Name: Dela Cruz, Mary Julieanne DR.

Section: BSLM-3B
AL 313 Case Digests

Chapter 01
Case no: 01
Case Title: Antonio A. Mecano vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982, 11
December, 1992.
Facts:
Antonio A. Mecano has requested for reimbursement for his hospital expenses on the
ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as he is the Director of the NBI, and is under the jurisdiction of the
provision which covers the allowances of govenment employees in case of injury,
death or sickness incurred in performance of duty. It was denied as the RAC was
repealed, which was met with a contention that the repeal was meant for general
provisions in the RAC and it did not affect the said code in its entirety. The request was
approved by the DOJ and forwarded to the COA. The COA remains firm in their
contention that Section 699 has been repealed as it was not restated nor re-enacted in
the RAC. Mecano remains in his argument that Section 699 remains operative despite
the repeal. The COA contends that the provision was revoked upon the enactment of
the repeal of the RAC.

Issue:
Whether or not the repeal of the RAC revoked the operation of Section 699.

Held:
No. The repeal did not revoke or abrogate Section 699 of the RAC. The repeal is a
general repeal for it failed to identify the acts that are intended to be repealed. Implied
repeal can only take effect when there is irreconcilable conflict between the two codes
pre and post repeal. In this case, there is no implied repeal of Section 699 as there has
been no irreconcilable conflict between the two provisions of the said codes. The RAC,
from the opinion of Justice Secretary Drilon, and its repeal covers only aspects of the
government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure. Hence, Section
699 of the RAC remains operative.
Case No: 02
Case Title: Premitivo Leveriza, Fe Leveriza, Parungao & Antonio C. Vaso,
Civil Aeronautics Administration.
Intermediate Appellate Court, Mobil Oil Philippines
G.R. No. L-66614, 25 January 1988

Facts
the Civil Aeronautics Administration,
The case is about a contract of lease between the
Contract A is between Leveriza and
Mobil Oil Philippines and RosarioC. Leveriza.
meters for 25 years.
CAA wherein the parcel of land in question was 4,502 square
over the same parcel of
Contract B was between Leveriza and Mobil Oil Philippines
25 years. Contract C is betweern
the CAA
land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters for
reduced to 3,000 square meters for 25
and Mobil Oil over the same parcel of land, but
years. Without the approval of
the secretary of the PWC. Due to the overlapping
and
contracts between the three parties, the
CAA seeks the rescission of Contract A
been cancelled by the CAA
Contract B, on the ground that both contracts have already
and maintains that Contract C with the CAA
is the only valid and subsisting contract
the object of both contracts. The Leverizas argue
regarding the parcel of land which is declared
contract and that Contract C mist be
that Contract A is the valid and subsisting
void.

Issue without the approval of the then

Whether or not the CAA had the Statutory Authority,
into or cancel a lease contract overa real property
secretary of the PWC, to enter
owned by the State.

Held
in Section 567 of the RAC.
Yes. The Court upheld the CAA's authority as provided
the CAA the authority to enter into a
Under the 3 category, the said provision grants
the legal authority for the CAA to
contract of lease. Sec. 32 of RA 776 also provides
administer real propertiesbelonging to the State.
Case No: 03
Case Title: Luzon Development Bank vs. Association of Luzon Development Bank
Employees, G.R. No. 120319, 09 October 1995

Facts
Attorney Ester S. Garcia received ALDBE's Position Paper, in her capacity as a
Voluntary Arbitrator. On the other hand, LDB failed to submit their Position Paper
despite Garcia, as Voluntary Arbitrator, reminded them to do so. Without said document
from LDB, Garcia has rendered decision that LDB has not adhered to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement upon promotion.
Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by LDB.

