Gios-Samar vs DOTC

Facts:

 The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and its attached agency, the
Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), posted an Invitation to Bidon the airport
development, operations, and maintenance of the Bacolod-Silay, Davao, Iloilo,
Laguindingan, New Bohol (Panglao), and Puerto Princesa Airports.

 GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., represented by its Chairperson Gerardo M. Malinao (petitioner), suing

as a taxpayer and invoking the transcendental importance of the issue, filed a petition for
prohibition, claiming that the Projects violated the "constitutional prohibitions on the anti-
dummy and the grant of opportunity to the general public to invest in public utilities, citing
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

 According to GIOS-SAMAR, Inc, bundling would allow companies with questionable or

shaky financial background to have direct access to the Projects "by simply joining a
consortium which under the bundling scheme adopted by the DOTC said [P]rojects taken
altogether would definitely be beyond the financial capability of any qualified, single
Filipino corporation. Second, bundling violates the constitutional prohibition on monopolies
under Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution because it would allow one winning bidder
to operate and maintain several airports, thus establishing a monopoly. Third, bundling will
"surely perpetrate an undue restraint of trade."Mid-sized Filipino companies which may have
previously considered participating in one of the six (6) distinct Projects will no longer have
a realistic opportunity to participate in the bidding because the separate projects became two
(2) gargantuan projects. This effectively placed the Projects beyond the reach of medium-
sized Filipino companies.

Held:

 The grant of a concession agreement to an entity, as a winning bidder, for the exclusive
development, operation, and maintenance of any or all of the Projects, does not by
itself create a monopoly violative of the provisions of the Constitution. Jurisprudence teaches
that exclusivity is inherent in the grant of a concession to a private entity to deliver a public
 service, where Government chooses not to undertake such service. Otherwise stated, while
the grant may result in a monopoly, it is a type of monopoly not violative of law.
 In any event, the Constitution provides that the State may, by law, prohibit or regulate
monopolies when the public interest so requires. Petitioner has failed to point to any
provision in the law, which specifically prohibits the bundling of bids
 The allegation that bundling is in grave abuse of discretion is a conclusion of law. No facts
were even alleged to show which specific law was violated by the decision to bundle the
Projects.

 The 1987 Constitution and the Rules of Court promulgated, pursuant to its provisions,
granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over certain cases. In some instances, this
jurisdiction is shared with Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) and the Court of Appeals (CA).
However, litigants do not have unfettered discretion to invoke the Court's original
jurisdiction. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that, direct recourse to this Court is
allowed only to resolve questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or
transcendental importance of the action. This doctrine is not mere policy, rather, it is a
constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable the Court to focus on the more
fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest law of the land.

 In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA in
the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus
(extraordinary writs), direct recourse to this Court is proper only to seek resolution of
questions of law. Save for the single specific instance provided by the Constitution under
Section 18, Article VII, cases the resolution of which depends on the determination of
questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the Court because we are not a trier of
facts. We are not equipped, either by structure or rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the
first instance; these are the primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory agencies. This
is the raison d'etre behind the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It operates as a constitutional
filtering mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus on the more fundamental tasks
assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be brushed aside by an
invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional dimension of the issue or cause
raised.
GREGORIO AMOGUIS TITO AMOGUIS, Petitioners, v. CONCEPCION BALLADO
AND MARY GRACE BALLADO

Facts:

 In 1987, The Ballado Spouses entered into a contract to sell with St. Joseph Realty. However.
St. Joseph realty rescinded the contract and sold the lot to the Amoguis brothers. filed a
Complaint for damages, injunction with writ of preliminary injunction, mandatory injunction,
cancellation and annulment of titles, and attorney's fees against St. Joseph Realty and the
Amoguis Brothers.

 The Amoguis Brothers then filed their Answer with Cross-Claim against St. Joseph Realty,
and Counterclaim against the Ballado Spouses.

 The case was archived in 1989 without prejudice, pending the submission of a settlement by
the parties. Five (5) years later, on April 8, 1994, the case was revived upon motion by the
Ballado Spouses.

 The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the Ballado Spouses, and against St. Joseph Realty
and the Amoguis Brothers. The Regional Trial Court noted that the Ballado Spouses failed to
file a formal offer of evidence. Flowever, this was not detrimental to their case as some of
these documents were admitted by St. Joseph Realty.

