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BATTLE DAMAGED CHIEFTAINS

Ref A - ACP Branch MVEE WORKING PAPER 0181

Following your request that MVEE examine and report

on the evidence relating to battle damaged Iranian
CHIEFTAINS, I attach a copy of a Working Paper
(reference A) summarising our findings. As you will
see it identifies a number of uncertainties which
it woiild be most valuable to resolve, should any
opportunities arise.

/C^
ad/acp
for D/MVEE
Chertsey
Surrey
Ascot 23366

2 Mar 81

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ACP BRANCH STUDIES GROUP WORKING PAPER NO 0181

AN ASSESSMENT OF BATTLE DAMAGED CHIEFTAINS

By

L R LEAKE AD/ACP

SUMMARY

Information of Iranian CHIEFTAIN tanks damaged in the recent

conflict between Iran and Iraq is summarised and possible
causes of the damage discussed. Specific information needed
to resolve some of the uncertainties in the attribution of
causes is identified.

I.. ---- - 'OR) I

05 M A R 198! I
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INTRODUCTION

As a result of the current conflict between Iran and Iraq some battle
damaged CHIEFTAINS have been captured by Iraq. Detailed information
on the nature of the damage has been made available to us from two
sources. Photographs supplied by the Defence and Military correspondent
of the Daily Telegraph, and a briefing given by members of IMS staff
(Brigadier P Tynan and Colonel H Malthouse) who visited Iraq recently.

2. AIM

The aim of this paper is to summarise the information gleaned from

the above sources( to interpret it as far as possible and to identify
areas of uncertanty which might be clarified if further opportunities
to inspect the vehicles were to become available.

3. REPORTED DAMAGE*
0
1
9
8
7
6
5
4

85 CHIEFTAINS were identified and examined. 69 of these had suffered

only superficial damage, probably resulting from their recovery from
the battlefield. 16 CHIEFTAINS therefore received significant damage
and details have been given on 14 of these.

4. 5 tanks were completely burnt out and appeared to have suffered an

internal explosion. In 3 the belly plate had been blown out and in
2 the turret bustle had been blown off. No evidence of a penetrating
strike was found on any of these 5 tanks.

5. Of the remaining 9 tanks for which details are available, some had
been attacked by KE, some by CE and some by both natures of ammunition.
Details of the attacks and the damage are described for each tank
separately in the following paragraphs.

6. 2 FSAPDS strikes, neither of which penetrated. 1 shot ricocheted from

glacis and lodged in the lower turret front, the other ricocheted from
the GPMG mounting. In addition 2 HEAT strikes, probably from a small
calibre weapon, near the lower edge of the glacis. Apparently neither
of these penetrated the armour. Burning had occurred inside the tank.

7. 3 strikes by FSAPDS, one of which ricocheted from the turret roof, the
other two penetrated the turret front. The tank was burnt out.
Photograph 44/45 shows the penetrating strikes.

8. FSAPDS strikes on turret, one of which penetrated. Tank burnt out,

see photograph 32/33.

9. RH hull side penetrated by HEAT round, strike just below turret ring.
"AP" round penetrated back of bustle. Tank had burned out.

10. 2 FSAPDS strikes on skirt plate approximately 2 feet from tank front.
One of the shots had emerged from the plate, no evidence of exit hole
from the other. Drivers compartment burnt out, turret (ie fighting
compartment?) undamaged. HEAT strike on side of turret^ no penetration
but hole depth approximately 5 inches.

Dn—
 OO N F ID B W IA L UK DVFiC II ^

11. HEAT strike on turret front - no penetration. Turret roof penetrated

by several small holes scattered over roof area. Tank burnt out.

12. Strike on LHS of hull, hole diameter approximately 3^ inches. Turret

burnt out.

13. HEAT penetration through roof centre, in forward area. Presumably

an oblique downward attack. Internal fire had occurred.

14. Turret penetrated by 2 HEAT rounds, hole diameters approximately

1^ inches. Turret burnt out.

Summarising, of the 16 damaged CHIEFTAINS the damage to 2 remains

unknown. Of the remaining 14, 9 had been completely burnt out,
5 of which had suffered internal explosion, and 5 had evidence of
partial burning.

15. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COMMENT BY IMS

CHIEFTAINS were Mark 5 and Mark 5/3 types. Sufficiently detailed

identification was available to conclude that tanks representing
each of the Iranian divisions supplied with CHIEFTAIN were captured
by Iraq. A comment by an Iraqi engineer officer suggested that the
CHIEFTAINS were badly maintained, "most would need engine replacement".

