Analecta Husserliana: Martin Heidegger and The Truth About The Black Notebooks

Analecta
Husserliana
The Yearbook of
Phenomenological Research
Volume CXXIII
Martin Heidegger and

the Truth About
the Black Notebooks
Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann
Francesco Alfieri
Analecta Husserliana
The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research
Volume CXXIII
Founder
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, The World Phenomenology Institute, Hanover,
New Hampshire, USA
Series Editors
William S. Smith, Executive President of the World Phenomenology Institute,
Hanover, New Hampshire, USA
Jadwiga S. Smith, Co-President of the American Division, The World

Phenomenology Institute, Hannover, New Hampshire, USA
Daniela Verducci, Co-President of the European Division, The World

Phenomenology Institute, Macerata, Italy
Published under the auspices of

The World Phenomenology Institute
A-T. Tymieniecka, Founder
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5621
Francesco Alfieri
Martin Heidegger and the

Truth About the Black
Notebooks
Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann Francesco Alfieri
Department of Philosophy Department of Philosophy
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Vita-Salute San Raffaele University
Freiburg, Germany Milan, Italy
Translated by
Bernhard Radloff
ISSN 0167-7276 ISSN 2542-8330 (electronic)

Analecta Husserliana
ISBN 978-3-030-69495-1 ISBN 978-3-030-69496-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69496-8
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In Commemoration of the Fortieth
Anniversary of the Death of
Martin Heidegger
Translator’s Foreword
In the wake of the original Italian edition and its German translation, this translation
presents the greater part of the text of the Italian edition, entitled Martin Heidegger.
La verità sui Quaderni neri, to the English reading public. The Annex to the Italian
edition by Claudia Gualdana, which offers a detailed analysis of the Italian recep-
tion of the Black Notebooks, has been omitted from this translation by decision of
the editors. Generically called the Black Notebooks because of their covers and
published in Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe, or Complete Edition, as volumes 94
through 97, “The Truth About the Black Notebooks” responds to widespread allega-
tions that Heidegger’s philosophy is compromised, at least within a certain time-
frame, by stereotypical expressions of anti-Semitism. With contributions from the
editors – Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann and Francesco Alfieri – along with
Leonardo Messinese and a biographical note by Hermann Heidegger, this book
offers a philological and philosophical response to claims and accusations initially
launched by Peter Trawny, the editor of volumes 94 through 97 of the Complete
Edition. These claims, quickly taken up and elaborated by Donatella Di Cesare and
propagated throughout Italy, subsequently generated a considerable medial echo in
Europe as in North America. The primary analytical intent of this book is to counter
the arguments of these two authors by philologically leading the reader back to the
source texts of Heidegger’s philosophy, without which his observations in the Black
Notebooks cannot be understood. What makes this particular chapter of the
“Heidegger Case” – his supposed sympathy for some version of National Socialist
ideology – different from its predecessors, is that Trawny and Di Cesare, in distinct
but related ways, attempt to make the case that Heidegger’s deconstruction of meta-
physics and his speculative unfolding of the “history of being” in the Occidental
tradition are “contaminated” by anti-Semitism. The heart of “The Truth About the
Black Notebooks” consists of Francesco Alfieri’s explication of relevant philosophi-
cal concepts of each of the four volumes, guided by the objective of disarming the
misconceptions evoked by Heidegger’s critics. The authors of this book collectively
emphasize that the formally indicative concept of the “history of being”, as well as
the comportment of the kind of thinking that enacts it, in principle excludes the
objectification of beings or other human beings, and therefore cannot be
vii
viii Translator’s Foreword
ideologically contaminated by such concepts of collective subjectivity as find

expression in “anti-Semitism”. Remarks that have been deemed anti-Semitic are
either philosophically irrelevant or need to be understood in terms of Heidegger’s
critique of the epoch of modern metaphysics.
The “genre” of the Black Notebooks has been the object of some discussion.
Basically, they have been critically received as a species of topical and philosophi-
cal diary. The relation between Heidegger’s observations on current events in the
years 1931–1948 and his strictly philosophical considerations is in fact the funda-
mental issue of contention between his detractors and the defenders of his philoso-
phy. In Chap. 2 of this book, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann argues that the
Notebooks, even in their uncontroversial, or strictly philosophical expressions, can-
not be understood independently of the being-historical treatises of the 1930s and
early 1940s, and this point is systematically developed by Francesco Alfieri in his
elucidation of controversial passages in their contexts. On this basis, the authors
contest interpretations of Heidegger’s thought that purport to discover an esoteric
essence of the meaning of the “history of being” which would reduce much of
Heidegger’s thought to a footnote to the history of German-European anti-Semitism.
The stakes in the conflict of interpretation addressed in this book are correspond-
ingly high and call for judicious reflection on the part of the reader.
The Black Notebooks are written in a variety of styles and tones, from philo-
sophical reflections to political commentary and social criticism. There are frequent
shifts of rhetorical strategy, which I have usually attempted to follow in translation.
In regard to Heidegger’s established philosophical vocabulary – the languages of
phenomenology, fundamental ontology, and being-historical thinking – I have gen-
erally relied on more or less broadly established practice.
In this regard, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), translated as
Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly,
deserves special mention because of the difficulties of Heidegger’s being-historical
vocabulary. In line with this translation, Ereignis, Ereignung, and related words are
translated here based on the root eigen, signifying the “own”: hence Ereignis as
“enowning”, Ereignung as “enownment”. The distinction between being (Sein) in
the metaphysical sense and being (Seyn) in the being-historical sense is indicated by
using beyng to translate Seyn. Where necessary, “history” as Geschichte (Geschichte
des Seyns) is parenthetically distinguished from Historie, or by use of the term
“object-historical”. Object-historical calculation is an integral component of the
consummation of metaphysics as Machenschaft (machination) and as Erlebnis,
which is here translated by the neologism “enliving” (formed like “enacting”),
rather than the common “lived-experience”.
The nominal form Wesen (derived from vb. wesen) is translated as “essence” in
accordance with common practice when it is used in the context of metaphysics.
When this word, related words, and compounds are used in the being-historical
sense, then the term “essence” is supplemented or replaced by a number of related
words that indicate the dynamic historicity and concentrated presencing, or quintes-
sence, of “essence” as differentiated from concepts of atemporality and self-
sameness. This distinction is not alien to English language use, as when the poet
Translator’s Foreword ix
writes “Essence of winter sleep is on the night / The scent of apples” (“After Apple
Picking”, by Robert Frost). Wesen is thought as “essential sway” (directing power
of a way-to-be), or as the “ownmost” of a way-to-be; Wesung as “essential sway-
ing”. When not explicitly metaphysical, Wesen is conceived as inherent, innermost
being as coming into presence in its historicity. “Das Wesen eines Volkes”, therefore,
should not be rendered as “the essence of a people”, but as “the ownmost of a
people”.
Unwesen, in turn, signifies the withholding or refusal of ownmost possibilities of
being. In accord with this dynamic understanding of the sense of being, Entwurf,
entwerfen, and related words are translated as “projecting-open”, or in related terms
in order to point to the founding, opening-up of a context of significance. As a
thrown project, Dasein’s projecting-open should be kept free of psychological, sub-
jectivist connotations. Dasein (or Da-sein as used in being-historical texts) is left
untranslated; its fundamental sense is dynamic being-open, understood as an indica-
tive concept of selfhood defined by historicity and as such, by being-with-others.
Heidegger makes an essential distinction between “knowledge” (Wissen) in the sci-
entific, object-historical sense and in the being-historical sense of Da-sein’s enact-
ment. In the latter case, Wissen is translated as “essential knowledge” or as “knowing
awareness”. For example, in the context of his critique of the modern university,
Heidegger writes: “An additional misconception was the opinion that the university
could still be transformed into a site of mindfulness (wesentlicher Besinnung), a site
of its ownmost contention, returning the Occident to the knowing awareness
(Wissen) of its own questionableness in order to help prepare another beginning of
the history of being (Seynsgeschichte)” (Ponderings XI, § 53 [76]).
The word Judentum has been translated as “Jewry”, not as “Judaism”, in order to
emphasize the distinction between the community of the Jewish religion and collec-
tive concepts of Jewish mutual interest, which need not necessarily be of a reli-
gious nature.
Heidegger gave the texts collected into the four volumes of the Complete Edition
at issue specific titles and they are cited accordingly here, albeit with reference to
Edition volume number and page when necessary. In brief, volume 94 (1931–1938)
contains Überlegungen (Ponderings) II–VI, volume 95 (1938–1939) Ponderings
VII–XI, volume 96 (1939–1941) Ponderings XII–XIV, and volume 97 (1942–1948)
Anmerkungen (Observations) IV. Where quotations from other translations occur –
such as citations of Emad’s and Maly’s translation of the Beiträge, for example – the
page reference to the translation always follows the page reference to the origi-
nal text.
I would like to extend my thanks to the authors and editors of this book, Friedrich-
Wilhelm von Herrmann and Francesco Alfieri, for entrusting me with this translation.
On occasion, I consulted – and appreciated – Richard Rojcewicz’s translation of
the first volume of the Black Notebooks into English, as well as Pascal David’s
translation of the original German and Italian language edition of “The Truth About
the Black Notebooks” into French. Finally, I would like to thank Professor Dean
Lauer, Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa, for his help in the proof-
reading of the text. Any errors that remain are my own.
x Translator’s Foreword
My thanks to Francesco Alfieri for his help with the proofreading and for under-
taking the formatting of the text of this book for the press.
Bernhard Radloff
University of Ottawa
Ottawa, ON, Canada
References
Heidegger, M. (1989). Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), in Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 65, hrsg.
v. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. English edition: Heidegger,
M. (1999). Contributions to Philosophy: (From Enowning) (trans.: Emad P. and Maly K.).
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. See translators’ Foreword, pp. xv–xliv.
Heidegger, M. (2014). Überlegungen ii-vi (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938), in Gesamtausgabe, Bd.
94, Abt. 4: Hinweise und Aufzeichnungen, hrsg. v. P. Trawny. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann. English edition: Heidegger, M. (2016). Ponderings II-VI (Black Notebooks
1931–1938) (trans. Rojcewicz R.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. See Herrmann,
F.-W. von and Alfieri, F. (2018). Martin Heidegger. La vérité sur ses Cahiers noirs (trans. from
the Italian and German by P. David). Paris: Gallimard.
Foreword
Toward the beginning of 2013, I received reports of passages in the Black Notebooks
that offered observations on Jewry, or as the case may be, world Jewry. It immedi-
ately became clear to me that the publication of the Black Notebooks would call
forth a wide-spread international debate. Already in the Spring of 2013, I had asked
Professor Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, last private assistant – and in the words
of my grandfather, the “chief co-worker of the complete edition”, − if he might
review the Notebooks as a whole, based on his profound insight into the thought of
Martin Heidegger, and in particular, review those Jewish-related passages that were
the focus of the public eye. My request also arose out of the context that my grand-
father had instructed Professor von Herrmann not to read the Notebooks and explic-
itly did not wish him to undertake the editorship of the volumes of the Black
Notebooks. For a Protestant deeply rooted in the Christian faith, this was bitter fare.
Publications about the Black Notebooks quickly came to propagate catchy
expressions such as “being-historical anti-Semitism” and “metaphysical anti-
Semitism”. The first question that obviously arises is: Does the thought of Martin
Heidegger exhibit any kind of anti-Semitism at all?
In this book, Professor von Herrmann now advances his hermeneutic explication.
With Professor Francesco Alfieri of the Pontificia Università Lateranense, he has
found a colleague who has drawn up a comprehensive philological analysis of vol-
umes GA 94 through GA 97 of the Complete Edition. Together they have arrived, in
common with Professor Leonardo Messinese and Claudia Gualdana, journalist, at
surprising results, which have opened a new perspective on the Black Notebooks.
Martin Heidegger’s two sons, Jörg and Hermann could only shake their heads in
response to the allegation that their father had been anti-Semitic. Both were famil-
iarly acquainted with their father’s close ties of friendship with Jewish people. As a
witness to these times, my father succinctly summarized his observations as follows.
The public appearances of my grandfather during the time of National Socialism
do not reflect anti-Semitic attitudes. The fact that Heidegger designated the hitherto
published Black Notebooks as Ponderings (Überlegungen) and as Observations
(Anmerkungen) has been given little consideration. He intentionally placed them at
the conclusion of the Complete Edition because without acquaintance with the
xi
xii Foreword
lectures, and above all, with the being-historical treatises that would come to be
published in the framework of the Complete Edition, they would not be
comprehensible.
The title of this book, “Martin Heidegger: The Truth About the Black Notebooks”,
may sound very self-certain, but is there anyone who claims for himself more fun-
damental insight into the thought of Martin Heidegger than Professor von Herrmann?
It was never the intention of my grandfather to propagate a doctrine, to construct a
system, or to gather a body of followers. The effort of his thinking is much rather
directed toward evoking essential questioning.
May the contributions to this volume help to make this questioning possible.
Arnulf Heidegger
Nachlaß of Martin Heidegger
Singen, Germany
Series Co-editor’s Note
In the Analecta Husserliana series, which mainly collects contributions from confer-
ences promoted by the World Phenomenology Institute, few monographic volumes
have been included and are all strictly connected to the phenomenological inquiry
of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka.
Six of them stand out because they were written by Tymieniecka herself: four
belong to the Logos and Life mini-series (1988, 1988, 1990, 2000) and two to the
The Fullness of the Logos in the Key of Life mini-series (2009, 2012).
Also of note is the monograph by Karol Wojtyla, The Acting Person (1979), the
English translation of the Polish work, Osoba i Czyn, revised and corrected in col-
laboration with A.-T. Tymieniecka.
In 2015, Francesco Alfieri’s monograph, The Presence of Duns Scotus in the
Thought of Edith Stein. The Question of Individuality, was printed in the series. The
theme of individuality was of great theoretical interest to Tymieniecka, who identi-
fied in the dynamic of auto- and onto-poietic individualization the new philosophi-
cal paradigm of the logos of life. Furthermore, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka was
always curious to compare ideas with those who had visions akin to her own: in the
1960s, at the beginning of her research, she referred to Leibniz’ metaphysics of
individual substance, and similarly in the last years of her life, she appreciated and
valorized the study of Francesco Alfieri, many times her guest in Vermont, who
drew upon Duns Scotus and Edith Stein in exploring the question of individuality.
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka’s sensibility is also powerfully present in the current
text by Francesco Alfieri and Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Martin Heidegger
and the Truth About the Black Notebooks, an English translation of the Italian vol-
ume of the same name (Martin Heidegger. La verità sui Quaderni neri, Morcelliana,
Brescia 2016). This is the main reason for accepting the volume in the Analecta
Husserliana series. The editorial board not only wished to valorize the experience of
spiritual closeness between Alfieri and Tymieniecka in the last years of her life, but
above all wanted to show the deep consonance that exists on the fundamental level
of the conception of truth between the method of writing the volume and
Tymieniecka’s modus cogitandi.
xiii
xiv Series Co-editor’s Note
In a 2002 essay, “Truth – The ontopoietic vortex of life,” which introduced vol-
ume LXXVI of Analecta Husserliana, Tymieniecka described truth as “a crucial
logoic device, the regulative vortex for the ontopoietic balancing out of life’s forces
in their constructive course” (ix). This concept of truth deepens in a dynamic, plural
and extra-intellectualistic sense the traditional Aristotelian idea of truth as “reflect-
ing the intellective sphere of rationality/logos in the human unfolding” (ix), because
it shows that “the validity of the proposition framing it [the truth], and its verifica-
tion reaches far below the logical sphere of statements” (ix). According to
Tymieniecka, this means that “truth’s validity reverberates down from the intellec-
tive sphere of the mind’s rationality into the spheres of sense that sustain it, within
the multiple spheres of the network of the sense in which the logos of life projects
its manifestations through living beings and whole world of life” (ix). Therefore, the
process of grasping the full meaning of notions of truth does not stop at some
achieved sphere or outlook, be it cognitive or pragmatic, because it feeds the urge to
clarify the origin and nature of truth, condensed into “its generative significance for
the entire expanse of life and in its role within the logoic schema of its dynamic
manifestation” (ix).
Precisely this conception of truth as a dynamism of continual deepening of the
knowledge of phenomena seems to be applied in the volume by Alfieri and von
Herrmann. Their inquiry begins by dealing directly with the knot of problems posed
by interpretations of the entire thought of Martin Heidegger in unilateral terms of
anti-Semitism, since most of these reductive interpretations arose subsequent to the
posthumous publication of his Black Notebooks. Alfieri and von Herrmann seek to
untie this knot “to find their way back to Heidegger himself” and to this end they
include it in interpretative rings of increasing cognitive and truthful penetration
(Chap. 2: F.-W. von Herrmann, Necessary Elucidations Concerning the Black
Notebooks. Of Naïve Instrumentalization, Staged on the Basis of Convenient
Insights and Speculations; Chap. 4: F. Alfieri, Concerning Certain Unpublished
Letters Received by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann). Thus, an actual “vortex” of
knowledge and truth is formed that culminates in Chap. 3: F. Alfieri, The Black
Notebooks. Critical Historical Analysis without Commentary, in which the pene-
trating tip of the vortex reaches the basic hermeneutic level of linguistic expression.
In his Postface, Hermann Heidegger concluded: “In the Black Notebooks, com-
ments on Jewry are somewhat marginal and derivative of criticism of modern
humanity. This critique also touches Roman Catholicism, Americanism, and
Bolshevism, as well as technology, science, the university, and not least of all,
National Socialism.”
It is hoped that with the publication of this volume, where her living conception
of truth implicitly plays an active role, Tymieniecka’s phenomenology of the onto-
poiesis of life, so promising as new philosophical paradigm of the second millen-
nium, can become an integral part of the American and Anglo-Saxon cultural
panorama.
Daniela Verducci
Co-editor of the Analecta Husserliana Series
Acknowledgments
We gratefully thank Dr. Herrmann Heidegger and Mr. Arnulf Heidegger, solicitor,
and the executor of Martin Heidegger’s estate, for having supported our work. Mr.
Arnulf Heidegger, moreover, supplied us with the photographic copies of the pages
of the Black Notebooks presented here, and granted us permission to reproduce
them in this book. We thank Mrs. Veronika von Herrmann for her valuable propos-
als. We also wish to thank her for sharing the daily efforts of our rigorous confronta-
tion with the texts, thereby partaking in the difficulties we encountered on the way.
Her help and support allowed us to concentrate on the work at hand without the least
distraction.
Furthermore, we would like to express our thanks to Professor Leonardo
Messinese for agreeing to write an essay, solidly based on his research and his
expertise, which once again gave us reason to review our own results, arrived at by
other ways than his own.
We thank Mrs. Anastasia Urban of the Vittorio Klostermann Press in Frankfurt
am Main and Dr. Ulrich von Bülow of the German Literary Archive (Deutsche
Literaturarchiv) in Marbach am Neckar.
This book was brought to completion thanks to the confidence placed in us by
Professor Enrico Minelli, President of the Morcelliana Press, as well as by its pub-
lisher Dr. Ilario Bertoletti. We worked as a team with Morcelliana Press; above all,
we would like to thank Dr. Giovanni Menestrina, who was entrusted with the man-
agement of the entire unpublished correspondence appearing here, as well as with
the production of the book. His task was not exactly made any easier by the fact that
we frequently revised our text, as we had to make many changes and necessary
additions. We would like to thank him and with him all persons of the Press who
supported and promoted our project.
Not least of all, we do thank all those knowledgeable persons who have already
set themselves to work in translation of this book into other languages, namely:
Juvenal Savian Filho and Clio Francesca Tricarico (Portuguese), Pascal David
(French and German), Pedro Jesús Teruel (Castilian), Paul Sandu (Romanian),
Bernhard Radloff (English), Raivis Bičerskis (Latvian), Ilya Inischev (Russian),
and Denyong Yang (Chinese).
xv
xvi Acknowledgments
Finally, we thank all of those with whom, in one way or another, we have gone a
part of the way: Pater Saverio Biasi OFM, François Fédier, Jean Grondin, Jermiah
Hackett, Otniel Vereş and Raluca Lazarovici Vereş (Ratio and Revelatio Press),
Giampaolo Azzoni, Franco Bertossa, (Associazione Spazio Interiore Ambiente),
Maurizo Borghi1, Paola Coriando, István Fehér, Dieter Foester, Lucia Menestrina,
Murray Miles, Eugenio Parati, Günter Pöltner, Hans-Jörg Reck, Manuela Ritte,
Emanuele Severino (†2020), Helmuth Vetter, Adalgisa Villani, and Pater Augustinus
Wucherer-Huldenfeld.
Among supporting societies, we would especially like to thank the Wiener
Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft (Martin Heidegger Society of Vienna) and
Österreichischen Daseinsanalytischen Gesellschaft (Austrian Society for Dasein-
Analysis), whose seat is in Vienna.
We want to thank the three presidents of The World Phenomenology Institute,
Mr. and Mrs. William and Jadwiga Smith and Daniela Verducci for wanting our
book to be published in the “Analecta Husserliana” series, founded by the late Prof.
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. Last but not least, our thanks go to Mr. Christopher
T. Coughlin of the Springer publishing house, to whom we are indepted not only for
having supported us with great professionalism in the publication of our book, but
also for his many gestures of human kindness, which we will always treasure.
Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann and Francesco Alfieri
1
See Libro Bianco. Heidegger e il nazismo sulla Stampa italiana (Weißbuch. Heidegger und der
nationalsozialismus in der italienischen Press. http://eudia.org/libro-bianco
Contents
1 Introduction �� 1

