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A Setback to Tomás Garrido Canabal's Desire to Eliminate the Church in Mexico

Author(s): Alan M. Kirshner


Source: Journal of Church and State, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Autumn 1971), pp. 479-492
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23914188
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A Setback to Toma's Garrido Canabal's Desire to

Eliminate the Church in Mexico

Alan M. Kirshner

Tomas Garrido Canabal, strong man of the southeastern Mexican


state of Tabasco, arrived in Mexico City at the end of November
1934 to become Minister of Agriculture in President Lâzaro
Cardenas' new administration. Tomas Garrido's radical activism
against the church in his home state made him the best known
member of the incoming cabinet.1 The Tabascan dictator had vir
tually exterminated the church in his small state. Not one priest
could officiate there because of the 1925 legislation defining the
qualifications of clerics: to be Tabascan or Mexican by birth, with
five years residency in the state; to be older than forty; to have
studied the primary and the preparatory courses in the official
schools; to be of good moral antecedents; to be married; and not to
have been, nor be subject to any lawsuits.2 Garrido's Blocs of Young
Revolutionaries, popularly known as the Red Shirts because of their
colorful uniforms, systematically leveled church buildings. They also

ALAN M. K1RSHNER (B.A., Hofstra University; M.A., The City College of New York;
Ph.D., New York University) is Associate Professor of History at Ohlone College in
Fremont, California. His doctoral dissertation, "Tornas Garrido Canabal and the Mexican
Red Shirt Movement," is presently being translated in Spanish for publication in Mexico.
This article may well be the first scholarly writing in English (and probably in any other
language) on the activities of Garrido Canabal.
1. George Creel, "The Scourge of Tabasco: Mexico's Hottest Dictator," Collier's 95 (23
February 1935): 10.
2. Tomas Garrido Canabal, Manifiesto a los obreros organizados de la Repûblica y al
elemento revolucionario (Villahermosa, Tabasco: n.p., 1925), p. 12. When Ernest Gruening
(Mexico and its Heritage [New York: Century Co., 1928], pp. 270-271) asked Tomas
Garrido on 13 November 1925 why the legislation included the provision that all priests
must be married, he replied that he wanted to legitimatize the existing children. Reports
spoke of one lone priest, Padre Macario Fernandez Aquado, hiding in the selvas and swamps
of Tabasco, always one step ahead of the police and death. Cf. Severo Garcfa, FA Indio
Gabriel: la matanza de San Carlos (México, D.F.: Editorial Jus, 1957), pp. 16-17. Graham
Greene wrote his famous book The Power and the Glory based upon these stories after a
trip through Mexico, including Tabasco, in the late 1930s.

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480 CHURCH AND STATE

held weekly meetings to burn all the religious symbols that they had
collected through the forcible entry of homes.
Tomas Garrido Canabal, the man whom many Mexicans con
sidered to be the anti-Christ, was now in a position to impose his
designs on all of the nation. Mexican Catholics feared that Garrido
had the active support of the new president, himself unfriendly to
the church. Lâzaro Cardenas had voted for Tomas Garrido for the
presidency on 1 July 1934. Since Cardenas chose to vote for the then
governor of Tabasco rather than himself, it could only be deduced
that he had complete faith in Garrido.3 During the election campaign
itself, Cardenas had called upon the rest of the nation to study
Garrido's success and had referred to Tabasco as the "Laboratory of
the Revolution."4
Garrido appeared in Mexico City to take his post as Minister of
Agriculture with all the confidence of a man convinced that his goals
were nearing completion. Hundreds of his Red Shirts came with him
from Tabasco to parade in the streets with their red-shirted comrades
of the Bloc's Mexico City chapter.
On 29 November 1934, the day before the inaugural ceremonies, a
contingent of Red Shirts travelled to Cuernavaca, a few miles from
the capital city, to march in honor of Mexico's political boss,
Plutarco Elias Calles, president from 1924 to 1928. The Mexican
strong man greeted them in front of his residence, Las Palmas. His
words bode doom for Mexican Catholics. He said: "I have con
gratulated you and I congratulate you again, because Tabasco with
Garrido has laid an example for the Republic with this movement
that is strongly affecting the whole country."5 He continued: "Thus,
then, the force and initiatives are not lost, because when there is a
youth that feels, thinks, and works as you do, one can die tranquil
carrying the deep conviction that the Revolution is saved."6 Tomas

