De Sanctis, Paciarotti, Giovine - 2016 - An Overview On Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Supportability (RAMS) Engineering

International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management
Integration between RCM and RAM: a case study

Ilaria De Sanctis, Claudia Paciarotti, Oreste Di Giovine,
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Ilaria De Sanctis, Claudia Paciarotti, Oreste Di Giovine, (2016) "Integration between RCM and RAM:
a case study", International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management, Vol. 33 Issue: 6, pp.852-880,
https://doi.org/10.1108/IJQRM-02-2015-0026
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IJQRM RELIABILITY PAPER

33,6
Integration between
RCM and RAM: a case study
852 Ilaria De Sanctis, Claudia Paciarotti and Oreste Di Giovine
Dipartimento di Ingegneria Industriale e Scienze Matematiche,
Received 23 February 2015 Università Politecnica delle Marche, Ancona, Italy
Revised 23 February 2015
Accepted 19 November 2015
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to propose a practical method of performing maintenance in
the offshore industry where engineers have to manage problems such as the high cost of operations,
assuring an high availability of the plant, safety on board and environmental protection. Indeed an
efficient maintenance method it is necessary in order to offer methods and criteria to select the rights
maintenance strategies keeping in to account the environmental, safety and production constrains.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper provides an overview of reliability centered
maintenance (RCM) and reliability, availability, maintainability methodologies and an integration of
the two methodologies in a particular case study in the oil and gas sector.
Findings – This paper suggests an improvement of the well-established RCM methodology applicable
to industries with high priority level. It is proposed an integration between a reliability analysis and an
availability analysis and an application on the offshore oil and gas industry.
Practical implications – The methodology provides an excellent tool that can be utilized in
industries, where safety, regulations and the availability of the plant play a fundamental role.
Originality/value – The proposed methodology provides a practical method for selecting the best
maintenance strategy considering the equipment redundancy and sparing, the asset’s performance
over long time scales, and the system uptime, downtime and slowdowns.
Keywords Oil and gas, Reliability availability maintainability, Reliability centred maintenance
Paper type Case study
1. Introduction
An old-fashioned and uneconomic point of view considers maintenance simply a cost
and a necessary evil, rather than a profit contributor and provider of business value.
But, especially in the oil and gas sector, the choice of the right maintenance strategies,
i.e. the best mix of corrective, preventive, condition based and proactive maintenance
for the equipment, is fundamental.
It is true that accidents inevitably accompany offshore development, but when
they occur, they cause environmental, human and economic disasters more severe than
in any other sector.
The causes (equipment failure, personnel mistakes and extreme natural impacts), the
scale and the severity of the accidents’ consequences are extremely variable (Patin, 1999).
Offshore-technology.com (2014) profiles the world’s worst offshore oil rig disasters
(Alexander L. Kielland, North Sea, Norway; Seacrest Drillship disaster, South China
Sea, Thailand; Glomar Java Sea Drillship disaster, South China; Bohai 2 oil rig disaster,
China; Enchova Central Platform disaster, Brazil; Mumbai High North disaster, Indian
Ocean; Usumacinta Jack-up disaster, Gulf of Mexico; C.P. Baker Drilling Barge disaster,
International Journal of Quality &
Reliability Management Gulf of Mexico) and identify the Piper Alpha disaster ( July 1988) in the North Sea,
Vol. 33 No. 6, 2016
pp. 852-880
UK, as the worst offshore oil disaster in history, after 167 people lost their lives
© Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0265-671X
(www.offshore-technology.com/features/feature-the-worlds-deadliest-offshore-oil-rig-
DOI 10.1108/IJQRM-02-2015-0026 disasters-4149812/).
Nevertheless, in the recent April 20, 2010 about 60 km southeast of the Louisiana Integration
coast the largest environmental disaster in US history has occurred due to explosion between RCM
and subsequent fire on the Deepwater Horizon semi-submersible Mobile Offshore
Drilling Unit. Deepwater Horizon was an exploratory drilling and it had been troubled
and RAM
by unusually frequent and forceful contact with explosive natural gas deposits.
The resulting fire could not be extinguished and, on April 22, 2010, Deepwater Horizon
sank, leaving the well gushing at the seabed and causing the largest offshore oil spill in 853
US history. The accident resulted in 11 deaths, huge environmental impact and
significant financial loses (Kaufman, 2010).
The research showed that primary factors that allowed disaster to happen were
poor management and wrong decision making (Høyland and Rausand, 2009). Moreover
that disasters show how rapidly reputation and finances could be lost and therefore
that it is crucially important to invest time and money in assurance of safety of
engineering projects, especially in the oil and gas offshore sector.
In light of that disasters, this article want to highlight how the importance
of preventive maintenance (PM) increases in the oil industry in case of offshore
installations because failure could bring to environmental disaster, human and huge
capital losses.
Reliability centered maintenance (RCM) is a widely accepted methodology that has
been available in the industry for over 30 years, and has proved to offer an efficient
strategy for PM optimization (Desphande and Modak, 2002; Fernandez et al., 2003).
Indeed the goal of RCM is to identify maintenance types and intervals only in relation
to the actual critical features of the various components, preserving the most
important equipment (as pumps, vessels and valves) functions with the required
reliability at the lowest maintenance cost (SKF Reliability Systems, 2008; Rausand
and Vatn, 2008).
But in the actual context activities levels are increasing, causing sector inflation and
exploration, development and production costs are rising. Complicating these
changes are the rising expectations of regulators, shareholders and communities, all
of which are demanding more from oil and gas companies. Regulations are becoming
increasingly complex and regulators more proactive, requiring a greater level of
attention to ensure compliance (McCreery et al., 2013; Fernandez et al., 2003).
So, in this context oil and gas companies need to focus on operational excellence and
unplanned shutdowns due to unexpected failures, typically longer and more costly
than planned shutdowns because of their complexity and the difficulty in reaching
them, are not permitted. So the availability of the system achieves a fundamental role
(Rajpal et al., 2006; Hussin et al., 2013).
Hence the importance of an analysis that finds out quantitatively system
availability, reliability and equipment maintainability and that is able to identify the
critical subsystems and the equipment which mainly influence system performance.
Indeed the objective of reliability, availability, maintainability (RAM) analyses is to
increase a system’s ability to operate normally, for a long time, without any failures.
Integrating the RAM and RCM analysis could help to reach an high efficiency of the
system and could contribute to optimize maintenance policies in order to reduce critical
issues and consequently increase system operating efficiency and availability. Indeed
in the present paper we integrated the two methodologies in the oil industry in case of
an offshore installations and we paid attention to procedures and legislation followed in
the maritime offshore sector (Carretero et al., 2003; Vatn, 2008; Turan et al., 2011).
Moreover, according to Conn et al. (2010), we supported standardization and provide
IJQRM value to strategic decisions and opportunities for the operational and maintenance
33,6 units to carry out modifications and projects that ensure safe operations and enhance
process capacity and reliability.
The paper is structured in six sections. After this introduction, Section 2 proposes
review of RCM and RAM methodology. Section 3 explains the methodologies adopted
and provides a detailed description of each step. Section 4 presents the case study and
854 Section 5 shows the main results of the study. The paper is concluded in Section 6 with
a brief discussion of the study and future development.
2. Literature review/background
2.1 RCM
The RCM approach is the main tool to improve the cost-effectiveness and control of
maintenance in all types of industries, and hence to improve availability and safety
(Vatan et al., 2011). The basic criteria of the RCM process are three technical standards:
IEC 60300-3-11 (ICE, 1999), SAE-JA1011 (SAE, 1999) and SAE-JA1012 (SAE, 2002).
These are the RCM standards typically used. The methodology has its origin in
the aircraft and aerospace industry and it was also early applied by the military and the
nuclear industry. The RCM methodology has extensive application also outside these
industries, as in rail work networks (Carretero et al., 2003; Vatn, 2008), metallurgical
industries (Deshpande and Modak, 2002; Bookless and Sharkey, 1999), coal mines
(Deshpande and Modak, 2002), chemical and processing, medical (hospitals), sawmill,
shipping, transportation and water distribution (Selvik and Aven, 2011). In addition to
the above, the RCM has been established in the offshore oil and gas industry too.
Serratella et al. (2007) discussed about RCM applications offshore, for the machinery
and rotating equipment of ships.
Mokashi et al. (2002) also presented the introduction of RCM on board ships and
showed how it can influence the ship management and the work of seafarers.
The OREDA (2009) handbook was another effort originating from a few oil
operators to enhance the maintenance and operation of offshore structures by
collecting data for the topside and subsea equipment.
2.2 RAM
RAM is a concept with a history very similar to that of RCM: its origins are in the 1970s,
and its intent was to assure availability for the military. But in the actual context,
keeping in view the competitive environment, overall operating and production costs
the significance of system’s RAM analysis has greatly been enhanced (Rajpal et al.,
2006). Lots of papers are available in literature which suggest that RAM analysis helps
the plant personnel to plan and adapt suitable maintenance strategies (Rajpal et al.,
2006; Sharma et al., 2008; Saraswat and Yadava, 2008). Indeed RAM is an engineering
tool which can be used to predict and improve the performance of the system. It allows
to identify areas within the system or process where improvement actions can be
initiated. The information obtained from analysis will help the management in the
performance improvement of the system (Calixto, 2012).
Indeed, the RAM model provides a quantitative basis for judging the acceptability
of the design, and the tools needed to facilitate justification and prioritization activities
for all future reliability and availability decision making. Factors that affect RAM of a
repairable industrial system include machinery, operating conditions, maintenance
conditions and infra-structural facilities (Komal Sharma and Kumar, 2010).
3. Methodology Integration
In this paper an integrated methodology between RAM and RCM is illustrated for an between RCM
offshore installation in the oil industry.
Indeed the RCM analysis focalize its attention on the maintenance strategy selection
and RAM
and definition, while the RAM analysis through the reliability block diagram (RBD)
structure defines the logical interaction of failures within a system.
RAM analysis concentrates more on quantitative indexes than RCM, in 855
order to enable engineers to rank various design options and scenarios, evaluate
the impact of future or proposed changes to current operations, allow modeling
of spares and maintenance resource constraints, predict system uptime, downtime
and slowdowns and provide a strategic view of the asset’s performance over longer
time scales.
For that reason a RAM analysis permit a continuous improvement and adaptation
throughout a power plant’s life. This helps to prevent confusion, obsolescence, and,
ultimately, disregard.
In the present paper an integration of the two methodologies is reported.
In particular here below we will describe in detail the integration of RCM and RAM
analysis. A RAM analysis will be developed in accordance with the results of
maintenance analysis and the criticality analysis (CA). The integration of RAM will
enable engineers to rank various design options and scenarios.
Moreover through the calculation of system uptime, downtime and slowdowns we
will have a strategic view of the asset’s performance over longer time scales that will
influence the maintenance plan definition.
In Figure 1 the entire methodology exploited in the case of study is illustrated.
A data collection is the first step of the analysis, where all the necessary
documentation are collected (pipe and instrument diagrams (P&ID), product flow
diagrams (PFDs), unit functional diagrams (UFDs), main equipment list (MEL), valve
list, instrument list, overall description, emergency shut down (ESD) philosophy and
RAM data collection). To follow, a failure mode and effect analysis and a CA are
implemented in order to identify critical items considering their environmental, security
and production impact. Considering the different level of criticality maintenance
policies could be supplied through a maintenance Strategy selection and a
maintainability analysis (MA) will define their lasts.
As is shown in Figure 1 the RAM analysis carried out downstream the CA and the
maintenance analysis. In fact in big dimension plant it would make sense implement
the RAM only on critical section of the plant and for critical item. Moreover items to
Redesign
RAM
Failure Review Analysis
RAM Data Mode and Criticality
Collection Effect Analysis Figure 1.
Analysis Maintenance Maintenance RCM procedure
Maintenance adopted in the
Strategy Plan
Analysis case of study
Selection Definition
IJQRM include in the RBD will be characterized by their own failure rates and the mean time to
33,6 repair (MTTR) coming from the maintenance analysis.
The pieces of equipment that are the major contributors to the production
unavailability of the project could be identified, to provide, if necessary and applicable,
input and recommendations to the engineering design team in order to improve and
enhance the availability of facilities. Moreover the results of the RAM analysis influence
856 the definition of the maintenance plan, indeed considering the efficiency of the system, it
could confirm the maintenance polices chosen or it will oblige to reconsider the
maintenance strategy of one or more items.
The paragraph below will detail each phase of the analysis explaining the procedure
and the outputs of each steps.
3.1 RAM data collection