2 Necessary Elucidations Concerning the Black Notebooks.
Of Naïve Instrumentalization, Staged on the Basis of Convenient
Insights and Speculations�� 9
1 Preliminary Remarks on the “Black Notebooks”, or “Notepads”
of Martin Heidegger�� 9
2 Origins of the Confused Interpretations of the Black Notebooks�� 10
3 The Place of Martin Heidegger’s “Notebooks” or “Black Oilcloth
Notepads” in His Collected Works�� 15
4 The Jewish References in the Black Notebooks Are Without
Systematic or Philosophical Relevance�� 20
5 Why Martin Heidegger’s Being-Historical Thinking Cannot Be
Anti-Semitic�� 21
6 Of the Greatness and Significance of Martin Heidegger’s Path of
Thought �� 23
6.1 Heidegger’s Thought as Primordial Experience of a
“Philosophy of Living Life”�� 23
6.2 Heidegger’s Elaboration of a Hermeneutic Phenomenology
of Factical Life in his Lectures of 1919–1923 �� 24
6.3 The Marburg Lectures of 1923–1928 Prepare the Way
for the Elaboration of Being and Time, Heidegger’s First
Major Work�� 26
6.4 The Experience of the Historicity of Being Itself and the
Path of Being-Historical Thinking�� 27
References �� 29
xvii
xviii Contents
3 The Black Notebooks. Critical Historical Analysis Without

Commentary�� 31
Francesco Alfieri
1 Preface. “For the Few – For the Rare Ones”�� 31
2 Ponderings II-VI: Black Notebooks 1931–1938�� 33
2.1 Heidegger’s Firm Attitude in Regard to National
Socialism�� 33
2.2 Deracination, Soil and Related Compound Words:
Their “Origin” and A-Political Usage�� 74
3 Ponderings VII-XI: The Black Notebooks 1938–1939�� 98
3.1 Heidegger’s Explicit “Distanciation” from National
Socialism and the Reason for His Reticence �� 98
3.2 “Modern Humanity” Compared to the “Humanity of the
Future” �� 121
4 Ponderings XII-XIV: The Black Notebooks 1939–1941�� 160
4.1 The National Socialist Worldview: Consequences of Their
“Culture – Destroying Impact”�� 160
4.2 Invisible “Desolation (Zerstörung)” as the Concealed
Precondition of Visible “Destruction (Verwüstung)” �� 167
5 Observations I-V – The Black Notebooks 1942–1948�� 190
5.1 To Give Heidegger the Floor: “I Mention This Not in
Defence, But Only as a Statement of Fact” �� 190
5.2 “Self-Destruction (Selbstvernichtung)”: From the
Ponderings to the Observations �� 237
6 Postscriptum�� 254
4 Concerning Certain Unpublished Letters Received by
Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann�� 263
Francesco Alfieri
1 Preface: Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger�� 263
2 Criteria of the Publication of this Correspondence �� 268
3 Three Letters from the Heidegger – von Herrmann
Correspondence�� 268
3.1 Martin Heidegger to von Herrmann. Letter No. 1 �� 271
3.2 Martin Heidegger to von Herrmann. Letter No. 2 �� 273
3.3 Heinrich Heidegger to von Herrmann. Letter No. 3�� 275
4 Hans-Georg Gadamer and the Farías Affair of 1987�� 275
4.1 Gadamer to von Herrmann. Letter No. 1 �� 281
4.2 Gadamer to von Herrmann: Letter No. 2 �� 288
4.3 Gadamer to von Herrmann: Letter No. 3 �� 293
Contents xix

Epilogue: The “Jewish Question” in the Black Notebooks in the
Perspective of the “Critique of Metaphysics” �� 299
Leonardo Messinese
Postface �� 315
Translator’s Afterword�� 317
Bibliography �� 333
Index�� 339
Introduction
Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, and Francesco Alfieri
[In Italy] one has not entirely forgotten what a dictatorship is, and in any case, it is fully
clear to people that a thinker like Heidegger will remain a phenomenon of the century. […]
In the final analysis, a man such as Heidegger is not dependant on the approval of dummies
or the so-called masses.
H.-G. Gadamer to F.-W. von Herrmann, Jan. 27, 1988.
How shall such a hypocritical generation, indulged in France as it is here, be capable of

standing steadfast and of overcoming the challenges which one day it will have to face?
H.-G. Gadamer to F.-W. von Herrmann, April 11, 1988.1
The word “truth” as used in the title of this book, Martin Heidegger. The Truth about
the Black Notebooks refers not only to the correctness of statements, but also more
fundamentally to “un-concealment”, and to the “undistorted” transmission of
Heidegger’s legacy. The intention of this book is to allow the truth communicated in
the manuscripts that are collected in the black oilcloth notepads, or notebooks, as
Heidegger also called them, to be understood.
With their publication in the context of the Complete Edition and even before
their appearance, by the time that the Black Notebooks had reached the public their
reception was distorted by deceptions and obfuscation. Shortly before their publica-
tion, misrepresented by the editor, the mass media, and especially the press, they
were advanced as evidence of Heidegger’s supposed “anti-Semitism” and brought
into disrepute, both nationally and internationally. Even before the first volumes of
the Black Notebooks could be carefully examined and evaluated, public opinion
took it to be a self-evident certainty that these texts in their entirety offered nothing
aside from anti-Semitic pronouncements. From the very beginning, the contents of
these Notebooks, including those still unpublished, were enveloped in a spell that
distorted and falsified all other possibilities of interpretation. The methods of those
giving impetus to these distorting and falsifying modes of interpretation
1
Consult chapter “Concerning Certain Unpublished Letters Received by Friedrich-Wilhelm von
Herrmann” for a copy of the complete text of this letter from Hans-Georg Gadamer.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 1

