Subject: CHINA: POLITICS, ECONOMY, AND FOREIGN POLICY

CHAPTER REVIEW BOOK:

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (A 100-YEAR TRAJECTORY)

Presented by:

Sharafat Ali, MS IR
Semester-II
Chapter # 1
ORGANISATIONAL TRAJECTORY
Main Topics:
1. Organisation and Lack of Democracy in the Chinese Communist Party: A Critical
Reading of the Successive Iterations of the Party Constitution by Jean-Pierre Cabestan
2. Decoupled State, Hollowed Civil Society: The Shifting Party-State-Society Nexus
(Patricia M. Thornton)
3. The Chinese Communist Party as a Global Force (Frank N. Pieke)
Organisation and (Lack of) Democracy in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): A Critical
Reading of the Successive Iterations of the Party Constitution (Jean-Pierre Cabestan)
 Can the CCP adopt more democratic stance? Can China become democratic? The answer
is probably not.
 The CCP claims that according to the Constitution of PRC, it makes decisions based on
democracy. Even the constitutions of China seem democratic but reality is different.
 First, many things are kept secrets by the CCP. To some extent, It has been visible about
certain policies and activities but it is still secretive about its internal workings. This
secrecy goes back to its history and need for legitimacy and stability. This secrecy is
essential for party integration.
 This secrecy has increased for more centralization of the Party due to the current enmity
with US and the west under Xi Jinping.
 Keeping in view the current situation, it is not possible that democracy within the Party
can grow enough which can lead China to democracy. There is no significance chance for
democracy until the leadership of the Party decides to adopt top-down political approach.
 Most of the people of PRC have not the membership of CCP, therefore, even
improvement in Intra-Party Democracy did not benefit the whole country.
 Additionally, the concept of Socialist Democracy being promoted by the CCP is more
like dictatorship instead of democracy. Because it is the sole power of the CCP to decide
whether who is enemy or not.
 As the democracy is even less in the country, the animosity against the Party has been
increased especially under Xi Jinping.
 In Sum, if the CCP has to remain in power than it has to remain secretive, undemocratic
and authoritative.
Decoupled State, Hollowed Civil Society: The Shifting Party-State-Society Nexus
 In this article the relations between the CCP, the state and the society especially focusing
on XI Jinping’s era have been explored. Apart from this, it has also been discussed about
the influence and expanding of the CCP in various sectors including businesses. The
legislative changes made in this regard have also been highlighted .
 In December, 2022, US removed 200 Chinese companies from stock exchange due to law
regarding audit and check enforced in 2020. China objected it by saying that it challenged
its sovereignty but later on agreed to allow inspection under certain conditions.
 US was concerned about party’s control and governance over businesses and foreign
investment.
 It is evident that by using mass tactics and secret societies, to strengthen its position, the
CCP collaborated with other groups. The CCP has also transformed many social groups
into State’s controlled entities. Due to this the influence of Party over government and
social societies increased which facilitate the events like Cultural Revolution.
 After, 1971, the CCP rebuild local societies and retained significant control on it.
 After the events in Tiananmen Square, the Party took back considerable power in the
government and reinstated organizations who had been expelled earlier. The "no
recognition, no banning, no intervention" approach relieved pressure on local
governments with limited resources by allowing unregistered social groups to function
without official action.
 The administration set out to restructure institutions in 2013 with the goal of easing
governmental control over social groups and facilitating their registration.
  In order to comply with Party regulations, MoCA started cleaning up social groups in
2021, which resulted in more stringent registration and auditing procedures. Social
organizations now have less autonomy as a result of this change in government priorities,
which has also raised questions about homogeneity and its effects on foreign investment.
The Chinese Communist Party as a Global Force Frank N. Pieke
 Chinese influence overseas has grown dramatically and now encompasses more than
simply economic expansion. China is now in a superpower position thanks to President
Xi Jinping's leadership, which has increased rivalry with the US.