 Only the Amoguis Brothers timely filed their appeal brief. Since St. Joseph Realty failed to
file its appeal brief, the Court of Appeals considered it to have abandoned its appeal. The
Amoguis Brothers did not raise the issue of jurisdiction on appeal. The Court of Appeals
ruled, that since neither St. Joseph Realty nor the Amoguis Brothers raised the issue of
jurisdiction before the Regional Trial Court, they must be considered estopped from raising it
on appeal. The Amoguis Brothers filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
by the Court of Appeals in its August 7, 2009 Resolution.

 The Amoguis Brothers filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, finally raising the issue of jurisdiction.

Issue

1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court's lack of jurisdiction was lost by waiver or
estoppel;
Held:

 The unique circumstances in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy are present in this case. The Regional
Trial Court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint. However,
under the doctrine in Tijam, petitioners cannot now raise lack of jurisdiction as they have
waived their right to do so. Estoppel by laches has set in. Petitioners did not question the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court during trial and on appeal. It is only before this
Court, 22 long years after the Complaint was filed, that petitioners raised the Regional Trial
Court's lack of jurisdiction.

 Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a complaint is conferred by law. It cannot be lost
through waiver or estoppel. It can be raised at any time in the proceedings, whether during
trial or on appeal. The edict in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is not an exception to the rule on
jurisdiction.

 A court that does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case will not acquire
jurisdiction because of estoppel. Rather, the edict in Tijam must be appreciated as a waiver of
a party's right to raise jurisdiction based on the doctrine of equity. It is only when the
circumstances in Tijam are present that a waiver or an estoppel in questioning jurisdiction is
appreciated.

 Tijam applies to a party claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction when:

(1) there was a statutory right in favor of the claimant;

(2) the statutory right was not invoked;
(3) an unreasonable length of time lapsed before the claimant raised the issue of jurisdiction;
(4) the claimant actively participated in the case and sought affirmative relief from the court
without jurisdiction;
(5) the claimant knew or had constructive knowledge of which forum possesses subject matter
jurisdiction;
(6) irreparable damage will be caused to the other party who relied on the forum and the
claimant's implicit waiver.
 Tijam applies in this case. The allegations, determinative of subject matter jurisdiction, were
apparent on the face of the Complaint. The law that determines jurisdiction of the National
Housing Authority had been in place for more than a decade when the Complaint was filed.
St. Joseph Realty raised lack of jurisdiction in its Answer. Petitioners sought affirmative
relief from the Regional Trial Court and actively participated in all stages of the proceedings.
Therefore, there was no valid reason for petitioners to raise the issue of jurisdiction only now
before this Court.

Side Issues:

1. The Amoguis Brothers claim that the evidence presented by the Ballado Spouses should
not have been considered as it was not formally offered. The Amoguis Brothers argue
that it was unfair to fault them for not objecting when the former's counsel started his
direct examination without offering the purpose of the witnesses' testimonies. Had they
done so, it would alert the Ballado Spouses' counsel of the defect.

Held :

 All evidence must be formally offered. Otherwise, the court cannot consider them. However,
testimonial evidence not formally offered but not timely objected to by an opposing party
may be still be considered by the court. The purpose of offering a witness' testimony is for
the court to expertly assess whether questions propounded are relevant and material, and if
the witness is competent to answer.
 Under the rules, a timely objection is a remedy available to the Amoguis Brothers. They
waived their right to this remedy when they waited until the case was submitted for
resolution to do so.
 As to the Ballado Spouses' documentary evidence, the Court of Appeals was correct to
consider only the contracts to sell. These were the only documents attached to the written
formal offer of evidence that they filed. Hence, these documents should be considered as the
only documentary evidence formally offered. When a party fails to formally offer his or her
documentary or object evidence within a considerable period after the presentation of
witnesses, he or she is deemed to have waived the opportunity to do so.
Rappler Inc vs Bautista

Facts:

 Petitioner Rappler, Inc. (petitioner) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against
Andres D. Bautista (respondent), in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). The petition seeks to nullify Part VI (C), paragraph 19 and Part VI (D),
paragraph 20 of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on the 2016 presidential and vice-
presidential debates, for being executed without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and for violating the
fundamental rights of petitioner protected under the Constitution.
 The MOA, signed on 13 January 2016, was executed by the COMELEC through its Chairman,
respondent Bautista, and the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), and the
various media networks, namely: ABS-CBN Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., Nine Media
Corporation, TV5 Network, Inc., Philstar Daily, Inc., Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc., Manila
Bulletin Publishing Corporation, Philippine Business Daily Mirror Publishing, Inc., and
petitioner. Under the MOA, the KBP was designated as Debate Coordinator while ABS-CBN,
GMA, Nine Media, and TV5, together with their respective print media partners were
designated as Lead Networks.

