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Kavous Ardalan
Understanding
Revolution
A Multi-Paradigmatic Approach
Understanding Revolution
Kavous Ardalan
Understanding Revolution
A Multi-Paradigmatic Approach
Kavous Ardalan
School of Management
Marist College
Poughkeepsie, NY, USA
ISBN 978-3-030-47590-1 ISBN 978-3-030-47591-8 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47591-8
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of
the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation,
broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information
storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the
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This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
This work is dedicated to my family.
Preface
This book is the seventh book that reflects the change in the way that I think about
the world, and in writing it, I hope that it will do the same for others. The writing of
my first book1 began a few years after I received my Ph.D. in Finance from York
University in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. But, the origin of it goes back to the time I
was a doctoral candidate and took a course in Philosophy and Method with Professor
Gareth Morgan. At that time, I was exposed to ideas which were totally new to me.
They occupied my mind and every day I found them more helpful than the day
before in explaining what I experienced in my daily, practical, and intellectual life.
When in high school, I grew up overseas and I was raised to appreciate mathe-
matics and science at the expense of other fields of study. Then in college, I received
my Bachelors in Arts in Economics. Afterwards, in order to obtain my master’s and
doctoral degrees in Economics, I attended University of California, Santa Barbara
and I received my specialized training in Economics. I pursued further studies in
Finance at York University and finished with another doctoral degree. As is clear,
throughout the years of my education, I was trained to see the world in a special
narrow way.
Among various courses, which I took during all these years of training, one
course stood out as being different and, in the final analysis, the most influential. It
was the Philosophy and Method course which I took with Professor Gareth Morgan
at York University. It was most influential, because none of the other courses gave
me the vision that this one did. Whereas all the other courses trained me to see the
world in one special narrow way, this course provided me with the idea that the
world can be seen from different vantage points, where each one would be insightful
in its own way. Over the years, constant applications of this idea in my daily, practi-
cal, and intellectual life were quite an eye-opener for me such that I naturally con-
verted to this new way of thinking about the world. This happened in spite of the
fact that my entire education, almost exclusively, trained me to see the world in a
1
Ardalan (2008).
vii
viii Preface
narrow and limited way. Since then, I have been writing based on this new approach,
and the current book represents what has been accumulated since the publication of
my first six books.2
This book crosses two existing lines of literature: philosophy of social science
and social revolution. More specifically, its frame of reference is Burrell and Morgan
(1979) and Morgan (1983) and applies their ideas and insights to social revolution.
Clearly, a thorough treatment of all the relevant issues referred to in this work is
well beyond just one book. Within such limits, this book aims at only providing an
overview, a review, a taxonomy, or a map of the topics and leaving further discus-
sions of all the relevant issues to the references cited herein. In other words, the aim
of this work is not so much to create a new piece of puzzle as it is to fit the existing
pieces of puzzle together in order to make sense of it. To implement this aim, and
given the specialized and abstract nature of the philosophy of social science, this
book first discusses the framework of Burrell and Morgan (1979), and in this con-
text, the following chapters bring some of the important dimensions of social revo-
lution into focus. The chapters in this book put the pieces of puzzle together into the
bigger picture. The choice of what is to be included in the book and what is to be
excluded has been a hard one. In numerous occasions, it is decided to refer to some
massive topics very briefly. In any case, this book is only an overview, but it pro-
vides a comprehensive set of references to avoid some of its shortcomings.
The main theme of the book is as follows. Social theory can usefully be conceived
in terms of four key paradigms: functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and
radical structuralist. The four paradigms are founded upon different assumptions
about the nature of social science and the nature of society. Each generates theories,
concepts, and analytical tools that are different from those of the other paradigms.
These four paradigms are not air-tight compartments into which all theories must
be squeezed. They are heuristic devices which are created to make sense of the
messy reality of the social revolution. They are merely useful constructs to aid
understanding. They are not claimed to be the only constructs to aid understanding.
They are not claimed to be the best constructs to aid understanding. They are only
one such construct, among many possible constructs, to aid understanding. They
provide an analytically clear and compelling map of the terrain. They help in dif-
ferentiating the various perspectives that exist with respect to a given phenomenon.
Their purpose is to help to understand differences, but not to make invidious com-
parisons. There is no one paradigm that can capture the essence of reality. Paradigm
diversity provides enhanced understanding. In intellectual, as well as natural envi-
ronments, diversity is a sine qua non of robust good health. There is no singular
approach that in its universality, can apprehend the totality of reality. Since aca-
demic models are inevitably the product of a partial viewpoint, they will always be
biased, and hence a multiplicity of perspectives is required to represent the com-
plexity and diversity of phenomena and activities. The four paradigms provide a
full-circle world-view.
2
Ardalan (2008, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2019a, 2019b).
Preface ix
The mainstream in most academic fields of study is based upon the functionalist
paradigm, and, for the most part, mainstream scholars are not always entirely aware
of the traditions to which they belong. Their understanding of different paradigms
leads to a better understanding of the multifaceted nature of their academic field of
study. Although a researcher may decide to conduct research from the point of view
of a certain paradigm, an understanding of the nature of other paradigms leads to a
better understanding of what one is doing.
Knowledge of any phenomenon is ultimately a product of the researcher’s para-
digmatic approach to that multifaceted phenomenon. Viewed from this angle, the
pursuit of knowledge is seen as much an ethical, moral, ideological, and political
activity, as a technical one. Each paradigm can gain much from the contributions of
the other paradigms.
The ancient parable of six blind scholars and their experience with the elephant
illustrates the benefits of paradigm diversity. There were six blind scholars who did
not know what the elephant looked like and had never even heard its name. They
decided to obtain a mental picture—that is, knowledge—by touching the animal.
The first blind scholar felt the elephant’s trunk and argued that the elephant was like
a lively snake. The second bind scholar rubbed along one of the elephant’s enor-
mous legs and likened the animal to a rough column of massive proportions. The
third blind scholar took hold of the elephant’s tail and insisted that the elephant
resembled a large, flexible brush. The fourth blind scholar felt the elephant’s sharp
tusk and declared it to be like a great spear. The fifth blind scholar examined the
elephant’s waving ear and was convinced that the animal was some sort of a fan.
The sixth blind scholar, who occupied the space between the elephant’s front and
hid legs, could not touch any parts of the elephant and consequently asserted that
there were no such beasts as elephant at all and accused his colleagues of making up
fantastic stories about non-existing things. Each of the six blind scholars held firmly
to their understanding of an elephant and they argued and fought about which story
contained the correct understanding of the elephant. As a result, their entire com-
munity was torn apart, and suspicion and distrust became the order of the day.
This parable contains many valuable lessons. First, probably reality is too com-
plex to be fully grasped by imperfect human beings. Second, although each person
might correctly identify one aspect of reality, each may incorrectly attempt to reduce
the entire phenomenon to their own partial and narrow experience. Third, the main-
tenance of communal peace and harmony might be worth much more than stub-
bornly clinging to one’s understanding of the world. Fourth, it might be wise for
each person to return to reality and exchange positions with others to better appreci-
ate the whole of the reality.3
This book, as in my previous six books, advocates a multi-paradigmatic approach
that employs the method of juxtaposing heterogeneous viewpoints in order to illu-
minate more comprehensively the phenomenon under consideration. The multi-
3
This parable is taken from Steger (2002).
x Preface
paradigmatic approach uses a systematic and structured method to explain the

