5: Consumers are the largest group of participants in the cold chain system, and
their behavioral patterns are gradual and can have significant impacts on other participants.
Many classic studies have used consumers as their research subjects. For example, Long et al.
[46] build a tripartite game model involving government, consumers and enterprises. Each
level of participant default will cause an inevitable loss hio to the fresh produce purchased by
consumers, and the loss caused by the default of a participant in the cold chain transportation
Xn 1
is Hl ¼ hi0 , and the loss of the n-level is Hn. The perceived benefit of the fresh produce pur-
i¼1
chased by consumers is Pe. Consumers can choose to report the participants in the cold chain,
and when a participant in the cold chain defaults, the government will reward the consumers
who report successfully Sx. The government adopts blockchain technology will provide vital
support to ensure the legitimate rights and interests of consumers Mc.
Assumption 6: As the implementer and regulator of policies, the government also adjusts
its policies in response to changing situations. In many classic evolutionary game theory arti-
cles, the government is regarded as a participant. For example, Wang et al. [47] constructed a
three-party evolutionary game model consisting of the government, recyclers, and consumers,

while Sheng et al. [48] constructed a three-party evolutionary game model consisting of the
central government, local governments, and enterprises in China. The government needs to
pay a particular technical cost Ck to adopt blockchain technology, and when the government
does not adopt blockchain technology but the consumer reports, it needs to invest the price of
Cf to identify the probability of successful identification is λ. The revenue that the fresh pro-
duce will bring to the market for the government is P.
According to prospect theory, there is no deviation between actual utility and perceived
value when the benefits or losses are certain; in contrast, there is only psychologically perceived
utility when the decision maker is uncertain about the benefits and costs. The cost of adopting
blockchain technology by the government, the cost of identifying the reports after receiving
them, and the fines and rewards for other participants are interrelated and are deterministic
expenditures. Meanwhile, the revenue from selling fresh produce and the cost of turning on
the cold storage equipment of the n-level cold chain participants are also only interrelated and
are deterministic expenses. Therefore, Pr, Co, Qu, Fc, Mg, Hn, Sx, Ck, Cf, P, α, β, and λ do not
have perceptual bias, while Sp, Gb, Pe, and Mc have uncertainty and perceptual characteristics.
This results in a specific combination of n-level cold chain participants, consumers, and gov-
ernment strategies, as well as the corresponding perceived benefits, as shown in Table 1. The
specific parameters are described in Table 2.
3. Model analysis: Expected payoff and replicator dynamics

equation of each participant
Based on the payoff matrix of the evolutionary game model, we can obtain the expected and
average payoffs of the three subjects, n-level cold chain participants, consumers and govern-
ment, which we denote by Eij and E�i respectively:
E11 ¼ ð1 zÞ∗VðGbÞ þ VðSpÞ þ ðl 1Þ∗z l∗y∗Fc þ Pr∗Qx∗ð1 bÞ ð4Þ
E12 ¼ ð 1 þ zÞ∗ð 1 þ yÞ∗VðSpÞ þ ðy∗ð1 zÞ þ zÞ∗VðSpÞ þ Mg∗y þ Pr∗Qx Co ð5Þ
E21 ¼ x∗z∗ðVðPeÞ þ Sx þ VðMcÞ Hl HnÞ þ x∗ð1 zÞ∗ðVðPeÞ þ SX∗l Hl HnÞ

þ ð1 xÞ∗z∗ðVðPeÞ þ a∗Sx þ VðMcÞ HlÞ þ ð1 xÞ∗ð1 zÞ∗ðVðPeÞ þ a∗l∗Sx HlÞð6Þ
Table 1. Three-party hybrid strategy game model for building CCSCS by blockchain technology.
Strategy Selection consumers government
adopt blockchain technology no adopt blockchain technology
z 1-z
n-level cold chain participants default report V(Sp)+Pr*Qx*(1-β)-Fc V(Gb)+V(Sp)+Pr*Qx*(1-β)-Fc*λ
x y V(Pe)+Sx+V(Mc)-Hl-Hn V(Pe)+Sx*λ-Hl-Hn
P-Ck+Fc-Sx+Fx P-Cf+Fc*λ-Sx+Fx
no report V(Sp)+Pr*Qx*(1-β) V(Gb)+V(Sp)+Pr*Qx*(1-β)
1-y V(Pe)+V(Mc)-Hl-Hn V(Pe)-Hl-Hn
P-Ck-Fx P
no default report V(Sp)+Pr*Qx+Mg-Co V(Sp)+Pr*Qx+Mg-Co
1-x y V(Pe)+α*Sx+V(Mc)-Hl V(Pe)+α*λ*Sx-Hl
P-Ck+Fx-Mg P-Cf+Fx-Mg
no report V(Sp)+Pr*Qx-Co V(Sp)+Pr*Qx-Co
1-y V(Pe)+V(Mc)-Hl V(Pe)-Hl
P-Ck P
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0294520.t001

Table 2. Evolutionary game model parameter variable.