F.-W. von Herrmann, F. Alfieri, Martin Heidegger and the Truth About the
Black Notebooks, Analecta Husserliana, 123,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69496-8_1
2 Introduction
unequivocally reveal that the reception of these manuscripts was instrumentalized,

planned, and staged in service of purely subjective ends. Instead of offering a
thoughtful analysis of the various content of the Black Notebooks and its place in the
whole of Heidegger’s work, the contents of these thirty-four Notebooks were
branded with a pejorative and emotive catchword in order to arouse interest and
attention, nationally and internationally, and to sow confusion in the mind of the
reader. Suddenly Heidegger’s notebooks became a topic of world-wide debate and
the key point of contention of so-called “being-historical anti-Semitism”, or its
Italian version, “metaphysical anti-Semitism”. So one schemed to stage a debate
that would be dominated from its outset by “non-philosophers” without expertise
who claimed to clarify the issues, but who in fact only spun a dense web of miscon-
ception based on the supposedly irrefutable certainty of the anti-Semitism of the
Black Notebooks. And this led to the implication that an entire chapter of the 20th
century history of philosophy would have to be re-written. Naturally this procedure
would be all the more effective when supported by the media and propagated by the
press, whose function consisted in assuring that these convenient interpretations
found broad acceptance.
Hardly anyone was prepared to admit that the “Heidegger Case” had not been
approached in its proper context; that it had rather fallen victim to appropriation in
service to other dimensions of thought. And in fact, almost anyone would be given
access to the press to communicate his or her impressions – as if everyone were a
stakeholder in formation of a historical memory founded in “collective conscious-
ness”. Not only does this “collective consciousness” take the anti-Semitism of the
Black Notebooks for a certainty, but going still further, it conjectures that Heidegger
played a strategic role in National Socialism by devising a closely related system of
thought, thereby becoming its abettor.
By now it has become obvious that such confusion could only arise because the
Black Notebooks have been read and interpreted by inexpert persons who claimed
to advocate open debate – and in fact created a difficult situation that made it clear
to everyone who had hitherto declined to take a position how difficult and fruitless
it would be to attempt debate in face of such an unfriendly atmosphere. In truth, the
thought-forms of such procedures of instrumentalization stand in no relation what-
soever to the demands of serious philosophical research.
It was no easy matter to bring about the publication of this book and no sooner
had we decided to undertake this project than a number of difficulties became clear
to us. We feel ourselves obligated to share these problems with our readers. First of
all, this deserves mention: after we began, as of January 2015, a systematic study of
volumes GA 94 through GA 97 of the Complete Edition, we were constantly
harassed by the international press. Press reports worked on the assumption that
Heidegger’s supposed anti-Semitism – be it “being-historical” or be it “metaphysi-
cal” – were the sole key of access to the Black Notebooks. The primary problem was
not that this perspective – strongly promoted by the press – had assumed such domi-
nance as to be accepted as absolutely binding common knowledge; we were beset
by a still greater difficulty which consisted in this, that these interpretations under-
mined the foundations of Heidegger’s thought. Calls for a public discussion
Introduction 3
concerning the “Heidegger Case”, as demanded by the “defenders of dialogue”,

were disingenuous, for these calls were guided by the objective of mobilizing cer-
tain experts: the discussion that was generated, as had been planned in advance, was
designed to maintain the effective instrumentalization of the “case”. The problem
that we suddenly became aware of was that whoever sought to advance the thesis of
“being-historical anti-Semitism” also wished to raise the suspicion that Heidegger’s
entire philosophical path since 1936 was dictated by anti-Semitism; and this would
elicit serious reservations not only concerning Heidegger, but also, indirectly, cast a
shadow on anyone who has spared no effort, over many years, to try and understand
the speculative thought of Heidegger. This cloud, namely the thesis of “being-
historical anti-Semitism”, enveloped Heidegger in darkness and held him culpable
of having constructed a system of thought compatible with the political constructs
of National Socialism. At the same time, the discourse of “being-historical anti-
Semitism” was designed to confirm the thesis that being-historical thinking, in and
for itself, was fundamentally anti-Semitic. This unfounded claim propagated a
remarkable misrepresentation. Heidegger’s position suffered still further deteriora-
tion when this so-called “being-historical anti-Semitism” was denounced by a num-
ber of scholars even while it was being championed as a new field of research in
philosophy. When, in response to this unfounded claim, the objections were raised
that the passages referencing Jews were neither essential to the whole, nor part of a
speculative treatment of issues in the framework of being-historical thinking, the
German editor of the Notebooks responded by claiming exactly the opposite, to the
effect that Heidegger’s being-historical thinking is “systematically” anti-Semitic. In
addition, speaking at a university in the United States, he advanced the claim that
Heidegger’s work is defined by a duality of esoteric and exoteric discourses; he
went so far as to theorize that one need only see through the exoteric surface of
Heidegger’s texts in order to disclose the esoteric core – which is comprehensively
anti-Semitic. Unfortunately, none of the American professors in attendance took
advantage of this occasion to ask the speaker to present just one textual example,
drawn from Heidegger’s being-historical works, in evidence of his so-called eso-
teric anti-Semitism. It is thoroughly typical, moreover, for these kinds of claims that
they are advanced without concrete reference to specific textual passages.
The concept of “metaphysical anti-Semitism”, as propagated in Italy, is compa-
rable to the concept of “being-historical anti-Semitism” and serves to formulate a
similar accusation: “metaphysical anti-Semitism”, which (supposedly) derives from
German philosophy, and in particular from a series of thinkers extending from Kant
to Nietzsche, is said to find its consummation with Heidegger. The seven being-
historical treatises composed between 1936 and 1944, beginning with the
Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) and concluding with Die Stege des
Anfangs (The Paths of Inception), however, show that neither the fundamental
ontology of Being and Time, nor the being-historical thought emerging from this
work, in their respective structures and divisions, allow for anything resembling an
anti-Judaic or anti-Semitic position. In the remaining, unpublished works to be
released in the framework of the Complete Edition (the contents being known to us,
inasmuch as F.-W. von Herrmann is the Editor-in-Chief of the Edition) one will not
find passages referencing the Jews.
4 Introduction
Reliance on the position of “metaphysical anti-Semitism” depends on occasional

anti-Jewish remarks, which are indeed to be found in the texts of this philosopher –
but never in the great systematic treatises. Emphasis on these kinds of remarks,
which are founded in confessional differences, in order to slander Kant, Fichte,
Schelling and Hegel as “metaphysically anti-Semitic” philosophers, does not con-
stitute a genuinely philosophical approach, but rather an ideological prejudice far
removed from rigorous engagement with speculative philosophy. Such philosophy
does not propagate a worldview – it presents a comprehensive conceptual structure
which in essence does not allow for anti-Semitism of any variety. This also holds for
the hermeneutic phenomenology of being-historical thinking, which does not con-
sist of a random admixture of thoughts either.
With reference to the distorted interpretations of Heidegger that have made their
appearance in Germany, it has become evident that the aforementioned position is
even more radical in design: in Heidegger’s own critique of metaphysics it proposes
to find a thinker who identified the Jews with the very concept of metaphysics he
sought to oppose and to refute. Thus the Jews are capriciously assigned a meta-
physical essence and consigned to the very history of metaphysics that Heidegger
with all his might refused. For their adherents, “being-historical” as well as “meta-
physical anti-Semitism” are believed to be undeniable realities that require no fur-
ther proof. Our objective was to seek out the basis for these certainties in Heidegger’s
texts, whereupon it became clear that based on the texts neither of these positions
can be supported.
Our book focuses explicitly on the presentation of philological evidence – which
does not make it any more easily accessible to the reader. We make no secret of the
difficulty involved in understanding Heidegger’s texts. However that may be, the
Black Notebooks require a more solid approach than reliance upon mere opinion
and the application of sensationalistic labels. It is not our objective to convince
someone or to establish a “consensus”. This is not Heidegger’s approach in his
speculative thought – and precisely for this reason are we all the less inclined to
follow this path. The “discourse of consent” is alien to us and value judgments con-
cerning persons and their work strike us as completely inappropriate.
Insulting allusions, such as did not spare the last co-worker of Heidegger’s final
years, who became the administrator of Heidegger’s estate, have also found a place
in the pages of widely-disseminated dailies, where repulsive and totally unfounded
judgments, comparable to those in certain books, were to be read. We have no wish
to respond to such provocations nor will we. In times when certain “cultural” circles
encourage their readers to feed upon such utterances, the philosophical depth cov-
eted by certain, convenient interpretations has remained too superficial to compose
a convincing counter argument. As we became aware that the longed-for path of
dialogue was blocked by those who claimed to advance it, we realized that their
opinions and interpretations could only be maintained intact as long as they with-
drew from debate to converse exclusively with each other. In the course of a genuine
debate, their laboriously erected house of cards would immediately collapse. It
would be advisable not to subject oneself to such risk, especially if one wants one’s
self-referential, fundamental principles to survive.
Introduction 5
In our book, we are offering the reader an opportunity to discover the many-
sidedness of the Black Notebooks. The reader is given the chance to understand the
true nature of Heidegger’s involvement in National Socialism, and to understand
why he avoided an open confrontation with the regime of that time. It will also
become clear how Heidegger’s initial illusion in regard to the “Movement” was fol-
lowed by another, to the effect that “the self-affirmation of the German university”
was possible at that time. Questions upon questions – and still more to ask, each in
its particular context, and each giving us, in some respect, still little-known insights
into another side of Heidegger. More often than not, this side is sacrificed to rough
and ready interpretations, and indeed this happens because these interpretations are
devoid of any relation to specific textual passages.
Based on the conclusions we had gradually reached, and above all in conse-
quence of the publication of volume GA 97 of the Complete Edition in 2015, it
became necessary to intensify our research concerning the concept of self-
destruction (Selbstvernichtung). We had to take account of the fact that different and
diverse interpretations of this term had distorted public opinion, giving rise to cata-
strophic, and often freely invented readings.
The concept of “self-destruction”, already in evidence in volume GA 96, became
a knot that had to be untangled. The reader will come to understand that without
constant reference to the Contributions to Philosophy Heidegger’s language-use in
the Black Notebooks would remain indecipherable. Heidegger employs the concepts
of the language of being-historical thinking, which will remain incomprehensible as
long as one remains outside this horizon of questioning and unfamiliar with the
basic concepts of the Contributions. At certain points, therefore, one will under-
stand how Heidegger’s critique of National Socialism is expressed by way of subtle
allusions, and in fact by the use of certain words of multiple senses in different
contexts. For example, it becomes evident that certain concepts are subjected to a
shift of meaning whereby their sense reverses itself. Heidegger’s procedure mirrors
this reversal: the reversal always refers to something else, whereby the full sense of
the word goes beyond the literal sense. Heidegger’s subtlety of language use can
easily mislead the uninitiated reader. The difficulty of understanding the text calls
for constant return to Heidegger’s works in order to grasp the full sense of his
remarks.
Consequently, it is important to recall the positions and opinions that elicited
such media uproar in order to show how difficult it is for those who incited it – not
to mention those who acclaimed it – to maintain intact their complicated discourse
of instrumentalization. The total of fourteen passages in volumes GA 95, 96, and 97
of the Complete Edition that refer to Jews or world Jewry compose barely three
pages (DIN A4) of the 1235 pages of these three volumes. All of the keywords that
Heidegger uses to refer to the Jews and to international Jewry derive from the con-
ceptual apparatus of his critique of modernity. This demonstrates that his character-
ization of Jewish modernity is not specific to the Jews but encompasses all peoples
and nations who live in accordance with the spirit of modernity. The manner and the
mode in which Jews and world Jewry are addressed in these few passages – aptly
described by Hermann Heidegger as marginal notes – is consistent with Heidegger’s
6 Introduction
confrontation with modernity in the context of being-historical thinking. Therefore,

the assignment of these Jewish-related passages to the class of “anti-Semitic” utter-
ances, or, more straight-forwardly and directly, to categorize them as “being-histor-
ical anti-Semitism”, or still worse, as “metaphysical anti-Semitism”, can only result
from a comprehensive confusion of thinking.
The Jewish references found in the three volumes noted above manifest neither
“being-historical anti-Semitism” nor any anti-Semitism whatsoever. Let it be
emphasized once again: the critical tone of the relevant textual passages derives, in
the first instance, from Heidegger’s being-historical critique of modernity.
Heidegger’s being-historical thought, or thinking from enowning, has nothing to do
with political-ideological discourses; regarded in its conceptual provenance, it
arises out of speculative phenomenology. Whoever insists on conceiving it other-
wise only betrays an incapacity to grasp being-historical thinking from the specula-
tive perspective – along with the inability to follow the movement of transformation
from the hermeneutic phenomenology of the fundamental ontology of Being and
Time into being-historical thinking.
From its first beginnings in 1916, the philosophy of Martin Heidegger has
remained removed, as far as is at all possible, from all biological and racist forms of
thought. His field of research remained unchanged for decades: namely, to ask, how
life is lived. Life is interpreted in its facticity; factical Dasein in its transcendental
relation to the disclosedness of the truth of being; and Da-sein in its enowned rela-
tion to the truth of being that enowns Da-sein to being.
Based on being-historical thinking, as it arose out of the analytic of Dasein in
Being and Time, Heidegger practiced a vigorous critique of National Socialism in
the 1930s and 1940s, pointing out that it is defined by a “barbaric principle”. Nor
does he make any secret of his opposition to Hitler and his “madness”. In volume
GA 97, for example, he notes the “irresponsibility with which Hitler raged and
wreaked havoc across Europe”; he mentions “Hitler’s criminal insanity” and points
out that “circa 1933 some intellectuals’ did not immediately recognize the criminal
character of Hitler”. In a letter of February 9, 1928 to his wife Elfride, Heidegger
makes the following reference to the Jews: “Of course, the Jews – are the best”. This
pertains to his students at the University of Marburg.
These passages, and numerous other critical comments that express Heidegger’s
sharp and vigorous critique of National Socialism were not considered by the
“guidebooks” to Heidegger’s supposed anti-Semitism nor by the interpreters them-
selves, who have come to dominate and channel public opinion of late. It has come
to this, that wanting to replace Heidegger as the author of the Notebooks they com-
mitted themselves to the error of arbitrarily re-writing the Notebooks. All of these
passages were intentionally set aside and buried in order to facilitate the long-
planned instrumentalization of the Black Notebooks.
The debate concerning Heidegger and the Black Notebooks, intentionally pro-
voked and as precisely targeted as an assault, offered – and it still offers – a shame-
ful spectacle. In fact, it consists of outrageous accusations, not just in the media, but
even in the publications of certain professors, who are (given their positions of
responsibility) called upon to conscientiously stand up for the truth – and instead,
Introduction 7
for all their agitation, all they have to show is their lack of decency and of profes-
sional ethics.
Martin Heidegger is and will remain for all time a great thinker. The confronta-
tion with his thought cannot take place on the political, ideological level; it is only
possible as a philosophical confrontation, even as the thinkers of the past demand of
us our rigorously substantive engagement.
These considerations should be received as a warning and a reminder to intel-
lectuals to allow their results to be subjected to critique and tested to the end of
coming back to the works of Heidegger: that guided by a sense of responsibility one
will avoid convenient interpretations that in fact unjustifiably instrumentalize the
Jewish people. Such procedure is unacceptable. It violates the dignity of a people
that so unjustly suffered Hitler’s horrific madness.
Today we declare our solidarity with this people, but not with this or that instru-
mentalization at the cost of this people.
We consider it advisable to again direct the attention of the reader to the fact that
in the Ponderings and in the Intimations Heidegger sharply and decisively con-
demns the madness unleashed by Hitler along with his barbarous policies. This
demonstrates how far removed he was from National Socialism. In consequence,
the intentional concealment of these passages – and in particular, those to be found
in volume GA 97 – as well as the interpretations of those intellectuals who dominate
the headlines today and make use of Heidegger’s philosophy even while they falsify
it, are unacceptable. They cannot justify their theories. Their systematic instrumen-
talization has no future; it is fated to soon die out.
The poor results of this instrumentalization is demonstrated by Leonardo
Messinese in the Epilogue of this book. His research shows how the thesis of “being-
historical anti-Semitism”, along with its variant, “metaphysical anti-Semitism”, are
both unfounded even in terms of their defenders’ own argumentative procedure.
Despite this they insist on maintaining the thesis of the supposedly unquestionable
anti-Semitism of these manuscripts.
It also became necessary to include a number of previously unpublished letters
from Heidegger’s correspondence with Hans-Georg Gadamer; for from these we
may draw the conclusion that the instrumentalization of Heidegger’s philosophy is
not exclusively of recent date. Gadamer himself was a key witness to this kind of
instrumentalization, as propagated in 1987 by Victor Farías of Chile. The reflections
contained in these letters pointedly remind us how risky it is to pursue errant paths
of interpretation that are far removed from the true sense and actual intentions of
Heidegger’s texts.
If one remains at any cost merely intent upon replacing the commentaries of the
past with new ones, then history will only repeat itself; in the present case, we will
just end up naively repeating – with a few variations on the same theme (if we are
lucky) – the past that was played out in the Farías controversy.
As the noise of vain and empty chatter presumed to take control and overwhelm
the calm of philosophical research, it seemed to us that our work could be helpful to
those for whom essential questioning is a necessity. And so we present the results of
our research to the reader and the academic community in this book, in the hope that
thereby genuine questioning may be called into life.
8 Introduction
In the course of proof-reading this book, we felt ourselves obligated to commu-