phenomenon from the viewpoint of each paradigm and juxtaposes them in order to
transcend the limitations of each of the worldviews.
My first book, entitled On the Role of Paradigms in Finance, applied the multi-
paradigmatic approach to the following phenomena: (1) development of the aca-
demic field of finance, (2) mathematical language of the academic field of finance,
(3) mathematical method of the academic field of finance, (4) money, (5) corporate
governance, (6) markets, (7) technology, and (8) education.
My second book, entitled Understanding Globalization: A Multi-Dimensional
Approach, applied, in the context of globalization, the multi-paradigmatic approach
to the following phenomena: (1) world order, (2) culture, (3) the state, (4) informa-
tion technology, (5) economics, (6) production, (7) development, and (8) Bretton
Woods Institutions.
My third book, entitled Paradigms in Political Economy, applied the multi-
paradigmatic approach to the following phenomena: (1) the state, (2) justice, (3)
freedom, (4) democracy, (5) liberal democracy, (6) media, and (7) the great reces-
sion. These seven applications of the multi-paradigmatic approach continued to
show that the multi-paradigmatic approach is very versatile in the sense that it can
be applied to almost any phenomenon, and that the multi-paradigmatic approach
can be applied not only to categorical concepts such as the state, justice, freedom,
and media, but also to categorical and sub-categorical concepts such as democracy
and liberal democracy, as well as practical categories such as the great recession.
My fourth book, entitled Case Method and Pluralist Economics: Philosophy,
Methodology, and Practice, applied the multi-paradigmatic approach to education
and economics, and noted that both the case method and pluralist economics ema-
nate from the same foundational philosophy that views the world as being socially
constructed and that both of them advocate pluralism. Therefore, the case method
seems to be compatible and congruent with pluralist economics. To this end, the
book discussed the philosophical, methodological, and practical aspects of the case
method through their comparisons with those of the lecture method, which is com-
monly known and experienced by most people. The book also discussed pluralist
economics through the exposition of the philosophical foundations of the extant
economics schools of thought, which is the focal point of the attention and admira-
tion of pluralist economics.
My fifth book, entitled Global Political Economy: A Multi-Paradigmatic
Approach, applied, in the context of global political economy, the multi-paradigmatic
approach to the following phenomena: (1) the driving force of globalization, (2)
governance, (3) modernity, (4) finance, (5) regionalization, (6) war, and (7) democ-
racy. These seven applications of the multi-paradigmatic approach continued to
show that the multi-paradigmatic approach is very versatile in the sense that it can
be applied to almost any phenomenon, both national or international, as well as
local and global.
My sixth book, entitled Equity Home Bias: A Place-Attachment Perspective,
introduced “place attachment” as a new explanation for the “equity home bias”
puzzle—the empirical finding that people overinvest in domestic stocks relative to
Preface xi
the theoretically optimal investment portfolio. For this purpose, Chapter 1 provided
a comprehensive review of the extant literature on the “equity home bias puzzle.”
Chapter 2 provided an overview of the literature on “place attachment.” Chapter 3
crossed the two lines of research to provide “place attachment” as a new explanation
for the “equity home bias puzzle.” Chapter 4 looked into the future of place attach-
ment and its effect on the home bias. At first sight, my sixth book might not seem to
have any relationship with the multi-paradigmatic approach. But it needs to be said
that: (1) the qualitative methodology, rather than the quantitative methodology of
mainstream finance, that is used in my sixth book stems from the teachings of the
multi-paradigmatic approach, i.e., there are paradigmatically diverse research meth-
odologies, and (2) the review of the literature on “place attachment,” which is pro-
vided in Chapter 2 of my sixth book, applies a multi-paradigmatic approach, i.e.,
there are paradigmatically diverse views on place attachment.
The current book, entitled Understanding Revolution: A Multi-Paradigmatic
Approach, intends to show how a multi-paradigmatic approach can be used in order
to better understand social revolution. The book starts with the discussion of four
broad worldviews, or paradigms. It, then, discusses several major social phenomena
from the viewpoints of the four paradigms to present the benefits and characteristics
of the multi-paradigmatic approach. It also shows how the multi-paradigmatic
approach helps a better and more comprehensive understanding the phenomenon
under consideration. It, finally, illustrates how the characteristics of the multi-
paradigmatic approach can be used to better understand social revolution.
My previous six books have shown how successfully the multi-paradigmatic
approach provides a broader and a balanced view of the phenomenon under consid-
eration. In addition, this book shows that the multi-paradigmatic approach substan-
tively improves the analysis and understanding of social revolution and rectifies
many extant controversies.
The book is about understanding revolution through a multi-paradigmatic
approach. For this purpose, the book starts with a discussion of four most diverse
worldviews or paradigms. Then, it discusses six relevant social aspects/dimensions
from the viewpoints of the four most diverse worldviews or paradigms. With this
background, the book introduces a comprehensive approach to the understanding of
revolution.
The book crosses two existing lines of literature: social philosophy and social
revolution. The main theme of the book can usefully be conceived in terms of four
key paradigms: functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical structural-
ist. The four paradigms are founded upon different assumptions about the nature of
social science and the nature of society. Each paradigm generates theories, con-
cepts, and analytical tools which are different from those of other paradigms. An
understanding of different paradigms leads to a broader and a balanced understand-
ing of the multi-faceted nature of the subject matter. A multi-paradigmatic approach
promotes self-reflexivity and reduces the risk of excessive dogmatism.
In this book, the first chapter reviews the four paradigms. Then, each of the next
six chapters provides four paradigmatic explanations for each of the six relevant
aspects/dimensions of human society. With this background, the book introduces a
xii Preface
comprehensive approach to the understanding of revolution. The final chapter con-

cludes by recommending paradigm diversity. Overall, this book shows the versatil-
ity and utility of the multi-paradigmatic approach.
In this book, Chapters 2 through 7 apply the multi-paradigmatic approach to a
variety of social phenomena to gain a better understanding of how to apply the
multi-paradigmatic approach to any possible phenomenon. Although the case of the
Iranian Revolution is discussed to gain not only some understanding of a revolution,
but also an understanding of how to apply the multi-paradigmatic approach, as the
main purpose is to understand how to apply the multi-paradigmatic approach. This
is because an understanding of how to apply the multi-paradigmatic approach is
deemed more crucial in understanding revolution than a case study of one revolu-
tion. The multi-paradigmatic approach will enable one to better analyze and better
understand most, if not all, social revolutions. Indeed, this is why the title of the
book is “Understanding Revolution: A Multi-Paradigmatic Approach.”
Chapters 2 through 7 also discusses six aspects, or dimensions, of social life.
Each chapter focuses on one aspect, or dimension, of social life and discusses that
aspect, or dimension, from the four most diverse paradigmatic viewpoints: function-
alist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical structuralist. Each chapter allocates
the same space, in terms of the number of book pages, to each of the four view-
points, which is the same principle as followed in my previous books as well. Each
of the four paradigmatic viewpoints is represented by a typical viewpoint. These
four different perspectives should be regarded as typical polar viewpoints. The work
of certain authors helps to define the logically coherent form of a certain polar view-
point. But, the work of many authors who share more than one perspective is located
between the poles of the spectrum defined by the polar viewpoints. For instance,
some critical realists believe that they offer a meta-theoretical perspective that actu-
ally subsumes all four paradigms treated in this book by explicitly theorizing the
subjective-objective and the reproduction-transformation dialectics. The purpose of
this book is not to put people into boxes. It is, rather, to recommend that a satisfac-
tory perspective may draw upon several of the typical polar viewpoints.
This book is unique due to its especial characteristics as follows:
• It is systematic and methodic: It discusses each of the six aspects/dimensions of
human social life from the same four paradigmatic viewpoints. This method of
analysis can be applied to any phenomenon, i.e., each phenomenon can be
viewed from these four perspectives. This method is, indeed, versatile and
resilient.
• It is fundamental and applied: It applies four fundamental viewpoints to each of
the six aspects/dimensions of human social life.
• It is fair and unbiased: In each chapter, it allocates the same number of pages to
each paradigmatic viewpoint. In contrast to other books on revolution, this book
does not focus on particular aspect/dimension of revolution and from a specific
viewpoint. This book emphasizes as many aspects/dimensions of revolution as
Preface xiii
possible and, in this way, proposes a comprehensive approach to the understand-

ing of revolution.
• It is enlightening: It provides four different views with respect to the same phe-
nomenon, and therefore, it provides a broader and a balanced understanding of
the phenomenon under consideration.
• It is multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary: Its explanation of many phenom-
ena, including the phenomena of conflict and social change, are both multi-
dimensional and multi-perspectival.
The writing of the chapters of this book involved extensive work over several
years. It required peace of mind and extended uninterrupted research time. My
deepest expressions of gratitude go to my wife Haleh, my son Arash, and my daugh-
ter Camellia for their prolonged patience, unlimited understanding, sustained sup-
port, constant cooperation, and individual independence during all these long years.
I hold much respect for my late parents (Javad and Afagholmolouk) who instilled in
their children (Ghobad, Golnar, Alireza, and Kavous) the grand Ardalan family’s
values of respect, openness, and love of learning, among others. I sincerely appreci-
ate the heartfelt support of my in-laws (Farideh, Parviz, and Houman) who have
always been in close contact with us since the formation of my immediate family.
The ideas expressed in this work are based on the teachings, writings, and
insights of Professor Gareth Morgan, to whom the nucleus of this work is owed.
Needless to say, I stand responsible for all the errors and omissions. I would like to
thank Professor Gareth Morgan who taught me how to diversely view the world and
accordingly inspired my work.
I am thankful of the Marist College library staff for their timely provision of the
requested literature, which they obtained from various sources. I would also like to
thank the publishers, referenced in the endnotes, who allowed me to use their mate-
rials. Certainly, I would like to thank the respectable people who work at Springer
for their recognition of the significance of my work and for their publication of the
book with utmost professionalism.
Poughkeepsie, NY, USA Kavous Ardalan
References
Ardalan, K. (2008). On the Role of Paradigms in Finance. Aldershot, Hampshire, Britain: Ashgate
Publishing Limited, and Burlington, Vermont, USA: Ashgate Publishing Company.
Ardalan, K. (2014). Understanding Globalization: A Multi-Dimensional Approach. Piscataway,
New Jersey, USA: Transaction Publishers.
Ardalan, K. (2016). Paradigms in Political Economy. New York, New York, USA: Routledge.
Ardalan, K. (2018). Case Method and Pluralist Economics: Philosophy, Methodology, and Practice.
New York, New York, USA; and Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing AG.
Ardalan, K. (2019a). Global Political Economy: A Multi-Paradigmatic Approach. New York,
New York, USA; and Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing AG.
xiv Preface
Ardalan, K. (2019b). Equity Home Bias in International Finance: A Place-Attachment Perspective.

