1

TEAM 5
V.R. KRISHNAN EZHUTHACHAN LAW COLLEGE, ELEVENCHERY
9TH SEMESTER INTRA-CLASS MOOT COURT

IN THE HON’BLE COURT OF V.R. KRISHNAN

EZHUTHACHAN LAW COLLEGE, ELEVENCHERY

UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDUS

ZARA AHMAD……………………………………….………………PETITIONER
V.
UNIVERSITY OF AMAGDHA………………..………………RESPONDENT

SUBMITTED BY,
NAYAN KRISHNA .P
ROLL NO. LVATLBA036 BBA, LL.B (HONS.)(2019-24)
BALAJITH .S
ROLL NO. LVATLBA019 BBA, LL.B (HONS.) (2019-24)

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVATIONS.................................................................... 3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................. 4

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ....................................................... 7

STATEMENT OF FACTS …………………………………………….. 8

ISSUED RAISED……………………………………………………… 9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ……………………………………… 10

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ………………………………………… 11

PRAYER……………………………………………………………… 19

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

 3

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIR All India Reporter

Art. Article

Anr. Another

HC High Court

Hon'ble Honorable

i.e, That is

Ors. Others

SC Supreme Court

V. Versus

U.O.I Union of India

Ltd. Limited

DDR Department
Development
Vol. Volume

P Paragraph

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

 4

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES REFERRED

1. NIVEDITA SHARMA V. CELLULAR OPERATORS ASSN. OF INDIA (2011) 14 SCC 337

2. MUTHUSAMI V K. NATARAJAN (1988) 1 SCC 572

3. RAJASTHAN SRTC V KRISHNA KANT (1995) 5 SCC 75;

4. KERALA SEB V KURIEN E. KALATHIL (2000) 6 SCC 293; A.

5. VENKATASUBBIAH NAIDU V S. CHELLAPPAN (2000) 7 SCC 695

6. THANSINGH NATHMAL V SUPT. OF TAXES

7. SHRI SANT SADGURU JANARDAN SWAMI (MOINGIRI MAHARAJ) SAHAKARI DUGDHA

8. UTPADAK SANSTHA V STATE OF STE OF A.P (2001) 8 SCC 509

9. L.L. SUDHAKAR REDDY V STATE OF A.P (2001)6 SCC 634; PRATAP SINGH V STATE OF HARYANA
(2002) 7 SCC 484

10. JCIT & ORS V KALANITHI MARAN & A NR WRIT APPEAL NO. 347 OF 2014

11. SHAYARA BANO VS. UNION OF INDIA [(2017) 9 SCC 1]

12. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND OTHERS V. ACHARYA JAGADISHWARANANDA

AVADHUTA AND ANOTHER 1983 4 SCC 522

13. INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION AND OTHERS PETITIONER(S) V. THE STATE OF
KERALA AND OTHERS (S).

14. COMMISSIONER HINDU RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS MADRAS VS. SRI LAKSHMINDRA THIRTHA
SWAMIAR OF SRI SHIRUR MUTT AIR 1954 SC 282

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

 5

15. DURGAH COMMITTEE, AJMER VS. SYED HUSSAIN ALI, AIR 1961 SC 1402

16. M. ISMAIL FARUQUI VS. UNION OF INDIA (1994) SCC 360

17. AS. NARAYANA DEEKSHITULU VS. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, (1996) 9 SCC 611

18. JAVED VS. STATE OF HARYANA (2003) 8 SCC 369

19. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE VS. ACHARYA JAGADISHWARANANDA AVADHUTA (2004) 12 SCC 770

20. AJMAL KHAN VS. THE ELECTION COMMISSION 2006 SCC ONLINE MAD 794

21. SHARAYA BANO

22. INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION AND OTHERS PETITIONER(S) V. THE STATE OF
KERALA AND OTHERS (S)