 The terminology of soft power mean statecraft vides which China wants to extend its
narrative. Moreover, the terminology of sharp power refer to infiltration in politics of
others nations.
 The Chinese students who are studying abroad have created branches of the CCP in these
foreign institutions to ensure the implication of the Chinese Communist Party’s policies
as well as party building.
 Despite the constraints, under the leadership of Xi, the CCP has attempted to increase its
influence in other states and fulfill this aim they are using social media platforms like
WeChat secretly.
 All the efforts regarding establishment of Party Network in other states are being made to
keep control over Chinese business firms and the Chinese people working abroad for
pursuit of profit.
 The strategy of Soft Power is being used to increase the influence of China on the global
stage and present the positive image of Chinese Nation. To accomplish this task, new
members are being recruited and experiences of people who are working abroad are
being utilized.
 The Party's international endeavors center on aiding Chinese enterprises, preserving ties
with Chinese nationals abroad, and advocating for Chinese foreign policies—frequently
by means of cultural exchanges that highlight China's distinctiveness.
ANALYSIS:
 Xi Jinping's enhanced transparency and centralization show a realism attitude to
preserving state authority. Because of its centralization, the CCP is guaranteed to
maintain ultimate authority and is shielded from internal challenges to its hegemony.
 The Party's "state's retreat and the Party's advance" policy, which emphasizes maintaining
the CCP's control over social groupings in order to consolidate power and minimize
possible opposition, is a realistic approach.
 The CCP's initiatives to collaborate with various social organizations and private business
owners. While these cooperative elements are in line with liberal ideals, liberalism can
only go so far in China as the CCP's main objective is not democratic.
 These tactics imply a restricted acceptance of liberal values, in which the Party manages
the discourse and steers charitable endeavors to conform to its goals. This limits the
growth of independent organizations and liberal democratic government.
 Constructivism is in line with the CCP's "socialist democracy" philosophy and emphasis
on retaining control over who is classified as a "people" or a "enemy." The Party's
internal and external ties are impacted by its capacity to mold social constructions.
Chapter # 2

IDEOLOGICAL BRICOLAGE

Main Topics:

1. Intellectuals and Ideological Governance of the Chinese Communist Party (Timothy

Cheek )
2. Shades of Red: Changing Understandings of Political Loyalty in the Chinese Communist
Party, 1921–2021 (Jérôme Doyon and Long Yang )
3. The United Front: The Magic Weapon of the Chinese Communist Party’s
Metamorphoses (Emmanuel Jourda)
Intellectuals and Ideological Governance of the Chinese Communist Party
 The CCP has maintained complicated relationship with intellectuals from the beginning.
The CCP founders members were teachers and intellectuals as well military officers but
intellectuals have historically been treated harshly especially in the period of Mao.
 While some intellectuals joined the Party voluntarily to support its revolutionary goals,
others were under constant observation to ensure their allegiance. Prominent intellectuals
like as historian Wu Han and journalist Chen Bulei joined at different points in time,
while once the Party came to power, individuals such as Yue Daiyun, a professor of
literature, and editor Wang Ruoshui joined.
 "Ideological governance" refers to a style of governing in which officials feel it is their
responsibility to inform and direct the populace in accordance with particular ideologies.
 To keep Party members in line with the CCP's purpose of standing up for the working
class and guiding people toward liberation, leaders such as Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi
placed a strong emphasis on intellectual instruction and personal reform.
 The scholar Wu Han left for territories under Communist rule after criticizing the
Nationalists. He later became a member of the CCP, but he remained independent, first
joining a non-Communist political party and then the Party.
 A new generation of intellectuals emerged at the same era as the older ones, comprising
Yue Daiyun, Zhang Chunqiao, and Wang Ruoshui.
 As censorship and orthodoxy is increasing, it raise question on the freedom of intellectual
in China.
 The varying response of intellectual suggests that the CCP is enforcing strict control over
them. The role of intellectual is like agents in this system but they oftenly disagreed from
the policies.
