Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia

Carolin Liss

Southeast Asian Affairs, Volume 2003, pp. 52-68 (Article)

Published by ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/400076/summary

[ Access provided at 14 Nov 2020 11:09 GMT from University of Athens (or National and Kapodistrian Univ. of Athens) ]
Southeast Asian Affairs 2003, pp. 52-68

MARITIME PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Carolin Liss

Preface
In November 1998, while en route from Shanghai to Port Klang in Malaysia, the
Hong Kong registered cargo-ship Cheung Son was approached just off the west
coast of Kaohsiung in Taiwan by a small boat which appeared to be a Chinese
Customs vessel. Left with little choice, the captain allowed the officers on
board his ship, which carried a cargo of furnace slag. Once on board the
Cheung Son, the Chinese 'officers', dressed in uniform and armed with guns,
threatened the crew and took control of the vessel. After being held hostage
for ten days, all twenty-three Chinese crew members of the Cheung Son were
bludgeoned to death and their weighted bodies thrown into the sea. After
the killings, the pirated vessel was sold within China for about US$36,000. The
new owner hired a new crew and reportedly sold the vessel to an unknown
Singaporean party for US$300,000.
The pirates, however, did not get away with their crime. In an interview
granted to the foreign media, Chinese police officials recounted that
investigation into the Cheung Sons disappearance had begun when the owner
of the vessel reported loss of contact with the ship. As fishermen found the
first bodies of the murdered crew members, police learned that a man from
Shanwei "went to sea and came back with a lot of money and a dented boat".
The police officers eventually located the boat and its owner, who was hiding
in a fishing village. He told the police that he had lent his vessel to two other
men who could be found in Shenzen. Acting on this information, 300 officers
raided a karaoke bar, where the alleged members of the pirate gang were
celebrating. In the course of further investigation, the Chinese authorities
discovered that some of the gang members had been involved in at least two
other serious pirate attacks between August and November 1998. This
information and the discovery of a celebratory photograph, taken by the pirates
on board the Cheung Son, led to further arrests. In total, more than fifty
'pirates',1 aged between twenty-one and sixty, were arrested. Among them, the
alleged leader of the gang Sony Wei, an Indonesian, who had previously been
involved in inspection work contracted out by the Chinese Customs authorities.
All other gang members captured were Chinese.
Carolin Liss is a Postgraduate Research Student in the School of Asian Studies, Murdoch
University, Australia.
Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia53

In mid-December 1999, the arrested pirates were brought to trial in the

Intermediate People's Court of Shanwei, Guangdong Province, where they
were charged with robbery, mass murder, the illegal possession of firearms,
and handling stolen property.
Most of the defendants, among them Lu Xu, an unemployed man from
Shanxi, and Cai Mutong, a fisher from Lufeng, claimed that they were hired
for a legitimate anti-smuggling mission. According to their statements both
only later discovered the true nature of the voyage, but were too afraid to
confront the 'pirates'. Zhang Fenshen, a forty-two-year-old mechanic, told the
court that the boat had sailed from an official border defence pier and added
that he was not aware of any attack, as he was working in the 'custom vessel's'
engine room. The court also heard that the Indonesian Sony Wei had been
commissioned by Liem Sioe Liong, a Chinese Indonesian tycoon, to hire a
pirate gang to attack the Cheung Son. Despite such testimony, the court
established that Weng Siliang, a businessman from Shanwei, and not Sony Wei,
was the ringleader of the gang. According to the trial statements, Weng co-
ordinated the attack from mainland China. He remained in Shanwei during
the hijacking and was sent a sample of the furnace slag on board which he
forwarded to Singapore to inquire if it could be sold there at a good price.
Sony Wei told the court that the command to kill the crew also came directly
from Weng. In regard to the executions, the prosecutor told the court that
each gang member was ordered to kill at least one crew member and those
who refused to obey were threatened to be thrown overboard.
Thirty-eight of the defendants were eventually convicted of hijacking the
Cheung Son and the court sentenced thirteen of the accused, among them
Sony Wei and Weng Siliang, to death. One other pirate was sentenced to life
in prison, while eighteen other gang members received sentences ranging
from one to twelve years. Six further suspects were not sentenced, because
they had earlier assisted the police with their investigations. The court also
ruled that those convicted pay compensation of 2.66 million yuan to the families
of the murdered crew members.
In late January 1999 the death sentence for the thirteen pirates was
confirmed. Before being led to the execution ground, however, the prisoners
were locked in the courtroom with relatives, some food, and a large quantity
of rice wine. Shortly after, the condemned pirates emerged, visibly intoxicated
by the liquor, shouting and singing a rendition of Ricky Martin's 1998 Soccer
World Cup theme song "La Copa de la Vita" — "The Cup of Life". One of the
pirates, Yangjingtao, who reportedly led the singing, jumped up and down in
his shackles, singing "Go, go, go, ole, ole, ole" as he was led to one of the
trucks that was to bring him and his companions to the execution ground.
Turning from the truck to speak to journalists waiting in front of the courtroom,
he yelled: "I want to thank all the Communist Party's judicial system and thank
my defending council for giving me a fair chance."
The thirteen pirates were shot by a firing squad a short time later.2
54Carolin Liss