Issue:
Whether or not the decision of a Voluntary Arbitrator is appealable to the Supreme
Court on a petition for certiorari and not the Court of Appeals.
Held:
No. A voluntary arbitrator by the nature of their function acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.
It follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law
the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent and apart from the NLRC since
their decisions are not applicable to the latter. A fortiori, the decision of the voluntary
arbitrator should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the
procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the
quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.
Under Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act. No. 7902, provides that
the Court of Appeals shall exercise:

(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements, decisions, resolutions,
orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards orcommissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Employees Compensation Commission, and the Civil Service Commission, except
those failing within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with
the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree N. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1
Case No; 04
and Maria Cristina
Case Title: Iron and Steel Authority vs. The Cout of Appeals
1995
Fertilizer Corporation. G.R. No. 102976, 25 October

Facts:
No. 272 in order to develop and
Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by P.D.
out in
the Philippines. The objectives are spelled
promote the iron and steel industry in
Section 2 of the Statute, stating that:

Sec. 2. Objectives -The Authority shall have the following objectives:

XXX XXX XXX

and low-cost supplies of raw materials

e) to assist the industry in securing adequate
on imports of iron and steel.
and to reduce the excessive dependence of the country
included the following:
The list of powers and functions of the ISA
have the following powers and
Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. -The authority shall
functions:

XXX XXX XXX

for basic iron and steel facilities for

G) to initiate expropriation of land required involved if it is shown that such use of
subsequent resale and/or lease to the companies
construction of capacity which is
the State's power is necessary to implement the
needed for the attainment of the objectives of the Authority;

XXX XXX XXX

owned by the National

The National Steel Corporation (NSC) is in itself an entity wholly
the construction of an
Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing
construction of such steel mill was considered a
integrated steel mill in ligan City. The
Government. Proclamation No. 2239 was
priority and major industrial project of the
land (totaling about 30.25
issued withdrawing from settlement a large tract of public
hectares in area) located in lligan City, and reserving
that land for the use and
land subject matter were
immediate occupancy of NSC. Certain portions of the public
and related facilities owned by
occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation ("MCFC").
NSC to "negotiate with the
Letter of Instruction No. 1277 was issued directing the
owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government,
for the compensation of
MCFC's present occupancy rights on the subject land." Said instrument also directed
of 60 days from
that should NSC and MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a period
the date of the letter of instruction issued, proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of
MCFC relating to the public land as well as the plant itself and related facilities and to
cede the same to the NSC. The said negotiations did fail.
ISA commenced eminent domain proceedings against MCFC in the RTC of ligan City,
praying that the ISA be placed in possession of the property involved upon depositing in
cOurt the amount representing 10% of the declared market values of theproperty. This
was followed with a writ of possession issued by the ISA, who in turn placed the NSC in
possession and control of the land occupied by MCFC. The case proceeded to trial,
during which the statutory existence of the ISA expired on 11 August 1988. MCFC iled
a motion to dismiss, contending that no valid judgement could be rendered as juridical
existence had already ceased, which was met with an opposition from the ISA.

The RTC granted MCFC's motion to dismiss, which was anchored on the provisionof
the Rules of Court stating that "only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized
by law may be parties in a civil case.", which was alongside a non-compliance by the
ISA with the requirements of Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. ISA moved for a
motion for reconsideration, contending that its juridical existence remains until the
winding up of its affairs is concluded. In the alternative, the ISA urged that the State
being the real party-in-interest, should be allowed to be substituted for ISA, which was
referred to in a letter from the Office of the President which especially directed the
Solicitor General to continue the expropriation case. This was denied, which led to the
ISA appealing to the Court of Appeals. But, no such luck as the CA affirmed the RTC's
order of dismissal.

