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Reelection and Legislative Power: Surprising Results from Brazil

Article in Legislative Studies Quarterly · November 2012

DOI: 10.2307/41719851

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Reelection and Legislative Power: Surprising
Results from Brazil

Saul Cunow Barry Ames Scott Desposato

Lucio Renno

April 5, 2012

Abstract

A diverse and growing literature ties legislative professionalization

and power to career paths. In particular, higher rates of re-election

and longer legislative careers should produce more professional, com-

petent, and high quality legislatures. Legislators have more incentives

to strengthen their own institution when they intend to remain there

for a long career. Using data from the most recent constitutional con-

vention in Brazil, we show that legislators with greater prospects for

long careers were actually less likely to support strengthening the leg-

islative branch. We explain this as part of a local equilibrium where

career legislators’ short-term need for pork trumped their long-term

interest in a stronger institution.

 Introduction

The notion that politicians seek re-election is a foundational assumption in nearly

all the literature on strategic behavior by legislators. Mayhew’s work on the

“electoral connection” begins with the assumption that members of Congress are

“single-minded seekers of reelection” (Mayhew, 1974). Much of the research on

policy positions, electoral rules, party formation, website construction, committee

systems, and even international cooperation derives its logic from the notion that

legislators want another term in office.1 Empirically, this is certainly true in the

United States, where more than 95% of incumbents regularly seek re-election. This

pattern actually predates the Constitution; Publius noted the frequent re-election

of legislators: “their re-election is considered by the legislative assemblies almost

as a matter of course” (Publius, 1788).

In practice, the high rates of re-election observed in the United States are

another example of American exceptionalism. In many countries and contexts,

most or even all incumbents fail to seek reelection (Morgenstern, Nielson and

Swindle, 2006; Samuels, 2003; Carey, 1996; Taylor, 1992). In some cases this is due

to term limits; in other cases legislators fail to seek re-election because elections are

costly and risky, because other political positions are more attractive, or because

their principals have other plans for them.

What happens when legislators do not seek re-election? Are they free from

all accountability, without incentives to represent constituents? Are they bound

to engage in mischief? Surprisingly, most research suggests otherwise. In Costa

Rica, a system without reelection, parties assign legislators to constituency service.

Good standing in the party is essential for post-legislature careers, so legislators

1
typically pursue their assignments enthusiastically (Taylor, 1992; Carey, 1996).

Poole (2003) finds that legislators “die in their ideological boots”; i.e., they fail to

change their roll-call voting when their careers are nearly over. Research on term

limits reaches similar conclusions (Wright, 2004).2

This good news about representation, however, may be attenuated by a less

sanguine line of work. A growing literature finds a strong relationship between

long legislative careers and legislative power and professionalization. Legislators

enjoying long careers will naturally acquire skill in policy making, and they will

further change the institution to enhance its power. 3 While this is a growing

research area, theorizing about the relationship between re-election rates and leg-

islative power is nothing new. Consider Publius from Federalist 53,“A few of the

members, as happens in all such assemblies, will possess superior talents, will by

frequent re-elections become members of long standing; will be thoroughly masters

of the public business...”. Publius argued that the normative consequences would

be negative, however, as he correctly predicted the emergence of hierarchy and

inequality of influence in any such legislative body (Publius, 1788).

Long legislative careers have two important implications. First, as re-election

rates increase, polities will enjoy more experienced and skilled leaders, at least

in theory, and thus produce better policy. Second, and more consequentially,

legislators will be better able to negotiate with other branches of government

when they build highly professionalized institutions. The professional resources

of the executive branch typically dwarf those of the legislative, and newly elected

legislators in weak legislatures have little help understanding the complexities of

public finance or detailed technical bills. Especially in cases with strong executives,

2
the lack of an equally skilled legislature leads to an unconstrained executive, weaker

representation of diverse interests in policy outputs, and an almost authoritarian

style of governance.4 For all these reasons, many scholars support high re-election

rates to ensure the development of a competent, skilled legislative branch capable

of checking the authority of competing sources of power and producing quality and

representative policy.

The greatest weakness in this literature comes from the evidence mustered to

defend it. Most evidence of the legislative strength – re-election relationship rests

on secondary measures of legislator preference – the number and salaries of their

staff, the length of budget negotiations, and so on. All these are indirect measures

of legislators’ desire for a more or less powerful institution. Even more problematic

are questions about the direction of causality and about endogeneity. Do high rates

of re-election lead to stronger legislatures? Or do stronger legislatures provide more

attractive careers for aspiring politicians? Can both be true?5

We contribute to this literature by measuring legislators’ preferences over leg-

islative strength directly, taking advantage of a unique situation in Brazil. In

1987 and 1988, legislators were part of a Constituent Assembly that wrote and ap-

proved a new constitution, with votes on hundreds of proposed amendments. Many

of these amendments directly affected the balance of power between branches of

government and thus provide an ideal opportunity to measure legislators’ prefer-

ences about institutional power. At the same time, Brazilian legislators are of two

obvious types. About half are regularly re-elected and pursue legislative careers,

while others pursue progressive ambition - running for mayor or seeking high-level

bureaucratic jobs (Samuels, 2003). If the extant literature is correct, those with

3
legislative careers should support legislature-strengthening amendments at higher

rates than progressively oriented legislators.

We analyze roll-call votes from Brazil’s Constituent Assembly on issues affect-

ing the balance of power between the executive and legislature. Our conclusion

is surprising: career legislators were most likely to vote for a weaker legislature!

These results reflect and reveal additional complexity in the ambition-legislative

strength relationship. In our discussion, we argue that Brazilian legislators with

static ambition were trapped in a short-term equilibrium. The power of the ex-

ecutive over pork distribution meant that in the short run, legislators needed to

appease the executive to obtain resources enabling re-election. Our results show

the complexity of incentives and their interaction with informal institutions.

We proceed in three steps. We first examine the literature on progressive ambi-

tion and legislative strength, probe its foundations, and consider its generalization.

