SSRN Id4781264

Blue Monday?
Decoding Its Impact on Reward-Based Crowdfunding

Weijia You1&, Jinmou Hu1&, Xiahua Wei2
(1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing Forestry University, China;
2. School of Business, University of Washington, Bothell, Washington 98011, USA)
Abstract
The Monday Effect, also known as “Blue Monday,” refers to negative emotions individuals often
experience on Mondays that can trigger irrational behaviors and lead to market inefficiencies. This
phenomenon, if extending to the crowdfunding market, could pose challenges to crowdfunding success.
To explore this possibility, we conducted a comprehensive study on the Monday Effect using daily data
from a leading reward-based crowdfunding platform. Our investigation reveals that the Monday Effect
is prevalent in crowdfunding. Specifically, we found that crowdfunding project performance, as
measured by the amount of new funds raised, the number of new backers, and the average contributions
of backers, tends to be weaker on Mondays than the other days of the week. Notably, this effect appears
to be evident across different types of crowdfunding projects, irrespective of their inherent
characteristics and qualities. However, the strength of the Monday Effect varies depending on the types
of project and the funding options offered. The effect is more pronounced in technology projects but
weaker in public-goods projects. Moreover, the donation options are less affected by the Monday Effect
compared to regular options, and intriguingly, lottery options seem to be immune to this effect. In
addition, the Monday Effect wanes as the fundraising period progresses, while it intensifies with
elevated project prices. We also discovered a potential strategy to mitigate the Monday Effect: product
sampling. Projects that receive higher user feedback scores from product sampling tend to experience
a weaker Monday Effect. Together, our findings shed light on the irrational behaviors of crowdfunding
backers arising from the Monday Effect, uncover its underlying mechanisms, and offer practical
implications for fundraisers to alleviate the Monday Effect and enhance their crowdfunding
performance.
Keywords: Monday Effect; Reward-based Crowdfunding; Irrational Behaviors; Motivations; Product
Sampling Strategy
Corresponding author: Xiahua, Wei: xhwei@uw.edu;

&: These authors contributed equally to this work and should be considered co-first authors.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4781264

1. Introduction
Reward-based crowdfunding, as an alternative fundraising approach to traditional finance, empowers
entrepreneurs to secure funding from the public by showcasing their creative ideas on an online platform
(Courtney et al., 2017; Mollick, 2014). In return, backers supporting these projects receive early access
to their products/services as rewards (Hemer, 2011). This business model has gained substantial traction
among aspiring entrepreneurs (Belleflamme et al., 2014; Drover et al., 2017). For instance, Kickstarter,
as a leading reward-based crowdfunding platform, has facilitated the allocation of over USD $7.81
billion from 22 million backers to support more than 253,000 projects since 2009.1 Globally evaluated
at USD $1.20 billion in 2023, the reward-based crowdfunding market is projected to reach USD $1.30
billion by 2027 (Statista, 2023). Despite its widespread popularity, however, the majority of projects
fail to achieve their funding targets (Xu & Ni, 2022), with platforms like Kickstarter experiencing close
to a 60% failure rate. This reality makes it imperative to delve into factors driving the performance of
crowdfunding projects.
While prior literature on crowdfunding has primarily focused on the impact of project
characteristics on funding performance—such as project duration, funding goal, and reward structure
(Mollick & Kuppuswamy, 2014), as well as the interactions between fundraisers and backers (Simon et
al., 2019), recent attention has turned to potentially irrational backer behaviors that can undermine
crowdfunding outcomes or lead to market inefficiency and failure (Li et al., 2022; Lin & Viswanathan,
2016; Zaggl & Block, 2019). For instance, home bias is observed in crowdfunding, with backers
showing preference for projects led by local fundraisers. This bias persists even when out-of-state
projects with lower risks and higher returns are available; investors consistently favor projects within
their home state (Lin & Viswanathan, 2016). Despite extant studies exploring various behavioral factors
influencing crowdfunding outcomes, the Monday Effect remains unexplored in crowdfunding, which
motivates our exploration of this intriguing phenomenon.
In financial markets, the Monday Effect is primarily characterized by negative or significantly
lower average returns of stocks on Mondays, ceteris paribus, compared to other days of the week
(Abraham & Ikenberry, 1994; Lakonishok & Maberly, 1990; Washer et al., 2011). Two prevailing
1 https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=global-footer
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explanations have been proposed to account for this phenomenon. The first hinges on the daily work
schedule. Individual investors often have more time to make personal financial decisions over the
weekend, leading to a surge in trading activities on Mondays. Moreover, their propensity to sell on
Mondays is higher than their propensity to buy. Taken together, these behaviors partially explain the
negative return of stocks on Mondays (Abraham & Ikenberry, 1994; Lakonishok & Maberly, 1990).
The second explanation draws from insights in the psychology literature, particularly the “Blue Monday”
phenomenon. Mondays mark the commencement of five consecutive workdays after two days of leisure,
a transition that many individuals approach with a degree of reluctance (Farber, 1953; Pecjak, 1970).
This initial reluctance can give rise to corresponding pessimistic emotions, which in turn induce some
irrational behaviors (Abu Bakar et al., 2014; Rystrom & Benson, 1989), such as stronger risk-aversion
on Mondays (Pettengill, 1993). Crowdfunding projects continuously raise funds throughout all seven
days of the week, underscoring the significance of the second explanation in comprehending the
Monday Effect in our study.
With distinctive features of reward-based crowdfunding, including diverse product categories and
funding options (Cappa et al., 2021; Gong et al., 2020; Tafesse, 2021), backers’ level of risk aversion
on Mondays may vary along these dimensions, leading to substantial heterogeneity in the Monday
Effect. At the project level, the inherent characteristics of the product influence the project risk (Kim et
al., 2022). Products with a higher degree of uncertainty may experience a stronger Monday Effect
compared to other product categories. In addition, projects emphasizing either commercial or charitable
goals attract backers with distinct motivations, namely, extrinsic (reward-oriented) and intrinsic
(altruistic) (Ryu et al., 2020). At the funding option level, these distinct motivations are further
accentuated by the design of various reward structures, catering to backers with varying tolerances for
risk (Gong et al., 2020), which may demonstrate the Monday Effect to different degrees across funding
options. In light of such heterogeneity and the inherent risk aversion that drives the Monday Effect, a
natural question arises regarding how to effectively manage this phenomenon in business practice. It is
plausible that strategies involving increased product information, such as product sampling (Liu et al.,
2022a; Liu et al., 2022b), could reduce perceived uncertainty, alleviate backers’ risk aversion, and create
more efficient crowdfunding markets.

Together, this paper endeavors to investigate the presence of the Monday Effect in crowdfunding,
to illuminate the underlying mechanisms at play, and to provide actionable recommendations for
fundraisers in mitigating the Monday Effect and enhancing the likelihood of crowdfunding success. As
such, we can not only inform fundraisers about managing their crowdfunding campaigns with greater
efficiency but also provide insights into enhancing the operation and management of crowdfunding
platforms. Specifically, we aim to address the following questions: (1) Does the Monday Effect
influence the financing performance of crowdfunding projects? (2) Does the Monday Effect vary across
different project categories? (3) How does the Monday Effect change with various funding options? (4)
Can the implementation of a product sampling strategy mitigate the Monday Effect?
To explore these inquiries, we proposed four sets of hypotheses grounded in self-determination
theory and information asymmetry theory. We test these hypotheses by collecting data from JD
Crowdfunding, one of the largest reward-based crowdfunding platforms in the world. The platform’s
extensive coverage of project categories (commercial and public goods) and unique design of funding
options (regular, donation, and lottery) draw in backers with both extrinsic and intrinsic motivations
(Gerber & Hui, 2013; Gong et al., 2020; Ryu et al., 2020). Our compiled dataset encompasses 7,935
projects with detailed daily funding data from January 2018 to December 2019.
Our empirical investigations yielded the following key findings. At the project level, crowdfunding
performance tends to be less favorable on Mondays compared to other days, a pattern consistent across
all types of projects. However, the observed Monday Effect is more conspicuous in technology-focused
projects while less pronounced in public-goods projects. At the funding option level, the Monday Effect
does not manifest in the fundraising process of lottery options. In contrast, it is evident for both regular
and donation options, with the latter demonstrating a lesser impact. Furthermore, we found that user
feedback reports from the product sampling can mitigate the Monday Effect. As the feedback scores
increase, the Monday Effect dampens, demonstrating a negative relationship between product quality
and the magnitude of the Monday Effect. In addition, we observed that the Monday Effect weakens as
the fundraising period progresses but increases with project prices.
Our study offers several contributions. First, it marks the first exploration of the Monday Effect in
crowdfunding, expanding the scope of the Monday Effect from traditional financial markets to this

novel context of finance. Second, we reveal the nuanced role of backers’ motivation on their
susceptibility to the Monday Effect, with intrinsically motivated backers exhibiting greater resilience to
risk. Third, our research enhances the comprehension of the impact of lottery options in crowdfunding.
These lottery options, which offer uncertain rewards, hold strong appeal for risk-seeking backers who
remain impervious to the Monday Effect. Fourth, we underscore the significance of a product sampling
strategy in alleviating the Monday Effect, providing practical insights for crowdfunding practitioners to
enhance their fundraising efficacy. Lastly, our research illuminates avenues for enhancing the
operational efficiency of crowdfunding, offering valuable guidance for both fundraisers and
crowdfunding platforms.
As such, our practical insights into the operation and management for crowdfunding are two-fold.
On one hand, we provide tailored recommendations for fundraisers to design crowdfunding campaigns
in the presence of the Monday Effect. This includes considering the motivations and risk tolerances of
different backers, integrating uncertain rewards as funding options, and implementing proactive
information disclosure strategies. On the other hand, for platforms, enhancing operational efficiency
involves promoting prosocial, lower-risk projects on Mondays, prioritizing projects with high levels of
information disclosure, and encouraging fundraisers to share more information.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the sequence of literature review (Section 2),
hypotheses development (Section 3), data description (Section 4), empirical analyses and results
(Section 5), robustness checks (Section 6), and finally, conclusions and discussions (Section 7).
2. Literature Review
2.1. The Monday Effect
Prior research offers two primary perspectives on the mechanisms driving the Monday Effect. One
focuses on the sequential flow of tasks. The conventional work schedule creates a natural interruption
in the workflow between the end of the previous week (Friday) and the beginning of the new week
(Monday). This interruption necessitates employees to reacquaint themselves with ongoing business
processes and address any pending tasks from the preceding week (Yao et al., 2019). Shedding light on
this phenomenon, Task-Sequence-Execution-Fit (TSEF) theory (Schmenner & Swink, 1998) posits that
a smooth production flow enhances productivity, while interruptions can diminish efficiency. Therefore,