Issue:
Whether or not the State is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of
ISA's term.
Held:
Yes, it is so entitled as it is the real party-in-interest. The NSC and the ISA are merely
representing the State in the sale of the properties, even though NSC and ISA may be
the ultimate users of the said properties involved should the condemnation suit be
eventually successful. Thus, the Court reversed the decisions of the RTC and the CA,
and the case is hereby remanded.
Name:Dela Cruz,Many Julieanne DR
Section BSLM3B

AL313 Case Digests

Case No: 05
Case Title: Isabelo T. Crisostomo vs. The Court of Appeals and The People of the
Philippines. G.R. No. 106296, 05 July, 1996
Facts:
Cnisostomo was the President of the Philippine College of Commerce, where during his
incumbency. two administrative cases were filed against him for illegal use of
govermment vehicles, misappropriation of construction materials belonging to the
college. oppression and harassment. grave misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty. The
case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. Two years
iater, Crisostomo was suspended from office pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
Another twO years passed and then President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. No. 1341
which decdared that PCC be converted into a Polytechnic College. Pursuant to the
provisions of Section 13. R.A. No. 3019, as amended, also known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, and under which the accused has been suspended by this Court
in an Order dated October 22, 1976, said accused was ordered reinstated to the
position of President of the PCC, now known as the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, from which he has been suspended.
By virtue of reinstatement, Crisostomo is entitled to receive the salaries and other
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him. On February 12, 1992,
Crisostomo filed a motion for execution of the judgement with the RTC, particularly the
part ordening his reinstatement to the position of president of the PUP and the payment
of his salaries and other benefits during the period of suspension. The motion was
partially granted, as the position of President of PUP has already been filled by an
appointee of then President Corazon C. Aquino. This led to a contempt citation, and
Crisostomo assumed the office of the president of PUP soon after.
The People of the Philippines filed a petition for review on certiorari and prohibition,
assailing the order and writs of execution of the trial court, as well as a temporary
restraining order. This was decided by the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals
setting aside the orders and writ of reinstatement issued by the trial court. Disallowing
the payment of salaries and benefits that came by virtue of reinstatement. Recover of
salaries and benefits was limited to those accruing from the time of the suspension until
before PCC became PUP.
Crisostomo argues that even though PCC was converted to PUP, it did not abolish the
former, as the declaration explicitly stated the institution be "converted" instead of
abolished, claiming that PUP is the continuation of PCC, hence, he could be reinstated
to his former position as president, salaries and benefits included.
Issue:
Whether or not the conversion of PCC into PUP abolished the eristence ot PCC

Ruling:
NO. In part, the contention is well taken, but, as will presenthy be explained
reinstatement is no longer possible due to the promuigation of PD. 1437 by the
President of the Philippines issued on June 10. 1978. P.D. 1341 did not abolish the
PCC but merely changed it into the PUP. It was a change in acadernic status df the
institution, not in its corporate existence. As Crisostomo correctly points out, when the
purpose is to abolish a department, an office or an organization and to replace it with
another one, the law making authority says so. But the reinstatement of Crisostomo to
his former position as President of said institution, could not be ordered by the court due
to the promulgation of P.D. 1437 which fixes the term of office for state universites and
colleges to six (6) years, renewable for another tem of six (6) years, and authorizing the
President of the Philippines to terminate the terms of incumbernts who were not
reappointed.
Case No: 00
Caso Title: Cosar G. Violn vs. Hon. Rataol M. Alunan I, ot al. O.R. No. 115644,15
August, 1997.

Facts:
Viola, as Barangay Chairman of Brgy. 167, Zone 15, District , Manila, filed a poition
for prohibition challonging the validity of the Art. , Soctions 1-2 of the Revis6d
Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the Goneral Elections of tho Liga ng mga
Barangay Officors insofar as they provide for the election of lirsi, socond and third vice
presidents and for auditors for the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chaplers.

Viola contended that the positions in question are in excoss of thoso provided in the
Local Government Code, Section 493, which mentions as elective positions only those
lor the president, vice president and five (5) mernbers of the board of directors in each
chapter at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan poltical subdivision and national
levels and thus the implemernting rules expand thenurnbers in the LocalGovernment
Code in violation of the principle that implomenting rules and regulations cannot add or
detract Irom the provisions of the law they are designed to implernent.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 1-2 of Implementing Rules are valid.