The first step of the analysis is a RAM data collection. In particular, in order to achieve
a RAM data collection in the petro chemical field the necessary documents are:
• overall description;
• P&ID;
• PFDs;
• UFD;
• MEL;
• instrument list; and
• ESD philosophy.
A RAM data collection collects all reliability, availability and maintainability data for
all main equipment composing the system under analysis. This activity has to be
continuously modified and integrated when new main equipment types are highlighted
and identified. The reference RAM data bank records data refers to main equipment
templates, that are generic descriptions of the actual main equipment belonging to the
installations object of the study. Reliability is a decisive aspect of equipment installed
on offshore installations. Equipment faults alone, or in combination with other factors,
have been the cause of a number of accidents.
In the oil and gas industries in order to use accurate and reliable data, and being not
always available specific field data, the reliability data used in the analysis will be kept
from a dedicated database available under the heading of OREDA (2009), Offshore
Reliability Data Handbook. OREDA has established a comprehensive data bank with
reliability and maintenance data for exploration and production equipment from a wide
variety of geographic areas, installations, equipment types and operating conditions.
It is considered the reliability of important equipment under “real life” operational
conditions (OREDA, 2009 handbook).
The equipment’s reliability data which are not available in OREDA data bank, will
be referred to European Industry Reliability Data Bank 3rd edition 1998 (Procaccia et al.,
1998), and ANSI/IEEE Std 500-1984 P&V (1984) Reliability data for Nuclear power
generation stations.
Reliability data collection output has to be issued in a table format as in the example
of a centrifugal pump illustrated in Table I, containing defined field format in order to
allow a standard data control/merging/integration.
Item λ MTTF ART Reference data
Integration
Item type Failure mode (×106h)a (h)b (h)c page Note between RCM
and RAM
Centrifugal PA External leakage – utility 5.35 186,916 15 OREDA (2009, –
pump p. 146)
External leakage – process
medium 4.93 202,840 25
Fail to start on demand 4.53 220,751 7.8 857
Spurious stop 9.06 110,375 13 Table I.
Vibration 5.83 171,527 27 Reliability data
Notes: Failure rate; mean time to failure; cactive
a b
repair time collection output
The defined fields of the reliability data collection template will be composed by:
• Item, it should contain the system where the item is located, the tag number
and the Item description. For privacy reason we summarize that section under
the name of item.
• Item type, where the analyst has to insert the reference labels used in P&IDS and
PFDs for all types of components belonging to the main equipment type category
under investigation.
• Failure mode, where the main failure modes of reference for the main equipment
under investigation are set. In OREDA failure modes are defined for each
equipment class. The severity class, which describes the severity of the failure for
the main function of the equipment unit, is defined in three levels: critical,
degraded and incipient. In order to be more conservative, the failure rate and
active repair time (ART) considered are the mean value of critical ones. OREDA
defines the critical failure mode as a failure which causes immediate and
complete loss of equipment unit’s capability of providing its output(OREDA,
2009 handbook).
• Failure rate, for each single item it is the frequency of failure related to a specific
failure mode. It is expressed in failures per hour.
• Mean time to failure (MTTF), it is the reciprocal of failure rate (explained in the AA).
• ART, it is the portion of downtime during which one or more technicians are
working on a system to effect a repair.
• Reference data page of the used database and note.
The first part of the activity consists in identifying functional relationship between
items, tags and item description, associating to each item the related family listed in the
reliability data collection.
For each failure mode the detection method and some preventive or mitigation
actions are also envisaged.
The approach is based on a “single failure” criteria, i.e. it assesses each failure
considering the others equipment functioning in normal conditions.
The analysis is performed by considering the relevant working phases of the
system. Moreover different operating Phase will be considered for the estimation of
the failure effects will be: start up, production/running phase, ESD, and planned
shut down.
IJQRM 3.2 Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)
33,6 FMEA is essentially a systematic brainstorming session aimed at finding out what
could go wrong with a system or process. The essence of the FMEA technique is to list
for each system component the potential effect of each failure on the rest of the system
(Rausand and Vatn, 2008).
The FMEA analysis consists in describing for each failure mode the local effects, the
858 sub-system effects and the system effects in terms of production, environment and
safety and defines for each failure mode the loss of production in terms of percentage of
loss of capacity of the system, not taking into account the duration of the loss.
The purpose of this analysis is to identify potential system weak points (failure modes)
and to determine their effects on the process considering the three aspects of
production, environment and safety.
At the end of the above steps, the FMEA analysis shall be properly documented in a
report summarizing the results.
FMEA output has to be issued in a table format containing defined field format in
order to allow a standard data control/merging/integration.
The FMEA report will include the following field:
• contractor system;
• main tag number;
• tag number;
• failure mode;
• failure mode description (textual description of failure mode);
• operating phase;
• effects at facility functional unit level;
• effects at contractor system level; and
• percent loss of production (percentage of reduction of capacity at system level,
at this stage the loss of production does not take into account the duration of
the loss).
FMEA regards frequency, consequences and detection keeping a qualitative
approach based on safe policies. A variation to this approach is called FMECA,
failure mode and effects CA.
3.3 CA
We found more useful in our study, separate the FMEA from the CA. Indeed the
criticality is an index that is deﬁned by failure cause, frequency, consequences and
detection (Calixto, 2012).
The aim of the CA is to evaluate the item’s criticality considering each failure mode
in terms of the worst potential consequences on the upper level of the system.
A severity category for each parameter (asset, safety, environment) is assigned
according to the tables depicted in Table II.
Moreover the severity value is assigned taking in consideration the existing
compensating provisions set to prevent the effect of the failure mode and to mitigate its
effects (e.g. The presence of sparing/ redundant equipment having equal capacity shall
be shown).
Severity
Integration
value Description between RCM
and RAM
Safety
0 No effects
1 No effect on work performance but may involve slight injury or health effects (e.g. first
aid case) and employee returns to work the same day
2 Low health effects or slight injury (lost time injury) – affecting work performance, such 859
as restriction to activities (restricted work case or occupational illness) or a need to take a
few days to fully recover (lost work case), e.g. food poisoning
3 Major injury or health effects (including permanent partial disability and occupational
illness) – affecting work performance in the longer term, such as a prolonged absence
from work. Irreversible health damage without loss of life, e.g. noise induced hearing
loss, chronic back injuries, sensitisation, hand/arm vibration syndrome and repetitive
strain injury
4 Permanent total disability or one to three fatalities – from an accident or occupational
illness. Irreversible health damage with serious disability or death, e.g. corrosive burns,
heat stroke, cancer (small exposed population)
5 Multiple fatalities – from an accident or occupational illness (e.g. chemical asphyxiation
or cancer) large exposed population
Production
0 No effects
1 Slight Damage – No disruption to operation (cost less than 100,000 USD)
2 Minor damage – brief disruption (cost less than 1,000,000 USD)
3 Local damage – partial shutdown (can be restarted, costs up to 10,000,000 USD)
4 Major damage – partial operation loss (2 weeks shutdown, cost up to 100,000,000 USD);
major inquiry for the cost of damage
5 Extensive damage – substantial or total loss of operation (costs in excess of 100,000,000
USD); Extensive inquiry for the cost of damage
Environment
0 No effects
1 Slight effect – minor environmental damage. No financial consequences
2 Low effect – sufficiently large contamination or discharge to damage the environment,
but no lasting effect. Single breach of statutory or prescribed limit, or single complaint
3 Localized effect – limited discharges affecting the neighborhood and damaging the
environment. Repeated breaches of statutory or prescribed limit, or many complaints
4 Major effect – severe environmental damage. The company is required to take extensive
measures to restore the damage environment. Extended breaches of statutory or Table II.
prescribed limits, or widespread nuisance Classifications of
5 Massive effect – persistent severe environmental damage or severe nuisance extending severity values in
over a large area. Loss of commercial or recreational use or nature conservancy resulting terms of safety, asset
in major financial consequences for the company. Ongoing breaches well above and environment
The detection method of a failure event describes the existing means and methods by
which the effects of a failure can be detected. Here below a non-exhaustive list of the
detection methods is provided:
• Functional testing: failure discovered by activating the intended function and
comparing the response against a predefined standard. Includes both functional
and capacity tests. Most relevant for failures on stand by/passive systems.
• Continuous condition monitoring: failures revealed during a continuous, automatic
checking for a predefined failure mode or on-line process monitoring. The failure is
IJQRM revealed by some instrumental monitored value being exceeded, normally
33,6 observed in the control room either by automatic detection (alarm or trip) or by
manually observed deviation.
• Test: performed while the system is operational.
• Inspection: failure discovered during periodic internal or external inspection
860 (e.g. visual inspection, non-destructive testing, etc.).
• Casual observation: casual observation during routine or casual operator checks
mainly by senses (noise, smell, smoke, leakage, appearance, local indicators, etc.).
• Observation method unknown or not specified.
• Corrective maintenance: failure observed during expected or unexpected
corrective maintenance (initiated by another failure).
• Production interference: failure discovered by production upset, reduction, etc.
• On demand: failure discovered during an on demand attempt to activate an