In the next section we examine career structures in the Brazilian case, discuss the

Constituent Assembly, and analyze legislators’ preferences through roll-call votes.

In the final section we discuss the broader implications and potential revisions of

ambition theory.

Ambition and Legislative Power

Mayhew is credited with proposing the general hypothesis that legislators build

institutions to suit their personal political interests. These personal political in-

terests essentially equal their will to survive in politics. That is, legislators build

institutions that will facilitate reelection. In the United States Congress, accord-

ing to Mayhew, legislators would be hard-pressed to improve what they already

4
have: Congressional institutions successfully help politicians strengthen their elec-

toral connection. Therefore, representatives seek to claim credit for their actions,

advertise their deeds in Congress, undertake casework, distribute pork, visit their

home districts, and engage in debates about policy, all in order to enhance their

electoral prospects. In sum, they invest their time to remain visible to their con-

stituencies, hoping that something they do will please voters (Mayhew, 1974; Hall

and Houweling, 1995).

Paralleling this debate, Nelson Polsby argues that institutionalization requires

setting clear boundaries between members and non-members of an organization.

In the case of the legislative branch, this implies the predominance of static am-

bition and low turnover rates. The stabilization of members’ careers within the

legislative branch is also related to specialization and improved knowledge about

the functioning of the institution, which increases its insulation from pressures of

other political actors - especially the executive branch (Polsby, 1968). Hence, the

argument is that professionalization, because it makes long careers in the legisla-

tive branch attractive and provides resources for incumbents seeking reelection,

also breeds institutionalization by shielding representatives from public opinion

tides and the electoral influence of other political actors, such as governors and

presidents.

If we combine both approaches, we illuminate a virtuous cycle linking career

choices, legislative professionalization and institutionalization. There clearly is

an intentionality in institutional design that serves as basis for this virtuous cy-

cle. However, such intentional creation has rarely been documented, even though

many studies have attempted to better explain the inner workings of the rela-

5
tionship between careerism, professionalization and institutionalization. Instead,

most scholarship observes correlations between careerism and professionalization

and presumes intentionality.

For instance, Berry, Berkman and Schneiderman confirm that professional-

ization and careerism foster institutionalization by “establishing boundaries that

insulate members from external shocks” (2000, 859). Their comparative study of

state legislatures (from 1970 to 1989) not only finds solid support for the hypoth-

esis that professionalization breeds careerism, but also finds that with high levels

of professionalization, the probability of state representatives’ reelection is unaf-

fected by external shocks such as the state of the national economy or presidential

coattails effects. Carey, also testing his model at the state level in the U.S., find

that professionalization increases the probability of incumbents’ electoral success,

increases institutionalization of the state legislature, and increases constituency

service and pork distribution (2001, 691). These findings are echoed in a broad

literature (Maestas, 2000; Clucas, 2007).

A few authors take advantage of institutional changes - arguing that these

are more ”exogenous” and help identify the causal relationship. For example,

Kousser (2005) compares the profile of the California state legislature before and

after the adoption of term limits, finding significant changes in legislative ability

to deal with complex policy issues. However, one might note that term limits were

not exogenous but were imposed by votes unsatisfied with an under-performing

political class, suggesting a less perfectly exogenous test case.

Not all results support the careerism - professionalism relationship. Carson

(2005); Carson and Roberts (2005); Swift (1987) show that careerism did not

6
emerge only after important reforms in Congress in the early 20th Century. Based

on a historical perspective, these authors find that reelection rates were not all

that different before and after the reforms. Hence, the link between careerism

and institution building may not be so automatic and might take different forms

under distinct institutional settings. Richardson, Valentine and Stokes (2005) in a

case study of Missouri, 1 of the 21 states that adopted some form of term limit in

1992, confirm that term limits had no impact on the composition of the General

Assembly or the competitiveness of legislative elections (2005). Note that the

impact of term limits on professionalization can be ameliorated in some cases by

intra-branch progressive careerism; in term-limited states there is a clear increase

in movement between house and senate.

These findings are paralleled in comparative legislative studies. Jones (2002)

argues that low careerism in Argentina prevents professionalization and keeps the

legislative branch weak vis-a-vis the executive. Samuels (2003), studying Brazil,

argues that short careers reduce incentives for institution building and lead most

legislators to focus on state and local politics. Studies of the Mexican legislature,

where re-election is prohibited, find low professionalization and little responsive-

ness to constituent demands, especially during the period of one-party dominance

by the PRI. Moncrief (1994) has shown that in Canada professionalization has not

necessarily led to careerism. There are some partial exceptions. As we pointed

out earlier, studies of Costa Rica (Taylor, 1992; Carey, 1996) find that legislators

are responsive to constituents in spite of prohibitions on immediate re-election,

but this may be the exception that proves the rule. Legislators do not provide

constituency service voluntarily; instead, they are assigned service tasks by their

7
national party organizations. In this sense, the party can seek re-election, even if

the individuals change. Strong party organizations, in other words, may interact

with careerism in determining professionalism.

Regardless of the direction of their findings, many of these studies have an

implicit intentionality of design. Careerism leads legislators deliberately to design

institutions that increase professionalization and thus strengthen the legislative

branch. For example, when writing about Brazil, Samuels notes, “The Brazilian

Chamber of Deputies does not meet the electoral needs of its members: deputies

have not shaped the budget process to ensure reelection because their careers do

not motivate them to do so” (Samuels, 2003, 112-113). There are at least two prob-

lems with this literature. First, the causal mechanisms here are deliberate efforts

by legislators to shape their institutional environment and build a more profes-

sional and stronger legislature that can better serve their career needs. However,

none of the aforementioned studies actually looks at the specific actions of legis-

lators in institution building - their efforts to increase staff and other resources,

their efforts to increase the power of the legislative branch, and their efforts to

improve their relationships with constituents. Second, most of this literature has

a directional problem. Is the causal arrow from careerism to professionalism; that

is, once legislators develop long careers and then invest in institutions? Or does

the causal arrow also (or exclusively) flow the other way; do legislators choose

longer careers when their institutions are stronger?