Abingdon, Oxon, UK; and New York, New York, USA: Routledge.
Burrell, G. & Morgan, G. (1979). Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis. Hants,
Britain: Gower Publishing Company Limited.
Morgan, G. (1983). Beyond Method: Strategies for Social Research. Beverley Hills, California,
USA: Sage Publications.
Steger, M. B. (2002). Globalism: The New Market Ideology. New York, New York, USA: Rowan
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Contents
1 Four Paradigms�� 1

1 Functionalist Paradigm �� 4
2 Interpretive Paradigm�� 5
3 Radical Humanist Paradigm �� 6
4 Radical Structuralist Paradigm �� 8
5 Conclusion�� 9
References�� 10
2 Culture: Four Paradigmatic Views�� 15
1 Functionalist View�� 15
2 Interpretive View�� 21
3 Radical Humanist View�� 26
4 Radical Structuralist View�� 32
References�� 38
3 Religion: Four Paradigmatic Views�� 45
References�� 55
4 Revolution: Four Paradigmatic Views �� 57
References�� 79
xv
xvi Contents
5 Iranian Revolution: Four Paradigmatic Views �� 83

References�� 126
6 Ideology: Four Paradigmatic Views �� 129
7 Ideology of Iranian Revolution: Four Paradigmatic Views �� 151
8 Understanding Revolution: A Comprehensive Approach�� 163
1 Introduction�� 163
2 Desirability of a Comprehensive Approach to Conflict
and Revolution�� 164
3 Continuum and Its Applications�� 166
3.1 Continuum of Conflict�� 167
3.2 Continuum of Revolution�� 168
4 Conceptual Dichotomies Encountered in the Literature�� 174
5 A Multidimensional, Multidisciplinary, and Holistic Approach�� 179
6 A Comprehensive Understanding of Revolution�� 181
6.1 Individual and Conflict �� 184
6.2 Conflict Resolution �� 185
6.3 Social Revolution�� 188
7 Consistency with Alternative Ways of Dividing the Literature�� 200
8 Consistency with Alternative Theories of Causes of Revolution�� 201
9 Consistency with Alternative Theories of the
Course of Revolution�� 203
10 Consistency with Alternative Theories of the Consequences
of Revolution�� 205
Chapter 1
Four Paradigms
Social theory can usefully be conceived in terms of four key paradigms: functional-
ist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical structuralist. The four paradigms are
founded upon different assumptions about the nature of social science and the
nature of society. Each generates theories, concepts, and analytical tools which are
different from those of other paradigms.1
All theories are based on a philosophy of science and a theory of society. Many
theorists appear to be unaware of, or ignore, the assumptions underlying these phi-
losophies. They emphasize only some aspects of the phenomenon and ignore others.
Unless they bring out the basic philosophical assumptions of the theories, their
analysis can be misleading; since by emphasizing differences between theories,
they imply diversity in approach. While there appear to be different kinds of theory,
they are founded on a certain philosophy, worldview, or paradigm. This becomes
evident when these theories are related to the wider background of social theory.
The functionalist paradigm has provided the framework for current mainstream
academic fields and accounts for the largest proportion of theory and research in
their respective academic fields.
In order to understand a new paradigm, theorists should be fully aware of
assumptions upon which their own paradigm is based. Moreover, to understand a
1
For the literature on paradigms, see Bottomore (1975), Clark (1985), Denisoff (1974), Eckburg
and Hill (1979), Effrat (1973), Evered and Louis (1981), Friedheim (1979), Gioia and Pitre (1990),
Goles and Hirschheim (2000), Guba (1985), Guba and Lincoln (1994), Hassard (1988, 1991a,
1991b, 1993, 2013), Holland (1990), Jackson and Carter (1991), Jackson and Carter (2008),
Jennings, Perren, and Carter (2005), Jick (1979), Kirkwood and Campbell-Hunt (2007), Knudsen
(2003), Kuhn (1962, 1970a, 1970b, 1974, 1977), Lammers (1974), Lehmann and Young (1974),
Lewis and Grimes (1999), Lincoln (1985), Martin (1990), Maruyama (1974), Masterman (1970),
McKelvey (2008), Mir and Mir (2002), Morgan (1990), Okhuysen and Bonardi (2011), Parsons
(1967), Ritzer (1975), Romani, Primecz, and Topcu (2011), Schultz and Hatch (1996), Shapere
(1971), Siehl and Martin (1988), Snizek (1976), Steinle (1983), van de Berge (1963), White
(1983), and Willmott (1990, 1993).
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to 1
Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
K. Ardalan, Understanding Revolution,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47591-8_1
2 1 Four Paradigms
new paradigm, one has to explore it from within, since the concepts in one paradigm
cannot easily be interpreted in terms of those of another. No attempt should be made
to criticize or evaluate a paradigm from the outside. This is self-defeating since it is
based on a separate paradigm. All four paradigms can be easily criticized and ruined
in this way.
These four paradigms are of paramount importance to any scientist, because the
process of learning about a favored paradigm is also the process of learning what
that paradigm is not. The knowledge of paradigms makes scientists aware of the
boundaries within which they approach their subject. Each of the four paradigms
implies a different way of social theorizing.
Before discussing each paradigm, it is useful to look at the notion of “paradigm.”
Burrell and Morgan (1979)2 regard the:
... four paradigms as being defined by very basic meta-theoretical assumptions which
underwrite the frame of reference, mode of theorizing and modus operandi of the social
theorists who operate within them. It is a term which is intended to emphasize the com-
monality of perspective which binds the work of a group of theorists together in such a way
that they can be usefully regarded as approaching social theory within the bounds of the
same problematic.
The paradigm does ... have an underlying unity in terms of its basic and often “taken for
granted” assumptions, which separate a group of theorists in a very fundamental way from
theorists located in other paradigms. The “unity” of the paradigm thus derives from refer-
ence to alternative views of reality which lie outside its boundaries and which may not
necessarily even be recognized as existing. (pages 23–24)
Each theory can be related to one of the four broad worldviews. These adhere to
different sets of fundamental assumptions about the nature of science – that is, the
subjective-objective dimension – and the nature of society, that is, the dimension of
regulation-radical change, as in Fig. 1.1.3
Assumptions related to the nature of science are assumptions with respect to
ontology, epistemology, human nature, and methodology.
The assumptions about ontology are assumptions regarding the very essence of
the phenomenon under investigation. That is, to what extent the phenomenon is
objective and external to the individual or it is subjective and the product of indi-
vidual’s mind.
The assumptions about epistemology are assumptions about the nature of knowl-
edge. That is, they are assumptions about how one might go about understanding the
world and communicate such knowledge to others. That is, what constitutes knowl-
edge and to what extent it is something which can be acquired or it is something
which has to be personally experienced.
2
This work borrows heavily from the ideas and insights of Burrell and Morgan (1979) and Morgan
(1983) and applies them to revolution. Burrell and Morgan (1979) state “The scope for applying
the analytical scheme to other field of study is enormous … readers interested in applying the
scheme in this way should find little difficulty in proceeding from the sociological analyses ... to
an analysis of the literature in their own sphere of specialised interest.” (page 35)
3
This can be used as both a classifactory device, or more importantly, as an analytical tool.
1 Four Paradigms 3
The Sociology of Radical Change
S
U Radical Radical O
B Humanist Structuralist B
J J
E E
C C
T T
I I
V Interpretive Functionalist V
E E
The Sociology of Regulation
Fig. 1.1 The Four Paradigms. Each paradigm adheres to a set of fundamental assumptions about
the nature of science (i.e., the subjective-objective dimension) and the nature of society (i.e., the
dimension of regulation-radical change)
The assumptions about human nature are concerned with human nature and, in
particular, the relationship between individuals and their environment, which is the
object and subject of social sciences. That is, to what extent human beings and their
experiences are the products of their environment or human beings are creators of
their environment.
The assumptions about methodology are related to the way in which one attempts
to investigate and obtain knowledge about the social world. That is, to what extent
the methodology treats the social world as being real hard and external to the indi-
vidual or it is as being of a much softer, personal, and more subjective quality. In the
former, the focus is on the universal relationship among elements of the phenome-
non, whereas in the latter, the focus is on the understanding of the way in which the
individual creates, modifies, and interprets the situation which is experienced.
The assumptions related to the nature of society are concerned with the extent of
regulation of the society or radical change in the society.
Sociology of regulation provides explanation of society based on the assumption
of its unity and cohesiveness. It focuses on the need to understand and explain why
society tends to hold together rather than fall apart.
Sociology of radical change provides explanation of society based on the assump-
tion of its deep-seated structural conflict, modes of domination, and structural con-
tradiction. It focuses on the deprivation of human beings, both material and psychic,
and it looks toward alternatives rather than the acceptance of status quo.
The subjective-objective dimension and the regulation-radical change dimension
together define four paradigms, each of which share common fundamental assump-
tions about the nature of social science and the nature of society. Each paradigm has
a fundamentally unique perspective for the analysis of social phenomena.
4 1 Four Paradigms
1 Functionalist Paradigm
The functionalist paradigm assumes that society has a concrete existence and fol-
lows certain order. These assumptions lead to the existence of an objective and
value-free social science which can produce true explanatory and predictive knowl-
edge of the reality “out there.” It assumes scientific theories can be assessed objec-
tively by reference to empirical evidence. Scientists do not see any roles for
themselves, within the phenomenon which they analyze, through the rigor and tech-
nique of the scientific method. It attributes independence to the observer from the
observed. That is, an ability to observe “what is” without affecting it. It assumes
there are universal standards of science, which determine what constitutes an ade-
quate explanation of what is observed. It assumes there are external rules and regu-
lations governing the external world. The goal of scientists is to find the orders that
prevail within that phenomenon.
The functionalist paradigm seeks to provide rational explanations of social
affairs and generate regulative sociology. It assumes a continuing order, pattern, and
coherence and tries to explain what is. It emphasizes the importance of understand-
ing order, the equilibrium and stability in society, and the way in which these can be
maintained. It is concerned with the regulation and control of social affairs. It
believes in social engineering as a basis for social reform.
The rationality which underlies functionalist science is used to explain the ratio-
nality of society. Science provides the basis for structuring and ordering the social
world, similar to the structure and order in the natural world. The methods of natural
science are used to generate explanations of the social world. The use of mechanical
and biological analogies for modeling and understanding the social phenomena is
particularly favored.
Functionalists are individualists. That is, the properties of the aggregate are
determined by the properties of its units. Their approach to social science is rooted
in the tradition of positivism. It assumes that the social world is concrete, meaning
it can be identified, studied, and measured through approaches derived from the
natural sciences.
Functionalists believe that the positivist methods which have triumphed in natu-
ral sciences should prevail in social sciences, as well. In addition, the functionalist
paradigm has become dominant in academic sociology. The social world is treated
as a place of concrete reality, characterized by uniformities and regularities which
can be understood and explained in terms of causes and effects. Given these assump-
tions, the individuals are regarded as taking on a passive role; their behavior is being
determined by the social environment.
Functionalists are pragmatic in orientation and are concerned to understand soci-
ety so that the knowledge thus generated can be used in society. It is problem orien-
tated in approach as it is concerned to provide practical solutions to practical
problems.
In Fig. 1.1, the functionalist paradigm occupies the southeast quadrant. Schools
of thought within this paradigm can be located on the objective-subjective
2 Interpretive Paradigm 5
c ontinuum. From the right to left, they are Objectivism, Social System Theory,
Integrative Theory, Interactionism, and Social Action Theory.4
2 Interpretive Paradigm
The interpretive paradigm assumes that social reality is the result of the subjective
interpretations of individuals. It sees the social world as a process which is created
by individuals. Social reality, insofar as it exists outside the consciousness of any
individual, is regarded as being a network of assumptions and intersubjectively
shared meanings. This assumption leads to the belief there are shared multiple reali-
ties which are sustained and changed. Researchers recognize their role within the
phenomenon under investigation. Their frame of reference is one of participant, as
opposed to observer. The goal of the interpretive researchers is to find the orders that
prevail within the phenomenon under consideration; however, they are not objective.
The interpretive paradigm is concerned with understanding the world as it is, at
the level of subjective experience. It seeks explanations within the realm of indi-
vidual consciousness and subjectivity. Its analysis of the social world produces soci-
ology of regulation. Its views are underwritten by the assumptions that the social
world is cohesive, ordered, and integrated.
Interpretive sociologists seek to understand the source of social reality. They
often delve into the depth of human consciousness and subjectivity in their quest for
the meanings in social life. They reject the use of mathematics and biological analo-
gies in learning about the society, and their approach places emphasis on under-
standing the social world from the vantage point of the individuals who are actually
engaged in social activities.
The interpretive paradigm views the functionalist position as unsatisfactory for
two reasons. First, human values affect the process of scientific enquiry. That is,
scientific method is not value free, since the frame of reference of the scientific
observer determines the way in which scientific knowledge is obtained. Second, in
cultural sciences, the subject matter is spiritual in nature. That is, human beings can-
not be studied by the methods of the natural sciences, which aim to establish general
laws. In the cultural sphere, human beings are perceived as free. An understanding
of their lives and actions can be obtained by the intuition of the total wholes, which
is bound to break down by atomistic analysis of functionalist paradigm.
Cultural phenomena are seen as the external manifestations of inner experience.
The cultural sciences, therefore, need to apply analytical methods based on “under-
standing,” through which the scientist can seek to understand human beings, their
minds, and their feelings, and the way these are expressed in their outward actions.
4
For classics in this literature, see Blau (1955, 1964), Buckley (1967), Comte (1953), Durkheim
(1938, 1947), James (1890), Mead (1932a, 1932b, 1934, 1938), Merton (1968), Pareto (1935),
Simmel (1936, 1955), Skinner (1953, 1957, 1972), and Spencer (1873).
6 1 Four Paradigms
The notion of “understanding” is a defining characteristic of all theories located