nicate the results of our research to the Heidegger family. This took place in Freiburg
im Breisgau on January 4, 2016, in the context of a private meeting with Arnulf
Heidegger, lawyer, when we informed him of the content of our work and of the
carelessness with which the Black Notebooks were instrumentalized by those who
have no knowledge of, or respect for, Heidegger’s being-historical thought. In order
to make the sense of many remarks in the Black Notebooks understandable and to
interpret them in their respective contexts without hermeneutic violence, we were
compelled to find our way back to Heidegger himself. This will put an end, in our
opinion, to the invalid and unfounded exploitation of Heidegger’s thought that is
still widespread.
We are fully conscious of swimming against the current. We already have the
reputation of being excessively zealous guardians of the memory of the philosopher.
Leaving this aside, it would have been irresponsible simply to remain silent – as
Heidegger himself decisively noted in his time. Would that the reader realize how
on the path followed here it is left to Heidegger himself, by means of his reflections,
to clear the way for himself. That we have succeeded in determining a substantial
aspect of the fateful import of the Black Notebooks, which still remains unknown to
many, we may hold with some confidence.
On the 27th of January 2016, the Day of Remembrance
Necessary Elucidations Concerning
the Black Notebooks. Of Naïve
Instrumentalization, Staged on the Basis
of Convenient Insights and Speculations
1 reliminary Remarks on the “Black Notebooks”, or

P
“Notepads” of Martin Heidegger
In his text of 1937/1938, “A Retrospective Look at the Pathway”, Heidegger refers

to the Black Notebooks, as they are called merely because of the colour of their cov-
ers, as “notepads”. These writings do not compose a genre of their own, in any strict
sense. The black notebooks simply compose the “philosophical notepads” that
accompanied Heidegger’s being-historical thinking from 1931. In these he recorded:
(1) such fragments or trains of thought as occasionally occurred to him, which did not
belong in the concurrent manuscripts of his lectures, presentations, and treatises, leading to
their being written down and preserved in the “notebooks”. Heidegger kept pen and paper
on his night-table next to his bed in order to quickly record the nascent philosophical
thoughts that come to him during sleepless nights; the next day he would carefully inscribe
them into his notebook. What I have described was the genuine, the primary purpose and
point of the notebooks.
(2) such remarks as reflected his personal views, opinions, and convictions; personal,
because they are of a different character than the splinters of thought and trains of thought
of the first category. Heidegger’s remarks on National Socialism, the Jews, or world Jewry
belong to these personal or private views.
Because Heidegger emphasizes the fundamentally being-historical concept of

“calculative thought” in respect to Jewish matters he generates a dire confusion of
concepts that could lead to the impression that being-historical thought, as such, has
an affinity to “anti-Semitism”. Based on this, at least Heidegger’s later thought
becomes suspect and is to be discarded.
On this topic I would ask the reader to follow the steps of Francesco Alfieri’s
thorough investigation and to confirm for himself that this “suspicion” is not sup-
ported by textual evidence. The return to Heidegger’s writings constitutes the sole
hermeneutic key by means of which these “naïve interpretations” may easily be
refuted. “Naïve” signifies that the result achieved has been produced by

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69496-8_2
10 Necessary Elucidations Concerning the Black Notebooks…
superficially pulling together certain remarks Heidegger that recorded, unavoidably

leading to unfounded and unjustified conclusions.
Heidegger’s commentary on “modernity,” or “diagnosis” of “modernity,” belongs
to the fundamental principles of being-historical thinking, which is rigorously and
systematically structured in itself. What I call the pure thought of Heidegger is the
jointure (Gefüge) of thought and of concept as articulated in Contributions to
Philosophy and the related works that follow.1 This conceptual structure needs to be
strictly separated from what I call Heidegger’s “private” opinions and convictions,
his private political views of the 1930s, which do not stand in any concrete or sys-
tematic relation to the jointure composed by the thinking of the historicity of enown-
ing. The fact that a concept belonging to this jointure of thought, such as the concept
of “calculative thinking”, is brought into relation to Jewish matters does not make
the pure being-historical concept, in itself, anti-Semitic. Being-historical thinking
has its provenance in fundamental ontology; the character of this provenance can be
traced with precision, as I have repeatedly demonstrated in my publications. To the
extent that Heidegger’s diagnosis of modernity, in effect, his observations on “cal-
culative thinking”, are set forth in the Notebooks without reference to the “Jews”,
they belong to Heidegger’s “pure” thought. They become political and private then
and only then when and how he relates them to the “Jews”.
The boundary that I have drawn between the pure thought of Heidegger and his
private pronouncements, does not run, in my opinion, between the Black Notebooks,
on the one hand, and other texts of Martin Heidegger, on the other. This boundary
runs through the Notebooks, for they also contain a great deal that belongs to his
pure, being-historical thought, which I have assigned to the first category noted
above. Heidegger’s personal and private observations, conversely, are to be assigned
to the second category. In a purely quantitative sense, this material does not out-
weigh the material assigned to the first category.
In my opinion, everything that belongs to the second division is completely
expendable!
2 rigins of the Confused Interpretations

O
of the Black Notebooks
The question whether or not Heidegger’s thinking was bound up with National
Socialist propaganda was still being discussed in 2014. The summit of confusion
was reached when Peter Trawny, the editor of the Black Notebooks, claimed to have
“evidence” confirming such involvement on Heidegger’s part. Based on selected
passages, not only did he propose to prove that Heidegger’s thought was accompa-
nied by a specific, National Socialist undertone, but he also claimed that this thought
instigated and perpetuated anti-Semitism. More precisely stated: he claims that
1
See Heidegger M. (1989).
2 Origins of the Confused Interpretations of the Black Notebooks 11
Heidegger’s philosophy opposed itself to the Jews because they blocked the way to
a renewed engagement with the history of being. Heidegger’s exclusion of the Jews
[from the history of being] constitutes “being-historical anti-Semitism”. An inter-
pretation of this kind, clearly, needs to be hermeneutically founded in the study of
Heidegger’s texts if it means to advance a rigorous claim. Otherwise one would run
the risk of arriving at interpretations that substantially deviate from the intentions of
the philosopher. An additional reason for studying Heidegger’s writings systemati-
cally and thoroughly, thereby opening up a pathway of understanding for the reader
that derives from what Heidegger has passed on to us, is that the questionable
“Jewish passages” will thereby be integrated into their respective historical con-
texts. Consequently, it is necessary to carry out a thorough investigation of
Heidegger’s Ponderings: all of these research components are indispensable to rig-
orous work, which will avoid political instrumentalization and the “naïve” insights
of Peter Trawny. This absolutely necessary, hermeneutic path of investigation has
certainly been strenuous for both authors of this book. We have taken upon our-
selves the painstaking task of constantly returning to the source texts, especially
upon discovering omissions – as are characteristic of Trawny’s interpretations –
which made us aware of the political “distortions” to which Heidegger’s philosophy
has been subjected. And in fact, his interpretations are designed to function like an
echo chamber for “other fragments of text”, which in truth can only be understood
in the context of what has been arbitrarily omitted and condemned to silence. For
this reason, we had to intensify our research, for the clarity of Heidegger’s discourse
demanded that we follow hermeneutic guidelines that would return us to the sources
in the sense of the praxis of the phenomenological epoché. Our objective, therefore,
is to compile such research material as will be helpful to the reader; however, it is
not our intention to “defend” a “conservative” interpretation of Heidegger or to pay
homage to his thought. These kinds of questions, or classifications, as the case may
be, are not suited to the initiation of a well-balanced, critical dialogue. In this fash-
ion, we only construct impediments on the path of current research.
From the moment that research ceases to put “results” into question it unknow-
ingly become the passive accompaniment of totalizing, calculative thinking.
Now I would like to accompany the reader in the act of discovery of the story of
the editor of the Black Notebooks, for there are some things to be learned from his
personal history that will help us to understand the origin of his “decisions”.
I came to know Peter Trawny soon after his Promotion (Wuppertal, 1995) and
the publication of his dissertation, entitled Martin Heidegger’s Phenomenology of
World.2 Since he was the student of a highly regarded colleague, Klaus Held, I gave
him my confidence. Over the succeeding years – also in response to Klaus Held’s
request – I attempted to assist Peter Trawny; for example, by way of my evaluation
in support of his appointment as extraordinary professor (non-remunerated), six
2
See Trawny P. (1997).
years after his Habilitation (2000), entitled The Time of the Threefold Unity: Studies
of the Trinity in Hegel and Schelling.3
I was initially surprized by the hermeneutic misconceptions that Peter Trawny
fell for in the course of his “personal” elucidations of several passages, which led
him to a disastrous misunderstanding of the Black Notebooks. I finally decided to
break my silence when it became clear to me – and notably through my collabora-
tion with Alfieri – that Trawny, in his reckless search for a consensus of interpreta-
tion, had triggered an entire series of distorted readings that only sought to establish,
in some degree, a calculative and instrumental scheme without foundation in
Heidegger’s texts. Furthermore, once awakened to this, I realized that he desper-
ately sought other “colleagues” with whom to share this consensus. Clearly this is
not the way of working of someone who responsibly provides evidence of that
which he proposes to demonstrate. Following upon my surprize, I decided to
respond responsibly and decisively to help readers free themselves of their bewil-
derment. To this end it became necessary to return to Heidegger’s texts and to
undertake a systematic study of the sources. Wonderment was succeeded by disap-
pointment, as for a long time I had been convinced that Trawny was the right person
to undertake the critical edition of the Black Notebooks. I had offered my support to
Peter Trawny. To the present day, at the age of 51, he has not found a paid profes-
sional position, a professorship, and yet he has to support his family of wife and
child. After Heidegger’s estate, managed by Dr. Hermann Heidegger and his son
Arnulf Heidegger, solicitor, advanced the date of publication of the Black Notebooks
against Heidegger’s stated will and my wishes, I recommended that Peter Trawny
serve as editor for all nine volumes of the Notebooks so that his financial necessities
might thereby be alleviated. Based on his presentation of the volumes that he had
edited for the Complete Edition as of 2012, and on his publications, I took him for
a “Heideggerian” and for someone to whom I could give my unreserved confidence.
In the forty-year publication history of the Martin Heidegger Complete Edition,
there has never been a case – Heidegger had forbidden editors to accompany their
editions with interpretative commentary – wherein an editor, parallel with the pub-
lication of a volume entrusted to him, published an interpretation of the same vol-
ume. Trawny ignores this and writes a book that misunderstands and disavows the
entire being-historical path of thought, of some forty-six years, of Heidegger’s later
philosophy. With the publication of this completely unphilosophical book,
Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy, Klostermann Publishers
seeks to dissociate itself from Heidegger’s remarks on Jews and world Jewry in the
Black Notebooks.4 I also distance myself from them, but not at the cost of disavow-
ing the highly significant work of a great thinker, in whose works these remarks are
not to be found, for they are not components of being-historical thinking. Not just
Trawny, but other professors as well, are in error if they think that being-historical
thinking can be understood on the basis of Heidegger’s political notes. In this regard
3
4
2 Origins of the Confused Interpretations of the Black Notebooks 13
I would like to cite an extract from a letter of August 2015 that Alfieri sent to me
from Brazil. In this letter, he refers to certain results that follow from his hermeneu-
tic method:
“The fundamental problem is as follows: had Trawny been willing to take advice from
someone who has concerned himself with Heidegger’s Complete Edition for years, then he
could have avoided these erroneous interpretations, which now only serve to demonstrate
that he is incapable of producing an edition based on scholarly methods, as was entrusted to
him. Still worse – and I am going to demonstrate this on hermeneutic grounds – is the fact
that Trawny is unaware of an entire series of historical and hermeneutic aspects, giving rise
to the risk that he might manipulate Heidegger’s entire thought and every possible interpre-
tation. By way of anticipation, I propose that aside from Heidegger’s critique and rejection
of ‘National-Socialist pseudo-philosophy’, certain insults, which Trawny thinks reference
Jews, are not intended by Heidegger to refer to Jews at all. Trawny’s interpretative achieve-
ment – his work of instrumentalization – is not only unfounded: it could also qualify as an
insult to the Jewish community inasmuch as he instrumentalizes the unjustified and inhu-
man pain which this community suffered under National Socialism. It is unacceptable for
anyone, of whatever belief, to stage and instrumentalize the pain that the Jewish people
have been forced to endure – and this, to be specific, by way of assigning a sense to
Heidegger’s texts that is dishonest and unbelievable. Responsible intellectuals have an obli-
gation to break this silence; it is their task to re-write the history of Heidegger’s path of
thought so that the pain of the Jews can no longer be instrumentalized. In this way, we can
move forward, and work our way out of the labyrinth of ‘instrumentalizing, all-too-personal
machinational modes of thought’ such as one person evokes to the end of establishing a
consensus with others. Whoever proceeds in this fashion, clearly adheres to an intellectual
culture that renounces thought for its own sake, rather pursuing the enticements of contem-
porary, fashionable philosophy. The topic of ‘Heidegger’, however, is worthy of a more
profound and systematic analysis. For in a certain sense, it is as if Heidegger himself antici-
pated what would come to pass with such as those who renounce genuine philosophy to
seek conquests, only to find themselves dominated by ignorance and the ahistorical prove-
nance of their personal insights”.
Without assistance from me, Dr. Hermann Heidegger had the most untenable
passages cut from the manuscript of Trawny’s book. But even the rest of the book is
unseemly and mistaken, in his opinion and that of his son. Since I had myself – in
my capacity as editor-in-chief of the Complete Edition – recommended Peter
Trawny as the editor of the Black Notebooks, I was appalled: not only by his eluci-
dations, which set forth the pretence of an interpretation, without in the least being
one – they rather resemble a dangerous deception – appalled, not only by the tone
of this book, but also by the tone he took in his national and international public
appearances. I had to acknowledge that I had been gravely mistaken in regard to the
integrity of character of Peter Trawny. In a letter, I communicated to him my deci-
sion to immediately sever all relations. When Alfieri was informed of what had
happened, he responded by mail in a letter of May 17, 2015, assuring me that he
would stand by me in the elaboration of this book:
“Unfortunately, a constructive confrontation is no longer conceivable – since Trawny has
ceded the controversy about the Black Notebooks to the Italian press – the site of the debate
has been definitively displaced from the workroom of rigorous philosophy. [...] A debate,
based on rigorous, systematic work is no longer possible, because the prerequisite condi-
tions remain unfulfilled. Now the Black Notebooks are hardly ever given serious thought. In
fact, the entire discussion concerns Peter Trawny, his apparently great public prominence,
and his personal interpretations; Heidegger himself is introduced to garnish the political
discussion. These kinds of interpretations were already rejected by Heidegger in GA 95,
writing that philosophy has come to feed upon the headlines and the newspaper articles
served up in the mass media. As he rejected the kinds of questions this produced, so should
we reject feeding upon mythological constructs such as the ‘Myth of the Jewish World
Conspiracy’ offers. [...] What is required is a systematic study of the Black Notebooks,
which hitherto has not been attempted by anyone. What Trawny was incapable of doing,
falls upon us to do. There is no better approach for us to undertake in common”.
What Trawny has produced since his “turn” is repulsive. These publications
shockingly reveal a desperate lack of conceptual clarity and power of philosophical
judgment. Instead of hermeneutic effort in service of truthfulness, instead of serious
conceptual work, what we encounter are essay-like texts, not so much motivated by
the spirit of philosophy as by the ambition to evoke a public echo. What Peter
Trawny produced to accompany the first four volumes of the notebooks is a com-
pletely unphilosophical book.
It is obvious that Peter Trawny is intent upon instrumentalizing his edition of the
black oilcloth notebooks: after failing to achieve sustained success on his previous
philosophical path and by means of his publications, and having been unable to
secure an academic position, he evidently has decided to take the opposed path – to
use the Notebooks to openly and internationally denounce Heidegger as anti-Semite,
and what is more, to proclaim so-called anti-Semitism as the esoteric background of
Heidegger’s being-historical thinking in its entirety. As such he has presented us
with all the evidence required to show that he has not understood the Contributions
to Philosophy (From Enowning), the work of one of the greatest thinkers of our
time, disrespecting and daring to disavow him.5 Peter Trawny wagers all, risks
everything on one card, to the end of finally achieving a paid position in academia.
Peter Trawny’s previous books were conceived as serious publications. Now he
deliberately uses the “Jewish question” to advance his personal career.
During the memorable conference on the black oilcloth notebooks in Paris in
March of 2015, professor of philosophy Alain Finkielkraut spoke as follows: “I
dread such philo-Semitism, and I am horrified by such anti-Heideggerianism”.6
With this statement he has stigmatized the instrumentalization of the Jewish ques-
tion by Trawny in unbeatable fashion.
There are indeed fourteen passages in the black oilcloth notebooks that concern
themselves with the Jewish question. I also distance myself from these passages.
Nevertheless, the philosophical recognition must prevail that everything that
Heidegger says in the Notebooks, and only in the Notebooks, in regard to the Jewish
question, even if it is formulated in the language of being-historical thinking, does
not constitute the spiritual background of attunement of his being-historical thought.
It is the greatest of errors to take the political utterances of the Notebooks as the
basis for the interpretation of the being-historical works of Heidegger, in which
these kinds of utterances do not occur. On the basis of the texts, it can be shown that
5
Heidegger M. (1989), p. 163. English translation, p. 113.
6
Source unknown [F-W. von Herrmann].
3 The Place of Martin Heidegger’s “Notebooks” or “Black Oilcloth Notepads”… 15
Heidegger takes his distance from political positions of National Socialism – as

