1964 0 Supreme(Raj) 140

1965 0 RLW(Raj) 444

Rajasthan High Court

Dave C. J. & Tyagi, J.
Messrs. Chohan Pan Bhandar - Appellant
Versus
The Asstt. Sales Tax Officer, Beawar - Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.424 of 1960
Decided On : August 07, 1964

Subject: Taxation - Sales Tax

betel-leaves - exemption - processed pan - interpretation - taxable commodity -

taxation laws - reasonable interpretation - liberal construction - narrow interpretation
- unreasonable interpretation - violence to language - scope and amplitude - fraud
prevention - public good promotion - handloom cloth - cereals -vegetables -
cashewnuts - tobacco - bidis - misri-patasa - handloom cloth - rice -idlies - dosas -
retrospective effect

Act Referred :
SALES TAX ACT : S.4

(a) Interpretation of Statutes—Taxation Statutes—Exemption clauses to be

reasonably interpreted neither enabling fraudulent evasion nor unreasonably
whitling scope.(b) Sales Tax Act, Sec. 4, Notification No. F. 5 (51) E & T/58,
dated April 1. 1958—Betel leaves include Pan after application of Chuna and
Katha.

Cases Referred:
(8) State of Travancore-Cochin vs. Shamuga Vilas Cashewnut Factory, Quilon, , (AIR

1953 SC 333)
(10) Messrs. Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1962
SC 1614),
(1) Upper India Chamber of Commerce Cawnpore vs. Commissioner of Income-tax,
C.P. and U.P., Lucknow (AIR 1948 Alld., , 64)
(2) The Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, West Bengal vs. Raja Jagdish
Chandra Deo Dhabal Dab, Chilkigarh, District Midnapore (1953 Cal. Weekly Notes, ,
506).
(3) Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras vs. K.E. Sundra Mudaliar (AIR 1950 Mad., ,
566)
(4) Kokilram vs. Province of Bihar (AIR 1951 Pat., , 367)
(5) Messrs. Dharmadas Paul vs. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, West Bengal, (AIR
1958 Cal., , 302)
(6) Bhairondan Tolaram vs. State of Rajasthan (8, Sales Tax Cases, , 798)
(7) Indersingh vs. Sales Tax Officer, Jodhpur (1961 RLW, , 314)
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(9) Messrs. Anwarkhan Mahboob Co. vs. The State of Bombay (AIR 1961 S.C, , 213)
(11) Kapildeoram Baijnath Prosad vs. J.K. Das (5, Sales Tax Cases, , 365)
(12) Yamnasi Sudarsanam vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh (13, , Sales Tax Cases.
743)
(13) Commissioner of Sales-Tax, Maharastra State, Bombay vs. Fairdeal Corporation
Ltd. (13, Sales Tax Cases, , 750)
(14) Jethmal Ramswaroop vs. The State of Rajasthan (1959 RLW, 605 = AIR 1958
Raj., , 262)
(15) Firm, Jaswant Rai Nainarain vs. Sales Tax Officer (AIR 1955 Alld., , 585)
(16) M. A. Ganpathy Iyer vs. Hyderabad State (AIR 1954 Hyderabad. 94),

Advocates: Advocates Appeared :

M.B.L. Bhargava, for Petitioner firm; Rajnarain, Dy. Govt. Advocate, for Respondents

DAVE, C.J.—This is writ application under Art.226 of the Constitution of India.

2. The petitioner-firm is a retail pan-bidi dealer and carries on its business at Pali
Bazar, Beawar. Under the Ajmer Sales Tax Act, 1955, betel-leaf was a non-taxable
commodity. The Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, which will hereinafter be referred as
the Act was extended to the erstwhile State of Ajmer after its merger with the State
of Rajasthan on 6th June, 1957. Thereafter, the Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Beawar,
issued a notice to the petitioner asking it to get itself registered under the Act. The
petitioner accordingly obtained a registration certificate on 1st November, 1957. By
a notification No.F.5(51), E&T/58 dated 1st April, 1958, issued by the Government of
Rajasthan, the sale of betel-leaves was exempted from sales-tax on the condition
that the dealer claiming exemption would obtain valid certificate of exemption for
which a fixed annual fee of Rs. 10/- was prescribed. Accordingly, the petitioner
obtained the exemption certificate on 22nd August, 1958. The Assistant Sales Tax
Officer, Beawar, issued to the petitioner notice No. 3276 dated 24th June, 1959
requiring it to produce its account books in connection with the assessment of the
sales-tax under sec. 10 of the Act. He assessed the petitioner to sales-tax by his
assessment order dated 3rd July, 1959.

