Plato: The Theory of Forms/Ideas and participation

For Plato, the problem of one and many was an enigma that needed to be resolved. The
problem of one and many was basically the challenge of explaining how a perfection (which
is one) is found in diverse subjects (many). For example, how can goodness (one)
characterize a good man, a good food or a good tree (many)?
Plato draws inspiration from Socrates, who, through definitions, concluded that the Form is
the principle of unity to which plurality and diversity are reducible. According to Plato, the
form is the real being – a being separate from matter (substantia separata), permanent and
eternal in differentiation from the material world that is characterized by change and flux
and is only a shadow of the real. In explaining the relationship between the Forms (which
are the causes of the material world) and the effects (the sensible, material world), Plato
employs the word participation – in terms of a relationship of dependence through
analogical sharing. Hence, participation is the structure of the relationship (analogon)
between the One and the many, and this relationship is one dependence such that material
things participate in the Forms which are participated in. Thus the material things depend
upon the Forms for their being. The Form has, by essence, what the image or shadow has by
participation. Despite his philosophical input, Plato is not credited with resolving the
problem of One and many since the Forms are multiple in relation to other Forms.

Aristotle: The canon of Causes

For Aristotle, the Forms do not have separate existence. Rather, the form is an intrinsic cause
of the substance (ousia). Separate Forms, for Aristotle, are causatively impotent. Aristotle
therefore goes ahead to talk of four causes: material, formal, efficient and final cause.

Participation and causality

Both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas believe in the universal dependence of all things in a
First Cause. According to Aristotle: if there is no first cause (proto arche), there is no cause at
all (Met III 994a 19); Aquinas on the other hand says: “Whatever is first in any order is the
cause of all that come after it (ST IIIa, q.56, a. 1 resp). However, what the First Cause is, its
functionality, and the relationship with its effect, vary between Aristotle and Thomas
Aquinas according to their cosmological views.

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For Aristotle, as for other early Greek thinkers, ex nihilo, nihil fit – nothing can come out of
nothing. Every substance in the material world is composed of matter and form, related as
potency and act. Generation and corruption is explained as a movement from potency to
act, initiated by the Unmoved Mover. Act is that which limits potency. So motion is
understood as reduction from potency to act and so the First Mover is unmoved because he
is without potency (Actus purus). Despite the idea of the unmoved mover as an efficient
cause, Aristotle fails to demonstrate metaphysical explanation of total dependence between
the Unmoved mover and the universe.

In de Hebdomadibus, Aquinas defines participation thus: “to take part in something; and so
when something receives in a particular way that which pertains to another universally, it is
said to participate in that thing.” He further explains the term in his commentary on the
Metaphysics, thus: “…that which is something in its entirety does not participate in it but is
essentially identical with it, whereas that which is not something in its entirety but has this
other thing joined to it, is said properly to participate in that thing” (In I Met. Lect. 10, n.
154). Aquinas identifies three modes of participation:
i. Logical relations of an individual, species and genus; eg. Man participates in
animal, since man does not exhaust animal. Fido participates in animal, since
Fido does not exhaust animal
ii. Matter-form/substance-accident relations; for example, an individual participates
in its accidental form – Socrates participating in whiteness. Matter participates in
esse once it receives form.
iii. Cause-effect relation – an effect participates in its cause, especially when its
cause is superior.
With this Aquinas shows that participation occurs both in the logical (as in i) and in the
ontological (ii and iii) order. Aquinas creates these categories of participation in order to
respond to Boethius who claimed that participation only occurs in the accidental order.
Boethius had asked the question: Are created things good by participation or by substance?
He replied:
i. They cannot be good by substance
ii. They cannot be good merely by participation, since what is good only by
participation is not good in itself but merely by accident.

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For Boethius, participation is accidents of substances. In showing how species participates in
the genus, Aquinas suggests that participation is possible in the substantial order. What can
be predicated by participation, can be predicated substantially. Aquinas thus delves into the
metaphysical structure of created being in relation to God, the first cause, to show how, in
God’s communication of his being to creatures, he also communicates his goodness such
that beings have a real, metaphysical participation on the substantial level in the divine
goodness by means of immanent form.

Matter/Form participation – Efficient Causality

God, as a subsistent being itself (ipsum esse subsistens), gives being by means of form, which
is a created likeness of the divine being. Through form, God gives being to a created
substance, for it is form that gives being (forma dat esse). This means that form is not
absolutely identifiable with a being’s act of existence (esse), but that esse is mediated
through form. Without form, there is no being. Without God, there will be no form since
God is the transcendent first cause.

Aquinas argued that things are good in themselves by virtue of the immanent form which
grants intrinsic relation to the good. The goodness of the creatures must be formally
received as an image and likeness (similitude) of the first good, which is God. Thus, God is
the efficient cause since he produces similitudes or formal likeness of himself in created
things.
From the beginning of philosophy, efficient causality is understood as the factor which
explains motion of beings. More fundamental than motion however is existence, for only
existing beings can move. Given that contingent beings do not have in themselves a
sufficient explanation of their coming-to-be, it follows that a necessary being is the efficient
cause of their existence. It can thus be said that the necessary being, “imparted” existence
on the contingent beings, hence the participation of contingent beings in the world of
existing reality is brought about by the efficient act of the necessary being. This is what we
call Creation (i.e. to bring a being into existence).