Parameter n-level cold chain participants
Sp Speculative gains from defaults
Pr Gain on sale of unit quantity of produce
α Chance of possible default by a former participant
β Chance of loss of fresh produce due to default by a former participant
Co Costs required to turn on refrigeration equipment
Qu Amount of produce transported
Gb Non-adoption of blockchain policy to provide an enabling environment for default
Fc Penalty for participant default
Mg Government incentives for cold chain participants not to default
Qx Quantity of produce for n levels of participants
Fx Total number of participant fines at the first n-1 levels
Consumers
hio Certain losses due to participant default at each level
Hl Losses due to default by a participant in cold chain transport
Hn Losses due to default by participants in the first n levels of cold chain transport
Pe Perceived benefits of purchasing fresh produce
λ Probability of successful identification and reporting by the government
Sx Proceeds from successful reporting
Mc Strong support to ensure consumer rights after the adoption of blockchain policy
Government
Ck Technical cost of adopting blockchain technology
Cf Cost of detection without blockchain technology
P Benefits of fresh produce reaching the market
E22 ¼ x∗z∗ðVðPeÞ þ VðMcÞ Hl HnÞ þ x∗ð1 zÞ∗ðVðPeÞ Hl HnÞ þ ð1 xÞ∗z∗ðVðPeÞ

þ VðMcÞ HlÞ þ ð1 xÞ∗ð1 zÞ∗ðVðPeÞ HlÞ ð7Þ
E31 ¼ x∗y∗ðP Ck þ Fc Sx þ FxÞ þ x∗ð1 yÞ∗ðP Ck FxÞ þ ð1 xÞ∗y∗ðP Ck þ Fx MgÞ

þ ð1 xÞ∗ð1 yÞ∗ðP CkÞ ð8Þ
E32 ¼ x∗y∗ðP Cf þ Fc∗l Sx þ FxÞ þ x∗ð1 yÞ∗ðPÞ þ ð1 xÞ∗y∗ðP Cf þ Fx MgÞ

þ ð1 xÞ∗ð1 yÞ∗ðPÞ ð9Þ
E1 ¼ x∗E11 þ ð1 xÞ∗E12 ð10Þ
E2 ¼ y∗E21 þ ð1 yÞ∗E22 ð11Þ
E3 ¼ z∗E31 þ ð1 zÞ∗E32 ð12Þ
Since there is asymmetry in the information available to n-level cold chain actors, consum-
ers, and the government, all three parties will make their own decisions based on constant trial
and error learning and historical experience to infer the strategies of the other parties. A repli-
cation process that is itself dynamic, with x, y, and z all making changes to their own strategies,
as defined by evolutionary game theory.

Replicator dynamics equations are mathematical models used to describe the changes in
strategy distribution during the evolution of a population [49]. They serve as a vital tool in evo-
lutionary game theory [50], widely applied in studying collective behavior in social, economic,
and biological systems. In replicator dynamics, each strategy or behavior is assigned a propor-
tion or frequency within the population, representing its relative prevalence. These propor-
tions change over time, reflecting the competition and selection among different strategies
during the evolutionary process.
Following is the formula for the replication dynamic equation of n-level cold chain actors,
consumers, and governments:
dx
FðxÞ ¼ ¼ x∗ðE11 E1Þ
dt
¼ x∗ðx 1Þ∗ðMg∗y VðGbÞ Co þ z∗VðGbÞ þ b∗Pr∗Qx þ l∗Fc∗y
þ Fc∗y∗z l∗Fc∗y∗zÞ ð13Þ
dy
F ðy Þ ¼ ¼ y∗ðE21 E2Þ ¼ Sx∗y∗ðy 1Þ∗ða þ x a∗xÞ∗ðl þ z l∗zÞ ð14Þ
dt
dz
FðzÞ ¼ ¼ z∗ðE31 E3Þ ¼ z∗ðz 1Þ∗ðCk Cf∗y þ Fx∗x Fc∗x∗y Fx∗x∗y þ l∗Fc∗x∗yÞð15Þ
dt
4. Stability analysis of evolutionary games

4.1 Stable strategy analysis for each participant
Stability strategy analysis is a method used to evaluate the stability and evolutionary outcomes
of strategies in game theory [51]. It is an important tool in the study of games and decision
problems, helping us understand the dynamic changes of strategies and the behavioral evolu-
tion of game participants. The core idea of stability strategy analysis is to assess the interactions
and outcomes among different strategies, determining which strategies can maintain their rel-
ative advantages and stability in long-term evolution. It takes into account the interactions and
feedback effects among game participants, as well as their process of selecting and adjusting
strategies.
When (x, y, z) no longer varies over time, the decision made by each participant is the best
possible strategy, as predicted by the differential equation stability principle when the replica
dynamic equation is 0 and its first derivative is smaller than 0. As a result, the following is a sta-
ble study of the tactics employed by the n-tiered cold chain’s actors, customers, and
governments:
For the n-level cold chain participants, the following conclusions can be drawn from Eq
(10):
r ∗Qx þz∗VðGb Þ Co VðGb ÞÞ
1. When 0 < y < ðb∗Pðl∗F c ∗z l∗Fc Fc ∗z Mg Þ
, then dFðxÞ j < 0, dFðxÞ
dx x¼1
j > 0, it can be inferred that
dx x¼0
x = 1 is the evolutionary stable point of the n-level cold chain participants. It shows that the
n-level cold chain participants’ strategy changes from no default to default, and finally stabi-
lized by choosing to default.
2. When y ¼ ðb∗Pðl∗F c ∗z l∗Fc Fc ∗z Mg Þ
, then F(x) = 0. It shows that the n-level cold chain partici-
pants choose to default and do not have the same benefit. All x are in an evolutionarily sta-
ble state, and the policy choice does not change with time.