 As evident from history that relationship between Confucian Intellectuals and imperial
state are not new in China. The role of state as a guiding teacher is still functioning in
China nowadays.
Shades of Red: Changing Understandings of Political Loyalty in the Chinese Communist
Party, 1921–2021 (Jérôme Doyon and Long Yang )
 In this chapter, the concept of political loyalty, interdependence of virtue and faithfulness
to the CCP has been examined. The concept of loyalty in the CCP has changed over time
from behavioral loyalty to ascriptive loyalty which is based on background and social
conduct.
 By relying on inscriptive loyalty, the CCP recruited members from Marxist Study Groups
as well as from Universities. But cooperation with Nationalist Party and budget issues
lead to confusion.
 In 1927, the cooperation between the CCP and GMD has been ended, resultantly 80
percent members of the CCP has changed their loyalty which leads to purges and
“proletarianization”.
 After the Jiangxi, the membership of the CCP being granted on the basis of behavior
rather than their class and Mao Zedong acknowledged the role of intellectuals in party
building. Therefore, the Politburo approved this change in 1935.
 Resultantly, due to this behavioral approach more people joined the CCP in 1945.
Additionally, to strengthen the position of Mao Zedong in party, the concept of political
education and rectification were emphasized through Yan’an Rectification movement.
  But after the death of Mao, behavior is considered important to join the party rather than
family history or class. Moreover, during the Era of Deng Xiaoping, the priority to join
the party has been given to professional, educated and skilled people. Furthermore,
During Jiang Zemin’s period, the businessmen were given priority to join the party under
“Three Represents” programme to enhance the party support.
 Originally associated with social classes, allegiance thereafter centered on "Party spirit"
and conduct. The shift made possible by the "Three Represents" approach demonstrated a
more comprehensive focus on conduct rather than background.
 The CCP has been able to overcome obstacles and preserve unity because of its flexibility
in defining allegiance. However, draconian loyalty laws and overbearing rectification
efforts can impede inclusivity and limit internal variety...
The United Front: The Magic Weapon of the Chinese Communist Party’s Metamorphoses
(Emmanuel Jourda)
 The chapter explores the history of the united front from Mao's time to the present,
emphasizing its discursive growth above its institutional structure. It investigates the
political and ideological uses of the unified front.
 Especially in the wake of the Japanese invasion and during the second united front with
the Guomingdang (GMD), Mao Zedong used the united front to cement CCP authority.
His employment of "magic weapons" stood for the adaptability in strategy needed to
guide the CCP to victory.
 The unified front was utilized to provide a framework for the consolidation of CCP
hegemony and to institutionalize the political system of the "people's democracy." It
changed from being a cooperative plan with the GMD to an ideological tool to maintain
CCP supremacy.
 The role of the United Front shifted after Mao's death, reflecting changes in the
philosophy of the Chinese Communist Party and the country's larger political landscape.
 Deng Xiaoping reinterpreted the unified front, stressing political stability while using it
as a weapon to move away from Maoism.
 During the era of Deng the United Front was advance as scientific socialism with more
focus on China.
 During Jiang Zemin period, the United Front was also strengthen inside the CCP for
transition management. He changed its policy from previous era revolutionary violence
be advancing “Three Represents” Programme.
 To stabilize the Administration as well as Government, Hu Jintao also used United Front
as a tool.
 Xi Jinping also recognized the importance on United Front and used it against opposition
and increase the role of Party. He also used United Front for Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) internationally.
 The United Front is demonstrating its role from its inception and being an ideological
unity, played a significant part since last 100 years.
 Analytical and Critical Analysis:
 According to the Realist School of thought, sufficient control to maintain order and
powerful leadership is essential, so the concept of political allegiance and loyalty to the
party by the CCP is realist approach. Moreover, the party discipline, ideological purity,
consolidation of powers and strict adherence of party’s policies by the CCP are Realist
strategy and these realist srategies kept the party strong and dominate.