equipment unit (e.g. safety valve fail to close on ESD-signal, fail to start gas
turbine in a demand situation).
• Other failure detection method.
• Unknown.
CA aims to classify the Items under investigation according to the impact of their
failure modes on safety, environmental protection and plant production/capacity
separately and to evaluate the related frequency of occurrence.
In order to screen the critical items vs the “acceptance” criteria, a semi-quantitative
screening based on the risk matrix approach is applied. In the risk matrix, illustrated in
Figure 2, we interpolate the quantitatively frequency of occurrence and the consequences
in terms of safety, asset damage and environmental protection studied by FMEA.
The matrix in Figure 2 foresees the evaluation of three different criticality indexes
related to safety, environment and assets. Their assessment requires the estimation of
the annual frequency of occurrence for each failure mode and the estimation of severity
values assigned during FMEA analysis.
For operational equipment the annual frequency is given by the failure rate as for
protection equipment, but if the failure probability is not available the annual frequency
must be set as the most critical one. The annual frequency class will be set according to
the table included in Table III. An annual frequency minor to 10−6 is considered 0 (Could
occur but has not necessarily been observed in exploration and production industry)
while an annual frequency major to 1 is classified as E (it occurs routinely).
The three criticality indexes represent the impact of the failure Mode on the personnel
or population safety, on the asset production and on the environmental damage,
respectively. They are expressed by the following equations:
ICS ¼ annual frequency class severity safety (1)
ICA ¼ annual frequency class severity production=asset (2)
ICE ¼ annual frequency class severity environment (3)