We contribute to this literature by looking at legislators’ explicit institution-

building decisions through an examination of actual roll-call votes on constitutional

articles strengthening or weakening the legislative branch. Do legislators seeking

8
reelection vote differently on such articles from legislators not seeking reelection?

Do leaders and backbenchers differ on their positions? Is the distribution of pork-

barrel a factor in influencing vote choice in the Constitutional Assembly? In the

next section, we provide an overview of the Brazilian Constituent Assembly and

the votes we use for our study.

Data and Estimation Strategy

To test for a relationship between legislative careerism and institution building, we

employ roll-call vote data and deputy biographies from the Brazilian Chamber of

Deputies during the National Constituent Assembly (ANC). The ANC was a for-

mative moment in Brazilian institutions. Its members (Senators and Deputies in

joint session) considered proposals that would fundamentally reshape the Brazilian

political arena. On the table were such choices as presidentialism versus parlia-

mentarism, changes in electoral rules, and the fundamental balance between local

and national authority. The process itself was highly decentralized. Committees

and subcommittees prepared reports on different themes. A “systematization”

committee would then draft a first version of a constitutional bill. This bill would

then be voted in two-rounds. Given the high level of ideological division, the bills

were voted article by article instead of en bloc, with each vote requiring exten-

sive negotiations (Souza and Lamounier, 1990). Deputies also faced at least two

competing historical legacies: the strong legislature model of the second repub-

lic (1946-1964) and the highly centralized presidency of the military dictatorship

(1964-1985). Souza and Lamounier (1990), however, argue that in other areas of

debate one could clearly spot legacies from the earlier, pre-1945 Vargas period.

9
 Note that the Executive Branch, during the ANC, did not have the legisla-

tive prerogatives and agenda-setting power it gained with the 1988 constitution

(Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000). There were no urgency petitions, provisionary

measures or “college of leaders” during the ANC. The process was entirely under

the control of legislators in a very decentralized way. This is not to say that the

president did not attempt to influence the outcomes of voting. In fact, as Kinzo

points out, the executive branch acted like a very powerful pressure group in the

Constituinte (1990, 128). It did so with great effort, using its control over the

budget and nominations in the Federal bureaucracy to influence roll-call votes.

For example, the president emerged victorious in voting that kept his mandate

at five years (instead of four) and in avoiding change to a parliamentary form of

government (Souza and Lamounier, 1990). Pork barrel politics, nominations and

even the accreditation of broadcasting licenses (concessões de rádio e televisão)

to politicians by the then Minister of Communication, Antônio Carlos Magalhães,

allegedly played a significant role in swinging the votes of many representatives

(constituintes) and in constructing a solid, multiparty base of support in the ANC,

the Centrão, composed of more conservative parties.

For our purposes, this period was also unique in forcing legislators to decide

how much power to grant their own and other institutions. Votes on methods for

selecting Supreme Court justices, veto and decree power, impeachment procedures,

and other fundamental features of institutional design are central to understand the

ultimate design of the Brazilian Constitution. Taken as a whole, this environment

provides a unique opportunity to test the relationship between legislative careers

and institution building.

10
 The result of the Constituinte was a substantial but not earth-shattering change

in institutions. In comparison with the military period, executive power was weak-

ened. Presidents, for example, lost their ability to legislate without congressional

approval, but the predominance of the executive branch is still a defining trait

of the Brazilian constitutional design. For instance, the President maintained ex-

traordinary mechanisms for proposing legislation, such as issuing decree-like Pro-

visional Measures. These were initially aimed to legislate under very specific and

special occasions, but they have been widely used to advance the executive branch’s

legislative agenda (Pereira, Power and Renno, 2005). The executive branch may

also request urgency for its proposals, fast-tracking them in Congress. Further,

and probably most importantly, the executive branch has also held control over

the budgetary process. It is the President who proposes the annual budgetary law

and, after approval in Congress (which has very little leeway to change the law

significantly), the executive branch can decide when and how much to expend.

Our dependent variable is an index of legislators’ votes on proposed constitu-

tional measures of executive strength. Given our goal of exploring the relationship

between careerism and preferences over legislative power, we obviously need to de-

fine and measure legislative power. Power is the ability to affect policy outcomes,

broadly defined. Such power can be exercised narrowly through agenda setting

and veto powers, or more broadly through potential influence over other branches

of government (the ability, for example, to dismiss the executive). Conceived this

way, legislative power is relative, not absolute; it is determined by the capabilities

of the legislature as well as those of competing actors. A legislature that can in-

troduce fiscal measures, for example, is more powerful than one that cannot. At

11
the same time, regardless of legislative capabilities, legislatures are weaker if the

executive has bill initiation capabilities (Fish and Kroenig, 2009).

This conceptualization implies a measurement strategy that identifies votes

where the constitutional provision at stake would change the relative influence of

the legislature over policy. We examined every vote during the ANC in Ames

and Power (1990), asking whether the provision would affect legislative power

over policy. Our analysis includes every vote where a clear increase or decrease

in relative legislative power was at stake. For example, proposed amendments

addressed presidential decree power, presidential term length, congressional cen-

suring of the executive branch, and congressional approval of the budget. The

Appendix presents a complete list of these votes as well as a discussion of the

validation of our measure using floor debates during the ANC.

Our central independent variable is an ordinal measure of legislative careerism.

This measure takes a value of 1 if the deputy sought reelection in 1990, a value of

2 if the deputy sought reelection in both 1990 and 1994, and a value of 0 other-

wise. We suspect that although legislators who sought reelection in 1990 should

be more likely to support measure of executive strength, reelection in 1990 is a

“noisy” measure of legislative careerism. The subset of legislators seeking reelec-

tion in 1990 includes prospective career legislators, but it also includes deputies

who sought reelection in 1990 with the intention of using the Chamber of Deputies

as a springboard to more powerful local executive offices in the 1992 elections

(Samuels, 2003). In other words, legislators seeking reelection in more than one

consecutive term after the constituent assembly should be classified as true career

legislators; the ambitions of deputies who sought election only once are less clear.