3. The author was informed in an interview with Emilio Portes Gil (México, D.F., 14
January 1969), president of Mexico in 1929, that it was quite usual for presidential
candidates to cast their ballot for someone else they considered worthy. He said that
Cürdenas voted for Garrido because he was a good revolutionary and a radical. Luis I.
Rodriguez, private secretary to President Cardenas in 1935, indicated in an interview
(México, D.F., 24 January 1969) that he did not know why Cardenas voted for Garrido, but
added that everyone has the right to vote for whom they wish.
4. These campaign speeches can be read in El Nacional (México, D.F.), 25 March 1934 and
27 March 1934.
5. El Nacional (México, D.F.), 30 November 1934, p. 1.
6. Ibid.

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TOMAS GARRIDO CANABAL 481

Garrido would interpret this encouragement from the most powerful


man in the country as his license to use his Red Shirts to attempt to
destroy the Mexican church.
The Red Shirt belief in the ultimate success of their anti-church
campaign was reflected in their bearing. They stole the show during
the inaugural parade the next day, 30 November 1934. In its English
section Excelsior reported:

Mexico City throughout the day took on a festive atmosphere as numerous


contingents of indigenous tribes in native costume milled through the highly
decorative streets en route to the stadium. The most sensational of these groups
was that of "the red shirts" from Tabasco, an organization formed to support
Governor Tomas Garrido Canabal who was appointed Secretary of Agriculture in
the new cabinet. The Tabascan Youth, some 800 strong, formed a solid mass of
red with their black trousers against the white stone of the stadium in the special
section reserved for them.7

After their colorful appearance during the inauguration, the


majority of Red Shirts returned to Tabasco.8 But many of the young
Tabascans remained in the capital to take positions as employees of
the Ministry of Agriculture. Garrido intended to bolster his position
with personnel he knew to be loyal and who would do his bidding.
What Garrido wanted his Red Shirts to do soon became obvious.
The Red Shirts proceeded to circulate through the capital and its
environs, attacking all aspects of religion. The Red Shirts were con
vinced that the burning of religious symbols and the use of fiery
rhetoric would radicalize the masses of the metropolis. They believed
that even if they did not succeed in converting the masses to their
brand of atheism, the power of the church would be undermined,
and the Revolution could then advance as it had in Tabasco. Con
frontation was the order of the day.
After a few weeks of these activities the Red Shirts decided to
harangue the Catholics attending Sunday mass. Garrido's fol
lowers were determined to open the eyes of the religious to
diverse opinions through direct action. Once this liberating process
occurred, they rationalized, the clergy would never again lead the
ignorant in counterrevolution.

7. Excelsior (México, D.F.), 1 December 1935, Sec. 2, p. 2.


8. El Nacional (México, D.F.), 3 December 1934, p. 1 ;Redenciön (Villahermosa, Tabasco),
4 December 1934, p. 1.

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482 CHURCH AND STATE

The first Sabbath encounter of the new Red Shirt campaign took
place at Atzcapotzalco on 23 December 1934.9 The defiant crusade
of the Red Shirts unsettled the Catholics of Mexico City. A few days
later, news arrived that Catholics had surprised seven youths while
soaking the Church of Santa Catarina with gasoline. Although a fire
was prevented, the invaders destroyed numerous religious ornaments
and statues before their escape. The press reported that the vandals
were armed and were followers of a politician who recently had
arrived in the capital.10 Everyone assumed that the politician was
Garrido Canabal and the seven youths were Red Shirts.
The uproar among the Catholics of the metropolis did not deter
the Bloc of Young Revolutionaries of the Federal District from their
new tactic. On Sunday, 30 December 1934, they gathered in front of
the famous Church of San Juan Bautista, built in 1530, in the colony
of Coyoacân on the outskirts of Mexico City.11
About seventy Red Shirts amassed in the garden near the church
at about 10:00 A.M. They planted their red and black flag in the soil.
Speakers perched upon a stone cross in the garden proceeded to
harass the worshippers. The actual cause of the clash that followed is
difficult to ascertain as in any incident of this type. The rhetoric of
the young radicals obviously inflamed the Catholics; their Red Shirt
belief in confrontation provided no quarter for rational action or
compromise.
An angry crowd gathered. Suddenly the doors of the church
opened and the worshippers began to advance on the Red Shirts.
Shouts from both sides increased passions, and someone fired a
shot.12 In the ensuing battle five Catholics were converted into
martyrs.13 But the Red Shirts retreated before the enraged mob,