23. KANTARU RAJEEVARU (SABARIMALA TEMPLE REVIEW-5J.) V. INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS

24. ASSOCIATION & ORS.11

25. A.K GOPALAN V. STATE OF MADRAS CASE AIR 1950 SC 27

26. MANEKA GANDHI V UNION OF INDIA AIR 1978 SC 597; (1978) 1 SCC 248

27. SAKAL PAPERS V. UNION OF INDIA AND BENNETT COLEMAN V. UNION OF INDIA

28. CHINTAMAN RAO V STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH; MOHD. FARUK V STATE

OF MADHYA PRADESH AIR 1951 SC 118

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

 6

BOOKS REFERRED

1. Dr. J.N PANDEY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA

2. DURGA DAS BASU INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

3. V N SHUKLA’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA

4. DR KAILASH RAI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA

5. MP JAIN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA

WEBSITES REFERRED

1. www.indiakanoon.org

2. www.livelaw.in

3. Blog.ipleaders.in

4. Legal.un.org

5. Scc.online

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

 7

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The respondents have approached the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka under Article 226 of
the Constitution1.

1
226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs
i. Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories
in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in
appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories’ directions, orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of
them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose
ii. The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority
or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories
within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power,
notwithstanding that the seat of such Government o authority or the residence of such person is not
within those territories
iii. Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other
manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without
a. Furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of
the plea for such interim order; and
b. Giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the
High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such
application to the party in whose favor such order has been made or the
counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a
period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on
which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where
the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the
next day afterwards on which the High Court is open ;and if the application is
not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as
the case may be , the expiry of the aid next day, stand vacated
iv. The power conferred on a High Court by this Article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred
on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
 8

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The REPUBLIC OF INDUS is a sovereign country, having its own sovereign government. It is governed by its
Constitution adopted in the year 1949 and its laws prevailing for the time being in force. UNIVERSITY OF AMAGDHA
is one of the prestigious universities in the state of Karnataka formed under UNIVERSITY OF AMAGDHA ACT, 1990.
The university issued an official order on 25th January 2022 that “All students are required to strictly adhere to the
uniform prescribed by each Department Development Committee. If the department has not fixed a dress code, clothes
that do not threaten equality, unity and public order must be worn.” The students expressed that the said order violates
fundamental rights and constitutional values. On 28th January 2022 the administration interdicted ten female students
belonging to a particular community to enter classes wearing religious or customary outfits along with the prescribed
uniforms. The university justified their action by stating that aforementioned order does not permit students to wear any
religious or customary outfits while attending classes. The students responded to the action of university by holding press
conference. It gained national importance. Miss. Zara Ahmad, a student who was aggrieved by the action of
UNIVERSITY OF AMAGDHA filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Hon’ble High Court
of Karnataka on 15th February 2022

note - The Laws of Indus are pari materia with the Laws of India.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

 9

ISSUES RAISED

I. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?

II. WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL CAN WEAR RELIGIOUS OR CUSTOMARY OUTFITS IN PUBLIC PLACES?

III. WHETHER THE UNIVERSITY ORDER IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID OR NOT?

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

 10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

i. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble apex court that the writ petition is not Maintainable In the present case under
Article 226 of the constitution of Indus because , has been no violation of the fundamental rights and there is another
statutory redressal mechanism as well.

ii. WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL CAN WEAR RELIGIOUS OR CUSTOMARY OUTFITS IN PUBLIC

PLACES

It is humbly contended that the freedom which is guaranteed by the constitution is not absolute and hence they are
susceptible to reasonable restrictions and regulations by law . Wearing hijab is not a part of essential religious practice in
the Islamic faith protected under Article 25 of the constitution. The state can regulate the exercise of fundamental freedom
subject to equality, justice and public order and there is a power to prescribe dress code in educational institutions.

iii. WHETHER THE UNIVERSITY ORDER IS CONSTITUIONALLY VALID OR NOT

It is humbly submitted that the directions issued by the university is not violating any provisions of the constitution of
Indus . The exercise of freedom of Religion is subjected to state restrictions and there is no place for religious sentiments
in institutions.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

 11

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the writ petition is not maintainable .No such circumstances had
arisen which would invoke Art. 226 of Constitution. There is another statutory redressal mechanism as well.