Ruling:
Yes. The creation of additional positions is authorized by Section 493 of the Local
Government Code which in fact requires-and not merely authorizes, the board of
directors to "create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the management
of the chapter of the chapter". To begin with, the creation of these positions was actually
made in the Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng mga Barangay which was adopted
by the First Barangay National Assembly.
Court
There is no undue delegation of power by Congress in this case. The Supreme
decisions have upheld the validity or reorganization statutes authorizing
the President of
the Philippines to create, abolish or merge offices in the executive management.

While the board of directors of a local chapter can create additional positions to provide
National Liga must be deemed
for the needs of the chapter, the board of directors of the
for its management but also for
to have the power to create additional positions not only
that of all the chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political
subdivision levels. Otherwise the National Liga would be no
different from the local
the power to create positions not only to the
chapters. The fact is that Section 493 grant
at the national level as well.
boards of the local chapters but to the board of the Liga
 ase N 07
Case 7tle Louis "Barok" C, Biraogo the
aR. Na t192935, 07 December, 2010
vs. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.

Facts
a y pestns the valhdity of E.O. No. 1, for being violative of the legislative power of
npress nuder Section 1, ArticNe VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution as it Usurps the
stitutYal authontv of the legislature to create public office and to
appropriate
funds
theretne
The Philpne Truth Commission
(PTC) is a body created by the Office of the President
d usa? only when necassary, with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and
NTupdon ammited by third-level public officers and employees, their
co-principals,
&mpioS and adSSories during the previous administration, and thereafter to
submis its tindings and recommendations to the President, the Congress and the
Ombradsman. Whilke it may be describes as an "independent collegial body", it is
essendaly an entity within the Ottice of the President Proper and subject to his/her
ntrol. The PTC shall have all the powers if an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I ot the Administrative Code of 1987. However, it is not considered as a
qUasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, setle or render awardsin
disputes between contending parties. It is a fact-finding body whose functions are to
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. However, the PTC cannot determine from such
facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
kaw. Needless to say, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or
sanctions.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 01 is Unconstitutional.

Ruling:
YES. An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a
derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of
Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

indeed., legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative., powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are
allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on
their prerogatives as legislators.

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will
sure that any act of government is done
upon a co-equal body but rather simply making
Constitution. And, if
in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the
it has no
after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then,
 not be
under review. therwise, the Court will
more authority of proscribing the actions
deterred to pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional.
Case No: 08
Case Title: Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Boards vs.
Commissioner Fe B. Barin, et al. G.R. No. 150974, 29 June, 2007

Facts:
Section 38 of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act, also known as Republic Act No.
9136, provides for the abolition of the existing Energy Regulatory Board and creation of
the Energy Regulatory Commission. The Kapisanan ng mga Kawani Energy Regulatory
Board asserts that there was no valid abolition of the ERB. Still there was merely a
6656.
reorganization done in bad faith, as expressed in Section 2 of Republic Act No.
The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as
rise
evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of the reorganization, giving
There is a
to a claim for reinstatement of reappointment by an aggrieved party: a)
of the
significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern
another
department or agency concerned, b) Where an office is abolished and
incumbents are
performing substantially the same functions are created, c) Where
and merit,
replaced by those with the less qualified status of appointment, performance,
d) There is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned, and the
The
reclassified offices perform substantially the same function as the original offices, e)
removal violates the order of separation provided in Section three hereof. The Kawni
claims that the present case falls under the situation described n Section 2(b) of
Republic Act No. 6656.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 38 of RA 9136 is a valid abolition of ERB.