employees may exhibit lower performance on Mondays due to interruptions in established processes.
Another explanation revolves around individuals’ psychological patterns. Studies have
demonstrated that emotions follow a 7-day cycle, reaching their lowest point on Mondays and peaking
around the weekend (Farber, 1953; Pecjak, 1970). This emotional pattern, linked to the traditional
Monday-to-Friday work schedule, results in a lack of motivation and reluctance towards work on
Mondays (Abu Bakar et al., 2014; Fritz & Sonnentag, 2005). These negative emotions can drive
irrational behaviors on Mondays, such as avoiding risky investments (Pettengill, 1993). In financial
markets, the Monday Effect, driven by stronger risk aversion in investing, manifests as negative average
stock market returns on Mondays (Cross, 1973).
In summary, while extensive research across various fields, including financial markets, has
investigated the Monday Effect, a gap remains in understanding its existence and impact on
crowdfunding, a novel form of financial markets. Our study seeks to fill this void, providing insights
and recommendations to mitigate the Monday Effect in crowdfunding and enhance the success of
crowdfunding projects.
2.2. Motivations
In crowdfunding research, motivation is defined as the driving force compelling backers to participate
in crowdfunding projects (Bretschneider & Leimeister, 2017; Gerber & Hui, 2013). Grounded in self-
determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000), scholars have identified various motivations for backing
behaviors in crowdfunding, which are further categorized into extrinsic and intrinsic motivations
(Burtch et al., 2013; Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; Gerber & Hui, 2013). For instance, "getting rewards"
falls under the extrinsic category, while "helping others," "integrating into the community," "gaining
recognition," and "supporting a career" are considered intrinsic motivations. Extrinsically motivated
backers focus on the quality, tangible returns, and future success of a project. Hence, projects with high
uncertainty may discourage them from participating (Bretschneider & Leimeister, 2017; Gierczak et al.,
2014). In contrast, intrinsically motivated backers, who seek satisfaction from contributing to a project
rather than material rewards (Jiao et al., 2021), tend to be more tolerant of risks compared to their
extrinsically motivated counterparts (Gong et al., 2020).
The Monday Effect observed in crowdfunding is predominantly ascribed to backers’ risk-averse

behavior (further discussion in Section 3.1). Existing literature on backer motivation highlights diverse
risk tolerances linked to different motivations. An inference follows that backers’ risk-averse behavior
is intricately connected to their risk tolerances. Therefore, our study aims to investigate how the Monday
Effect influences backer behaviors, considering their inherent motivations, which in turn are associated
with varying degrees of risk aversion. This endeavor is geared towards fostering a deeper understanding
of backer motivations in the crowdfunding domain, thereby contributing to a more nuanced
understanding of the factors influencing crowdfunding dynamics.
2.3. Information Asymmetry

In traditional financial markets, raising funds, whether from financial institutions or the public, is
subject to strict supervision by relevant regulatory agencies; fundraisers are obligated to inform
investors of potential risks. However, in crowdfunding, fundraisers raise money from backers before
the product has been brought to market without stringent oversight (Cascino et al., 2019). Consequently,
fundraisers typically possess more information about the anticipated quality of the finished product than
backers, giving rise to an information asymmetry problem between fundraisers and backers (Agrawal
et al., 2014). This asymmetry provides fundraisers with the opportunity to overstate the quality of their
product, potentially misleading backers in an attempt to increase their funding performance (Wei et al.,
2021). This introduces a significant risk for potential backers and leads to market inefficiency or failures,
as in the case of a "lemon market" (Akerlof, 1978).
To mitigate the negative impact of information asymmetry in crowdfunding, there are two major
categories of solutions, rooted in signaling theory (Spence, 1978), which recognize that given the scarce
information available, potential backers may highly value signals that enable them to infer information
about the project's quality. The first category is related to implicit signals of project quality, embedded
in project characteristics. They include the project's funding goal (Chakraborty & Swinney, 2021),
features of rewards (Tafesse, 2021), the experience of fundraisers (Courtney et al., 2017), pricing
strategies (Sewaid et al., 2021), and more. The second category involves proactively and explicitly
providing investors with additional project-related information to alleviate information asymmetry.
Specific strategies may include prefunding (Wei et al., 2021), allowing fundraisers to share project
details with potential backers before fundraising officially commences, product sampling (Liu et al.,

2022b), which involves providing backers with feedback reports about the products, and direct
communication between fundraisers and backers (Wang et al., 2021). Projects with promising prospects
can leverage these proactive instruments to signify their project quality and fundraiser credibility. In
addition to implicit and explicit signals employed by fundraisers, platform mandates for information
sharing can also be effective. For instance, Kickstarter enforces project risk disclosure, a practice that
yields long-term benefits for both crowdfunding projects and the platform (Kim et al., 2022).
In our study, the Monday Effect proposed is partially attributed to information asymmetry (more
deliberations in Section 3.4). Building upon previous research, we have further formulated solutions
aimed at alleviating the Monday Effect. As a result, our research contributes to the ongoing exploration
of mitigating information asymmetry in crowdfunding, providing additional insights and enriching the
existing body of knowledge.
3. Hypotheses
3.1. The Monday Effect
In the crowdfunding market, where projects continuously raise funds throughout the week, our
hypotheses on the Monday Effect are grounded in the literature that explains it through psychological
factors. Empirical research has examined the relationship between emotions and the Monday Effect,
revealing a consistent correlation between investors’ levels of pessimistic emotions and the intensity of
the Monday Effect (Gondhalekar & Mehdian, 2003). Additionally, investors tend to be more pessimistic
earlier in the week but gradually become more optimistic (Abu Bakar et al., 2014). These studies
provide strong empirical evidence attributing the Monday Effect in financial markets to pessimistic
emotions. Moreover, these pessimistic emotions induce risk-averse behavior among investors, thereby
explaining the occurrence of the Monday Effect. As evidence, Pettengill (1993) observed that investors
allocate a higher proportion of their investments to safe treasury bills on Mondays compared to other
days, indicating a psychological aversion to risk on Mondays.
In reward-based crowdfunding, various drawbacks compared to other financial markets contribute
to their perceived risks for backers. These drawbacks include limited interactions between backers and
fundraisers, the absence of regulatory authorities, and the nonprofessional nature of backers (Agrawal
et al., 2014; Bi et al., 2017). These factors elevate the investment risk for backers, potentially giving

rise to the Monday Effect. In addition, the crowdfunding market features considerably less capital
compared to traditional stock or bond markets. Research suggests that the Monday Effect is more
pronounced in markets with limited capital (Abu Bakar et al., 2014). Hence, we propose the following
hypothesis:
H1: The crowdfunding project’s funding performance is lower on Mondays than on other days.
3.2. The Monday Effect on Different Project Types

Reward-based crowdfunding projects span a wide range of product categories, including technology,
design, health, publishing, and electronics. Moreover, it is notable that JD Crowdfunding includes
public-goods projects as an additional category, focusing on raising funds to assist people in
impoverished areas. Unlike donation-based crowdfunding platforms, where donations are solely
selfless without rewards, backers of public-goods projects on JD Crowdfunding receive local specialties
from impoverished areas in return for contributing to a charitable cause. Therefore, in our context, a
public-goods project is considered as a type of reward-based crowdfunding. Additionally, in reward-
based crowdfunding, where the funding for any product is project-specific, we use the terms “project
type” and “product category” interchangeably, as the former is determined by the latter.
Two distinct research streams have investigated the effect of project types on project funding
performance. One stream aligns with signaling theory (Spence, 1978), which emphasizes the visibility
of product types, product features, and risks among different projects on crowdfunding platforms,
making them informative signals for potential backers (Cappa et al., 2021; Tafesse, 2021). Evidence
from Kickstarter, the leading reward-based crowdfunding platform worldwide, reveals that technology
projects exhibit the lowest success rate, with only a 23.15% chance of reaching their funding goals,
while the average success rate for all projects on the platform is 41.18% (Kickstarter, January 2024).
Given their lowest chance of success, technology projects carry a higher risk than other projects.
Consistent with this conspicuous differentiation, Kim et al. (2022) categorize technology projects as
higher-risk endeavors due to their inherent complexity and variability. Furthermore, the complexity
involved in products contributes to an elevated perceived risk for consumers (Bettman, 1973; Folkes,
1988). Therefore, project types have inherently different success rates, serving as indicators of the
associated backing risk. Considering backers’ strong aversion to risk on Mondays, it is inferred that

their risk-averse behavior is more pronounced for projects with higher risk. Hence, we propose:
H2A: The Monday Effect is more pronounced in technology projects compared to other types of projects.
Another perspective on the role of project types is based on the motivations of backers. In reward-
based crowdfunding, backers’ decisions to pledge money are shaped by a mix of intrinsic and extrinsic
factors (Burtch et al., 2013; Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; Gerber & Hui, 2013). Projects employ various
rewards to attract diverse backers. The nature of rewards varies across different crowdfunding project
types, leading to distinctions in the number of intrinsically and extrinsically motivated backers who
possess varying risk tolerances. Intrinsically motivated backers, driven by altruism and enjoyment of
participating (Jiao et al., 2021), are less sensitive to project risk (less risk-averse). As the Monday effect
stems from backer risk aversion, we speculate that projects with a focus on public welfare, which can
effectively attract intrinsically motivated backers, are less susceptible to the Monday Effect.
Additionally, evidence suggests that these projects, appealing to and funded by backers with intrinsic
motivations, also tend to exhibit better funding performance and higher success rates. For instance,
projects with a sustainability orientation are more likely to succeed (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016), and
cleantech projects demonstrated greater success in raising funds (Cumming et al., 2017). Together, we
propose:
H2B: The Monday Effect is weaker in projects focusing on public welfare, such as public-goods projects.
3.3. The Monday Effect on Different Funding Options

Crowdfunding projects typically offer various funding options to attract backers, including the regular
option, the donation option, and the lottery option (Gong et al., 2020). In the regular option, the most
common funding option, backers contribute a pre-specified amount of money for a product reward. In
the donation option, backers support the project selflessly without receiving any reward. In the lottery
option, backers support the project with a small amount to win the product with a small probability.
Among the regular and donation options, backers who opt for the former seek extrinsic rewards,
while those choosing the latter are intrinsically motivated by contributing without returns. Consequently,
the funding performance of the regular option relies mainly on contributions from extrinsically
motivated backers, while the donation option depends primarily on contributions from intrinsically
motivated backers. As intrinsically motivated backers tend to be less sensitive to risk, we infer that they
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exhibit behaviors with a lower degree of risk aversion on Mondays compared to their extrinsically
motivated counterparts. Based on this, we propose:
H3A: The Monday Effect is weaker in the donation option compared to the regular option.
The lottery option, despite its low probability of getting the reward, attracts backers who are risk-
seeking, derive pleasure from the uncertainty, and tolerate the risk of not winning the rewards (Conlisk,
1993; Miyazaki et al., 1999; Gong et al., 2020). In other words, lottery backers are not primarily
concerned about the associated risk of not winning; rather, they engage in the lottery for the thrill of
risk-taking. Hence, we propose:
H3B: The Monday Effect is weaker or may not exist in the lottery option compared to other types of
options.
3.4. The Moderating Effect of Product Sampling Strategy