3. The petitioner has produced a copy of the assessment order dated 3rd July, 1959,
and it appears from its perusal that it was urged on its behalf that it was not liable
to pay any tax on the sale of betel-leaves. Its contention was not accepted by the
Assistant Sales Tax Officer and it was held by him that the exemption allowed for
betel-leaves did not extend to what he called a processed Pan which, in Hindi, was
termed as laga huwa pan. It was observed by him as follows:—

"In the case of preparing pan ready for eating there is a series of actions. Not only
this, continuous operation or treatment and a chemical process of applying Chuna,
Katha and Supari to the betel-leaf, one after the other in an orderly and methodical
way is present there. In the circumstances I am of the view that the assessee is a
processor and his sales of eatable or ready pan are sales of processed pan and
hence attract sales-tax."

It was also urged on behalf of the petitioner that even if the application of Chuna
and Katha be treated as processing of the betel-leaves, it was not liable to pay tax
on the so-called processed pan, because all the commodities used, namely, Chuna,
Katha and Supari were tax-paid and they should not be taxed again. This contention
was also repelled by observing that "as soon as Chuna, Katha and Supari are applied
to betel-leaves, their individual identity is lost". According to the said officer, the
processed pan was a commodity in itself different from its constituents and being a
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separate commodity, it attracted levy of sales-tax.

4. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed an appeal which was heard by the
Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax ( Appeals ), Jaipur. The appellate authority
approved the view taken by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer and dismissed the
appeal on 18th May, 1960.

5. The petitioner then filed the present writ application in this Court on 10th
October, 1960. It was urged by him that the respondents had committed an error in
making a distinction between betel-leaves and what they termed as processed pan
and declaring that the latter was a distinct commodity and liable to sales-tax. It was
pointed out that no manufacturing or chemical process was used in the preparation
o f pan and it was neither correct nor proper to use those high sounding terms,
simply because Chuna, Katha and Supari or some masalas which are already tax-
paid were added to a betel-leaf before it was offered for chewing. It was contended
that the respondents had placed a wrong interpretation on the term betel-leaves
appearing in the said notification and that they had imposed illegal tax on the
petitioner. Hence, it was prayed that a writ of certiorari or any other writ or direction
may be issued and the said orders be quashed. It was also proved that the
respondents may be directed to refund the tax which was paid by the petitioner on
account of the wrong interpretation of the said notification.

6. The writ application is contested on behalf of the respondents and it is urged that
the view which they had taken was quite correct and no exception could be taken to
it.

7. It would-appear from the said narration of facts that the main question invoved in
the present case is the inter-pretation of the term betel-leaves appearing in the
notification dated 1st April, 1958, which runs as follows:—

"Government of Rajasthan

Notification

No.F.5(51) E&T/58

Jaipur, April 1, 1958.

In exercise of the powers conferred by subsec. (2) of sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Sales
Tax Act, 1954 (Rajasthan Act No. XXIX of 1954), the Government of Rajasthan,
being of the opinion that it is necessary in the public interest so to do, does hereby
exempt the sale of betel-leaves from tax, on the condition that the dealer clai ming
exemption holds a valid certificate of exemption for which a fixed annual fee of Rs.
10/ is hereby prescribed.

By Order of the Governor

Sd/- G.S. Purohit

Secretary to the Govt."

8. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that the Government wanted to give relief to
the dealers and consumers of betel-leaves, that betel-leaves are generally not sold
in retail in their raw form without the application of Katha, Chuna and Supari and the

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Assistant Sales Tax Officer should not have interpreted the term betel-leaves in such
a narrow sense as to defeat the very purpose of granting exemption to their sale. It
is contended that in case of any doubt or ambiguity the taxing Statute must be
construed liberally and in favour of the assessee. In support of his contention,
learned counsel has referred to the following cases : Upper India Chamber of
Commerce Gawnpore vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, C. P. & U. P. Lucknow(l), The
Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, West Bengal Vs. Raja Jagdish Chandra Deo
Dhabal Dab, Chilkigarh, District Midnapore(2), and Commissioner of Income-tax,
Madras Vs. K. E. Sumdara Mudaliar(3).