1.1. THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

The Department Development Committee based on reason to promote equality and unity provided an order to make
uniformity in dress code which is as per procedure and well within the committee’s jurisdiction. An earlier judicial
decision of an Apex Court contends that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the
statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction for relief2. The Apex Court has adverted to the rule of self-imposed
restraint that the writ petition will not be entertained if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and
observed3:
“The HC does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and
does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining
for relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for
obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition
under Art. 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party
applying to it to seek resort to the machinery to set up.”

1.2. THERE IS ANOTHER STATUTORY REDRESSAL MECHANISM

It is humbly contended before the Hon’ble Court that the instant writ petition filed by the University of Amagdha
(Hereinafter referred to as “the petitioner”) is not maintainable. It is submitted that redressal mechanism has been
provided under the statute when a student is aggrieved by order of university. The Petitioner has not followed statutory
redressal mechanism and has challenged the order at the immature stage. The Petitioner has wrongly invoked the
jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of Indus,1949.
The prescribed dress code was made by the Department Development Committee in accordance with the authority
derived from the UNIVERSITY OF AMAGDHA ACT, 1990. The Department Development Committee has followed due
procedure by issuing a notice to the petitioner communicating the reason to wear dress that do not threaten equality, unity
and public order. It is contended that a proper statutory redressal mechanism is available to the Petitioner which is to ask
for reasons, file objections and then receive and order of Department Development Committee disposing off her
objections. It is contended that a writ in exercise of the power under Art. 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and

2
Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Assn. Of India (2011) 14 SCC 337; S.T. Muthusami v K. Natarajan (1988) 1
SCC 572; Rajasthan SRTC V Krishna Kant (1995) 5 SCC 75; Kerala SEB V Kurien E. Kalathil (2000) 6 SCC 293; A.
Venkatasubbiah Naidu v S. Chellappan (2000) 7 SCC 695
3
Thansingh Nathmal v Supt. Of Taxes; Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha
Utpadak Sanstha v State of Ste of A.P (2001) 8 SCC 509; L.L. Sudhakar Reddy v State of A.P (2001)6 SCC 634; Pratap
Singh v State of Haryana (2002) 7 SCC 484
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
 12

extraordinary, that too, when a complete mechanism for efficacious remedy is provided under the statute, more so, a fiscal
one4.
II. WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL CAN WEAR RELIGIOUS OR CUSTOMARY OUTFITS IN PUBLIC
PLACES?

whatever rights petitioners claim under Article 25 of the Constitution, are not absolute. They are susceptible to reasonable
restriction and regulation by law.

2.1 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IS NOT ABSOLUTE

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that drawing the jurisprudence ideology “power corrupts and absolute
power corrupts absolutely”, the Indus Constitution has subjected to the enjoyment of religious freedom subject to public
order. Hence gives power to state for interfering in the personal law when it vitiates development 5. The Constitution
guarantees the right to religious freedoms only to the extent it does not harm public policy. The right to religion under
Article 26 is subject to certain limitations and not absolute and unfettered. If any religious practice is in contravention to
any public order, morality or health then such religious practice cannot claim the protection of the state.

2.2 WEARING HIJAB IS NOT A PART OF ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE IN THE ISLAMIC FAITH
PROTECTED UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION

Since the question of hijab being a part of essential religious practice is the bone of contention, it becomes necessary to
briefly state as to what is an essential religious practice in Indian context and how it is to be ascertained. This doctrine can
plausibly be traced to the Chief Architect of our Constitution, Dr. B.R.Ambedkar and to his famous statement in the
Constituent Assembly during debates on the Codification of Hindu Law: “the religious conception in this country are so
vast that they cover every aspect of life from birth to death…there is nothing extraordinary in saying that we ought to
strive hereafter to limit the definition of religion in such a manner that we shall not extend it beyond beliefs and such
rituals as may be connected with ceremonials which are essentially religious…” [Constituent Assembly Debates VII: 781].
In ACHARYA JAGADISHWARANANDA AVADHUTA6, supra, it has been observed at paragraph 9 as under:
“The protection guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is not confined to matters of doctrine or belief
but extends to acts done in pursuance of religion and, therefore, contains a guarantee for rituals, observances, ceremonies
and modes of worship which are essential or integral part of religion. What constitutes an integral or essential part of
religion has to be determined with reference to its doctrines, practices, tenets, historical background, etc. of the given
religion… What is meant by “an essential part or practices of a religion” is now the matter for elucidation. Essential part
of a religion means the core beliefs upon which a religion is founded. Essential practice means those practices that are
fundamental to follow a religious belief. It is upon the cornerstone of essential parts or practices that the superstructure of
a religion is built, without which a religion will be no religion. Test to determine whether a part or practice is essential to
a religion is to find out whether the nature of the religion will be changed without that part or practice. If the taking away