 Subsequently, Rappler alleged that it is being discriminated as regards the MOA provisions on
live audio broadcast via online streaming. It argues that the MOA grants radio stations the
right to simultaneously broadcast live the audio of the debates, even if the radio stations are
not obliged to perform any obligation under the MOA. Yet, this right to broadcast by live
streaming online the audio of the debates is denied Rappler and other online media entities,
which also have the capacity to live stream the audio of the debates. Rapplerr insists that it
signed the MOA believing in good faith the issues it has raised will be resolved by the
COMELEC. Rappler demand to exercise the right to live stream the debates, as a contractual
right of petitioner under the MOA.

Held:

demand to exercise the right to live stream the debates is a contractual right of petitioner under
the MOA. Under Part VI (C), paragraph 19 of the MOA, the Lead Networks are expressly
mandated to "allow the debates they have produced to be shown or streamed on other
websites," but "subject to copyright conditions or separate negotiations with the Lead
Networks." The use of the word "or" means that compliance with the "copyright conditions" is
sufficient for petitioner to exercise its right to live stream the debates in its website.

The "copyright conditions" refer to the limitations on copyright as provided under Section
184.1(c) of the Intellectual Property Code (IPC), thus:

SEC. 184. Limitations on Copyright. - 184.1 Notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter V, the
following acts shall not constitute infringement of copyright:
x x x x

(c) The reproduction or communication to the public by mass media of articles on current
political, social, economic, scientific or religious topic, lectures, addresses and other works of
the same nature, which are delivered in public if such use is for information purposes
and has not been expressly reserved; Provided, That the source is clearly indicated ;
(Sec. 11, P.D. No. 49) (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

 Under this provision, the debates fall under "addresses and other works of the same nature." Thus,
the copyright conditions for the debates are: (1) the reproduction or communication to the public by
mass media of the debates is for information purposes; (2) the debates have not been expressly
reserved by the Lead Networks (copyright holders); and (3) the source is clearly indicated.

 Once the conditions imposed under Section 184.1(c) of the IPC are complied with,
the information - in this case the live audio of the debates -now forms part of the
public domain. There is now freedom of the press to report or publicly disseminate
the live audio of the debates.
Ramones vs Guimoc

Facts

 Petitioner Ramones claims she was defrauded by Respondent Guimoc. An information for Estafa
was then filed against Respondent Guimoc before the MTC. After the said Information was filed
the MTC Clerk of Court wrote a letter to petitioner Ramones requiring her to pay the amount of
₱500.00 as docket fees. After petitioner's payment thereof, a certification was later issued by the
MTC Clerk of Court reflecting the same. The MTC subsequently declared that Respondent
Guimoc is gulty of Estafa, sentencing Guimoc to imprisonment and awarding damages to
Ramones.

 Respondents Guimoc appealed before the RTC and argued that the MTC did not acquire
jurisdiction to award damages in favor of petitioner Ramones, for failure of the latter to pay the
correct amount of docket fees pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 35- 200 4
(SC Circular No. 35-2004), which provides that the filing fees must be paid for money claims
in estafa cases. Respondent Guimoc claimed that due to petitioner Ramones’ failure to make an
express reservation to separately institute a civil action, her payment of filing fees in the amount
of ₱500.00 was deficient. The damages sought was worth ₱663,000.00; thus, the correct filing
fees should have allegedly been around ₱9,960.00. The RTC affirmed the MTC but the CA
reversed, deleting the award of damages in favor of Petitioner Ramones.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA correctly deleted the award of damages.

Held: No, the CA erred in deleting the damages.

 Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in these
Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

 Among these exceptions, Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, states that the payment of filing fees is required in estafa cases
under the following conditions:
 SEC. 21. Other fees. - The following fees shall also be collected by the clerks of court of
the regional trial courts or courts of the first level, as the case may be:

(a) In estafa cases where the offended party fails to manifest within fifteen (15) days
following the filing of the information that the civil liability arising from the crime has
been or would be separately prosecuted, or in violations of BP No. 22 if the amount
involved is

 In the 1987 case of Manchester Development Corporation v. CA (Manchester),37 the Court laid
down the general rule that "[a court] acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fee." Subsequent decisions now uniformly hold however, that "when
insufficient filing fees are initially paid by the plaintiffs and there is no intention to defraud the
government, the Manchester rule does not apply.

 In line with this legal paradigm, prevailing case law now demonstrates that "[t]he non-payment
of the prescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading
fails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the trial court. Yet, where the plaintiff has paid the
amount of filing fees assessed by the clerk of court, and the amount paid turns out to be
deficient, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction over the case, subject to the payment by the
plaintiff of the deficiency assessment." "The reason is that to penalize the party for the omission
of the clerk of court is not fair if the party has acted. in good faith."

 In this case, it is undisputed that the amount of ₱500.00 paid by petitioner was insufficient to
cover the required filing fees for her estafa case under the premises of Section 21, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. Nonetheless, it is equally undisputed that
she paid the full amount of docket fees as assessed by the Clerk of Court of the MTC, which is
evidenced by a certification dated April 11, 2016 issued therefor. In addition, petitioner
consistently manifested her willingness to pay additional docket fees when required. applying the
principles above-discussed, the Court holds that the court a quo properly acquired jurisdiction
over the case. However, petitioner should pay the deficiency that shall be considered as a lien on
the monetary awards in her favor pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,

 Besides, the Court observes that if respondents believed that the assessment of filing fees was
incorrect, then it was incumbent upon them to have raised the same before the MTC. Instead,
contrary to the CA's assertion, records show that respondents actively participated in the
proceedings before the MTC and belatedly questioned the alleged underpayment of docket fees
only for the first time on appeal before the RTC, or five (5) years later after the institution of the
instant case. The Court is aware that lack of jurisdiction, as a ground to dismiss a complaint, may,
as a general rule, be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, in United Overseas Bank,
the Court has observed that the same is subject to the doctrine of estoppel by laches, which
squarely applies here.
Padlan vs Dinglasan

Facts:

 Respondent Dinglasan filed a case against Petitioner Padlan before the RTC, for the Cancellation
of Transfer Certificate of Title but the RTC dismissed the case.

 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. Petitioner Padlan then sought
reconsideration, arguing among others, that failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case because the value of the property is only 4,000 pesos.

 The CA issued a Resolution denying the motion. The CA concluded that the rationale for the
exception made in the landmark case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy was present in the case. It
reasoned that when the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction, petitioner neither moved for a reconsideration of the order nor did she avail of any
remedy provided by the Rules. Instead, she kept silent and only became interested in the case
again when the CA rendered a decision adverse to her claim.

Issue: W/N the RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.

Held:

 Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.

 The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined
based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments
in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
 Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

 An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiff's cause of action is based on a
claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive control,
possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same. Title is the "legal link between (1) a person
who owns property and (2) the property itself." "Title" is different from a "certificate of title"
which is the document of ownership under the Torrens system of registration issued by the
government through the Register of Deeds. While title is the claim, right or interest in real
property, a certificate of title is the evidence of such claim.
 The case filed by respondent is not simply a case for the cancellation of a particular certificate of
title and the revival of another. The determination of such issue merely follows after a court of
competent jurisdiction shall have first resolved the matter of who between the conflicting parties
is the lawful owner of the subject property and ultimately entitled to its possession and
enjoyment. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of these parties is the lawful owner
of the subject lot, jurisdiction over which is determined by the assessed value of such lot.

 The Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property
subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the
action. In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in
the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of ₱4,000.00. No tax
declaration was even presented that would show the valuation of the subject property.