Another important question is to consider whether God is the source of the material
element of creation. Now, whatsoever material urstuff created beings are made from, we

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can either say that such an urstuff received its existence from God (i.e. material world is
contingent) or did not receive its existence from God (i.e. the material world is eternal). The
second option, which was accepted in ancient philosophy is absurd because it will imply that
the necessary being is the not the ‘First cause’ and in terms of motion is not the ‘Unmoved
Mover’. But since ancient philosophy arrived at the discovery of the Unmoved Mover, it only
leaves us with the option of the contingency of the world. Hence, the efficient causality of
the Creator extends to all elements (both matter and form) of the nature or essence of the
existing beings. Therefore, the Creator is the last cause – ultimate cause - of the existence
and the essence of contingent beings. All that exists come from Him. Put in other words,
created beings ‘receive their beings’ from the Creator and as such participate in the
phenomenon of existence which fully belongs to the Creator. As products of his idea (form),
created beings also derive (receive) their nature/essence from the Creator. In this way, the
application of participation to efficient cause with respect to the relation of necessary being
to contingent beings is absolute in the case of the Creator-creature relationship. In this way,
the doctrine of ‘creatio ex nihilo’ is to be understood as a metaphysical doctrine of
participation of created beings in terms of efficient causality

Ens/Essence-existence participation
The participation of beings in esse is the most fundamental kind of participation, since only
this participation can show how any given being can actually exist. All creatures are beings
by participation since their essence participates in the esse. In this relationship, the essence
is the participating principle and the esse is that which is participated.
Created substances, in this sense, are compared to their being as potency to act. Potency
participates in act, while limiting act at the same time. It is on this foundation that the
relation between God and creatures is built upon.

Exemplarity and participation: creatio ex nihilo:

In Plato, exemplars are the archetypal forms or ideas that are separate and account for the
existence of the multiple beings that share in their perfection. These exemplars possess
these perfections absolutely and in an unchanging manner, whereas these perfections are
limited in other entities that participate in them.

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In Aquinas, however, exemplarity is understood as “similitude” of the created world as a
resemblance of the divine nature in terms of the divine goodness. God himself is the
simplicity and absoluteness of his being is the one “exemplar” of/for creation. Things in
nature receive determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the
divine wisdom as its first principle…we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of
all things, which we call ideas – exemplar forms existing in the divine mind). Instead of
having multitude of exemplary ideas, as in Plato, Aquinas reduced all of them to the one
divine being which is the totality of the perfection of being. The divine ideas are the reasons
of created things, but not as formal causes in an intrinsic manner – the divine ideas are not
in things. The divine idea is an extrinsic cause. For Aquinas, the exemplars are within the
divine being itself as God’s knowledge of his imitability and therefore participability.
In scholastic philosophy, the exemplar cause, while referred to as the “plan in the mind of an
intelligent agent,” is a formal cause insofar as it is spoken of as that idea or plan; an efficient
cause insofar as it “aids or equips the agent for his task,” and a final cause “insofar as
It represents the good to be realized.”

Final Causality
A last consideration for our purposes here is the application of the doctrine of participation
in terms of final causality. As has already been noted, Aristotle’s most original contribution
to the theory of causes is that of final cause or teleology. In a sense the final cause is
connected to the full realization of the plan or idea (nature) which the efficient cause has in
bringing into existence the created being. The world in which we live in is not a world of
chance or chaos. Rather, natural things are purpose driven things and every agent acts for
the sake of an end – each according to its natural kind. It is the end-purpose of nature
(essence) so to speak.

The final cause is the best representation of the reason for being (i.e. purpose of creation). It
is an ideal to be realized and the life of a being consists in an oscillation with respect to the
final cause, that is either approximating closer or distancing away from the telos (final
cause). A being is perfected the more it approaches closer to the final cause and
imperfection is a movement in the opposite direction. Participation explained in terms of the
final cause highlights the realization of the plan of the necessary being by the contingent

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being. In this way, we mean obeying or accepting or living in accordance to this plan which
the necessary being set out for the contingent being from the beginning.
On the one hand, participation as a realization of the final cause, brings about harmony of
the contingent being with the necessary being. In this way, it engenders pleasure (of will)
and satisfaction (of the intellect) of the creator or necessary being. On the other hand,
participation in terms of realization of the final cause perfects and fully actualizes the
contingent being. In Kantian terms, it brings about happiness. The final cause is thus to be
understood as the inclination or potency to actualize the fullness of being, which entails the
participation in the goal or purpose intended by the Creator, which is the greatest good
(perfect satisfaction or happiness) of the creature. When attained, the final cause is the
source/fountain of happiness, which according to Kant is the satisfaction of all our
inclinations.

Conclusion
Participation as causation has been considered to be “the crowning point and completion of
metaphysical cognition.” The rationale for such accolade is found in its ability to offer
metaphysical justification for the source of being through a demonstration of the necessary
connection and ordering of being to the Absolute.