demonstrated, for example, in Heidegger’s astounding critique of Hitler in volume
GA 97 of the Complete Edition.7 When Alfieri and I decided to elucidate these texts,
we were not in the frame of mind of looking for passages that could exculpate him
of the accusations of his accusers. In doing this, we only wanted to understand
Heidegger’s discourse without preconceptions and without prejudice. This also
allowed us to develop a new perspective on Heidegger’s anti-Catholicism – namely,
by tracing his train of thought step by step. Our collaboration has led us to unex-
pected conclusions. The reader who is concerned to know how far conceptual con-
sequences, arbitrarily applied to Heidegger’s works, depart from the truth may come
to conclusions comparable to our own. So, it goes to Heidegger’s credit – by way of
his writings – to guide the reader’s steps, even as he has shown us the way.
3 he Place of Martin Heidegger’s “Notebooks” or “Black

T
Oilcloth Notepads” in His Collected Works
The Appendix to Mindfulness (GA 66 of the Complete Edition), “A Retrospective

Look at the Pathway”, contains a text entitled “The Wish and the Will (On Preserving
What is Attempted)”.8 The “attempted” pertains to Martin Heidegger’s unpublished
manuscripts as of 1937–1938. Under Part I, “Extant Manuscripts,” Heidegger enu-
merates seven divisions:
“1. The lecture-courses. 2. The lectures. 3. Notes for the seminars. 4. The preparatory elabo-
rations for works. 5. Ponderings and Intimations, Booklets II-IV-V.9 6. Lectures on
Hölderlin and preparatory work on ‘Empedocles’. 7. From Enowning (Contributions to
Philosophy) and section number 4”.10
For Part II, Heidegger records highly important elucidations regarding the list of
seven manuscript types.
For our purposes, the elucidations regarding Number 5 (Ponderings und
Intimations), in relation to Number 4 (Preparatory elaborations) and Number 7
(From Enowning) are especially important. In regard to Number 5, Heidegger
writes: “What is recorded in these notebooks, especially in number II, IV, and V,
indicates in part also the grounding-attunements of questioning as well as the direc-
tives unto the uttermost horizon of the attempts for the projecting-open of thinking.
To all appearances originating in accordance with the moment, they preserve the
thrust of continuous effort for the sake of the sole question at issue”.11
7
Heidegger M. (2015). Please refer to the hermeneutic explication by Alfieri in Chapter Three of
this text. Cited as Observations.
8
Heidegger M. (1997), pp. 419–428. English translation, pp. 370–378.
9
My emphasis [F.-W. von Herrmann].
10
Heidegger M. (1997), p. 419. English translation, pp. 370–371 (mod. B.R.).
11
See ibid. p. 426. English translation, p. 376 (mod. B.R.).
The text “On the Preserving What is Attempted” was composed upon the com-
pletion of Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) in 1938. On this occasion
Heidegger refers only to Booklets II-V (Ponderings) of the notebooks, which have
now been published as GA 94 of the Complete Edition.12
Booklet I cannot be found, nor does Heidegger mention it, anywhere. One may
assume that Heidegger himself excluded it. Why, we can only guess; perhaps it
contained notes for a planned reworking of Being and Time for the 3d edition of
1931 on the basis of Heidegger’s Freiburg lectures of 1930, entitled, “Of the Essence
of Freedom,” in which he grounds Being and Time in its concrete relation to “Being
and Freedom”.13
Booklet II of the Ponderings is initiated in October 1931. This is the period of the
inception of being-historical thinking. The “black oilcloth booklets”, which is to say
the notebooks, collectively belong to the extended pathway of being-historical
thinking, which reaches from 1930/1931 to the first half of the 1970s. The Ponderings
of 1931–1941 (now published as volumes GA 94 through GA 96) of the Complete
Edition, accompany the path of being-historical thinking, which is above all
unfolded in “Preparatory elaborations for works” and the great treatises starting
with Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) (1937/1938) and concluding
with Enowning (1941/1942).14
The explanatory note to Number 5, Ponderings and Intimations, emphasizes
three components: 1. “grounding-attunements of questioning”; 2. “directives unto
the uttermost horizon of the attempts for the projecting-open of thinking”; 3. “the
thrust of continuous effort for the sake of the sole question at issue”. The “grounding-
attunements of questioning” are shock, reservedness, and awe, which respectively
attune being-historical thinking. The “uttermost horizon[s]” are named in Number
4, “Preparatory elaborations for works”15 and encompass:
“The differentiation of beyng and beings”; 2. “Da-sein and truth”; 3. “the time-
space”; 4. “the modalities”; 5. “attunement”; 6. “language”; 7. the approach to
“the Ownmost of Questioning”. The sole question of the endeavour of being-
historical thinking is “the question concerning the truth of beyng” as delimited
by the aforementioned “horizon[s]”.16 The “preparatory elaborations” are called
“first shaping” or “starts” that grasp the entire range of the questioning of Being
and Time more primordially and move it into the horizons of questioning noted.
The Ponderings also find their place in the contexts of these horizons, inasmuch
as they, along with the “preparatory elaborations”, stand in service of the sole
question of the truth of beyng.
12
Heidegger M. (2014a).
13
14
See Heidegger M. (2014a).
15
Heidegger M. (1997), pp. 424–426. English translation, pp. 374–376.
16
See ibid. p. 424. English translation, pp. 375–376 (mod. B.R.).
The same section Number 4, concerning “preparatory elaborations”, also has

something important to say about Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning):
“Since the spring of 1932, the basic outline of the plan that takes its initial form in
the project-design ‘From Enowning’ has been firmly established”.17 All of the trea-
tises that follow upon Contributions to Philosophy – Mindfulness (1938/1939),
Overcoming Metaphysics (1938/1939),18 The History of Beyng (1938/1940),19 On
the Inception (1941),20 The Event (1941/1942),21 and The Paths of Inception
(1944)22 – constitute ever new forms of what has stood firm since the Spring of 1932
as the design for the jointures of being-historical thinking.
The treatises open up the primary path of being-historical thinking inasmuch as
they construct and refine the structure of this thought; the Ponderings accompany
this primary path and supplement it. They are subordinated to the great path-
breaking works and as such not do not precede them, let alone stand over them.
Consequently, the shorter as the longer passages of the “black oilcloth notebooks”
are accessible and understandable only on the basis of the great treatises. This is the
sole reason why, in accordance with Martin Heidegger’s intentions, they close the
Complete Edition and were to be published after all the other volumes of the Edition.
The “notebooks” entitled Ponderings are multi-layered, critical and being-
historical interpretations of contemporary events. They constitute, furthermore,
supplements to previous reflections, stating a position on this or that matter and
critically evaluating it. For example, sections number 201, 202, and 204 in GA 94
recur to and elaborate thoughts on the theme of “mankind and the animal” in con-
nection with the comparative examination of the world-poor animal and world-
forming Dasein as laid out in Winter semester 1929/1930 and subsequently
published as The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World –
Finitude – Solitude.23
Since 1931, every occasional thought which may have occurred to Heidegger,
such as does not belong to work in progress, or which cannot be assigned a place in
Heidegger’s files under the heading of a key concept, is taken up and recorded in the
“notebooks”. Heidegger kept pen and paper on his night-table next to his bed in
order to quickly record the nascent philosophical thoughts that come to him during
sleepless nights; the next day he would carefully inscribe them into the “black
notebook”.
Let us now consider the right and only correct way of approach to the “black
oilcloth booklets”.
17
Ibid.p. 424. English translation, p. 374 (mod. B.R.).
18
See Heidegger M. (1999), pp. 4–174.
19
20
21
22
23
In two of the three volumes of the Ponderings, the reader will come upon thirteen
passages, each of one, or two, or four, and in one case of five sentences, in which
Martin Heidegger comments on “international Jewry”, or “world Jewry”, from a
being-historical perspective.24 The editor seized upon these passages, which hardly
compose 2.5 pages (DIN A 4) of the 1250 pages of the three volumes of the
Ponderings, as an occasion to disqualify not only the passages themselves, but
being-historical thinking in itself, as “anti-Semitic”. According to the transcript of
an American professor of philosophy in attendance at a conference at Emory in
Atlanta (September 2014), the editor Peter Trawny stated that Heidegger’s anti-
Semitic references to Judaism were informed by “systemic components”. The con-
cepts underlying Heidegger’s critical evaluation of “international Jewry” are said to
be the following: rootlessness, ahistoricity, focus on the mere calculability of beings,
the gigantic, worldlessness, empty rationality and computational capacity, failure to
pose the question of being, the empowerment of machination in regard to beings,
absolute unboundedness, the deracination of all beings from being.
Whoever has actually read and thoroughly understood the being-historical trea-
tises, that is, the primary texts of being-historical thought, will immediately recog-
nize that this list of concepts are the being-historical concepts by which Heidegger
characterizes the spirit of modernity, and as such, the present, inasmuch as they
fundamentally arise out of the spirit of the mathematical sciences of nature and
modern technology. This signifies that these concepts are not as such anti-Semitic;
namely, that they pertain not only to the Jewish spirit, but rather characterize the
spirit of the present as such. In effect, if Heidegger uses these concepts to elucidate
the spirit of “international Jewry”, then this serves to include international Jewry in
the modern spirit of the present. The fact that he mentions and critically comments
on “world Jewry” in particular, although the distinguishing features he emphasizes
inhere in the modern spirit of the present in general, can be understood as a reflec-
tion of the dominant spirit of the time. The being-historical mode of thought and its
proper conceptual structure is not essentially anti-Semitic, nor does it arise of a
fundamental attunement of anti-Semitism; it arises out of the spirit of phenomenol-
ogy, which experiences the phenomena in the particularity of their historicity, ren-
dering them visible and accessible to thought. The scandal is not the thirteen
passages. The scandal rather consists in this alone: an approach to these passages
that falsifies and employs them to the ends of slander and untruth. The editor’s
“book”, which is no philosophical book as Professor Ingeborg Schüßler of Lausanne
pointedly noted, is not a genuine and true interpretation. His thesis, positing the
systematic anti-Semitism of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, is not a serious per-
spective of interpretation worthy of discussion, but a mere assertion unsupported by
evidence.
In my capacity as editor-in-chief of the Complete Edition, as designated in writ-
ing by Martin Heidegger, and as his private assistant in the last four years of his life,
24
See Heidegger M. (2014b).
I recommended the current editor of the Black Notebooks to the administrators of