Introduction
The hijacking of the Cheung Son in late 1998 shows that piracy is not, as many
believe, solely a phenomenon of the past. Although major hijackings remain the
exception today, the case of the Cheung Son nonetheless provides a good example
of some basic facts about modern day piracy. It illustrates for instance that
modern pirates are able to attack large vessels and are willing to use extreme
forms of violence to further their aims. The romantic notion still associated with
piracy of a bygone era is clearly at odds with such acts of modern piracy.
Furthermore, the arrest of the Cheung Son pirate gang and their trial in a Chinese
court demonstrate that regional governments have begun to take the problem
of contemporary piracy very seriously. However, that such pirates are arrested
and brought to justice still remains rather exceptional. The Cheung Son case also
illustrates that pirate gangs may comprise members from different countries and
from different backgrounds, ranging from unemployed labourers to mechanics,
fishers, and businessmen. The attack on the Cheung Son further demonstrates
that certain attacks require extensive planning, and often involve a network of
people based or operating in different countries.
This article analyses the complex phenomenon of modern piracy, focusing
on the Asian region in the post-Cold War era. It provides an overview of the
different kinds of pirate attacks and the various types of pirates operating in
the region today. Even though piracy is by no means restricted to Asia, with
attacks also occurring in Latin American and African waters, the majority of
incidents in recent years have been reported in the Asian region. As pirates
regularly transgress national and regional borders, my analysis will focus upon
the incidence of piracy in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea.3
The first part of this article discusses modern day piracy in the region in
general terms, based on data published by the Piracy Reporting Centre in
Kuala Lumpur. The second part focuses on the political, economic, and social
developments, which have played a part in the increase and shape of modern
piracy in the post-Cold War era. The third part then addresses the two different
types of pirates, which I believe are operating in the region today. The ensuing
part of the article then attempts to show that piracy is not an isolated problem
but is linked to smuggling activity and a flourishing black market in the region.
Here, I also discuss the much-publicized links between piracy and the activities
of terrorists and separatist movements operating in the region, such as the
Abu Sayyaf in the southern Philippines and the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free
Aceh Movement, or GAM) in Indonesia. In concluding the article, I argue that
piracy should be taken seriously as a major security issue, but that a variety of
social, economic, and political strategies are necessary in order to reduce the
number of pirate attacks in the region.
Modern Day Piracy
Since the early 1970s incidences of piracy and crime on the high seas have
steadily increased in Southeast Asia. While maritime raiding already existed
Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia55
when the Portuguese arrived in Asia in the sixteenth century, the region has
once again become in recent years one of the global hot spots of vessel
attacks. Even though attacks on merchant ships increased in the area in the
1970s and 1980s, they were often still small-scale and rarely involved physical
injuries to those who were attacked — except for attacks on Vietnamese boat
people in the Gulf of Thailand, which often featured violence and cruelty.
This changed in the 1990s when pirates began operating on a larger scale
and across regional borders. By the late 1990s more than half of all reported
attacks on vessels worldwide occurred in Southeast Asia, in the Straits of
Malacca, the Gulf of Thailand, the South China Sea, the sea north of Java,
and in the waters surrounding the SuIu Archipelago. The modern day pirates,
armed with parangs and modern guns, operate in fast motor boats and prey
on fishers, barter traders, cruising yachts, refugee boats, and, increasingly,
commercial shipping.4
The rising number of pirate attacks in the region throughout the 1980s
prompted the establishment of the International Maritime Bureau's (1MB)
Regional Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur in October 1992. In its
early years, the centre provided services only for the East Asian region, including
both Northeast and Southeast Asia. However, in 1998, the name was changed
to 1MB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) and it now collects data and reports on
piracy and armed robbery at sea from all around the world.5 The centre also
issues warnings to seafarers, liaises with law enforcement authorities, issues
consolidated reports to interested bodies, and regularly publishes reports on
piracy and armed robbery at sea.6 While there are a variety of different
definitions of piracy that often only consider attacks on the high seas, the PRC
employs a more inclusive definition. It includes in its analysis any "act of
boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and
with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act".7 The
PRCs reports therefore include information on attempted attacks, attacks on
vessels at anchorage or at berth, simple hit-and run robberies in territorial
waters, as well as hijackings of vessels, such as the attack on the Cheung Son. For
the purpose of this article the IMB's definition of piracy will be adopted with
the proviso that those acts have to be committed for private — as opposed to
political — ends.
According to data from the PRC the number of actual and attempted
pirate attacks reported in the 1990s range from 90 attacks in 1994 to as many
as 469 reported incidents in 2000. In 2001, the number slightly declined to
335 attacks, and there have been 271 incidents reported in the first nine
months of 2002.8 (See Table 1.) However, the actual number of attacks may be
much higher. According to Noel Choong, the regional manager of the PRC,
more than 50 per cent of all pirate attacks remain unreported for a variety of
reasons.9 Some ship owners for instance are reluctant to report attacks, as they
fear that an investigation will delay their vessel even further, resulting in
additional costs. Many also do not want to be regarded as unreliable carriers
56 Carolin Liss

TABLE 1
Reported Actual and Attempted Attacks per Annum, 1991-2002
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

107 106 103 90 188 228 247 202 300 469 335 271*

Note: * Sub. total January to September only.

Source: ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. Report for the Period
1 January-30 September 2002" (Barking, U.K.: ICC-IMB 2002), p. 5.