9. It is further contended that "betel-leaves were held to be equivalent to pan in

Kokilram Vs. Province of Bihar(4), Messrs. Dharmadas Paul Vs. Commissioner of
Commercial,Tax, West Bengal (5) and Bhairondan Tolaram Vs. State of Rajasthan(6)
It has been vehemently argued that both the respondents had themselves.conceded
that Chuna, Katha and Supari are masalas which are generally added to a green
betel-leaf in order to make it flavoury and eatable, that they were already tax-paid,
that the betel-leaves were expressly exempted from the tax by the said notification
that no particular manufacturing process was necessary for making them eatable
and that both the respondents had committed a serious error in holding that the so-
called processed pan was a commodity different from the betel-leaves.

10. In reply, it is urged by the respondents learned counsel that it has been held by
this Court in Indersingh Vs. Sales Tax Officer, Jodhpur(7) that an exemption clause
must be interpreted strictly and that the respondents had, therefore, committed no
error in holding that the term betel-leaves appearing in the said notification was
confined to only those betel-leaves to which nothing was added and that the
processed pan was a different commodity from the betel-leaves. He has relied on
the following cases : State of Travancore-Cochin Vs. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut
Factory, Quilon (8), Messrs. Anwarkhan Mahboob Co., Vs. The State of Bombay(9),
Messrs. Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh(lO),
Kapildeoram Baijnath Prosad Vs. J.K. Das (11), Yamsani Sudarsanam Vs. The State of
Andhra Pradesh(12) and Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra State, Bombay Vs.
Fairdeal Corporation Ltd.(13).

11. Before proceeding to interpret the term betel-leaves appearing in the said
notification, it may be observed that in Indersingh Vs. Sales Tax Officer, Jodhpur(7),
the assessee claimed exemption of sales-tax on Durries. The Sales Tax Officer
disallowed it holding that Durries were not included in the category of handloom
cloth. The question, which arose for determination before the Court was, whether a
Durri was included in the term handloom cloth. It was held that it would not be
proper to give the term cloth such a wide meaning as to bring a Durri within its
ambit. It is obvious that the facts of the said case were very different from those of
the present one. It was held that Durri was used as a carpet and not as a cloth and
simply because it was also prepared on a handloom, it could not be included within
the ambit of the term handloom cloth. It is obvious that in the said case, the
petitioner wanted to extend the scope of the term "handloom cloth" to a grossly
unreasonable extent and so his arguments did not find favour with the learned
Judges and it was held that the Durri was outside the scope of the term handloom
cloth.

12. Learned Deputy Government Advocate has laid stress upon the following

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observations made in Kapildeoram Baijnath Prosad Vs. J.K. Das (11) and to which
pointed reference was made by the learned Judges in the above case:

"All exemptions from taxation must be strictly construed and must not be extended
beyond the express requirements of the language used. The taxation laws are not in
the nature of penal laws; they are substantially remedial in their character and are
intended to prevent fraud, suppress public wrong and promote the public good.
They should, therefore, be construed in such a way as to accomplish those objects."

The learned Deputy Government Advocate seems to be of the view that this
observation is in conflict with the views expressed in the cases relied upon by
learned counsel for the petitioner and it is prayed that we should not depart from
the view which has been adopted by another Bench in the said case. Before
expressing our views, it would be proper to refer to the following cases relied upon
by the petitioners learned counsel:

In Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax,

Lucknow (1), Verma J., to whom the case was referred on account of difference of
opinion between Iqbal Ahmad C. J., and Braund J., concurred with the view of Iqbal
Ahmad C. J., who had observed as follows:

"In the present case, we are concerned with the interpretation of an exemption
clause in a taxing statute and that clause must be, as far as possible, liberally
construed and in favour of the assessee, provided no violence is done to the
language used."