4
JCIT & Ors V Kalanithi Maran & A nr Writ Appeal No. 347 of 2014
5
Shayara Bano vs. Union of India [(2017) 9 SCC 1]
6
Commissioner of police and others v. Acharya jagadishwarananda avadhuta and another 1983 4 SCC 522
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
 13

of that part or practice could result in a fundamental change in the character of that religion or in its belief, then such
part could be treated as an essential or integral part. There cannot be additions or subtractions to such part because it is
the very essence of that religion and alterations will change its fundamental character. It is such permanent essential
parts which are protected by the Constitution. Nobody can say that an essential part or practice of one's religion has
changed from a particular date or by an event. Such alterable parts or practices are definitely not the “core” of religion
whereupon the belief is based and religion is founded upon. They could only be treated as mere embellishments to the
non-essential (sic essential) part or practices.”

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION7 surveyed the development of law relating to essential religious practice and
the extent of its constitutional patronage consistent with the long standing view. Ordinarily, a religious practice in order to
be called an ‘essential religious practice’ should have the following indicia:
(i) Not every activity associated with the religion is essential to such religion. Practice should be fundamental to religion
and it should be from the time immemorial.
(ii) Foundation of the practice must precede the religion itself or should be co-founded at the origin of the religion.
(iii) Such practice must form the cornerstone of religion itself. If that practice is not observed or followed, it would result
in the change of religion itself and,
(iv) Such practice must be binding nature of the religion itself and it must be compelling. That a practice claimed to be
essential to the religion has been carried on since time immemorial or is grounded in religious texts per se does not lend to
it the constitutional protection unless it passes the test of essentiality as is adjudged by the Courts in their role as the
guardians of the Constitution.
Since ages, India is a secular country. For India, there is no official religion, inasmuch as it is not a theocratic State. The
State does not extend patronage to any particular religion and thus, it maintains neutrality in the sense that it does not
discriminate against anyone on the basis of religious identities per se. Essential Religious Practices should associate with
Constitutional values. The person seeking refuge under the umbrella of Article 25 of the Constitution has to demonstrate
not only essential religious practice but also its engagement with the constitutional values. Holy Quran does not mandate
the wearing of a Hijab or Headgear for Muslim women. “…at the most is a means to gain access to public places and not a
religious end in itself. It was a measure of women enablement and not a figurative constraint.” What is not religiously
made obligatory therefore cannot be made a quintessential aspect of the religion through public agitations or by the
passionate arguments in courts. It is not that if the alleged practice of wearing hijab is not adhered to, those not wearing
hijab become the sinners, Islam loses its glory and it ceases to be a religion. Therefore, wearing of hijab by Muslim
Women does not form a part of essential religious practice in Islamic faith.
Hence, wearing hijab or head scarf is not a part of ‘essential religious practice’ of Islamic faith; the Holy Quran does not
contain any such injunctions; the Apex Court has laid down the principles for determining what is an ‘essential religious
practice’8. Wearing hijab at the most may be a ‘cultural’ practice which has nothing to do with religion. Culture and
religion are different from each other.

7
Indian young lawyers association and others petitioner(s) v. The state of kerala and others (s).
8Commissioner hindu religious endowments madras vs. sri
Lakshmindra thirtha swamiar of sri shirur mutt AIR 1954 SC 282
Durgah committee, ajmer vs. syed hussain ali, AIR 1961 SC 1402
M. ismail faruqui vs. union of india (1994) SCC 360
AS. narayana deekshitulu vs. state of andhra pradesh, (1996) 9 SCC 611
Javed vs. state of haryana (2003) 8 SCC 369
Commissioner of police vs. acharya jagadishwarananda avadhuta (2004) 12 SCC 770
Ajmal khan vs. the election commission 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 794
Sharaya bano
Indian young lawyers association and others petitioner(s) v. The state of kerala and others (s).