of freight or fear rising insurance rates. Governments and law enforcement

agencies in the region are also often reluctant to disclose the number of
attacks in their respective countries in order to preserve its reputation as a safe
place for trade and passage.10 Furthermore, attacks on fishing boats and other
small craft are rarely reported and, even when reported to the local police, are
hardly ever communicated to the 1MB and, therefore, do not find their way
into the IMB's statistics.
However flawed, the 1MB statistics nevertheless indicate that while
Southeast Asia as a whole must be considered the most pirate-prone area in
the world, there have been interesting shifts in the distribution of attacks
across the region since the early 1990s. From 1990 to 1992 the waters between
the Malacca and Singapore Straits were identified as the most pirate-infested.
The narrow Malacca Straits is one of the most congested waterways in the
world, and vessels have to be particularly careful as the Straits is beset by
numerous shallow points, forcing vessels to reduce speed to ensure safe
passage. These conditions are favourable for pirates, as it enables them to
approach their vulnerable target without difficulty in small speedboats.
However, after the initiation of joint anti-piracy patrols by the Malaysian,
Singaporean, and Indonesian authorities in this vital area, the focus of piracy
shifted to the South China Sea. Between 1993 and 1995, more than 50 per
cent of attacks recorded for Southeast Asia took place in the South China
Sea. Particularly affected were the territorial waters of Hong Kong and
Macau and the so-called HLH 'terror-triangle', encompassing the waters
between Hong Kong, Luzon in the Philippines, and the Chinese island of
Hainan. Some observers believe that the spate of attacks were officially
sanctioned by the Chinese authorities, while others suggest that only a few
corrupt elements of the southern Chinese bureaucracy and navy were involved.
However, since the mid-1990s, as the Soeharto regime unravelled, Indonesian
ports and territorial waters are identified as the most pirate-prone in Southeast
Asia. The geographic features of Indonesia and its sheer size make effective
anti-piracy patrols a difficult task at the best of times and particularly so in
the aftermath of the economic recession since 1997. Furthermore, as in
other parts of the region, pirates can readily slip across borders to escape
patrols by the authorities.11
Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia57
The PRC reports also indicate that modern day pirates are increasingly
prepared to use violence to further their aims, with the number of pirates
armed with modern weapons on the rise. Injuries to the crew, assaults, killings,
and hostage taking of crew members occur regularly in pirate attacks in the
region. An attack, therefore, poses a direct threat to the welfare and lives of
seafarers and can be a frightening or even traumatic experience for the victims.
At sea, the victims usually have to face the attackers alone and are forced to
defend themselves with whatever means available. This is complicated by the
fact that modern technology has drastically reduced the number of crew on
board commercial vessels, leaving vessels more vulnerable to pirate attacks.
The data collected by the PRC demonstrates that piracy is once again
flourishing in East and Southeast Asia. In order to understand why piracy re-
emerged with such a vengeance in the Asian region in the 1990s, and to
analyse its distribution and characteristics, one has to look at the factors that
shaped modern piracy in the region, particularly in the post-Cold War era.
Shaping Modern Day Piracy
Piracy is not a new phenomenon in Southeast Asia and many observers point
to an age-old 'culture of piracy' to explain its modern day manifestation in the
region. However, what is referred to as piracy in the past performed a
structurally different role in global and local interactions than contemporary
piracy. Many of those labelled 'pirates' in Southeast Asian waters in the past
— a label assigned to them by Western colonial powers — were involved in
slave raiding or other activities, which were conducted to strengthen chiefdoms
or sultanates (while at the same time enriching the sponsors of such raids) .12
These state-sponsored — or at least tolerated — activities were very different
from modern piracy, which is largely conducted for private ends. In fact,
modern day piracy is more likely to have an adverse effect on state power,
weakening state control and contributing to the loss of state sovereignty.
Therefore, I believe that one has to look to more recent developments to
explain the phenomenon of modern day piracy. A number of major
developments in the 1990s were conducive to the rise of modern day piracy.
Among those developments, three are of particular importance: (1) accelerating
globalization and the intensification of the global economy, (2) the end of the
Cold War, and (3) technological advances.
First, increased globalization and the intensification of the global economy
brought about many changes in Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War era.
These include the transformation of polities and economies, with a rise in
commercial maritime traffic, providing a ready supply of potential targets for
pirates.13 Furthermore, while many people benefited from economic
developments in the 1990s, others were left behind in the boom, resulting in
an ever-widening gap between the haves and have nots. For some of the more
desperate of those left behind, a pirate attack can be an alternative source of
income to feed a hungry family. Since the 1997 economic crisis, poverty,
58Carolin Liss

unemployment, and uncertainty spread even more widely in Southeast Asia,

and more people were forced to seek alternative sources of livelihood and
income. Moreover, as a result of the financial crisis, various states in the region
had less capital available to finance military and naval operations, including
effective anti-piracy patrols in their territorial waters. With less capital available
to them, corruption among officials also increased and many undoubtedly
accepted bribes from pirates in exchange for their co-operation.
These developments also led to a further decline in the ability of some
states to maintain a certain level of 'law and order' in particular areas in the
region. Batam, an Indonesian island just off the coast of Singapore, is one
example. Hopes were once high that the small island could develop into a
place of economic prosperity, based on tourism and intensive industrial
development. Lured in by rumours of a booming economy, migrants from all
parts of Indonesia arrived on the island in the wake of the economic crisis. As
the economic opportunities they had hoped for did not emerge, many migrants
ended up in squatter communities around the island. Today, the island is a
place where golf courses and resorts co-exist with squatter communities,
factories, and thriving brothels. The island is in fact known for the ready
availability of inexpensive sex and drugs, and is a hot spot for smuggling goods
and people. In his work on Batam, Johann Lindquist characterizes the island
as a place that changed too fast in recent years and now enjoys a certain level
of lawlessness — a place with a distinct frontier-town atmosphere.14 It is therefore
not surprising that Batam is also known as a latter-day pirate base, with various
pirate gangs operating from the island.15
Second, with end of the Cold War a new world order emerged. As a result,
Southeast Asia saw a sharp reduction in the number of superpower naval
vessels patrolling Asian sea-lanes, leaving stretches of international and territorial
waters without regular patrols.16 Moreover, with the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the end of the Soviet and American supported proxy wars in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America, the international arms markets suddenly became saturated
with automatic weapons. Light arms from the Soviet Union, Cambodia, China,
and Afghanistan have been sold at relatively low prices in countries such as
Myanmar, Indonesia, and the Philippines and are readily available to drug
lords, terrorists, crime syndicates and pirates alike.17
Third, advanced technology has had an immense impact on modern day
piracy, with pirates today using modern weaponry and speedboats for their
operations. Furthermore, advanced communication technology has enabled
pirate gangs and other crime syndicates to network, plan, and execute regional
operations, as ideas and vast sums of money can now be transmitted rapidly
from one country to another. Particularly, organized crime syndicates have
benefited from these developments. The rise of powerful global and regional
crime syndicates in recent years and their ability to adapt to the modern world
and refine their criminal methods has shattered the theory that economic
development, technological advances, and modernization will automatically
Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia59