9. See the photographs of the Bloc of Young Revolutionaries meeting at Atzcapotzalco in


El Nacional (México, D.F.), 25 December 1934, p. 8.
10. Excelsior (México, D.F.), 27 December 1934, Sec. 2, p. 1.
11. Baltasar Dromundo (Tomas Garrido: su vida y su leyenda [México, D.F.: Editorial
Guaram'a, 1953], p. 114) reported that Eloisa Azcuaga del Valle and Arnulfo Pérez H., two
of Garrido's aides, had changed the orders of the Red Shirts. They told them to go to
Coyoacän rather than Xochimilco as originally planned.
12. Redenciôn (ViHahermosa, Tabasco), 2 January 1935, p. 2. A later account ("Martires
Mexicanos: la tragedia de Coyoacän," Alerta 224 [18 October 1969]: 11) indicated that
one of the Red Shirts shouted, "Cursed be Christ the King." A young woman, Maria de la
Luz Camacho, allegedly responded and stirred the crowd with: "Long Live Christ the King."
13. The dead were Maria de la Luz Camacho, society woman from Coyoacän; Andrés
Velasco, a worker; José Inès Mendoza, gardener; Inocencio Ramirez, gardener; and Angel
Calderön, Spanish businessman. El Universal (México, D.F.), 31 December 1934, p. 1.

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TOMAS GARRIDO CANABAL 483

taking refuge in the ex-Municipal Palace across from the church. This
was the seat of the delegation of Coyoacân. The federal delegate
happened to be the Tabascan, Homero Margalli, a close associate of
Garrido. The crowd tried to attack the building, but one hundred
and fifty police, called by Margalli to protect the Red Shirts, arrived
with carbines. The police surrounded the building, but they were
unable to prevent the lynching of Ernesto Malda, who appeared late
at the church, dressed in his red shirt.
Malda had awakened late that morning and had hurriedly dressed
in his Red Shirt uniform in order to participate in a propaganda
meeting in Coyoacân. He boarded a bus without eating breakfast and
went forth to join his companions.14 Young Malda descended from
the bus at Coyoacân in the midst of the skirmish. As he realized what
was happening, he tried to escape; but from every direction groups of
embittered Catholics advanced upon him. He ran in one direction
and then another. Finally a street car appeared and he tried to get
on, but the driver closed the glass doors in his face and proceeded on
his way. The mob grabbed Malda and dragged him to the doors of
the church where only a few minutes before the shootings had
occurred. There he was mercilessly beaten to death.15 Thus the tall,
thin, twenty-year-old youth became the Red Shirts' martyr.
The violent clash was reported to President Cdrdenas when
Homero Margalli sent him a telegram. The message was obviously
designed to protect the Red Shirts: "Today at 11 A.M., during a
meeting, a group of the Bloc of Young Revolutionaries of the
Federal District were violently attacked by the multitudes that left
the Church of San Juan Bautista of this delegation. Deaths resulted
on both sides: one youth of the Bloc and five of the antagonistic
group. The judicial authorities have already received knowledge of
these lamentable facts. I communicate them to you for your superior
knowledge."16 Three men were arrested for the murder of Ernesto
Malda. The police placed sixty-four Red Shirts in custody for
wounding thirty people and killing five.

14. Roberto Blanco Moheno, Crônica de la Revoluciôn Mexicana, 3 vols. (Me'xico, D.F.:
Editorial Diana, 1967), 3:342.
15. El Universal (México, D.F.), 31 December 1934, p. 9.
16. Archivo del Présidente Lâzaro Clrdenas, Archivo General de la Naciôn (Hereafter, AC):
Telegram from Homero Margalli C., México, D.F., to President Cardenas, National Palace,
30 December 1934.