Consequence Increasing Annual Frequency

0 A B C D E
Practically non-
Rare Unlikely Credible Probable Likely/frequent
credible
occurrence occurrence occurrence occurrence occurrence
occurrence
Happens Happens
Safety
Assets
Could happen Has occurred Has occurred
Severity
Environ.
Reported for several several
in E&P at least once several times
E&P industry times/y in times/y in
industry in Company in Company
Company one location
Slight health Slight Slight

1 effect/injury
Continuous Improvement
effect damage
Minor health Minor Minor

2 effect/injury effect damage Risk Reduction Measures
Major health Local Local

3 effect/injury effect damage
PTD(*) or 1 Major Major Intolerable Risk

4 fatality effect damage
Multiple Extensive Extensive

5 fatalities effect damage
approach
Figure 2.
and RAM
between RCM
Risk matrix
861
Integration
IJQRM They are located in one of the three different colored area of the matrix and they could
33,6 be classified as:
• Tolerable risk: no further impact reduction measures are necessary. Monitor
performance and manage for continuous improvements.
• Compulsory impact reduction required: risk is tolerable when appropriate control
862 measures have been identified and implemented.
• Intolerable risk without detailed justification: it does not satisfy initial screening
criteria. Additional risk reduction measures are required. It is justifiable if compliance
with ALARP principle and individual and societal risk criteria are demonstrated.
The overall criticality (CFM) related to each item failure mode will be estimated as the
worst of the three criticality’s indexes set above: CFM ¼ max (ICS; ICA; ICE).
It represents the overall impact of the failure mode considering all types of effects
(safety, asset damage and environmental damage).
The criticality assigned to each item depends on the impact of their failure modes so
the criticality shall be assumed to be the worst effect of the pertaining failure modes:
CI ¼ min (CFM).
The overall criticality index can assume three values:
• Criticality 1: intolerable without detailed justification.
• Criticality 2: compulsory impact reduction required.
• Criticality 3: tolerable risk.
Once the CA is completed, the maintenance strategy selection and availability analysis
could be started.
3.4 Maintenance strategy selection
Efficient maintenance of offshore structures is one of the priority development areas of
the offshore industry world-wide (Kam, 1989). The maintenance strategy selection is a
crucial point and it is performed in order to reduce the routine maintenance tasks to
sustainable minimum, without affecting the plant performance, product quality, safety
or environmental integrity. Indeed the traditional view of maintenance is based on
belief that all failures are bad and must be prevented. However, this is practically
unrealistic from two angles. First, from purely technical point of view it is often not
feasible to prevent failure. Second, even if one could prevent or anticipate all failures it
would be cost prohibitive (Desphande and Modak, 2002). The maintenance strategy
Selection is a decision-making procedure where a suitable flow chart allows to
determine which maintenance strategy is applicable, starting from item criticality
index (FMEA and CA output).
Annual frequency class IAF (event/year)

0 IAF o10−6
A 10−6 ⩽ IAF o10−4
B 10−4 ⩽ IAF o10−3
C 10−3 ⩽ IAF o10−1
D 10−1 ⩽ IAF o1
Table III. E 1 ⩽ IAF
Annual frequency Note: IAF, increasing annual frequency
There are four distinct options available in order to decide how better maintain Integration
the equipment: between RCM
(1) Predictive or on condition maintenance: if the equipment presents performance and RAM
degradation, due to some component loss of performance associated with a
failure mode development, a monitoring system may be used to detect failure
mode development aiming at the use of predictive maintenance practice instead
of preventive practice. The predictive (or on condition) tasks entail checking for 863
potential failures, so that action can be taken to prevent the equipment failure
(Carazas and Souza, 2010). The maintenance tasks are not previously scheduled,
being executed based on the results of monitoring e.g. vibration monitoring
or rotating equipment. The use of this maintenance practice is recommended
for both random frequency of failure and constant frequency of failure (Carazas
and Souza, 2010).
(2) Cyclical maintenance: if the equipment presents a repetitive failure pattern,
schedule periodic tasks to perform on certain equipment classes in order to

optimize costs and reliability level is recommended.
(3) Corrective maintenance: it is performed after failure has occurred in order to return
the equipment to service as soon as possible (Aoudia and Belmokhtar, 2008).
(4) Redesign: change the equipment, system or procedures to eliminate the failure
or change its consequences.
3.5 MA
The aim of MA is to estimate the time spent to repair and maintain the Item considering
the normal operating scenario and the maintenance’s strategy selected through MSS
activity. The MA aims to determine the total maintenance time (MT) required by each
Item. The MA’s outputs allow calculating the item’s MTTR in order to complete the
reliability data used as input in the RAM study. The MTTR is a measure of how long,
on average, it will take to bring the equipment back to normal service ability when it
does fail (Carazas and Souza, 2010).
The purpose of maintenance management is to reduce the adverse effects of
breakdown and to maximize the production system availability at a minimum cost
(Bazrafshan and Hajjari, 2012).
MT is identified by two main categories:
(1) corrective maintenance time (CMT); and
(2) preventive maintenance time (PMT).
3.5.1 CMT. Corrective maintenance (CM) is a part of maintenance carried out after
fault recognition and intended to put an item into a state in which it can perform a
required function. CMT, expressed in the following equation, is the time required to
perform a CM action and, taking into consideration experts’ field experience, it is
composed by the following contributes:
CMT ¼ FLDT þ LD þ TOST þ ART þ BIST þ AOT (4)
where:
(1) FLDT, fault location/diagnosis time. Due to the offshore equipment location, the
FLDT is assessed to be 4 hrs considering the time spent to access to the item, to
IJQRM locate where the failure has occurred and to identify the causes. FLDT
33,6 is assumed to be equal to 0 hr for continuous monitoring or if the failure is
detectable by the control system. FLDT is considered negligible in case of
failures occurring on loops not provided of valves (failures are only related
to the electronic elaboration of measure).
(2) LD, logistic delay. Considering the high criticality of gas production, it can be
864 assumed that each failure is considered as critical failure for the system,
therefore the logistic delay due to crew intervention (located in nearest
platforms) comprehensive of the time necessary to retrieve material (from
on-site warehouse), has been considered to be 4 hrs for offshore .
(3) TOST, take out of service time, the TOST time, expressed in the following
equation, is evaluated taking into account the following contributes:
• FT ¼ fluid temperature: 2 hrs for hot ( W 50°C) fluid; 0 hr for cold fluid;
• PI ¼ process isolation: 0.25 hrs for each valve to operate;