 The conection between the CCP and Intellectuals is restricted and hierarchical rather than
democratic / liberal. The exploitation of the intellectuals to advance party’s ideology
without observing freedom of speech/ expression as stated in the article is not fall in
liberal paradigm. The strict controlled of the CCP in connection with intellectuals is not
democratic aspect and liberal collaboration.
 Ideological control and efforts which are being made by the CCP to maintain party
position is fall in the Constructivism School of thought as Constructivist also advance
that how social structures influence political behavior of society as well as governments.
The CCP published stories to promote shared values which effect intersubjectively the
society. Moreover the change of role of the United Front over time show a constructivist
approach.
Chapter # 3

CHINA’S PATH TO MODERNISATION AND ITS CHALLENGES

Main Topics:

1. Adapting the Hukou to Modernise the Country While Maintaining Social Polarisation
and Stratification (Chloé Froissart)
2. Capitalist Agrarian Change and the End of the Revolutionary Peasant Dialectic: Chinese
Communist Party Rural Policies in Long-Term Perspective (Alexander F. Day)
3. The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Bourgeoisie (1949–present): From First
Alliance to Repression and Contemporary Mutual Dependence Gilles Guiheux
Adapting the Hukou to Modernize the Country While Maintaining Social Polarization and
Stratification Chloé Froissart
 The Hukou System in incient China was stimulated from Baojia System which was first
used for the purpose of Census, collecting taxes and to maintain social order in the
society.
 In People’s Republic of China (PRC), the concept of Hukou System was used to control
the labour, managing the allocation of Urban Area and to modernize the society by the
CCP.
 During the period of Mao, for the promotion of heavy industries, population was
controlled by restricting migration and organizing labour.
 To get benefits from the urban economy during the Reform Era the Hukou System was
redesigned to promote the socioeconomic elite by controlling rural migration.
 Xi Jinping mostly focused on common prosperity and to reduce the inequality in the
society he reformed the Hukou System.
 Reforms made regulated urbanisation possible, emphasising smaller towns and cities.
Larger cities still continued to face substantial obstacles, which led to an elite integration
paradigm.
 Many cities use a points-record system that excludes poorer and more migratory
populations while favouring a socioeconomic elite among long-term residents. This
system stratifies social citizenship.
 The hukou system still leads to inequality and stratification in spite of changes. Many
rural migrants are denied benefits since public services and social insurance are
sometimes dependent on certain point-based requirements.
 By upholding a form of social control and state-planned urbanisation, the system
perpetuates the socioeconomic gap between residents of rural and urban areas. Even
while certain changes have made a positive impact on the lives of particular groups, there
are still big obstacles in the way of ensuring fairness and justice for all individuals.
Capitalist Agrarian Change and the End of the Revolutionary Peasant Dialectic: Chinese
Communist Party Rural Policies in Long-Term Perspective
 Since the late 1990s, Meitan County's farmer earnings have improved dramatically,
mostly as a result of the county government's support of tea cultivation. Meitan is now
one of China's top tea-producing districts and the creation of over 500 tea firms.
 The CCP utilised a revolutionary comprehension of peasant inclinations and prioritised
practical evaluation of peasant classes to secure an advantage over the Nationalists.
 Socialist Period (1949–1970s): To promote industrialization, the emphasis was on
modernising and collectivising agriculture, weighing the validity of rural areas against the
exploitation of excess resources.
 The Post-Socialist Reform Period saw a return to household administration of agricultural
output, a trend towards urban legitimacy, and an increase in rural-urban disparity.
 Around 2008, the Post-Reform Period took place, with a focus on capitalist agricultural
development that resulted in heightened class disparity and the establishment of new
institutions such specialised cooperatives and dragonhead agribusiness enterprises..
 Income gaps between rural and urban regions are a result of protracted rural stagnation,
despite strong economic expansion in metropolitan areas. This strategy moved urban
issues into the rural realm and deepened the gap between rural and urban areas.