13. In the Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, West Bengal Vs. Raja Jagdish
Chandra Deo Dhabal Dab(2), it was observed that "where an exemption is conferred
by a statute by an exemption clause, that clause has to be interpreted liberally and
in favour of the assessee but must always be without any violence to the language
used."

14. In the Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras Vs. K. E. Sundara Mudaliar(3), the

learned Judges after referring to number of English cases, observed that "exemption
from tax granted by the statute should be given full scope and amplitude and should
not be whittled down by importing limitations not inserted by the Legislature.

15. It may be observed that, in our opinion, there is no essential difference between
the view expressed by this Court in Inder Singh Vs. The Sales Tax Officer, Jodhpur(7)
and the view taken in the last three cases, referred above, and relied upon by
learned counsel for the petitioners. It is interesting to point out that in Kapildeoram
Baijnath Prosad Vs. J. K. Das(ll) on which reliance was placed by this Court in
Indersingh Vs. The Sales Tax Officer, Jodhpur (7), the question before the Court was
whether chira and muri were included in "cereals" and it was held that they were
included. It is common knowledge that chira and muri are prepared from rice after it
is put to certain processes and yet the learned Judges held that they were not
excluded from the ambit of the term "cereals". Thus, although the learned Judges
made the said observation, they were not reasonably harsh in its application. In
Indersingh vs. The Sales Tax Officer, Jodhpur (7), the learned Judges had to refer to
the said observation because the petitioner wanted to stretch the scope of
exemption clause to unreasonable length. In our opinion, every observation, which is
made by the Court, should be understood in the context of the facts and

Page No. 5 of 10
circumstances of that particular case. In Indersingh vs. The Sales Tax Officer (7), the
tax-payer wanted to stretch the scope of the term handloom cloth to an
unreasonable length and, therefore, the Court made its remarks from that angle of
vision and observed that exemption clause "must not be extended beyond the
express requirements of the language used."

16. On the other hand, in the three cases relied upon by the petitioners learned
counsel, the taxing authorities had placed a very narrow interpretation on the
exemption clause and hence the Court made its observation from the other angle
and remarked that it should be interpreted liberally in favour of the assessee but
without doing any violence to the language used.

17. The real import of all the observations made in the said cases is that the
exemption clause appearing in taxation laws should be reasonably interpreted. The
interpretation should neither be so liberal that it may promote fraud and open flood-
gates for the tax-payers to evade the tax by subtle and dishonest devices, nor
should it be so narrow and un-reasonable that the remedy provided by the
Legislature becomes only nominal and the very object which it is sought to
accomplish is defeated. It should be given its full and reasonable scope and
amplitude so long as no violence is done to the language used and the exemption
should not be whittled down by importing limitations not inserted or contemplated
by the Legislature.

18. We have now to see in this light as to what should be the reasonable
interpretation of the term betel-leaves appearing in the said notification.

19. It may be observed that although a number of cases have been cited on either
side, none of them has a direct bearing on the controversy which has been raised in
this case. In Bhairondan vs. State of Rajasthan(6) relied upon by learned counsel for
the petitioner, the question involved was whether the betel-leaves came within the
ambit of eatable vegetables and it was held that the word vegetables was used in
the Schedule in its narrowed sense meaning only those classes of vegetables which
were grown in kitchen gardens to supplement the food and, therefore the term
"betel-leaves" fell outside the admit of the term "vegetables".

20. In Kokilram vs. Province of Bihar(4) also, it was held that the word "vegetables"
used in the notification was used in the limited sense of plants cultivated for food
and did not include "betel-leaves".

21. Again, in Messrs Dharmadas Paul vs. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, West
Bengal (5), it was held that the pan or betel-leave was not a vegetable within the
meaning of Item 6 of the Schedule appended to the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act,
1947.

22. It is, no doubt, true that the words "pan" and "betel leaf" were used as
synonymus in the last two cases, but there was no controversy, as in the present
case, as to the question whether, the term "betel-leaves" also included leaves after
the Chuna and Katha were applied to them. These cases are, therefore, not very
helpful for resolving the dispute which has been raised before us. We have,
therefore, to see what should be the reasonable interpretation of the term "betel-
leaves" appearing in the said notification.

