REVIEW OF DDA’s L

DDA LAND POOL POLICY TILL NOW AND ITS FUTURE PROSPECTS
 REVIEW OF THE
POLICY
Land pooling is extensively used globally. It was first adopted by Holland and
Germany in and around 1890s. the policy quickly spread across the globe
including Europe (Sweden, Finland, France and Belgium); Asia (Japan, South
Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, India and Nepal); Middle East (Israel, Lebanon and
Palestine) and Australia. Primarily, the policy is used for peri-urban expansion.
In India, the land pooling policy was first used under the Bombay Town Planning
Act, 1915 in the erstwhile Bombay Presidency. Few decades later, it became the
basis of the Town Planning Act in Gujarat — The Gujarat Town Planning and
Urban Development Act, 1976. The Town Planning Scheme (TPS) was extensively
used in Maharashtra in the first half of 20th Century. For instance, several large
parts of Mahim, Khar and Borivali in Mumbai were developed through TPS.
However, its usage declined over years after the enactment of Maharashtra
Regional & Town Planning Act, 1966, which shifted focus for the implementation
of the city master plan from TPS to Detailed Development Plan (DDP). The major
reason for the shift from TPS approach to DDP approach was due to long time
involved in execution of former scheme and the fact that ownership dispute over
a single land parcel used to hold up the entire scheme.
On the other hand, TPS scheme was a grand success in the State of Gujarat
which brought several amendments to address the issues being faced in the TPS
scheme. The major changes in the TPS scheme of Gujarat were as follows:
• Possession of land for construction of roads after approval of the Draft TPS
(amendment brought in 1999). This help ensure land-owners support
through the entire execution stage as the value of land appreciates after
road and other infrastructure construction starts.
• Sale of plots (up to 15 percent of scheme area) to finance the scheme (1986
amendment).
 • Tighter time limits in the process (1999 amendment) Additionally, the TPS
process in Gujarat does not settle ownership disputes, but transfer them
to the newly reconstituted plots, thereby ensuring execution of TPS
scheme.
Apart from extensive usage in the state of Gujarat and Chhattisgarh, the town
planning scheme is occasionally used in Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka,
Punjab and Kerala.

DELHI’S LAND POOL POLICY:

Delhi has grown rapidly over the last few years and its population has
increased ten-fold (to 1.7 crore) in just six decades. However, according to
the Delhi Development Authority’s (DDA) estimate, the current
infrastructure can serve only 1.5 crore people.
The large-scale Land Acquisition, Development and Disposal Policy of Delhi
approved in 1961 is still in operation. However, land acquisition and planned
development has not kept pace with the increasing demand of urbanization.
The process of acquisition is increasingly challenged by land owners due to low
compensation as compared to the market value. Therefore, Land Pooling
Policy is an alternative option for assembly and development of land/
infrastructure with the involvement of the private sector.
The new land policy based on the concept of Land Pooling wherein the land
parcels owned by individuals or group of owners are legally consolidated by
transfer of ownership rights to the designated Land Pooling Policy, which later
transfers the ownership of the part of the land back to the landowners for
undertaking development for such areas was notified. The policy is applicable
in the proposed urban sable areas of the Urban Extensions for which Zonal
Plans have been approved.
The land policy was notified on 5.9.2013 which guiding principles, the role of
DDA/Government, the role of the developer entity (DE), land use
distribution, norms for land assembly/land pooling, development control
norms with other terms and conditions.
The Delhi Development Authority's land pooling policy, which aims to
develop 105 villages in Delhi, has not received a positive response from
landowners. The policy requires landowners to form consortiums and
contribute contiguous land for development. However, not many applications
have been received for consortium formation so far. Villagers argue that the
policy cannot be effectively implemented without amendments to the Delhi
Development Act and the notification of the Delhi Master Plan. The
authority plans to hold more camps to encourage participation and has
proposed amendments to overcome operational challenges.
According to news reports, the scheme has not seen too many takers yet. This
is a significant issue since the draft Delhi Master Plan 2041 envisages land
pooling as one of the main mechanisms through which the bulk of additional
housing required in Delhi will be developed.

MAJOR ISSUE WITH THE POLICY:

Any scheme to consolidate land owned by different individuals faces a
collective action problem. Some landowners are either unconvinced of the
value of the proposed development or are holding out in expectation of a
better deal. While land acquisition deals with this problem by taking the issue
of landowner consent out of the question by expropriating them, land pooling
leaves this largely to the landowners themselves. The degree to which land
pooling is voluntary for non-consenting landowners varies according to the
design of the specific scheme, but in general, pooling relies on landowners
understanding the value of pooling their land.

The holdout problem seems to be particularly bad in Delhi’s land pooling

scheme. According to the most recent news reports, while more than a third
of all landowners in the scheme area are willing to pool their land, this
proportion does not add up to contiguous areas of pooled land. Contiguity is
a necessary prerequisite for developing pooled land. Delhi’s land pooling
scheme divides up the entire area under the scheme into 138 sectors. In each
of these sectors, the scheme requires “a minimum of 70% contiguous land of
the developable area within the sector, free of encumbrances.”
Non-participation at this scale implies that most landowners do not yet see
the value proposition in pooling their land together for development.
However, this also potentially highlights flaws in the design of the scheme
and DDA’s approach.
One of the key features of Delhi’s land pooling scheme is just how much of the
collective action problem is left to the landowners to solve themselves. First,
it is completely up to the landowners within a sector themselves to decide if
they wish to avail of the benefits of pooling their land. Second, interested
landowners have to convince others to reach the 70 percent threshold for
forming a consortium. Third, the plan proposal (“layout plan”) for developing
the pooled land, minus the area taken over by the DDA for public amenities
and infrastructure, has to be created by the landowners and implemented by
the consortium. This is likely to involve contentious issues like the respective
shares of landowners in the pooled land, the location and designs of their
houses, and so on. Fourth, the management of the consortium itself is left to
the landowners, though the DDA has set up grievance redress mechanisms.
Land pooling was also employed as the mechanism for acquiring land for the
creation of Amravati, the proposed new capital of a bifurcated Andhra
Pradesh. Unlike in Delhi, pooling in Amravati was done by a specific, newly
created state entity, the Andhra Pradesh Capital Region Development
Authority (APCRDA). As the scheme document further describes, the necessary
legislation and rules were enacted in December 2014, but the policy
underwent changes in 2015 and 2016 after consultations with affected
farmers.

The APCRDA and other relevant authorities were highly consultative. The
imperatives of creating a new capital meant that very generous incentives
were provided to landowners. The master plan was discussed through a
series of consultations; the zoning regulations and layout plans were
prepared by the APCRDA and other agencies, again in consultation with
landowners. Consultations were held again after the state agencies created
draft layout plans, and time was given for making objections and suggestions.
Plot allotments were made through a digital lottery, and landowners were
given a land pooling ownership certificate.
In Amravati as well, there was intensive state activity to ensure the land
required for the capital was pooled on time. The state took ownership of key
components of the scheme where coordination or collective action would have
been a problem. The processes and the role of the state in the pooling scheme
were closer to the TPS readjustment in Gujarat than Delhi’s land pooling.

Misidentifying the Problem: Proposed Amendments to the

DD Act, 1957:
Last year, in response to the low participation rates and difficulties in
consortium formation in Delhi, the central government proposed
amendments to the Delhi Development Act, 1957. Clauses 6 and 7 of the
proposed amendments read:

“6. The Central Government, if it so determines as being necessary, under

special order, direct the Authority to declare and notify mandatory pooling of
land in identified Sectors to ensure time bound planned development,
notwithstanding the fact that minimum threshold of voluntarily participation
as specified in the Land Pooling Policy may not have been achieved. Upon such
notification, the sectors so notified shall be deemed to be eligible for land
pooling.

7. Once a sector is notified as eligible for land pooling, it shall be obligatory for
all landowners of the sector to mandatorily participate in land pooling.”

These amendments basically empower the DDA to overcome the holdout

problem by making pooling mandatory, even when the required area of
contiguous land—70 percent—has not been achieved. So, this is not about
dealing with the unpooled land beyond the threshold of 70 percent. It is
designed to overcome the problem of not being able to reach the 70 percent
threshold itself.

As the discussion above highlights, while lack of landowner interest may be

one of the issues in the slow implementation of the scheme, lack of state
action in preventing collective action problems is also an important issue. In
the examples discussed above, the holdout problem in every example was
prevented or foreclosed because the relevant state agency (a) prepared the
necessary plans and developed or modified them in consultation with
landowners, (b) decided on key issues like the location of the returnable plot
by itself in consultation with landowners, and through these practices (c)
reduced some areas of uncertainty for landowners, and reduced the scope of
issues that they would have to negotiate with other landowners.

While making pooling mandatory may solve holdout problems in some cases,
it would not solve the problem of the lack of state involvement in Delhi.
Instead, it may give rise to more grievances and more litigation. To respond
correctly, the DDA will have to adapt institutionally from a land acquirer
using eminent domain to a facilitator and consultative planner. This change
in approach will have to be complemented by a change in the policy design,
where some of the key points of uncertainty and friction that arise when
private parties negotiate are solved through government action. Policy
designs like land readjustment in Gujarat and other states and the experience
of land pooling in Amravati are examples of such designs working.

Therefore, in order to successfully transition to using land pooling for urban

development, there is a need for both elements: better policy design and
institutional adaptation.

SOURCES:
• https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/dda-nudges-landowners-to-
opt-for-land-pooling-policy-finds-few-takers/articleshow/104618834.cms
• https://thewire.in/political-economy/delhis-land-pooling-policy-cant-go-
ahead-as-landowners-concerns-remain-unresolved
• https://naredco.in/notification/pdfs/DDA%20land%20pooling%20policy.pdf
• https://carnegieindia.org/2023/06/28/designing-land-pooling-for-india-
%7C-robert-bates-theory-of-politics-of-development-pub-90068