The Monday Effect in crowdfunding is rooted in backers’ risk aversion. Mitigating it hinges on reducing
perceived risk, which in turn is determined by the extent of information asymmetry (Kim et al., 2022;
Madsen & McMullin, 2020). In reward-based crowdfunding, where products are unavailable at the time
of funding, fundraisers hold private information about their product quality and prospects of future
success in manufacturing and on-time delivery, while backers can only obtain incomplete information
(Agrawal et al., 2014; Chakraborty & Swinney, 2021). This gap in information leads backers to perceive
crowdfunding investments as highly uncertain, thereby increasing their perceived risk. Therefore,
addressing the information asymmetry between fundraisers and backers is crucial to reduce perceived
risk and mitigate the Monday Effect.
Product sampling, where a pre-specified number of participants are randomly drawn to receive
product samples and provide feedback reports, has proven an effective strategy to address information
asymmetry. The information in these reports enables other backers to better assess product quality and
gain insights into the project's reliability and potential success, thereby alleviating information
asymmetry, consequently reducing backers’ perceived risk (Liu et al., 2022a). As the Monday Effect is
primarily attributed to the risk aversion of backers, we speculate that the product sampling strategy,
which is associated with reducing backers’ perceived risk in the project, diminishes their level of risk
aversion, ultimately weakening the Monday Effect. Hence, we propose:
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H4A: The availability of feedback reports through product sampling mitigates the Monday Effect.
Moreover, feedback reports provide not only product sample recipients’ usage experience but also
their ratings for product samples in three dimensions: practicality, aesthetics, and ease of operation.
These ratings serve as effective quality signals for projects (Liu et al., 2022b), where higher scores
indicate better product quality, thus lowering risk perception among backers and reducing the Monday
Effect. This leads to our next hypothesis:
H4B: The feedback report scores in product sampling alleviate the Monday Effect, the higher the report
scores, the weaker the Monday Effect.
4. Data
4.1. Data Source and Research Context
Our dataset is sourced from JD Crowdfunding. On this platform, each project is showcased on a
dedicated webpage, featuring essential information such as a project description, project duration, the
funding goal, current funds raised, various funding options with corresponding rewards, and the number
of backers for every funding option. We collected detailed daily panel data for 7,935 projects from
January 2018 to December 2019, among which 4,890 projects (61.6%) had successfully reached their
funding goals. In addition, given the relevance of our study to research on product sampling in
crowdfunding, we gathered data on user feedback reports from projects implementing the product
sampling strategy, where fortunate backers, who were randomly drawn to receive product samples,
provided product ratings along three dimensions: functionality, aesthetics, and ease of operation.
4.2. Variables and Summary Statistics

The key variables in this study are organized into three categories: days of the week, funding
performance, and product sampling. Table 1 describes these variables and Table 2 presents their
summary statistics.
First, among variables that indicate days of the week, Mon is a key binary indicator used to explore
the Monday Effect. Complementary dummies (Tue, Wed, Thu, Fri, Sat, Sun) are employed to assess the
impact of the other days of the week, enhancing the robustness of our results. Furthermore, we introduce
another dummy variable Festival to capture any potential effects stemming from holidays, i.e., the
festival effect.
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Second, we employed three alternative measures to gauge the project’s funding performance: the
daily amount of funds raised (New_raised), the daily count of new backers (New_backer), and the daily
average contributions per backer (Avg_contribution). Additionally, we considered the cumulative funds
raised (Pre_raised) and the cumulative number of backers (Pre_backer) at both the project level and
funding option level to assess potential herding or crowding-out effects in crowdfunding (Burtch et al.,
2021; Chan et al., 2020; Dai & Zhang, 2019).
Third, we created the dummy variable Report to indicate whether a project implements a product
sampling strategy with user feedback reports. Moreover, we calculated the average of the total scores
derived from all user reports for a project to construct variable Report_scores (where the total score of
a report equals the sum of backer ratings across three dimensions: functionality, aesthetics, and ease of
operation), providing a measure of the backer’s overall assessment of the product.

Table1 Variable Descriptions
Symbol Descriptions
Monit
Tueit
Wedit
The day of the week. For example, if the day t of the project (funding
Thuit
Key option) i is Mondays, the variable Monit equals 1, others 0.
Friit
variable
Satit
Sunit
If day t of the project (funding option) i falls in the period of festival,
Festivalit
it equals 1, else 0.
New_raisedit The amount of newly raised funds of project i on day t.
Dependen
New_backerit The number of new backers of project (funding option) i on day t.
t variable
Avg_contributionit The average amount of funds per backer of project i on day t.
Pre_raisedi,t-1 The cumulative amount of funds raised of project i by day t-1.
Pre_perfo Pre_backeri,t-1 The cumulative number of backers of project i by day t-1.
rmance Pre_option_backeri,t-
The cumulative number of backers of funding option i by day t-1.
1(funding option level)
Whether project i has user feedback reports on day t, if yes, it equals
Reportit
Product 1, else 0.
sampling The average of the total scores of all the product sampling’s reports of
Report_scoresit
project i on day t.
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Table 2 Summary Statistics of Key variables
Variable Observations Mean Std Min Max
Mon 254,457 0.142 0.349 0.000 1.000
Tue 254,457 0.140 0.347 0.000 1.000
Wed 254,457 0.143 0.350 0.000 1.000
Thu 254,457 0.140 0.347 0.000 1.000
Fri 254,457 0.144 0.351 0.000 1.000
Sat 254,457 0.143 0.350 0.000 1.000
Sun 254,457 0.144 0.351 0.000 1.000
Festival 254,457 0.084 0.278 0.000 1.000
New_raised1 254,457 7,178 101,507 0.000 19,421,636
New_backer 254,457 14.918 65.534 0.000 8,398
Avg_contribution 254,457 55.486 972.500 0.000 300,000
Pre_raised 254,457 160,817 1,234,768 0.000 111,540,818
Pre_backer 254,457 355.346 1258.481 0.000 55,122
Pre_option_backer 254,457 47.512 320.291 0.000 52,154
Report 254,457 0.017 0.129 0.000 1.000
Report_scores 4,365 14.41 0.79 8.000 15.000
4.3. Model-Free Evidence

To alleviate concerns about selection bias and data imbalance, we analyzed the frequency of Mondays
in the datasets and the duration of projects. The result in Table 3 reveals a balanced dataset, with
Mondays occurring approximately one-seventh of the time (36,307 instances). In addition, Figure 1
shows that the majority of projects have a duration between 25 to 70 days, ensuring an even distribution
of Monday and other days of the week throughout the fundraising process, regardless of the day the
projects were initiated.
To examine the Monday Effect on the overall crowdfunding performance of the platform, we
aggregated the daily funding performance of all projects. Accounting for variations in project numbers
over time, we calculated the average funding performance of all projects for each day. Figure 2
illustrates that Mondays consistently exhibit the lowest funding performance across all metrics
(New_raised, New_backer, Avg_contribution). These preliminary findings suggest the presence of the
Monday Effect in the crowdfunding market.
1 In our data, variables related to funds, including New_raised , Avg_contribution and Pre_raised, are measured in Chinese
yuan (CNY). During our sample period 2018, the exchange rate was $1 USD = ¥6.54 CNY.
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Table 3 Frequency of Different Days of the Week
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
Observations 36,307 35,861 36,548 35,793 36,748 36,549 36,651
Percentage 14.2% 14.0% 14.3% 14.0% 14.4% 14.3% 14.4%
Figure 1 Histogram of Duration of Projects
Figure 2 Model-Free Evidence
15

5. Results
5.1. The Monday Effect in the Overall Market
To rigorously corroborate the presence of the Monday Effect in crowdfunding, we constructed two panel
models with project fixed effects. The dependent variables encompass alternative key metrics of
crowdfunding performance, namely New_raised, New_backer, and Avg_contribution. In Model (1), the
primary explanatory variable is Mon, the dummy variable indicating whether the day is Monday. As a
parallel analysis, Model (2) replaces Mon with dummies for other days of the week as explanatory
variables, facilitating a comparison of their effects against Mondays, thereby yielding detailed insights
into the Monday Effect. Several control variables are incorporated, including the Festival Effect
(Festival), cumulative funding performance (Pre_performance), and seasonality and year effect
(seasonal and yearly dummies are collectively referred to as Time_dummy_variable throughout the
paper). We also incorporated the number of discussions between fundraisers and backers (Discussion)
to control for their interactions. Finally, we included the project-level fixed effects (represented by ξ )
in the models to control for the time-invariant project characteristics, including the funding goal, project
duration, the number of other fundraisers’ projects backed by and the number of projects created by the
fundraiser before the focal project, and the median prices of the rewards in the project.
Given the right-skewed distribution of variables related to project daily funding performance,
cumulative funding performance, and discussions, a logarithmic transformation, adjusted by adding one
(to address zeros), is applied. Hence, Model (1) and Model (2) are specified as follows, with the
estimation results presented in Table 4.
Ln(Performanceit )  0  1 Monit   2 Festivalit  3 Ln

（ Pre_performancei ,t 1 )
 4 Ln(Discussionit )  5Time _ dummy _ var iableit  it   it (1)
Ln( Performanceit )  0  1Tueit   2Wedit   3Thuit   4 Friit   5 Satit  6 Sunit