Held:
YES. Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9136 is considered a valid abolition of the Energy
and issued
Regulatory Board. A valid abolition order must come from a legitimate body
in good faith, which means it is not made or political or personal reasons, and does not
circumvent civil service employees' constitutional security of tenure. Where one officeis
abolished and replaced with another office vested with similar furnctions, the abolition is
a legal nulity. When there is a void abolition, the incumbent is deemed to have never
ceased holding office.
After comparing the functions of the Energy Regulatory Board and the Energy
the
Regulatory Commission, the Supreme Court found that the latter indeed assumed
the
positions of the former. However, the overlap in the Energy Regulatory Board and
that there is valid abolition
Energy Regulatory Commission functions does not mean no
of the preceding latest agency. The Energy Regulatory Commission expanded functions
intended to meet the specific needs of a deregulated power industry.
Whether a law abolished an office is a question of legislative intent. If there is an explicit
declaration of abolition in the law itself, then it is considered as such. Section 38 of
the
Republic Act No. 9136 explicitly abolished the Energy Regulatory Board. However,
aboition of an office and its related positions is different from removing an incumbent
from his her office. Aboliton and Removal are mutually exclusive concepts. From a
egal standpoint. there is no occupant in an abolished otice. Where there is no
occupant. there is no tenure to speak of. Thus, the impairment of the constitutional
guarantee ot secunty of tenure does not arise in the abolition of an office. On the other
hand, removal implies that the office and its related positions exist and that the
oocupants are merely separated from their positions.
Case No: 09
Case Title: Commission on Human Rights Employees, represented by its
Commission on Human Rights. G.R. No.
President, Marcial A. Sanchez, Jr. vs.

155336, 25 November, 2004.

Facts:
as Republic Act
Congress passed the General Appropriations Act 1998, published
of
to All Constitutional Offices
No. 8522. It provided for Special Provisions applicable
of these provisions, the CHR promulgated
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength and classification scheme among
Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading CHR
virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the
selected positions in the Commission. By
source of funding for
in the body to provide additional
"collapsed" the vacant positions
said staffing and modification.

modification and upgrading scheme

to the DBM with a
The CHR forwarded said staffing Soon after, the
for its approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request.
request recommended to the
a memorandum,
CSC-National Capital Region Office, through
be rejected owing to the DBM's
CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments
reclassification.
disapproval of the plantilla
of the CHR,
of the rank and file employees
The officers of the CHREA in representation recommendation of the CSC-Regional
to affirm the
requested the CSC-Central Office Resolution and reversed
denied CHREA's request in a
Office. The CSC-Central Office scheme be
Office that the upgrading
the recommendation of the CSC-Regional CSC-Central Office denied
censured. CHREA filed a motion
for reconsideration, but the
the same.
of
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the pronouncement
CHREA elevated matter to
and
CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling,
the the
on the justification
that such action is within
reclassification scheme in the CHR
ambit of CHR's fiscal autonomy.

Issue: constitutional bodies clothed with fiscal autonomy.

Whether or not CHR is one of the

Ruling: branch, the

grants fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary
NO. The Constitution explicitly As already settled in the
and the Office of the Ombudsman.
constitutional commissions,
be constitutionally
the creation of the CHR may
assailed decision of the Court, Article IX of the
constitutional commission.
in the strict sense, a
mandated, but it is not,
the Commission on Elections,
Constitution identifies only
the Civil Service Commission, Section
mandate for the creation
for CHR is found in
Commission on Audit. The invoke
and the Thus, the CHR cannot
Xlll of the Constitution, on Human Rights. for its
17 of Article constitutional commissions
the Constitution on
Article IX of
provisions under constitutional and/or statutory
basis, particularly
be able to present extends to the CHR
benefit. It must
The Constitution
to supportits claim of fiscal autonomy.
pertaining
 approved annual
a certain degree of fiscal autonomy through the privilege of having its
from
appropriations released automatically and regularly. However, it withholds
respondent fiscal autonomy, in its broad or extensive sense, as granted to the Judiciary,
Ombudsman.
constitutional commissions, and the Office of the