3. When ðb∗Pðl∗F c ∗z l∗Fc Fc ∗z Mg Þ
< y < 1, then dFðxÞ j < 0, dFðxÞ
dx x¼0
j > 0, it can be inferred that
dx x¼1
x = 0 is the evolutionary stable point of the n-level cold chain participants. It shows that the
n-level cold chain participants’ strategy changes from default to no default, and finally stabi-
lized by choosing no default.
For the consumers, the following conclusions can be drawn from Eq (11):
1. When 0 < z < l l 1, then dFðyÞ j > 0, dFðyÞ

dy y¼1
j < 0, it can be inferred that y = 0 is the evolu-
dy y¼0
tionary stable point of the consumers. It shows that the consumers’ strategy changes from
report to no report, and finally stabilized by choosing no report.
2. When z ¼ l l 1, then F(y) = 0. It shows that the consumers choose to report and do not have
the same benefit. All y are in an evolutionarily stable state, and the policy choice does not
change with time.
3. When l l 1 < z < 1, then dFðyÞ j > 0, dFðyÞ

dy y¼0
j < 0, it can be inferred that y = 1 is the evolu-
dy y¼1
tionary stable point of the consumers. It shows that the consumers’ strategy changes from
no report to report, and finally stabilized by choosing to report.
For the government, the following conclusions can be drawn from Eq (12):
1. When 0 < x < ðl∗Fc ∗yðCFf ∗y Ck Þ

c ∗y Fx ∗yþFx Þ
, then dFðzÞ j < 0, dFðzÞ
dz z¼1
j > 0, it can be inferred that z = 1
dz z¼0
is the evolutionary stable point of the government. It shows that the government’s strategy
changed from not adopting blockchain technology to adopting blockchain technology and
finally stabilized by choosing to adopt blockchain technology.
2. When x ¼ ðl∗Fc ∗yðCFf ∗y Ck Þ

, then F(z) = 0. It shows that the government chooses to adopt
blockchain technology and does not have the same benefit. All z are in an evolutionarily sta-
ble state, and the policy choice does not change with time.
3. When ðl∗Fc ∗yðCFf ∗y Ck Þ

< x < 1, then dFðzÞ j < 0, dFðzÞ
dz z¼0
j > 0, it can be inferred that z = 0
dz z¼1
is the evolutionary stable point of the government. It shows that the government’s strategy
changes from adopting blockchain technology to not adopting blockchain technology, and
finally stabilized by choosing to not adopt blockchain technology.
4.2 System stability analysis

When F (x) = F (y) = F (z) = 0, we can obtain the local equilibrium points as E1 (0,0,0), E2 (0,
0,1), E3 (0.1,0), E4 (1,0,0), E5 (0,1,1), E6 (1,0,1), E7 (1,1,0), and E8 (1,1,1). According to the
method proposed by Friedman [52], the local stability of the equilibrium point can be analyzed
by the Jacobian matrix of the system. According to the evolutionary game theory, the equilib-
rium point that satisfies all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are non-positive is the e evo-
lutionary stabilization strategy (ESS) of the system. The specific analysis is as follows:
0 1
dðFðxÞÞ dðFðxÞÞ dðFðxÞÞ
B dx dy dz C
B C
B C
B dðFðyÞÞ dðFðyÞÞ dðFðyÞÞ C
J¼B B C ð16Þ
B dx dy dz C C
B C
@ dðFðzÞÞ dðFðzÞÞ dðFðzÞÞ A
dx dy dz

8 � � � �
>
> dðFðxÞÞ
>
> ¼ x∗ Mg ∗y VðGb Þ Co þ z∗VðGb Þ þ b∗Pr ∗Qx þ l∗Fc ∗y þ Fc ∗y∗z l∗Fc ∗y∗z þ ðx 1Þ∗ Mg ∗y VðGb Þ Co þ z∗VðGb Þ þ b∗Px ∗Qx þ l∗Fc ∗y þ Fc ∗y∗z l∗Fc ∗y∗z
>
> dx
>
>
>
> � �
>
> dðFðxÞÞ
> dy ¼ x∗ðx 1Þ∗ Mg þ Fc ∗z þ l∗Fc l∗Fc ∗z
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> dðFðxÞÞ
>
>
>
> ¼ x∗ðx 1Þ∗ðVðGb Þ þ Fc ∗y l∗Fc ∗yÞ
>
> dz
>
>
>
> dðFðyÞÞ
>
>
>
> ¼ Sx y∗ða 1Þ∗ðy 1Þ∗ðl þ z l∗zÞ
>
> dx
>
>
< dðFðyÞÞ
¼ Sx ∗y∗ða þ x a∗xÞ∗ðl þ z l∗zÞ Sx ∗ðy 1Þ∗ða þ x a∗xÞ∗ðl þ z l∗zÞ ð17Þ
> dy
>
>
>
>
> dðFðyÞÞ
>
>
>
> ¼ Sx ∗y∗ðl 1Þ∗ðy 1Þ∗ða þ x a∗xÞ
>
> dz
>
>
>
>
>
> dðFðzÞÞ
>
> dx ¼ z∗ðz 1Þ∗ðFx Fc ∗y Fx ∗y þ l∗Fc ∗yÞ
>
>
>
>
>
>
> dðFðzÞÞ
>
>
> ¼ z∗ðz 1Þ∗ðCf þ Fc ∗x þ Fx ∗x l∗Fc ∗xÞ
>
> dy
>
>
>
>
>
> dðFðzÞÞ
>
: ¼ ðz 1Þ∗ðCk Cf ∗y þ Fx ∗x Fc ∗x∗y Fx ∗x∗y þ l∗Fc ∗x∗yÞ þ z∗ðCk Cf ∗y þ Fx ∗x Fc ∗x∗y Fx ∗x∗y þ l∗Fc ∗x∗yÞ
dz
The Jacobian matrix serves as a fundamental tool for assessing the stability of evolution
[53]. At an equilibrium point, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix, denoted as J, play a cru-
cial role in determining its stability. Specifically, if all eigenvalues of J are less than 0, the equi-
librium point represents an evolutionary stable strategy. Conversely, if all eigenvalues are
greater than 0, the equilibrium point is deemed unstable. If one or two of the eigenvalues are
greater than 0, it corresponds to a saddle point.
The above eight equilibrium points represent eight different scenarios. It is evident that E1
(0,0,0) E2 (0,0,1) E4 (1,0,0) E6 (1,0,1), and E8 (1,1,1) cannot be evolutionarily stable points. E3
(0,1,0), E5 (0,1,1), and E7 (1,1,0) are possible evolutionarily stable points, and these three
points correspond to the cold chain. Although the stable strategy for consumers in all three sit-
uations is to report, simulation analysis reveals that the evolutionary paths of consumers in the
three situations are not the same and that consumers have a constraining effect on the other
two parties that cannot be ignored. The three development stages in the construction of the
supply chain system are analyzed as follows. The eigenvalues of all equilibrium points are
shown in Table 3.
Case 1: At this point the condition Mg—Co—V(Gb) + λ*Fc + β*Pr*Qx,—λ*Sx, Cf—Ck +
Fc—λ*Fc is satisfied. (1, 1, 0) shows that in the case that the government does not use block-
chain technology, the cold chain participant chooses to default, and the consumer chooses to
report.
Table 3. Stability of equilibrium points.