 7 Festivalit   8 Ln( Pre_performancei ,t 1 )   4 Ln( Discussionit ) (2)
  9Time _ dummy _ var iableit  it   it
16

Table 4 Estimation Results at Project-level
Model (1) Model (2)
Variable Ln(New_r Ln(New_b Ln(Avg_contri Ln(New_r Ln(New_b Ln(Avg_contri
aised) acker) bution) aised) acker) bution)
-0.251*** -0.088*** -0.168***
Mon
(0.014) (0.004) (0.008)
0.263*** 0.090*** 0.167***
Tue
(0.018) (0.006) (0.010)
0.265*** 0.094*** 0.181***
Wed
(0.018) (0.006) (0.010)
0.305*** 0.118*** 0.209***
Thu
(0.019) (0.006) (0.010)
0.342*** 0.123*** 0.218***
Fri
(0.018) (0.006) (0.010)
0.207*** 0.072*** 0.154***
Sat
(0.018) (0.006) (0.010)
0.139*** 0.414*** 0.088***
Sun
(0.018) (0.006) (0.010)
-0.432*** -0.184*** -0.224*** -0.407*** -0.173*** -0.206***
Festival
(0.019) (0.006) (0.019) (0.019) (0.006) (0.011)
-0.290*** -0.038*** -0.576*** -0.290*** -0.039*** -0.576***
Ln(Discussion)
(0.013) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013) (0.005) (0.007)
Ln(Pre_backer -0.215*** -0.215*** -0.294***
) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
-0.248*** -0.294*** -0.248***
Ln(Pre_raised)
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Time_dummy_
YES YES YES YES YES YES
variable
Project-
fixed Effects
R2 0.060 0.085 0.244 0.060 0.086 0.245
Observations 254,457 254,457 254,457 254,457 254,457 254,457
Note: *, **, *** indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, with standard errors in parentheses.
As Table 4 shows, the coefficients of Mon in Model (1) are consistently and significantly negative
at the 1% significance level across all three alternative dependent variables (Columns 1–3). This
observation suggests that the funding performance of crowdfunding projects, measured by the amount
of new funds raised, the number of new backers, and the average contributions of backers, experiences
a notable decline on Mondays compared to other days of the week. These results affirm the presence of
the Monday Effect in crowdfunding. In Model (2), the dummy coefficients of other days are
17

significantly positive at the 1% significance level for all three dependent variables (Columns 4–6).
These results imply that the funding performance of projects on all other six days of the week tends to
surpass Mondays, ceteris paribus, further validating the existence of the Monday Effect. Together, the
evidence lends strong support to Hypothesis H1.
5.2. The Monday Effect across Different Types of Projects

Before assessing the relative impact of the Monday Effect on different types of projects, we first
examined the presence of the Monday Effect across various projects. We classified projects into six
types based on the pre-defined categories by JD Crowdfunding: technology, design, health, publishing,
electronics, and public-goods. Stratifying the original data by project category, we employed Model (1)
and Model (2) for estimation. For brevity, we present the results on the dependent variable New_raised
in Table 5, leaving other results in Table A.1 and A.2 (Appendix).

Table 5 The Monday Effect by Project Types (New_raised)
Technology Design Health
Variable
Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2)
-0.352*** -0.230*** -0.187***
Mon
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
0.354*** 0.272*** 0.193***
Tue
(0.035) (0.036) (0.034)
0.367*** 0.262*** 0.154***
Wed
(0.034) (0.036) (0.034)
0.446*** 0.280*** 0.222***
Thu
(0.035) (0.036) (0.034)
0.491*** 0.290*** 0.245***
Fri
(0.034) (0.036) (0.034)
0.301*** 0.189*** 0.140***
Sat
(0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
0.180*** 0.102*** 0.170***
Sun
(0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
-0.479*** -0.431*** -0.375*** -0.350*** -0.463*** -0.455***
Festival
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
Ln(Discu -0.470*** -0.469*** -0.467*** -0.467*** 0.079*** 0.079***
ssion) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023)
Ln(Pre_r -0.227*** -0.226*** -0.246*** -0.246*** -0.232*** -0.232***
aised) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Time_du
mmy_var YES YES YES YES YES YES
iable
18

Project-
fixed Eff YES YES YES YES YES YES
ects
R2 0.067 0.068 0.072 0.072 0.039 0.039
Observati
80,293 80,293 67,496 67,496 65,565 65,565
ons
Publishing Electronics Public-goods
Variable
-0.146*** -0.413*** -0.145***
Mon
(0.049) (0.082) (0.035)
0.133** 0.368*** 0.079*
Tue
(0.065) (0.107) (0.046)
0.234*** 0.395*** 0.086*
Wed
(0.065) (0.107) (0.046)
0.145** 0.408*** 0.177***
Thu
(0.065) (0.108) (0.046)
0.183*** 0.675*** 0.211***
Fri
(0.065) (0.107) (0.046)
0.191*** 0.386*** 0.121***
Sat
(0.065) (0.106) (0.047)
0.004 0.267** 0.186***
Sun
(0.064) (0.106) (0.046)
-0.345*** -0.322*** -0.407*** -0.379*** -0.152*** -0.158***
Festival
(0.068) (0.069) (0.109) (0.109) (0.050) (0.051)
Ln(Discu -0.162*** -0.162*** -0.631*** -0.636*** 0.372*** 0.371***
ssion) (0.054) (0.054) (0.077) (0.077) (0.032) (0.032)
Ln(Pre_r -0.342*** -0.342*** -0.202*** -0.200*** -0.184*** -0.185***
aised) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008)
Time_du
mmy_vari YES YES YES YES YES YES
able
Project-
fixed Effe YES YES YES YES YES YES
cts
R2 0.062 0.062 0.073 0.075 0.021 0.021
Observati
25,194 25,194 9,093 9,093 31,266 31,266
ons
In Model (1), the coefficients of Mon are significantly negative across all groups, indicating that
the funding performance of all types of projects tends to be weaker on Mondays compared to other days
of the week. The results in Model (2) further corroborate this finding. The results in Tables A.1 and A.2
19

are also consistent. Together, we find the Monday Effect is prevalent, irrespective of project
characteristics.
To investigate the variation in the Monday Effect among different types of projects and test
Hypotheses H2A and H2B, we introduced interaction terms between Mon and the dummy variable
indicating project types. We selected two representative project types: technology projects, indicating
higher risk and the lowest chance of success (with a success rate of only 23%, in contrast to the overall
average success rate of 41% across all categories), and public-goods projects, known for attracting
intrinsically motivated backers who are less sensitive to risk compared to their extrinsically motivated
peers. We then constructed the Model (3) and Model (4) and estimated them with the full sample. The
estimation results are presented in Table 6.
Ln( Performanceit )  0  1 Monit + 2 Monit * Technologyi   3 Festivalit

  4 Ln( Pre_performancei ,t 1 )   5 Ln( Discussionit ) (3)
 6Time _ dummy _ var iableit  it   it
Ln( Performanceit )  0  1 Monit + 2 Monit * Public _ goodsi  3 Festivalit

(4)
  4 Ln( Pre_performancei ,t 1 )   5 Ln( Discussionit )
Table 6 The Monday Effect Differences across Project Types (full sample)
Model (3) Model (4)
Variable Ln(New_r Ln(New_b Ln(Avg_contri Ln(New_r Ln(New_b Ln(Avg_contri
aised) acker) bution) aised) acker) bution)
-0.205*** -0.071*** -0.139*** -0.272*** -0.098*** -0.182***
Mon
(0.017) (0.005) (0.009) (0.015) (0.005) (0.008)
Mon×Technol -0.143*** -0.057*** -0.090***
ogy (0.030) (0.010) (0.017)
Mon×Public_g 0.167*** 0.076*** 0.114***
oods (0.043) (0.014) (0.024)
-0.432*** -0.184*** -0.224*** -0.433*** -0.184*** -0.224***
Festival
(0.019) (0.006) (0.010) (0.019) (0.006) (0.010)
-0.290*** -0.038*** -0.576*** -0.290*** -0.038*** -0.576***
Ln(Discussion)
(0.013) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013) (0.005) (0.007)
Ln(Pre_backer -0.215*** -0.215***
) (0.002) (0.002)
-0.248*** -0.296*** -0.248*** -0.294***
Ln(Pre_raised)
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Time_dummy_ YES YES YES YES YES YES
20

variable
Project-
fixed Effects
R2 0.061 0.085 0.244 0.060 0.085 0.244
Observations 254,457 254,457 254,457 254,457 254,457 254,457
As Table 6 shows, in Model (3), the coefficient of the interaction term Mon×Technology is
significantly negative at the 1% level across all three funding performance metrics (Columns 1–3). This
signifies that the negative Monday Effect is more prevalent in technology projects compared to other
categories, attributed to their higher risk and lower success rate. Hence, Hypothesis H2A is supported.
Meanwhile, in Model (4), the coefficient of interaction term Mon×Public_goods is significantly
positive at the 1% level across all three metrics (Columns 4–6). It implies that the negative Monday
Effect is less pronounced in public-goods projects, which tend to attract intrinsically motivated backers
who are less sensitive to risk than extrinsically motivated backers. Consequently, Hypothesis H2B is
also supported.
5.3. The Monday Effect across Different Types of Funding Options

To delve deeper into the Monday Effect on a more granular level, we categorized and analyzed three
funding options for crowdfunding projects: regular option, donation option, and lottery option (Gong et
al., 2020). Given the unavailability of information on the amount of funds newly raised for donation
options on JD Crowdfunding, our analysis focused solely on the number of new backers (New_backer)
as a proxy for funding option performance. We constructed Model (5) and Model (6), estimating them
on funding-option-level daily data. The results are presented in Table 7.
Ln( New_backerit )  0  1 Monit   2 Festivalit   3 Ln( Discussionit )

  4 Ln( Pre_backeri ,t 1 )   5 Ln( Pre_option_backeri ,t 1 ) (5)
 6 Time _ dummy _ var iableit  it   it
Ln( New_backerit )  0  1Tueit   2Wedit   3Thuit   4 Friit   5 Satit  6 Sunit

 7 Festivalit   8 Ln( Discussionit )   9 Ln( Pre_backeri ,t 1 ) (6)
 10 Ln( Pre_option_backeri ,t 1 )  11Time _ dummy _ var iableit  it   it
21

Table 7 The Monday Effect on Different Types of Options
Regular Donation Lottery
Variable
-0.033*** -0.015*** -0.005
Mon
(0.001) (0.002) (0.019)
0.034*** 0.010*** 0.050**
Tue
(0.001) (0.003) (0.025)
0.035*** 0.019*** 0.018
Wed
(0.001) (0.003) (0.024)
0.041*** 0.023*** 0.001
Thu
(0.001) (0.003) (0.024)
0.049*** 0.026*** 0.006
Fri
(0.001) (0.003) (0.024)
0.031*** 0.009*** -0.114***
Sat
(0.001) (0.003) (0.024)
0.015*** 0.005 0.067***
Sun
(0.001) (0.003) (0.024)
-0.064*** -0.060*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.185*** -0.201***
Festival
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.042) (0.042)
Ln(Discu 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.027*** 0.027*** -0.073*** -0.069***
ssion) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.025) (0.025)
Ln(Pre_b 0.064*** 0.064*** -0.027*** -0.027*** 0.024* 0.025*
acker) (8.0e-4) (8.0e-4) (0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.014)
Ln(Pre_o
-0.389*** -0.389*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.160*** -0.161***
ption_bac
(9.0e-4) (9.0e-4) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009)
ker)
Time_du
able
Project-
ects
R2 0.180 0.180 0.010 0.010 0.057 0.061
Observati
1,293,613 1,293,613 250,627 250,627 15,536 15,536
ons
For regular and donation options, the coefficients of Mon are significantly negative for respective
funding option performance (Columns 1 and 3), indicating the presence of the Monday Effect in these
two options. The results from the alternative model further validate this effect (Columns 2 and 4).
However, for the lottery option, the coefficient of Mon becomes insignificant (Column 5), while only
22

the coefficients of Tue and Sun are significantly positive (Column 6), suggesting that the Monday Effect
does not manifest in the fundraising process of lottery options. Lottery options may attract risk-seeking
backers who derive utility and pleasure from the uncertainty and have a high risk tolerance, making
them impervious to the Monday Effect. Therefore, Hypothesis H3B is supported.
To compare the strength of the Monday Effect between regular and donation options, we excluded
lottery options from the data and created a binary indicator, Regular, which equals 1 if the funding
option is regular and 0 otherwise. Model (7) was developed for this comparison, and the estimation
results are reported in Table 8.
Ln( New_backerit )  0  1 Monit + 2 Monit *Regulari   3 Festivalit