within this paradigm.
The interpretive paradigm believes that science is based on “taken for granted”
assumptions and, like any other social practice, must be understood within a specific
context. Therefore, it cannot generate objective and value-free knowledge. Scientific
knowledge is socially constructed and socially sustained; its significance and mean-
ing can only be understood within its immediate social context.
The interpretive paradigm regards mainstream social theorists as belonging to a
small and self-sustaining community, who believe that corporations and financial
markets exist in a concrete world. They theorize about concepts which have little
significance to people outside the community, who practice social theory, and the
limited community whom social theorists may attempt to serve.
Functionalist social theorists tend to treat their subject of study as a hard, con-
crete, and tangible empirical phenomenon which exists “out there” in the “real
world.” Interpretive researchers are opposed to such structural absolution. They
emphasize that the social world is no more than the subjective construction of indi-
vidual human beings who create and sustain a social world of intersubjectively
shared meaning, which is in a continuous process of reaffirmation or change.
Therefore, there are no universally valid social rules. Interpretive social research
enables scientists to examine social behavior together with ethical, cultural, politi-
cal, and social issues.
In Fig. 1.1, the interpretive paradigm occupies the southwest quadrant. Schools
of thought within this paradigm can be located on the objective-subjective contin-
uum. From the left to right, they are Solipsism, Phenomenology, Phenomenological
Sociology, and Hermeneutics.5
3 Radical Humanist Paradigm
The radical humanist paradigm provides critiques of the status quo and is concerned
to articulate, from a subjective standpoint, the sociology of radical change, modes
of domination, emancipation, deprivation, and potentiality. Based on its subjectivist
approach, it places great emphasis on human consciousness. It tends to view society
as antihuman. It views the process of reality creation as feeding back on itself; such
that individuals and society are prevented from reaching their highest possible
potential. That is, the consciousness of human beings is dominated by the ideologi-
cal superstructures of the social system, which results in their alienation or false
consciousness. This, in turn, prevents true human fulfillment. The social theorist
regards the orders that prevail in the society as instruments of ideological domination.
5
For classics in this literature, see Berkeley (1962), Dilthey (1976), Gadamer (1965), Garfinkel
(1967), Hegel (1931), Husserl (1929), Schutz (1964, 1966, 1967), Winch (1958), and Wittgenstein
(1963).
3 Radical Humanist Paradigm 7
The major concern for theorists is with the way this occurs and finding ways in
which human beings can release themselves from constraints which existing social
arrangements place upon realization of their full potential. They seek to change the
social world through a change in consciousness.
Radical humanists believe that everything must be grasped as a whole, because
the whole dominates the parts in an all-embracing sense. Moreover, truth is histori-
cally specific, relative to a given set of circumstances, so that one should not search
for generalizations for the laws of motion of societies.
The radical humanists believe the functionalist paradigm accepts purposive
rationality, logic of science, positive functions of technology, and neutrality of lan-
guage and uses them in the construction of “value-free” social theories. The radical
humanist theorists intend to demolish this structure, emphasizing the political and
repressive nature of it. They aim to show the role that science, ideology, technology,
language, and other aspects of the superstructure play in sustaining and developing
the system of power and domination, within the totality of the social formation.
Their function is to influence the consciousness of human beings for eventual eman-
cipation and formation of alternative social formations.
The radical humanists note that functionalist sociologists create and sustain a
view of social reality which maintains the status quo and which forms one aspect of
the network of ideological domination of the society.
The focus of the radical humanists upon the “superstructural” aspects of society
reflects their attempt to move away from the economism of orthodox Marxism and
emphasize the Hegelian dialectics. It is through the dialectic that the objective and
subjective aspects of social life interact. The superstructure of society is believed to
be the medium through which the consciousness of human beings is controlled and
molded to fit the requirements of the social formation as a whole. The concepts of
structural conflict, contradiction, and crisis do not play a major role in this para-
digm, because these are more objectivist view of social reality, that is, the ones
which fall in the radical structuralist paradigm. In the radical humanist paradigm,
the concepts of consciousness, alienation, and critique form their concerns.
In Fig. 1.1, the radical humanist paradigm occupies the northwest quadrant.
Schools of thought within this paradigm can be located on the objective-subjective
continuum. From the left to right, they are Solipsism, French Existentialism,
Anarchistic Individualism, and Critical Theory.6
6
For classics in this literature, see Bookchin (1974), Fichte (1970), Goldmann (1969), Gouldner
(1954a, 1954b, 1970, 1973, 1976), Gramsci (1971), Habermas (1970a, 1970b, 1971, 1972, 1974,
1976), Horkheimer (1972), Lukacs (1971), Marcuse (1954, 1964, 1966, 1968), Marx (1975),
Meszaros (1970, 1971), Sartre (1966, 1974, 1976), and Stirner (1907).
8 1 Four Paradigms
4 Radical Structuralist Paradigm
The radical structuralist paradigm assumes that reality is objective and concrete, as
it is rooted in the materialist view of natural and social world. The social world,
similar to the natural world, has an independent existence, that is, it exists outside
the minds of human beings. Sociologists aim at discovering and understanding the
patterns and regularities which characterize the social world. Scientists do not see
any roles for themselves in the phenomenon under investigation. They use scientific
methods to find the order that prevails in the phenomenon. This paradigm views
society as a potentially dominating force. Sociologists working within this para-
digm have an objectivist standpoint and are committed to radical change, emancipa-
tion, and potentiality. In their analysis, they emphasize structural conflict, modes of
domination, contradiction, and deprivation. They analyze the basic interrelation-
ships within the total social formation and emphasize the fact that radical change is
inherent in the structure of society, and the radical change takes place though politi-
cal and economic crises. This radical change necessarily disrupts the status quo and
replaces it by a radically different social formation. It is through this radical change
that the emancipation of human beings from the social structure is materialized.
For radical structuralists, an understanding of classes in society is essential for
understanding the nature of knowledge. They argue that all knowledge is class spe-
cific. That is, it is determined by the place one occupies in the productive process.
Knowledge is more than a reflection of the material world in thought. It is deter-
mined by one’s relation to that reality. Since different classes occupy different posi-
tions in the process of material transformation, there are different kinds of
knowledge. Hence class knowledge is produced by and for classes and exists in a
struggle for domination. Knowledge is thus ideological. That is, it formulates views
of reality and solves problems from class points of view.
Radical structuralists reject the idea that it is possible to verify knowledge in an
absolute sense through comparison with socially neutral theories or data. But,
emphasize that there is the possibility of producing a “correct” knowledge from a
class standpoint. They argue that the dominated class is uniquely positioned to
obtain an objectively “correct” knowledge of social reality and its contradictions. It
is the class with the most direct and widest access to the process of material trans-
formation that ultimately produces and reproduces that reality.
Radical structuralists’ analysis indicates that the social scientist, as a producer of
class-based knowledge, is a part of the class struggle.
Radical structuralists believe truth is the whole and emphasize the need to under-
stand the social order as a totality rather than as a collection of small truths about
various parts and aspects of society. The economic empiricists are seen as relying
almost exclusively upon a number of seemingly disparate, data-packed, problem-
centered studies. Such studies, therefore, are irrelevant exercises in mathematical
methods.
5 Conclusion 9
This paradigm is based on four central notions. First, there is the notion of total-
ity. All theories address the total social formation. This notion emphasizes that the
parts reflect the totality, not the totality of the parts.
Second, there is the notion of structure. The focus is upon the configurations of
social relationships, called structures, which are treated as persistent and enduring
concrete facilities.
The third notion is that of contradiction. Structures, or social formations, contain
contradictory and antagonistic relationships within them which act as seeds of their
own decay.
The fourth notion is that of crisis. Contradictions within a given totality reach a
point at which they can no longer be contained. The resulting political, economic
crises indicate the point of transformation from one totality to another, in which one
set of structures is replaced by another of a fundamentally different kind.
In Fig. 1.1, the radical structuralist paradigm occupies the north-east quadrant.
Schools of thought within this paradigm can be located on the objective-subjective
continuum. From the right to left, they are Russian Social Theory, Conflict Theory,
and Contemporary Mediterranean Marxism.7
5 Conclusion
This chapter briefly discussed social theory, its complexity, and diversity. It indi-
cated that theorists are not always entirely aware of the traditions to which they
belong. The diversity of theories presented in this section is vast. While each para-
digm advocates a research strategy that is logically coherent, in terms of underlying
assumptions, these vary from paradigm to paradigm. The phenomenon to be
researched is conceptualized and studied in many different ways, each generating
distinctive kinds of insight and understanding. There are many different ways of
studying the same social phenomenon, and given that the insights generated by any
one approach are at best partial and incomplete, the social researcher can gain much
by reflecting on the nature and merits of different approaches before engaging in a
particular mode of research practice.
Social knowledge is ultimately a product of the researcher’s paradigmatic
approach to this multifaceted phenomenon. Viewed from this angle, the pursuit of
social knowledge is seen as much an ethical, moral, ideological, and political activ-
ity, as a technical one. Economists can gain much by exploiting the new insights
coming from other paradigms.
7
For classics in this literature see Althusser (1969, 1971), Althusser and Balibar (1970), Bukharin
(1965), Colletti (1972, 1974, 1975), Dahrendorf (1959), Marx (1973, 1976), Marx and Engels
(1965, 1968), Plekhanov (1974), and Rex (1961, 1974).
10 1 Four Paradigms
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Another random document with
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As this letter is to be historical, I may as well claim what little
belongs to me in the matter, and that is the figure of Pickwick.
Seymour’s first sketch was of a long, thin man. The present
immortal one he made from my description of a friend of mine at
Richmond—a fat old beau who would wear, in spite of the ladies’
protests, drab tights and black gaiters. His name was John
1
Foster.
1
Is there not a blend of Mr. Tracy Tupman
here?
Seymour drew the figure from Mr. Chapman’s description:

Dickens put life into it—yet more life—and made it a “nurseling of
immortality.” That, believe me, is how it happens; just so, and in no
other way: and the operative power is called Genius. Remind
yourselves of this when learned men, discussing Shakespeare,
assure you they have fished the particular murex up which dyed
Hamlet’s inky cloak. Themselves are the cuttle, and only theirs is the
ink.
II
But we talk of Dickens: and the trouble with Dickens is that he—
whose brain in creating personage I suppose to be the most fecund
that ever employed itself on fiction—to the end of his days kept a
curious distrust of himself and a propensity for this childish expedient
of “drawing from the life.” It is miserable, to me, to think of this giant
who could turn off a Pickwick, a Sam Weller, a Dick Swiveller, a Mark
Tapley, a Sarah Gamp, Captain Cuttle, Mr. Dick, Mr. Toots, Mr.
Crummles, Mr. Mantalini, Dodson and Fogg, Codlin and Short,
Spenlow and Jorkins, Mrs. Jellaby, Mrs. Billickin, Mrs. Gargery, Mrs.
Wilfer, Mr. Twemlow, Mr. and Mrs. Micawber, Mr. Sapsea, Silas
Wegg, and indeed anyone you take into your own experience of life
—from Mr. Chadband to the Dolls’ Dressmaker, with hundreds of
lesser characters no less distinct—it is miserable to me, I say, that a
Genius with all this largess to mint and scatter should have taxed his
acquaintance to stamp their effigies upon poorer coin.
III
But let us discriminate. In “drawing from life” much will depend,
as Aristotle might say, on (a) the extent, (b) the manner, (c) your
intention: as likewise upon (d) the person drawn. I exclude all such
portraits as are likely to provoke an action at law; for these come to
be assessed under separate rules of criticism: and in general we
may say of them that they should be avoided from the instinct of self-
preservation rather than on grounds of disinterested aesthetic.
Confining ourselves, then, to portraits which are not actionable,
we may take, as an extreme instance, Samuel Butler’s The Way of
All Flesh. For in this book the persons portrayed are the author’s
own parents, and he portrays them in a manner and with intention to
make them odious, and to any extent: which seems to involve the
nice moral question whether a person the best able to do a thing
should not sometimes be the person who least ought to do it. And
should the injunction against laying hands on your father
Parmenides cover Parmenides if he happen to be your maiden aunt?
—and maybe, too, she can retort, because you come of a literary
family, you know! This power of retort, again, complicates a question
which, you perceive, begins to be delicate. Ought you to catch
anyone and hit him where he cannot hit back? Parmenides is no
longer a relative but (say) a publisher, and you have—or think you
have—reason to believe that he has cheated you. (And before you
answer that this is incredible, let me say that I am dealing with an
actual case, in which, however, I was not a party.) Are you justified in
writing a work of fiction which holds him up to public opprobrium
under a thin disguise? In my opinion you are not: because it means
your attacking the fellow from a plane on which he can get no
footing, to retaliate.
But it may be urged against him that Dickens by consent, and
pretty well on his own admission, drew portraits of his mother in Mrs.
Nickleby, and of his father in Mr. Micawber, and again in old Mr.
Dorrit of the Marshalsea—this last, I am sure, the nearest to life.
Well, I pass the question of provocation or moral excuse, observing
only that Dickens tholed a childhood of culpable, even of damnable,
neglect, whereas the parents of Samuel Butler did at least wing, with
a Shrewsbury and Cambridge education, the barbs he was to shoot
into their dead breasts. Dickens’ parents turned him down, at ten, to
a blacking-factory, and, as we saw in our last lecture, when the
moment came to release him from the blacking-warehouse his
mother tried to insist on his returning.
“I do not,” he records to Forster, “write resentfully or angrily,