Equilibrium Jacobian Eigenvalues
λ1,λ2,λ3
E1(0,0,0) Co + V(Gb) -β*Pr*Qx, α*λ*Sx, -Ck
E2(0,0,1) Co -β*Pr*Qx, α*Sx, Ck
E3(0,1,0) Co—Mg + V(Gb) -λ*Fc -β*Pr*Qx, -α*λ*Sx, Cf—Ck
E4(1,0,0) β*Pr*Qx—V(Gb)—Co, λ*Sx,—Ck—Fx
E5(0,1,1) Co—Fc—Mg -β*Pr*Qx, -α*Sx, Ck—Cf
E6(1,0,1) β*Pr*Qx—Co, Sx, Ck + Fx
E7(1,1,0) Mg—Co—V(Gb) +λ*Fc +β*Pr*Qx, -λ*Sx, Cf—Ck + Fc -λ*Fc
E8(1,1,1) Fc—Co + Mg +β*Pr*Qx, -Sx, Ck—Cf—Fc +λ*Fc

This case is equivalent to the early stage of the construction of the CCSCS, due to an under-
developed industry culture and environment, the supply chain technology is not sufficiently
mature, and the cost to the government in adopting blockchain technology is high. When the
cost to the government in adopting blockchain technology is surpasses a certain threshold, Cf
—Ck + Fc—λ*Fc < 0, the government will not adopt the blockchain policy. As the govern-
ment does not adopt blockchain policy, it provides favorable conditions for cold chain partici-
pants to default; at this time, cold chain participants can achieve more considerable speculative
gains with lower hypothetical costs, and the government’s insufficient rewards and punish-
ments make the original gains of default higher than those of non-default. At this time, Mg—
Co—V(Gb) + λ*Fc + β*Pr*Qx < 0, and cold chain participants will choose to default. Due to
the lack of corresponding government measures, the probability of default of cold chain partic-
ipants becomes higher and higher, and consumers will suffer losses as a result; thus, to protect
their rights and interests, consumers will choose to report.
Case 2: At this point the condition Co—Fc—Mg—β*Pr*Qx, -α*Sx, Ck—Cf is satisfied. (0,
1, 1) shows that in the case where the government uses blockchain technology, the cold chain
participant chooses not to breach the contract, and the consumer chooses to report.
This case is equivalent to the development period. With the gradual maturity of blockchain
technology and the government’s awareness of the importance of strengthening the construc-
tion of the CCSCS, the government will begin to increase the supervision of the cold chain.
When the cost of using blockchain technology is less than traditional regulations to identify
cold chain problems, Ck—Cf < 0, and the government will start to adopt blockchain technol-
ogy. At the same time, the government also starts strengthening the rewards and penalties for
cold chain participants. When the bonuses and punishments reach a certain level, Co—Fc—
Mg—β*Pr*Qx < 0, the cold chain participants will choose not to breach the contract. At this
time, there remain some cold chain participants in breach of contract, and consumers will
choose to report under the dual role of reward for successful reporting and protection of their
rights and interests.
Case 3: At this point the condition Co—Mg + V(Gb) -λ*Fc -β*Pr*Qx, -α*λ*Sx, Cf—Ck is
satisfied. (0, 1, 0) indicates that in the case that the government does not use blockchain tech-
nology, the cold chain participant chooses not to breach the contract, and the consumer
chooses to report.
This case is equivalent to the mature stage of the development of the cold chain industry.
blockchain technology is developed, and the government attaches great importance to it. The
benefits of default of the cold chain participants will be significantly reduced, and they will
start to consciously comply with the industry norms. At this time Co—Mg + V(Gb)—C*Fc—
B*Pr*Qx <0, and the cold chain participants will choose not to default. Additionally, at this
time, excessive government intervention will only increase the financial burden, and since Cf
—Ck < 0, the government will gradually withdraw from the market and choose not to adopt
blockchain technology. Consumers will still choose to report problems with the product due to
the low cost of reporting and the reward for successful reporting.
The simulations of the three cases are shown in Fig 2.
5. Simulation Analyses of the Evolutionary Game

5.1 Initial variable
This section discusses the sensitivities of critical parameters in the system stability analysis,
including the cost required to adopt blockchain technology, the amount of raw produce to be
transported, and the chance of default for former cold chain participants. In modeling the sen-
sitivity of the parameters, we hold the other parameters constant.