cause the disappearance of organized crime. Moreover, an important statement

made by Judge Giovanni Falcone in regard to the transformation of the Cosa
Nostra may shed some light on the nature of operations of crime syndicates
in Asia in the last two decades. Falcone argues that the spread of mass
consumerism has "changed the entire social context (in Italy) and thus has
also changed the Cosa Nostra, whose evolution develops in parallel with it".
Falcone believes that as a result of the spread of consumer capitalism the Cosa
Nostra became ever more ruthless and money oriented.18 Asian crime syndicates,
operating in a similar environment, may have also undergone a similar
transformation. Large-scale operations, which promise huge profits, by
organized crime gangs and pirate syndicates may in fact be a direct response
to the spread of capitalism and materialism in the region.
These developments taking place in the early 1990s influenced and shaped
modern day piracy in East and Southeast Asia. As a result, two different types
of pirates emerged — opportunistic sea-robbers and sophisticated organized
pirate gangs.

Contemporary Pirates
'Common Sea-Robbers' and 'Social Pirates'
The vast majority of pirate attacks today are simple hit-and-run robberies,
committed by what can best be described as common sea-robbers. The
perpetrators of these attacks operate in small groups who have most likely
known each other for some time.19 These sea-robbers attack ships at sea, at
anchorage or in ports and most likely do not share their booty with anyone
outside the pirate gang with the possible exception of bribe money paid to
outsiders to ensure their silence or co-operation. The attacks often last no
longer than 15 to 30 minutes, and require a minimum level of organization
and planning. Two different kinds of hit-and-run attacks can be identified in
East and Southeast Asia, primarily distinguished by the level of violence involved
in the attacks and the type of vessel attacked. It is, however, important to stress
that the boundaries between these two kinds of attacks are blurred and that
some perpetrators may fit into either category at certain points in time as they
change their modus operandi.
The first type of hit-and-run attacks is often referred to as 'Asian piracy'
and, with few exceptions, takes place in territorial waters. The sea-robbers in
this scenario skilfully slip aboard a ship, mostly under cover of darkness, and
take anything of value before leaving the vessel. In some instances such an
attack is only discovered when the ship's equipment and crew's belongings are
found missing after the pirates have left the vessel. The booty stolen in these
attacks may include cash, radios, VCRs, or even tins of paint or ropes. Violence
in these cases is mostly limited to occasions in which the perpetrators' route
of escape is blocked or when they are confronted or threatened in any other
way.20
60Carolin Liss

The second type of hit-and-run attacks is more violent in nature. The

pirates in these cases attack small vessels, including yachts and other small
pleasure craft. A number of holidaymakers in the Asian region have in recent
years experienced such attacks. While some of these assaults are simple hit-
and-run robberies while a yacht is left unattended, others involve a high level
of violence as the pirates confront the crew on-board directly21 The vast majority
of attacks targeting small craft, however, involve fishermen, either as victims or
as perpetrators. Fishing boats and their crews are arguably most affected by
contemporary piracy, even though most of these attacks are not reported,
either out of ignorance or of fear of revenge by the pirates.22 The perpetrators
in these attacks are in most cases heavily armed, carrying semi-automatic rifles
or similar weapons, though the level of violence and armaments of the pirates
vary from region to region depending on local conditions. The following
account by a Vietnamese fisher demonstrates some characteristics of such an
encounter:

"We were setting our nets off the Ca Mau peninsula (at the southern
tip of Vietnam), (when) (s)uddenly two high-speed vessels raced towards
us. Masked assailants carrying guns jumped onto our fishing boat and
threatened us with their guns. They ordered us to jump overboard and
abandon the boat." As the owner tried to resist, he was shot and killed
by the pirates. The perpetrators then attempted to restart the vessel's
engine, but fled after they failed to do so. The frightened crew was later
rescued by a passing fishing boat.23
A second example from the southern Philippines demonstrates that such attacks
can also be extremely violent, in cases where the pirates show no interest in
the fishing boat itself. In this incident three fishermen were shot dead in the
strait between Basilan and Zamboanga province, as pirates in a motor boat and
armed with rifles approached their boat and opened fire, killing the fishermen.
The pirates then took the fishing boat's engine and fishing gear and fled.
Other fishermen working nearby heard the shots, but were too afraid to
approach the scene of the crime and the victims' bodies were only later
discovered by policemen.24
These attacks are without doubt extremely traumatic for the surviving
fishermen. While not all such attacks result in the death of a crew member, the
level of violence is still high, as the pirates have to confront the crew directly.
Furthermore, the sea-robbers often destroy the fishermen's livelihood by taking
their fishing boats, their equipment, or catch. Additionally, hostage taking has
become a frequent occurrence in some areas, especially the southern
Philippines, and ransom demands for the return of seized equipment, vessels,
or crew members are a further burden for the victims.
In other cases, fishermen themselves are the perpetrators. Fishermen
throughout Asia have to struggle increasingly with depleted marine resources
and higher oil prices and often find themselves in competition with large
Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia61

