Accommoda ng Discomfor ng Diversity Into Intelligence Educa on: The 'Real', The Bad and The Flu y - Masculini

lu y - Masculini es, Race, Class and

Going Beyond ”the Crust of Conven onalized Consciousness” Sexuality in SGBV Programming
Irene Chiru (Na onal Ins tute for Intelligence Studies) Henri Myr nen (Interna onal Alert)
The Pe coat Promise: Gender and Intelligence in the #MeToo Era De ning Gendered Insecuri es and Delinea ng Perpetratorhood: A
Ma hew Crosston (American Military University) Cri cal Examina on of ‘the Male Perpetrator’ of Sexual Violence in
Diversity Management in the US Intelligence Community DRC
Damien Van Puyvelde (University of Glasgow) Chloé Lewis (University of Oxford)
The Bene ts of Diverse Intelligence Organiza ons
Ellen Shipitalo (Naval Postgraduate School) TD49: Thursday 4:00 PM - 5:45 PM Roundtable
New Developments in Nuclear Arms: Regional Implica ons of Low
TD46: Thursday 4:00 PM - 5:45 PM Roundtable Yield Weapons and INF Treaty Dissolu on
Roundtable on Star ng and Managing a Public Dataset Re-Visioning Interna onal Studies: Innova on and Progress (Theme)
Scien c Study of Interna onal Processes
Chair Mason Richey (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)
Re-Visioning Interna onal Studies: Innova on and Progress (Theme)
Part. Sven Biscop (Egmont - Royal Ins tute for Interna onal
Chair David L. Richards (University of Connec cut) Rela ons & Ghent University)
Part. Sabine Carey (University of Mannheim) Part. Je rey S. Lan s (The College of Wooster)
Part. K. Chad Clay (University of Georgia) Part. Ramesh C. Thakur (Australian Na onal University)
Part. Valerie Hudson (Texas A&M University, The Bush School of Part. Alexander T. J. Ma elaer (Vrije Universiteit Brussel)
Government and Public Service) Part. Andrew Reddie (University of California, Berkeley)
Part. Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (University of Iowa) Part. Anne Harrington (Cardi University)
Part. Je rey Berejikian (University of Georgia)
TD47: Thursday 4:00 PM - 5:45 PM Panel Part. Rebecca Davis Gibbons (The Belfer Center)
Legi macy in Global Governance: Why, Who, and How
Interna onal Organiza on TD50: Thursday 4:00 PM - 5:45 PM Panel
Human Rights Foreign Policy of La n America
Chair Sarah von Billerbeck (University of Reading) Foreign Policy Analysis
Disc. Mar n Binder (University of Reading) Chair André Leite Araujo (University of Bologna)
The Cult of the UN: Organiza onal Self-Legi ma on and UN Disc. Emanuel Porcelli (Facultad de Ciencias Sociales - Universidad
Peacekeeping de Buenos Aires (UBA))
Sarah von Billerbeck (University of Reading) The Contesta on Strategies of Regional Secondary Powers in South
Object(s) of (De)Legi ma on? The Case of WHO America and East Asia
Kris na Jonsson (Lund University) Rafael Castro (German Ins tute of Global and Area Studies)
Rachel Irwin (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine) Structuring Public Opinion on Foreign Policy Issues: The case of
Future-Talk as a Prac ce of Legi ma on? Brazil
Nora Stappert (University of Copenhagen) Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida (University of Sao Paulo)
Ca a Gregora (Lund University) Ivan Filipe Almeida Lopes Fernandes (University of Sao Paulo)
Elite (De)Legi ma on of Global Governance Ins tu ons Feliciano de Sá Guimarães (University of São Paulo)
Magdalena Bexell (Lund University) Interna onal Socializa on of a Revolu onary State: Has Cuba's
Anders Uhlin (Lund University) Foreign Policy Moderated?
Soetkin Verhaegen (Stockholm University) Arturo Lopez-Levy (Gustavus Adolphus College)
Exploring Legi macy in Private Global Governance
Hortense Jongen (University of Gothenburg)
TD51: Thursday 4:00 PM - 5:45 PM Panel
Jan Aart Scholte (University of Gothenburg)
Back to the Future in East Asia?: China and Japan
Foreign Policy Analysis
TD48: Thursday 4:00 PM - 5:45 PM Panel Chair David A. Welch (Balsillie School of Interna onal A airs)
Gendered Insecuri es, Problema c Dichotomies – Engaging Disc. Tsuyoshi Kawasaki (Simon Fraser University)
Cri cally with Masculini es in Con ict-a ected Spaces Disc. David A. Welch (Balsillie School of Interna onal A airs)
Feminist Theory and Gender Studies Na onal Characters, Geopoli cal Constraints and Militarism: How
Disc. Koen Slootmaeckers (City, University of London) War Memory Structures China’s Threat Percep on of Japan
What Lurks in the Shadows – Addressing Latent Misogyny, Homo- Yi Wang (The University of Manchester)
and Transphobia in Masculini es Work Japan’s Changing Status in the Interna onal Trade Regime: The Past
Philipp Schulz (University of Bremen) and the Present
Sex, Violence and Heteronorma vity: Beyond the War/Peace Shigeki Shibata (Oita University)
Dichotomy in Sexual Violence Against Men China-Japan and India-Japan Rela ons in the Indo-Paci c Era
Paula Drumond (Pon cal Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro) Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (Ritsumeikan Asia-Paci c University)
Harm, Respect and Integrity: Are Understandings of Ethics in Japan-U.K. Security Coopera on
Poli cal Science and Con ict Studies Gendered? Hidekazu Sakai (Kansai Gaidai University)
Denisa Kostovicova (London School of Economics and Poli cal Japan-China “Island Ques ons” in the Japanese, Chinese and US
Science) Government Records
Kimie Hara (University of Waterloo)
 Index of Participants
Almeida Lopes Fernandes, Ivan Filipe TD50 Arapova, Ekaterina TB54
Almeida Resende, Erica Simone TA31, FB40, FC41, TC25, SB25 Arat, Zehra F. Kabasakal WC66, WD57, SC31
Almustafa, Maissaa WB62 Araujo, Maxwel SD30
Aloyo, Eamon T. WC65, WA71, TC64 Arce, Moises SA10, TB21
Alphin, Caroline WD39, WB43 Arceneaux, David TD52, SD50
Alrababa'h, Ala' SA45 Arceneaux, Phillip SA29, SB26
Alt, Suvi TB51 Archambault, Emil SD41, TA15
Altamirano-Jimenez, Isabel SD35 Arcos, Ruben SA47, WC24
Altan-Olcay, Ozlem FB48, PWK39 Ardovini, Lucia SB38
Al er, Mary Beth TD61 Arendarska, Justyna SC48, TB46
Altman, David TA30 Ar , Badredine SB03, WB13
Altmann, Philipp SA39 Argo, Nichole TA81
Alvarez, Sandra FC54 Ari, Baris TA47
Al-Zoby, Mazhar SB58, TA84 Arias, Aimee K. TC20
Amaral, Joana TB48, WD65 Aridici, Nuray SC81
Amarasingam, Amarnath TB66 Ari anto, Alexander SC42
Amat, Consuelo TD59, SB66 Armijo, Leslie Ellio SD05
Amicelle, Anthony WA38, TB26 Arnold, Richard FA46
Amin, Sanjida FB63 Arokiaraj P, Johny WC08
Amiri, Sohaela WA82, SB26 Aronson, Jacob SD29, WC59
An, Jingjing SC14, FC22, WA14 Aroussi, Sahla TC75
An, Jungbae TA41 Arpaci Ayhan, Sevde FC21
Anand, Dibyesh TB03 Arreguin-To , Ivan TD37, FC46, SC32, SB46
Ananyeva, Ekaterina SC76 Arrington, Celeste TA34
Anders, Birthe WA69 Arves, Stephen WB65
Anders, Therese SA46 Asal, Victor SD17, FD58, SA83, FA08, SB44
Andersen, Nikolaj K. WD00 Ash, Konstan n WA65, TB23, FD52, SD29
Andersen-Rodgers, David R. FB83, TC68, WC28, TB24 Ashford, Emma FB56, SC52, TA64, WA02
Anderson, Emma-Louise WA33, TA25 Ashley, Sean SD14
Anderson, Joseph SB72 Ashworth, Lucian M. TC57, FB72, WA72
Anderson, Miriam J. FC48 Asi, Yara WA19, PIF, WB30
Anderson, Molly SA15 Askonas, Jonathan TD66, TB67
Anderson, Nicholas WC03 Asmita, Ananya WB83
Anderson, Noel SD03, SB39 Assaf, Elias SB31
Andjelic, Neven FA50, WC45, TD69 Asvapromtada, Siremorn TB52
Andonova, Liliana FD06, SB70 Atkinson, Douglas SB18
Andrade, Roberta C. WB12 Atlani-Duault, Laë a SD82
Andreas, Peter TB71, SA22 A na, Fulvio FC70, SA55
Andregg, Michael WB19 Atzili, Boaz FC62
Andreopoulos, George J. WC50, WA83, TD65 Auchter, Jessica SB19, SD61
Andresen, Steinar E. FC29, FA30 Audet, Francois SC47
Andrews, Nathan SA10, TC12, FC06 Augustova, Karolina FA32
Angevine, Sara TC15 Auld, Graeme WD80, SB08
Angin, Merih SB15, SA41 Aus n, Jonathan Luke SA38, TD10, WD20
Angulo-Pasel, Carla WA01-A, FB36 Autesserre, Séverine WC55, PWK45, FC10
Anthony, Mely C. FD26 Avant, Deborah FA68, WD32, TC24, WC25, TD00
Antoniades, Andreas WA22 Avdan, Nazli SD17, FB36
Antonova, Irina WB42 Avdeyeva, Olga FC73
Anyorikeya, Mark Amaliya TB65 Awan, Akil FD10
Aoi, Chiyuki TC55 Awass, Omer SD54
Aoki, Naoko SA63 Awwad, Ghadeer FB73
Aparicio Ramirez, Mariana EGSS, TA10 Axelrod, Mark FA82, FC81
Apaydin, Fulya SD54 Axelrod, Regina WC33
Appel, Tiago WB82 Axster, Sabrina FC19
Appleby, R. Sco WD13 Axyonova, Vera TC47
Aradau, Claudia E. FA37, WD38, WA10, TD10, SA26 Aydin, Mustafa WA66, SB55
Aragao, Daniel M. TC12 Aydin-Duzgit, Senem WD15
Araj, Victoria TD01-C Ayhan, Kadir Jun FC77, SC05, TB15, SD42
Structuring the Public Opinion on Foreign Policy Issues: The Case of Brazil

Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida

Professor

Centro Brasileiro de Análise Planejamento (CEBRAP)

Institute of International Relations

University of São Paulo

e-mail: mhbtdalm@usp.br

Ivan Filipe Lopes Fernandes

Assistant Professor

Federal University of ABC

e-mail: ivan.fernandes@ufabc.edu.br

Feliciano de Sá Guimarães

Associate Professor

Institute of International Relations

University of São Paulo

e-mail: felicianosa@usp.br

1
 Abstract

This paper analyzes the structure of the Brazilian public attitudes towards foreign policy

issues. We argue that the Brazilian mass opinion is more structured and stable than

previously thought. We sustain that deep and historical beliefs about Brazil’s role in

international affairs, such as pacifism and protagonism, are responsible for creating fairly

consistent and stable public attitudes toward specific foreign policy preferences. We build

our argument upon the model proposed by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) in their study on

the coherence of US public opinion on foreign policy issues. We use survey data from a

national sample (1,800 respondents) undertaken in 2014. The sample is part of the

Americas and the World Project that conveys information about the Brazilian public

opinion on international and foreign policy issues.

Key words: Foreign Policy Attitudes, Public Opinion, Brazilian Foreign Policy

2
Introduction

It has long been assumed that foreign-policy attitudes of the mass public in Brazil are

random, disorganized, and unconstrained if they exist at all. In this paper we argue that,

against this widespread notion, the Brazilian attitudes towards foreign policy issues are

more structured and stable than previously thought. We sustain that attitudes toward

specific foreign policy preferences derive from postures (abstract beliefs regarding

appropriate general governmental strategies) that, in turn, are constrained by deeper and

historical beliefs about Brazil’s role in international affairs, such as pacifism and

protagonism. This hierarchical belief system is responsible for creating fairly consistent

and stable public on foreign policy issues.

In addition, we argue that the general attitudes that constrain specific preferences pertain

exclusively to the foreign policy domain and not to the traditional left-right spectrum,

class or partisan lines. That is, the Brazilian public build their preferences on foreign

policy issues having in mind general principles of international relations, and not their

ideological or party preferences.

We adapt the model proposed by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) for the study of the US

public opinion about foreign policy to show that the structure of Brazilian attitudes is

similar to the US experience in terms of coherence and stability. The hierarchical model

of foreign policy belief systems developed by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) stipulates that

attitudes toward specific foreign policies be constrained by more general foreign policy

beliefs (postures and images of other nations) which, in turn, are constrained by even

more general core values (ethnocentrism and the morality of war).

Thus, we design a threefold hierarchical model meant to capture how attitudes towards

foreign policy issues in Brazil are structured. The goal is to assess if deeply rooted

perceptions about Brazil’s role in the world affairs, such as pacifism and protagonism,
3
constrain postures regarding the appropriate government involvement in foreign affairs

issues. In turn, postures refer to the public’s support for multilateralism, regional

leadership, Americanism and regional integration. These postures should constrain the

opinions about four specific foreign policy actions: South-South diplomacy, the US-

Brazil bilateral relationship, relationships between Brazil and Latin American neighbors,

and the strengthening of multilateral institutions. In this way, we show that Brazilians

exhibit consistency and structure in their foreign policy attitudes, despite their low levels

of specific information on international relations.

We use a nationally representative sample (1,800 respondents) undertaken in 2014 and

carried out by the Americas and the World Project focused on the Brazilian and Latin

American attitudes towards foreign policy issues.

In the first part of the article, we discuss the literature that deals with attitudes coherence

towards foreign policy. In the second part, we present our analytical framework, the

model and its variables adapted to the Brazilian case. In the third part, we present and

discuss our results.

From incoherence to structure

The discussion about the nature of public opinion on foreign policy has a long tradition,

especially in the United States. The first studies have suggested that the American mass

public was uninterested and misinformed about world affairs, and, therefore, could only

have incoherent and volatile perceptions (Lippmann and Merz, 1920, Almond, 1950). At

best, the public would follow elites’ opinions (Lipset 1966, Verba et al., 1967). According

to this interpretation, called the Almond-Lippmann consensus, stable and coherent

opinions were depended on high levels of information and interest, and, therefore, only

4
possible to the public when the issue at stake was close enough to the individuals’ daily

experience, which was rarely the case for international affairs (Campbell et al. 1960,

Zaller, 1992).

Scholars contested this unanimity in the early 1980s. Shapiro and Page were among the

first to present direct empirical evidence of the public’s capabilities to comprehend

foreign policy issues and to show that shifts in their understanding occurred due to

international environmental changes, such as wars, and not to something closely related

to their daily routines (Page and Shapiro 1982, 1992; Shapiro and Page 1988).

In the early 1990s, Holsti (1992) argued that challenging the consensus would require,

among other factors, cross-national studies and better accumulation of surveys.

Eventually, the prevailing understanding was challenged by a wave of researchers that

have reassessed an always-increasing amount of survey data, and concluded that the

public actually had discernible patterns, stability and coherence on their opinions about

international issues, despite its limited information about world affairs (Maggiotto and

Wittkopf 1981, Wittkopf 1990, Jentleson, 1992, Popkin 1993, Holsti 2004).

Aldrich et al. (2006), reviewing the literature on the public opinion and the American

foreign policy, have pointed out to the emergence of a new consensus around two key

issues. First, citizens have a significant information deficit about world affairs when

compared to the leaders, putting them in disadvantage to elites. Second, they compensate

it following heuristic clues provided by the elites that allow them to make reasoned

judgments based on limited amounts of information.