12
 We also test for relationships between legislative careerism, pork-barrel politics,

and support for measures of executive strength. Our measure of received pork is

based on convênios, agreements signed with ministers that allocate spending to

particular municipalities. The measure of pork counts the number of municipalities

in which a deputy was the leading vote-getter and for which the deputy was able

to secure at least one convênio in 1990 and 1991 (Brazil, 1992).6 The models

presented in Table 2 control for received pork, while the models presented in

Table 3 interact received pork with our careerism index.

Our models include a number of other control variables. The prominence

of a legislator in the Chamber of Deputies is measured by a dichotomous vari-

able, Chamber Leader denoting deputies with seats on the important Comissão

de Sistematização. We include this variable because the incentives of prominent

legislators differ from those of backbenchers. The former are likely to have longer

time horizons and thus should vote more exclusively in support of the institu-

tional design they believed would be most effective in the future; the latter may

be more concerned with toeing the party line or supporting measures furthering

their short-term career goals. We also include a dichotomous variable indicating

if deputies were members of the pro-government ARENA party during the mili-

tary regime as a proxy for deputies’ preferences for military or pre-1964 politics.

We also control for differences across political parties by employing party “fixed

effects”. Finally, some models also include bill “fixed effects” in order to account

for variations in the potential impact or controversy associated with each proposed

measure. Table 1 presents summary statistics for our variables.

[ Table 1 about here ]

13
 Measuring legislative careerism during the Constituent Assembly poses some

challenges. Previous legislative experience, a typical measure of careerism, is flawed

here, because almost all legislators in the ANC who had served previous terms in

the Chamber of Deputies had served under Brazil’s military regime rather than

in a democratic system. Given our focus on democratic institutional design, the

connection between previous legislative experience under a non-democratic regime

and institution building does not fit well with our theoretical expectations or with

previous work on careerism and institutional design.

Considering the brevity of Brazil’s democratic history immediately preceding

the Constituent Assembly, prospective careerism represents the best (and perhaps

the only) way of measuring legislative careerism during that period. It is not,

however, without methodological shortcomings. In particular, looking ex-post at

legislators’ roll-call votes during the ANC and their prospective legislative careers

presents a significant temporal ordering problem. Deputies cast votes on constitu-

tional amendments prior to seeking reelection and pursuing prospective legislative

careers. As a result, our dependent variable precedes our key independent variable.

This ordering problem is more problematic for the part of our ordinal measure of

careerism that includes whether or not deputies sought reelection in 1994; it is

less problematic for our 1990 reelection measure. By the time deputies seeking

reelection in 1990 cast votes on the amendments we analyze, their closest remain-

ing option for pursuing elected office was the 1990 elections. In other words, most

deputies who sought reelection in 1990 likely were planning to do so when they

cast their votes on executive and legislative strength. Deputies planning to leave

the legislature had also already made their decision by that time.

14
 Had deputies who sought reelection in both 1990 and 1994 decided on their

prospective legislative careers during the ANC? This is less clear, but we believe

that even during the Constituent Assembly, most deputies knew whether they

would pursue legislative careers. Furthermore, reverse causality is not a serious

threat to our approach; it is unlikely that legislators’ votes on measures of legisla-

tive and executive strength influenced their decisions to pursue legislative careers.

These votes were only a small subset of the hundreds of votes cast during the Con-

stituent Assembly. Moreover, only three of the 17 bills in our analysis passed, two

of which increased executive strength. As such, legislators’ votes on this subset of

bills would have little effect on the likelihood that they pursued reelection in the

future. In sum, a measure of prospective legislative careerism that includes two

legislative elections after the ANC is an appropriate measure of careerism, and its

imperfections should not substantially alter the results presented in this article.

Although we do not believe that the votes included in our analysis affected

deputies’ decision to stay in the legislature or to seek other office we address the

possibility of reverse causality by using an instrument for careerism. To correct for

potential endogeneity, we need to identify an instrument Z that is correlated with

careerism but has no direct relationship with preferences over legislative power.

The legislator’s age at the time of election is a suitable instrument. Age is clearly

correlated with careerism: older legislators are those most likely to move on to

other opportunities, whether running for mayor, senator, governor; taking ap-

pointed executive offices, or even retiring. Younger legislators are most likely to

seek reelection. At the same time, there is no direct link between age and pref-

erences over the structure of the constitution. Consequently, age is only likely to

15
affect the votes of legislators through their career plans.

This article presents results from six logistic regression models. Each model

takes deputy-vote combinations as the unit of observation and uses logistic regres-

sion with robust standard errors clustered by deputy. 7 In all of our models, the

dependent variable is dichotomous, taking a value of 1 when a deputy casts a vote

in favor of a measure strengthening the executive branch or against a measure

strengthening the legislature; and taking a value of 0 when a deputy voted against

increasing executive strength or in favor of greater legislative strength.

One concern with our approach might be the repeated measurement of legis-

lators - our unit of analysis is the legislator-vote, thus there are as many as 3,477

votes by individual legislators in the vote we analyzed and nearly 150,000 in the

complete dataset. As a robustness check, we aggregated these votes into a count of

votes for executive strength and ran a negative binomial model, with an exposure

control for the number of bills for which legislators’ were present in the legislature

to cast a vote. Our results concur completely with our logit analysis: there is a

positive and significant relationship between legislative careerism and voting for

executive strength.8 These results, included in the appendix, also persist when

instrumenting for future career plans. We focus here on the logit analysis for two

reasons. First, we wished to avoid assuming that all bills were equally contentious.

Second, many legislators switched party during this period, and it would be inap-

propriate to assume identical behavior in each party given previous work on the

impact of switching on roll-call behavior.

16
 Results

Table 2 presents results from models testing the relationship between careerism

and support for executive strength on all votes related to executive and legislative

strength during the ANC. Results from these models show a positive and statisti-

cally significant relationship between prospective legislative careerism and support

for executive strength. In other words, our results show that career legislators were

more likely to support amendments designed to strengthen the executive branch

or weaken the legislature. Deputies running for reelection in the two elections

following the ANC were more likely to support executive strength than deputies

who did not pursue legislative careers.