technologically advanced foreign trawlers. To supplement their income, some

fishers reportedly resort to attacks on other fishing boats or other passing
vessels. A high level of violence is once again characteristic of such attacks, as
the target vessels are often small or medium-sized.
In addition to these two types of hit-and-run robberies at sea, a distinct
type of pirate — the 'social pirate' — may be worth discussing briefly. Until
today, many people still maintain a romantic view of pirates and their activities,
perceiving them as simply adventurers or social — Robin Hood type — bandits
of the sea. While the reality often seems rather different, Eric Hobsbawm's
discussion of social banditry may be useful to shed some light on the activities
of certain groups of modern pirates — and certain aspects of modern piracy
— in Southeast Asia. Hobsbawm's analysis of social bandits25 focuses on peasant
outlaws "whom the lord and state regard as criminals, but who remain within
peasant society, and are considered by their people as heroes, as champions,
avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and in any
case as men to be admired, helped and supported". Social bandits always rob
or attack people outside their own community, with the Robin Hood type (at
least in theory) robbing the rich to give to the poor. Hobsbawm points out
that social banditry emerged in agricultural areas ruled and oppressed by
"someone else" and often in times of economic crisis. Hobsbawm further stresses
that mass social banditry only flourished where the structure of (central) state
power was weak, unstable, or absent.26
Social bandits are, for obvious reasons, in many aspects very different from
modern pirates, and any comparison must consequently take account of this
very important fact. However, by discussing two examples of modern day piracy,
I will attempt to show that a certain type of pirate in Southeast Asia may in fact
share some crucial characteristics with Hobsbawm's social bandits.
The first example is based on recent reports from various parts of Indonesia.
These reports state that 'whole villages' predominately on remote islands,
occasionally gang up and attack vessels for food, cigarettes, and other small
goods. Rising poverty, especially since the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the
relentless depletion of fish stocks in the region are mainly blamed for such
activities. For the inhabitants of such impoverished places, passing vessels are
tempting targets as some of these ships can feed a 'whole village'. The attack
itself, however, is most likely planned and conducted by a small number of
able-bodied men from the community, not the 'whole village' as such. However,
the 'whole village' may share the booty, benefit from the attack, and admire
and support the perpetrators.27
The second example comes from urban Manila, where in 1992, the
journalist Michael Bociurkwic, was able to interview Renée, a local pirate. At
the time of the interview, Renee was thirty-three years old with a family of four
and had been engaged in pirate activity for some five years. He revealed that
he and his gang plunder ships in Manila Bay three or four times a month,
taking cash, cigarettes, small engines, and cargo. The targets are, according to
62Carolin Liss

Renee, selected by his "very rich" boss, who remains anonymous. Renee told
the journalist that they are well armed when they launch an attack and do not
hesitate to shoot when "there is no way to get out". "I don't like the job, but
I need it to feed my family", he added. According to the pirate, a large part
of his monthly 'salary' of up to 20,000 pesos goes towards his family, neighbours,
and the urban poor, in particular the squatters who spend their days searching
for scraps around Manila's notorious Smokey Mountain. "We give money to
the poor because it is very difficult for them to survive. They have no hospitals
or schools. The government has no time for people like us."28
The pirates in these examples clearly have certain characteristics in common
with the social bandits. Just as in the case of the social bandits, these particular
pirates share their booty with the poor are most likely admired by their people
and therefore receive help and support from them. Both the Indonesian
villagers and the poor on the rubbish tip in urban Manila can be regarded as
people governed by someone who, according to Renee, has no time for people
like them. Furthermore, those areas may be described as places where state
power is comparatively weak. This and the support the pirates receive from
their communities make it difficult for the authorities to arrest these pirates.

Organized Pirate Gangs

The second group of pirates can be characterized by a much higher level of
organization and sophistication compared with the hit-and-run sea-robbers.
These organized pirate gangs — or syndicates — predominately attack medium-
sized vessels, including cargo ships, bulk carriers, and tankers. Favoured cargoes
are those that can be shifted and sold easily, ranging from diesel fuel to steel
ingots and electronic goods. Organized pirate gangs adapt their own strategic
and logistical methods to a rapidly changing world, becoming increasingly
sophisticated in the process. Today, the gathering of intelligence and the
conduct of surveillance with modern technical equipment are common practice
among organized pirates and are used to target selected ships and cargoes.
Two different types of pirate attacks by organized gangs can be
distinguished, so-called long-term and permanent seizures. Long-term seizures
are attacks in which a vessel and its crew are held hostage for a stipulated
period of time. In these cases a vessel is attacked whilst underway, the crew
overpowered, and the ship diverted from its course. In some cases, the ship is
repainted and the name changed by the pirates in order to avoid detection.
However, while the crew is held hostage, the ship is brought to a safe location
to unload the cargo, after which the crew and the vessel are released.29
An even higher level of organization and sophistication is required for
permanent seizures. In these cases the entire vessel is literally hijacked by
pirates. One example is the seizure of the Cheung Son discussed earlier.
Permanent seizures appear to be a phenomenon particular to the Far East
region and, increasingly, Indonesian waters. In the past, many hijacked vessels
have been found in southern Chinese ports. Hijacking a vessel is a method
Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia63