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

 14

The 'essential practices' test was formulated in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Muttw, where the court stated that "what constitutes the essential part of a
religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. The essential practice test
clearly states that the practices integral to the faith are exempted from state intervention, in order to determine whether a
particular act constitutes an essential religious function or not reliance needs to place on the doctrines and religious texts
of
that particular religion".
Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta & Ors. v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta & Anr, the Supreme Court applied the
test of essential religious practices in deciding whether the Tandava dance was an essential rite of the Ananda Marga
Faith. It ruled that the faith had come into existence in 1955, while the Tandava dance was adopted only in 1966. The
court, therefore, ruled that since the faith had existed before the adoption of
the dance, the latter cannot be considered an essential feature of the faith.

2.3. THE STATE CAN REGULATE THE EXERCISE OF FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM SUBJECT TO
EQUALITY, JUSTICE AND PUBLIC ORDER

It is humbly submitted that with the objective of saving society from disorder an to make it function systematically, it is
important to impose reasonable restrictions. Hence an individual is subject to reasonable restriction. The freedoms
guaranteed by the Constitution is to promote intellectual self-expression and social interaction of citizens also to preserve
the spirit of unity by encouraging free movement throughout the country, as well as for development of personality and
the pursuit of gainful activity to boost national productivity. Hence granting rights to only a particular community arose a
sense of hatred in others.
The petitioner’s community asserts their right to wear customary outfit. In a case already adjudicated with the same fact
od Muslim Community women protesting right to wear Hijab gave rise to the widespread dilemma where students from
other community also started to wear their dress of religious choice. Hence in the instant case when one community is
exempted, everyone will have to be given the same consideration. Hence in totality it would lead to disturbance of public
order, inequality and injustice.
By virtue of Constitution Article 19 (5) in the interest of public the authority can impose reasonable restrictions. Also, the
Constitution provides for restriction on public order which connotes absence of disorder involving breaches as opposed to
the nation in general.

2.4. THERE IS POWER TO PRESCRIBE DRES CODE IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

No reasonable mind can imagine a school without a uniform. The power to prescribe uniform as of necessity inheres in
every school subject to all just exceptions. “…it is impossible to instill the scientific temperament which our Constitution
prescribes as a fundamental duty vide Article 51A(h) into the young minds so long as any propositions such as wearing of
hijab or bhagwa are regarded as religiously sacrosanct and therefore, not open to question. They inculcate secular values
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
 15

amongst the students in their impressionable & formative years.” “It is nobody’s case that the dress code is sectaraian.”
Stating that the Court has no quarrel with petitioners’ essential proposition that what one desires to wear is a facet of one’s
autonomy and that one’s attire is one’s expression, but the same is subject to reasonable regulation. It is too far-fetched to
argue that the school dress code militates against the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Articles, 14, 15, 19, 21 & 25
of the Constitution and therefore, the same should be outlawed by the stroke of a pen. Adherence to the dress code is a
mandatory for students. Hence, the prescription of school uniform is only a reasonable restriction constitutionally
permissible which the students cannot object to.

The educational institutions of the kind being ‘qualified public places’, the students have to adhere to the campus
discipline and dress code as lawfully prescribed since years i.e., as early as 2004. The parents have in the admission forms
of their wards (minor students) have signified their consent to such adherence. All the students had been accordingly
adhering to the same all through. It is only in the recent past; quite a few students have raked up this issue after being
brainwashed by some fundamentalist Muslim organizations like Popular Front of India, Campus Front of India, Jamaat-e-
Islami, and Students Islamic Organization of India. An FIR is also registered. Police papers are furnished to the court in a
sealed cover since investigation is half way through. Otherwise, the students and parents of the Muslim community do not
have any issue at all. Therefore, they cannot now turn around and contend or act to the contrary.
The power to prescribe school uniform is inherent in the concept of school education itself. There is sufficient indication
of the same in the 1983 Act and the 1995 Curricula Rules. It is wrong to argue that prescription of uniform is a ‘police
power and that unless the Statute gives the same; there cannot be any prescription of dress code for the students. The so
called ‘prospectus’ allegedly issued by the Education Department prohibiting prescription of uniform/dress code in the
schools does not have any authenticity nor legal efficacy.