23. We have given our earnest consideration to the views expressed by the
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Assistant Sales Tax Officer and the Deputy Commissioner and with due respect to
them, we find it very difficult to accept the very restricted meaning which they have
tried to give to the term "betel-leaves". If their interpretation is accepted, it would
mean that only those betel-leaves would be saved from the tax which are not
consumed after the application of Chuna and Katha.

24. Now, it is common knowledge that the betel leaves are not used without the
application of Chuna and Katha generally except for medicinal purposes. In other
words, an insignificant quantity of betel-leaves is, no doubt, used as a vehicle for
administering certain drugs of medicines by Vaids. It is likely that some negligible
quantity of such leaves might be used for some other purposes also, but the vast
bulk of betel-leaves are used only after the Chuna and Katha are applied to them. If
the authorities, which issued the notification, meant to exempt only that negligible
quantity of betel-leaves from taxation which is used without Katha and Chuna, there
was nothing to prevent them from saying so in express terms. We are inclined to
think that when the sale of betel-leaves was exempted by the Government of
Rajasthan from Sales-tax, it meant to exempt the entire bulk of betel-leaves from
the payment of tax. If this notification is held to apply only to that number of betel-
leaves which are used without the application of Chuna and Katha, the entire
purpose of exemption would be defeated, because the number of quantity of such
leaves would almost be negligible. The respondents have laid great stress on the
fact that the betel-leaves ready for eating have to undergo a series of actions and a
chemical process. In our view, it looks very high sounding to use the word process
for the mere application of a very small quantity of Chuna and Katha to a betel-leaf.
It may be pointed out that the betel-leaf even after the application of Chuna and
Katha does not lose its original character of a leaf. It is neither boiled nor parched
nor dehydrated, but it is consumed in the same raw condition as it is in before the
application of Chuna and Katha. All that is done is that a very small quantity of
Chuna and Katha is applied and a few pieces of areca nut or some other flavouring
article like cardamom etc. is put in to make it more tasteful. To say that the
processed pan is a different commodity from the betel-leaf is, in our opinion, not
quite correct.

25. The learned Deputy Government Advocate has referred to State of Tra-vancore-
Gochin vs. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory, Quilon (8). In that case the
question before their Lordships was, whether the transaction of cashewnuts
purchased by the respondent came within the scope of Articles 286(l)(b) of the
Constitution of India. The observations made in that case have no direct bearing on
the controversy which has been raised before us. Learned counsel has referred to
this case in order to point out that the raw cashewnuts and the kernels
manufactured out of them were held to be commercially different commodities. In
our opinion, this case is not helpful to the respondents, because it was clearly
pointed out in that case that the kernels were taken out by various processes, partly
mechanical and partly manual. In the present case, as we have already pointed out,
the betel leaves do not undergo any mechanical or manual process so as to extract
anything like juice etc. from them. They continue to be betel-leaves even after the
application of Chuna and Katha. These things are added to the betel leaves only to
make them eatable and their character is not changed.

26. The learned Deputy Government Advocate has next referred to Messrs
Anwarkhan Mahboob Co. vs. The State of Bombay (9). In that case, the petitioner

Page No. 7 of 10
carried on the business of manufacture of Bidis in the State of Madhya Pradesh after
purchasing raw tobacco from the cultivators in the State of Bombay. A question
arose whether the tobacco which was delivered in the State of Bombay, was
delivered for the purpose of consumption and whether the purchase fell within the
meaning of explanation to Art.286 (1) of the Constitution of India. It was found that
the petitioner used to subject raw tobacco to certain processes leading to its
conversion into "Bidi pattis", by getting the stems and dust removed from the leaves
for immediate use in the manufacture of Bidis before they sent to the State of
Madhya Pradesh where Bidis were manufactured. It was in those circumstances that
it was held that the raw tobacco and bidi patti were distinct and different
commercial articles. It would suffice to say that this case is again of little help to the
respondents, because a green-betel-leaf is not converted into something else. On
the other hand, it continues to remain in the same green and fresh condition even
after the application of Chuna and Katha till the time it is actually eaten by the
consumer.

27. Another case on which reliance is placed by the learned Deputy Government
Advocate is Messrs. Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
(10). In that case, their Lordships made a distinction between tobacco as it was
defined, and hand-made bidis and the observations made therein are of no help for
resolving the question which has been raised before us.