used by organized crime to acquire a ship, which is then turned into a so-
called phantom ship. Pirate syndicates are interested in obtaining a vessel
either because they know of shippers eager to find a ship to carry their cargo,
or a ship is hijacked on order from a third party. In both cases the vessel's
original cargo is disposed of and the original crew either killed, thrown
overboard, or put into life rafts and left to their own device. The ship is then
registered under a different name and turned into a phantom ship. Registering
a vessel under a false name is surprisingly simple, as temporary registrations
are — for a certain price — "issued indiscriminately by officials of some ship
registries". The re-registration of hijacked vessels makes it particularly difficult
for authorities to trace them and provides the new owner with official protection
"during any legal proceedings that may subsequently take place". Equipped
with its new identity, the vessel is then offered to an anxious shipper to transport
his cargo. The cargo, however, will never arrive at its destined port, as the
vessel is diverted and the cargo off-loaded in another port and sold to a
different consignee. The vessel is then once again re-registered under a new
name and the play begins once again.30 These attacks undoubtedly display a
high degree of organization and require detailed planning and upfront capital.
According to Noel Choong, four major pirate syndicates involved in ship-
jackings are operating in Southeast Asia at present.31 To operate successfully,
pirate syndicates are thought to have links to government agencies or officials,
particularly in China and Indonesia. Discussing piracy in China, Bertil Lintner,
suggests that: "... while piracy may not be condoned by the Chinese navy as
such, the temptation to participate in attacks on foreign ships, or to turn a
blind eye to sea-robbery in exchange for bribes or part of the loot, appears to
be very strong."32 Moreover, these kinds of pirate attacks suggest close links
between piracy and other illegal activity in the region, which will be discussed
in the following section.

Pirates, Smugglers, Rebels, and Terrorists

Irrespective of the vessel or cargo seized, pirates need a reliable support network
at sea and ashore in order to sell the stolen goods and launder the money
gained in the operation. In pirate attacks in which the cargo is stolen or the
entire ship hijacked, the perpetrators often know in advance what cargo the
targeted vessel is carrying. The pirates, or their financiers, choose cargoes that
can be sold easily on a ready black market in the region. Cargoes targeted
therefore include television sets, steel ingots, or rubber, as well as palm and
diesel oil. In the case of a diesel oil tanker targeted and seized, either for a
short period or permanently, the oil has to be unloaded, smuggled into the
country of destination and eventually sold there. In case of a permanent seizure,
forged documents may be used for the hijacked vessel and its cargo, and the
oil is then 'legally' discharged in a port. In attacks in which tankers are seized
for a short period of time only, as well as in some permanent hijacking cases,
the oil is discharged at sea into other tankers or fishing vessels adapted to hold
64Carolin Liss

10,000 to 100,000 litres of oil. The diesel oil is then sold illegally to fishermen,
boat operators, or patrol stations. With a high demand for oil in the region,
buyers for the cheaper, stolen oil are not difficult to find.33 Furthermore, it is
not unlikely that phantom ships are used by organized crime gangs to smuggle
arms, drugs, people, fauna, or any other goods.
Another significant aspect of modern day piracy is its links to the activities
of rebel groups and terrorists operating in Southeast Asia. Newspapers in the
region have repeatedly published articles indicating that both the Free Aceh
Movement (GAM) in Indonesia and the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines have
been involved in pirate attacks and arms smuggling.
The GAM rebels in Aceh are believed to have conducted pirate attacks in
recent years in order to finance their struggle against the Indonesian
Government. Unlike GAM attacks in which political targets are hit, such as
attacks on vessels servicing Exxon Mobile platforms, the GAM is said to have
attacked vessels and taken crew members hostage solely to extort money. The
boundaries between a pirate attack and a politically motivated act are in this
case clearly blurred, as the money from the attack was used to finance the
GAM's politically motivated fight against the Indonesian military forces in
Aceh.34
The Abu Sayyaf in the southern Philippines has also repeatedly been
associated with pirate activity. There are, however, a large number of armed
groups and individuals operating in the southern Philippines — both politically
motivated and with pure criminal intent — and to find the real culprits in this
maze is often impossible. Furthermore, although some Abu Sayyaf members
or splinter groups are most likely involved in criminal activities — including
piracy — the overall motivating force behind the group's major activities is
political in nature. These activities include the terrorist acts that have made
the Abu Sayyaf notorious, such as the kidnapping of foreign tourists and resort
workers from the island of Sipadan, Malaysia, in 2000. The motivation behind
the Abu Sayyaf's operations is crucial, as it is the motive (and consequently the
perpetrators' modus operandi) that distinguishes the terrorist from a modern
day pirate, or an ordinary criminal. While the pirate is acting primarily for
selfish, personal reasons, the terrorist believes that he is serving a 'good' cause
designed to achieve a higher good for a wider constituency. The terrorist's
action is designed to have political and social consequences or to create
psychological repercussions beyond the sheer act of violence itself. Unlike the
pirate, the terrorist aims at conveying a fundamental message — often political
or religious — through an act of violence.35 The terrorist, therefore, aims at
disrupting society, while criminals, and particularly organized crime syndicates,
"may live outside the law, (but) have never been outside society".36
However, as in the case of the GAM, the boundaries are also blurred in
some Abu Sayyaf operations. Ironically, it was the Abu Sayyafs attack on Sipadan
that prompted the Malaysian Government to significantly step up anti-piracy
patrols in East Malaysian waters.
Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia65
Conclusion
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, maritime piracy in Southeast Asia
has once again become a problem of national and international concern.
Despite the fact that the number of attacks may appear rather low compared
with the vast number of vessels passing through Asian shipping lanes, piratical
activity has serious implications, not only for crews and shippers directly affected
by attacks. Dangers posed by contemporary piracy include threats to trade,
national security, and the environment in the region. A further increase in
attacks may, for example, have an adverse impact on regional trade, especially
in areas, or certain ports, associated with pirate activity. Furthermore, some
piratical activity is linked to smuggling and other illegal activities, and
sophisticated syndicates or organized pirate gangs are today increasingly involved
in piracy. Those illegal activities and the rise of organized crime in Asia
unquestionably pose a threat to the security of all countries in the region.
Moreover, acts of piracy also have the potential to cause excessive environmental
damage, as pirates are known to tie up the crew or throw them overboard,
leaving the attacked vessel to drift without control. Given the increased danger
of a mid-sea collision, such an incident can have dire consequences, particularly
in the crowded Asian sea-lanes. The worst-case scenario is a collision or crash,
involving a large oil tanker.37 Such an incident would have devastating
consequences for the marine life as well as for coastal areas and its inhabitants.
The sinking of the tanker Prestige off the coast of Spain in November 2002,
served as a recent reminder of the devastating consequences of a major oil
spill, particularly in a densely populated area.38
However, there are indications that piracy and other non-traditional security
issues, such as illegal immigration and illegal fishing, are more widely discussed
today then in the past. Until the late 1980s, communism had been identified
as the pre-eminent security threat, which allowed many non-traditional security
issues to be sidelined. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the
focus shifted, and piracy and other related issues receive more attention from
governments and security experts. This international redefinition of security
may increase the chances of finding effective ways of addressing the problem
of modern day piracy.39 To find satisfactory solutions, however, is not an easy
task. As discussed above, modern day piracy is a complex phenomenon,
encompassing various kinds of pirates and piratical activities, caused and
reinforced by a number of social, political, and economic factors. A variety of
approaches are therefore necessary to address the problem.
While there have been responses to modern day piracy, further efforts by
the shipping industry, international institutions and regional governments
are required. It has been suggested that the shipping industry and
international institutions could further raise awareness of the problem,
encourage the reporting of pirate attacks to the 1MB or other institutions,
and promote programmes to improve security on board commercial vessels.
According to the 1MB, security on board can be improved by, for example,
66Carolin Liss