 To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it
should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property
subject thereof. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is
only ₱4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all
proceedings in the RTC are null and void.
Surviving Heirs of Bautista vs Lindo

Facts:

 Bautista (Bautista), petitioner’s predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-patent land. A few

years later, he subdivided the property and sold it to several vendees, herein
respondentsThree years after the sale, or on August 5, 1994, Bautista filed a complaint for
repurchase against respondents before the RTC, anchoring his cause of action on Section
119 of Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 141, otherwise known as the "Public Land Act

 The RTC issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court
found that Bautista failed to allege in his complaint that the value of the subject property
exceeds 20 thousand pesos. Furthermore, what was only stated therein was that the total
and full refund of the purchase price of the property is PhP 16,500. This omission was
considered by the RTC as fatal to the case considering that in real actions, jurisdictional
amount is determinative of whether it is the municipal trial court or the RTC that has
jurisdiction over the case. The petitioners then filed a Rule 45 petition before the Supreme
Court.

Issue:

Whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession of real property or any
interest therein or one incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Held:

 The course of action embodied in the complaint by the present petitioners’ predecessor,
Alfredo R. Bautista, is to enforce his right to repurchase the lots he formerly owned pursuant
to the right of a free-patent holder under Sec. 119 of CA 141 or the Public Land Act.

 The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action
incapable of pecuniary estimation, since an action to redeem the land is essentially one for
specific performance. The facts are clear that Bautista sold to respondents his lots which
were covered by a free patent. The sale is subject to repurchase within a period of five (5)
years from the date of conveyance pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141. Bautista filed a
complaint to enforce this right granted by law. Ergo, it is clear that his action is for specific
performance, or if not strictly such action, then it is akin or analogous to one of specific
 performance. Such being the case, his action for specific performance is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.

 It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought.

 In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim." But where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These cases are
cognizable exclusively by RTCs.

 Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation, viz:

1. Actions for specific performance;

2. Actions for support which will require the determination of the civil status;

3. The right to support of the plaintiff;

4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts;

5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts; 13

6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation.

 At first blush, it appears that the action filed by Bautista involves title to or possession of the
lots he sold to respondents. Since the total selling price is less than PhP 20,000, then the
MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over the case. This proposition is incorrect for the re-
acquisition of the lots by Bautista or herein successors-in-interests, the present petitioners, is
but incidental to and an offshoot of the exercise of the right by the latter to redeem said lots
pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141. The reconveyance of the title to petitioners is solely
dependent on the exercise of such right to repurchase the lots in question and is not the
principal or main relief or remedy sought. Thus, the action of petitioners is, in reality,
incapable of pecuniary estimation, and the reconveyance of the lot is merely the outcome of
the performance of the obligation to return the property conformably to the express provision
of CA 141.
Spouses Erorita vs Spouses Dumlao

Facts :

 In 2002, the Respondents Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of possession before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against the Petitioners Spouses Erorita. The RTC ruled in favor of
Dumlao.
 On appeal, the Spouses Erorita argued that the complaint patently shows a case for unlawful
detainer. Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Nonetheless, The
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, stating that this case involves an action for possession of
real property and not unlawful detainer.

Issue: W/N The RTC has jurisdiction

Held:

 The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and jurisdiction over the case.
Jurisdiction does not depend on the complaint’s caption. Nor is jurisdiction changed by the
defenses in the answer; otherwise, the defendant may easily delay a case by raising other issues,
then, claim lack of jurisdiction.

 To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a) initially, the defendant
lawfully possessed the property, either by contract or by plaintiff’s tolerance; (b) the plaintiff
notified the defendant that his right of possession is terminated; (c) the defendant remained in
possession and deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a complaint within
one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property. A complaint for accion
publiciana or recovery of possession of real property will not be considered as an action for
unlawful detainer if any of these special jurisdictional facts is omitted.

 Although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its allegations contain the
jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under RA 7691, an action for unlawful detainer
is within the MTC’s exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the property’s assessed value.
 The CA incorrectly applied the case ruling in Barbosa. In that case, the complaint did not state
that (i) possession was unlawfully withheld and (ii) the complaint was filed within a year from
the last demand. Because these special jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case were
lacking, we held that the case should be accion publiciana over which the RTC has jurisdiction.
In the present case, however, the complaint clearly contained the elements of an unlawful
detainer case. Thus, the case should have been filed with the MTC. The RTC had no
jurisdiction over this case.

 As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, or even
for the first time on appeal. An exception to this rule is the principle of estoppel by laches.

