CASE ANALYSIS: NEW OKHLA DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORITY (NOIDA) Vs. YUNUS LA

INDUSTRIAL
Case name New Okhla Industrial Development
Authority (Noida) Vs Yunus

Citation CIVIL APPEAL NO.901 OF 2022

Aplleant New okhala Industrial development

authority (Noida)
Respondent Yunus

Bench Justice K. M. Joseph Justice P. Sri

Narasimha
Date of judgement 3rd February,2022

INTRODUCTION:
In this case an appeal was filed in the Supreme court of India against
the order of the high court which held that the award passed by the lok
Adalat can form the foundation for exercising power under section 28A
of the land Acquisition Act. Court in the present case interpreted the
jurisdiction of the Lok Adalats to mean that an application under
Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be maintained
based on an award passed by the Lok Adalat under Section 20 of
the Legal Services Authority.
FACTS OF THE CASE :
 Under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 (henceforth referred to
as “the act”), a notification was sent on March 21, 1983, to the villages of
Teshsil Dadri, which is located in Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh, regarding
planned industrial development that the appellant was to undertake. The
Land Acquisition Officer determined the compensation for the respondents’
land to be Rs. 20 per square yard in an award dated November 28, 1984.
Although one Fateh Mohammed filed a reference against the
aforementioned award with a Lok Adalat, the respondents did not request
an enhancement of the award under section 18 of the Act.
 With its award dated 12.03.2016, the Lok Adalat cited the High Court’s
order regarding several appeals against the Land Acquisition Officer’s award
dated 28.11.1984, in which the High Court instructed the relevant
Authorities to calculate compensation at a rate of Rs. 297.50 per square
yard rather than 20 sq. yard. Through the execution of
Settlement/Compromise Agreement Paper No. 60Ka1, the parties
reaffirmed the aforementioned decree. Following the High Court’s order
and the settlement agreement, the Lok Adalat made its decision.
 This prompted the respondents to file applications under Section 28A of the
Act with the Additional District Magistrate, requesting a re-evaluation of the
Lok Adalat outcome. But, the aforementioned applications were turned
down because the Lok Adalat’s decision was predicated on a compromise.
The responders subsequently filed writ petitions in the High Court, where
the judge ruled that the respondents would have the right to invoke Section
28A of the Act and that the Lok Adalat award would be regarded as a Civil
Court decree. Consequently, this appeal was filed with the Supreme Court
by the appellants.
 The appellants’ learned attorney contended that since the Lok Adalats were
established to reach a compromise under section 19 of the Legal
Authorities Act, 1987, they do not have the adjudication function that the
land acquisition act intended. Hence, the award passed by the Lok Adalat
 can’t be considered as a decree for the purpose of Section 28A of the land
acquisition act.
 As the award of the Lok Adalat is based on the ruling of the High Court, the
learned counsel representing the respondents contended that it would be
unjust to ignore it. The legal representative for the respondents further
contended that Section 21 of the Legal Service Authorities Act, 1987, which
states that “Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree
of a civil court,” is sufficiently broad to include the award of a Lok Adalat as
an order of the court under Section 18 of the Act.

ISSUES:
Whether an award made by a Lok Adalat under Section 20 of the Legal
Services Authorities Act, 1987 can serve as the foundation for a
redetermination of compensation as envisioned by Section 28A of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894?

CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF APLLEANT:

 Appeal Against Section 28 A of the 1987 Act
 The appellant argues that section 28 A cannot be applied without a
court ruling under the act.
 The appellant argues that Lok Adalat, established under section 19 of
the 1987 Act, does not perform any judicial or adjudicatory
functions.
 The appellant argues that the deeming fiction in Section 21 of the
Act should only apply to the initial cause of friction.
 The appellant cites rulings in Government of India v. Vedanta Limited
(2020) and State of Punjab versus Jalour Singh (2008) 2 SCC 660.
 The appellant argues that different high courts have different
opinions on the matter.
 The appellant notes that the first appeal number 1100/04, Mangu
versus State of UP, granted compensation at a rate of INR 297 per
square yard.
 Lok Adalat's Compensation Decision, the court upheld the High
Court's decision on the compensation computation, dismissing a
special leave petition.
 The court emphasized that the appellant acknowledged the
possibility of compensation being set at Rs 297 per square yard.
 The court argued that the Lok Adalat's decision fulfilled the need for
an application under Act Section 28a.
 The court criticized the High Court's decision in the Mangu Ram case,
which found the rate at Rs 297.50 per square yard, as erroneous.

CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:

• The respondent's attorney argues that a review of the Lok Adalat

award would demonstrate the applicant's inability to escape a rate
predicated on a High court ruling.
• The legal fiction must be given full effect, and the process
resulting in the award should be compared to the one typically
considered under section 18 of the act.
• The respondent argues that the court must not be blind to the
command of equality to fulfil the noble purpose of section 28a.
• The respondent argues that the award of a lok Adalat is treated
as an order of any other court, as stipulated by section 21.
• The lok Adalat award would become a court order that
increased the compensation recommended by the land
acquisition officer.
• The respondent argues that the court cannot exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction in the appellant's Favor under Article 136
of the Constitution, even if it were inclined to rule against the
respondents.
• The respondent argues that Noida is estopped because the lok
Adalat represents the appellant's position and is consensual,
having been approved by the Noida.
• The lok Adalat award could also be regarded as a court order,
depending on the circumstances.
JUDGEMENT:
The Court expounded on the purpose of the 1987 act and stated
that the jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat under Section 20 is to
enable a genuine compromise and the settlement of disputes
between the parties in a case.
The Court then cited the ruling in K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon v.
C.D. Shaji, where it was decided that every Lok Adalat award
would be regarded, for the purposes of Section 21 of the Act, as a
decree of a civil court, and would therefore be subject to
execution by that court.Nevertheless, the Court in this instance
pointed out that the Award is only meant to be made enforceable
by virtue of Section 21 of 1987, which treats the Award like a
decree. Only by giving it enforceability in the same way as a
decree does the lawmaker intend it to be valid.It was observed by
the Court that the term “Court” in the land acquisition act refers
to the Principal Civil Court with original jurisdiction, unless a
Special Judicial Officer has been appointed by the relevant
Government to carry out the judicial functions of the court under
this Act. Therefore, in accordance with the guidelines established
in the case of P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job, the court concluded that
an award made by the Lok Adalat is not a compromise decree (the
acceptance by the Court of something to which the parties
agreed). As a result, an award made by the Lok Adalat pursuant to
Section 20 of the 1987 Act cannot be the basis for an application
under Section 28A of the Act.

LAWS INVOLVED:
Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987
Section 19- Organisation of Lok Adalats. Section 20-
Cognizance of cases by Lok Adalats. Section 21- Award of
Lok Adalat.
Land acquisition act 1984 Section 28A- Re-determination of
the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of
the Court.

ANALYSIS:
The validity of a Lok Adalat award in determining land acquisition
compensation under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, was at issue in the case of New Okhla Industrial
Development Authority (NOIDA) vs. Yunus.

The main question was whether the Lok Adalat award—which was
the result of a settlement between the parties—could serve as the
foundation for a new calculation of compensation. Although
NOIDA contested the award in the Supreme Court, the High Court
upheld its legality. IN the end, the Supreme Court upheld the High
 Court’s ruling in its 2022 ruling. It recognized that while the Lok
Adalat award was based on a compromise, it still constituted a
“determination” within the meaning of Section 28A, provided it
was fair and reasonable. The Court did, however, also stress that
Lok Adalat awards must be carefully examined to make sure they
are not just collusive agreements that violate landowners’ rights.

Significant ramifications of this case exist for Indian land

acquisition disputes. It makes clear how Lok Adalat awards factor
into determining compensation and stresses how crucial it is to
maintain their fairness and openness. It also emphasizes the
necessity of safeguards to stop the exploitation of Lok Adalat
procedures to get around the requirements of the Land
Acquisition Act, though.

CONCLUSION:
A forum for the amicable settlement of cases that are either
pending in court or at the pre-litigation stage is Lok Adalat, one of
the alternative dispute redressal mechanisms. In the current case,
the Court construed the Lok Adalats’ jurisdiction to mean that an
award made by the Lok Adalat pursuant to Section 20 of the Legal
Services Authority Act 1987 cannot serve as the basis for an
application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act.

This article is written by TAMANA SALARIA student of THE LAW

SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY OF JAMMU; Intern at LEGAL VIDHYA.