16. None of the CHIEFTAINS examined had suffered damage to the engine
compartment and non had track or suspension damage. None of the
tanks showed any evidence of there having been crew casualties.
26 of the 85 tanks had their gun tampons in position when examined.

17. Conversation between Iraqi officers suggested that the CHIEFTAINS

may have been carrying mines. No direct evidence of this was
found. The remains of HESH shells were seen. They appeared to
have split open and burnt - ie they had not detonated.

18. The IMS team formed the tentative impression that, since there
was little evidence to support the view that a tank battle had
occurred, the CHIEFTAINS may have captured intact and some
subsequently used for 'target practise'.

19. In response to direct questioning by the IMS team, Iraqi officers

stated that they had only 1 'compnay1 of T72s. The size of this
unit was not made clear. Some 35 Iranian M^Os had been sent to
Jordan.

20. DISCUSSION

The most striking fact revealed by this report is the very high
proportion of those tanks classified as damaged which had suffered
from fire or explosion (at least 14 out of 16). In the majority
of cases the tanks had suffered more than 1 penetration and the
chance of fire would therefore be increased in these cases. Two
other causes of fire can be postulated;

3
 a. The tanks were reported to be badly maintained (para 15). If
so it would be reasonable to assume that the liquid level and
pressurization of the charge bins was checked infrequently, if
at all. The effectiveness of charge bins in inhibiting the
spread of propellant fires is markedly reduced if they are
not properly maintained so this factor may have contributed
to the high proportion of vehicle fires.

b. If the report that mines were carried on the CHIEFTAINS (para 17)
is correct then the 5 tanks which reportedly suffered internal
explosion becomes more easily understood. Mine casings are
comparatively thin and fairly easily penetrated by fragments
which could cause the mine to explode. The HESH shell, with
its much thicker casing, is less susceptible to this form of
attack.

21. The description of HEAT strikes is somewhat puzzling. 8 HEAT strikes

were reported (paras 6, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14) but only 4 were considered
to be penetrations. On the basis of the high penetration performance
of HEAT weapons against RHA more penetrations would have been expected.
This may indicate poor warhead constriction resulting in a malformed
jet, or that the holes, examined only from the outside of the vehicle,
were plugged by copper from the tail of the jet and penetration had
in fact occurred.

22. The majority of the KE strikes recorded (8 out of 10) were identified
as FSAPDS. Of these, surprisingly, 3 failed to penetrate. The shot
described (para 6) as being a ricochet from the glacis, lodged in the
turret seems a reasonable explanation. The ricochet from the GPMG
sounds extraordinary, as does the shot which failed to penetrate the
turret front (para 8). The photograph showing this last strike (32/33)
does not look like a typical FS strike. The line of sight armour
thickness at the part of strike is about 250 mm and likely to be
penetrated by any tank gun sized FS round.

23. The evidence, such as it is, supports the view of the IMS staff that the
damage did not occur during battle. The complete absence of crew
casualties and of strikes on the engine compartment and running gear,
the evidence of HEAT and FSAPDS strikes on the same vehicle, the
suggestion that some of the HEAT strikes were from hand-held weapons
and therefore inflicted at very short range, the close proximity of
the FSAPDS strikes to each other all.seem consistent with an ad hoc
trial rather than the more random types of damage resulting from combat.

24. FURTHER COLLECTION OF INFORMATION4

If further opportunities to examine these tanks were made available

there are several items which would repay further effort

a. Examination of the debris inside those tanks which had suffered

an internal explosion. If this was caused by a mine (see para 17)
there should be identifiable fragments of mine casing present.

4
t GQNJTX D E M T IA L U K In Y r n
 b. Examination of the charge bins in the undamaged CHIEFTAINS
should give some indication of their state (eg dry, fluid
filled and/or pressurized) and therefore of the state of
those in the damaged tanks.

c. Accurate location of strike points and direction of attack

for all penetrations. This would enable us to predict
whether a direct strike by the penetrator (shot or jet) on
the ammunition has occurred.

d. Examination of each non penetrating strike for its location

and attack direction, the state of the interior surface and
whether the hole has been plugged either by the jet slug or a
piece of the KE penetrator.

Attempts to resolve these issues by such an examination will generate

other ideas which can be pursued at the time, but which cannot be
identified from the information we have at present.
L
25. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The issue of most immediate concern is the very high proportion of

fires/explosions with CHIEFTAINS attacked by anti-tank weapons.
At present the information is insufficient to explain this result,
but it may prove possible to provide such explanations if a more
detailed examination is possible. Failure to provide an explanation
could lead to an erroneous view being taken of the sensitivity of
CHIEFTAIN to such catastrophic events.

t January 1981

ACP Branch