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484 CHURCH AND STATE

In court the Red Shirts testified that they never used guns and
that the Catholics fired the only shots.17 The police did not find any
guns, but the papers explained that Margalli and his aides hid the
weapons. The authorities arrested an employee of the delegation,
César Padrôn from Tabasco, for impeding justice when they
uncovered a box containing a number of cartridges, a red shirt, and a
garrison cap in the delegation's headquarters.18
At the arraignment, the Red Shirts gave false names and most
could not produce identification. Padrôn received the blame for
advising the Red Shirts to destroy their identification cards.19 The
radical youths later gave their real names. Agapito Dommguez
Canabal, President of the Bloc of Young Revolutionaries of the
Federal District, used the pseudonym of Agapito Dominguez
Cabrera.20 It appeared that he intended to avoid the association the
press would make with his relative, Tomas Garrido Canabal, who was
visiting Tabasco at tbe time of the tragedy. The other leader of the
day's events, Julio Diaz Quiroz, President of the Bloc of Young
Revolutionaries of Coyoacân, having changed his clothes before the
arrest, was arraigned dressed as a peasant.21
Most of the Red Shirts did not have the opportunity to change
their clothes. The authorities found in the pockets of the youths'
uniforms a circular detailing their daily activities. According to this
paper the Red Shirts participated in military exercises every Monday,
Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday at 4:00 P.M. The Bloc of Young
Revolutionaries of the Federal District met in their headquarters on
Tacuba Street at 5:00 P.M. each Wednesday. On Saturday all
members of the Bloc were to attend the Red Saturday ceremonies at
the Palace of Fine Arts, beginning at 7:00 P.M.22 The sheet included
the reminder that if a member missed these obligatory meetings
twice he would be expelled immediately from the organization. The
Red Shirts also carried copies of "The Socialist Hymn."23

17. Manuel Gonzalez Calzada, Tomds Garrido Canabal: al derecho y al rêvés (México, D.F.:
By the author, 1940), p. 89; Excelsior (México, D.F.), 2 January 1934, p. 3.
18. El Universal (Mexico, D.F.), 31 December 1934, p. 9.
19. Ibid.
20. See the list of those arrested in ibid., 3 January 1935, p. 5.
21. Excelsior (Mexico, D.F.), 31 December 1934, p. 1.
22. Every Saturday evening Tomas Garrido held these anti-church meetings. Songs, dances,
poems, plays, and speeches put across his atheistic message to a friendly audience.
23. Excelsior (Mexico, D.F.), 31 December 1934, p. 1.

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TOMAS GARRIDO CANABAL 485

The police took declarations from the sixty-five prisoners. These


statements were almost identical. The youths related to their
inquisitors how they arrived from Tabasco under an amparo and with
the support of a high government functionary.24 The Red Shirts
who were detained confessed that most of them worked for the
Ministry of Agriculture, that they organized a group called the Bloc
of Young Revolutionaries to fulfill their goals, that their creed was
socialism and that they wore the red shirt as symbolic of this
doctrine, that they were prepared to die in order to destroy the evil
influences of religion, that to eliminate the false and oppressive
doctrines of the church they used various methods of propaganda,
and that their rules required the organization of anti-religious
meetings in places where their message would be effective.25
Further in their testimony, the Red Shirts confirmed the fact that
they met in Coyoacan to propagandize the Catholics. They tacitly
admitted, according to the depositions, that they had counted upon
the facilities and guarantees that Homero Margalli, the federal
delegate, could provide.26
As the police questioned the Red Shirts, citizens of Coyoacan
assaulted the jail. For their prisoners' safety, the authorities decided
to transfer the sixty-five youths to the federal penitentiary under a
heavy guard.27 The crowd moved to the Bloc offices on Tacuba
Street where they held a protest meeting, demanding the removal of
Tomas Garrido and Homero Margalli from their government posts. 28
Some residents of Coyoacan formed a group which they called the
"Club of the Assassinated of Coyoacan." The organization's program
included four points: the removal of Tomas Garrido, the unseating of
Arnulfo Pérez (Tabascan Deputy), dismissal of Homero Margalli, and
the vigorous prosecution of the Red Shirts.29 Letters and telegrams
decrying the massacre at Coyoacan flooded the president's office
from groups and individuals throughout Mexico demanding similar
action.30

24. The Red Shirt use of the technical term amparo appears to be incorrect. An amparo in
Mexican law is similar to an injunction, but can provide absolute protection from further
arrest. The amparo is also designed to protect an individual from persecution if his health or
life is thought to be in danger.
25. El Universal (Mexico, D.F.), 1 January 1935, pp. 1,11.
Ibid., p. 11.
Excelsior (México, D.F.), 31 December 1934, p. 4.
Ibid., 1 January 1935, p. 11.
New York Times, 2 January 1935, p. 52.
AC: See listing under Coyoacân.