28. Learned counsel has also referred to Jethmal Ramswarop vs. The State of
Rajasthan (14). In that case, it was argued by the petitioner that misri-patasa etc.
were not liable to tax, because sales-tax was already paid on sugar. This contention
was not allowed. It may be pointed out that in the said case, it was urged on behalf
of the State that the writ application was not maintainable at that stage and this
preliminary objection was allowed. After discussing this point at length, it was
observed only by way of passing, at the end of the judgment, that even on merits
there was no force in the applicants contention because misri-patasa etc. were not
merely sugar. It would bear repetition to point out that the observations made in a
particular case have to be understood in the context of the facts and circumstances
of that case and such an observation cannot be applied to another case by ignoring
the background in which it is made.

29. The learned Judges in that case did not give any reasons because the
preliminary objection was allowed. Secondly, it seems to have weighed with the
learned Judges that misri and patasa were not sold in the same form as sugar.

30. In the case of betel-leaves, we have already pointed out that there is no change
in its original form even by the time it is consumed.

31. He has next referred to Firm Jaswant Rai Jainarain vs. Sales Tax Officer (15). In
that case, it was held by the learned Judges that "where a dealer takes handloom
cloth and either cuts it into specific sizes or manufactures them into specific sizes,
so that the pieces can be used as saris, bed covers, lihafs (quilt covers) etc. and
then prints them so that they can be readily used for the purpose for which they are
meant, the articles sold by dealer are clothes or garments and cannot be treated as
cloth manufactured on handlooms within the meaning of the Notification. It is
obvious that the distinction pointed out by the learned Judges in the said case is
hardly of any avail to respondents in the present case.

Page No. 8 of 10
32. He has also referred to M.A. Ganapathy Iyer vs. Hyderabad State (16). In that
case, it was held that merely because rice was mentioned as one of the items
exempt from sales-tax, any form of rice such as idlies and dosas should also be
deemed to be exempt from sales-tax. This case is also of no help to the respondents
because although rice may be one of the main constituents of idlies and dosas they
are not the same things as rice.

33. In the end, the learned Deputy Government Advocate has referred to a
Notification of 2nd June, 1962, which runs as follows:

"Government of Rajasthan

(Excise & Taxation Department)

NOTIFICATION

No. F. 5(43) E & T/62

Jaipur, June 2, 1962

In exercise of the powers conferred by proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3 of the

Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 (Rajasthan Act No. 29 of 1954), the State
Government hereby specifies, for the purpose of clause (a) of the said sub-section,
Rs. 10,000/- to be the limit in respect of manufacturers of goods of the classes
specified below, namely:

1. Pan (processed betel)

2. Footwear of all kinds.

By Order of the Governor,

S. P. Singh Bhandari,

Secretary to the Government"

34. On the basis of this notification, it is contended that if the Government meant to
exempt processed pan by the notification dated 1st April, 1958, it would not have
issued this notification in respect of processed betel. It is pointed out that this
notification fixes the limit of Rs. 10,000/- and a person who deals in processed pan
and whose total turnover does not exceed Rs. 10,000/- would not be required to pay
sales-tax. It may be observed that the notification which was issued on 2nd June,
1962 cannot have retrospective effect because it has not been made applicable
retrospectively. Moreover, this notification does not modify the provisions of the first
notification by itself. The present petitioner filed this writ petition in October, 1960
and the respondents filed their reply on 1st March, 1961 and the subsequent
notification of this nature made by the Government which does not expressly tend
to modify the first notification of 1st April, 1958, cannot be availed of, for resolving
the controversy before the Court.

35. To sum up the case, the betel-leaves to which Chuna and Katha are applied do
not fall outside the scope of the term "betel-leaves" used in the notification of 1st
April, 1958 and, in our opinion, they are as much exempt from sales-tax as the
betel-leaves to which Chuna and Katha are not applied.

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36. The writ application is, therefore, allowed and the impugned orders of the
Assistant Sales Tax Officer and the Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax (Appeals), are
hereby quashed, so far as they relate to taxes assessed with effect from 1st April,
1958. The tax realised from the petitioner on the sales of the betel-leaves after 1st
April, 1958, should be refunded to it. The petitioner will receive its costs from the
respondents.

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