installing Secure-Ship — a 9,000 volt, non-lethal, electrifying fence surrounding

the ship to deter boarding attempts — or by using Shiploc, a satellite tracking
system designed to locate vessels at sea or in port.40 Initiatives by governments
should not only include increased patrols and improved coastal surveillance
systems but also socio-economic and political measures to address the root
causes of modern day piracy, which include poverty, dislocation, uncertainty,
and corruption.41 Given the nature of modern day piracy, further regional
and international co-operation is necessary to cope with the problem.42
Regional co-operation is in fact crucial as modern day piracy is a regional
phenomenon, linking squatters on the rubbish tip in urban Manila and
villagers on a remote island in Indonesia to wealthy businessmen and crime
syndicates in Asian capitals.

Notes
1.In the Chinese legal system, 'piracy' is not defined as such, but certain crimes,
especially those that endanger public security, are related to piracy, and acts of
piracy can be punished under those laws. See Zou Keyuan, "Piracy at Sea and
China's Response", EAI Background Brief no. 55 (Singapore: East Asian Institute,
2000).
2.Information on the Cheung Son hijacking is based on a number of newspaper
articles, particularly articles from the South China Morning Post and the Straits
Times.
3.The article is based on material widely available. Primary research on the subject
of contemporary piracy has thus far been rather limited and more in-depth research
is required to fully understand modern day piracy in all its manifest forms and
complexity.
4.James Francis Warren, "A Tale of Two Centuries: The Globalisation of Maritime
Raiding and Piracy in Southeast Asia at the End of the Eighteenth and Twentieth
Centuries", Paper presented at KITLVJubilee Workshop, Leiden, 14-16 June 2001,
pp. 13-17.
5.There are a number of other organizations and institutions concerned with piracy,
such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which cannot be discussed
in this article.
6.Zou Keyuan, "Enforcing the Law of Piracy in the South China Sea", EAI Background
Brief no. 19 (Singapore: East Asian Institute, 1998), p. 13.
7.ICC International Maritime Bureau, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. A
Special Report. Revised edition — March 1998" (Barking, U.K.: International
Chamber of Commerce 1MB, 1998), p. 2.
8.ICC International Maritime Bureau, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships.
Report for the Period 1 January-30 September 2002" (Barking, U.K.: International
Chamber of Commerce 1MB, 2002), p. 5.
9.Author's interview with Noel Choong on 23 October 2002.
10."Piracy in Southeast Asia", CSS Strategic Briefing Papers vol. 3, part 2, Centre for
Strategic Studies, June 2000.
11.Peter Chalk, Non-Military Security and Global Order (New York: St. Martin's Press,
2000), pp. 68-71.
12.See James Francis Warren, The SuIu Zone 1768-1898: The Dynamics of External
Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981). James Francis Warren, Iranun and
Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia67
Balangingi: Globalisation, Maritime Raiding and the Birth of Ethnicity (Singapore:
Singapore University Press, 2002). Carl Trocki, Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs
and the Development of Johor and Singapore, 1784-1885 (Singapore: Singapore
University Press, 1979).
13.Chalk, Non-Military Security, p. 60.
14.Johann Lindquist, "The Anxieties of Mobility. Development, Migration, and Tourism
in the Indonesian Borderlands" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Social
Anthropology, Stockholm University, 2002), pp. 10-13.
15.See Jon Vagg, "Rough Seas? Contemporary Piracy in South East Asia. (Riau
Archipelago, Indonesia)", British Journal of Criminology 35, no. 1 (1995): 63-80.
16.Chalk, Non-Military Security, p. 60.
1 7.The trade in light arms has enormous impact on the countries involved, affecting
political stability and the economy. See Peter Chalk, "Light Arms Trading in
Southeast Asia", Jane's Intelligence Review, March 2002, pp. 42-45.
18.Giovanni Falcone with Marcelle Padovani, Men ofHonour. The Truth about the Mafia
(London: Warner Books, 1992), p. 118.
19.This is not necessarily the case in regard to perpetrators involved in major attacks,
where a group of people have in some cases been hired to attack a vessel who did
not 'work' together or know each other prior to the attack.
20.ICC International Maritime Bureau. "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. A
Special Report. Revised Edition — March 1998", pp. 3, 7.
21.Reports of lost yacht equipment, hijacked yachts, injury or even death of yacht
owners and their crew appear from time to time in newspapers or other reports.
A systematic data collection, however, does not exist to my knowledge.
22.It is therefore impossible to determine the exact number of such attacks. However,
some idea of the extent of the problem can be gained from various (newspaper)
reports. Vietnamese officials, for example, recorded 68 encounters with pirates
involving some 120 fishing vessels in the first nine months of 2001. See Tran Dinh
Thanh Lam. 'Vietnam: Wave of Piracy Terrifies Local Fishermen", Inter Press
Service, 24 October 2001. Another report from the southern Philippines recounts
that in Patalon, a small village of 200 subsistence fishermen and their families,
about 50 have lost their boats or engines to pirates. See Indira A.R. Lakshmanan,
"Sidebar Rich, Poor Targeted by Modern Buccaneers", Boston Globe, 3 September
2000.
23.Tran, "Vietnam: Wave of Piracy".
24."Pirates Rob, Shoot to Death Three Fishermen off Southern Philippine Province",
Associated Press Newswire, 12 April 1999.
25.Hobsbawm distinguished between three different types of social bandit, the "noble
robber" (Robin Hood type), the "terror bringing avenger", and the "haiduk", the
primitive resistance fighter. For the purpose of this article, however, the "noble
robber" is of primary interest. Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits (London: Abacus, 2001),
p. 23.
26.Ibid., pp. 14-20.
27.Sethuraman Dinakar and Harry Maurer, "The Jolly Roger Flies High ... as Piracy
Feeds the Hungry", Business Week (Internatioal Edition), 24 May 1999. There are a
number of articles in East and Southeast Asian newspapers (as well as some
international newspapers), mentioning attacks organized by 'whole villages'.
However, there are other types of pirates who also give a proportion of their booty
to their local community, but only in order to ensure the villagers' silence or
co-operation. See Robert Stuart, In Search of Pirates: A Modern Day Odyssey in the
South China Sea (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing (Edinburgh) Ltd, 2002),
pp. 218-20.
28.Michael Bociurkwic, "Pirate Says He Plunders to Feed His Family", South China
Morning Post, 2 May 1993.
68Carolin Liss