In this vein, Baum & Potter (2008) argue that attitudes towards foreign policy issues

emerge from a complex process whereby governmental officials, high-level bureaucrats,

public intellectuals (Foyle 2002, Keller & Berry 2003) and the mass media (Jentleson

1992, Brody 1991,; Krosnick and Kinder 1990, Baum 2003, Berinsky 2007) exert
5
influence upon the public’s perceptions and therefore provide cognitive shortcuts,

allowing the public to circumvent its information liabilities (Sniderman et al. 1991,

Popkin 1993).

Furthermore, some studies have shown that US citizens base their opinions about foreign

policy issues on abstract principles, such as preferences for internationalism or

isolationism, as well as on images of specific foreign nations (Brewer et al 2004,

Herrmann et al 1999, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Peffley and Hurwitz 1992, Wittkopf

1990). Others have explored how religious factors can be important sources to the

formation of foreign policy beliefs (Baumgartner et al 2008). Also, Gadarian (2010) and

Baum and Groeling (2010) have shown how citizens from significantly different foreign

policy views can be affected by emotionally powerful environments, such as wars,

changing their deep rooted values and their more observable preferences about foreign

affairs.

The same can be said of other publics in Western Europe, albeit with less evidences and

studies than in the United States. The study of Gravelle et al (2017) comparing the

structure of foreign policy attitudes in France, Germany, United Kingdom and the United

States using Hurwitz and Peffley model finds a common set of core constructs structuring

both American and European attitudes. Nevertheless, they rightly argue that the debate

still relies excessively on the American public opinion, or on the comparison of American

attitudes with those of single nations (Bjereld and Ekengren 1999, Hurwitz et al. 1993).

In addition, they show that many existing cross-national analyses are focused on specific

issues, such as the Iraq War in 2003 (Kritzinger 2003), environmental agreements

(Brechin 2003) or nuclear weapons negotiations (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2004).

In sum, one can see an increasing research refinement about the mechanisms formation

of the US and Western European public opinion beliefs systems on foreign policy issues.

6
The literature has shown that these publics have consistent and stable perceptions and that

understanding the transmission processes between elites and the public is a promising and

burgeoning research agenda that is currently moving away from the debate of stability

versus volatility and focusing on the solution of this transmission puzzle (Aldrich et al

2006; Baum & Potter 2008).

In Latin American, however, only a handful of studies have addressed how the domestic

public perceive foreign affairs (Souza 2008, Almeida 2016, Onuki et al 2016, Mourón et

al 2016, Reynolds et al 2017, Guimarães et al 2019). Similar to the European case, these

studies are predominantly focused on narrow and specific issues, such as immigration in

Mexico (Schiavon 2010), diplomatic relations between Brazil and Argentina (Lustig and

Olego 2016), defense in Argentina (Fraga and Asa 2010), or regional leadership in Brazil

(Guimarães et al 2019).

The exception that proves the rule is the important cross-countries comparison made by

Castillo et al (2015). Using data from The Americas and the World Project, in 2010, they

have shown that there is coherence in the opinions of citizens from five Latin American

countries (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru) and that ideology accounts for

such stability. They argue that the differences of opinion among Latin Americans

concerning foreign issues could not be explained by their amount of knowledge, but rather

by a set of values reflected in their political ideology, measured in a left-right spectrum.

Exploring data found in a national representative sample (1,800 respondents) from The

Americas and the World Project, undertaken in 2014, we want to move the explanation

further in Latin America by showing how core beliefs and postures about Brazil’s role in

international affairs do structure the citizens’ opinion regarding foreign policy issues. As

we argued, our point of departure is the seminal study of Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) to

show that the Brazilian public, coping with an extraordinarily confusing world with

7
limited informational resources, is still able to structure their views about foreign policy

using their own normative beliefs about the role of Brazil in the world and not to previous

ideological or class lines.

Structuring preferences in Brazil: the model

Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) assume that because humans have severe cognitive

limitations, they often behave as cognitive misers. In other words, when facing the

complex issues of world affairs, individuals resort to cognitive shortcuts that simplify

their decisions, despite their informational disadvantage. These shortcuts are derived from

their normative beliefs and core values developed over the years.

Based on an information-process perspective, where individual's reliance on

simplification is assumed to increase with the complexity of the environment, the authors

suggest a three-layer analytical model where preferences over specific foreign policy

issues are framed by prior postures that citizens possess which inform their view of how

their nation should behave in the international arena. These postures, laid out in a gradient

from acceptance to rejection, provide criteria for citizens to assess actual governmental

initiatives regarding concrete issues, despite their informational limitations. In turn, these

postures are rooted in core values expressing world visions that are predominant among

citizen.

We have adapted the three folded and hierarchical model of Hurwitz and Peffley to the

Brazilian context to analyze whether core values and postures determine preferences for

concrete foreign policy issues. As we mentioned, we seek to verify whether concepts

specific to the debate about Brazil’s foreign affairs affect the public preferences for

concrete foreign policy actions and behavior.

8
Hurwitz and Peffley’s model suggests that core values and abstract postures are related

to a long established domestic debate involving foreign affairs issues such as, in case of

US, animosity towards the Soviet Union or the myth of the country’s exceptionalism in

the world. The same logic applies to the domestic debate in Brazil where diplomats,

academics and intellectuals have discussed over decades what should be the appropriate

role for Brazil in international affairs. We will show that local debates about the Brazilian

foreign policy among policy makers, specialists and scholars have created a broad

conceptual framework that help to organize how the Brazilian public, with scant

knowledge or information, understand those issues.

Our research goal is not only to verify whether Brazilian individuals have a structured

understanding of world politics, but also whether their opinions are organized by the

foreign policy shared views about Brazil’s role in world politics.

Core beliefs

We argue that the two most fundamental core beliefs shared by the Brazilian public about

the country’s orientations in world affairs are international protagonism and pacifism.

The literature about Brazil’s foreign policy shows that these two principles are

intrinsically embedded in a diplomatic discourse that praises Brazil as a country in peace

with its neighborhood and willing to be prominent and influential actor in the world stage.

These principles express deep and historical visions advocated by every administration

since the late XIX Century. Diplomats and intellectuals alike sustain that pacifism and

protagonism are moral cornerstones of Brazil’s position in the world (Ricupero 1995,

2000, 2017a, 2017b; Lafer 2001, Côrrea 2000).

More precisely, pacifism represents a vision in which diplomacy and peaceful solutions

to military conflicts should be pursued by Brazil in all scenarios. The myth of a peaceful

9
country is embedded in the official diplomatic rhetoric since the times of the legendary

Barão do Rio Branco, minister of foreign relations from 1902 to 1912. The same vision

can be found in Ruy Barbosa’s (1849-1923) intellectual contribution, especially at his

speech to the Second Peace Conference in The Hague, in 1907, in which he praises

Brazil’s peaceful vocation. In the Brazilian diplomatic mythology, these two leaders

impersonated the country’s pacifism and the preference for negotiated solutions to

international conflicts, receiving constant accolades in current speeches and narratives by

contemporary diplomats (Cunha 1977, Cardim 2017, Ricupero 2017b).

In turn, international protagonism indicates Brazil’s continuous claim for recognition as

an important player in world affairs. The literature on Brazil’s foreign policy continually

discusses its search for reputation, especially in Europe and the US (Lafer 2001, Burges

2005, and Lima 2005). According to Lima, there is a long lasting belief, shared by the

Brazilian elites, that the country is destined to play a significant role in world affairs and

that it deserves the recognition of this capacity by the major world powers (Lima 2005,

5-6).

Normative postures

At the intermediate level, we introduce normative beliefs expressed in postures regarding

the role of the Brazilian state and the possibilities for governmental action in the

international system. Postures are related to general directions or orientation that the

government should adopt. Postures are broad representations that structure the public

ideas about foreign policy because they involve practical strategic orientations for

governmental actions in multiple scenarios. Using the literature on the Brazilian foreign

policy, we identified four postures related to Brazil’s behavior abroad: multilateralism,

Americanism, regional leadership, and integrationism.