• P ¼ purging: it should be considered the different substance to be purged
and the line’s nominal diameter (DN):
– If the line’s purging contains oil: 4 hrs for line with DN ⩽ 2, 6 hrs for line
with DN W 2; and
– If the line’s purging contains gas: 2 hrs for line with DN ⩽ 2, 4 hrs for
line with DN W 2.
• TI ¼ tracing and insulation: 4 hrs to remove heat or electrical tracing and/or
insulation;
• EI ¼ electrical isolation: 1 hr to disconnect the electrical cable connections;
• IR ¼ items removing: 4 hrs to remove high weight/volume machine and
2 hrs to remove other items/equipment; and
• ACA ¼ air circulation assurance: 1.5 hrs to assure air availability to
equipment where manholes are open:
TOST ¼ FT þ PI þ Pþ TI þ EI þ IR þ ACA (5)
(4) ART: active repair time. The items’ ARTs comes from the referenced reliability
database and reported in the reliability data collection report.
(5) BIST: bring into service time (in the following equation). The items’ BIST is
evaluated considering the following contribute:
• ITR ¼ installation, test and restoring: reconnecting, testing and ramping-up
the equipment to operating conditions, 8 hrs for large equipment and 4 hrs
for small ones;
• TI ¼ tracing and insulation: restoring insulation and tracing, 4 hrs; and
• EC ¼ electric connection: 1 hr to reconnect the item’s instrumentation:
BIST ¼ ITR þ TI þ EC (6)
(6) Activities overlapping time (AOT), activities performed at the same time.
3.5.2 PMT. PM is that part of maintenance periodically carried out in order to preserve Integration
the good functioning and prevent the failure occurrence. between RCM
PMT is the time required to perform a PM action and it is composed by the
contributes reported in the following equation:
and RAM
PMT ¼ LDþ TOST þ APMT þ BIST þ AOT (7)

865
where APMT, active preventive maintenance time. The APMT contains the estimated
time to perform the relevant job plan. This time includes time to access the item, to
carry out the maintenance activity and the time for the final test. In order to estimate
the APMT value it has been assumed different values for the different main categories,
as shown in Table IV.
MA output, containing defined fields, will be issued in a table format in order to
allow a standard data control/merging/integration.
The following fields will be included in the MA report: contractor system, main tag
number, tag number, failure mode code, failure mode description, LD, FLDT (only for
CM), TOST, BIST, ART (only for CM), APMT (only for PM), CMT (only for CM), PMT
(only for PM) and notes.
3.6 Reliability availability maintainability

Considering the previous analysis (FMEA and CA), it is not possible to define which
system, subsystems and equipment more impact system availability.
RAM is considered an engineering tool capable to evaluate the equipment
performance at different stages in design process and it can be used to improve and
predict the performance of the system. It addresses both operation and safety issues
and aims to identify areas within the system or process where improvement actions can
be initiated. The information obtained from analysis will help the management in the
performance improvement of the system. The RAM model provides a quantitative
basis for judging the acceptability of the design, and the tools needed to facilitate
justification and prioritization activities for all future reliability and availability
decision making (Carazas and Souza, 2010).
The main results of the AA are:
(1) percent of availability (to compare with the client target value);
(2) the sub-system which mainly impact the availability;
(3) MTBF (reliability qualitative index);
Main categories APMTa
Vessel and separators 3 hrs

Filters scrubbers and dryers 2 hrs
Pumps 4 hrs
Compressors 7 hrs
Process’s valves 1 hrs
Safety’s valves 2 hrs
Instruments 1 hrs
Electric motors 1 hrs Table IV.
Note: aActive preventive maintenance time APMT values
IJQRM (4) identifying possible bottlenecks (mechanical and process);
33,6 (5) predicting the impact of equipment redundancy and sparing; and
(6) MTTR.
The equations used for the RAM analysis are applied with a failure rate considered
constant (steady state period). It has been demonstrated in the literature that the
866 exponential distribution provides good approximations to machine failure distributions.
The constant failure rate approximation is often quite adequate even though a system
or some of its components may exhibit moderate early failures or aging effects.
The magnitude of early failures is limited by strictly quality control in manufacturing and
aging effects can be sharply limited by careful predictive or PM (Carazas and Souza, 2010).
Taking into account the previous assumption, the reliability of a component is
calculated as reported in the following equation. Where, λ is the constant failure rate of
the component and t the operational time:
Rt
ðlÞdt
R ðt Þ ¼ e 0 (8)
The MTTF, which is the mean value of the failure time, when the failure rate is
constant (λ) can be expressed by the the following equation:
Z 1 Z 1
1
M TTF ¼ Rðt Þdt ¼ elt dt ¼ (9)
0 0 l
Particular attention should be pose on how system reliability are represented. Indeed
series or parallel configurations are used for dependent and independent effects.
When the system reliability includes a high number of blocks the system reliability
is represented by the the following equation. In case of a series configuration:
Y
n
R i ðT Þ ¼ Ri ðt Þ ¼ Rðt Þn (10)
i¼1
where n, number of blocks.

In case n, identical parallel blocks and system availability requires k of n blocks
on same time. The system reliability can be represented by the following equation:
Xn
n
Ri ðk; n; RÞ ¼ Rr ð1RÞnr (11)
r¼k
r
where k, number of parallel blocks required; n, number of parallel blocks; R, reliability

The RAM analysis is executed taking into account the plant data model definition,
failure modes affecting production resulting from FMEA, criticality of each single item.
It will be considered in the analysis the items, equipment, control valves and safety
equipment which will produce severe effects on contractor system level in terms of
production, environment and safety (Criticality 1 and Criticality 2).
The approach adopted in evaluating the plant availability is based on the RBD
method. A RBD performs the system reliability and availability analyses on large and
complex systems using block diagrams to show network relationships. The RBD
structure defines the logical interaction of failures within a system, which is required
to sustain system operation. The input node, located on the left side of the diagram, flows
to arrangements of series or parallel blocks that conclude to the output node on the right Integration
side of the diagram. A diagram should only contain one input and one output node. between RCM
The RBD system can have either a parallel or series configuration, the first one used
to show redundancy and it is joined through multiple links or paths from the start node
and RAM
to the end node, the second one is joined through one continuous link from the start
node to the end node. A system can contain a series, parallel or combination of series
and parallel connections to make up the network. 867
PTC’s Windchill Quality Solution suite (RBD and prediction modules) is used in our
case of study to build a mathematical-logic model that fully describes the major
operational functions, networks, as well as random outage for the plant. Windchill uses
a Monte Carlo simulation-based package, and models plant availability in terms of
production efficiency, as reported in the following equation:
Actual production
Production efficiency ¼ 100% (12)
Potential production
The items to include in the RBD will be characterized by their own failure rates and MTTR.
It is assumed that MTTR values, which represent the maintainability of a system,
are equal to the results preventive or CMT defined in maintainability report.
So, inherent or technical availability (UNI EN ISO 14224) of the system is given by
the following equation:
M TTF
A¼ (13)
M TTF þ M TTR
In a simple way, availability is controlled by the two parameters MTTF and MTTR.
Moreover the software will provide the mean time between failure of every single
item and of the units, through the following equation:
M TBF ¼ M TTF þ M TTR (14)
It is used to identify the most critical section and the most critical item of the system.
The detailed results provided by software, as the availability percentage trend
through the years and the yearly downtime days, are graphically displayed, giving a
lifecycle screening perspective. In the worst case RAM results recommend a redesign,
in order to improve and enhance the availability of facilities. Otherwise it would bring
to the acceptance or review of the selected maintenance strategy.
3.8 Maintenance plan definition