 Estoppel by laches may only be invoked to bar the defense of lack of jurisdiction if the factual
milieu is analogous to Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. In that case, lack of jurisdiction was raised for the
first time after almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered and after
the movant actively participated in several stages of the proceedings. It was only invoked, too,
after the CA rendered a decision adverse to the movant.

 In Figueroa v. People, we ruled that the failure to assail jurisdiction during trial is not
sufficient for estoppel by laches to apply. When lack of jurisdiction is raised before the
appellate court, no considerable length of time had elapsed for laches to apply. Laches
refers to the "negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it."

 The factual setting of this present case is not similar to Tijam so as to trigger the
application of the estoppel by laches doctrine. As in Figueroa, the present petitioners
assailed the RTC’s jurisdiction in their appeal before the CA. Asserting lack of
jurisdiction on appeal before the CA does not constitute laches. Furthermore, the filing of
an answer and the failure to attend the pre-trial do not constitute the active participation
in judicial proceedings contemplated in Tijam.

 Thus, the general rule should apply. The petitioners timely questioned the RTC's
jurisdiction.
Foronda-Crystal vs Lawas Son

Facts :

 Aniana Lawas Son (respondent) instituted an action for reconveyance and damages against
Glynna Foronda-Crystal (petitioner) alleging that she is the lawful owner and possessor of a
certain lot. She alleged that she purchased the same from a certain seller on August 4, 1986 for a
sum of P200,000.00. According to her, since her acquisition, she has been religiously paying real
property taxes thereon as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 16408A, which was issued under her
name.

 Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, but the RTC stated
it has jurisdiction since the Complaint stated that the property was worth P200,000.00 and that
the RTC has judicial knowledge that the BIR zonal valuation carries the value that may be
summed up to more than P20,000.00 for the property with an area of 1,570 square meters. The
RTC then rendered a decision in favor of the Respondent, which the CA affirmed.

Issue: W/N The RTC has jurisdiction

Held:

 Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. In
order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits,
it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction
over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of
any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists.
  The law is emphatic that in determining which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value
of the realty involved that should be computed.

 To determine the assessed value, which would in turn determine the court with appropriate
jurisdiction, an examination of the allegations in the complaint is necessary. It is a hornbook
doctrine that the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine
whether a suit is within its jurisdiction. only these facts can be the basis of the court's competence
to take cognizance of a case, and that one cannot advert to anything not set forth in the complaint,
such as evidence adduced at the trial, to determine the nature of the action thereby initiated.

 A failure to allege the assessed value of a real property in the complaint would result to a
dismissal of the case. This is because absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value
of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. Indeed, the courts cannot take judicial notice of the
assessed or market value of the land.

 The rule on determining the assessed value of a real property, insofar as the identification of the
jurisdiction of the first and second level courts is concerned, would be two-tiered:

First, the general rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the real property as
alleged in the complaint; and

Second, the rule would be liberally applied if the assessed value of the property, while not alleged in the
complaint, could still be identified through a facial examination of the documents already attached to the
complaint.

 Rule 141 of the Rules of Court concerns the amount of the prescribed filing and docket fees, the
payment of which bestows upon the courts the jurisdiction to entertain the pleadings to be
filed. Rule 141 provision already deleted the phrase "estimated value thereof," such that the
determination of the amount of prescribed filing and docket fees are now based on the following:
(a) the fair market value of the real property in litigation stated in the current tax declaration or
current zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; or (b) the stated value of the real or
personal property in litigation as alleged by the claimant.

 The respondent failed to allege in her complaint the assessed value of the subject property.
Rather, what she included therein was an allegation of its market value amounting to
P200,000.00. In the course of the trial, the petitioner asserted that the assessed value of the
property as stated in the tax declaration was merely P1,030.00, and therefore the RTC lacked
jurisdiction.
 Even a liberal interpretation of this law, as opined by the Court in Tumpag vs Tumpag, would
necessitate an examination of the documents annexed to the complaint. In this instance, the
complaint referred to Tax Declaration No. 16408A, attached therein as Annex "B," which
naturally would contain the assessed value of the property. A perusal thereof would reveal that
the property was valued at P2,826.00.On this basis, it is clear that it is the MTC, and not the RTC,
that has jurisdiction over the case. The RTC should have dismissed the case.