  4 Ln( Discussionit )   5 Ln( Pre_backeri ,t 1 ) (7)
 6 Time _ dummy _ var iableit  it   it
Table 8 The Monday Effect Difference across Option Types
Variable Model (7)
-0.012***
Mon
(0.002)
-0.023***
Mon×Regular
(0.003)
-0.057***
Festival
(0.001)
0.043***
Ln(Discussion)
(0.001)
0.048***
Ln(Pre_backer)
(7.0e-4)
-0.344***
Ln(Pre_option_backer)
(8.0e-4)
Time_dummy_variable YES
Project-fixed Effects YES
2
R 0.148
Observations 1,544,240
The coefficient of the interaction term Mon×Regular is significantly negative (at the 1% level) in
Table 8. This moderation effect indicates that the Monday Effect is weaker in the fundraising process
of the donation option compared to the regular option. This result aligns with the findings in Section
5.2, reinforcing the potential explanation that intrinsically motivated backers are generally more tolerant
of risk compared to extrinsically motivated backers. Therefore, Hypothesis H3A is supported.
23

5.4. The Moderation Effect of Product Sampling Strategy on the Monday Effect
To explore the potential efficacy of product sampling as a strategy to mitigate the Monday Effect, we
created and analyzed a sample comprising projects that employed product sampling (the treatment
group) and their comparable counterparts without this strategy (the control group). To address possible
selection bias, we utilized the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method to ensure that observable
project characteristics were comparable between both groups. We first performed a logistic regression
with the product sampling decision as the dependent variable and project characteristics as explanatory
variables, including the funding goal, project duration, the number of other fundraisers’ projects that
had been backed by the focal project’s fundraiser, and the number of projects created by the fundraiser
before the focal project. Then, we duplicated the daily data of each project in the control group as many
times as it was matched.
To assess Hypotheses H4A, we introduced a dummy variable Report, indicating whether a project
employs the product sampling strategy, and its interaction term with Mon into Model (1), leading to
Model (8) below. The estimation results are displayed in Table 9.
Ln( Performanceit )  0  1 Monit + 2 Reportit + 3 Monit * Reportit

  4 Festivalit   5 Ln( Pre_performancei ,t 1 )  6 Ln( Discussionit ) (8)
Table 9 Moderation Effect of Feedback Reports
Ln(New_raised) Ln(New_backer) Ln(Avg_contribution)
Variable
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
-0.513*** -0.585*** -0.204*** -0.226*** -0.345*** -0.401***
Mon
(0.056) (0.063) (0.019) (0.022) (0.030) (0.035)
-0.306*** -0.351*** -0.173*** -0.186*** -0.326*** -0.361***
Report
(0.070) (0.072) (0.024) (0.025) (0.038) (0.039)
0.313** 0.094** 0.245***
Mon×Report
(0.133) (0.046) (0.073)
-0.528** -0.528** -0.231*** -0.231*** -0.276*** -0.275***
Festival
(0.076) (0.076) (0.026) (0.026) (0.041) (0.041)
-0.603*** -0.604*** -0.194*** -0.195*** -0.801*** -0.802***
Ln(Discussion)
(0.056) (0.056) (0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.031)
-0.244*** -0.244***
Ln(Pre_backer)
(0.009) (0.009)
-0.195*** -0.194*** -0.261*** -0.261***
Ln(Pre_raised)
(0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
24

Time_dummy_variable YES YES YES YES YES YES
Project-fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.080 0.080 0.154 0.154 0.288 0.288
Observations 18,806 18,806 18,806 18,806 18,806 18,806
The coefficient of the interaction term Mon×Report is significantly positive at the 1% level on all
three funding performance metrics (Columns 2, 4, and 6), suggesting that product feedback reports
provided by backers attenuate the Monday Effect. This result supports Hypothesis H4A, indicating that
the information contained in feedback reports may alleviate the information asymmetry between
fundraisers and backers, thereby reducing the Monday Effect.
It is noteworthy that the coefficient of Report remains significantly negative across all metrics, in
line with findings from Liu et al. (2022b). This observation can be attributed to two factors. First, JD
Crowdfunding features projects with product sampling on a separate designated page, granting them
more visibility. However, the listings on this separate page are arranged chronologically from newest to
oldest, and the feedback report stage of product sampling appears last, therefore projects at the report
stage may receive less attention from backers compared to earlier stages, contributing to the negative
coefficient of Report. Second, backers may have overestimated the quality of the project in previous
stages, and the product feedback reports reveal that the project falls short of their expectations.
As feedback reports provide specific numerical scores based on backer evaluation, we delve deeper
into the moderating effect of product sampling strategy along this line. Our focus was on analyzing the
sub-sample of projects that have feedback reports. We incorporated the variable Report_scores and its
interaction term with Mon in Model (1) and estimated the new Model (9) as follows. The results are
presented in Table 10.
Ln( Performanceit )  0  1Monit + 2 Report_scoresit + 3 Monit * Report_scoresit

  4 Festivalit   5 Ln( Pre_performancei ,t 1 )  6 Ln( Discussionit ) (9)
25

Table 10 Moderation Effect of Feedback Report Scores
Variable
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
-0.254** -4.467** -0.117*** -0.763 -0.150*** -1.680**
Mon
(0.104) (1.799) (0.034) (0.603) (0.049) (0.856)
0.310** 0.240** 0.100** 0.089** 0.080 0.055
Report_scores
(0.125) (0.128) (0.041) (0.043) (0.059) (0.061)
0.292** 0.044 0.160*
Mon×Report_scores
(0.124) (0.041) (0.059)
-0.600*** -0.603*** -0.274*** -0.275*** -0.211*** -0.212***
Festival
(0.138) (0.138) (0.046) (0.046) (0.066) (0.066)
-0.315 -0.315 0.081 0.081 -0.417*** -0.417***
Ln(Discussion)
(0.228) (0.228) (0.092) (0.092) (0.111) (0.111)
-0.405*** -0.404***
Ln(Pre_backer)
(0.080) (0.080)
0.005 0.003 -0.211*** -0.212***
Ln(Pre_raised)
(0.126) (0.126) (0.060) (0.060)
2
R 0.010 0.011 0.025 0.026 0.023 0.024
Observations 4,182 4,182 4,182 4,182 4,182 4,182
In Table 10, the significantly positive coefficient of Report_scores for dependent variables
New_raised and New_backer (Columns 1 and 3) suggest that higher feedback scores attract new backers,
enhancing project funding performance. Moreover, the significantly positive coefficient of the
interaction term Mon×Report_scores for the dependent variable New_raised and Avg_contribution
(Columns 2 and 6), with an effect opposite to Mon, indicates that projects with higher scores experience
a weaker Monday Effect. Interestingly, this result stands in contrast to the insignificant coefficient of
Mon×Report_scores for the dependent variable New_backer. It implies that while report scores may not
alleviate the Monday effect to attract more new backers, they do induce each backer to contribute more,
leading to higher average contributions and, consequently, greater total funds raised, thereby increasing
the likelihood of reaching the funding goal. Taken together, Hypothesis H4B is supported. This finding
underscores the crucial role of favorable feedback reports in reducing information asymmetry, attracting
backers, and consequently mitigating the adverse impact of the Monday Effect in crowdfunding. When
projects leverage a product sampling strategy, they exhibit greater resilience against the challenges
posed by the Monday Effect as they garner higher feedback scores.

26

5.5. The Economic Value
In addition to the statistical significance of our findings, we gauged their economic impact on
crowdfunding practice through a series of analyses based on our estimated models. First, we compared
the funding performance of projects on Mondays with their average performance, while holding other
variables constant at their means. The results revealed that, on average, the coefficients for Mon (Table
4) translate to a substantial decrease of CNY ¥1801.678 in the daily amount of newly funds raised (25.1%
lower) and a CNY ¥9.321 reduction in average contributions per backer (16.8% lower)1.
Second, the Monday Effect results in an extensive decrease in the daily amount of newly funds
raised across different project categories (based on Table 5): a reduction of CNY ¥5050.570 (35.2%) in
technology, ¥1188.272 (23.0%) in design, ¥573.075 (18.7%) in health, ¥286.711 (14.6%) in publishing,
¥2172.933 (41.3%) in electronics, and ¥199.869 (14.5%) in public-goods projects. The calculations of
monetary value involve multiplying the average New_raised in each project category by its respective
percentage. Figure 3 visually captures this variation of the Monday Effect, highlighting the most
pronounced impact in technology projects and the least significant in public-goods projects.
Figure 3 The Monday Effect across Project Categories
1 The calculations are based on logarithmic transformations to the dependent variables.