for I know how all these things have worked together to make
me what I am; but I never afterwards forgot, I never shall forget, I
never can forget, that my mother was warm for my being sent
back.”
IV
So there was provocation in plenty, humiliation inflicted on a
young and infinitely sensitive mind. But, when we have granted that
Dickens borrowed from his mother for Mrs. Nickleby, from his father
for Mr. Micawber and the Elder Dorrit, mark you how genius diverges
from the mere hint—how far Micawber differs from Dorrit, while both
are elemental. Mark you further how and while both are sublimated
and Mrs. Nickleby too—how much charity has to do with the
chemical process. Who thinks of Mrs. Nickleby but as an amiable
noodle? Who of Mr. Micawber, but to enjoy his company? Who of Mr.
Dorrit but with a sad ironical pity? Where in any portrait of the three
can you trace a stroke of that vindictiveness you find bitten upon
page after page of The Way of All Flesh?
Moreover, choosing Old Dorrit, the least sympathetically but the
most subtly drawn of the three, I would ask you, studying that
character for yourselves, to note how Dickens conveys that, while
much of its infirmity is native, much also comes of the punishment of
the Marshalsea against which the poor creature’s pomposities are at
once a narcotic, and a protest, however futile, of the dignity of a
human soul, however abject. Mark especially, at the close of Chapter
XXXV, how delicately he draws the shade of the Marshalsea over
Little Dorrit herself. He would fain keep her, born and bred in that
unwholesome den, its one uncontaminated “prison-flower”—but with
all his charity he is (as I tried to show you in a previous lecture) a
magisterial artist and the truth compels him. Mark then the workings
of this child’s mind on hearing the glad news of her father’s release.
Here is the passage:
Little Dorrit had been thinking too. After softly putting his [her
father’s] hair aside, and touching his forehead with her lips, she
looked towards Arthur, who came nearer to her, and pursued in
a low whisper the subject of her thoughts.
“Mr. Clennam, will he pay all his debts before he leaves
here?”
“No doubt. All.”
“All the debts for which he has been imprisoned here, all my
life and longer?”
“No doubt.”
There was something of uncertainty and remonstrance in
her look; something that was not all satisfaction. He wondered to
detect it, and said:
“You are glad that he should do so?”
“Are you?” asked Little Dorrit wistfully.
“Am I? Most heartily glad!”
“Then I know I ought to be.”
“And are you not?”
“It seems to me hard,” said Little Dorrit, “that he should have
lost so many years and suffered so much, and at last pay all the
debts as well. It seems to me hard that he should pay in life and
money both.”
“My dear child——” Clennam was beginning.
“Yes, I know I am wrong,” she pleaded timidly. “Don’t think
any worse of me; it has all grown up with me here.”
The prison, which could spoil so many things, had tainted
Little Dorrit’s mind no more than this. Engendered as the
confusion was, in compassion for the poor prisoner, her father, it
was the first speck Clennam had ever seen, it was the last speck
Clennam ever saw, of the prison atmosphere upon her.
Now I call that, Gentlemen, the true novelist’s stroke; rightly

divined, so suddenly noted that we, who had not expected it, consent
at once with a “Yes, yes—of course it happened so.”
V
But what I wish you to grasp is—in a man who could play strokes
like that by the score and conjure up out of his vasty deeps anything
from Dick Swiveller to Uncle Pumblechook, from the Marchioness to
Mrs. Joe Gargery—the silliness of diffidence which drove him again
and again to mere copying “from the life.” The superstition was idle,
even when it did no harm. Having, in Oliver Twist, to describe a
harsh and insolent Magistrate, Dickens (who could invent a Mr.
Nupkins at will) took pains to be introduced to the Hatton Garden
Police Court over which a certain Mr. Laing presided. He took these
pains scrupulously, through an official channel (as they say), with the
double result that we get Mr. Fang in the novel and that the Home
Secretary very soon found it convenient to remove Mr. Laing from
the Bench—and this, maybe, was all for the good—but you see how
our author has already mixed up his conception of Charles Dickens
as an author with that of Charles Dickens as a popular institution.
We will suppose that this Mr. Laing got his deserts. None the
less Dickens was hitting him on a pitch where he had no standing
and could not hit back. And I would warn you of this, Gentlemen—
that if, trained here, you go forth to do battle with wrongdoing, one of
two methods is equally fair, and no other. Either you must persuade
men generally that such and such a principle should govern their
actions, or, if you have to take a particular wrongdoer by the throat,
you should in the first place be absolutely sure of your facts, and, in
the second, take him preferably on his own ground: so that his
defeat will be righteous and plain to all, and he can excuse nothing
on your advantage of position.
I have diverged into advising you as artists in public life: but the
advice is not irrelevant, for it echoes that which, repeatedly given to
Dickens by his best friends, he repeatedly ignored, yet never without
detriment to his art and not seldom with irritating personal
consequences. You all know how he came to grief over his
caricatures of Landor and Leigh Hunt in Bleak House. Laurence
Boythorne was merely a cheap superficial, not ill-natured, portrait.
Landor, who never condescended to notice it, might well have
shrugged his tall shoulders and said, “Is this the friend who visited
Fiesole for my sake, and sent me home the only gift I demanded—
an ivy-leaf from my old Villa there ... and is this what he knows of
me, or even what I seemed to him?” (The ivy-leaf was found
wrapped away among Landor’s papers, twenty years later.) But
nothing—least of all its verisimilitude—can excuse the outrage
perpetrated upon Leigh Hunt in the mask of Harold Skimpole: for, as
Forster observes, to this character in the plot itself of Bleak House is
assigned a part which no fascinating foibles or gaieties of speech
could redeem from contempt. Hunt, who (with all his faults) never
lacked generosity, had been among the first to hail and help Dickens,
was (as often happens) the last to recognise himself for the intended
victim: but when some kind friend drew his attention to the calculated
wound, it went deep. Dickens apologised in a letter which did its
best, but could, in the nature of things, amount to no more than
kindly evasiveness. He was guilty, and he knew it. Hunt had been
wounded in the house of his friend. It was all very well, or ill, for
Dickens to plead (as he did) that in Micawber and Mrs. Nickleby he
had played a like trick on his own father and mother. The first and
most obvious answer to that is, “Well, if you did, you ought to have
known better”—the second, “And, anyhow, why should that make it
any the more agreeable to me?” But Mrs. Nickleby and Mr. Micawber
(as we saw) are kindly, even lovable characters. Harold Skimpole is
at once abject and mischievous: and as Forster very justly remarks:
The kindly or unkindly impression makes all the difference

where liberties are taken with a friend; and even this entirely
favourable condition will not excuse the practice to many, where
near relatives are concerned.
But Landor and Leigh Hunt, you may say, were literary men of
their hands, well able to defend themselves. Well, then, take down
your David Copperfield and compare the Miss Mowcher of Chapter
XXII with the Miss Mowcher of Chapter XXXII. You will see at once
that something very queer has happened; that the Miss Mowcher of
the earlier chapter, obviously meant to be an odious little go-between
in the Steerforth plot, has changed into a decent little creature at
once pathetic and purposeless. Why? The answer is that the
deformed original, recognising her portrait, had in the interim
addressed to Dickens a poignant letter of remonstrance. Dickens,
writing the story in monthly numbers, apologised and hastily
readjusted his plot.
These things work out to this—that in dealing with Dickens we
have to lay our account—as in dealing with Shakespeare we have to
lay our account—with a genius capable of vast surprises but at any
point liable to bolt out of self-control. I have no theories at all of what
a genius should be, or of how it ought to behave. Let us take what
the gods give and be thankful: and with Dickens as with
Shakespeare—both of whom write execrably at times and at times
above admiration—we have to accept this inequality as a condition
of our arriving at the very best. Even if we allow that a stricter
schooling would have spoilt both, and is indeed the bane of
originality: still let us keep our heads and tell ourselves that a great
part of Oliver Twist is execrable stuff and no less, as the talk of
Speed in The Two Gentlemen of Verona or of Lucio in Measure for
Measure is execrable stuff and no less. By all means let us keep in
mind that these flagrancies are human and, if you will, a necessary
part of any Shakespeare, of any Dickens. But let us be quite clear in
judging them as counterweights, and tell ourselves that a Virgil or a
Dante—yes, or a Cervantes—would never need to ask such
forgiveness from us.
VI
Corruptio optimi pessima is one of those orotund sayings which
impress for the moment but are liable to have their wisdom very
considerably spokeshaved (so to speak) as soon as we apply the
Socratic knife. Is Tarzan of the Apes, after all, a corruption of the
best? And, if so, from what incalculable height did Lucifer plunge,
and how many days did he take before he broke the roof of the
railway station and scattered himself over the bookstalls? We may
derive solace, if we will, by telling ourselves that those horrible days
in the Chandos Street blacking-warehouse were a part of the
education of Dickens’ genius, taught it to observe, and so on. But I
say to you, as he said of Little Dorrit, that such a shadow of cruelty,
induced upon a sensitive boy, must inevitably leave its stain: and I do
most earnestly ask you, some of whom may find yourselves trustees
for the education of poor children, if you are sure that Dickens
himself was the better for a starved childhood? For my part I can
give that starvation little credit for his achievement, reading its effect
rather into his many faults of taste and judgment.
VII
It is usual to class among the first of these faults a defective
sense of English prose: and the commonest arraignment lies against
his use of blank verse in moments of pathos or of deep emotion.
Well, but let us clear our minds of cant about English prose, and
abstain from talking about it as if the Almighty had invented its final
pattern somewhere in the eighteenth century. Prose—and Poetry
too, for that matter—is a way of putting things worth record into
memorable speech. English writers of the late seventeenth and the
eighteenth century found, with some measure of consent, an
admirable fashion of doing this, and have left a tradition: and it is a
tradition to which I, personally, would cling if I could, admiring it as I
do, and admiring so much less many pages of Dickens and a
thousand of pages of Carlyle. After all, so long as the thing gets itself
said, and effectively, and memorably, who are we to prescribe rules
or parse sentences? What, for example, could that mysterious body,
the College of Preceptors, do to improve the grammar of Antony and
Cleopatra, even if they persuaded one another “Well, apparently
they have come to stay, and perhaps we had better call upon them,
my dear”?
VIII
Having, then, no preconceived notions about prose, and few
prejudices save against certain locutions of which I confess I dislike
them mainly because I dislike the sort of person who employs them
—I assert that Dickens, aiming straight at his purpose, wrote
countless pages of quite splendid prose. I defy you, for example, to
suggest how a sense of the eeriness of the Woolwich marshes with
an apprehension of horror behind the fog could be better conveyed
in words than Dickens conveys them in the opening chapters of
Great Expectations; as I ask you how the earliest impressions of a
sensitive child can be better conveyed in language than they are in
the early chapters of David Copperfield.
IX
But even this apologia—sufficient as I think it—does not cover
the whole defence. We have picked up a habit of consenting with
critics who tell us that Dickens’ prose is careless and therefore not
worth studying. Believe me, you are mistaken if you believe these
critics. Dickens sometimes wrote execrably: far oftener he penned at
a stretch page upon page of comment and conversation that
brilliantly effect their purpose and are, therefore, good writing. You
will allow, I dare say, his expertness in glorifying the loquacity that
comes of a well-meaning heart and a rambling head. Recall, for
example—casually chosen out of hundreds—Mrs. Chivery on her
son John, nursing his love-lornness amid the washing in the back-
yard: and remark the idiom of it:
“It’s the only change he takes,” said Mrs. Chivery, shaking