10
The first posture refers to the preference for a foreign policy that seeks to strengthen

multilateral institutions seen as the most favorable forum for Brazil to negotiate its

interests. Brazil’s long-standing adherence to the principle of multilateralism has become

a flagship of the country’s foreign policy and international identity. Fonseca Jr (2008,

2014), an important diplomat and intellectual, highlights that the Brazilian diplomatic

discourse has historically stated its support for multilateralism and the need to strengthen

it as alternative to power politics. Discussing Brazil’s historical foreign policy

orientations, the former minister of foreign affairs Celso Lafer (2000:12) argued that

multilateral arenas constitute the “best chessboard for the country to exercise its national

interests” protecting it from bilateral asymmetrical relations.

The second posture expresses the importance of the United States to Brazil’s in

international affairs. The option for the Americanism, as a strategic foreign policy

orientation, dates back to Barão do Rio Branco when, as foreign minister in the early

1900s, he promoted a strategic re-orientation from Europe to the United States (Lafer

2000, Ricupero 2017). Since then, the Americanism has become an important source of

controversy and dispute among scholars and diplomats over to which extent Brazil’s

should follow the US in global affairs or, conversely, to stay autonomous regarding

American initiatives (Hirst 2006, Almeida and Barbosa 2006, Lima 2005).

The third posture is related to the importance of Latin America for Brazil and whether the

country should exert regional leadership. Although this is a historical issue, more recently

the exercise of regional leadership has been a highly controversial topic in the debates

about Brazil’s role in the region (Flemes 2010, Malamud 2011, Guimarães et al 2018,

Mourón et al 2016, Ricupero 2017, Almeida 2016, Schenoni 2015, and Flemes 2010).

The fourth posture relates to the importance attributed to regional integration in the

Brazilian foreign policy agenda. Although regional integration became an important topic

11
much later than the previous three postures, it gained prominence in the last 30 years due

to the Mercosur initiative and other institutional development at the Latin American

system. As Burges has argued, “Latin America more broadly and South America

specifically provide the platform on which Brazilian foreign policy architects position

their main lever for attempting to shift structural power frameworks and the pursuit of

their country’s particular brand of international insertion” (2016: 23). Many other

scholars have pointed out to the growing importance of the region to Brazil’s strategic

thinking and domestic debates (Vigevani and Ramanzini Jr 2012, 2014; Bueno,

Ramanzini Jr and Vigevani 2014).

Specific foreign policy issues

We have chosen four specific policy issues that in the last decades have been central to

the Brazilian foreign policy agenda and its diplomatic rhetoric: the bilateral relationship

with the United States, the South-South diplomacy, multilateral foreign policy initiatives,

and the relationship with Latin American countries. In each dimension, we included

survey questions about concrete and more recent foreign policy initiatives, as well as

about images regarding specific countries, such as the USA, India and China.

The bilateral relationship between Brazil and the United States has been extensively

studied (Amorim Neto 2012, Bandeira 2004). It is needless to say how important and

influential is the bilateral relationship with a global power located in the same

hemisphere, but, more importantly for our study, is how and to which degree Brazilians

perceive the importance of this relationship. The literature on these perceptions shows

that the Brazilian public have a fairly positive, consistent and stable opinion about the

United States from the earlies 1960s to the late 2000s (Loureiro et al 2015, Mourón et al

2016, Souza 2008).

12
South-South diplomacy has become a cornerstone of Brazil’s foreign policy in the last

two decades. Although it does not represent something new in the history of the Brazilian

foreign policy, it is fair to say that since Lula’s administration (2002-2010) Brazil has

pivoted more prominently towards China, Russia and African countries aiming to

counter-balance the US influence in global affairs. The creation of the BRICS has marked

Lula’s foreign policy (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007, Burges 2005).

Third, as we already mentioned, commitment to the principle of multilateralism has been

a linchpin of Brazil’s foreign policy since long. More recently Brazil’s has pushed for a

permanent seat at the Security Council, fully supported the creation of the Human Rights

Council at the United Nations and had active participation in organizations of the UN

system, such as WHO, FAO and so forth. The same can be said regarding the Brazilian

participation at Bretton Woods’s institutions and the GATT-WTO system (Almeida 2016,

Reynolds 2017).

Fourth, the relationship between Brazil and its Latin American countries has acquired, in

the recent years, increasing importance with the creation of UNASUL (2008) and CELAC

(2010). During the presidencies of Lula (2002-2010) and Dilma Rousseff’s (2011-2016)

it became clear that the country’s neighborhood and its new institutional arrangements

were part of a broader strategy to turn Brazil into the actual political center of the region

with less US influence (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007, Malamud 2011, Flemes 2010). The

domestic support for this new approach has been fairly studied by the specialized

literature (Mourón et al 2016, Onuki et al 2016).

13
The model

The diagram bellow shows the expected relations between core values, normative beliefs

and opinions about the specific issues mentioned above.

Figure 1. Path Diagram

CORE BELIEFS

PACIFISM PROTAGONISM

NORMATIVE POSTURES

REGIONAL
AMERICANISM MULTILATERALISM INTEGRATIONISM
LEADERSHIP

SPECIFIC POLICY PREFERENCES

South – South Multilateral Latin America-Brazil

US-Brazil relationship
Diplomacy Foreign Policy relationship

In the next paragraphs, we present how we measure each latent concept with survey

questions and which are our expectations about the relationships between concepts in the

established framework. We list them on a descending order of abstraction. For the specific

14
survey questions selected for each category see the Appendix. At the end, we present the

methodology of the empirical test and the model specification.

Building Core Beliefs

Core beliefs are the main exogenous concepts of our analysis, as they affect postures that,

in turn, have an effect on the attitudes about specific foreign policies actions. We built all

categories using specific questions of the 2014 survey. All questions included in each

category are presented in the Appendix.

International protagonism signals the active role Brazil should play in world affairs. To

measure protagonism we have used two different survey question. The respondents were

asked whether in their opinion, Brazil should (1) have an active participation or to stay

away from world affairs, and (2) what is the importance of Brazil at the international

level.

We expect that protagonism will affect our four proposed postures. The aspiration for

Brazil’s active role in the world politics is expected to be related with a stronger push

towards multilateralism, South American integration and a more active role as regional

leader. On the other side, we expect that the bid for more protagonism in world affairs

would be negatively related with positive attitudes towards the hegemonic power, the

United States.

Pacifism displays the preference for diplomacy and peaceful solutions to international

conflicts. To measure pacifism, we used three different survey questions. The respondents

were asked whether Brazil should increase its influence in the world affairs using military

power, diplomacy or trade. We expect that both diplomacy and trade should be positively

related to pacifism, whereas military power negatively related to it. Since the last

15
indicator – military power -- had an inverted relation to pacifism in the survey, we

inverted the scale of the responses to this item. Hence, we expect that the three indicators

have a positive relation with pacifism.

Pacifism should be positively related to all postures. A pacifist view of the Brazilian role

in world affairs should be related to strong multilateral stance and, since Brazil does not

have any important border dispute with its neighbors, both regional integration and

regional leadership should also be seen as peaceful means to deal with the possible

economic and political rivalries among Latin American countries. We also expect that

pacifism should be positively related to the United States since Brazil does not have any

strategic or military antagonism with that country.

Building Postures

Postures are the attitudes of respondents towards the general direction that government

should take in international affairs. We have selected multilateralism, regional leadership,

Americanism and integrationism.

Multilateralism refers to the preference for multilateral institutions as an important

instrument for dealing with international challenges. To measure it, we used two different

questions about the role and relevance of United Nations institutions in dealing with

peacekeeping missions and one question related to the United Nations human rights

agenda.

Regional leadership expresses the importance of Brazil behaving as a leader of Latin

America. We have chosen two questions to capture the latent beliefs about Brazil’s

leadership role. Respondents were asked whether Brazil should be the representative of

16
Latin America at the UN Security Council and whether Brazil should be the regional

leader or not.

Americanism expresses positive or negative attitudes towards the United States. We have

used three questions to measure it. The first one is related to the feelings of trust or distrust

towards US and the second to feelings of admiration or contempt towards that country.

The last one asks the respondent to position herself in a continuum of favorable or

unfavorable opinion about the US.

Finally, integrationism is related to the importance attributed to regional integration. The

three questions we have chosen are related to attitudes towards a political integration of

South America. The first two questions measure the support for establishing a South

American parliament and a common foreign policy for the region. The third one asks

whether the respondent agree with the free movement of persons – without border

controls – within the region.