[ Table 2 about here ]

The second and third models in Table 2 show that these results hold even with

the addition of controls for pork, party leadership, and prior membership in the

ARENA party as well as party and bill fixed effects (shown in the third model in

the table). As expected, former members of the ARENA party and more pork-

oriented deputies were more likely to support greater executive strength. However,

these relationships lose statistical significance once fixed effects are included in the

model.

What explains the relationship between legislative careerism and support for

executive strength? In part, the answer lies in deputies’ pursuit of pork for their

districts. Table 3 shows results from models interacting our measures of careerism

and pork. Here we see a significant positive interactive relationship between pork

and careerism; i.e., pork-oriented deputies pursuing careers in the legislature were

17
more likely to support measures of executive strength. Our control variables in this

model behave similarly to the models without the interaction term. These results

suggest that pork-oriented deputies planning to pursue careers in the legislature

may have believed that a stronger executive branch – even at the expense of a

strong legislature – would be the most effective means of ensuring their continued

ability to provide pork in future legislative sessions.

[ Table 3 about here ]

Table 4 shows results from our instrumental variable approach. Column 1

shows the relationship between age and careerism; as expected, age is a strong

predictor of future career plans. Columns 2 through 4 replicate our original models

with the instrument for careerism as the key independent variable. As before, there

is a strong and significant relationship between the now-exogenous measure of

careerism and legislators’ preferences over legislative power. Once again, deputies

seeking legislative careers were most likely to support a weaker legislature. Unlike

our original models, however, these results using an instrument for careerism are

not robust to the addition of party fixed effects.

[ Table 4 about here ]

Despite the robustness of the relationship between legislative careerism in the

Chamber of Deputies and support for executive strength, the magnitude of the

effect is relatively small. Table 5 shows the predicted probability of opposition

to one amendment (Amendment 279) for hypothetical legislators from the largest

parties in the Chamber who are not chamber leaders, lack previous experience, and

are 51 years old (the mean age of deputies in our sample). The level of prospective

18
careerism of these hypothetical deputies varies from 0 (no reelection) to 2 (seeking

reelection in both subsequent elections). Like other proposed amendments during

the ANC, Amendment 279 represented a clear choice between strengthening the

legislature and the executive branch. The amendment sought to increase legislative

strength by reducing the number of legislators required for normal Congressional

decisions from an absolute majority to a simple majority of the members present.

As such, legislators who opposed Amendment 279 voted to strengthen the execu-

tive branch; those who supported it voted to strengthen the legislature.

Table 5 shows that for hypothetical legislators from all of the major parties,

pursuing a legislative career was associated with an increased probability of op-

posing Amendment 279; in other words, an increased probability of voting to

strengthen the executive branch. For example, for hypothetical legislators from

the PMDB, seeking reelection in both 1990 and 1994 increased the probability

of opposing this amendment from 56.7% to 61.9%. Hypothetical legislators from

the PT were far less likely to oppose Amendment 279 overall, but they were more

likely to do so if they sought reelection. Across all parties, legislative careerism

increased the likelihood that legislators would support measures that increased ex-

ecutive strength. This effect is not statistically significant, however, for all party-

bill combinations in the ANC. When a party voted very cohesively on a particular

amendment (such as the PT legislators’ opposition to Amendment 279), roll-call

votes of legislators from that party reflect their party’s position on the issue at

hand rather than individual-level factors such as career ambitions or their beliefs

about the relative strength of the executive and legislative branches. Further, even

when the effects of legislative careerism are statistically significant, they are rela-

19
tively small when compared to such factors as party affiliation or the qualities of

particular amendments.

[ Table 5 about here ]

In sum, our results identify a strong positive relationship between legislative

careerism and support for a strong executive branch. Contrary to the conventional

wisdom on legislative careerism and institution building, Brazilian legislators pur-

suing legislative careers were more likely than those not intending to remain in the

legislature to delegate power to the executive branch and to weaken the legislature.

At least in part, the orientation of deputies towards pork-barrel politics explains

this relationship. Deputies planning to pursue legislative careers and provide pork

to their districts were more likely to support strengthening the executive branch,

sometimes even directly at the expense of a weaker legislature.

Discussion

Notwithstanding the oft-heard public desire to “throw the bums out” , political

scientists have repeatedly argued against term limits on the grounds that they

weaken legislatures . In presidential systems, weaker legislatures restrict the avail-

able channels for public influence over policy making and the consolidation of party

systems. In both the Mexican Congress and the California State Assembly, leg-

islators face restrictions on re-election, and in both cases political scientists and

pundits regularly lament the lack of professionalization from legislators.

Our analysis of votes on Brazilian constitutional articles suggests that the rela-

tionship is not as clear and unidirectional as the literature suggests. In the Brazil-

ian Constitutional Assembly, legislators who sought re-election were less likely to

20
support legislative strength than those leaving the Congress. The relationship is

consistently negative and statistically significant in almost every model specifica-

tion - controlling for bill, party, and even legislative experience. Legislators were

not strategically changing the institutional rules to increase their power; indeed,

the opposite was happening!

What explains our surprising results? Local informal institutions may play a

key role. In particular, the widespread use of pork to generate electoral support

has created an odd equilibrium. For many re-election seeking deputies, political

security depends upon a close relationship with the executive branch and upon

access to the pork that presidents distribute. Legislators seeking re-election have

to balance two competing incentives. On the one hand, a stronger legislature gives

them more influence over policy and resource distribution in an eventual future

Congress. But the short-term demands of the re-election process in a fragmented

system with hundreds of candidates motivates them to sacrifice their long-term

preferences for short-term electoral advantage.

The key features of the system included the importance of public resources

for electoral success and, at the national level, the president’s monopoly on such

resources (Alston et al., 2009). Deputies seeking re-election needed to please the

president to get pork. Deputies not seeking re-election had other sources of cam-

paign resources, so they were more able to vote their consciences.