  Rural demonstrations in the early 2000s over concerns including corrupt land
expropriation and tax burdens led the CCP to implement a number of pro-peasant
reforms, including the abolition of the agricultural tax in 2006. On the other hand, the
emphasis on capitalist agrarian reform brought about by the post-2008 drive towards
agricultural modernization resulted in greater class difference and land consolidation.
 Class division has grown as a result of the reorganised rural policies and capitalist
agricultural transformation, making it more difficult to control rural-urban migration. A
trend away from traditional rural ideals and towards a more practical and utilitarian
approach to rural development and agricultural modernization is shown by the shift
towards class distinction.
The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Bourgeoisie (1949–present): From First
Alliance to Repression and Contemporary Mutual Dependence, Gilles Guiheux
 Despite the private sector's substantial contribution to China's economy, the CCP has a
vague stance on private enterprises. Prominent businesspeople encounter regulatory
scrutiny, commendation and criticism, and even legal action or incarceration.
 The CCP's stance on capitalists has changed throughout time, illustrating the nuanced
interplay between cooperation and repression. Before 1956, the CCP made partnership
with private businesses but nationalized afterwards.
 During 1979, after changing the policies, a new businessmen class was come-up which
also encourage entrepreneurial.
 As capitalist advantage was vanished during Cultural Revolution, before it, even the
political disapproval, various capitalist enjoyed luxurious life styles because of the
strategies used by the United Front under the supervision of the CCP.
 The private sector in China evolved gradually as during 1980 the entrance was
unofficially followed by formal legitimating in 1988 and full protection through
legislation in 2004.
 The private business played a vital role in the economy of China but secrutiny and
uncertainty remained ever along with strict supervision as the businessman who did not
obey the party’s policy faced consequences.
 The party has great influence on private enterprises, the CCP controlled it by a long time
through different strategies of governance as United Front etc.
Analysis of Chapter 3
 The controlled over entrepreneurs and private businesses by the CCP especially in the era
of XI Jinping aligned with Realist tendencies as Realist School of thought emphasized on
maintenance of strict control to centralize power and maintain security. To advance the
state’s interests, the CCP used strict polices as well as ready to use whatever menas
necessary to maintain state’s power. In recent history, the policy of China toward free
trade and participation in World Trade Organizaiton (WTO) has attracted foreign
investment as well as other polices regarding State Environmental Protectoin aligned
with liberal school of thoughts.
 The concept of “Sinification of Marxism” about leadership personalization adopted by
the CCP means that the Party’s policies are being guided by the ideologies and socially
constructed identity as this focus on the nationalist approach rather than class oriented
policy.
 Constructivism can explain the CCP's use of campaigns, like the "blue sky war" and other
environmental initiatives, as a way to shape public perception and rally support. The
focus on ideological unity and political education in the Yan'an rectification movement
illustrates the role of constructed identities in guiding Party members. Constructivism
would highlight the historical roots of the CCP's governance approach.
Chapter # 4
TERRITORIAL CONTROL AND NATION-BUILDING
Main Topics:
1. ‘Unity within Diversity’: The Chinese Communist Party’s Construction of the Chinese
Nation (Vanessa Frangville)
2. The Integration of Xinjiang into the Chinese NationState: Controlling Minority
Representations and Fighting against Political Contestation (Rémi Castets)
3. From Making Friends to Countering Threats: The Changing Contours of United Front
Work in Hong Kong (Samson Yuen and Edmund W. Cheng)
4. The Chinese Communist Party’s Unfulfilled ‘Taiwan Dream’ (Gunter Schubert)
‘Unity within Diversity’: The Chinese Communist Party’s Construction of the Chinese
Nation (Vanessa Frangville)
 Since the 1960s, there has been a notable change in Chinese policy circles that favours
giving non-Han ethnic communities less autonomy.
 Even if the national ethnic policies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have not been
officially changed, the local laws and regulations that have been implemented have
significantly changed the situation for non-Han people.