3. UNIVERSITY ORDER IS CONSTITUIONALLY VALID OT NOT

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the direction issued by the college development community is not
violating any provisions enshrined in the constitution of Indus .
3.1. THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF ANY PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION
According to the section 133(2) of the Karnatic Education Act, 1983, that the every institution his the right to set up a
dress code for their institution and most be abide by all the students. When the students joined the institution , they all
consented to follow all the rates and regulation of the institution In referred to the global nous that uniforms and dress
codes will be imposed in educational institutions, The State government imposition of a dress code is a reasonable
restriction and does not offend constitutionally protected rights is religion-neutral and universally applicable to all
students. It noted that the dress code in fact promotes the principles of “secularism and equality”

As per Section 72(v) of the Karnatic Education Act, 1983 students of all educational institutions shall behave as one
family, without restricting themselves to one class of person jointly maintain and upheld public order, Under Section 111
of the Act, the government reserve the right to issue appropriate direction to schools and colleges to ensure Maintenance
of public order The Constitution of India pervaded the right to choose what wears a facet of one’s autonomy and
expression heat with the reasonable restriction that in qualified public spaces such schools, freedom should be curtailed to
maintain discipline and decorum. “School uniform ceases to be uniform” in such a matter regarding the hijab is not
violation of any fundamental rights of a person and constitutionally valid by law.
Colleges, education is an important stage in students lives. As per the Circular, Development Committees of all schools
and colleges have been created to make proper use of government grants, improve basic infrastructure and facilities, and
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
 16

mountain the quality of education schools anal colleges are directed to operate as per the decisions of the development
Committees. Any supervisory Committees in schools and colleges School Development Monitoring Committee or
College Development Community) may come policies/rates/codes of conduct in accordance with government rules, to
facilitate a smooth functioning atmosphere for the students. The decisions of the committees will he applicable to their
respective institutions. All Schools and colleges have adopted methods to allow all students to participate in uniform
learning programs

The Apex court in

Asha Renjan & others V. State of Bihar & Ors.(2017)4 SCC 3071 accepted the balance in test when competing rights are
involved and has taken a view that individual interest must yield to larger public interest. Thus, conflict over competing
rights can be resolved not by negating individual rights, but by upholding larger rights remains, to hold such relationships.
Between institution and students”,

In colleges that all under the Karnataka Board of Pre-University Education, dress code prescribed by the College
Development Committee on the administrative supervisory committee must be followed. If the administration does not fix
a dress code, clothes that do not threaten equality, unity, and public order must be worn.

In Fatima Thasneem V. State of Kerala

it was decided by the Kerala High Court in 2018, that the petitioners in the case were Muslim students who challenged
their school’s uniform policy prohibiting the wearing of the hijab. The school was a private School education institution.
The High Court held that it was for the institution to decide it’s dress code
Fatima Hussain Sayed V. Bharat Education Society c case, it was decided by the Bombay High Court in 2002. In this case,
the petitioner was a class six Muslim student who wished to wear the hijab to school. She was prohibited by the principal
of the school from wearing the hijab. The Muslim student challenged this, claiming that the prohibition violated her Right
to Religious Expression under Article 25 of the Constitution. Relying on Islamic scriptures, the Court said since the
student was studying in an all-girls” section of the school, she did not have to wear a hijab as per religious practice.

3.2. ARTICLE 25

By allowing the Salafi students to wear the hijab in classrooms would hinder their emancipation and go against the
constitutional spirit of “positive secularism”.

As per Article 25 of the Constitution it maintains that all people are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right
to profess, practice and propagate religion subject to public order. Morality and health.
Apart from the section above the provision Article 25(2)(a) adds that the state shall be entitled to regulate or restrict any
economic financial political or other secular activities which may be associated with religious practice 9.