Building Specific Policy Preferences

Specific policy preferences are related to four types of concrete foreign policy behavior

regarding (1) South-South diplomacy, (2) the US-Brazil bilateral relationship, (3) the

Latin America-Brazil relationship, and (4) policy decisions regarding multilateral

institutions

To measure attitudes towards specific policy preference about South-South Diplomacy,

we have picked up four questions. One is about BRICS, other two about how Brazilians

describe the country’s relationship with China and India and the last one is about the

importance of establishing new embassies and consulates in other countries, especially in

Africa.

17
In order to measure the preferences regarding actual and concrete policies towards the

United States, we included two questions. The first one is about how Brazilians describe

the relationship between the two countries and the second one is on how to classify the

relation between the two countries in terms of friendship, partnership, rivalry or threat.

To measure the preferences regarding actual policies towards Latin America we included

three questions. The first one is about how Brazilians perceive the importance of

promoting regional integration as a foreign policy goal. The others ones are about whether

Brazilians agree that the country should lead the region in international forums, and

whether Brazil should intervene in regional disputes or not.

Finally, the last dimension is the specific policy attitudes towards multilateral institutions.

To measure it, we included two questions: whether the Brazilian foreign policy should

aim at strengthening its participation in United Nations and the on whether Brazil should

accept UN decisions, despite being against these same decisions.

In the annex 1 we present all selected questions divided in each category and the way

each response was tabulated.

Methodology

To estimate the hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes, we opted to use the

framework of structural equation modeling (SEM) and confirmatory factor analysis

(CFA). Jöreskog (1969) introduced CFA and it is used to test whether the measures of

constructs or factors are consistent with a specific understanding of the constructs. The

objective of CFA is to test whether the data fits a hypothesized measurement model based

on a previous theory, allowing the incorporation of latent variables – the constructs. The

18
SEM permits us to propose within a CFA, series of multiple equations simultaneously

interdependent about those constructs (Hair, Black et al, 2009).

We used a hierarchical hypothetical model of factors underlying the concrete measures

and how those factors are constrained by each other. By imposing these constraints, we

can propose a path analysis in ways that the model becomes consistent with our theory,

permitting the hierarchical organization of core values, postures and specific foreign

policy preferences.

Hair, Black et al, (2009) highlights the importance of the theoretical framework

supporting the model, as SEM is a confirmatory and not an exploratory analysis. It is

useful to test whether there are evidences that confirm the theory. All the relations should

be specified before the model is estimated.

After estimating the model, we obtain the fit statistics to assess how well the proposed

model has captured the covariance between all the constructs and measures of the model.

If the constraints of the model are inconsistent with the sample data, the results of

statistical tests of model fit will indicate a poor fit, and the model should be rejected. If

the fit is poor, it may be due to some items measuring multiple factors. It might also be

that some items within a factor are more related to each other than others. Most

importantly, the theoretical expectations were not met with the data. Here we estimate a

standard linear hierarchical confirmatory factor analysis within a structural equation-

modeling framework.

Model specification

Following Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), our model assumes that ideas that are more

concrete are constrained by attitudes that are more abstract. Each of the postures is

19
assumed to be constrained by both of the core values, and each of the specific policy

attitudes is assumed to be constrained by all four of the postures. The exogenous variables

in the model, the two core values, are linked by unexplained covariances. The model

specification is presented at Figure 1 presented above.

RESULTS

We first present the measurement model of the eleven latent constructs suggested in our

structural model. We establish that there can be some exogenous covariance between our

two core values – protagonism and pacifism – but we did not allow for covariations

among the other latent constructs. At table 1 we present the standardized epistemic

correlations of our measurement model and at table 2 the structural correlations among

the three dimensional levels.

Generally, the indicators – the survey questions – appear to be reliable measures of our

theoretical constructs. The mean R-squared of the indicators is 0.25, all of them are

significant related with the theoretical construct at 0.1% of confidence and most of them

have positive covariation1. The R-squared of the construct are also reasonable. The mean

value is of 0.42 and if we exclude the two indicators with higher values, the mean remains

relatively high: 0.29.

1
There is only one exception: regional intervention as an indicator of the specific policy preferences
towards Latin America-Brazil relationship is negatively correlated, but it is also significant. This is an
expected result since the question is made in a negative way. Question: “Because of its territorial,
demographic and economic size, Brazil is the most important country in South America. Considering these
aspects, do you agree or disagree that Brazil does not intervene in regional disputes?”.

20
 Table 1. Epistemic Correlation – Measurement Model

Standardized
Std Indicator Construct
Theoretical Construct Indicator Epistemic
Error R2 R2
Correlations

SPECIFIC ISSUE PREFERENCES

Leadership 0.533* 0.032 28%

Latin America-Brazil Intervention -0.218* 0.032 5% 78%

relationship Integration 0.461* 0.028 21%

Favorable to ONU 0.615* 0.077 38%

Multilateral
Acceptance of UN 52%
Foreign Policy 0.176* 0.031 3%
decisions

Consulates 0.301* 0.032 9%

South – South BRICS 0.198* 0.031 4%

43%
Diplomacy China – Brazil 0.483* 0.031 23%

India – Brazil 0.554* 0.032 31%

US-Brazil relationship US - Brazil description 0.459* 0.028 21% 54%

US - Brazil
0.619* 0.031 38%
classification

POSTURES

UN involvement peace
0.659* 0.041 43%
missions
MULTILATERALISM 8%
UN involvement human
0.537* 0.035 29%
rights

Free movement of
0.222* 0.027 5%
persons

INTEGRACIONISM South American 7%

0.759* 0.039 58%
parliament

Common foreign Policy 0.640* 0.035 41%

REGIONAL UN Security Council

0.209* 0.030 4% 89%
LEADERSHIP Seat

21
 Leadership LA 0.337* 0.029 11%

Trust to US 0.546* 0.024 30%

Sentiments to US 0.675* 0.024 46%

AMERICANISM 7%
Favorable opinion to
0.614* 0.026 38%
US

CORE VALUES

Brazil use of military

0.137* 0.030 2%
power

PACIFISM Brazil use of diplomacy 0.647* 0.033 42%

Brazil use of trade

0.618* 0.032 38%
diplomacy

Active participation of
0.458* 0.037 21%
PROTAGONISM Brazil

Brazil's importance 0.367* 0.032 13%

p-value: *<0.001

Overall fitting

Our proposed hierarchical model fits the data. It is important to report the goodness-of-

fit-statistics, as the fit refers to the ability of our model to reproduce the dataset. The chi-

square-test between the estimated to the saturated model is 1170.47 with 274 degrees of

freedoms. The ratio between chi-square and degrees-of-freedom is 4.27. Wheaton, et al.

(1977) consider a chi-square- to-degrees-of-freedom ratio of about 5.0 or less as

“beginning to be reasonable”. Also the root mean squared error of approximation

(RMSEA) is of 0.042 (90% IC: 0.039 – 0.044), what indicates goodness of fit, as proposed

by both Hu and Bentler (1999) and Browne and Cudeck (1993). The standardized root

mean square residual (SRMR) of 0.042 also indicates a reasonable goodness-of-fit as

22
suggested by Hu and Bentler (1999). Finally, the coefficient of determination of 0.951 is

another indication of the quality of our proposed model2.

It is important to highlight the good performance of our model on the goodness-of-fitting

statistics because it is a very complex model, with many parameters, paths and latent

constructs to be estimated and with a big sample, which are difficult scenarios to find

good model performance3.