 The notion of an indivisible territory supporting a united China is a top priority for the
CCP.
 Discussions concerning the origins of this country and strategies for unification
frequently centre on describing a supra-nation (minzu, guozu) made up of sub-nations
(minzu, zuqun).
 The main source of inspiration for the CCP's unification strategy is a fragmented but
superior Han-centric model.
 This strategy has caused disputes in outlying areas and stoked Han colonial irrationality,
sustaining disparities, prejudice, and stereotypes.
 The CCP's rhetoric heavily relies on the notion of minzu, which facilitates a discourse on
"unity within diversity" and shapes the fantasy of a unified Chinese people based on
shared lineage.
 But in actuality, the CCP's endorsement of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples is not realised. The party restricts non-Han communities' capacity to
exercise their right to prior consultation on changes to their territory since it does not
recognise the rights of indigenous peoples living inside its borders.
 The CCP only associates the idea of indigeneity with Western colonial contexts, rejecting
it within China. In Chinese, terms like "indigenous" or "indigeneity" are seldom ever
used to describe China.
 The CCP's narrative, which frames the integration of different peoples into the Chinese
nation as a natural and consensual process, is compatible with the denial. China is a
cohesive polyethnic state and was never a colonial power.
 Consequently, the CCP's portrayal of the Chinese people will probably still be dominated
by the idea of minzu, which will serve to bolster the notion of a varied yet cohesive
nation under its rule.
The Integration of Xinjiang into the Chinese NationState: Controlling Minority
Representations and Fighting against Political Contestation (Rémi Castets)
 Xinjiang has been an unstable area since its annexation, regularly posing a threat to the
legitimacy of the Chinese central government.
 Due to internal divergences between the central and local levels and opaque decision-
making processes, comprehending the methods employed by the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) in Xinjiang is a challenging task.
 Over the last thirty years, a substantial body of study (monographs, reports, PhD theses,
scholarly papers) has improved our knowledge of Xinjiang's political background and the
CCP's reassertion tactics.
 These studies demonstrate how the Party's internal dynamics and factional balances have
caused the CCP's tactics to change over time in response to requests from ethnic
minorities and political opposition.
  The shifting political interests within the CCP leadership, the local autonomy levels, and
the shifting power dynamics among factions are all reflected in the CCP's strategic
adjustments in Xinjiang.
 Even though CCP policies are kept secret, academic literature, reports from non-
governmental organisations, administrative leaks, interviews, and data gathered from
Xinjiang and the Uyghur diaspora can be utilised to recontextualize strategy revisions.
 The CCP has utilised many tactics to stifle anti-colonial groups and alternative ideologies
since its "peaceful liberation," such as:
 Defend against counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, mass mobilisations, mass queue
campaigns, reeducation, legal definitions of disloyal actions, and mass monitoring.
 The CCP employs a securitization rhetoric to defend these tactics, portraying resistance
in Xinjiang as a danger to national security and classifying dissidents using a wide
vocabulary.
 The phrases "terrorists" and "extremists" have replaced terminology like "counter-
revolutionary," "rightist," and "local nationalist" in the CCP's securitization strategy
throughout time.
 The Party opposes colonial criticisms and the expansion of political autonomy for ethnic
minorities, advocating instead for the "Chinafication" of religion and culture, particularly
under the direction of Xi Jinping.
 The CCP sees other beliefs as "ideological viruses" and blames the instability in Xinjiang
on outside subversive forces.
 This viewpoint explains why it won't have a conversation about changing Xinjiang's
policies.
 Under Xi Jinping, the CCP's strategy focuses on advancing social order through social
credit systems, increased state control, and high-tech surveillance.
 The CCP's growing influence in Xinjiang is indicative of a larger trend towards a more
securitarian state, which is marked by state-sponsored businesses and high-tech
surveillance. Thanks to alliances with other autocratic nations, China's control model is
spreading outside its boundaries.