her head afresh. “He won’t go out, even to the back-yard, when
there’s no linen: but when there’s linen to keep the neighbours’
eyes off, he’ll sit there, hours. Hours he will. Says he feels as if it
was groves.... Our John has everyone’s good word and
everyone’s good wish. He played with her as a child when in that
yard she played. He has known her ever since. He went out
upon the Sunday afternoon when in this very parlour he had
dined, and met her, with appointment or without appointment
which I do not pretend to say. He made his offer to her. Her
brother and sister is high in their views and against Our John.
‘No, John, I cannot have you, I cannot have any husband, it is
not my intentions ever to become a wife, it is my intentions to be
always a sacrifice, farewell. Find another worthy of you and
forget me!’ This is the way in which she is doomed to be a
constant slave, to them that are not worthy that a constant slave
unto them she should be. This is the way in which Our John has
come to find no pleasure but in taking cold among the linen....”
Is that not prose? Of course it is prose for its purpose: and,

strictly for her purpose—strictly, mind you for their purpose—Mrs.
Chivery’s parallelisms of speech will match those of the prophet
Jeremiah at his literary best. “Ah,” say you, “but Dickens is dealing
out humorous reported speech. Can he write prose of his own?”
Well, yes, and yes most certainly. If you will search and study his
passages of deliberate writing you will scarcely miss to see how he
derives in turn of phrase as in intonation from the great eighteenth-
century novelists and translators whose works, if you remember,
were the small child’s library in the beautiful fourth chapter of David
Copperfield:
My father had left a small collection of books in a little room

upstairs ... which nobody else in our house ever troubled. From
that blessed little room, Roderick Random, Peregrine Pickle,
Humphrey Clinker, Tom Jones, the Vicar of Wakefield, Don
Quixote, Gil Blas, and Robinson Crusoe came out, a glorious
host, to keep me company....
The whole passage, if you will turn to it, you will recognise as
delicate English prose. But it is also a faithful, if translated, record.
From this line of English writers, the more you study him, the more
clearly you will recognise Dickens as standing in the direct descent
of a pupil. He brings something of his own, of course, to infuse it, as
genius will: and that something is usually a hint of pathos which the
eighteenth-century man avoided. But (this touch of pathos excepted)
you will find little, say, to distinguish Fielding’s sketch of Squire
Allworthy on his morning stroll from this sketch, which I take casually
from The Old Curiosity Shop, of an aged woman punctually visiting
the grave of her husband who had died in his prime of twenty-three:
“Yes, I was his wife. Death doesn’t change no more than life,
my dear.”... And now that five-and-fifty years were gone, she
spoke of the dead man as if he had been her son or grandson,
with a kind of pity for his youth growing out of her own old age,
and an exalting of his strength and manly beauty, as compared
with her own weakness and decay; and yet she spoke of him as
her husband too, and thinking of herself in connection with him,
as she used to be and not as she was now, talked of their
meeting in another world, as if he were dead but yesterday, and
she, separated from her former self, were thinking of the
happiness of that comely girl who seemed to have died with him.
X
No, we can none of us afford to despise Dickens’ prose. This
passage comes from one of his earliest books: if you would learn
how he (ever a learner) learned to consolidate his style, study that
neglected work of his, The Uncommercial Traveller—study such
essays as that on “Wapping Workhouse” or that on “The City
Churchyards”—study them with Thackeray’s Roundabout Papers—
and tell me if these two great Victorian novelists, after shaking the
dust of an Esmond or a David Copperfield off their palms, cannot, as
a parergon, match your Augustans—your Steele or your Addison—
on their own ground. Few recognise it, this pair being otherwise so
great: but it is so.
And because you will probably disbelieve me at first going-off, I
shall add the testimony of one you will be apter to trust—that of
George Gissing. I have spoken of one chapter in David Copperfield,
to commend it.
But, says Gissing:
In the story of David Copperfield’s journey on the Dover road

we have as good a piece of narrative prose as can be found in
English. Equally good, in another way, are those passages of
rapid retrospect in which David tells us of his later boyhood, a
concentration of memory perfumed with the sweetest humour. It
is not an easy thing to relate, with perfect proportion of detail,
with interest that never for a moment drops, the course of a year
or two of wholly uneventful marriage: but read the chapter
entitled Our Domestic Life and try to award adequate praise to
the great artist who composed it. One can readily suggest how
the chapter could have been spoiled; ever so little undue satire,
ever so little excess of sentiment; but who can point to a line in
which it might be bettered? It is perfect writing: one can say no
more and no less.
XI
I am glad, Gentlemen, on the verge of concluding these talks
about Dickens, to quote this from Gissing—a genuine genius,
himself an author of what Dr. Johnson would have described as
“inspissated gloom.” There is, I daresay, some heaven of recognition
in which all true artists meet; and at any rate it pleases one to think
that the author of The New Grub Street should, in this sublunary
sphere, have been comforted on his way (it would even seem,
entranced) by such children of joy as Sam Weller and Mr. Toots. And
I, at any rate, who admired Gissing in life, like to think of him who
found this world so hard, now, by virtue of his love for Dickens,
reconciled to look down on it from that other sphere, with tolerant
laughter—upon this queer individual England, at least. For
Providence has made and kept this nation a comfortable nation,
even to this day: and if you take its raciest literature from Chaucer
down, you may assure yourselves that much of its glorious merit
rests on the “triple pillar” of common-sense, religious morality and
hearty laughter. I for my part hold that we shall help a great deal to
restore our commonwealth by seeking back to that last “Godlike
function” and re-learning it. To promote that laughter, with good
sense and good morality, was ever Dickens’ way, as to kill wherever
he could what he once called “this custom of putting the natural
demand for amusement out of sight, as some untidy housekeepers
put dust, and pretending that it was swept away.” And I think of
Dickens as a great Englishman not least in this, that he was a man
of his hands, with a great laugh scattering humbug to make place for
mirth and goodwill; “a clean hearth and [to adapt Mrs. Battle] the
spirit of the game.”
XII
I conclude these lectures on Dickens with a word or two casually
uttered in conversation by a great man—possibly the greatest—of
the generation that succeeded Dickens; himself a superb novelist,
and a ruthless thinker for the good of his kind; a Russian, moreover,
to whom the language alone of Sam Weller or of Mrs. Gamp must
have presented difficulties well-nigh inconceivable by us. Some
nineteen years ago a friend of mine visited Tolstoy at his home and,
the talk falling upon Dickens, this is what Tolstoy said:
All his characters are my personal friends. I am constantly

comparing them with living persons, and living persons with
them. And what a spirit there was in all he wrote!
This having been reported to Swinburne, here is a part of

Swinburne’s answer:
What a superb and crushing reply to the vulgar insults of

such malignant boobies and poetasters as G. H. Lewes and Co.
(too numerous a Co.!) is the witness of ... such a man among
men!... After all, like will to like—genius will find out genius, and
goodness will recognise goodness.
Tolstoy to Dickens.... That is how the tall ships, the grandees of