27

Third, we present the distinction in the Monday Effect between regular and donation options. As
indicated in Table 7, where the number of backers is used as a proxy for the amount of funds, the
Monday Effect results in a decrease of 2.944 (3.3%) new backers in the regular option and 0.016 (1.5%)
backers in the donation option. The Monday Effect is more pronounced in the regular option.
Finally, we demonstrate the practical importance of product sampling strategy in mitigating the
Monday Effect. In Model (8), we take the partial derivative of the performance dependent variables
with respect to Mon to obtain the Monday Effect. The coefficient β1 represents the Monday Effect (when
Report = 0), while β3 indicates the moderating impact of product sampling. Utilizing the outcomes from
Table 9, it becomes evident that the product sampling strategy reduces the Monday Effect by 53.5%
(0.313/0.585) in the daily amount of newly raised funds, 41.5% (0.094/0.226) in the number of new
backers, and 61.0% (0.245/0.401) in the average contributions per backer. This outcome further affirms
the effectiveness of the product sampling strategy in alleviating the Monday Effect.
5.6. Post Analyses

The premise of our analysis rests on the assertion that the Monday Effect in crowdfunding can be
attributed to backers' risk-averse behavior on Mondays. To enhance the validity of our findings, we
conducted supplementary tests to fortify this proposition.
As the fundraising progresses, an increasing number of backers engage in the crowdfunding
campaign, and more information is disclosed by the fundraiser through project updates and discussions,
gradually reducing information asymmetry. This progressive reduction contributes to a decline in the
project's overall perceived risk. Therefore, we posit that if the Monday Effect is attributed to backers’
risk aversion, the intensity of its impact is likely to weaken over time.
To assess the varying impact of the Monday Effect across different funding stages, we incorporated
a variable Count_Mons—the number of Mondays since the project’s inception—as well as its interaction
term Mon×Count_Mons into Model (1). The estimation results, reported in Table A.3, reveal a
diminishing Monday Effect in crowdfunding as the funding progresses.
Moreover, as depicted in Figure 1, the majority of projects on JD Crowdfunding exhibit a duration
of approximately 30 days. Therefore, we partitioned the funding period into five stages: the first week,
the second week, the third week, the fourth week, and subsequent weeks (beyond the fourth week).
28

Employing Model (1), we conducted separate estimations for each of these five stages. The results are
detailed in Table A.4, and the economic impact of the Monday Effect in each stage is presented in Figure
4 (illustrated as a percentage change in each of the three performance metrics). Our findings affirm a
diminishing Monday Effect over time. Specifically, the Monday Effect weakens in the second week
compared to the first week, and this trend persists in subsequent weeks.
Furthermore, the price of a crowdfunding project indicates project risk. The higher the project price,
the greater the potential losses for backers, indicating a comparatively higher risk. To quantify project
risk levels, we introduce the variable Price, measured by the median prices of all backing options in the
project. Subsequently, we incorporate this variable and the interaction term Price×Mon into Model (1).
The estimation results, presented in Table A.5, demonstrate that the intensity of the Monday Effect
increases with the project's price.
Figure 4 The Monday Effect Intensity across Funding Stages

In conclusion, we have validated the proposition that the Monday Effect can be ascribed to backers’
aversion on Mondays, supported by two perspectives: the intensity of the Monday Effect at various
stages of the project funding process and projects’ risk levels. This strengthens the credibility of our
conclusion.
29

6. Robustness Checks
6.1. Analogous Monday Effect
Throughout our sample period, several Chinese festivals occurred in line with statutory national
holidays. We postulate the first working day following these holidays resembles the Monday Effect. To
examine this post-holiday effect analogous to the Monday Effect, we designated these days with a
dummy variable Post_Holiday and constructed a two-way fixed effects panel model (two-way fixed
effects are not applicable in Section 5, as the Monday Effect is a form of time effect). The results,
presented in Table A.6 in the Appendix, show a significantly negative coefficient on Post_Holiday,
reaffirming our earlier findings. These results regarding the analogous Monday Effect further illustrate
the underlying mechanisms of the underperformance in crowdfunding on the first workday after a break
from working, propelled by their pessimistic emotions that induce risk-averse behaviors not only on the
first working day after weekends but also after holidays.
6.2. The Monday Effect on Different Funding Days

To further confirm the prevalence of the Monday Effect, we conducted a series of analyses focusing on
three specific and critical days of the fundraising process. This necessitates the use of cross-sectional
data and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation in this section. Additionally, for the cross-sectional
data, we utilized the total funds raised and the total number of backers as target metrics to gauge project
funding performance.
First, we formulated a subsample consisting solely of the initial day of each project's fundraising
process. In examining the significance of Mondays, we introduced the dummy variable First_Mon,
assigning it a value of 1 if the first day fell on a Monday and 0 otherwise. Our outcomes are detailed in
Table A.7 within the Appendix, showing that the coefficient of First_Mon shares the same negative sign
as Mon in the preceding sections of our investigation.
Furthermore, our attention narrowed exclusively to the initial five days of fundraising for each
project. This truncation of the time window in our analysis ensures that each project under investigation
begins from inception and experiences the same number of funding days, thus isolating potential noise
caused by prior cumulative funds that may differ substantially across projects. The dependent variable
is the cumulative funds raised on the fifth day. The key explanatory variable, Included_Mon, is a binary
30

indicator of whether Monday was part of the initial five days of a crowdfunding project. Its coefficient
is significantly negative on project funding performance (Table A.8, Appendix), echoing our earlier
results on the Monday Effect.
Finally, our analysis honed in on the last fundraising day of each project. Introducing the dummy
variable Final_Mon, set to 1 if the final day is Monday and 0 otherwise, we present the results in Table
A.9 within the Appendix. Notably, Final_Mon mirrors the effect observed with Mon, confirming the
presence of the Monday Effect. These findings also imply that the Monday Effect discourages backers
from offering support, as they must make pledge decisions without the option to postpone on the last
day of the fundraising.
6.3. The Role of Project Quality and Fundraiser Quality

To alleviate concerns that the Monday Effect occurs only in projects of a certain quality, we distinguish
between high-quality and low-quality projects based on their ultimate success. High-quality projects,
defined as those surpassing their funding goal, constitute 4,890 projects, approximately 62 percent of
the total dataset. Re-estimating Model (1) with this subsample yielded results consistent with our
previous findings (Table A.10, Appendix). We extended this analysis to two additional subsamples,
including projects that raised funds three times or five times over their goals (Tables A.11 and A.12,
respectively). The results remain consistent with our previous findings, reinforcing the persistence of
the Monday Effect across different scenarios (similar results for projects raising funds two or four times
over their goals are not reported for brevity). Furthermore, examining all the fundraising records once
the funding goal is reached (Table A.13, Appendix) led to results in line with our earlier findings,
confirming their robustness.
Lastly, we considered the potential influence of fundraisers on the perceived reliability and quality
of projects. Projects initiated by fundraisers with substantial experience in creating and running
crowdfunding campaigns may be perceived as more reliable, instilling greater confidence in backers to
invest. With the mean of “projects initialized by the fundraiser” at 4.96, we defined projects initiated by
fundraisers with at least five previous projects as high-quality. This resulted in a subsample of 1,499
high-quality projects, the estimation results of which (Table A.14, Appendix) stay consistent with our
previous findings.
31

In summary, the Monday Effect persists throughout the fundraising process of projects,
demonstrating its prevalence across various dimensions, irrespective of their inherent quality or the
track record of fundraisers.
6.4. The Role of Market Competition Intensity

To assess the alternative explanation that the Monday Effect is attributed to more intense market
competition on Mondays compared to other days of the week, we introduced the variable Competition
to gauge the intensity of market competition, measured by the total number of projects on JD
Crowdfunding each day. A greater number of projects is presumed to indicate stronger competition. The
comparison of Competition is presented in Table A.15 within the Appendix, revealing that Mondays
demonstrate the lowest competition intensity relative to other days.
Formally, we incorporated Competition into Model (1). The estimation results, reported in Table
A.16 within the Appendix, indicate that even after controlling for market competition intensity, the
coefficient of Mon remains significantly negative on the three key metrics of project funding
performance. These consistent results rule out the possibility that the Monday Effect is solely driven by
market competition, reinforcing the robustness of our findings.
7. Conclusions and Discussion

Investors’ emotions and their tendencies towards risk aversion, coupled with asymmetric information
on financial markets, can trigger irrational investment behaviors, as exemplified by the “Monday Effect.”
In the domain of reward-based crowdfunding, an emerging form of financing characterized by
substantial information asymmetry between fundraisers and backers, comprehending the prevalence
and extent of the “Monday Effect,” along with potential response strategies, is crucial for managing the
success of crowdfunding projects.
In our quest for this comprehension, we conducted an extensive analysis of a daily project-level
dataset on reward-based crowdfunding. Our analysis substantiated the presence of the “Monday Effect”
in crowdfunding, with a range of funding performance metrics consistently ranking the lowest on
Mondays throughout the week. Further exploration across project categories revealed that technology
projects, inherently involving more risk, demonstrate a stronger Monday Effect. Conversely, public-
goods projects, appealing to intrinsically motivated backers, experience the effect to a lesser extent. In
32

addition to the varying intensity of the Monday Effect across projects, we observed that the Monday
Effect weakens as the fundraising period advances, yet amplifies with higher project price. Our
exploration extended to different funding options, with the Monday Effect absent in lottery options,
likely due to their low prices attracting backers who relish the thrill of reward uncertainty and are willing
to tolerate associated risk. For regular and donation options, the Monday Effect is notably weaker in the
latter, attributed to the prevalence of intrinsically motivated backers who are less sensitive to risk. In
exploring how a product sampling strategy moderates the Monday Effect, we discovered that user
feedback reports can help reduce information asymmetry and consequently, mitigate the Monday Effect.
In addition, our study unveils an intriguing finding. We observe a Festival Effect—weaker funding
performance on festival days than on other days—which mirrors the Monday effect across various
project categories and funding options. It is infeasible to gauge the Festival Effect in traditional financial
markets due to business suspension during festivals. Therefore, exploring the mechanism of the Festival
Effect in crowdfunding presents a highly creative endeavor.
Our study makes unique contributions to the literature in multiple key areas. Firstly, this study is
the first to systematically investigate the Monday Effect in crowdfunding, expanding our understanding
beyond traditional financial markets. While existing research has focused on project characteristics
influencing funding performance (Mollick & Kuppuswamy, 2014; Simon et al., 2019), the Monday Effect,
driven by irrational behaviors of backers, has yet to be investigated. Our study fills this gap, shedding
light on this phenomenon and furthering our understanding in the context of crowdfunding.
Secondly, our exploration into crowdfunding backer motivation adds depth to the existing
literature. Building on the premise of the literature that backers support particular projects to satisfy
diverse needs (Burtch et al., 2013; Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; Gerber & Hui, 2013), we delve into the
role of intrinsic motivations. Intrinsically motivated backers, propelled by altruism and the joy of
participation, appear to be less sensitive to project risks, resulting in a weaker Monday Effect. This is
evident in both public-goods projects and donation options, contributing fine-tuned insights into backer
motivations.
Thirdly, our study extends the literature on uncertain rewards in individual behaviors. Prior
research has demonstrated the allure of reward uncertainty in shaping individual behaviors across
33