Fig 2. Changes in the willingness of system parties under different conditions: (a) Case 1; (b) Case 2; (c) Case 3.
HNA Cold Chain is a company dedicated to third-party cold chain logistics for warehous-
ing, transportation, and distribution services, as well as providing logistics solutions and other
value-added logistics services to its customers. Since its establishment in 1997, based on the
rapidly developing industry environment, the company has been improving its domestic and
international network layout, focusing on becoming a comprehensive service provider, cold
chain ecological operator, and investor in the global production, financing, and trust integra-
tion of the cold chain industry, such as Zhejiang’s Wenling watermelon, yellow cauliflower,
and other special agricultural products sold to the whole country and the world through the
cold chain. And in the future, it will further standardize the corporate governance structure
and operation management, accelerate the construction and network layout of the national
cold chain logistics center, while continuously extending to the business fields of cold chain
finance, cold chain business, and cold chain technology, and transforming from a traditional
logistics resource operator to a modern cold chain logistics resource integrator. This case is
typical and replicable for the cold chain industry in China and worldwide. Therefore, we
choose HNA Cold Chain Company as the case for calculating the initial values of variables.
In this paper, the initial values of the parameters are obtained through four channels. First,
the relevant policies promulgated by the government. Opinions on the Implementation of
Rewards for Reporting Cold Chain Logistics Epidemic" encourages the whole society to report
the illegal acts of cold chain logistics, and once the reported clues are confirmed, the reward
amount will be calculated according to 1% of the amount of administrative punishment, and
the maximum reward can be 50,000 yuan, and we refer to get Sx = 20. The National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission issued the "About the Construction of National Backbone
Cold Chain Logistics Base in 2020 The Notice of Work" mentioned that in 2020, the Ministry

Table 4. Initial values of all variables.

Participants Parameters Variables Value
n-level cold chain participants Speculative gains from non-compliance Sp [24] 50
Gain from selling a unit quantity of produce Pr [56] 3
Chance of possible default by a former participant α(Field research) 0.3
Rate of loss of fresh produce due to default by a former participant β(Field research) 0.2
Costs r to turn on refrigerated equipment for transport Co [56] 45
Amount of produce transported Qu [56] 100
Non-adoption of blockchain policy to provide an enabling environment for default Gb(Expert assessment) 20
Penalty for participant default Fc(Expert assessment) 20
Incentives Mg [57] 20
Consumers The nth level of loss is Hn [55] 15
Perceived benefits of purchasing fresh produce Pe(Field research) 100
Probability of successful identification and reporting by the government λ(Field research) 0.4
Gains from successful reporting Sx [58] 20
Strong support to ensure consumer rights with the adoption of blockchain policies Mc(Expert assessment) 30
Government Technical cost of adopting blockchain technology Ck [54] 30
Cost of detection without blockchain technology Cf(Expert assessment) 40
Benefits of fresh produce reaching the market P(Expert assessment) 100
of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, together with relevant departments, arranged 5 billion yuan
of central financial funds to support 16 provinces, such as Hebei and Shanxi, to carry out the
construction of storage and preservation cold chain facilities around fresh and live agricultural
products such as fruits and vegetables, and we refer to get Mg = 20. Second, the classical litera-
ture and financial statements of enterprises. The data obtained by Liu [24] through the inter-
view of "SF Express", we refer to get the following parameter Sp = 50. Through the
evolutionary game model established by Song [54], which consists of government, telecommu-
nication operators, and agricultural enterprises, we refer to get Ck = 30. Through the study of
the supply chain logistics information collaboration strategy by Zhang [55], we refer to get
Hn = 15. Third. Data from field research. We researched more than ten cold chain-related
companies and one thousand consumers of fresh products in China and got α = 0.3, β = 0.2, λ
= 0.4, and Pe = 100. Fourth, the opinions of experts in related fields. More than ten experts in
related fields in Wenzhou combined the data obtained from the research with a large amount
of related literature to estimate the impact of government policies on cold chain participants
and consumers in terms of objective environment and subjective factors. For the sake of valid-
ity and accuracy of the data, we grouped these more than ten experts, and then performed sev-
eral valuations and optimization processes to obtain the most reasonable data.
With the above four sources, we finally determined the initial data of each parameter and
simplified the process, as shown in Table 4.
5.2 Simulation of changes in different variables

5.2.1 Impact of the cost required to adopt blockchain technology. We set the cost of
adopting blockchain technology as Ck = 20, 30, 40, 50; the change of willingness of each party
is shown in Fig 3. From the figure, we can see that the technical cost of blockchain technology
adoption by the government will significantly affect the willingness of the government to
adopt blockchain technology, and the willingness of the government to adopt blockchain tech-
nology will increase significantly as the cost of blockchain technology decreases. Blockchain
technology can establish a perfect cold chain information tracing system, accurately supervise

Fig 3. Change in the willingness of parties at different costs of adopting blockchain technology. (a) change in the
willingness of n-level cold chain participants, (b) change in the willingness of consumers, and (c) change in the
willingness of government.
the CCSCS, and effectively identify problematic links. Therefore, the government’s willingness
to adopt blockchain technology will also affect the probability of successful reporting by con-
sumers, which in turn will affect consumers’ willingness to report. Therefore, vigorously devel-
oping blockchain technology and reducing the cost of using blockchain technology will have a
substantial impact on building a CCSCS.
5.2.2 The impact of transporting the quantity of fresh agricultural products. We set
the quantity of fresh agricultural products transported by cold chain as Qx = 50, 70, 90, 110;
the change of willingness of each party is shown in Fig 4. As can be seen from the figure, the
higher the quantity of fresh agricultural products transported in the cold chain logistics, the
greater the willingness of the government to adopt blockchain technology and the n-level cold
chain participants not to breach the contract. The larger the scale of cold chain logistics, the
more that the government and n-level cold chain participants can reap benefits through the
cold chain; thus, the government will choose to adopt blockchain technology, and n-level cold
chain participants will choose not to default. The government should therefore actively pro-
mote the construction of the CCSCS and expand the scale of the cold chain.
5.2.3 Impact of the chance of default of former cold chain participants. We set the
default probability as α = 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6 for the former cold chain participants; the change of
willingness of each party is shown in Fig 5. As can be seen from the figure, there are many
nodes in the cold chain transportation, and the information for each node is not shared under
the traditional cold chain system. Therefore, the behavior of a single cold chain participant will
have significant externality, and the default of a particular cold chain participant will affect the
willingness of other cold chain participants not to default. As can be seen from the figure, the

Fig 4. Changes in the willingness of parties to transport fresh produce in different quantities. (a) change in the
willingness of n-level cold chain participants, (b) change in the willingness of consumers, and (c) change in the
willingness of government.
higher the willingness to default of the pre-cold-chain participant, the lower the motivation of
the n-level cold chain participant not to default. In addition, the higher the willingness of the
former cold chain participants to default, the higher the necessity of the government to use
blockchain technology.
5.2.4 Impact of government on cold chain participants and consumer rewards. We set
the government rewards to cold chain participants and consumers as Mg = 20, 40, 60, 80 and
Sx = 20, 40, 60, 80, respectively. The change in the willingness of each party is shown in Fig 6.
From the figure, it can be seen that the increase in government incentives will have a positive
impact on the non-violation behavior of cold chain participants and the willingness of con-
sumers to report their behavior. In the early stage of industry construction, when the compli-
ance awareness of cold chain participants is low and the food safety awareness of consumers is
poor, the government’s reward policy will play a leading role. However, with the increase in
government rewards, the effect will become less pronounced, and the impact of government
rewards will become smaller over time. The government should set a reasonable incentive
mechanism to achieve the maximum benefit.
6. Discussion
As a predominantly agricultural country, China ranks first in the world in producing fresh
agricultural products such as perishable fruits and vegetables [16]. However, due to inadequate
infrastructure and storage facilities and the lack of relevant knowledge and technology, the loss
rate of fresh agricultural products in China has been high [59], with storage losses currently

Fig 5. Changes in the willingness of the parties with different chances of default of the former cold chain
participants. (a) change in the willingness of n-level cold chain participants, (b) change in the willingness of
consumers, and (c) change in the willingness of government.
accounting for about 15–20% for vegetables and 10–15% for fruits. Improving traditional cold
chain logistics and building a CCSCS requires introducing modern technology [60]. Building
a CCSCS is a process involving coordinating multiple stakeholders [61]. The CCSCS requires a
reliable information traceability system to effectively monitor the cold chain and protect the
interests of various cold chain participants, including consumers. This means that the national
government must coordinate the interests of multiple parties [62] to achieve the completion of
the CCSCS.
Countries worldwide attach great importance to the construction of modern cold chain
logistics. Canada was the first to build a complete set of complex and efficient integrated cold
chain logistics systems, which organically combined air, land, rail, and waterways [63], with a
highly developed cold chain logistics network for agricultural products formed by coordina-
tion among various carrier resources [64]. To lessen the environmental impact of storing and
transporting food, a system of low-temperature controls must be implemented throughout the
entire cold chain logistics operation. The network ensures that the loss of fruits and vegetables
in Canada is controlled within 5% by modern means, and the logistics cost is less than 30%.
The integration of cold chain resources has expanded the scale and transportation methods
within the industry, effectively reducing transportation losses. This aligns with the sensitivity
analysis in this paper regarding the quantity factor of fresh agricultural products transporta-
tion. Through strategic collaboration and resource allocation, the cold chain has optimized
operations, improved coordination, and increased transportation capacity. As a result, losses
in transportation have been significantly reduced, leading to a more efficient and sustainable
cold chain system. The congruity between the sensitivity analysis and the discussions in this

Fig 6. Changes in the willingness of parties with different government incentives. (a) change in the willingness of
n-level cold chain participants, (b) change in the willingness of consumers, and (c) change in the willingness of the
government.
paper highlights the importance of integrating cold chain resources in addressing challenges
related to the transportation of varying quantities of fresh agricultural products. The United
States applies RFID, a GPS equipped with automatic temperature control [65], for the real-
time temperature monitoring of pharmaceutical temperatures [66]. This system allows for
maintaining the temperature of transported pharmaceuticals in the range of 2–8˚C during the
cold chain shipping process of vaccines, biological agents, and other medications. Addition-
ally, the United States possesses the most cutting-edge "three-stage" refrigerated delivery
trucks, which can simultaneously meet the temperature needs of three separate refrigerated
medications [67]. For each cold chain vehicle operated by Britain’s C.R. England cold chain
service transport company, an electronic data interchange, a satellite positioning system, a
remote control platform, and other cutting-edge auxiliary technology are standard [68] and
can monitor the whereabouts of each cold chain vehicle in real time, providing confirmation
that the procedure meets standards for quality and safety. Japan is also a leader in barcode
innovation [69] and temperature sensor technology, which can monitor the quality of pharma-
ceutical cold chain logistics services in real time. Similarly, Japan has implemented an in-vehi-
cle mapping system to determine logistics distribution routes for pharmaceutical cold chain
distribution vehicles, which greatly decreases the logistics of in-transit consumption time and
improves the efficiency of pharmaceutical cold chain logistics distribution. The integration of
digital technologies has ushered in significant advancements within the cold chain industry,
leading to a more centralized, systematic, and transparent approach. This transformative shift
has successfully mitigated the potential negative impact of individual participants on the entire
system, thus fostering the overall development of the cold chain. The findings from the

sensitivity analysis conducted in this paper regarding the default probability of previous cold
chain participants provide further support for these observations. The analysis highlights the
crucial importance of enhancing processes and promoting transparency throughout the cold
chain, a goal that can be effectively realized through the integration of digital technologies. By
leveraging tools such as real-time tracking, temperature monitoring, and data analytics, the
cold chain ecosystem can proactively manage risks and optimize operational efficiency across
the entire supply chain.
The necessity of using blockchain and other technologies in the cold chain has been proven
in numerous studies. Smart contracts combining blockchain and IoT technologies applied in
the blood cold chain (BCC) can ensure the quality of blood or blood products [70]. Using
blockchain technology (BCT) in the food cold chain, is expected to provide traceability and
sustainability for food products [71]. Wan [72] investigated a novel drug quality control tech-
nology for cold chain logistics based on port transportation to achieve strict control in the port
logistics industry. The simulation results in this paper also show that the development of
blockchain technology to reduce the costs associated with technology use can effectively facili-
tate the construction of CCSCSs. The combination of modern technology and traditional cold
chain logistics makes all aspects of cold chain logistics more compact, builds an information
traceability system, forms a CCSCS, and provides a development direction for the high-quality
development of the cold chain industry. The simulation results of this paper also indicate that
the government’s incentive policy plays a motivating role in encouraging positive behavior
among all parties, aligning with existing research in the field. The government should set a rea-
sonable reward and punishment mechanism [73], regulate the price of cold chain transporta-
tion products [74], promote the development of the cold chain, and support and manage the
information sharing of companies, all of which can effectively prevent the phenomenon of
cold chain disconnection [75].
7. Conclusions
An evolutionary game model involving n-level cold chain participants, consumers, and gov-
ernment is established in this paper using evolutionary game theory and prospect theory. We
analyze the stability of the model and simulate the impact of different parameter changes on
the system to reveal the effect of government blockchain technology usage on building a
CCSCS. We draw the following three conclusions.
First, we determined three stability cases that will occur in the construction of the CCSCS
as well as the reasons why for these cases through system stability analysis, of the early, middle,
and late stages of CCSCS construction. Through this study, we conclude that factors such as
government incentives and the cost of using blockchain technology in the process of CCSCS
construction will affect the evolution of the system to a higher stage of development. Factors
such as Ck, Qx, α, Mg, and Sx will influence the evolutionary steady state of the system.
Second, the research results show that there are strong negative externalities among the par-
ticipants in the cold chain. At the same time, the scale of the cold chain will also have an impact
on the system. The larger the scale of the cold chain, the greater the reduction in default of the
cold chain participants. The cost of using block-chain technology will significantly affect the
benefit of its adoption by the government, thus affecting the behavior of cold chain partici-
pants and consumers. In addition, the government’s incentive policy will also have a positive
influence; a customized and reasonable incentive mechanism will have an essential impact in
the early stage of cold chain supply chain construction.
Third, this paper combines prospect theory with evolutionary game theory. Through evolu-
tionary game theory, we obtain the evolutionary stability strategy of the three parties of n-level

cold chain participants, consumers, and government after continuous trial and error, imita-
tion, and learning, while prospect theory adds the perceived differences in the consideration of
the three parties with limited rationality; thus the stability strategy obtained can provide guid-
ance for the construction of realistic cold chain supply chain system. In order to build a strong
cold chain supply chain system, Chinese cold chain enterprises need to work to improve the
overall awareness of non-breach of contract among all the nodes involved in the cold chain
and build a positive environment to promote the construction of the cold chain supply chain
system. Enterprises should also actively participate in the use of blockchain technology to
jointly maintain a traceability system with transparent information.
7.1 Policy recommendations

Based on the conclusions obtained after the analysis of the system stability and sensitivity of
typical parameters, we present the following policy recommendations.
First, publicity and education must be strenghtened. Promoting the Concept of Cold Chain
Logistics, Raising Awareness about the Hazards of Cold Chain Disruptions, and Enhancing
Public Understanding and Support for Initiatives to Advance Cold Chain Logistics. Cultivat-
ing good consumption habits and a healthy lifestyle, improve the ability of the public to iden-
tify unqualified frozen products, enhance the sense of responsibility of consumers to maintain
the healthy development of the CCSCS, and build a good cold chain environment together
through active reporting by consumers. At the same time to improve the cold chain enterprises
and practitioners’ product quality and safety awareness, strict compliance with the cold chain
logistics related laws and regulations and operating norms, building a solid cold chain product
quality and safety line of defense. Publicize and promote several cold chain logistics enterprises
should be encouraged to operate in good faith, with quality service in typical cases, to create a
positive environment for industry development.
Second, the development of blockchain technology and associated technologies should be
supported, as a boost in technological innovation will aid in the building of CCSCSs. Busi-
nesses involved in cold-chain logistics should be encouraged to ensure the timely delivery of
data, informatization, and visualization of cold chain products and update, yard facilities, car-
rier equipment, and other infrastructure. Overall goals include lifting the bar on intelligent
progress, pushing businesses toward cutting-edge IT and AI, and promoting the evolution and
modernization of cold chain infrastructure, among others.
Third, a fair reward and punishment system should be implemented for the cold chain
transportation regulatory system. The quality of cold chain transportation oversight should be
improved by establishing a foolproof system for tracking shipments and increasing market
surveillance. Use penalties for infractions, funding for the development of technology like
blockchain, active compliance from cold chain members, and consumer reporting to ensure
accountability are also important elements.
7.2 Limitations
In the process of constructing the three-way evolutionary game model of n-level cold chain
participants, consumers, and government and its subsequent analysis, we realized some limita-
tions of this paper, which will provide possible directions for our future research. First, this
paper does not consider certain possible influencing factors regarding the construction of
CCSCSs with blockchain technology, such as the psychological factors of cold chain partici-
pants influenced as by the negative externalities of other cold chain participants, as well as the
additional costs required by cold chain participants. Second, this paper constructs the evolu-
tionary game model based on three of n-level cold chain participants, consumers, and

government, but does not consider the influence of more other stakeholders, such as fresh pro-
duce sellers on the construction of CCSCS. Moreover, the impact of consumers in the model is
relatively smaller compared to the other two groups, and in the future, simplification of the
model can be considered. Thirdly, this paper does not take into account the heterogeneity of
individual behaviors of different subjects. In the future, we will address individual differences,
such as the knowledge level and consumption demands of consumers and the professional eth-
ics of cold chain participants.
Supporting information
S1 Table. Minimal data set. https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.24192573.v2.
(XLSX)
S1 File. Replication of dynamic equations and eigenvalue computation procedures. https://
doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.24197271.v4.
(DOCX)
S2 File. The matlab program used to plot Fig 2. https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.
24198243.v3.
(DOCX)
24198264.v3.
(DOCX)
24198273.v3.
(DOCX)
24198282.v3.
(DOCX)
24198288.v3.
(DOCX)
Acknowledgments
Thanks to the reviewers for their suggestions.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization: Yanhu Bai, Hansheng Wu.
Data curation: Minmin Huang.
Formal analysis: Hansheng Wu.
Funding acquisition: Jianli Luo.
Methodology: Minmin Huang.
Project administration: Yanhu Bai.
Resources: Jianli Luo.
Software: Zhuodong Yang.

Supervision: Yanhu Bai.

Writing – original draft: Hansheng Wu.
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PLOS ONE

How to build a cold chain supply chain system

PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0294520 November 29, 2023 1 / 27

Technology of Zhejiang Province; Zhejiang 1. Introduction

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2. Model building on theoretical basis

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2.2 Prospect theory

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2.3 Problem description

2.4 Model assumptions

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3. Model analysis: Expected payoff and replicator dynamics

E12 ¼ ð 1 þ zÞ∗ð 1 þ yÞ∗VðSpÞ þ ðy∗ð1 zÞ þ zÞ∗VðSpÞ þ Mg∗y þ Pr∗Qx Co ð5Þ

E21 ¼ x∗z∗ðVðPeÞ þ Sx þ VðMcÞ Hl HnÞ þ x∗ð1 zÞ∗ðVðPeÞ þ SX∗l Hl HnÞ

PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0294520 November 29, 2023 9 / 27

Table 2. Evolutionary game model parameter variable.

E22 ¼ x∗z∗ðVðPeÞ þ VðMcÞ Hl HnÞ þ x∗ð1 zÞ∗ðVðPeÞ Hl HnÞ þ ð1 xÞ∗z∗ðVðPeÞ

E31 ¼ x∗y∗ðP Ck þ Fc Sx þ FxÞ þ x∗ð1 yÞ∗ðP Ck FxÞ þ ð1 xÞ∗y∗ðP Ck þ Fx MgÞ

E32 ¼ x∗y∗ðP Cf þ Fc∗l Sx þ FxÞ þ x∗ð1 yÞ∗ðPÞ þ ð1 xÞ∗y∗ðP Cf þ Fx MgÞ

E1 ¼ x∗E11 þ ð1 xÞ∗E12 ð10Þ

E2 ¼ y∗E21 þ ð1 yÞ∗E22 ð11Þ

E3 ¼ z∗E31 þ ð1 zÞ∗E32 ð12Þ

PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0294520 November 29, 2023 10 / 27

4. Stability analysis of evolutionary games

PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0294520 November 29, 2023 11 / 27

r ∗Qx þz∗VðGb Þ Co VðGb ÞÞ

1. When 0 < z < l l 1, then dFðyÞ j > 0, dFðyÞ

3. When l l 1 < z < 1, then dFðyÞ j > 0, dFðyÞ

1. When 0 < x < ðl∗Fc ∗yðCFf ∗y Ck Þ

2. When x ¼ ðl∗Fc ∗yðCFf ∗y Ck Þ

3. When ðl∗Fc ∗yðCFf ∗y Ck Þ

4.2 System stability analysis

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Table 3. Stability of equilibrium points.

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5. Simulation Analyses of the Evolutionary Game

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Table 4. Initial values of all variables.

5.2 Simulation of changes in different variables

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7.1 Policy recommendations

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Supervision: Yanhu Bai.

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