The executive branch’s tight control of public resources left re-election-seeking

legislators dependent on good relations with the President for access to distributable

jobs, contracts, and campaign support. At that time, there was no other resource-

rich actors at the national level. State governments, for example, might also be a

21
source of distributable jobs and public works, but (a) the votes in the Constituent

Assembly occurred before governors regained much of the strength lost during the

military regime and (b) governors with resources invested in deputies running for

local office, not those enamored with life in Brası́lia.

Deputies leaving politics or running for other offices were less subject to presi-

dential pressure. Those leaving politics felt no political pressure, and those running

for any of the many state or local offices had other potential sources of finance.

These legislators were consequently less responsive to demands for more consti-

tutional authority. In sum, the need for patronage during this period reversed

the expected relationship between re-election and legislative professionalism. Our

findings offer two broader lessons. The first is the role of re-election in structuring

legislators’ behavioral incentives. A long literature argues that legislators with long

careers control their own destinies - building institutions that serve their careers

and increase their influence over policy. Our empirical results show how short-term

incentives, especially the more immediate pressures of careers and elections, can

disrupt these long-term incentives. Politicians with plans for longer legislative ca-

reers need pork to deliver to constituents; such politicians were willing to support

a stronger executive than those leaving the legislature.

Our study also contributes to the broader question of legislative-executive bar-

gaining over constitutional design. Many constitutions have been rewritten in the

last 20 years. Some have strengthened the legislative branch; others have weak-

ened it. Popular executives, as in the case of Chavez in Venezuela, have capitalized

on their support to strengthen their hands. Unpopular executives have suffered

reductions in executive power (cf. the Philippines under anti-Marcos forces in

22
1986)9 . Other dynamics may be observed when constitutions are drafted by in-

dependent or military commissions instead of elected legislatures or constituent

assemblies. Explaining variance in legislative power across new constitutions is

beyond the scope of this article, but the comparative literature suggests that the

results of constitutional changes and amendments depend on several factors, in-

cluding which institutions are assigned to write and approve the constitution, the

relative strength and cohesion of government and opposition parties and/or coali-

tions, levels of certainty/uncertainty about the person who will initially govern un-

der the new constitution, and that leader’s popular support and resources(Barkan,

1998; Vencovsky, 2007; Posner and Young, 2007; Hicken, 2006; Souza, 1997).

Brazil is just one case, but it fits in a broader framework. The term of the sit-

ting president would not end until well after the new constitution was promulgated;

he had incentives to protect the power of his office, and he used pork aggressively

to sway legislators to his side on key constitutional votes(Souza, 1997). The party

system was highly fragmented and unstable. Frequent party switches and realign-

ments prevented the emergence of an anti-executive majority. And Brazil has a

reputation for resource bargains between the executive and legislature, with legis-

lators willing to trade votes for pork and appointed positions. Our results suggest

that this political arena reversed the usual relationship between careerism and

constitution-writing, as the combination of pork-oriented politics, a highly moti-

vated executive, and weak parties encouraged long-term legislators to weaken the

power of their own offices.

Our results fit more broadly in a growing literature on the non-spatial dimen-

sions of politics. Recent work has shown how the nexus of control over government

23
resources structures and orients party systems as vertical or horizontal organiza-

tions (Desposato and Scheiner, 2008). We have shown how those effects can also

be present in constitution writing and in the expression of preferences about insti-

tutional power.

Finally, our results are yet another caution to those seeking instant improve-

ment through reform. Democracy naturally involves compromise, and in any di-

verse group compromise means that most voters are not content with the outcome

of their political system. Institutional change has a strong appeal: change the

rules, fix the system, produce better politicians. Democracies globally are con-

stantly casting about for ways to change institutions, including electoral rules, to

fix their problems. Politicians attach high expectations to institutional reform and

mobilize popular support for change.

Our results are also another reminder of the complex mechanisms linking insti-

tutions and outcomes in political environments. Institutions such as terms limits

should be carefully evaluated before their adoption or abandonment. High expec-

tations can yield severe disappointments. Sometimes institutional reforms have

the expected impact on the political game, but often the impact of institutional

rules on political systems is subtle and highly contingent with local context.

Saul Cunow <scunow@ucsd.edu>is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of

California, San Diego, Department of Political Science, Social Sciences Building

301, 9500 Gilman Drive, #0521, La Jolla, CA 92093-0521.

24
 Notes

1
This literature is too large to cite with any degree of comprehensiveness; some di-
verse examples include (Downs, 1957; Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Weingast, Shepsle and
Johansen, 1981; Conconi and Huget, 2005; Alvarez and Saving, 1997).
2
Perhaps this apparently irrational behavior should not be so surprising to faculty who
keep publishing after tenure.
3
In some systems, these legislative skills may be more oriented towards the pursuit of
pork or patronage. Nonetheless, legislators with long careers should become better able
to navigate the legislative process and pass legislation, even if their work is focused on
particularistic ends.
4
Legislators in a newly professionalized legislature have described negotiations with the
executive before and after a professionalization program. Before, the executive delivered a
budget proposal and the legislature swiftly approved it. After, the executive sends a team
of accountants to discuss details of the budget with legislators and their staff.
5
Some have argued that voter-imposed term limits provide an exogenous treatment
allowing for a rigorous test of the impact of term length. But even such cases do not
provide conclusive evidence: in theory, skilled politicians would keep constituents happy
enough to avoid voter-imposed term limits. Their imposition suggests that frequent re-
election does not guarantee legislative skill or power and that the legislative body in
question was already in decline.
6
This measure only includes municipalities in which deputies were the leading vote-
getter in order to avoid attributing convênios to every deputy who received at least one
vote in a municipality. We only credit deputies for having earned at least one convênio in
a municipality because spending was often allocated in multiple convênios .
7
This “long” data structure allows for the inclusion of party effects in the models.
Because deputies frequently switch parties, it is difficult to control for party with deputies
as the unit of observation. Instead, by taking each deputy-vote combination as the unit

25
of analysis, it is possible to control for party influences because each deputy can only be
affiliated with one party at the time of each vote.
8
Models using Poisson regressions yielded similar results but are not included in the
article for brevity.
9
These dynamics extend to constitutional amendments as well. In Africa, many lame-
duck Presidents have sought additional terms through constitutional amendments. Some
succeed, others fail, but a common theme is executive deployment of resources in an
attempt to sway legislators’ votes. For example, writing on Uganda and Nigeria, Posner
and Young (2007) notes that the executive bought parliamentary votes when trying to
change the constitution to allow a third term.