various fields, such as health behavior (Acland & Levy, 2015), tax compliance (Naritomi, 2019), and
bank savings (Cole et al., 2022), among others. In the context of crowdfunding, our study goes further
to reveal that backers attracted by uncertain rewards, specifically in the form of lottery options, exhibit
resistance to the Monday Effect. This not only expands the existing research on uncertain rewards but
also illuminates the unique role of the lottery option in mitigating the Monday Effect in crowdfunding.
Fourthly, our research contributes to the literature on information asymmetry and signaling theory
and highlights the role of product sampling. In crowdfunding, project categories signal inherent risk,
while feedback reports from product sampling signal project quality. We confirmed that product
sampling is an effective strategy to reduce information asymmetry, thus attenuating the Monday Effect.
This finding underscores the significance of feedback reports in boosting crowdfunding performance.
Finally, our study provides practical implications for both crowdfunding fundraisers and platforms.
For fundraisers, comprehending the motivations and risk tolerance of backers is paramount for project
success. This involves strategically highlighting defining characteristics of the project to incentivize
different types of backers. For instance, technology projects can showcase their feasibility to mitigate
perceived risk for extrinsically motivated backers, while public-goods projects may be better positioned
to emphasize their societal impact to engage intrinsically motivated backers. Moreover, our research
sheds light on the operational dynamics of crowdfunding projects, notably highlighting the observed
Monday Effect, which is detrimental to fundraising performance. We propose practical solutions to
mitigate this effect, including avoiding launching campaigns on Mondays, incorporating uncertain
rewards as backing options, and enhancing information disclosure strategies such as product sampling.
From the platform management perspective, our findings suggest promoting lower-risk projects
on Mondays to counteract the Monday Effect. These projects, often characterized by lower prices,
stronger public welfare attributes, and longer fundraising periods, are less susceptible to the Monday
Effect. Additionally, strategies aimed at fostering information disclosure are useful to improve the
operational efficiency of platforms. Greater information sharing not only demonstrate fundraisers’
confidence in their projects but also signals high quality, thus enhancing the fundraising performance
and mitigating the Monday Effect for the projects. In turn, platforms and backers can effectively screen
low-quality projects, thereby cultivating a more sustainable and trustworthy crowdfunding environment.
34

Our study has several limitations that could guide the pathways for future research. Our results are
derived from the context of crowdfunding in China, and extending our analysis to other global
crowdfunding platforms would enhance the generalizability of our findings. In addition, our project-
level aggregated data limits our ability to observe individual backer behaviors. Future studies that
explore individual-level analyses, especially varying Monday Effects across backers with different
motivations, when detailed backing history is available, would provide valuable insights. Furthermore,
our classification of projects pre-determined by JD Crowdfunding could be refined in future research,
possibly based on reward characteristics, such as tangible and intangible, to provide deeper insights into
the impact of project types on associated risks. We hope that our study lays a foundation for
understanding the mechanisms of the Monday Effect in crowdfunding and inspires future studies on
related phenomena of irrational investment behaviors.
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Online Appendix
Table A.1 The Monday Effect by Project Types (New_backer)

Variable
-0.128*** -0.080*** -0.061***
Mon
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
0.130*** 0.095*** 0.057***
Tue
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
0.138*** 0.092*** 0.048***
Wed
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
0.175*** 0.099*** 0.085***
Thu
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
0.183*** 0.100*** 0.083***
Fri
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
0.105*** 0.068*** 0.049***
Sat
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
0.048*** 0.030*** 0.049***
Sun
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
-0.193*** -0.175*** -0.180*** -0.171*** -0.178*** -0.173***
Festival
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Ln(Discu -0.138*** -0.139*** -0.102*** -0.102*** 0.122*** 0.122***
ssion) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Ln(Pre_b -0.204*** -0.203*** -0.231*** -0.230*** -0.184*** -0.183***
acker) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Time_du
iable
Project-
ects
R2 0.103 0.105 0.111 0.111 0.045 0.045
Observati
80,293 80,293 67,496 67,496 65,565 65,565
ons
Variable
-0.066*** -0.131*** -0.045***
Mon
(0.012) (0.025) (0.013)
0.055*** 0.117*** 0.015
Tue
(0.016) (0.034) (0.017)
Wed 0.079*** 0.116*** 0.027
39

(0.016) (0.034) (0.017)
0.084*** 0.151*** 0.061***
Thu
(0.016) (0.034) (0.017)
0.089*** 0.228*** 0.066***
Fri
(0.016) (0.034) (0.017)
0.065*** 0.111*** 0.034**
Sat
(0.016) (0.034) (0.017)
0.029* 0.075** 0.062***
Sun
(0.016) (0.034) (0.017)
-0.148*** -0.140*** -0.138*** -0.125*** -0.027 -0.030
Festival
(0.017) (0.017) (0.034) (0.034) (0.018) (0.018)
Ln(Discu 0.077*** 0.077*** -0.072*** -0.074*** 0.231*** 0.231***
ssion) (0.015) (0.015) (0.028) (0.028) (0.013) (0.013)
Ln(Pre_b -0.298*** -0.298*** -0.206*** -0.205*** -0.122*** -0.122***
acker) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006)
Time_du
able
Project-
cts
R2 0.111 0.112 0.101 0.103 0.019 0.020
Observati
25,194 25,194 9,093 9,093 31,266 31,266
ons
40

Table A.2 The Monday Effect by Project Types (Avg_raised)
Variable
-0.230*** -0.157*** -0.120***
Mon
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
0.221*** 0.165*** 0.126***
Tue
(0.019) (0.020) (0.018)
0.250*** 0.179*** 0.103***
Wed
(0.019) (0.020) (0.018)
0.292*** 0.204*** 0.149***
Thu
(0.019) (0.020) (0.018)
0.304*** 0.195*** 0.152***
Fri
(0.019) (0.020) (0.018)
0.219*** 0.138*** 0.099***
Sat
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
0.112*** 0.072*** 0.095***
Sun
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
-0.283*** -0.257*** -0.200*** -0.182*** -0.209*** -0.201***
Festival
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Ln(Discu -0.767*** -0.767*** -0.721*** -0.721*** 0.300*** 0.300***
ssion) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Ln(Pre_r -0.271*** -0.271*** -0.286*** -0.286*** -0.302*** -0.302***
aised) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Time_du
iable
Project-
ects
R2 .0.257 0.259 0.261 0.262 0.231 0.231
Observati
80,293 80,293 67,496 67,496 65,565 65,565
ons
Variable
-0.094*** -0.282*** -0.088***
Mon
(0.006) (0.047) (0.019)
0.096*** 0.248*** 0.064**
Tue
(0.036) (0.062) (0.025)
0.137*** 0.283*** 0.055**
Wed
(0.036) (0.062) (0.025)
0.082** 0.289*** 0.119***
Thu
(0.037) (0.063) (0.025)
41

0.110*** 0.421*** 0.128***
Fri
(0.036) (0.062) (0.025)
0.138*** 0.283*** 0.071**
Sat
(0.036) (0.061) (0.025)
0.007 0.183** 0.093***
Sun
(0.036) (0.061) (0.024)
-0.175*** -0.162*** -0.210*** -0.191*** -0.071*** -0.069***
Festival
(0.038) (0.039) (0.063) (0.063) (0.027) (0.027)
Ln(Discu -0.487*** -0.486*** -0.844*** -0.847*** -0.160*** -0.160***
ssion) (0.030) (0.030) (0.045) (0.045) (0.017) (0.017)
Ln(Pre_r -0.351*** -0.351*** -0.235*** -0.234*** -0.276*** -0.276***
aised) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
Time_du
able
Project-
cts
R2 0.209 0.209 0.221 0.222 0.193 0.193
Observati
25,194 25,194 9,093 9,093 31,266 31,266
ons
42

Table A.3 The Intensity of the Monday Effect
Variable
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
-0.333*** -0.477*** -0.116*** -0.175*** -0.230*** -0.329***
Mon
(0.014) (0.023) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013)
-0.184*** -0.192*** -0.060*** -0.063*** -0.139*** -0.145***
Count_Mons
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
0.057*** 0.023*** 0.039***
Mon×Count_Mons
(0.007) (0.002) (0.004)
-0.479** -0.480** -0.199*** -0.200*** -0.260*** -0.260***
Festival
(0.019) (0.019) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
0.072*** 0.070*** 0.060*** 0.059*** -0.301*** -0.302***
Ln(Discussion)
(0.016) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
-0.194*** -0.193***
Ln(Pre_backer)
(0.002) (0.002)
-0.233*** -0.232*** -0.283*** -0.282***
Ln(Pre_raised)
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
2
R 0.066 0.066 0.091 0.091 0.254 0.255
Observations 254,457 254,457 254,457 254,457 254,457 254,457
43

Table A.4 The Monday Effect across Funding Stages
Ln(New_raised)
Variable
First Week Second Week Third Week Fourth Week Other Weeks
-0.439*** -0.409*** -0.201*** -0.142*** -0.091***
Mon
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027)
-0.386*** -0.402*** -0.219*** -0.070 -0.306***
Festival
(0.060) (0.056) (0.055) (0.058) (0.038)
Ln(Discu 0.238*** 0.198** 0.502*** 1.067*** 0.488***
ssion) (0.035) (0.077) (0.097) (0.128) (0.069)
Ln(Pre_r -0.251*** -0.520*** -0.629*** -0.628*** -0.166***
aised) (0.004) (0.027) (0.037) (0.046) (0.030)
Time_du
mmy_var YES YES YES YES YES
iable
Project-
fixed Eff YES YES YES YES YES
ects
R2 0.120 0.015 0.009 0.006 0.003
Observati
51,684 49,731 47,653 45,945 59,444
ons
Ln(New_backer)
Variable
-0.161*** -0.128*** -0.072*** -0.047*** -0.034***
Mon
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
-0.151*** -0.161*** -0.082*** -0.060*** -0.127***
Festival
(0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011)
Ln(Discu 0.213*** 0.240*** 0.251*** 0.379*** 0.094***
ssion) (0.012) (0.024) (0.029) (0.037) (0.023)
Ln(Pre_b -0.288*** -0.362*** -0.377*** -0.258*** -0.051***
acker) (0.003) (0.016) (0.022) (0.026) (0.018)
Time_du
iable
Project-
ects
R2 0.188 0.021 0.011 0.005 0.003
Observati
51,684 49,731 47,653 45,945 59,444
ons
Ln(Avg_contribution)
Variable
Mon -0.316*** -0.248*** -0.124*** -0.101*** -0.062***
44

(0.021) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012)
-0.297*** -0.239*** -0.117*** -0.058** -0.128***
Festival
(0.041) (0.031) (0.027) (0.028) (0.017)
Ln(Discu -0.113*** -0.097** 0.077 0.421*** -0.052
ssion) (0.024) (0.043) (0.049) (0.061) (0.031)
Ln(Pre_r -0.290*** -0.525*** -0.596*** -0.605*** -0.241***
aised) (0.002) (0.015) (0.018) (0.021) (0.013)
Time_du
iable
Project-
ects
R2 0.296 0.038 0.028 0.021 0.008
Observati
51,684 49,731 47,653 45,945 59,444
ons
45