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486 CHURCH AND STATE

The Red Shirts had their defenders as well. In what was apparently
an organized campaign, letters and telegrams arrived at the presi
dential palace from Tabasco condemning the attack of the Catholic
fanatics upon the members of the Bloc of Young Revolutionaries of
the Federal District.31 The term cristero appeared over and over
again in these messages—a reference to the Catholics who rose against
the government between 1926 and 1929. Left-wing worker and
peasant organizations from all parts of Mexico also supported the
Red Shirts.32
The Catholics were convinced that the government sanctioned
such attacks. President Cardenas did nothing to alter this conclusion.
In his New Year's message the Chief Executive reiterated his govern
ment's determination to enforce the religious laws with vigor.33 His
silence on Coyoacân was indicative enough; but when he sent a
wreath of flowers to the grave of the fallen Red Shirt Ernesto Malda,
the religious circles expected another era of government persecution
worse than during the presidency of Plutarco Eifas Calles.34
The Red Shirts took their cue and were inspired to enact new
dramas in the streets of the capital. The Blocs of Young Revolu
tionaries declared that they would continue with a renewed
dynamism their radical ideological campaign against the clergy and
the "fanatics."35
The funeral of Ernesto Malda provided an opportunity to begin
their new anticlerical activities. Followers of Tomas Garrido carried
Malda's coffin, draped in a red and black flag, through the streets of
Mexico City to the French cemetery. There mourners buried the
casket and strewed mounds of red flowers on the grave.36 A speaker
proclaimed that Malda "fell like Obregôn, sacrificed by the
clergy."37

31. Ibid.
32. Ibid. The Bloc of Young Revolutionaries of Villahermosa also sent their formal protest
of the "cristero" attack; AC: Telegram from Alfonso Bates Caparroso, President, and
Napoleôn Pedrero Focfl, General-Secretary, Villahermosa, Tabasco, to President Lâzaro
Cârdenas, México, D.F., 31 December 1934.
33. New York Times, 2 January 1935, p. 52; El Nacional (México, D.F.), 2 January 1935,
pp. 1, 7.
34. El Nacional (México, D.F.), 3 January 1935, p. 7.
35. Redenciôn (Villahermosa, Tabasco), 3 January 1935, p. 1.
36. New York Times, 2 January 1935, p. 52.
37. El Nacional (México, D.F.), 2 January 1935, p. 7.

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TOMAS GARRIDO CANABAL 487

A few days after the funeral, a large group of young girls marched
through the streets of the metropolis carrying red flowers which they
explained symbolized the blood of the fallen Red Shirt martyr. They
appeared at various newspaper offices to express their displeasure
with the coverage of the events of Coyoacan.38 After assuring them
selves of the desired news coverage for their protest, the young
women walked to the federal penitentiary and showered the jail with
roses to express their support of the incarcerated Red Shirts.39
On 3 January 1935, the judge freed twenty-five of those arrested,
formally charging the remaining forty with precipitating the clash
and causing the death of the five Catholics. The magistrate stated
that it was obvious that the Red Shirts dispatched the bullets at
Coyoacan.40 The judge also held two men over for trial in the death
of Malda while releasing a third.41
The following day, the court established bail at one thousand
pesos for each of the Red Shirts still in jail. The judge informed the
press that under the law he must set bail.42 The papers reported that
the forty thousand pesos was paid by a bonding company. At a later
date, Tomas Garrido told a journalist that he had mortgaged his
wife's house to pay the Red Shirts' bail.43 In this interview Garrido
related his visit to the Red Shirts in the federal penitentiary and how
he became convinced of their innocence. He repeated the youth's
charge that the priest of the parroquia provoked the crowd to attack
the Red Shirts.44 Garrido also revealed that he spoke to Cardenas on
behalf of his followers after this visit.45
Release of the Bloc members provided them with another excuse
for celebration and a propaganda meeting. They organized a gather
ing with the employees of the Ministry of Agriculture. The speakers
attacked the "bourgeois reactionaries" for placing the Red Shirts in
jail.46 The radicals then held a march that proceeded to the tomb of