26
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 Tables and Figures

Table 1: Summary Statistics

count mean sd min max

Exec. Votes 3432 0.593 0.491 0 1
Index 400 5.090 1.954 0 11
Careerism 3840 0.957 0.810 0 2
Pork 3819 23.197 22.349 0 93
Careerism*Pork 3819 21.178 31.520 0 156
Chamber Leader 3694 0.204 0.403 0 1
Age 3679 3.916 0.177 3 4
ARENA 3432 0.236 0.425 0 1
Observations 3840
Age variable is log

33
Table 2: Legislative Careerism and Support for Executive Strength

(1) (2) (3)

Exec. Votes Exec. Votes Exec. Votes
Careerism 0.129∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗
(0.0470) (0.0484) (0.0514)

Pork 0.00482∗∗∗ 0.00405∗∗ 0.00157

(0.00161) (0.00163) (0.00195)

Chamber Leader -0.198∗∗ -0.255∗∗

(0.0887) (0.102)

ARENA 0.305∗∗∗ 0.0356

(0.0959) (0.121)

Constant 0.139∗ 0.130∗ 0.477

(0.0746) (0.0786) (0.346)

Party Fixed Effects No No Yes

Bill Fixed Effects No No Yes

Observations 3456 3312 3307
Logistic Regression Models
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

34
Table 3: Pork, Careerism, and Support for Executive Strength

(1) (2) (3)

Exec. Votes Exec. Votes Exec. Votes
Careerism*Pork 0.00456∗∗ 0.00457∗∗ 0.00436∗
(0.00192) (0.00200) (0.00227)

Careerism 0.0235 0.0347 0.0137

(0.0657) (0.0674) (0.0676)

Pork 0.00120 0.000478 -0.00168

(0.00225) (0.00223) (0.00254)

Chamber Leader -0.213∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗

(0.0871) (0.101)

ARENA 0.293∗∗∗ 0.0247

(0.0959) (0.121)

Constant 0.230∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗ 0.526

(0.0870) (0.0914) (0.344)

Party Fixed Effects No No Yes

Bill Fixed Effects No No Yes

Observations 3456 3312 3307
Logistic Regression Models
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

35
Table 4: Careerism Instrument and Support for Executive Strength

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Careerism Exec. Votes Exec. Votes Exec. Votes
Age -0.667∗∗∗
(0.240)

Careerim YStarHat 0.829∗∗∗ 0.905∗∗∗ 0.130

(0.210) (0.262) (0.356)

Pork -0.00152 0.00559∗∗∗ 0.00617∗∗∗ 0.00227

(0.00197) (0.00175) (0.00212) (0.00213)

ARENA -0.0836 0.326∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.0589

(0.122) (0.0995) (0.121) (0.140)

Chamber Leader 0.229∗∗ -0.355∗∗∗ -0.438∗∗∗ -0.253∗

(0.109) (0.104) (0.125) (0.133)

Constant 3.562∗∗∗ -0.564∗∗∗ -0.618∗∗ 0.436

(0.981) (0.209) (0.298) (0.476)

Party Fixed Effects Yes No No Yes

Bill Fixed Effects Yes No Yes Yes

Observations 3121 3121 3121 3121
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

36
Table 5: Predicted Probabilities of Support for Executive Strength (Voting
Against Amendment 279)

PMDB PFL PDS PDT PTB PT PSDB

Pr(Y=1—X=0) 0.567 0.761 0.536 0.487 0.668 0.316 0.653
se 0.174 0.211 0.252 0.197 0.251 0.187 0.309
Pr(Y=1—X=1) 0.593 0.781 0.563 0.515 0.692 0.340 0.677
se 0.163 0.201 0.241 0.186 0.246 0.172 0.302
Pr(Y=1—X=2) 0.619 0.799 0.590 0.542 0.715 0.365 0.701
se 0.168 0.204 0.242 0.189 0.252 0.171 0.304

37
 Appendix

Table 6: Robustness Check with Additive Index

(1) (2) (3)

Index Index Index
Careerism 0.0482∗ 0.0525∗ 0.0559∗∗
(0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0280)

Pork 0.00192∗∗ 0.00158∗

(0.000922) (0.000949)

Chamber Leader -0.0816

(0.0550)

ARENA 0.116∗∗
(0.0522)

Constant -0.570∗∗∗ -0.621∗∗∗ -0.623∗∗∗

(0.0348) (0.0425) (0.0455)
Observations 402 400 381
Negative Binomial Regression Models with Legislators as Unit of Analysis
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

38
Validation of Vote Selection Using Floor Debates

In order to ensure that legislators were aware that legislative power was at stake

when voting on the bills included in our analysis, we examined floor debates from

the legislature during the constituent assembly. We found substantial evidence that

legislators clearly interpreted these votes as critical in determining the strength of

the legislative branch in the future.

For example, vote 851 on August 25, 1988 was to decide the role of Medidas

Provisórias in the new Constitution - whether the President should have some

form of decree authority, that is, the ability to write executive orders with the

force of law. In the discussion preceding the vote, legislators referred repeatedly

to the balance of power between the executive and legislative branch. Speakers

made references to the weakness of the legislative branch during the military pe-

riod, and the need to recover powers lost during that period. Speakers argued that

including Medidas Provisórias in the constitution would be equivalent to commit-

ting harakiri, that the amendment was a form of self-castration, and that the

legislature would cease to have any function as law-making would be taken over

by the President’s staff. The limited defense of the measure noted that it was not

really so powerful and was part of a modernization program, that the Medidas

Provisórias would have limits(Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, 1998b).