Table A.5 Moderation Effect of Project Price
Variable Ln(New_raised) Ln(New_backer) Ln(Avg_contribution)
0.177** -0.003 0.100***
Mon
(0.067) (0.022) (0.037)
-0.075*** -0.015*** -0.047***
Mon×Ln(price)
(0.011) (0.003) (0.006)
-0.433*** -0.184*** -0.224***
Festival
(0.019) (0.006) (0.010)
-0.290*** -0.038*** -0.576***
Ln(Discussion)
(0.013) (0.005) (0.007)
-0.215***
Ln(Pre_backer)
(0.002)
-0.248*** -0.294***
Ln(Pre_raised)
(0.003) (0.001)
Time_dummy_variable YES YES YES
Project-fixed Effects YES YES YES
2
R 0.060 0.092 0.244
Observations 254,457 254,457 254,457
46

Table A.6 Analogous Monday Effect
-0.504** -0.374*** -0.172
Post_Holiday
(0.212) (0.069) (0.117)
0.105*** 0.073*** -0.272***
Ln(Discussion)
(0.016) (0.005) (0.008)
-0.185***
Ln(Pre_backer)
(0.002)
-0.223*** -0.278***
Ln(Pre_raised)
(0.003) (0.001)
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
2
R 0.021 0.027 0.124
Observations 254,457 254,457 254,457
Table A.7 The First Day of Fundraising for the Crowdfunding Project
Variable Ln(Raised) Ln(Backer)
-0.599*** -0.296***
First_Mon
(0.139) (0.066)
0.055 -0.015
Festival
(0.185) (0.087)
0.866*** 0.464***
Ln(Goal)
(0.032) (0.015)
0.464*** 0.190***
Ln(Duration)
(0.109) (0.052)
-0.156*** -0.331***
Ln(Price)
(0.030) (0.014)
-0.072*** -0.036***
Startercreate
(0.010) (0.005)
0.033*** 0.030***
Startsupport
(0.012) (0.006)
0.105*** 0.050***
Starterfocus
(0.012) (0.006)
-2.872*** -1.329***
Intercept
(0.509) (0.241)
2
R 0.109 0.144
Observations 7,740 7,740
Note: *, **, *** indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, with standard errors in parentheses. Only 7,740
projects in the sample began fundraising after January 1, 2018.
47

Table A.8 The First Five Days of Fundraising for the Crowdfunding Project
-0.137** -0.104***
Included_Mon
(0.063) (0.039)
0.843*** 0.517***
Ln(Goal)
(0.026) (0.016)
0.529*** 0.366***
Ln(Duration)
(0.099) (0.061)
-0.028 -0.387***
Ln(Price)
(0.025) (0.015)
-0.043*** -0.032***
Startercreate
(0.009) (0.005)
0.055*** 0.046***
Startsupport
(0.010) (0.006)
0.058*** 0.040***
Starterfocus
(0.010) (0.006)
-1.857*** -1.056***
Intercept
(0.446) (0.276)
2
R 0.148 0.156
Note: *, **, *** indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, and standard errors in parentheses. This analysis is
based on data from the fifth day of 7,749 projects initiating after January 1, 2018. Projects started before
December 28, 2017 or have a duration of less than 5 days are excluded.
48

Table A.9 The Last Day of Fundraising for the Crowdfunding Project
-0.142* -0.131**
Final_Mon
(0.075) (0.057)
-0.142 -0.146*
Festival
(0.103) (0.078)
0.742*** 0.508***
Ln(Goal)
(0.024) (0.018)
0.981*** 0.995***
Ln(Duration)
(0.081) (0.061)
-0.012 -0.477***
Ln(Price)
(0.023) (0.017)
-0.050*** -0.038***
Startercreate
(0.007) (0.005)
0.054*** 0.052***
Startsupport
(0.008) (0.006)
0.066*** 0.050***
Starterfocus
(0.008) (0.006)
-1.183*** -1.597***
Intercept
(0.374) (0.284)
2
R 0.168 0.181
Note: *, **, *** indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, with standard errors in parentheses. Among the 7,740
projects started after January 1, 2018, 7,407 projects continued fundraising until the targeted last day, while the
remaining terminating their campaigns prematurely.
49

Table A.10 High-Quality Projects (The Raised Funds Surpass Funding Goal)
-0.292*** -0.114*** -0.191***
Mon
(0.018) (0.006) (0.010)
-0.556*** -0.238*** -0.289***
Festival
(0.024) (0.008) (0.013)
-0.312*** -0.063*** -0.684***
Ln(Discussion)
(0.017) (0.007) (0.009)
-0.200***
Ln(Pre_backer)
(0.003)
-0.200*** -0.270***
Ln(Pre_raised)
(0.004) (0.002)
Time_dummy_variable Yes Yes Yes
2
R 0.049 0.082 0.260
Observations 164,786 164,786 164,786
Table A.11 High-Quality Projects (The Raised Funds Three Times Over Funding Goal)
Variable Ln(New_raised) Ln(New_backer) Ln(Avg_raised)
-0.214*** -0.102*** -0.150***
Mon
(0.028) (0.012) (0.016)
-0.436*** -0.244*** -0.251***
Festival
(0.036) (0.016) (0.020)
-0.194*** -0.037*** -0.753***
Ln(Discussion)
(0.023) (0.012) (0.013)
-0.127***
Ln(Pre_backer)
(0.005)
-0.116*** -0.213***
Ln(Pre_raised)
(0.006) (0.003)
R2 0.034 0.050 0.307
Observations 51,536 51,536 51,536
50

Table A.12 High-Quality Projects (The Raised Funds Five Times Over Their Funding Goal)
Variable Ln(New_raised) Ln(New_backer) Ln(Avg_raised)
-0.234*** -0.116*** -0.167***
Mon
(0.034) (0.016) (0.020)
-0.477*** -0.259*** -0.281***
Festival
(0.043) (0.020) (0.025)
-0.113*** -0.029* -0.708***
Ln(Discussion)
(0.027) (0.015) (0.016)
-0.097***
Ln(Pre_backer)
(0.007)
-0.095*** -0.199***
Ln(Pre_raised)
(0.007) (0.004)
2
R 0.029 0.040 0.300
Observations 33,886 33,886 33,886
Table A.13 The Monday Effect After the Funding Goal is Reached
-0.205*** -0.086*** -0.131***
Mon
(0.021) (0.007) (0.010)
-0.482*** -0.217*** -0.239***
Festival
(0.028) (0.010) (0.014)
-0.664*** -0.196*** -0.882***
Ln(Discussion)
(0.023) (0.009) (0.011)
-0.333***
Ln(Pre_backer)
(0.005)
-0.376*** -0.400***
Ln(Pre_raised)
(0.008) (0.004)
R2 0.057 0.100 0.229
Observations 111,476 111,476 111,476
51

Table A.14 The Monday Effect in Projects Initiated by Experienced Fundraisers
-0.143*** -0.068*** -0.105***
Mon
(0.031) (0.010) (0.017)
-0.374*** -0.215*** -0.185***
Festival
(0.041) (0.013) (0.022)
-0.127*** -0.011 -0.551***
Ln(Discussion)
(0.029) (0.011) (0.015)
-0.216***
Ln(Pre_backer)
(0.005)
-0.248*** -0.301***
Ln(Pre_raised)
(0.007) (0.004)
2
R 0.051 0.082 0.255
Observations 48,724 48,724 48,724
52

Table A.15 Market Competition Intensity
Mon Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
409.165 413.151 416.738 419.354 418.883 419.149 415.600
Table A.16 The Monday Effect: Controlling for Market Competition Intensity
-0.272*** -0.092*** -0.179***
Mon
(0.014) (0.004) (0.008)
-0.376*** -0.175*** -0.194***
Festival
(0.020) (0.006) (0.011)
-0.265*** -0.035*** -0.562***
Ln(Discussion)
(0.013) (0.005) (0.007)
-0.214***
Ln(Pre_backer)
(0.002)
-0.246*** -0.293***
Ln(Pre_raised)
(0.003) (0.001)
-0.002*** -0.0004*** -0.002***
Competition
(0.0001) (4.465e-05) (7.427e-05)
2
R 0.061 0.085 0.245
Observations 254,457 254,457 254,457
53

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Blue Monday?

Decoding Its Impact on Reward-Based Crowdfunding

(1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing Forestry University, China;

2. School of Business, University of Washington, Bothell, Washington 98011, USA)

is prevalent in crowdfunding. Specifically, we found that crowdfunding project performance, as

to be evident across different types of crowdfunding projects, irrespective of their inherent

Corresponding author: Xiahua, Wei: xhwei@uw.edu;

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4781264

motivates our exploration of this intriguing phenomenon.

In financial markets, the Monday Effect is primarily characterized by negative or significantly

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4781264

Monday Effect in our study.

more efficient crowdfunding markets.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4781264

To explore these inquiries, we proposed four sets of hypotheses grounded in self-determination

the fundraising period progresses but increases with project prices.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4781264

information disclosure, and encouraging fundraisers to share more information.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4781264

Another explanation revolves around individuals’ psychological patterns. Studies have

stock market returns on Mondays (Cross, 1973).

extrinsically motivated counterparts (Gong et al., 2020).

The Monday Effect observed in crowdfunding is predominantly ascribed to backers’ risk-averse

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4781264

of backer motivations in the crowdfunding domain, thereby contributing to a more nuanced

understanding of the factors influencing crowdfunding dynamics.

2.3. Information Asymmetry

as in the case of a "lemon market" (Akerlof, 1978).

providing investors with additional project-related information to alleviate information asymmetry.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4781264

existing body of knowledge.

days, indicating a psychological aversion to risk on Mondays.

In reward-based crowdfunding, various drawbacks compared to other financial markets contribute

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4781264

3.2. The Monday Effect on Different Project Types

public-goods projects as an additional category, focusing on raising funds to assist people in

public-goods project is considered as a type of reward-based crowdfunding. Additionally, in reward-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4781264

3.3. The Monday Effect on Different Funding Options

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4781264

motivated counterparts. Based on this, we propose:

risk-taking. Hence, we propose:

3.4. The Moderating Effect of Product Sampling Strategy

risk and mitigate the Monday Effect.

aversion, ultimately weakening the Monday Effect. Hence, we propose:

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4781264

Effect. This leads to our next hypothesis:

scores, the weaker the Monday Effect.

4.2. Variables and Summary Statistics

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4781264

2021; Chan et al., 2020; Dai & Zhang, 2019).

operation), providing a measure of the backer’s overall assessment of the product.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4781264

4.3. Model-Free Evidence

projects were initiated.

Monday Effect in the crowdfunding market.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4781264

Figure 1 Histogram of Duration of Projects