the estate to the end that he edit the texts, not that he interpret them.
The editor’s book, if intended to complement the publication of the edition of the
Ponderings, calls for a completely different conception and composition. If this
book were designed to offer the edior’s interpretation of these thirteen passages,
then this work of clarification would elucidate the relation of these utterances to the
philosophical dimension of the Ponderings and to the context in which these scat-
tered, critical remarks appear – even as we have done. This alone would have been
the solely legitimate approach to the first three volumes of the “black oilcloth note-
books”, because in accordance with the matter at issue. Instead, the editor ignores
the philosophical dimension of the Black Notebooks, and thus of the three volumes
of the Ponderings, to pursue a purely ideological and political perspective of inter-
pretation that passes over the philosophical content and its relation to other being-
historical texts. In consequence, the readers of his totally unphilosophical book
along with the auditors of his oral presentations are falsely induced to believe that
the Black Notebooks in their entirety consist of anti-Semitic fabrications of thought.
His handling, therefore, of Heidegger’s “notebooks” is thoroughly deceptive and as
such fundamentally untruthful.
A passage in the Contributions fully supports our explication:
“It is sheer nonsense to say that experimental research is Nordic-Germanic and that rational
[research] on the other hand comes from foreigners (fremdartig). We would have then
already to make up our mind to count Newton and Leibniz among the ‘Jews’. It is precisely
the projecting-open of nature in the mathematical sense that is the presupposition for the
necessity and possibility of ‘experiment’ as measuring (experiment)”.25
Here Heidegger with biting irony critically comments on a thesis of the National
Socialist understanding of the natural sciences, which claims that experimental
research is Nordic and Germanic, and rational research of “alien” – that is, of
“Jewish” provenance. The National Socialist classification of experimental research
as Nordic-Germanic, and rational research as a product of the Jewish spirit, is des-
ignated as “complete nonsense”, for experimental research in the natural sciences
itself demands a rational basis in the mathematical project of nature, which was
essentially established by Newton and Leibnitz, who are evidently not “Jews”. The
terms “Jews” is put in quotation marks by Heidegger because he uses it in the
National Socialist sense. This quotation from the Contributions offers unequivocal
evidence that Heidegger does not understand rational research and thought in
National Socialist terms as a specific characteristic of the Jewish spirit. The rational
as such is not determined by reference to the spirit of a people. The quotation, there-
fore, shows by way of example that Heidegger does not conceive the positive sci-
ences, nor philosophy, in an anti-Semitic way.
Based on our characterization of the philosophical dimension of the three vol-
umes of the Ponderings, and our analysis of the governing concepts of these short,
thirteen passages, it follows that these passages do not constitute systematic
25
“building blocks” – that is, components – of the structure of being-historical think-

ing. In order to understand the evidential basis of this claim, one has to have a clear
conception of what the immanent, systematic order of philosophical thought entails.
In other words, one has to be able to distinguish between systematically unfolded
thinking and merely anecdotal, or as Hegel says, random thoughts.26 As Heidegger
himself emphasizes in the Contributions, and above all in his contemporaneous
Schelling lectures, “every philosophy is systematic, but not every philosophy con-
stitutes a system”.27 Hence every philosophy, including being-historical thinking, is
in itself systematic, that is, composes a jointure of thought. Heidegger grasps the
systematic character of being-historical thinking in the word “jointure”, signifying
the inner composition and order of questioning. The “black oilcloth notebooks” of
the Ponderings and their numerated commentaries are guided by their continuous
pursuit of the sole question of the truth of being. This question is unfolded system-
atically in the rigorous order of questioning and the sought-for of the question. To
see this, to work through it, and to understand it, is the only appropriate way of
approach to what is held fast in these records. And this demands that we distinguish
systematic concepts of the unified architecture of the whole and occasional reflec-
tions that do not belong to the systemic jointure of this thought. In this sense, the
oft-considered thirteen passages from volume GA 95 and volume GA 96 of the
Complete Edition are simply occasional thoughts, whose removal in no way touches
the jointure of the asking of the question concerning the truth of being. Solely in this
sense, we emphasize that these thirteen passages are “without philosophical signifi-
cance”, as my Hungarian colleague, Professor István Fehér of Budapest, once pre-
cisely judged and formulated the matter.
What Martin Heidegger greatly valued to the end of his life in his eminent stu-
dents, such as Hannah Arendt, Hans Jonas, and Karl Löwith, was not merely ratio-
nal thought but a great gift for creative thought. In a Festschrift in honor of Martin
Heidegger’s 80th birthday, Hans Jonas published an essay which gave Heidegger
particular pleasure.28
4 he Jewish References in the Black Notebooks Are Without

T
Systematic or Philosophical Relevance
As the editor-in-chief of the Complete Edition and as Heidegger’s sole private sec-
retary during the last years of his life, I will present a short, corrective summary of
my position in regard to the group of manuscripts known as the “black notebooks”
or “workbooks”.
26
Hegel G.W.F. (1952). Pascal David, translator.
27
Heidegger M. (1988a), p. 51; English translation, p. 29 (mod. B.R.).
28
See Jonas H. (1970), pp. 1–26.
5 Why Martin Heidegger’s Being-Historical Thinking Cannot Be Anti-Semitic 21
As noted above, I recommended the current editor of the Black Notebooks as

textual editor, not as textual interpreter. For the sake of Martin Heidegger’s philoso-
phy and the truth, I have to strictly distance myself from the editor’s internationally
propagated interpretative attempts, which profoundly disappointed me because of
their fundamental untruthfulness.
From their inception in 1930–1931, the Black Notebooks simply accompany
Heidegger’s being-historical or enownment-historical thinking, which is to say, the
second elaboration of the question of being. Consequently, their content is purely
philosophical, and they are co-ordinated or sub-ordinated to the great works of
being-historical thinking. The philosophical content of these recurrent annotations,
therefore, can only be reconstructed on the basis of the fundamental, conceptual
interrelations of the concurrently composed treatises.
The passages that reference Jewry are very few in number relative to the length
of the 34 notebooks; they do not stand in a more extended context; philosophically
and systematically they are without relevance for Heidegger’s thought, and as such
superfluous. Above all, they do not constitute systemic components of thought of
being-historical thinking. The concurrently composed lectures, presentations, and
treatises – which do not contain any anti-Semitic material – bear witness to this.
For Heidegger, Judaism and its ancient, honored history do not belong to the his-
tory of being, which pertains only to the philosophy of the Occident. This history
extends from the Greeks to Hegel and Nietzsche, encompasses modern and contem-
porary science and technology. The later is characterized by “calculative thinking”,
a form of thought which Heidegger regards as a danger to mankind.
The vague and misleading concept of “being-historical anti-Semitism”, coined
by the editor in response to the few sentences written in reference to the Jews, leads
to the disastrous confusion that being-historical thinking as such is anti-Semitic.
Nor did Heidegger “think like that for a while”, as the editor formulates it;
namely, think as expressed in the sentences referencing Jews and Jewry. With this
indiscriminate judgment, the reader and the auditor are led to believe that during the
period of composition of these sentences Heidegger’s philosophical treatises were
informed “like that”, meaning, they were informed by anti-Semitism, which is com-
plete nonsense. The seven, great being-historical treatises of 1936 through 1944,
beginning with the Contributions to Philosophy and concluding with Die Stegen des
Anfangs, bear witness that being-historical thinking, in its jointure and design, does
not incorporate any anti-Semitic attitudes whatsoever.
5 hy Martin Heidegger’s Being-Historical Thinking

W
Cannot Be Anti-Semitic
There is only one decisive issue to attend to in dealing with the Jewish-related pas-
sages in the notebooks, and that is: the spirit of these passages finds no trace what-
soever in the ground-breaking texts of being-historical thinking represented by the
seven treatises. Not a single enowning-historical concept of these treatises is even

remotely anti-Semitic. I have not only read the great treatises sentence by sentence
but read every sentence in such a way as to comprehend it in its essential source.
This source is the ownmost eventuation of the truth of being. Heidegger’s insight
into the essential swaying (Wesung) of the truth of being arose out of his grasp of the
historicity of the truth of being, which phenomenologically manifested itself to fun-
damental ontology as the transcendental-horizonal disclosure of the disclosedness
(Erschlossenheit) of being. All of the fundamental concepts of being-historical
thinking, as first unfolded in the Contributions, and subsequently modified and sup-
plemented in the following treatises, arose out of the immanent transformation of
fundamental ontology into being-historical thought. Beginning with sense certainty,
Hegel thought the historicity of absolute Spirit; Heidegger the historicity of the truth
of being, beginning with the echo (Anklang) of the truth of beyng through to the
grounding (Grundung) of the truth of beyng and beyond this to the future-ones and
the god enowned in enowning.
All of this holds and unfolds itself in a completely different realm of conscious-
ness than everyday variants of anti-Semitism of whatever persuasion. For this rea-
son alone, the anti-Semitic dimension of discourse, whatever form it may take,
cannot infiltrate the enowning-historical dimension of consciousness. Consequently,
it is obvious that anti-Semitic expressions are completely irrelevant to thinking in
the being-historical dimension.
It does not require any lengthy investigation and re-reading of Martin Heidegger’s
writings to come to this conclusion; it suffices to have a well-developed philosophi-
cal capability to differentiate and to judge. Peter Trawny does not possess either;
and therefore he babbles on, conceptually weak and feeble of judgment, about
Heidegger’s anti-Semitism.
In short, there is no intrinsic correlation between the questionable passages in
the Notebooks and Heidegger’s being-historical thought.
Given that it is correct to distinguish between racially motivated anti-Semitism
and religiously motivated anti-Judaism, then these questionable passages do not
belong to the one or the other. Then what is their proper place? They belong solely
to the realm of Heidegger’s private political opinions, although he does in fact cloth
them in the being-historical conceptual language of “calculative thinking”. Yet this
subsequent conceptual formulation does not render the being-historical source of
the concept “anti-Semitic”. Although Heidegger speaks of the calculative thinking
of finance and of economic Jewry, this does not imply that these texts compose
systematic components of the systematic jointure of the thought of enownment. The
gigantic error of Trawny, and all those who trot along after him, is to suppose this
to be so.
The anti-Semitism of the Third Reich, which belonged to its political topogra-
phy, ultimately has its origin in the religiously motivated anti-Judaism of the 19th
century.
Therefore: we have to strictly discriminate (krinein) between textual passages of
the notebooks referencing the Jews and purely philosophical enowning-historical
thinking, which as such has no affinity with any form of anti-Semitism whatsoever!
6 Of the Greatness and Significance of Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thought 23
Any reader of the published works who has truly followed and understood the
ultimate grounds of these texts will arrive at the necessity of this distinction.
During the entire course of my intensive study of Heidegger’s works, I have
never come across anti-Semitic or National Socialist traces in Heidegger. I find no
need to sit down and read these texts again, now on the look-out for such traces.
Should the executive of the Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft (pre-2015) continue
to insist that one ought to investigate and determine if “anti-Semitism” is relevant
for Heidegger’s thought, or not, then I would find myself obligated to resign my
membership in the Society and from the Board of Trustees. Not out of protest
against the thought of Martin Heidegger, but out of protest in the face of such a
fragile and insecure attitude in regard to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.
Members of the Society, as well as the magnificent representatives of the Wiener
Daseinsanalytischen Gesellschaft deserve to hear a clearly stated philosophical
position in regard to Heidegger’s thought. For the Society’s concern is not Martin
Heidegger as a person: its sole matter of concern is the thought of this thinker. For
my part, philosophically speaking, there is no further need for clarification, a posi-
tion clearly brought to expression in my explication of the issues.
My strong stand on this question does not call for whitewashing Martin
Heidegger; it simply calls for keeping his philosophical thought free of
falsifications.
6 f the Greatness and Significance of Martin Heidegger’s

O
Path of Thought
6.1 eidegger’s Thought as Primordial Experience

H
of a “Philosophy of Living Life”
After Martin Heidegger’s first lectures in the winter semester of 1915–1916, he

wrote a highly significant letter, dated March 5, 1916, to his bride-to-be, Elfride Petri:
“Today I know that a philosophy of living life is possible – that I must declare war on ratio-
nalism right through to the bitter end – without falling victim to the anathema of unscien-
tific thought – I can – I must – and so today, of necessity, I face the problem: how can
philosophy as living truth be enacted as a valuable and powerful creation of the personality”.29
This happy discovery of the young philosopher – the insight that befalling him,
opens his path and indicates the way – is the possibility of the elaboration of a phi-
losophy of living life, the possibility of philosophy as living truth. This insight dis-
closes that in distinction to the theoretical life of knowledge there is a pre-theoretical
or atheoretical life in which we already live before taking up the attitude of theoreti-
cal knowledge; this theoretical attitude arises out of life, and in that respect it is the
29
Heidegger M. (2005b), pp. 36–37. English translation, p. 17 (mod. B.R.).
primary task of philosophy to interpret the pre-theoretical and the atheoretical, and
that means, living life, in its ownmost truth. What is interpreted as living life mani-
fests itself as the living truth concerning living life.
The young Heidegger will afterwards, in his lectures of 1919 through 1921, des-
ignate that which he had grasped for the first time as living life, as factical life and
factical Dasein. Through the publication of Heidegger’s early letters, and in particu-
lar, by way of the most important of these – the letter of March 5, 1916 – we newly
come to recognize that the fundamental, or originary experience, of Heidegger’s
ownmost philosophical perspective of questioning befell him in the first third of the
year 1916. This fundamental, philosophical experience will be elaborated after the
War, in lectures through to 1923, and afterwards in the Marburg lectures (1923/1924
to 1928) to finally find their full systematic development in Being and Time, his first
major work (1927).
6.2 eidegger’s Elaboration of a Hermeneutic