9
Kantaru Rajeevaru (Sabarimala Temple Review-5J.) v. Indian Young Lawyers
Association & Ors.11
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
 17

On some occasions of communal and public disturbances, the prohibitive orders can also include banning of the use of
loudspeaker and such electronic devices employed in religious profession and practice. For instance, the Commissioner of
Police in Calcutta prohibited the use of loudspeakers for prayer in Mosques located in some residential areas in the city.
On challenge. His ban order was held constitutional. The right to profess one’s religion includes also the right to use all
lawful means required for such acts provided they don’t destroy public peace and order. The protection given under article
25 (1), however, does not divest the citizens from their duty to co-operate with the State to maintain public order so that
people may live their ordinary life in dignity.

3.3. THE EXERCISE OF RELIGION SUBJECT TO STATE RESTRICTION

The Constitution of the democratic States guarantee freedom of conscience and the right to manifest one’s religious
beliefs in overt ways. But this freedom is to be ensured in a balanced manner so as not to endanger the security and well
being of the society, the maintenance of which is the prerogative of the State for the proper growth and progress of the
people. Hence, Constitutions provide also the power to regulate and even to restrict this freedom. The manner and various
reasons under which religious freedom comes under State restriction in India will be discussed in the proceeding sections.
The freedom of religion as restrictively guaranteed by Article25 [1] is further subjected to the exceptions provided by sub
clauses (a) and (b) of clause 2 of the same article.

In S.R. Bommai V. Union of India” case, the Supreme Court held that in the Indian context secularism has a positive
context. So, secular activity can be regulated by the state by enacting the law, when there is any kind of problem in
maintaining the public order morality health and other provisions contained in part 3 of the constitution the state has the
right to impose the reasonable restrictions to maintain the peace and balance in the society.

The constitution permits reasonable restriction to be imposed on individual’s liberties in the interest of society. Justice
Mukherjee J. in A.K Gopalan V. State of Madras case10, it was observed that there cannot be any such thing as absolute
and an uncontrolled Liberty wholly freed from restraint for that would lead to Anarchy and disorder the possession and
enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the
country which is essential to be the safety health is General order and moral of the community.

3.4. NO PLACE FOR RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Article21 pertains to the protection of life and personal liberty.

The idea of “personal liberty” has to satisfy the requirements under Article 19 also11.27 Article 21 A is subjected the
restrictions imposed by state. Religious sentiments should not prevail while taking decisions on matters of education and
it should be based on the combination of rationality and modern. Our Constitution guarantees to everyone an inviolate

10
A.K Gopalan V. State of Madras case AIR 1950 SC 27
11
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597; (1978) 1 SCC 248
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
 18

“zone of freedom” in personal matters only, as long as the effect of this freedom does not cause harm, or discrimination, at
a broader social level.
In the instant case the respondents framed such an order to ensure uniformity in institutions. There have got reasonable
restrictions over the religious freedom as to ensure progressive development. it is reasonable as it has the same effect of
regulation of the right guaranteed under
Art. 19(1)12.
It is humbly contended that power to prescribe school uniform is inherent in the concept of education.
The students are strictly adhered to follow rules , that the educational institutions of the kind being ‘qualified public
places’, the students have to adhere to the campus discipline and dress code as lawfully prescribed. The parents in the
admission forms of their wards have signified to the consent of to such adherence. In the instant case it is contended the
petitioner’s freedom is violated but wearing a dress of our choice comes in the purview of fundamental freedoms which
are not absolute rights and are susceptible to reasonable regulation13 .

12
Sakal Papers v. Union of India and Bennett Coleman v. Union of India
13
Chintaman Rao v State of Madhya Pradesh; Mohd. Faruk v State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1951 SC 118
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
 19

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, in the lights of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited it is more humbly and
respectfully prayed before his hon’ble court that it may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:
The present petition is devoid in all merits and to dismiss the same
AND/OR pass any other order/orders as this hon’ble court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the given case and
I the light of justice, equity and good conscience and thus render justice
The counsel pleads this hon’ble court to bind “sacramentum habet in se tres comites, veritatem, justitiam et judicium
habenda est in jurato, Justitia et judicium in judice”

And for this act of kindness and justice the RESPONDENT shall be duly bound and forever pray
All of which is submitted with utmost reverence

Place
s/d
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS
Date

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

 20

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT