West European Politics,

Vol. 29, No. 1, 134 – 146, January 2006

RESEARCH NOTE

Does the EU Cause Domestic

Developments? Improving Case
Selection in Europeanisation
Research
MARKUS HAVERLAND

This study ties into the debate about the effect of the EU on its member states. Most
studies do not include non-EU cases in their investigations. Therefore, it is difficult to
establish the (isolated) causal effect or relative importance of the EU. Moreover,
studies with an exclusive focus on EU cases tend to be biased towards EU-level
explanations, at the expense of domestic or global explanations. The article examines
three strategies to demonstrate the causal importance of the EU. It points to the limits
of process tracing and counterfactual reasoning and advocates the comparison of EU
member states with non-members or, if research is restricted to EU countries, cases
where the source of an EU effect is present with cases where the source is absent.

Research on the impact of the EU on the political systems of its member

states has increased in sophistication over the last two decades. Idiosyncratic
descriptive single case studies are increasingly replaced by theoretically
informed comparative designs. A research programme is evolving that
allows for the accumulation of systematic knowledge about the factors and
mechanisms shaping national adaptation and non-adaptation to EU
pressures, incentives and ideas (Cowles et al. 2001; Dyson and Goetz
2003; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Goetz and Hix 2001).
Europeanisation research has benefited from its increasing linkages with
political science in general. Europeanisation scholars have successfully
utilised theoretical approaches dominant in comparative politics and internal
relations, including rational choice, sociological institutionalism and
constructivism. Also, conceptual issues are increasingly discussed drawing
on insights from comparative politics (see Anderson 2003; Eising 2003,
Falkner 2003; Olsen 2002; Radaelli 2000, Vink 2003). In this paper, I argue
that Europeanisation research would also benefit from a greater awareness
of political science methodology, in particular regarding the issue of proper

Correspondence Address: mhaverland@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

ISSN 0140-2382 Print/1743-9655 Online ª 2006 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/01402380500389331
 Does the EU Cause Domestic Developments? 135

case selection. In the remainder, I will first elaborate on the specific problem
identified with regard to case selection: the lack of variation in the
independent–EU-level–variable. Then, two remedies put forward in the
literature to cope with the no-variance problem are examined: process
tracing and counterfactual reasoning. This discussion will reveal some
shortcomings of these strategies. Therefore, the final section will discuss
another strategy: comparing EU cases with non-EU cases. I will argue in
particular that ceteris paribus the inclusion of moderately similar non-EU
cases is a promising strategy to deal with the no-variance problem and will
accordingly help to answer one of the core questions of Europeanisation
research: whether and to what extent the EU makes a difference.

The No-Variance Problem

If one follows the emerging consensus to define Europeanisation as the effect
of the EU on member states’ polity, politics and policy, the issue of
causality, or internal validity, is of paramount importance. It must be
demonstrated that domestic developments in the case(s) under investigation
are indeed the effect of the EU. Based on a counterfactual understanding of
causality that informs most empirical political science, the statement that the
EU causes a particular outcome implies that if the EU were to absent that
particular outcome would not occur. The magnitude of the causal effect is
defined by the difference in the outcome between both situations (Fearon
1991; Holland 1986; King et al. 1994: 76–82). Empirical political science
typically approximates the hypothetical comparison, between the presence
and the absence of a factor in the same case, through real world comparisons
with other cases where the hypothesised factor is absent (Landman 2003:
13). But Europeanisation research typically focuses exclusively on cases
where potential EU pressures, incentives or ideas are present. Hence
research is typically confined to EU member states; with regard to policy
studies, typically those policy sectors are studied where EU competences
exist; when the EU is theorised as an agent of new ideas, typically areas are
selected where the EU promotes a new idea, and so on. This case selection
implies that the independent variable we should be very interested in, the
EU-level factor, is not a variable at all but a constant. The causal effect
cannot be determined.
It is important to stress that without variation in the independent variable
a specific ‘EU matters’ hypothesis can be rejected when the hypothesised
pattern or outcome is not matched by our observations. For example, if a
European policy requires a certain regulatory regime and this regime has not
been established in the member state, the EU pressure to adapt was not
effective. But without variation in the independent variable, it is difficult to
confirm the ‘EU matters’ hypothesis when the hypothesised pattern or
outcome is matched by our observations, as there is no control through case
selection for other potential explanations, such as globalisation. Hence if the
136 M. Haverland

EU requires a certain regulatory regime and this regime is adopted in the

member state, we should wonder whether this regime would not also have
been adopted in the absence of the EU requirement. The precise timing,
speed or sequence of introducing such a regime may be shaped by an EU
policy, but it should be more interesting to investigate whether or not a
roughly similar regime would have been adopted anyway.
To be sure, as Anderson has pointed out, in some instances it is very easy,
even trivial, to attribute causal importance to the EU (Anderson 2003).
Hence, the establishment of new administrative units within ministries to
coordinate EU matters can be easily traced back to the existence of the EU.
But the problem of demonstrating causality looms very large if the
investigator hypothesises rather indirect effects of the EU, for instance, if the
researcher wants to test whether EMU causes cuts in German pension
system because of a shift in the opportunity structure (Haverland 2003a),
or whether European regional policy resulted in more cooperative
government–society relations on the sub-national level due to a diffusion
of the European model (Kohler-Koch 2002).
I do not wish to suggest here that Europeanisation research lacks
variation altogether. Many research designs, in particular those interested in
policy adaptation, utilise the concept of ‘goodness of fit’: the degree of
congruence or compatibility between the national status quo and European
requirements. Typically, case selection ensures that the goodness of fit varies
between member states (see for instance the contributions to Cowles et al.
2001; Haverland 2000; Knill and Lenschow 1998). However, ‘goodness of
fit’ is a composite variable consisting of the EU requirements and the
national status quo. The EU requirement is not isolated from the domestic
situation. Moreover the ‘EU requirement’ part does not vary. In other
words, the basic variance, EU vs. non-EU, is not explored. If, for example,
in a situation of misfit, a domestic development that ‘closes the gap’ takes
place, we cannot be sufficiently confident whether this is caused by this misfit
or another factor: a ‘misfit’ with another external or internal factor.
Research into the role of mediating variables such as domestic interest
constellations, domestic veto points, and political cultures also treat the EU
level variable as constant. Variation is restricted to these mediators (see, for
instance, Börzel and Risse 2003; Haverland 2003b; Knill and Lehmkuhl
2002). To be sure, this type of Europeanisation research has generated very
valuable insights into processes of adaptation. We know a lot about how
Europe matters, but we have not sufficiently established to what extent it
matters: its relative importance or ‘net impact’ (Levi Faur 2004).

The Limits of Process Tracing and Counterfactual Reasoning

There are a few scholars that have taken up the challenge to analyse more
explicitly and systematically the question of whether and to what extent the
EU matters. They have mentioned a number of strategies including process
 Does the EU Cause Domestic Developments? 137

tracing with a strong emphasis on the temporal dimensions time, timing and
speed (Goetz 2000); counterfactual reasoning (Anderson 2003; Haverland
2003b; Schmitter 1999); and the inclusion of non-EU cases in the research
design as a control group (Anderson 2003; Eising 2003).
Process tracing that takes alternative explanations explicitly into account
potentially allows for establishing the relative importance of the EU even if
research is restricted to EU cases, if observable implications can be derived
that contrast with EU-level theories. A number of scholars looking at
economic policy adaptation, for instance, have added global or domestic
factors to their explanatory framework from the outset, or as they ‘came
across’ these factors in the course of their study. That the inclusion of
alternative explanations cast doubts on the strength of the EU effect is
revealed by Schmidt’s review of her own and others’ work on the impact of
the EU on domestic economic policies. Only in seven out of 21 cases has the
EU been the dominant source for adaptation pressure; in seven cases global
pressures have been decisive; and in two cases internal pressures. In the
remaining cases combinations of two of the three sources of adaptation have
been at work (Schmidt 2002).
However, establishing the causal effect of the EU is far from easy even if
one takes full account of alternative explanations. One problem is that
factors and mechanisms we associate with European integration often
generate similar empirically observable implications rather than rival
implications for domestic developments. Take economic globalisation: the
lowering of domestic policy standards might be caused by increased
competitive pressures spurred either by the single market programme or by
economic globalisation. Likewise, the ‘decline of the classical public
bureaucracy’ can be related to the EU but also to economic and
technological developments and the rise of new public management (Goetz
2000: 225).
Moreover, these developments might exhibit similar temporal patterns.
European integration, globalisation, neo-liberal ideas, new public manage-
ment, new information and communication technologies or the
individualisation of society emerged in the second half of the last century
and intensified in recent decades. Given its restriction to cases where the EU
source of pressure, incentives or models is present, there is the danger of
biased conclusions. As Anderson reminds us with regard to globalisation
‘[n]o matter how careful the empirical process tracing . . ., there is always the
risk of analytical oversight – of failing to see how integration’s effects are
overshadowed by, or a straightforward function of, broader forces of
globalization’ (Anderson 2003: 51).
The results of the few studies that have included non-EU cases for control
suggest that there is indeed a problem of analytical oversight. In a
quantitative study of OECD countries, Verdier and Breen investigated the
impact of economic globalisation and/or European integration on broad
patterns of interest representation. With regard to interest representation in
138 M. Haverland

the capital market, an area quite likely to be affected by the EU, no effect of
European integration could be found (Verdier and Breen 2001). Levi-Faur
also provides evidence that in areas where most scholars would probably
expect an EU effect developments are actually driven by other factors. In his
comprehensive qualitative study of telecommunication and energy reforms
in 28 countries, he found that ‘it is highly plausible that the major features
of the liberalisation would have been diffused to most member states even
if the Commission and other agents of Europeanisation had not existed’
(Levi-Faur 2004: 25).
The fact that studies that systematically control for other variables
through their case selection find a rather weak effect of EU-level variables in
cases where strong effects are expected suggests that only taking alternative
explanations into account is not sufficient. We need to include non-EU cases
for control. Before that strategy is discussed, I will turn to another possible
remedy against the no-variance problem, counterfactual reasoning.
The counterfactual concept of causation does not necessarily lead to the
inclusion of real cases that approximate the hypothetical situation of the
absence of the EU-level factor. Instead, the researcher can engage in a
‘thought experiment’ and speculate about what would have happened in the
case under investigation if the EU-level factor had been absent. Schmitter,
for instance, forcefully argued that ‘no realistic or compelling assessment of
the impact of the EU on domestic democracy can afford to ignore taking
counterfactuals [emphasis original] into account’ (Schmitter 1999: 296).
Note that counterfactual reasoning does not need to result in unlimited
speculation. Several authors have suggested criteria for the development of
compelling counterfactuals (see for instance Ned Lebow 2000; Tetlock and
Belkin 1996). The criteria of clarity, for instance, demands that researchers
should make explicit which variables are changed in his or her thought
experiment and which remain unchanged. Historical consistency is also
important. Hence variables should be specified in a way that requires few
changes to historical facts. Also, the hypothesised linkages between the
(mentally changed) independent variable and the dependent variable
should be consistent with well-established empirical and theoretical
generalisations.
Yet counterfactual arguments are problematic in complex situations. For
instance, to establish the overall net impact of the EU on a specific member
state, or one of its institutions or policy sectors, researchers would have to
explore what had happened without the existence of the European Union, or
at least without that particular member state being a member of it. In that
case, however, one would have to rewrite history quite drastically and the
story would become more speculative and therefore less compelling as by
implication many more phenomena may be different as well. Generally
speaking, the more changes we make the greater the number of
consequences and the lower their predictability, in particular when there
are also interaction effects between ‘independent’ variables. Therefore it is
 Does the EU Cause Domestic Developments? 139

often advisable to include in the research design ‘real’ cases where the EU
effect is absent.

Including Non-EU Cases

There are basically two options for real-world comparisons: first, to
compare EU member states with non-members; and, second, if the
investigator concentrates only on EU member states, to include policy
areas, economic sectors, administrative units, interest groups, and so on
where the EU factor of interest is lacking. Note that what follows is for a
large part a generic discussion of the pro and cons of the different strategies.
Specific case selection also depends on the nature of the theoretical
argument and the nature of the rival explanations for which the researcher
seeks control.

Comparing EU Members with Non-members

Comparing EU member states with non-members is the most straightfor-
ward strategy to cope with the no-variance problem. It is the strategy chosen
in the study by Verdier and Breen (2001) and it is an important building
block in the study by Levi-Faur (2004). In a quasi-experimental fashion, one
compares countries where the ‘stimulus’, the EU, is present, with a control
group where the stimulus is absent (Lijphart 1971). This strategy is not
without problems, however, as it demands a critical trade-off. Ideally, the
researcher needs to choose countries where he or she can be confident that
the EU has no effect. At the same time, he or she wants to choose countries
which are ‘comparable’ in the sense that they are similar with regard to other
explanatory variables (Lijphart 1971). Comparability enables the researcher
to control for other effects that might confound the hypothesised effect of
the EU. The logic of control of this ‘most similar systems’ design is based
upon Mill’s method of difference: similarities across countries cannot
explain differences between them (Landman 2003). The need to ensure
variation in the EU variable but similarity with regard to other variables
represents the crux of the trade-off. Let me elaborate.

Choosing Most Similar Countries

Norway and Switzerland are usual suspects as non-EU countries in
comparative studies. Both countries are included in the studies by Levi-
Faur (2004) and Verdier and Breen (2001).1 These countries are similar to
the EU member states concerning their geographical location and history,
macro-political institutions, and socio-economic structure: they are Eur-
opean democratic and capitalist welfare states. The problem arising here is
twofold. First, the sheer number of suitable countries is small. Therefore the
opportunity for replication of the findings of the first round of research is
140 M. Haverland

severely restricted. In other words, only weak conclusions can be drawn as

they are based on a maximum of two non-EU countries. Idiosyncrasies of
Norway, Switzerland or both have a great impact on the outcome.
In addition to the ‘small n’ problem, there are also theoretical problems
involved. One of the main theoretical claims of Europeanisation research is
that the effect of the EU on its member states is not confined to direct legal
compliance pressure. As stated above, the EU may have an indirect effect on
its member states. It may change the domestic opportunity structure and the
terms of the domestic debate. Domestic actors can use European policies
and ideas to legitimise their own policy positions or to de-legitimise the
positions of others. Also, European policies and ideas may spur changes in
domestic belief systems, hence contributing to policy-oriented learning
(Börzel and Risse 2003; Checkel 1999; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002; Radaelli
1997). Whereas legal obligations to comply with the acquis communitaire are
in principle confined to the territory of the EU, learning or other indirect
mechanisms do not need to stop at the European Union borders. For
example, a new economic policy concept developed by EU institutions may
inform political choices in Switzerland or Norway. If this is the case, then it
cannot be taken as evidence against an impact of the EU – evidence that EU
members and non-members exhibit similar domestic development. It could
even be taken as evidence for the rather strong causal power of the EU! In
fact, there are studies suggesting that the EU had a significant impact on
Norway and Switzerland (Sciarini et al. 2004; Sverdrup 1998).
Theories about policy learning and diffusion suggest that these mechan-
isms are more likely to operate when the recipient of the idea shares borders
and political and economic conditions with the entity from which the ideas
emerge (Berry and Berry 1999). For theoretical reasons, therefore, countries
which fulfil these properties should not be selected for a comparative and
quasi-experimental research design that seeks to isolate the EU effect by
selecting for a ‘control’ group those countries where the hypothesised EU
effect must be absent. The irony here should not go unnoticed: the very same
properties that make countries like Norway and Switzerland a good choice
for general methodological reasons make them a bad choice for theoretical
reasons. A methodological virtue turns into a theoretical vice.

Choosing Most Different Countries

Choosing countries which are dissimilar to the EU member states mirrors
the problem. There might be good theoretical reasons why the EU should
not have an effect in Latin America, Africa or Southeast Asia. At the same
time, countries in these regions vary according to so many other variables as
well that the risk of an over-determined research design looms large. In
other words, if the investigator were to find a large and systematic variation
in outcomes between EU member states and non-members, the difference
may not be caused by the EU factor, but by another factor which also
 Does the EU Cause Domestic Developments? 141

systematically varies between member states and non-members, for

instance the level of socio-economic development, or the general nature
of the political system (democratic vs. authoritarian regime). For example,
if an EU directive requires member states to protect the privacy of telecom
users and such a protection is found in all the member states studied but in
none of the Latin American and African control cases, the variance might
not be caused by the EU directive but by a systematic variance in the
strength of democratic values. The EU member states may have adopted
these privacy rules due to strong democratic values, irrespective of the
directive.

Moderately Similar Countries

The preceding discussion suggests that if the hypothesised effect has a rather
direct character, e.g. institutional compliance (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002),
then it makes sense to compare a European Union country with Switzer-
land, or – if the investigator strives for replication – two EU countries and
Switzerland and Norway, at least if the issues under consideration are not
dealt with by EEA agreements or bilateral treaties. If the hypothesised effect
is rather indirect, the investigator should select countries that are less ‘close’
to the EU members but are not too dissimilar either. Such a selection might
include Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. These
countries are stable and liberal democracies with a capitalist economy. Due
to a different historical trajectory and geographical distance they are so
‘remote’ from the EU that often it can be plausibly argued that indirect EU
effects also do not reach them. But even these countries should be treated
with care (Mair, personal communication). All of them belong to the
English-speaking ‘family of nations’ (Castles 1993). Their heritage of being
former English colonies and their common culture has shaped a typical
pattern of public policy making. Moreover, these countries exhibit
similarities with regard to the role of the state in society and their policy
styles (van Waarden 1995). For instance, these countries are characterised
by small welfare states and pluralistic government – interest group relations.
This is quite distinct from, for instance, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Belgium. This implies that with regard to certain research
topics, the ‘English-speaking’ non-EU countries might be too dissimilar,
hence leading to an over-determined research design. Differences with
regard to certain policies might be attributed to differences in welfare state
levels rather than membership in the EU. But if, for instance, certain effects
of the EU on federal systems are hypothesised, it may make sense to
compare Germany and Belgium with the control cases Australia and
Canada. Or, more generally, a comparison of the UK with one of these four
English-speaking countries would come close to the ideal of the most similar
system design: same ‘family of nations’ but variance with regard to EU
membership.
142 M. Haverland

Historical Analysis and Different Europes

The discussion so far has assumed a fixed set of EU member states and non-
EU members. However, in the course of the integration process more and
more countries have become part of the European Union. Also, the EU
increasingly allows for flexibility with regard to integration and for
integration with various speeds. Can these aspects be exploited for case
selection purposes?2 The historical dimension of the integration process
implies that in earlier times there have been more – most similar – non-EU
cases, for instance, the UK, Denmark, and Ireland before 1973, or Sweden,
Finland, Austria before 1995. Hence, by analysing an earlier period in time,
the potential for control is much greater than by studying the current period.
Yet, at the same time, the theoretical relevance of such an endeavour is
doubtful. After all, it is often argued that the (indirect) effect of the EU on
the member states has grown over the years, so it might not be very relevant
if such an investigation arrives at the conclusion that the EU had no
significant causal effects in the 1960s or 1980s.
The phenomena of flexible integration and integration with various
speeds might offer better opportunities for control. Through opt-outs like
EMU, or closer cooperation like the Schengen agreement, some EU member
states are subject to integration effects and others are not. These countries
can be taken as – most similar – control cases. Two caveats should be
mentioned here, however. First, strictly speaking, we no longer analyse
Europeanisation but ‘EMUisation’ or ‘Schengenisation’. We have to make
certain, and explicit, that we entertain the same theoretical arguments as
used in Europeanisation research, or, to be specific, ‘EUisation’ research.
Secondly, the choice to opt out is mostly informed by the desire to remain
unaffected by the EU, hence these cases are least likely instances of
Europeanisation (Eckstein 1975). The possible conclusions are asymmetrical
in their theoretical relevance. If one finds that the EU has indeed no effect
here, the result is very much expected and some would say banal. If one
finds that the EU has an effect even here, however, the results are of high
theoretical significance.3

Cross-‘Section’ Comparison within EU Member States

Another strategy to increase the variation in the independent variable
confines the research to EU member states but compares economic sectors,
policy fields, institutions, interest organisations, elites, or other ‘sections’
subject to EU pressures, incentives or ideas with counterparts not exposed
to these EU-level factors.4 For instance, if the investigator wants to know
whether the EU has an impact on the professionalisation of interest
groups, he or she can compare interest groups which have an incentive
to lobby about EU policies with lobby groups who have no incentive to
do so.
 Does the EU Cause Domestic Developments? 143

There are several studies that follow this strategy (e.g. Sciarini et al. 2004).
Unfortunately, the cross-section design suffers from the same trade-off as the
cross-country design. Comparing sections where EU pressure, incentives, or
models exist with other sections comes close to the ideal of the most-similar-
systems design, because the investigator can keep all national factors
constant. At the same time, because the country is a member of the European
Union it might be difficult to argue that the cases are independent from one
other. Horizontal effects, from one section to another, may be at work. This
horizontal impact, driven for instance by diffusion or learning, may have had
its origin at the European level. Thus not only borders between members and
non-members become blurred but also boundaries between sections within
member states. For example, if the investigator wants to research whether
partnerships between sub-national governments and business in regional
economic policy are causally related to EU regional policy, it might be
problematic to compare it with regional vocational training policies, as the
norm of partnership may have diffused via regional economic policy to
vocational training policy as well. If this is the case, then the EU has caused
changes in vocational training policy even though it has almost no formal
competences in this area. In this example, it would be important here to
choose sections that are ‘disconnected’ from each other. In general, it is
important to choose sections that are not too similar with regard to
theoretically relevant properties. For instance, if policy fields are concerned,
it is often wise to choose fields that are regulated by different ministries.
As in the cross-country design, however, a design that selects most different
sections may suffer from over-determination. If the hypothesised effect occurs
in sections subject to EU pressures but does not in sections that are not subject
to such pressures, the variation could be caused by section-specific properties.
For instance, if the researcher hypothesises that the incentive to lobby the EU
results in a professionalisation of interest groups and he or she compares
interest groups in telecommunications with interest groups of teachers of
primary education, one could argue that if telecommunications interest groups
are indeed more professionalised, it is related to economic globalisation or
technological changes rather than European integration. Therefore, in
choosing sections it is important to control for section-specific variables.
Again, it is worth noting that concrete selection criteria depend very much on
existing theories and hypotheses. A crucial aspect is whether the relevant
theories hypothesise direct or indirect effects.

Conclusion
This analysis has addressed the issue of case selection in Europeanisation
research and has detected a no-variance problem. In many studies, case
selection is confined to instances where potential EU pressures, incentives or
ideas are present. Control cases are lacking. Following the counterfactual
notion of causality, that informs most empirical political science, it is
144 M. Haverland

therefore difficult – if not impossible – to establish the causal effect of the

EU. Also, the results of studies that do include non-EU cases suggest that a
restriction to EU cases biases towards EU-level explanations.
The paper has identified shortcomings with regard to two strategies that
promise to cope with the no-variance problem, process tracing and
counterfactual reasoning. Even if alternative explanations are taken into
account, process tracing may still be biased towards EU-level explanations
due to analytical oversight. Counterfactual reasoning becomes difficult in
situations where history has to be drastically rewritten and in situations of
causal complexity, the interaction of various variables. Given these
shortcomings, the paper advocates the inclusion of non-EU cases for
control. If researchers want to follow this strategy they should be aware of
the trade-off between methodological and theoretical concerns. Whereas, for
theoretical reasons, most different countries or sections should be chosen to
minimise the potential impact of indirect EU effects beyond member states,
methodological reasons require that most similar countries or sections
should be chosen to control for alternative explanations. The precise nature
of the trade-off depends very much on the character of the theoretical
argument advanced but ceteris paribus moderately similar cases should be
the most adequate to establish whether and to what extent the EU matters.

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Karen Anderson, Peter Bursens, Antoaneta
Dimitrova, David Levi-Faur, David Lowery, Peter Mair, Ellen Masten-
broek, Mark Rhinard, Bertjan Verbeek, and the anonymous referees for
helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper.

Notes
1. Note, however, that Norway (and Iceland and Liechtenstein) are part of the European
Economic Area, and Switzerland has engaged in bilateral treaties with the EU. As far as
issues are concerned that fall under the scope of such agreements, the respective country
cannot be regarded as non-EU case (Sciarini et al. 2004; Sverdrup 1998). Moreover,
countries that seek membership of the EU, i.e. candidate countries, cannot be regarded as
control cases either, as it is quite likely that the EU has already had an effect there.
2. I would like to thank Peter Mair for pointing me to the potential opportunities arising from
the historical dimension of the integration process and from its current flexibility.
3. In addition, one has to make sure that these countries do not adapt to the EU in order to
‘keep the door open’.
4. In the remainder of the paper I will use the term ‘sections’ as a general label for all units of
comparison except countries, e.g. policy fields, economic sectors, institutions, elites, interest
organisations.

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