 The "scientific state" aims to outperform Western liberal regimes, which the CCP
believes are undermined by their emphasis on individual liberties and democratic
balances of power.
From Making Friends to Countering Threats: The Changing Contours of United Front
Work in Hong Kong (Samson Yuen and Edmund W. Cheng)
 Although Hong Kong was a Chinese Special Administrative Region (SAR) until 1997,
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) utilised the territory for political and revolutionary
activities and as a point of contact and commerce with the outside world even prior to the
handover.
 The united front idea was first developed by Leninists to unite workers against the
capitalist class. Since then, it has been a vital instrument for the CCP to grow and retain
its power in Hong Kong, enabling it to cultivate a pro-Beijing base that will guarantee its
hold on the city.
 Previous studies on the united front in Hong Kong have concentrated on state actors such
as the Central Liaison Office, and have covered the history, major players, tactics, and
effect on local politics.
  Using an original event dataset and publically accessible reports, this chapter uses a
social network technique to investigate the dynamics of China's united front work in post-
handover Hong Kong.
 It suggests that united front activity in Hong Kong involves more than just traditional
state actors like the Central Liaison Office; it also involves other governmental entities,
mainland municipal governments, and a range of social players.
 As more participants in the united front network become involved, the research points to
a change in post-handover Hong Kong's governance paradigm from a more centralised
statist-corporatism to collaborative political clientelism.
 This fresh viewpoint expands upon the comprehension of united front activity by
suggesting that state power in Hong Kong encompasses a complex web of state and
societal actors rather than being limited to governmental institutions alone.
The Chinese Communist Party’s Unfulfilled ‘Taiwan Dream’ (Gunter Schubert)
 As a fundamental tenet of the Party's governing legitimacy, eventual "unification" is the
ultimate aim of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) policy towards Taiwan.
 The nationalist narrative of the CCP is challenged by Taiwan's pro-independence
movements and unique national identity.
 Following the "One China" policy, post-authoritarian administrations headed by
Guomindang (GMD) permitted the CCP to work towards "peaceful unification."
However, the likelihood of cross-strait reconciliation on the CCP's terms was reduced by
the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) return to power in 2016.
 Although the CCP has continued to use a carrot-and-stick strategy with Taiwan, its
"inalienable part of the great Chinese nation" rhetoric has been less and less successful un
light of Taiwan's political developments.
 The CCP's approach to Taiwan has not succeeded in bringing about "peaceful
unification," mostly because of Taiwan's developing sense of identity and growing
resistance to the CCP's advances.
 The CCP has been using "hard power" more and more under Xi Jinping's leadership to
stifle Taiwan's claims to sovereignty and foreign support for the island, portraying
Taiwan as one of the biggest threats to CCP legitimacy.
 The manner in which the CCP views Taiwanese domestic politics and the US-Taiwan
relationship determines how patient or impatient it is with regard to the "Taiwan issue."
 The CCP had the view that “Peaceful Unification” is not impossible to achieve through
economic associations and pragmatic approach but under the leadership of Xi-Jinping
such expectations are impossible.
Analysis:
 The policy adopted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regarding “One China” is
aligned with the realist school of thought as realist perspectives emphasize on state
power, consolidation and centralization. To maintain unity and national identity the
realism advance the concept of curb opposition as evident by the policies of the CCP. To
maintain the state power, stability and secure the national interest even on the cost of
exploiting and suppressing minorities is the realist perspective. Moreover, the policies
adopted by the CCP in Hong Kong through United Front regarding to contain political
movements to secure the ligtimacy and authority of the state fall in realist paradigm.
Conversely, the CCP’s policies towards unification of Taiwan by using hard power
illustrate China’s Power Politics and secure its interests, security and sovereignty.
 As the CCP’s is adapted the methods of surveillance and suppression which are aginst the
Basic Human Rights of the people completely opposite the concepts advance by the
liberal school of thought. Apart from this, the United Front’s approach to integrate Hong
Kong by opposing political rights and freedom of speech is against the liberal policies.