Similarly, on Vote 839, which revoked Congressional authority to censure min-

isters, speakers on both sides referred to the balance of power between the execu-

tive and legislative branch. Proponents of the measure thought that the Congress

should not have so much power - that a too-strong legislature contributed to crises

in Presidential systems. Opponents also referred to power, and claimed that the

39
censure authority would force the executive to seek dialogue and compromise with

the legislative branch(Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, 1998a).

List of Included Votes

This section briefly describes each of the votes included in the models presented in

this article, relying on the coding of Ames and Power (1990). The votes are listed

in chronological order.

Vote 272 (March 16, 1988)

On the selection of the members of the Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU).

The CS had two-thirds of TCU members being elected by Congress, and the

remaining third being nominated by the Executive branch, subject to Senate

approval. In this amendment, Adhemar de Barros Filho wants the Congress

to choose all of the TCU members, via secret vote. YES is for Adhemar’s

strengthening of Congress. YES 194, NO 141, defeated. (Yes = support for

executive strength)

Vote 276 (March 17, 1988)

The CS stipulated that Congress would have to sanction the concession of

public lands in excess of 500 ha. Centrão later changed this limit to 2500

ha. This amendment seeks a return to the CS language. YES is for a 500

ha limit, NO is for a 2500 ha limit. YES 254, NO 193, defeated. (Yes =

support for legislative strength)

Vote 278 (March 17, 1988)

Would give Congress the power to authorize the foreign sale and purchase

40
 of war materials. YES is to give these powers to Congress. YES 97, NO

340, defeated. (Yes = support for legislative strength)

Vote 279 (March 17, 1988)

The CS had provided that normal Congressional decisions could be taken

by a simple majority of the members present, as long as the simple majority

was greater than or equal to one-fifth of the total membership. The Centrão

changed this, requiring an absolute majority. This amendment seeks a return

to the CS language. YES is for the CS scheme, NO is for the Centrão scheme.

YES 197, NO 238, defeated. (Yes = support for legislative strength)

Vote 299 (March 19, 1988)

This is a move to eliminate the presidential power of the medida provisoria

altogether. YES is for eliminating the medida provisoria. YES 78, NO 275,

defeated. (Yes = support for legislative strength)

Vote 315 (March 23, 1988)

This is the Emenda Humberto Lucena, the extremely important amendment

by which the CS option for parliamentarism was removed and a presidential

system of government was introduced into the text. This was the only time

during the entire ANC that all 559 constituintes were present to vote. YES is

for presidentialism, NO is for parliamentarism. YES 344, NO 212, approved.

(Yes = support for executive strength)

Vote 322 (March 24, 1988)

On the subject of foreign military forces crossing or stationed on Brazilian

territory. The CS allowed this only during wartime and only with the au-

41
 thorization of Congress. This amendment would, in peacetime, allow the

president to act without the authorization of Congress. YES is for increas-

ing presidential powers in peacetime, NO is for sticking with the CS text.

YES 187, NO 200, defeated. (Yes = support for executive strength)

Vote 324 (March 25, 1988)

The CS stipulated that a motion of censure of the president had to win a

2/3 majority in Congress. This is an attempt to confirm the CS text. YES

supports the CS text requiring a 2/3 majority, NO means there should be

no need for it. PDS, PFL, PL walk out, thus no quorum. YES 105, NO 73,

no quorum. (Yes = support for executive strength)

Vote 353 (April 7, 1988)

Would establish a Constitutional Court, replacing the STF. It would be

expanded to 16 ministers, only 4 of whom would be nominated by the presi-

dent. YES is for this proposal. YES 130, NO 263, defeated. (No = support

for executive strength)

Vote 471 (April 21, 1988)

Changes language concerning the Lei de Diretrizes Orcamentarias, adding

two things: Congress would require details on outlays of capital, and the

executive would also be required to submit bimonthly reports on the imple-

mentation of the budget. YES is for increased Congressional oversight of the

federal budget. YES 312, NO 83, approved. (Yes = Support for legislative

strength)

Vote 477 (April 22, 1988)

42
 Would require the Congress to approve the federal budget. If the budget is

not approved by the end of the legislative session, the president would be

able to implement it by decree. Provides that the legislative session will not

end until the budget is passed. YES is for increased efficiency in producing

and implementing the budget. YES 275, NO 96, defeated. (Yes = Support

for executive strength)

Vote 839 (August 24, 1988)

On the right of Congress to censure ministers. YES means Congress loses

the power to censure ministers, NO means Congress retains the power. YES

312, NO 71, approved. (Yes = support for executive strength)

Vote 851 (August 25, 1988)

On medidas provisorias. YES eliminates MPs, NO retains MPs in the text.

YES 66, NO 309, defeated. (YES = support for legislative strength)

Vote 879 (August 26, 1988)

On the method of nominating the Procurador-Geral da Republica. YES

means the president nominates freely,but the nominee has to be a career

person; NO means the president chooses from a 3-person list prepared by

procuradores. YES 88, NO 292, defeated. (Yes = support for executive

strength)

Vote 884 (August 27, 1988)

On the exclusive competence of Congress to legislate on subjects that have

“encargos or serious commitments of the national Patrimony” (e.g., price-

setting in agriculture would cause losses or gains). YES means Congress

43
 does not have exclusive competence, NO means it does. YES 208, NO 142,

defeated. (No = support for legislative strength)

Vote 896 (August 27, 1988)

On the State of Defense – as distinguished from the State of Siege. In the

latter the president has to have the support of the Council of the Republic

and the National Defense Council. In the former the president can imple-

ment it alone. YES gets rid of State of Defense altogether, NO retains it.

YES 74, NO 299, defeated. (No = support for executive strength)

Vote 919 (August 28, 1988)

On whether president can be held responsible for “atos estranhos ao exercicio

de suas funções”. YES 257, NO 136, defeated. (No = support for executive

strength)

44

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