H
Phenomenology of Factical Life in his Lectures
of 1919–1923
At the same time, the philosophy of living life inaugurated by Heidegger is posited
as the perspective of investigation for the elaboration of a newly conceived philoso-
phy of religion, which he calls “veritable philosophy of religion”. What is sought as
such is to win its veracity on the basis of the new foundation of the philosophy of
living life. Heidegger offers founding essays in this direction in two lecture courses
after World War I. First, in the ground-laying course in the philosophy of religion of
the Winter semester of 1920/1921, entitled “Introduction to the Phenomenology of
Religion”, Heidegger, following the method of hermeneutic phenomenology, offers
a thorough interpretation of three Pauline Letters to establish the sense and mean-
ingfulness of the originary Christian religiosity of the New Testament, understood
as originary, factical Christian life-experience. Second, in the lectures of the Summer
semester of 1921, “Augustine and Neo-Platonism”, Heidegger interprets Augustine’s
self-interpretation of anima and vita in Book X of the Confessions, which is gov-
erned and directed by his search for God, as substantially determined by factical
experience of life as concretely lived. In his lectures on Paul as on Augustine,
Heidegger interprets Christian existence without reference to the Greek world,
hence without reliance on Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, or Stoic concepts, and solely
on the basis of factical-living life. What Heidegger unfolds in these two significant
courses from the early 1920s has its defining origin in that extraordinary discovery
which Heidegger excitedly communicated to his future bride in the above-mentioned
letter of March 5, 1916.
The year 1916, so fruitful to Heidegger in terms of his own perspective of ques-
tioning, records another letter from Heidegger to his fiancé, wherein he informs her
of another, equally significant and far-reaching insight. This is the letter of June 13,
1916, and it reads:
“I’ve made a bold throw, the last consisting in this, my discovery of a fundamen-
tal problem of the theory of categories – the solution comes of itself, in research it
is always the manner of posing the question that is decisive”.30 The “bold throw”, or
“design” referred to here, the discovery of a fundamental problem of the doctrine of
categories, consists in the path-breaking insight that aside from the generally recog-
nized, objective or logical treatment of the categories known since Aristotle, a com-
pletely new question arises and calls for explication and that is the question of the
categories of living life and the living spirit in themselves. This discovery consti-
tutes the decisive, anticipatory insight into Heidegger’s development of the concepts
of “content-sense”, “relational-sense”, and “enactment-sense” of living, factical life
in the post-War lectures of 1919–1920, which will subsequently be unfolded in
Being and Time as structural concepts of Dasein’s existential understanding of being.
In the preface to his last Freiburg lecture as Adjunct Professor, “Ontology (The
Hermeneutics of Facticity)”, Heidegger writes:
“Companions in seeking were the young Luther, and Aristotle, whom Luther hated, was my
model. Kierkegaard gave me impulses, and Husserl gave me eyes”.31
In this passage, Heidegger invokes the phenomenological method of seeing,

which he learned above all from Husserl’s Logical Investigations. The spiritual eye
of philosophical insight into the phenomena as the matter of thought Heidegger
owes to the phenomenology of Husserl. Yet Husserl’s own phenomenology, as a
method of approach, has the character of reflective phenomenology, according to
which sense experience in its full extent is the point of departure for human con-
sciousness of the world. With the inception of his lectures as Adjunct, Heidegger
transformed Husserl’s phenomenology of reflection into hermeneutic phenomenol-
ogy. This phenomenology is called “hermeneutic” because it interprets living-in-a-
world as it is constituted and enacted prior to reflective pre-formation. And this is
what Heidegger calls pre-theoretical life, whereas Husserl’s intuition of simple
sense experience has already been informed by a reflective-theoretical perspective.
Heidegger could nonetheless learn phenomenological seeing from Husserl’s phe-
nomenology – now, however, in service to hermeneutic phenomenology understood
as pre-condition of reflective phenomenology.
In a number of different respects, the total of ten lecture courses from Heidegger’s
period as Adjunct Professor work out a hermeneutic phenomenology of factical life.
Every one of these constitutes a substantial step of Heidegger’s ownmost philoso-
phizing, in which he achieves the interpretation of the factical, that is, of the reality
of human life in its facticity. Although Husserl himself, in his phenomenology of
consciousness, did not advance into the field of the factical, nonetheless he made
30
Ibid. (mod. B.R.)
31
Heidegger M. (1988b), p. 13. English translation, p. 4 (mod. and corrected B.R.: “whom Luther
hated”).
hermeneutic seeing and explication of the phenomena of factical life possible

through the praxis of the phenomenology of consciousness.
6.3 he Marburg Lectures of 1923–1928 Prepare the Way

T
for the Elaboration of Being and Time, Heidegger’s First
Major Work
Upon moving from Freiburg to the University of Marburg in the Fall of 1923,
Heidegger continued to develop the way of thought he had initiated with his Freiburg
lectures: the explication of factical life in the tradition of hermeneutic phenomenol-
ogy is now transformed into the ontological, that is, existential analytic of Dasein in
its understanding of being. The analytic of Dasein is guided by the question of being
as the question concerning the meaning of being as such. “Being as such”, names
two things: being means the constitution of being of factical human life; and it
means the constitution of being of other realms of beings, among which Dasein,
understanding being, exists. The last of Heidegger’s Adjunct lectures at Freiburg
already treated ontology in the perspective of the hermeneutics of facticity.
Heidegger’s early insight recognizes that the problem of categories involves inves-
tigation of the categories of factical Dasein, and at the same time, the categories of
beings, the beings to which factical Dasein relates; and therefore, the question that
this problem poses precedes the question concerning being in the whole, being as
such, and the meaning of being. In this respect the Marburg lectures and the accom-
panying elaboration of Being and Time are the continuation of the perspective of
questioning of the Freiburg lectures.
The first Division of Being and Time is divided into three Parts: I. Preparatory
Fundamental Analytic of Dasein; II. Dasein and Temporality (Zeitlichkeit); III. Time
and Being.
The work as a whole is a work of fundamental ontology, in the sense that it pre-
cedes and founds every regional ontology.
In Part I, the “categories” of Dasein’s understanding of being, the “existentials”,
are analytically disclosed in their distinction from the categories in the narrow
sense, which is to say, the categories of beings, to which Dasein stands in relation.
In Part II, the meaning of the existentials for the temporal sense of the being of
Dasein are phenomenologically and hermeneutically disclosed.
On the basis of the existential temporality of Dasein, Part III, “Time and Being”,
asks about the sense of being of beings other than Dasein, to which Dasein stands in
essential relation. The sense of being of the categories of the being of beings is inter-
rogated, and this sense of being is grasped as Temporality (Temporalität) in distinc-
tion from the temporality (Zeitlichkeit) of Dasein. Whereas the temporality of
Dasein is transcendentally enacted, time as Temporality is the horizon, that is, the
field of vision within which Dasein, in the enactment of its temporality (Zeitlichkeit)
understands time as the meaning of the being of beings. Transcendental temporality
of the existence of Dasein, and the horizonal Temporality (time) of the being of
beings to which Dasein relates, in their belonging-together compose the answer to
the guiding question of Being and Time: the question concerning the meaning of
being as such, that is, as a whole.
In fact, Part III of Being and Time was not published in 1927. But in the Marburg
lectures of the Summer semester of 1927 Heidegger offers a “New Elaboration of
the Third Part of Being and Time” that was published as volume GA 24 of the
Complete Edition.32 In his last Marburg lectures, moreover, held in the Summer
semester of 1928, Heidegger presents essential outlines from Part III (“Time and
Being”). The lectures of Summer semester 1927, “The Fundamental Problems of
Phenomenology”, namely the hermeneutic phenomenology of fundamental ontol-
ogy should be read as a retroactive elaboration of the Third Part of Being and Time.
6.4 he Experience of the Historicity of Being Itself

T
and the Path of Being-Historical Thinking
This experience, that beyng itself of itself articulates itself in historicity, is another
fundamental experience of momentous significance on Martin Heidegger’s path of
thinking. The experience of the historicity of beyng itself, and not only of the exis-
tential possibilities of Dasein, opens up for Heidegger in 1930. One of the first texts
witnessing of this new experience is the famous presentation of 1930, “On the
Essence of Truth”. After 1930, all of the 29 courses from Heidegger’s Freiburg
period belong to the newly opened perspective of being-historical thinking.
The foundational work of being-historical thinking is Contributions to Philosophy
(From Enowning) (1936–1937, 1938). In a retrospective review of his thought,
Heidegger affirms that in the Spring of 1932 he established the fundamental plan of
what would find its first realization in the Contributions. The Contributions are the
first of seven being-historical treatises of a period concluding in 1944. The being-
historical thought that finds its first beginnings in 1930 and its inception in the
Contributions, opens up a new path of the elaboration of the question of being. This
path does not, like Being and Time, undertake an existential-ontological analysis of
Dasein’s understanding of being, but rather begins with the historicity of being as a
whole. On the way to Being and Time, being in the whole manifests itself as
transcendental-horizonal disclosedness, or clearing, and in this sense as the truth of
being. Because this truth is indeed more or less primordial, but of itself not histori-
cal (geschichtlich), being-historical thinking is brought to experience the same truth
of the clearing of being in its historicity as the sway (Walten) of disclosure or con-
cealment, or self-refusing withdrawal. Being-historical thinking also has hermeneu-
tic and phenomenological character. The historicity of the truth of being manifests
and prevails in the contention between the withdrawal or arrival of the truth of
32
being. Heidegger grasps arrival as the enowning of enownment, withdrawal as

expropriation of enownment. Heidegger conceives the history of modernity, modern
natural sciences and technology, and their global impact, as the history of the
increasing refusal (Entzug) of the truth of being. “Calculative thinking”, which has
dominated the modern epoch down to our day, is also an essential component of this
being-historical refusal. In the Contributions, the being-historical movement from
the most extreme refusal of being to the first approach of the truth of being passes
through six stations on the way to the renewed emergence of the dimension of the
divine and of the god(s). This movement of the truth of being may be grasped as the
phenomenology of the truth of being. What Hegel advances as the phenomenology
of the Spirit, Heidegger sets forth as the phenomenology of the truth of being. A
comparison of the two thinkers in this regard is eminently appealing to thought.
The fundamental question of the relation of being and language, and therefore
the question of the ownmost of language, belongs to the very center of being-
historical thinking. The questioning of being-historical thinking and poetry are con-
ceived as two exceptional articulations of the relation of language to the ownmost
of language in its relation to being. In Heidegger’s regard, the poet most closely
attuned in thought to the perspective of being-historical thinking is Friedrich
Hölderlin. For this reason, Heidegger asks about the proximity of Hölderlin’s poet-
izing to the neighborhood of being-historical thought. For Heidegger, the elegies
and hymns of Hölderlin’s late poetry take their life from the poetic experience of the
clearing and openness of beyng. This is where the three great Hölderlin courses of
the nineteen- thirties and -forties have their place. In the 1950s, as the writer of these
lines was a student in Freiburg, the question of the essential relation of thinking and
poetizing was also significant. Heidegger’s attempts to elaborate these issues were
taken up into an expanded version of Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry as well as
On the Way to Language.
Being-historical thinking arises out of an immanent transformation of fundamen-
tal ontology. The deployment of being-historical thinking is motivated solely by the
experience of the proper historicity of the truth of being. As of 1930, this experience
increasingly came to inform Heidegger’s Freiburg lectures, and even more so, his
seven great being-historical treatises. These alone allow us to properly identify the
structural components of being-historical thinking. These treatises do not articulate
two discourses – one exoteric and the other esoteric and anti-Semitic – as the editor
of the black oilcloth booklets, the notebooks, postulates. In conversation, Heidegger
spoke of the “black notebooks”, by way of reference to their covers; but in review
of his manuscripts he calls these booklets (Hefte), notepads (Notizbücher) in order
to characterize them by their contents. They are notepads of a special kind, not con-
cerned with recording notes for further elaboration, but rather record short, extended
passages of thought, not intended for his on-going manuscript projects, which from
time to time came to him, as on sleepless nights. The majority of these passages are
additions, sometimes to much earlier manuscripts on being-historical themes.
Entries, however, as do not have this quality of supplements, while taking positions
on political matters and current events using the language of being-historical think-
ing, do not by that belong to the stock of Heidegger’s being-historical reflections.
References 29
What does belong can only be found, fully and completely, in the being-historical
treatises. Each of these treatises, moreover, offers a thorough working-out of the
jointure of being-historical thought. Whoever is incapable of distinguishing these
systematic trains of thought from occasional utterances, suffers from a significant
lack of philosophical power of judgment.
Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology along with his being-historical
thought is of a rank comparable, in its philosophical originality, to the thinkers of
the tradition beginning with Aristotle, with whom Heidegger took his point of
departure. But the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl, drawing on the mod-
ern tradition of Descartes, Kant, and Fichte, also constitutes an exceptional ground-
laying tradition.
In the last letters that I exchanged with Otto Pöggeler he spoke of the diversity of
voices in philosophy – a saying that I can affirm with conviction.
The fundamental position of every truly great philosopher is a finite path of
thoughtful reception of what is given to thought to think, but not to master.
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(Vol. 72, v ed.). Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Vittorio Klostermann. (In preparation).
Heidegger, M. (1975). Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. In F.-W. von Herrmann (Ed.),
Gesamtausgabe (Vol. 24, v ed.). Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Vittorio Klostermann. English
edition: Heidegger, M. (1982). The basic problems of phenomenology (A. Hofstadter, Trans.).
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1982). Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie.
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duction to philosophy (T. Sadler, Trans.). London, UK: Bloomsbury/Continuum.
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(Ed.), Gesamtausgabe (Vol. 42, v ed.). Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Vittorio Klostermann.
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K. Maly, Trans.). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
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Unveröffentlichte Abhandlungen. Vorträge – Gedachtes) (Vol. 66, v). Frankfurt am Main,
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& Th. Kalary, Trans.). London, UK: Bloomsbury/Continuum.
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ed.). Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Vittorio Klostermann.
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The Black Notebooks. Critical Historical
Analysis Without Commentary
Francesco Alfieri
1 Preface. “For the Few – For the Rare Ones”
Whoever holds Heidegger’s Black Notebooks in his hands and whose eye flies
across its pages as quickly as the “philosopher” recorded his momentary thoughts in
these notebooks engages in risky business. And in fact, this naïve procedure reveals
its inherent limits in this – that whoever uses this method shows himself incapable
of following the train of Heidegger’s thoughts. For this reason, certain readers have
chosen the much easier path of relying on their own, isolated and accidental insights,
and having assumed for themselves the role of author, have gone astray on a dead-
end trail. This danger did not escape the notice of Heidegger. For the philosopher
stipulated that the Black Notebooks were to be released only after the completed
publication of his collected works. We should not ignore this detail, because famil-
iarity with Heidegger’s historical-philosophical texts offers us the only key to the
interpretation of these notebooks, as well as to the thorough explication of their
contents in the terseness of their formulation and their uninhibited flow. The only
objective of these recorded remarks was to preserve insights that otherwise were
liable to have gone lost over the course of time. The terseness of Heidegger’s style
is unmistakable in many passages recorded in Ponderings (GA 94 and GA 95):
entire passages apparently consist of spontaneous, unconnected comments, unelab-
orated and incomplete; passages in general, it seems, hastily composed, and in part
written in colloquial style rather than in the elevated language of professional dis-
course. So, we are not dealing with a rigorously elaborated text that could function
as a building block of systematic discourse. For this reason, it seems to me expedi-
ent to emphasize certain passages by means of braces, or curly brackets ({}), when-
ever this manner of composition makes itself noticeable; attention to this mode of
writing may be helpful to the reader in her attempt to make sense of Heidegger’s
terse formulations. But this alone does not suffice: the thematic multiplicity of
Heidegger’s observations is so extensive that only a few of them can be worked out,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69496-8_3
32 The Black Notebooks. Critical Historical Analysis Without Commentary
gradually and systematically. Traces of this elaboration of insights can be found in