38. The young women echoed the words of the Red Shirt President, Agapito Domi'nguez,
who had sent a telegram from the penitentiary to President Cardenas. He protested the
coverage of the events by the "clerical press." He also defended the Red Shirts' right to free
speech: "We have as much right to be anti-clerical as the church has to preach," AC:
Telegram from Agapito Domi'nguez to President Cardenas, 31 December 1934.
39. El Nacional (México, D.F.), 5 January 1935, p. 2.
40. El Universal (México, D.F.), 4 January 1935, pp. 1, 5.
41. Ibid., p. 5.
42. Diario de Yucatân (Mérida, Yucatan), 6 January 1935, p. 2.
43. "Garrido Canabal continua siendo un 'comecuras,' " La Prensa (México, D.F.), 22
March 1941, p. 8.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Diario de Yucatân (Mérida, Yucatan), 5 January 1935, p. 2.

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488 CHURCH AND STATE

Malda. They covered the grave with fresh red flowers.47 From there
a group of Red Shirts, led by Agapito Dominguez, went to the
offices of El Nacional, the government's official newspaper, to thank
its personnel for their unbiased reporting of the events of Coyoacân.
The delegation also visited other organizations that had supported
them during their incarceration and bestowed their thanks.48
The Red Shirts decided to publish a special edition of their
journal, Juventud Roja, to correct the injustice they thought they
had received because of the coverage of Coyoacân in the non
government press. Juventud Roja described the Bloc's interpretation
of the clash and attacked the directors of El Universal and La Prensa,
two of the capital's principle newspapers, as the moral authors of
Malda's lynching.49 To enliven their propaganda campaign, the Red
Shirts dropped twenty thousand copies of this "extra" over
Coyoacân from Garrido's private airplanes, the Rojinegro and the
Guacamayo.50
The "Committee of the Assassinated of Coyoacân" resolved to
continue their fight despite the airlifted news dropped by the Red
Shirts. Their street corner meetings continued to inflame the
citizenry of Coyoacân. On 5 January 1935, the police arrested the
chief organizer of the protest, Alberto Alejandro Delgado, for
inciting the crowds to violence against the Red Shirts.51 Catholics
concluded that the government intended to continue its support of
Garrido Canabal and his Blocs of Young Revolutionaries.
Tempers continued to mount. The Committee received reports
that the Bloc was reinforcing its ranks with new arrivals from
Tabasco and interpreted this development as preparation for further
intimidation and violence.52 The Red Shirts broke up a gathering
held in the theatre of the Ministry of Education on 3 January
1935.53 Two days later they roared into a benefit for a children's

47. Ibid.
48. El National (México, D.F.), 5 January 1935, p. 2; Redenciôn (Villahermosa, Tabasco),
5 January 1935, p. 1.
49. Redenciôn (Villahermosa, Tabasco), 3 January 1935, p. 1.
50. Ibid., 4 January 1935, p. 4; La Prensa (México, D.F.), 5 January 1935, p. 22.
51. La Prensa (Mexico, D.F.), 6 January 1935, p. 2. Alberto Alejandro Delgado was
reported to be a communist.
52. Ibid., 7 January 1935, p. 17; Diario de Yucatan (Mérida, Yucatan), 8 January 1935, p.
2.
53. Diario de Yucatan (Mérida, Yucatan), 5 January 1935, p. 8; Excelsior (México, D.F.), 4
January 1935, Sec. 2, p. 1.

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TOMAS GARRIDO CANABAL 489

hospital in the Palace of Fine Arts because it interfered with their


plans for a Red Saturday.54 These disruptions added greatly to the
people's fears.
On 7 January 1935, university students held a meeting to orotest
against the Red Shirt "murderers." They waited in vain for a Red
Shirt invasion of their gathering.55 Various orators proceeded to
blast the Red Shirt movement. The famous Mexican painter and
communist leader, David Alfaro Siqueiros, declared the Red Shirts
more dangerous than the Gold Shirts, a decidedly fascist organi
zation. He said that it is easy to identify the false doctrines of the
latter group, but the former group "speaks to the people."56
Siqueiros accused the Blocs of being organized, in part, to protect
the United Fruit Company and Yankee imperialism, a reference to
the large state-controlled banana industry in Tabasco.57 He called
for a united front to combat the common enemy—the Red Shirts. 58
The oratory excited the students. Fifteen hundred marched to the
National Palace to demand the dissolution of the Red Shirts.59 The
students recognized that the crimson movement, with its uncom
promising radicalism, represented a threat to academic freedom.
They also remembered that Tabascan youths had been in the fore
front of a drive to have Marxism declared the university's official
doctrine in 1933.60
From the National Palace the crowd of students walked to the
corner of Aquiles Serdân and Tacuba Street where the Red Shirts
had their offices. The crowd soon became a mob and attacked the
building. They threw cobblestones, broke windows, tore down the
red flags, and destroyed the sign that read: "Bloc of Young
Revolutionaries."61 At the initial attack members of the Bloc
apparently were absent.62 Manuel Gonzalez, a Red Shirt, said that
Agapito Dommguez and five others received news that a hostile
54. Diario de Yucatân (Mérida, Yucatan), 7 January 1935, p. 2.
55. Ibid., 8 January 1935, p. 1.
56. El Hombre Libre (Mexico, D.F.), 11 January 1935, pp. 1, 3.
57. Excelsior (Mexico, D.F.), 8 January 1935, p. 3.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Cf. Sebastian Mayo, La Educaciôn Socialista en Mexico: el asalto a la Universidad
Nacional (Rosario, Argentina: Editorial Bear, 1964), pp. 70-126.
61. El Nacional (Mexico, D.F.), 8 January 1935, pp. 1, 2; Excelsior (México, D.F.), 8
January 1935, pp. 1, 3;£I Universal (México, D.F.), 8 January, pp. 1, 2; La Prensa (México,
D.F.), 8 January 1935, pp. 3, 6,18.
62. El Nacional (Mexico, D.F.), 8 January 1935, p. 2; Gonzalez, Tomds Garrido Canabal, p.
92; Redenciön (Villahermosa, Tabasco), 8 January 1935, p. 1, reported that five Bloc
members were in the building when the clash occurred.

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490 CHURCH AND STATE

crowd was gathering and rushed to defend their building.63 According


to one report, when the Red Shirts realized the attackers were trying
to force their way into the building, they opened fire.64 Within
seconds firemen, who the Red Shirts had called along with police to
protect them, turned their hoses on the mob.65 The crowd dis
persed, but not before five persons were seriously wounded and
twenty others had received minor injuries.66 The attack caused
extensive damage to the Red Shirts' headquarters.67 Redenciôn,
Tomas Garrido's newspaper in Tabasco, blamed the aggression on the
"cristeros. "68
Finally, President Cardenas acted. He lambasted the clergy,
implying that they were the cause of both the incident at Coyoacân
and the destruction of the Red Shirts' headquarters. Cardenas stated
that the clerical groups of the country "united the conservative
forces to profit from the less important designs of ideological action
that the revolutionary groups promoted [apparently a comment on
the activities of Tomas Garrido and his Red Shirts], in order to
transform these into bloody clashes with the purpose of causing
scandal."69
Cardenas heard the demonstrators shouting in the street and let
them know their actions would not influence him. He struck out at
the protesters as dupes of the clergy. It was time to end the politics
of the streets "to prevent a repeat of events like those of Coyoacân
and Tacuba Street."70 Cardenas announced the following actions:

The government has taken suitable measures to prevent the repetition of similar
events to those of Coyoacan and the street of Tacuba.

The Minister of Gobernaciôn has declared, and will see that it is fulfilled, that
only the National Revolutionary Party is qualified to carry on the political and
social activities that strengthen the ideals which serve as banners to the
Revolution and which we revolutionaires hold as norms.