Table 2. Hierarchical Structural Model

Standardized
Std Error
Betas

SPECIFIC ISSUE PREFERENCES

MULTILATERALISM 0.143** 0.056

INTEGRACIONISM 0.226*** 0.048

Latin America-Brazil
REGIONAL LEADERSHIP 0.773*** 0.060
Relationship
AMERICANISM -0.060 0.052

MULTILATERALISM 0.296*** 0.059

Multilateral INTEGRACIONISM 0.102* 0.049

Foreign Policy REGIONAL LEADERSHIP 0.257*** 0.061

AMERICANISM 0.471*** 0.075

MULTILATERALISM 0.233*** 0.051

South – South INTEGRACIONISM 0.059 0.044

Diplomacy REGIONAL LEADERSHIP 0.535*** 0.056

AMERICANISM 0.051 0.046

2
On the other hand, the results of the Comparative fit index (0.818) and of the Tucker-Lewis index (0.784)
are a little below the established threshold of 0.9. TLI and CFI index tend to be smaller whenever the
correlations among the observed variables in the dataset are not high. Kenny et all (2014) indicates that
whenever the RMSEA of the null model is below 0.158, the TLI and CFI index are misleading. The RMSEA
for our baseline model – that includes the means and variances of all observed variables – is (0.092).
3
Another important feature of our study is that in the full model with two covariances we estimate 111
parameters (24 within the structural model, 52 within the measurement model and 35 variances and
covariances) with 1881 observations, giving a ratio of 16.9 observations per parameter, close to satisfy the
very demanding requirement of Tanaka (1987) of a 20 to 1 ratio.

23
 MULTILATERALISM 0.146** 0.047

US-Brazil INTEGRACIONISM 0.022+ 0.040

Relationship REGIONAL LEADERSHIP 0.283*** 0.050

AMERICANISM 0.570*** 0.043

POSTURES

PROTAGONISM 0.163** 0.063

MULTILATERALISM
PACIFISM 0.181** 0.053

PROTAGONISM 0.089 0.056

INTEGRACIONISM
PACIFISM 0.223*** 0.047

PROTAGONISM 0.873*** 0.094

REGIONAL LEADERSHIP
PACIFISM 0.148+ 0.084

PROTAGONISM 0.251*** 0.059

AMERICANISM
PACIFISM 0.012 0.050

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.1, + p <0.5

Structural Model

The most important result is the high level of interconnectedness and structure between

foreign-policy elements. Attitudes and preferences for specific policy levels are tied to

constructs of higher level of abstraction – postures and core values. Despite the fact that

not all connections are statistically significant, most of them are quite robust – seventeen

out of the twenty-four proposed relations.

At the postural level, for example, there are strong connections between the postures and

one or both of the core values ideas (protagonism and pacifism). The same happens for

specific foreign policy issue preferences. Actually, both constructs that include questions

about multilateralism – the posture for multilateralism and the specific issue preferences

for a multilateral foreign policy – are correlated at a very high level, as expected. All the

24
other postures and specific foreign policy issue preferences are related with some of their

respective higher-level constructs.

As it was indicated by the r-squares in Table 1, a substantial proportion of the variation

in most of the endogenous constructs is explained by beliefs that are more abstract. At the

specific policy levels, the variations of r-squared varies from 43% observed in the South

– South Diplomacy construct to 78% in the Latin America-Brazil relationships.

This is an important empirical result with crucial theoretical implications. The estimated

hierarchical model states clearly that there are structure and consistency on the foreign

policy attitudes of the public. Our results clearly indicate that when constraint is measured

as a series of vertical relationships between attitudes at different levels of abstraction the

degree of structure on the Brazilians foreign policy attitudes is consistent.

A closer inspection of the connections among foreign-policy attitudes shows a number of

interesting findings. We focus first in the connections between core values and foreign

policy postures. Second, we focus on the connection between postures and specific

foreign policy issues.

Core Values and Postures

The relationships uncovered in the first type of relationship provides a valuable insight

into the various ways that core values anchor the general orientations people develop to

guide their foreign-policy attitudes. And for the most part, the linkages that emerge are

consistent with our conceptualization of the particular postures and core values included

in the study.

25
We found that respondents supporting protagonism are likely to be more positive about

the idea of Brazil being a regional leader (β= 0.874), and tend to endorse multilateralism

more often (β= 0.16). However, they have a more favorable view of United States (β=

0.25), which goes counter the idea of Brazil being an important actor of global affairs. In

addition, there is no relation between protagonism and regional integration, which is

somewhat counter intuitive since a more protagonist stance should be associated with

positive views about regional integration.

The public supporting pacifism are very likely to support multilateralism (β= 0.18),

supportive of regional leadership (β= 0.15) and have a positive view of integrationism

(β= 0.22). In the other hand, we could not find any stable relationship between pacifism

and positive attitudes towards United States, as it was expected.

Postures and Specific Issues

The other important dimension of our causal model is the links between postures and

specific issues preferences.

First, Americanism is related to high support for Multilateral Foreign Policy (β=0.47) and,

obviously, to US-Brazil relationship (β= 0.57). The first finding is counter intuitive since

a multilateral approach in global affairs should not represent a strong support for the

United States. On the other hand, Americanism is not related to support to South-South

diplomacy and Latin America-Brazil relationships, as expected.

Second, the overall preference for the multilateralism posture is related with all specific

foreign policy issues preferences. Of course, the stronger effects are related to Multilateral

Foreign Policy (β=0.30), as it is the empirical realization of the posture. It is also

4
All coefficients presented at the SEM model are standardized.

26
positively related with Latin America-Brazil relationship (β=0.14), South-South

Diplomacy (β=0.23), and US-Brazil relationship (β=0.15).

Brazil’s bid for regional leadership has affected all four specific policy issues preferences

analyzed. The stronger effects are, as expected, in the foreign policy towards Latin

America (β= 0.77), South – South Diplomacy (β= 0.53) and Multilateral Foreign Policy

(β= 0.26). This posture has also influence in US-Brazil relationship (β= 0.28).

Finally, the last posture – integrationism – is also positively related with Latin America-

Brazil relationship (β= 0.22) and Multilateral Foreign Policy (β= 0.10). However, the

posture is also positive – but weakly – associated with US-Brazil relationships (β= 0.11),

which is something that we did not expect. Lastly, integrationism is not linked to South –

South Diplomacy, which is something also unexpected.

Conclusions

How do individuals in Brazil make sense out of a complex international environment

given their low levels of specialized information? Based on Hurwitz and Peffley (1987),

we resisted to answer this question with the assumption of unidimensional ideology or

party lines. Instead, using an intensive and domain specific approach we found that

foreign policy views to be constrained to an impressive degree by core values and

postures located within the sphere of international relations values and beliefs.

In this paper, we determined that Brazilians' attitudes on a host of specific foreign policy

issues are closely predicted by more general foreign policy postures. These postures are

the individual's generalized preferences for the conduct of foreign policy. We found that

four key postures to be strong predictors of attitudes on specific foreign policy issues –

multilateralism, Americanism, integrationism, and regional leadership.

27
More importantly, a set of general beliefs, or core values, about international affairs was

found to underline these postures – pacifism and protagonism – and not previous

ideological assumptions. This means that earlier findings in Latin America (Castillo et al

2015) showing that international attitudes are related to a liberal-conservative dimension

should not be interpreted in a way that foreign-policy attitudes lack an autonomous

structure and that they rely solemnly on party, ideological or class lines. On the contrary,

our study shows that the general attitudes that constrain specific preferences are

distinctive to the foreign-policy domain.

The results of this study should provide strong evidence to analysts and pundits who have

argued that the nature of political opinion in the international realm was random or

disorganized in Brazil (Gaspari 2010). The study of Hurwitz et al (1993) had already

showed that in the case of a Latin American country – Costa Rica – public attitudes were

structured by core beliefs and postures from the foreign policy domain. Given the

differences between the US and Costa Rica, the authors were surprised that the replication

of the model of foreign policy beliefs had been possible. Likewise, our study indicates

that perceptions about the foreign policy are more structured in Brazil than previously

thought.

Similar to what was argued by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), the postures that respondents

used to anchor their specific policy preferences should prove to be important analytical

guideline for future efforts to interpret and predict mass reactions to foreign-policy events

in Brazil. They argued that it was both more powerful and more parsimonious for scholar

and analysts to examine these general orientations than to focus on the opinions to specific

issues, which change over time. The Brazilian case seems to re-confirm this speculation.

In addition, our specific empirical findings are six fold. First, the influence of protagonism

as a core value has interesting results. In one hand, the public favoring a protagonist stance

28
of Brazilian foreign policy supports regional leadership and multilateralism, as expected,

but in the other hand, it also favors a closer relationship with the Unite States and it does

not favor regional integration.

