SBI Cards & Payments Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Rohidas Jadhav (2018).

It was 1

found that in addition to being received, the PDF attachment of the served
notification had also been opened.

"I shall accept this for the purposes of serving the Notice under Order XXI Rule
22. I take this action because the symbol indicators blatantly demonstrate that not
only was
the message and its attachment delivered to the Respondent's number but that both
were opened," Justice Patel observed.
EXECUTION APPLICATION NO. 1196 OF 2015

Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC 81], has held : (SCC pp.
85-88, paras 9-15)

“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be
blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word
“sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be
necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word
“sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude,
which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose
intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined
from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this
context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have
acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its
part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged
that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”.

In the case of **M/S. BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LT v. MICRO AND SMALL

ENTERPRISES (Madras High Court, 2024)**, it was highlighted that the receipt of a notice in
arbitration is essential for the parties to be aware of the arbitration process and their rights within
it. The document emphasizes the importance of serving notice to the respondent regarding the
appointment of an arbitrator and the initiation of arbitral proceedings. Failure to provide such
notice can impact the validity and effectiveness of the arbitration process. Therefore, in the
absence of attaching a copy of the order to the notice in arbitration, it is crucial to ensure that the
notice itself contains all necessary information and serves as a clear and formal communication
regarding the arbitration proceedings. Adequate notice is essential to inform the parties of their
rights, obligations, and the progression of the arbitration process.
In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575], this Court reiterated the following classic
statement from Krishna vs. Chathappan [1890 ILR 13 Mad 269] :

“… Section 5 gives the courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way
in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well
understood; the words ‘sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial
justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant.”

In N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy [1998 (7) SCC 123], this Court held:

“It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the
Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain
limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes
delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas
in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is
satisfactory.

Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion
and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction,
unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a
different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court
would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court
to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. The primary
function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial
justice…...

Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties
do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. A court knows that refusal to
condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no
presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate.

This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should
receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. It must be remembered that in
every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not
enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him.

If the explanation does not mack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the
court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think
that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean
against acceptance of the explanation.”+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
In Ram Nath Sao vs. Gobardhan Sao [2002 (3) SCC 195] this Court observed thus : “12. Thus it
becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or
Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as
to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a
party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not
will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or
rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the
courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the
petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished
should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of
bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter
the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a
valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning
delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter
the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of
facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party
against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a
party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance
between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.”

In Ram Nath Sao vs. Gobardhan Sao [2002 (3) SCC 195] this Court observed thus : “12.

Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the
Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction
so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is
imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient
cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each case.

There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay
caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of
finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of
disposal drive.

Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no
negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other
hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking
steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be
lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner.

However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished
should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in
the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates,
either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on
merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the
order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.”
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2023

(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (CIVIL) NO(S). 12180/2023) M/S JAITLEY CONSTRUCTION CO. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA RESPONDENT(S)

Furthermore, paragraph no.61 of the judgement in Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources
Department) Represented by Executive Engineer (Supra) is required to be looked into. The relevant
paragraph is delineated below :-

"61. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the
Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under section 37 of the Arbitration
Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or section 13(1A) of the
Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned
by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona
fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the
court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite
party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's
inaction, negligence or laches."

This explanation does not cut any ice whatsoever as the law of limitation as explained in the
judgments above and elaborated in the judgment in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By L.Rs. and
others (supra) penned by Hon'ble Pankaj Mithal, J. is that the discretionary power is only to be
exercised when sufficient cause is made out and compelling reasons are provided for condonation of
delay.

The Supreme Court very recently in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.31248 of 2018 titled as

Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By L.Rs. & Ors

v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) [Coram :- Bela M. Trivedi and

Pankaj Mithal, JJ.]

Delhi Development Authority v. M/s. Ajab Singh and Co.
(2022 SCC ONLINE DEL 2236)
24. This Court has carefully gone through the aforesaid judgment, and the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the aforesaid case has held that, in case, the delay is explained satisfactorily, the
Party has acted bona fide, and not in a negligent manner, the delay can be condoned. And,
therefore, the judgment does not help the Respondent in any manner.
25. As delay involved in the present case can be condoned, subject to explanation of
sufficient cause, if it is not more than 30 days as provided under the Statute.
27. In the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the explanation of
sufficient cause should be considered with pragmatism, in justice oriented approach rather
than technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay.
33. The Application for condonation of delay in respect of the objection filed under Section
34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 stands allowed.