63. Gonzalez, Tomas Garrido Canabal, pp. 92-93.


64. Ibid., p. 94.
65. La Prensa (Mexico, D.F.), 8 January 1935, p. 6.
66. Excelsior (Mexico, D.F.), 8 January 1935, p. 1 ; New York Times, 9 January 1935, p. 7.
67. La Prensa (México, D.F.), 9 January 1935, p. 19.
68. Redenciôn (Villahermosa, Tabasco), 8 January 1935, p. 1. To protect themselves
against further surprise attacks of the magnitude of 7 January, the Red Shirts sent spies to
student meetings.
69. La Prensa (México, D.F.), 9 January 1935, p. 3.
70. Ibid.

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TOMAS GARRIDO CANABAL 491

The Central Department of the Federal District will authorize public demonstra
tions in order to protect against those groups or persons with different ideas
than the petitioners who seek to spread subversive ideas, or the ideas of the
confessional prohibited by our laws.71

The measures that the President decreed were interpreted in


clerical circles as support for the Red Shirts. In the United States,
Bishop Francis Clement Kelley wrote in his Blood-Drenched Altars:

Enough has been quoted from Dictator, President, Congress, and Cabinet, to
show that the religious persecution is a planned affair. That it will be carried out
legally or illegally, is certain, as the news dispatches show. The murder of people
coming out of church at Coyoacan, a suburb of Mexico City, is only one
incident on the illegal side. The fact that President Cardenas was in sympathy
with these murderers and intends to have that fact known to all is proved by his
action in forbidding public demonstrations except by those who were actually
responsible for the murders, his own political party,72

But apparently Cardenas also directed his manifesto against the


Red Shirts. Despite the President's three-point decree, he seemed to
have heard the demonstrators. Red Shirts began leaving the capital
by mid-February. The newspaper La Prensa reported that they left
under the direct orders of President Cardenas, because he had
declared that only the official party was able to create social
propaganda.73 High official spokesmen such as Vicente Lombardo
Toledano, one-time supporter of the Red Shirt movement, began to
call for the dissolution of the organization.74
In the months that followed, Red Shirt activity tapered off.
Numerous clashes occurred in Mexico City and other parts of the
nation between Tomas Garrido's followers and fanatical church
supporters. Yet none of the events matched the magnitude of the
clashes at Coyoacan and the Red Shirt headquarters. The Red Shirts

71. Ibid.; Gustavo Casasola, ed., Historia grâfica de la Revoluciôn, 1900-1951, 6 vols.
(Mexico, D.F.: Archivo Casasola, 1954), 5:2133.
72. Italics mine. Francis Clement Kelley, Blood-Drenched Altars: Mexican Study and
Comment (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1935), pp. 381-382.
73. Excelsior (México, D.F.), 21 January 1935, p. 3.
74. La Prensa (México, D.F.), 13 February, 1935, p. 3. However, one problem arose in that
many of the Red Shirts leaving the capital were out of jail on bail for the shootings at
Coyoacün; ibid., 15 February 1935, p. 3. A judge of the Second Federal District Court said
he would take the matter under advisement. That was as far as it went; ibid., 16 February
1935, p. 2.

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492 CHURCH AND STATE

had discontinued their direct confrontations with the large numbers


of Sunday worshippers.
President Cardenas and other government officials ceased the
glowing praise of Tomas Garrido Canabal which had highlighted the
days before Coyoacân. The Minister of Agriculture's activities had
embarrassed the government because of the adverse publicity. It
became necessary for Cardenas to announce that the official party
would control all future activities and demonstrations, even when in
accord with the goals of the government.
Tomas Garrido Canabal and his Red Shirts continued their efforts
on behalf of their anti-church, pro-socialist creed, but the President's
declaration prevented them from taking to the streets as they had
done before. Intimidation had failed as a policy of conversion.
Whatever they preached, or whatever they did, the ghosts of
Coyoacân deafened those who might have been receptive.
The Red Shirts continued along with Tomas Garrido Canabal
under the impression that they and their methods were right. But the
man who many people had predicted would follow Cardenas in the
presidency75 had lost, after Coyoacân, the favor of Mexico's closed
political establishment. Tomas Garrido Canabal never would obtain
another opportunity to fulfill his desire to eliminate the church.

75. On 26 December 1934, El Hombre Libre (México, D.F.) ran the following headline
across its front page: "Garrido, Future President."

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