29.ICC International Maritime Bureau. "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. A
Special Report. Revised Edition — March 1998", pp. 35-36.
30.Ibid., pp. 32-35.
31.Author's interview with Noel Choong on 23 October 2002.
32.Bertil Lintner, Blood Brothers: Crime, Business and Politics in Asia (Crows Nest, NSW,
Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2002), p. 10.
33.Robert S. Redmond, "The Modern Pirate", Contemporary Review 266, no. 1553
(1995): 292-97; Zou Keyuan, "Piracy at Sea and China's Response". See also Pasuk
Phongpaichit, Sungsidh Piriyarangsan, and Nualnoi Treerat, Guns, Girls, Gambling,
Ganja: Thailand's Illegal Economy and Public Policy (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books,
1998), pp. 113-20.
34.See, for example, Stuart Mcmillan, "Japan Should Continue Role in Anti-Piracy
Steps", Asahi Shimbun. Asia Network, 4 May 2002; available online at <www.asahi.com/
English/asianet/column/eng_020205.html>. See also Tay Ninh, "Piracy a
Concern in Malacca Strait", <www.geocities.com/glen_crippen/01-ll/PIR-
concern0110.html> , accessed on 20 October 2001.
35.For a discussion of the differences between terrorists, ordinary criminals and
insane assassins, see Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: 1998), pp. 41-43.
36.Lintner, Blood Brothers, p. 10.
37.Chalk, Non-Military Security, p. 67.
38.The most devastating incident before the Prestige disaster was arguably the ecological
and environmental damage caused by the Exxon Valdez in Alaska in 1989. However,
the Prestige disaster may prove more devastating, as the incident occurred in an
area more densely populated. Moreover, if all the oil on the Prestige finds its way
into the ocean (some of it is still locked inside the vessel at the time of writing)
the amount of oil discharged will be double of that lost by the Exxon Valdez. See
"Öltanker komplett gesunken", MSN News, 20 November 2001; available online at
<http://news.focus.msn.de/G/GN/gn.htm?snr=113631>.
39.N. Ganesan, "Illegal Fishing and Illegal Immigration in Thailand's Bilateral
Relations with Malaysia and Myanmar", in Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast
Asia, edited by Andrew TH. Tan and J.D. Kenneth Boutin (Singapore: Select
Publishing, 2001), pp. 307-8.
40.ICC International Maritime Bureau "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships.
Report for the Period 1 January-30 September 2002", p. 19. For further details,
see <www.secure.ship.com> and <www.shiploc.com>.
4L See "Future Challenges for Southeast Asian Nations in Maritime Security", at
<www.iips.org/Mak_paper.pdf>, accessed on 18 September 2002; Mak Joon Num,
"Incidents at Sea: Shipjacking, Maritime Muggings, Thefts and Illegal Migration in
Southeast Asia", Paper presented at the Intercargo Roundtable Discussion on
Piracy, Singapore, 4 February 2002.
42. This is not an easy task as Abbot and Renwick point out, because piracy raises
complex issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction. See Jason Abbot and Neil Renwick,
"Pirates? Maritime Piracy and Social Security in Southeast Asia", Pacifica Review:
Peace Security & Global Change 11, no. 1 (February 1999): 15.