One can argue that a closer relationship with the United States is part of being a global

protagonist, as the foreign policy of countries like France or China proves it, but not

favoring regional integration is contradictory to the general understanding of Brazilian

international identity, at least among policy makers. To favor regional integration

represents one of Brazil’s most important credentials abroad (Lafer 2000, 2001). It is

possible to speculate that the common sense about the Brazilian international and regional

strategy among policymakers is not entirely supported by the country’s public opinion.

More studies about how the public and policymakers support protagonism and how it is

related with regional integration need to be done.

Second, pacifism has a clearer and more consistent influence in other constructs. As

expected, pacifists in Brazil support multilateralism, regional leadership and

integrationism; and do not support a closer relationship with the United States. It seems

that pacifists in Brazil have an unhindered view of what should be Brazil’s most important

postures towards peace in global affairs: multilateral institutions, regional integration and

stay away from the United States. It is important to remember that this last connection is

contrary to our initial expectation since we originally thought that since Brazil does not

have any strategic problem with the United States local pacifists should perceive a closer

relationship with that country in a more favorable fashion.

Third, as we showed in the discussion, Americanists tend to support, obviously, a closer

relationship with the United State, as well as specific multilateral foreign policy issues.

Based on these two findings, we can argue that the position towards multilateral

institutions is structurally connected with Americanism and a positive view towards the

29
US. This particularly finding can be explained by a perception that multilateral

institutions since the end of World War II have been highly supported and promoted by

the US diplomacy. Furthermore, Americanism, as expected, is not related to support to

South-South diplomacy or Latin America-Brazil relationships. In this sense, the

orientation towards Latin American and other South–South partners represent a strategic

move that highlights Brazil’s autonomy vis-a-vis the United States.

Fourth, the Multilateralism posture affecting all specific foreign policy issues preferences,

with widespread ramifications, only reinforces the traditional idea that Brazil’s is

multilateralist country par excellence, a characteristic now widely supported by its public.

Itamaraty’s long history of supporting multilateralism has apparently paid off with the

local public. Clearly, multilateralism is a main topic and a concrete belief among the

Brazilian public since it is correlated with all other concepts: it is simultaneously

influenced by both core values and it is affecting all four specific foreign policy issue

preferences.

Fifth, the Regional Leadership posture affecting all four specific policy issues

preferences, with less influence in the US-Brazil relationship and Multilateral Foreign

Policy, shows that the public supporting a regional leadership stance tends to favor a more

encompassing foreign policy in all possible scenarios, even when comes to establish a

closer relationship with the United States. The influence of protagonism over this posture,

as mentioned above, only reinforces this idea.

Sixth, the support for Integrationism is strongly related to Latin-America-Brazil

relationship and to a multilateralist foreign policy, which highlights the connection

between regional integration and a positive view of multilateral institutions. As expected,

Integrationism is not connected to South – South Diplomacy since the latter is composed

with questions about countries like India and China, and about the expansion of Brazilian

30
consulates and Embassies in Africa. Lastly, Integrationism is not associated with US-

Brazil relationship, as anticipated.

In sum, our model and empirical results show that the Brazilian attitudes towards foreign

policy issues are structured, consistent and coherent. These new findings have showed

that is not possible anymore to abide by Ulysses Guimarães – former President of the

National Congress - famous quote made in 1986 about the importance of foreign policy

issues to the median Brazilian voter. In his words “Itamaraty only gains vote in Burundi”

(Gaspari 2010). It seems that it might be gaining in Brazil as well.

REFERENCES

Aldrich, John et al. 2006. Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection. Annual Review

of Political Science, No. 09, pp. 477-502

Almeida, Maria Hermínia Tavares. 2016. “Within the region, beyond the region: the role

of Brazil according to the mass public”, Gardini, Gian Lucca and Almeida, Maria

Hermínia, eds. Foreign policy responses to the rise of Brazil – Balancing power in

emerging states, New York: Palgrave – Macmillan, pp. 29-45.

Almeida, Paulo Roberto and Barbosa, Rubens. 2006. Relações Brasil-Estados Unidos:

assimetrias e convergências. Editora Saraiva.

Amorim Neto, Octavio. 2012. De Dutra a Lula: a condução e os determinantes da política

externa brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campus

Bandeira, Moniz. 2004. As Relações Perigosas: Brasil-Estados Unidos (De Collor de

Melo a Lula). Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 417 pp.

31
Baum, Matthew and Potter, Philip. 2008. The Relationships between Mass Media, Public

Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis. The Annual Review of

Political Science, No. 11, pp. 39-66.

Baum, Matthew and Groeling, Tim. 2010. Reality Asserts Itself Public Opinion on Iraq

and the Elasticity of Reality. International Organization, Vol 64, No. 03, pp. 443-479.

Baumgartner, Jody; Francis, Peter; and Morris, Jonathan. 2008. A Clash of Civilizations?

The Influence of Religion on Public Opinion of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East.

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 02, pp. 171-179.

Berinsky, Adam. 2007. Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public

Support for Military Conflict. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 4, November 2007,

pp. 975–997.

Bjereld, Ulf and Ekengren, Anne-Marie. 1999. Foreign policy dimensions: a comparison

between the United States and Sweden. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 03,

pp. 503–518.

Brechin, Steven. 2003. Comparative public opinion and knowledge on global climatic

change and the Kyoto Protocol: The US versus the world? International Journal of

Sociology and Social Policy, Vol. 23, No. 10, pp. 106–134.

Brewer, Paul; Gross, Kimberly, Aday, Sean; and Willnat, Lars. 2004. International

Trust and Public Opinion about World Affairs. American Journal of Political Science,

Vol. 49, No. 01, pp. 93-109.

Brody, Richard. 1991. Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public

Support. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Browne, Michael and Cudeck, Robert. 1993. Alternative ways of assessing model fit.

Sociological Methods and Research, Vol. 21, No. 02 pp. 230-258.

32
Bueno, Clodoaldo; Ramanzini Júnior, Haroldo and Vigevani, Tullo. 2014. Uma

Perspectiva de Longo Período sobre a Integração Latino-americana Vista pelo Brasil.

Contexto Internacional, Vol. 36, No. 02, pp. 549-583.

Burges, Sean. 2005. Auto-estima in Brazil: The logic of Lula's south-south foreign policy.

International Journal, Vol. 50, No. 04, pp. 1133-1151.

Burges, Sean. 2016. Brazil in the world: the international relations of a South American

giant Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Cardim, Carlos Henrique. 2017. “The root of the matter - Rui Barbosa: Brazil in the

world”. in Pimentel, José Vicente. 2017. Brazilian Diplomatic Thought. Brasília:

FUNAG, Vol. III, pp. 457-500.

Corrêa, Luiz Felipe de Seixas. 2000. Diplomacia e História: política externa e identidade

nacional brasileira. Política Externa. São Paulo, Vol. 9, No. 01, pp. 22-32.

Cunha, Pedro. 1977. A Diplomacia da Paz – Rui Barbosa em Haia. Ministério da

Educação e Cultura, Fundação Casa de Rui Barbosa – Rio de Janeiro – Brasil, 68 p.

Flemes, Daniel. 2010. “Brazil strategic options in a changing world order”, Flemes, Dd.,

ed. Regional leadership in the global system: ideas, interests and strategies of the regional

powers, Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 93-112.

Fonseca Jr., Gélson. 2008. O interesse e a regra: ensaios sobre o multilateralismo. 1. ed.

São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2008. 362pp.

Fonseca Jr., Gélson. 2014. Apontamentos para o estudo da diplomacia multilateral do

Brasil. PhD Dissertation, UFRGS. 205pp.

Foyle, Douglas. 1997. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as a Mediating

Variable. International Studies Quarterly, No. 41, pp. 141–169.

33
Fraga, Rosendo and Pablo Asa. 2010. La opinion pública argentina sobre política exterior

y defensa. CARI, Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales.

Gaspari, Elio. 2010. Serra joga parado, mas quer preferência. Folha de São Paulo, March

3rd.