In case the RAM analysis would confirm the maintenance strategy selected, the
maintenances engineer could elaborate the maintenance plans.
Elaborating maintenance programs are often set up to ensure a high level of
equipment availability and to avoid accidental stoppages, which cause significant
financial losses (Aoudia and Belmokhtar, 2008). The aim of the maintenance plan
definition is to prepare a maintenance plan for the equipment selected to PM
(on condition, predictive and cyclical). Indeed when it is required a PM, the maintenance
department plans systematic and periodic inspections according to an annual schedule.
This schedule is based upon the accumulation of equipment operating time, the laws
regarding equipment subjected to pressure (balloons, furnaces, aero-columns, storage
tanks, etc.) and vendors instructions if required.
IJQRM The PM plan will be developed in a structured manner considering the following steps:
33,6 (1) identification and selection of the items making up the plan; and
(2) association of the job plans to be executed for the selected items, including
frequency of task, estimated manpower and accessibility of the item.
While curative maintenance is carried out after the occurrence of a sudden or
868 progressive failure of equipment.
Moreover not all the maintenance services are carried out by the company,
the maintenance of power lines and some static equipment like boiler making, heat
insulation and the manufacture of mechanical equipment is outsourced. In those cases
the PM should not be scheduled.
The resulting activity shall be provided in a report containing all the previous
information.
4. Case study
The proposed approach illustrated in Section 3 is applied to a context of a particular
offshore installation in the oil industry. RCM is implemented in order to ensure that the
maintenance strategies on company assets deliver the process uptime, safety assurance
and environmental integrity required by the business. The aim is reducing the total
production downtime and the actual cost of the maintenance activities achieving the
best-planned maintenance policies for equipment. We suppose that the analysis is
implemented on a project in phase of detailed design.
Indeed RCM has a particular relevance in the case of offshore installations because,
unplanned shutdowns due to unexpected failures are typically longer and more costly
than planned shutdowns. Because of the complexity of an offshore installation and the
fact that maintenance is generally outsourced, and hence requires considerable up-front
planning, unplanned maintenance activities normally result in much more production
loss than a similar planned one. Additionally, because of contracts with oil and gas
clients, unplanned shutdowns can imply financial penalties (Conn et al., 2010).
The plant considered in the analysis produces hydrocarbons from the offshore field;
gas will be dedicated to feed an onshore power plant in order to achieve its full electric
power production. Associated hydrocarbons liquid will be valorized by means of
dedicated facilities and they will be delivered to an existing oil export terminal.
Moreover the onshore plant, the multiphase sea line to onshore plant, pipeline
for hydrocarbon liquids export are excluded from the study, because the aim of the
study is to focus on offshore installations. The electric distribution sections
are modeled as always available as the architectures of these systems are completely
redundant and the probability of failure that can lead to the complete unavailability
of electrical feeding is negligible. Hence our case of study will consider only the
offshore installation.
The platform is designed for unmanned operation in normal operating conditions,
consequently the amount of facilities installed on board is reduced at least. Separation,
gas treatment and compression facilities will be installed onshore.
Three different production scenarios, with the related average production, will be
considered during the next 30 years:
• Scenario A: six gas wells producing: it is referred to the period starting from 2014
to 2024, only the gas wellheads are considered available, corresponding to the full
load of both the generation station and the gas turbine installed onshore.
The average production used in the calculation is 2.1 MSm3/day of gas coming Integration
from offshore plus overdesign factor. between RCM
• Scenario B: six gas wells+two oil wells producing: it is referred to the period and RAM
starting from 2025 to 2038, gas and oil wellheads are considered totally available;
the gas sent to onshore is equal to 2.1 MSm3/day of gas coming from gas
wellhead plus 73,080 Sm^3/day of associated gas coming from the two oil wells,
plus the overdesign factor. 869
• Scenaraio C: three gas wells+two oil wells producing: it is referred to the period
starting from 2038 to 2045, gas and oil wellheads are considered available but the
gas production coming from gas wellhead is reduced to 1.05 MSm3/day.
A spare philosophy will be adopted for the platform and the following equipment will
be installed with 100 percent spare capacity: pumps and machinery, related to gas and
condensate process, safety valves and oil export pumps.
5. Results and discussion

The results of the seven steps composing the analysis are summarized in the
following paragraphs.
5.1 Reliability data collection and FMEA

The first part of the activity consists in itemizing all the equipment part of the analyzed
unit, using, when it is possible, the contractor nomenclature and in attributing each
item to a family of the reliability data collection achieving the FMEA report with the
data included in it.
The FMEA has been performed for every single item in order to describe for each
failure mode the local effects, sub-system effects and system effects as shown in Table V.
For example the main failure modes associated to a shut down valve located in the oil
production separation unit are: fail to close on demand, fail to open on demand and fail to
regulate and external leakage process medium.
A fail to close on demand can have no effect on the main equipment level, on the
units and on the system if the considered valve has a fail to close system.
A fail to open on demand can cause: no oil flow on the main equipment level; no oil
flow to crude oil transport unit and no gas flow to the gas compression unit; a shut
down of delivered oil to the onshore plant and a reduction of delivered gas to onshore
plant. Hence a fail to open on demand of the considered shut down valve cause a
100 percent oil loss production and a reduction of gas production depending from the
number of wellheads.
An external leakage process medium can have different impact depending on where
the valve is located.
The previous considerations have been extended to the entire failure mode
belonging to each item achieving an FMEA report.
5.2 CA
The CA foresees the evaluation of item criticality through a risk matrix approach as
illustrate in the methodology. The compensating provisions installed on the plant as
the automatic activation of spare system reduce or cancel the severity value in terms of
asset production because they guarantee the regular operating of the plant. Hence a
33,6
870
Table V.
IJQRM
FMEA result
valve located
separation unit
for a shut down
in the oil production

Effects at
main Effects at
Item Failure mode λ MTTF ART Reference Operating equipment Effects at facility contractor system % loss of
description description (106h)a (h)b (h)c OREDA Phase level functional unit level level production
Shut down Fail to close on 0.38 2,631,579 2 OREDA na No effect No effect No effect 0.00%
valve demand (2009, p. 574)
Shut down Fail to open on 0.76 1,315,789 1.8 OREDA Production No oil flow No oil flow to unit 220 Shut down 100% oil
valve demand (2009, p. 574) crude oil transport delivered oil to
onshore plant
Shut down Fail to open on 0.76 1,315,789 1.8 OREDA No gas flow to unit 360 Reduction of 2.86% gas
valve demand (2009, p. 574) associated gas delivered gas to
compression onshore plant
Shut down Fail to regulate 1.14 877,193 2.7 OREDA na No effect No effect no effect 0.00%
valve (2009, p. 574)
Shut down External 0.38 2,631,579 10 OREDA Production Gas and oil No oil flow to unit 220 Shut down 100% oil
valve leakage (2009, p. 574) leakage crude oil Transport delivered oil to
process onshore plant
medium
Shut down External 0.38 2,631,579 10 OREDA No gas flow to unit 360 Reduction of 2.86% gas
valve leakage (2009, p. 574) associated gas delivered gas to
process compression onshore plant
medium
Notes: aFailure rate; bmean time to failure; cactive repair time
deep and attentive analysis of the plant functioning and its P&IDs are necessary to Integration
implement the CA. between RCM
and RAM
5.3 Maintenance strategy selection and maintenance analysis
MSS is a decision-making policy through whom it will be defined the maintenance
policy for each item part of the offshore platform. For items which results Criticality 1
or 2 from CA, the MSS flow chart addresses user toward a preventive strategy choice, 871
in order to assure risk lowering. For Criticality 3 items, the default strategy is CM if
allowed by laws or constraints.
For the specific case of study it had been developed the decision diagram shown
in Figure 3. Through various “yes or no” questions, it navigates to the optimal
maintenance task for the item assessed.
Using the results obtained by MSS, through the MA methodology it will be
calculated PMT for each item and CMT related to each failure mode. During their
evaluation the following assumption will be considered:

• administrative delay, such as authorization procedures, work order management,
etc., have not been considered in the maintenance time evaluation;
• influence of the environmental aspects (temperature, wind, snow, etc.) on the
outdoor work condition will not be considered; and
• the offshore plant, therefore personnel, materials and special tools management
have been assumed available on-site in an average interval calculated by
expert judgment.
Moreover the offshore platform considered, as illustrated before, is totally
unmanned, so the probability of heaving impact due to a failure on safety can be
considered negligible.
5.4 Reliability availability maintainability

The RAM has been carried out after the CA and MA. Indeed some items should be
omitted because their failure will not impact seriously the production and the time
estimated for the selected maintenance is used as MTTR for each RBD. The items
which are considered as Criticality 3 have been excluded from the RAM analysis.
However, even though some of the items, as spare pumps, spare valve, spare filter
resulted as Criticality 3 due to their redundancy layout, in order to take into account the
system fail to switch and the high costs for their replace they have been modeled and
implemented in the RAM.
The approach adopted in RAM’s results evaluation is based on the RBD method.
The RBD has been created through equipment considered in the analysis taking into
account design redundancies. PTC Windchill Quality Solution allows to build up RBD
describing the dependencies between item and units of the process.
Considering the normal operating case among the years, the availability analysis
evaluates the average production availability for all the Cases A, B and C of production
scenarios and three different overall scenarios have been modeled.
The simulation models referred to the Production Scenario A are structured, at the
higher level, as a series of group embodying all units enclosed in the RAM analysis, as
illustrated in Figure 4.
Process section and auxiliary section have been modeled as groups that encloses all
the item considered in the RAM analysis.
33,6
872
IJQRM
Figure 3.
MSS flow chart
Is There An Incipient Are There Vendor’s
Is the Aging
Criticality 1 and 2 Signal For This Failure NO NO Maintenance
Predictable?
Mode? Instructions?
YES YES NO
NO
Can Be Can Be Can Be

Monitored? Inspected? Tested?
YES
YES
YES NO
Is The Failure
An Option?
Can Be Caught in Start Start Planning
time to YES The Inspections
Monitoring
intervene?
YES
Predictive or On
Condition
Maintenance
NO
Maintenance
Does the Maintenance Plan YES NO
Plan NO YES Approved
satisfy Laws and/or Constraints?
Upgrading
Cyclical
Maintenance
Corrective
Maintenance
YES
REDESIGN
Is There Any Law or Constraint
Criticality 3 (assurance/warranty) asking for NO
preventive Maintenance?
Linked to: Linked to:

PN: ESD PN: FIRE AND GAS
UNIT 450 GAS WELLHEADS case A/B
Start
Linked to: Linked to:

UNIT 130 GAS PROD FLOWLINE UNIT 190
Linked to: Linked to: Linked to:

UNIT 230 UNIT 420 UNIT 460
Linked to: Linked to: Linked to:

UNIT 470 UNIT 550 UNIT 500
End
1::1
the plant production

models referred to
Simulation
Figure 4.
and RAM
between RCM
873
Integration
scenario A
IJQRM Stand-by group are modeled as in normal operation, one item is active and the other one
33,6 is in stand by. The same structure has been used for all production safety valves,
pumps, electric heaters and fuel gas filters.
In the simulation model referred to Scenario A only six gas wells have been
considered available. In Scenario B and C the Unit 100 has been structured considering
the respectively operating scenario, six gas wells and two oil wells producing and three
874 gas wells and two oil wells producing.
The results obtained by the RAM in the three production scenarios is summarized
by the Table VI.
Considering the three different scenarios, which includes the plant behavior from
2014 to 2044, in Figure 5 it is shown the ideal productivity and the loss of production
among the years compared with the plant availability. The normal production it is
assumed to be equal to 100 percent.
Moreover it is compared the plant downtime with the plant availability.
It had been considered every five years planned shutdown, it is possible to notice
from the Figure 6 how they increase the days shutdown and have a severe impact on
the plant availability.
Moreover, in order to identify the most critical units of the plant, which give the
major contribution to the plant production unavailability, the MTBF of each section for
the three different scenarios is calculated.
From the Figure 7 it is possible to extract the most critical sections of the plant
because of their lowest MTBF value. The oil wellheads seems to be the most critical
units of the plant because of their series structure of the block and the MTTF and
MTTR of the items enclosed in the unit. Moreover a logarithmic scale has been chosen
because of the high variability of the dates related to different section and scenarios.
Indeed Unit 500, which contains sea water system is the least critical unit of the plant
and has and high MTBF value.
Through their analysis it is possible to evaluate the most critical items of unit. In the
Figure 8 is shown the results obtained from the analysis.
The redundant items have not been considered in the most critical items assessment
because their failure do not cause an unavailability of the unit.
Taking into account the unit related to gas production wellhead, the two flow
control valves are considered the most critical items of the considered unit.
As for gas production wellhead, the same diagram has been calculated for the other
sections of the plant, analyzing the bottlenecks object of possible redesign and
modifications. But, considering the acceptable value of the availability of the system no
process redesign and maintenance review are recommended.
5.5 Maintenance plan definition

The aim of the job plan is to prepare a maintenance plan for each equipment that
requires PM (on condition, predictive and cyclical) for one or more of its failure mode.
From the MA, the necessary time for the maintenance action is evaluated. On this
phase, maintenance department team will define the maintenance task basing
principally on their field experience.
Wellhead platform PM should be performed during relevant planned preventive
campaigns, while preventive inspections that not require shutdown or PM on stand-by
equipment are supposed to be performed during normal operating phase.
The frequency is determinate by expert judgment and vendors instructions.
When the maintenance actions require the plant stoppage they are included in the
λ Operating Plant
Item Failure mode description (106h)a phase MSSb CMTc PMTc Redundancy Maintenances tasks status Frequency
Flow control Fail to close on demand 0.38 Maintenance PMT 23.75 22.75 n Functional verification 1 1Y
valve Fail to open on demand 0.76 Start up PMT 23.55 Functional verification 1 1Y
Fail to regulate 1.14 na PMT 24.45 Functional verification 1 1Y
External leakage process 0.38 Production PMT 31.75 Tightening shaft 1 1Y
medium packing nut
External leakage process 0.38 Production PMT 31.75 Tightening shaft 1 1Y
medium packing nut
c
Notes: aFailure rate; bmaintenance strategy selection; corrective maintenance time; dpreventive maintenance time
definition template
Maintenance plan
and RAM
between RCM
Table VI.
875
Integration
IJQRM 3
Loss in production Ideal productivity Availability
100
33,6 99.5
2.5 99
98.5
2 98
Productivity MSm3
97.5
Availability
876 1.5 97
96.5
1 96
95.5
Figure 5. 0.5 95
Ideal productivity- 94.5
loss production- 0 94
availability
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
2024
2026
2028
2030
2032
2034
2036
2038
2040
2042
2044
Down time days Availability