literature, dip their flags and salute as they pass. Gentlemen, let us
leave it at that!
THACKERAY (I)
I
AMONG many wise sayings left behind him by the late Sir Walter
Raleigh—our Sir Walter and Oxford’s of whom his pupils there would
say, “But Raleigh is a prince”—there haunts me as I begin to speak
of Thackeray, a slow remark dropped as from an afterthought upon
those combatants who are for ever extorting details of
Shakespeare’s private life out of the Plays and the Sonnets, and
those others (Browning, for example, and Matthew Arnold) who in
revulsion have preached Shakespeare up for the grand impersonal
artist who never unlocked his heart, who smiles down upon all
questioning and is still
Out-topping knowledge.
Such a counter-claim may be plausible—is at any rate excusable if
only as an oath upon the swarm of pedlars who infest Shakespeare
and traffic in obscure hints of scandal. Yet, it will not work. “It would
never be entertained,” says Raleigh, “by an artist, and would have
had short shrift from any of the company that assembled at the
Mermaid Tavern. No man can walk abroad save on his own shadow.
No dramatist can create live characters save by bequeathing the
best of himself to the children of his art, scattering among them a
largess of his own qualities, giving, it may be, to one his wit, to
another his philosophic doubt, to another his love of action, to
another the simplicity and constancy that he finds deep in his own
nature. There is no thrill of feeling communicated from the printed
page but has first been alive in the mind of the author: there was
nothing alive in his mind that was not intensely and sincerely felt.
Plays like Shakespeare’s cannot be written in cold blood; they call
forth the man’s whole energies, and take toll of the last farthing of his
wealth of sympathy and experience.”
II
No man can walk abroad save on his own shadow. That is the
sentence, of truly Johnsonian common-sense, which bears most
intimately on our subject this morning. The story runs that
Thackeray, one day tapping impatiently upon the cover of some
adulatory memoir of somebody, warm from the press, enjoined upon
his family, “None of this nonsense about me, after my death”: and
the injunction was construed by his daughter, Lady Ritchie, most
piously beyond a doubt, perhaps too strictly, for certain not with the
happiest results. For this denial of any authoritative biography—of a
writer and a clean-living English gentleman who might, if any human
being can or could, have walked up to the Recording Angel and
claimed his dossier without a blush—has not only let in a flood of
spurious reminiscences, anecdotes, sayings he most likely never
uttered or at least never uttered with meaning or accent to give pain
that, as reported, they convey. It has led to a number of editions with
gossipy prefaces and filial chat (I fear I must say it) none the more
helpful for being tinctured by affection and qualified by reserve.
This happens to be the more unfortunate of Thackeray since, as
I suppose, no writer of the Victorian age walked abroad more sturdily
on his own tall shadow, or trusted more on it. It was a shadow, too:
dark enough for any man’s footstep. I do not wish—nor is it
necessary—to break in upon any reticence. But you probably know
the main outline of the story—of a Cambridge youth, of Trinity, who
living moderately beyond his means (as undergraduates will) lost his
affluence, lost the remains of it when, bolting to London, he dared to
run a newspaper—two newspapers. The National Standard had
soon (in his own phrase) to be hauled down, and The Constitutional
belied its title by a rapid decline and decease. Thus he lost a
moderate patrimony, and we find him next as a roving journalist in
Paris, divided between pen and pencil, with an almost empty pocket.
There, in August, 1836, at the British Embassy, he made a most
imprudent but happy marriage—most happy, that is for a while.
Years afterwards he wrote to a young friend:
I married at your age with £400 paid by a newspaper which

failed six months afterwards, and always love to hear of a young
man testing his fortune in that way. Though my marriage was a
wreck, as you know, I would do it over again, for behold Love is
the crown and completion of all earthly good.... The very best
and pleasantest house I ever knew in my life had but £300 to
keep it.
Here, then, comes in the tragedy of Thackeray’s life. Daughters

were born to him amid those pleasures and anxieties which only they
can taste fully who earn their daily bread in mutual love on the
future’s chance. As he beautifully wrote, long after, in Philip:
I hope, friend, you and I are not too proud to ask for our daily
bread, and to be grateful for getting it? Mr. Philip had to work for
his, in care and trouble, like other children of men:—to work for
it, and I hope to pray for it too. It is a thought to me awful and
beautiful, that of the daily prayer, and of the myriads of fellow-
men uttering it, in care and in sickness, in doubt and in poverty,
in health and in wealth. Panem nostrum da nobis hodie. Philip
whispers it by the bedside where wife and child lie sleeping, and
goes to his early labour with a stouter heart: as he creeps to his
rest when the day’s labour is over, and the quotidian bread is
earned, and breathes his hushed thanks to the bountiful Giver of
the meal. All over this world what an endless chorus is singing of
love, and thanks, and prayer. Day tells to day the wondrous
story, and night recounts it unto night. How do I come to think of
a sunrise which I saw near twenty years ago on the Nile when
the river and sky flushed with the dawning light and, as the
luminary appeared, the boatmen knelt on the rosey deck and
adored Allah? So, as thy sun rises, friend, over the humble
housetops round about your home, shall you wake many and
many a day to duty and labour. May the task have been honestly
done when the night comes; and the steward deal kindly with the
labourer.
Always this refrain in Thackeray—the text which Dr. Johnson

once had inscribed on his watch, ΝΥΞ ΓΑΡ ΕΡΧΕΤΑΙ, “For the night
cometh.”
With the birth of her third child, however, Mrs. Thackeray fell
under a mental disease not violent at first, but deepening until it
imperatively required removal and restraint.
III
I have been as short over this as could be: but the simple fact
must be taken into account if we would understand Thackeray at all.
Without knowledge of it, for instance, how can we interpret the ache
behind his jolly Ballad of Bouillabaisse?
This Bouillabaisse a noble dish is—

A sort of soup, or broth, or brew,
Or hotchpotch, of all sorts of fishes,
That Greenwich never could outdo;
Green herbs, red peppers, mussels, saffern,
Soles, onions, garlic, roach, and dace;
All these you eat at Terré’s tavern,
In that one dish of Bouillabaisse...
Ah me! how quick the days are flitting!
I mind me of a day that’s gone,
When here I’d sit, as now I’m sitting,
In this same place—but not alone.
A fair young form was nestled near me,
A dear, dear face looked fondly up,
And sweetly spoke and smiled to cheer me
—There’s no one now to share my cup.
If you wish, taking him at his best, to envisage Thackeray in the

days of his assured triumph, you must understand him as a
desolated man; as a man who, having built a fine house for himself
in Kensington Palace Gardens, could never fit it for a real home. If
he built himself a house, he could not sit and write in it; scarcely a
page of The Newcomes was written but on Club paper or at a hotel.
It would seem as if the very anguish of the hearth drove this soul, so
domestic by instinct, into the waste of Club-land, Pall Mall, the
Reform Club, where his portrait now so pathetically hangs. For
above all (let The Rose and the Ring with its delightful and delicate
occasion attest) Thackeray was born to be beloved of a nursery—the
sort of great fellow to whom on entrance every child, as every dog,
takes by instinct. In the nursery, quite at home, he rattles off the
gayest unforgettable verses:
Did you ever hear of Miss Symons?

She lives at a two-penny pieman’s:
But when she goes out
To a ball or a rout
Her stomacher’s all covered with di’monds.
Or, for elder taste,
In the romantic little town of Highbury,

My father kept a Succulating Libary.
He followed in his youth the Man immortal who
Conquered the Frenchman on the plains of Waterloo
—with similar fooling. Some men at Cambridge had the gift of this
fooling—in Tennyson’s day, too—and not the least of them was
Edward Lear, incomparable melodist of nonsense—nursery Mozart
of the Magic Flute—to whom, on his Travels in Greece, Tennyson
dedicated those very lovely stanzas beginning:
Illyrian woodlands, echoing falls

Of water, sheets of summer glass,
The long divine Peneian pass,
The vast Acroceraunian walls....
He must be an unsympathetic critic (I think) and therefore an

incomplete critic, if indeed a critic at all, who feels any real
incongruity as in his mind he lets those lines fade off into
Far and few, far and few,

Are the lands where the Jumblies live, etc.;
for as Shelley once assured us, more or less:
Many a green isle needs must be

In the deep wide sea of—Philistie,
and to anyone who remembers the imaginary horizons of his nursery

I dare say the Blessed Isles of Nonsense and the land where the
Bong tree grows lie not far from Calypso’s grot, or the house of Circe
In gardens near the pale of Proserpine,

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Paradigmatic Approach Kavous

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paradigmatic approach uses a systematic and structured method to explain the

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possible and, in this way, proposes a comprehensive approach to the understand-

Poughkeepsie, NY, USA Kavous Ardalan

Ardalan, K. (2019b). Equity Home Bias in International Finance: A Place-Attachment Perspective.

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The Sociology of Radical Change

The Sociology of Regulation

The notion of “understanding” is a defining characteristic of all theories located

3 Radical Humanist Paradigm

4 Radical Structuralist Paradigm

Althusser, L., 1969, For Marx, Harmondsworth, England: Penguin.

Seymour drew the figure from Mr. Chapman’s description:

“I do not,” he records to Forster, “write resentfully or angrily,

Now I call that, Gentlemen, the true novelist’s stroke; rightly

The kindly or unkindly impression makes all the difference

“It’s the only change he takes,” said Mrs. Chivery, shaking

Is that not prose? Of course it is prose for its purpose: and,

My father had left a small collection of books in a little room

In the story of David Copperfield’s journey on the Dover road

All his characters are my personal friends. I am constantly

This having been reported to Swinburne, here is a part of

What a superb and crushing reply to the vulgar insults of

Tolstoy to Dickens.... That is how the tall ships, the grandees of

I married at your age with £400 paid by a newspaper which

Here, then, comes in the tragedy of Thackeray’s life. Daughters

Always this refrain in Thackeray—the text which Dr. Johnson

This Bouillabaisse a noble dish is—

If you wish, taking him at his best, to envisage Thackeray in the

Did you ever hear of Miss Symons?

Or, for elder taste,

In the romantic little town of Highbury,

Illyrian woodlands, echoing falls

He must be an unsympathetic critic (I think) and therefore an

Far and few, far and few,

for as Shelley once assured us, more or less:

Many a green isle needs must be

and to anyone who remembers the imaginary horizons of his nursery

In gardens near the pale of Proserpine,

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