Gravelle, Timothy; Reifler, Jason; and Scotto, Thomas. 2017. The structure of foreign

policy attitudes in transatlantic perspective: Comparing the United States, United

Kingdom, France and Germany. European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 56, No. 04,

pp. 757-776.

Guimarães, Feliciano; Fernandes, Ivan and Maldonaldo, Gerardo. 2019. Domestic

Attitudes towards Regional Leadership: a survey experiment in Brazil. Foreign Policy

Analysis, forthcoming.

Hair, Joseph F. et al. Análise multivariada de dados. Bookman Editora, 2009.

Herrmann, Richard; Tetlock, Philip; and Visser, Penny. 1999. Mass Public Decisions on

Go to War: A Cognitive-Interactionist Framework. American Political Science Review,

Vol. 93, No. 03, pp. 553-573.

Hirst, Mônica. 2006. Os cinco “as” das relações Brasil–Estados Unidos: aliança,

alinhamento, autonomia, ajustamento e afirmação. Relações internacionais do Brasil:

temas e agendas. São Paulo: Editora Saraiva, pp. 91-127.

Holsti, Ole. 1992. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-

Lippmann Consensus Mershon. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 439-

466.

Holsti, Ole. 2004. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: The

University of Michigan Press.

34
Hu, Litze and Bentler, Peter. 1999. Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure

analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural equation modeling: a

multidisciplinary journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 1-55.

Hurwitz, Jon and Peffley, Mark. 1987. How are Foreign policy attitudes structured? A

hierarchical model. American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 04, pp. 1099–1100.

Hurwitz, Jon, Peffley, Mark and Seligson, Mitchell. 1993. Foreign policy belief systems

in comparative perspective: The United States and Costa Rica. International Studies

Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 245–270.

Jenkins-Smith, Hank, Mitchell, Neil and Herron, Kerry. 2004. Foreign and domestic

policy belief structures in the US and British publics. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.

48, No. 03, pp. 287–309.

Jentleson, Bruce. 1992. The pretty prudent public—post post-Vietnam American opinion

on the use of military force. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 01: 49–74.

Jöreskog, Karl. 1969. A general approach to confirmatory maximum likelihood factor

analysis. Psychometrika, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 183-202.

Keller, Ed and Jon Berry. 2003. The Influentials: One American in Ten Tells the Other

Nine How to Vote, Where to Eat, and What to Buy. New York: Free Press.

Kenny, David, Kaniskan, Burcu, & McCoach, D. Betsy 2014. The performance of

RMSEA in models with small degrees of freedom. Sociological Methods and Research,

Vol. 44, No. 03, pp. 486-507.

Kritzinger, Sylvia. 2003. Public opinion in the Iraq crisis: Explaining developments in

Italy, the UK, France and Germany. European Political Science, Vol. 03, No. 01, pp. 30–

35.

35
Krosnick, Jon and Kinder, Donald. 1990. Altering the Foundations of Support for the

President through Priming. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 2, pp.

497-512.

Lafer, Celso. 2000. Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present and

Future. Daedalus, Vol. 129, No. 02, pp. 207-238.

Lafer, Celso. 2001. A Identidade Internacional do Brasil e a Política Externa

Brasileira: passado, presente e futuro. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 126 p.

Lima, Maria Regina and Hirst, Mônica. 2006. Brazil as an Intermediate State and

Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities. International Affairs, Vol. 82, No.

01, pp. 21-40.

Lima, Maria Regina Soares. 2005. Aspiração Internacional e Política Externa. RBCE, No.

82, pp. 4-19.

Loureio, Felipe; Guimarães, Feliciano and Schor, Adriana. 2015. Public opinion and

foreign policy in João Goulart's Brazil (1961-1964): Coherence between national and

foreign policy perceptions?. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional Vol.58, No.2,

pp.98-118.

Lustig, Carola and Olego, Tomás. 2016. Public Opinion and Framing Effects of Argentine

Foreign Policy toward Brazil: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Urban Centers in

Argentina. Contexto Internacional, Vol. 38, No. 01, pp. 241-275.

Maggiotto, Michael and Wittkopf, Eugene R. 1981. American Public Attitudes Toward

Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 601–631. Malamud,

Andrés. 2011. A Leader without Followers? The Growing Divergence between the

Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy. in Latin American Politics

and Society, Vol. 53, No. 03, pp. 01-24.

36
Mourón, Fernando; Urdinez, Francisco and Onuki, Janina. 2016. Efectos de framing en

temas de política externa. Evidencia experimental de países emergentes: la rivalidad

argentino-brasileña. Opinião Pública. Vol. 22, pp. 195-218.

Onuki, Janina; Mourón, Fernando and Urdinez, Francisco. 2016. Latin American

Perceptions in Comparative Perspective. Regional Identity and Contested Leadership.

Contexto Internacional, Vol. 38, pp. 45-69.

Page, Benjamin and Shapiro Robert. 1992. The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in

Americans’ Foreign Policy Preferences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 489 pp.

Page, Benjamin and Shapiro, Robert. 1982. Changes in Americans’ policy preferences

1935–1979. Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 01, pp. 24–42.

Peffley, Mark and Hurwitz, Jon. 1992. International Events and Foreign Policy Beliefs:

Public Response to Changing Soviet-US. Relations. American Journal of Political

Science, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 431-461.

Pimentel, José Vicente. 2017. Brazilian Diplomatic Thought. Brasília: FUNAG, Vol. I,

II, III.

Popkin, Samuel. 1993. The Reasoning Voter: communication and persuasion in

presidential campaigns. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Reynolds, Evangeline; Oliveira, Amâncio; Onuki, Janina; Winters, Mathew. 2017.

Attitudes toward Consent-Based and Non-Consent-Based International Law in a

Regional Power Context. International Interactions, Vol. 53, pp. 1-20.

Ricupero, Rubens. 1995. Visões do Brasil: ensaios sobre a história e a inserção

internacional do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record.

Ricupero, Rubens. 2000. Rio Branco: o Brasil no mundo. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto.

37
Ricupero, Rubens. 2017a. A diplomacia na construção do Brasil 1750-2016. Rio de

Janeiro: Versátil Editores.

Ricupero, Rubens. 2017b. “The foreign policy of the First Republic (1889-1930)” in

Pimentel, José Vicente. 2017. Brazilian Diplomatic Thought. Brasília: FUNAG, Vol. III,

pp. 349-374.

Schiavon, Jorge. 2010. La migración México-Estados Unidos: Entre intereses,

simulaciones y opciones reales de política”, en Jorge Durand y Jorge A. Schiavon

(editores). Perspectivas migratorias: un análisis interdisciplinario de la migración

internacional, México, CIDE, pp. 221-251.

Shapiro, Robert and Page, Benjamin. 1988. Foreign policy and the rational public. Journal

Conflict Resolution, 32, pp. 211–47.

Sniderman, Paul; Brody, Richard; and Tetlock, Philip. 1991. Reasoning and Choice:

Explorations in Political Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Souza, Amaury. 2008. O Brasil na Região e no Mundo: Percepções da Comunidade

Brasileira de Política Externa. Rio de Janeiro: Centro Brasileiro de Relações

Internacionais.

Tanaka, J. S. 1987. How big is big enough?: Sample size and goodness of fit in structural

equation models with latent variables. Child Development, 58, pp. 134-146.

Vigevani, Tullo and Cepaluni, Gabriel. 2007. Lula's foreign policy and the quest for

autonomy through diversification. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 07, pp. 1309-

1326.

Vigevani, Tullo and Ramanzini Júnior, Haroldo. 2010. Pensamento Brasileiro e

Integração regional. Contexto Internacional, Vol. 38, No. 02, pp. 437-487.

38
Vigevani, Tullo and Ramanzini Júnior, Haroldo. 2014. Autonomia, Integração regional e

Política Externa Brasileira: Mercosul e Unasul. Revista Dados, Vol. 57, pp. 517-552.

Wheaton, Blair, Muthen, Bengt, Alwin, Duane, and Summers, Gene. 1977. Assessing

Reliability and Stability in Panel Models. Sociological Methodology, Vol. 08, No. 01, pp.

84-136.

Wittkopf, Eugenne. 1990. Faces of Internationalism Public Opinion and American

Foreign. Duke University Press.

39