6 100
99.5
5 99
98.5
4 98
Availability
97.5
Days
3 97
96.5
2 96
95.5
1 95
94.5
Figure 6. 0 94
2015
2017
2019
2021
2023
2025
2027
2029
2031
2033
2035
2037
2039
2041
2043
2045
Downtime days
SCENARIO A SCENARIO B SCENARIO C

100,000,000
10,000,000
1,000,000
Log MTBF
100,000
10,000
1,000
100
10
1
0
0
S
0
0
0
0
S
20
22
23
45
46
47
19
50
55
42
D
N
EA
EA
LI
IT
IT
IT
IT
IT
IT
IT
IT
IT
IT
W
LH
N
N
N
N
O
L
U
U
U
U
EL
EL
FL
W
D
O
AS
IL
PR
O
G
Figure 7.
AS
G
MTBF of different
0
13
section of the plant

IT
N
U
0.000025
Critical items Fuel Gas System Integration
0.00002
between RCM
and RAM
Criticality
0.000015
0.00001
0.000005
0
877
1
03
03
04
21
7
00
00
02
01
02
00
00
00
00
00
V0
V0
V0
V0
LT
LT
PT
PT
PT
VN
VN
LT
PT
PT
BD
SD
SD
SD
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
Figure 8.
00
00
00
00
42
42
42
42
42
42
42
42
42
42
42
42
42
42
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
MSS flow chart
36
36
36
36
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
01
01
01
01
01
01
01
01
01
01
01
01
01
01
fixed plant shut down foreseen every two year for the lines pigging as shown in
the RAM analysis.

The Table VII shows a typical template resulting from the maintenance plan
definition related to a flow control valve located in the oil wellhead. Not all the columns
have been included, indeed the maintenance plan definition will contain all the previous
information of the analysis for each item.
6. Conclusion
In process industries, where production generally operates continuously, the
availability of equipment is very important. In this study an integrated RCM and
RAM approach is defined and it is applied to a context of a particular offshore
installation in the oil industry.
The present work started understanding the relationships between the different
process section and auxiliary section of the plant and establishing the failure mode
belonging to each item and its effect on the system. All that allows us to calculate the
items criticality that has been useful for the best maintenance strategy selection.
At that point the integration of the reliability study with the availability study,
based on the CA and maintenance analysis results, makes the process analysis more
sensible to the efficiency of the system and focussed on quantitative point of view.
A software simulation allows us to minimize the contract losses due to production
failures, to avoid excessive attention to areas that are non-critical, and instead focus on
areas where improvements and modifications will make a larger impact. Indeed
performing the analysis at an early stage, the study will allow for enhancement
suggestions that would have been much more expensive if carried out at a later stage.
Moreover it would be possible evaluating the impact of future or proposed changes to
current operations, for example through the modeling of spares; predicting system
uptime, downtime and slowdowns; and providing a strategic view of the asset’s
performance over longer time scales.
Result Case A Result Case B Result Case C
Availability (%) 99.1 98.99 99.03 Table VII.

MTBF 1,564.5986 1,098.05667 1,159.4537 AA results for
MTTR 13.0326 9.8604 9.7394 Scenario A, B and C
IJQRM The possible loss in production related to the real production during the design life is
33,6 even represented through a graph in order to analyze the effect of the plant availability
considering the proposed maintenance strategy. Indeed comparing the availability of
the entire system and the target required by vendors possible improvement on the
maintenance strategy could be recommended from the RAM analysis.
Moreover the subsystems which mainly impact the availability (considering the
878 MTBF values) are shown.
This paper has an important practical and theoretical role in the oil industry; but it
provides a methodology that it is applicable to other industries with high priority level,
such as electricity generation or steel production, and may have some relevance even
on industries with a lower degree of severity. The methodology provides an excellent
tool that can be utilized in industries, where safety and regulations play a fundamental
role in the production process.
Future development will focus on cost indicators in order to measure improvements
on the plant brought by the application of integrated methodology.
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About the authors

Ilaria De Sanctis, PhD Student in Industrial Plants at the Polytechnic University of Marche,
880 Graduated cum Laude in 2013 in Mechanical Engineering at the University of Ancona.
She acquired experience in maintenance engineer: RCM analysis (reliability centered
maintenance), RAM analysis (reliability availability maintainability), FMECA (failure mode
effects and criticality analysis) and maintenance planning. At the moment her research activities
are focussed on lean and agile manufacturing in different contexts. Ilaria De Sanctis is the
corresponding author and can be contacted at: i.desanctis@univpm.it
Claudia Paciarotti, a Full Time Researcher in Industrial Plants at the Polytechnic University
of Marche, Ancona, Italy. Her research activity mainly deals with: emergency management,
operation management in in industrial and healthcare sectors, process management and

reengineering in healthcare and third sector, risk analysis in industrial plants and services sector,
industrial plants design. She is the Author of papers that have been published in national and
international journals and conference proceedings.
Oreste Di Giovine, a Master Degree in Mechanical Engineering and a PhD Candidate
at the Polytechnic University of Marche. He acquired experience in maintenance engineer:
RCM analysis (reliability centered maintenance), RAM analysis (reliability availability
maintainability), FMECA (failure mode effects and criticality analysis), maintenance planning,
RCA analysis (root cause analysis), maintenance strategy selection and maintainability analysis.
At the moment his research activities are focussed on the application of this methodology on a
real case in Romania.
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Integration between RCM and RAM: a case study

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IJQRM RELIABILITY PAPER

3.1 RAM data collection

• On demand: failure discovered during an on demand attempt to activate an

ICS ¼ annual frequency class severity safety (1)

ICA ¼ annual frequency class severity production=asset (2)

ICE ¼ annual frequency class severity environment (3)

Consequence Increasing Annual Frequency

Slight health Slight Slight

Minor health Minor Minor

Major health Local Local

PTD(*) or 1 Major Major Intolerable Risk

Multiple Extensive Extensive

Annual frequency class IAF (event/year)

schedule periodic tasks to perform on certain equipment classes in order to

• PI ¼ process isolation: 0.25 hrs for each valve to operate;

TOST ¼ FT þ PI þ Pþ TI þ EI þ IR þ ACA (5)

PMT ¼ LDþ TOST þ APMT þ BIST þ AOT (7)

3.6 Reliability availability maintainability

Main categories APMTa

Vessel and separators 3 hrs

where n, number of blocks.

where k, number of parallel blocks required; n, number of parallel blocks; R, reliability

3.8 Maintenance plan definition

5. Results and discussion

5.1 Reliability data collection and FMEA

in the oil production

evaluation the following assumption will be considered:

5.4 Reliability availability maintainability

Can Be Can Be Can Be

Linked to: Linked to:

Linked to: Linked to:

Linked to: Linked to: Linked to:

Linked to: Linked to: Linked to:

the plant production

5.5 Maintenance plan definition

Down time days Availability

SCENARIO A SCENARIO B SCENARIO C

section of the plant

the RAM analysis.

Result Case A Result Case B Result Case C

Availability (%) 99.1 98.99 99.03 Table VII.

on the plant brought by the application of integrated methodology.

About the authors

operation management in in industrial and healthcare sectors, process management and

1. OmoyaOlanrewaju Ayobami, Olanrewaju Ayobami Omoya, PapadopoulouKassandra A., Kassandra

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