the works of the Complete Edition. But for the greater part, most of these observa-
tions find no further mention in the works, nor are they taken up and developed
there. How is it possible that some such hastily composed comments, as found in the
notebooks, have no relation to Heidegger’s systematic observations? Indeed, one
could assume – were one aware that Heidegger’s questioning leads to a new begin-
ning of thinking, which is questioning itself – that these comments, which disap-
peared without a trace in the Complete Edition, are mere drafts, or sketches that
have to be read with an eye for the formal transformations of Heideggerian catego-
ries. Beginning with Being and Time (1927) these categories are taken up only in
modified form in Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), and then further
explicated in Letter on Humanism (1946), and The Question Concerning
Technology (1953).
In the course of such questioning, it is likely that it will become still more diffi-
cult, but not impossible, to understand the sense of these observations. These
remarks have to be evaluated in relation to Heidegger’s language use; and in my
opinion this is the only way to avoid the kinds of misunderstanding that arise out of
exceeding the conceptual limits of the path of thinking that Heidegger, with great
effort, opened up. The obligatory task and responsibility of the intellectual, if he is
not going to follow alternative ways at any price, begins with the personal decision
to endure the difficulty of these observations, even and especially if – as many read-
ers these past years took to be “self-evident” – one will attempt to “go beyond” them
in commentary. It has by no means been easy to commit oneself to a study of the
notebooks, especially in view of the widely received claims of certain professionals
that the self-evident results of such study were already available. However that may
be, what was presented as supposedly known and established with the conclusion of
the discussion could not suffice to quiet the often unsettling urge to ask and pursue
questions on the part of the writer of these lines. This urge awakens the need to
question the results achieved; for it seems to me extremely questionable that a com-
prehensive interpretation could be established, given that Heidegger’s path of
thought always generates new questions. It was fully clear to me, in my approach to
the notebooks and what Heidegger wrote there from time to time, that I wanted to
experience the matters he addressed. Laborious though this may be, I have taken
care not to “cease paying attention” to the hasty mode of composition of the note-
books; and just as little to avoid the “temptation” to arrive at an interpretation of the
notebooks that ultimately can only be achieved in return to the inception. This does
not mean that I have succeeded in solving the vexata quaestio of the Black Notebooks.
On the contrary: in order to mediate an issue, we have to assume that at the end of
the discussion – one – perhaps far-reaching – vexata quaestio still remains. My
objective primarily consists in explicating the complex, terminological multiplicity
of Heidegger’s comments and observations by reference to their specific contexts.
The portion of the way I have gone here, I pass on to the reader. But then it is up to
the reader to grasp the necessity of returning to Heidegger’s texts for himself or
herself; for this becomes the basis of opening up new paths of research to confront,
and suffer, the complexity of questioning without falling back on compromises with
a position that claims to be self-evident, although it is in the utmost degree untenable.
2 Ponderings II-VI: Black Notebooks 1931–1938 33
This is not the place, and I will not here respond to those scholars who advanced
“interpretations” in the past years, nor to their completely different judgments
regarding Heidegger’s literary estate, nor to the efforts of his students. It is and
remains our duty to determine the reliability of their claims, and this, indeed, on the
basis of the notes that Heidegger has left us. Even if certain scholars have arrived at
so-called undeniable and self-evident facts, it does not seem appropriate to me to
give place here to their interpretative attempts. In the final analysis, and therefore on
the basis of the conclusions derived from the philological analysis of the notebooks,
it may be left to us to decide if these so-called self-evident facts rest on philological
evidence. Let it be said in advance, that this project required a radical turn of per-
spective in order to bring us back to Heidegger, thus to allow us to interpret the
Black Notebooks, published by the Klostermann Press, without commentary or
expression of opinion. The reader will come to confirm that new horizons, which
Heidegger himself anticipated, are opened in this text. Hitherto I have always con-
cluded my own investigations with reference to a number of possible conclusions
that may be derived from them. In this case, on the contrary, it shall be left to the
reader to draw the necessary conclusions; for it seems to me that to bring about a
return (to Heidegger), it is necessary to swim against the current to arrive at my
point of departure.
This project of research – following Heidegger’s practice, I call it moving back
toward the source, running against the current – is intended as the first step, starting
from the notebooks, to go back to the intentions of the author: our objective is to
understand Heidegger’s path of thinking from the starting point of his works. In
what follows, all the volumes of the Black Notebooks will be represented by selected
passages; key concepts are printed in bold and subsequently explicated. Only a few
passages of the original manuscript will be reproduced in facsimile. The objective is
to show how Heidegger reconceives the ontological concept of “category” by bring-
ing the ontological aspect into relation with the specific, real-existing historical
events to which he refers and to which he personally re-acts. What is solely deci-
sive, in order to return to Heidegger and to grasp the complexity of the notebooks,
is to undertake the hermeneutic passage marked by a new understanding of Dasein
and the ontic sphere within the perspective of being-historical thinking. In consid-
eration of the significance of the themes examined here, I consider this text only as
an attempt to constantly subject oneself to critical judgment.
2 Ponderings II-VI: Black Notebooks 1931–19381
2.1 Heidegger’s Firm Attitude in Regard to National Socialism
Let us now more closely consider the material Heidegger has left us. There is no
other way of understanding Heidegger’s actual involvement with National Socialism
in those dark times of his rectorate of the University of Freiburg. After a thorough
1
reading of volume GA 94, I selected all passages that reference the concept, or the-
matic unity, of “National Socialism” along with related and subordinate concepts
that reflect Heidegger’s observations between 1931 and 1938. Only in this fashion
can we understand his involvement and his possible responsibility. In order to give
the reader an interpretative grid, I have left a trace in Heidegger’s texts, consisting,
as noted above, in having the words and expressions of the Black Notebooks that are
to be explicated printed in bold type. Emphasized in this way, we can better under-
stand the use of these terms and above all, their mutual correspondence in relation
to the contextual unity of this turbulent historical period. It is not unusual for the
meaning of certain expressions to change in accordance with the historical context
to which they belong. Before we turn to the texts, let us consider the following sur-
vey of key concepts, which will be of further use to us in conclusion to this section.
In this way we can begin to initiate a more refined grasp of the subject.
The Seinsfrage, as the question concerning being, constitutes the comprehensive
background of Heidegger’s reflections. This background consists not only of the
historical period, but also of the pathway of a possible re-awakening of the incep-
tion (Anfang). In this context, Dasein has to be understood in a new way, and there-
fore one risks being led astray on paths that lead away from the return (retrieval) to
the origin (Ursprung) of the history of being. One way to go astray is to lose sight
of the inception in its originary and authentic sense – which is to say – the inception
as questioning. In reference to the question of being Heidegger warns of reducing
thinking to the “play” of various “philosophical discourses” or directions
(Intimations X Ponderings II, and Directives, § 211). The question of being rather
has to do with a “new inception”. We find frequent reference to the creative trans-
formation of Dasein; the “creative” however, must not be confused with “machina-
tion” (Ponderings and Intimations III, § 68 and § 79); only a higher, genuine and
superior knowledge can establish a “historical-spiritual” world (§ 83). Hence “the
spiritual distress of Dasein” and the urgent question: “When will we experience the
great distress of Dasein? [...] When will get serious about the question-worthiness
of Dasein [...]?” (§ 88).
That is the background. We will now proceed to map Heidegger’s terminology as
well as the specific, modified usages of key terms in Ponderings II-VI.
In Ponderings and Intimations III, the term National Socialism is used as fol-
lows: the “National Socialist Movement” is mentioned with specific reference to
“slogans and phrases” (§ 46). Regarding “slogans” (Schlagworte), Heidegger allows
himself the use of a slogan to describe the National Socialist “philosopher” Alfred
Baeumler’s work as “Neokantianism warmed up with National Socialism” (§ 207);
in GA 95, Heidegger comes back to this with reference to National Socialism. Here
the reference is to “professional organizations” and their “calculative evaluation of
the totality of requirements” (rechnend; § 68). In the same context, Heidegger
remarks on the future of the university: “As if National Socialism were a coating of
paint that quickly can be applied everywhere”; and “one often hears that National
Socialism did not develop, first of all, as ‘theory’, but [...] rather began as praxis”
(§ 69). Heidegger asserts that “We do not want to establish a ‘theoretical’
foundation for National Socialism, in order to supposedly give it, in this fashion,
viability and make it sustainable” (§ 70).
Evidently a new tone begins to sound with § 72. Heidegger introduces the con-
cept of “spiritual National Socialism” (geistiger Nationalsozialismus), while noting
that spiritual National Socialism is nothing “theoretical”; nor is it the “better” or
even the “authentic” National Socialism; and nonetheless it is just as “necessary”.
This tone continues unchanged into § 73.
Consequent to a change of course, Heidegger takes note of the “deformation of
National Socialism” as a “spin”, (on events) and in the same segment of text he
refers to the “advantage” (that with this spin) one can pass oneself off as a “National
Socialist” and be “recommended to the masses by the press” (§ 78).
What follows is the first use of the term “ideology”; National Socialism (§ 80) is
said to decay into “vulgar National Socialism” (Vulgärnationalsozialismus), aided
by the controversial gestalt of “newspaper writers” (Zeitungsschreiber) in the “pro-
ducers of culture” (§ 81). In the context of a critique of the socialist posturing of the
student associations, Heidegger offers the opinion that “as ‘student’ the student of
today is no National Socialist” (§ 83).
In subsequent passages, Heidegger seems to be of the opinion that National
Socialism will suffer the same fate as Christianity: some seek refuge in “self-deceiv-
ing flight into the emptiness that Christianity has become”, and others “through the
proclamation of a National Socialist worldview, which is as spiritually questionable
as its origin is dubious” (§ 88). For the moment we restrict ourselves to recording
this data. But what Heidegger understands by Christianity remains an open question.
By reference to “student associations”, and “teachers’ associations”, Heidegger
comes back to National Socialism, stating that “using the excuse of an often very
questionable National Socialism and guided by an unjustified sense of self-assur-
ance, they play at being judge and jury; and so, in respect to the university as a
whole, they try to cover up in advance their complete lack of aptitude in shaping and
designing, while putting themselves on track to achieve the unrivalled ‘organiza-
tion’ of mediocrity” (§ 96, n. 5).
As it draws to a close, § 101 introduces us to Heidegger’s assessment of his
Rectorate: “A merely reactive approach, drawing upon National Socialist means of
power and its associated functionaries, may offer the semblance of the self-asser-
tion of a dominant position to outsiders; but what is the point, when the entire con-
struct is inherently powerless; [...]?”. Then, in renewed reference to National
Socialism, Heidegger contrasts “the most up-to-date literary means” of the Jesuits
and the (National Socialist) “injunction – read the National Socialist press!” (§ 169).
Another sudden course correction, in comparison to § 72 (which introduces
“spiritual National Socialism”), can be found in § 183: there he notes that “National
Socialism laments the absence of ‘spirit’”. It furthermore becomes evident that
National Socialism (unlike “German Catholicism”, and intent upon) “emphasizing
what is different and new, runs the risk of cutting itself off from the great tradition,
losing itself on the byroads of ineptitude and half-baked measures” (§ 184).
Heidegger voices the opinion that “National Socialism can never constitute the
principle of a philosophy” (§ 198). For the first time he determines it as “a barbaric
principle” (barbarisches Prinzip). Its “essential nature” consists in “the received
‘logic’ of common thinking and the exact sciences” (§ 206). This determination of
National Socialism as defined by a “barbaric principle” recurs in volumes GA 95
and GA 97.
Heidegger takes a still harder tone in Ponderings V: “National Socialist philoso-
phy is not a ‘philosophy’, nor does it serve ‘National Socialism’ – it simply trails
along behind, burdening it with its know-it-all attitude – which sufficiently demon-
strates its ineptitude for philosophy” (§ 61). In Ponderings VI, Heidegger declares
“the superfluity and impossibility” of such philosophy; it is “even more impossi-
ble”, and at the same time, far more superfluous than “Catholic philosophy” (§ 154).
The sole reference to Hitler is to be found in Ponderings and Intimations III:
“This gives rise – naturally with brainless invocation of Hitler’s ‘Mein Kampf’ – to
a specific doctrine of history and of humanity, which is passed on to the people. This
doctrine may best be described as ethical materialism [...]”; “one now combines a
cloudy biologism which nonetheless supplies ethical materialism with its proper
‘ideology’” (§ 81). The context of this observation is supplied by “vulgar National
Socialism”.
In the context of reflections on the university system of 1933, this category of
texts includes another set that elaborates on and modifies the terminology of strug-
gle (Kampf) to include (1) “spiritual struggle” (§ 68, n. 9); (2) struggle as prepara-
tory activity: “struggle to transform [existing institutions] into a company of leaders
working in small groups and quietly [to] prepare the arrival of what is to come” (§
68, n. 11). Then again, (3) the expression is used in regard to National Socialism (§
79), but with Heidegger’s clarification as to how he had previously understood
“struggle”, followed by (4) its definition as “future-directed engagement and strug-
gle”, which is glossed as “danger and suffering, meaning: knowing awareness!”.
(§ 81). In what follows (5) “struggle” is used in the modified sense of “to struggle
against” (bekämpfen), or to resist: “but it is a basic requirement to resist Catholicism,
as a center that is expanding into the spiritual-political domain by means of the
entire fixed inner cadre of its staunchly ecclesiastical ‘organization’” (§ 184).
The different thematic unities, or passages, as formulated above, are solely
intended to demonstrate to the reader the multiple modifications of sense of these
thematic and semantic unities in the present division of the text. After reading the
following selection of texts, the reader should be better prepared to gain a sense,
directly, of Heidegger’s comments and observations. In conclusion I will propose
one possible interpretation, based upon the consideration of the entire material gath-
ered together here.
Winke x Überlegungen (ii) und Anweisungen Intimations X, Ponderings II and

§ 211 [123], S. 87–88: Directives
Das Ende – die Verwesung des Wesens zum Sein (vgl. § 211 [123]:
S. 105 f.) The end – the decomposition of the
Das Sein ist vergessen – eben weil noch ständig ownmost of being (compare p. 105ff.)
beiläufig gekannt und gebraucht. Das Sein in einem Being is forgotten – even as it is
Gemenge wurzelloser Begriffe vertan, in einem casually and constantly still known and
Gewirre aller (leicht) aufstellbaren “dialektischen” put to use. Being is used up in blends
Begriffsbeziehungen vernutzt der Tummelplatz für das of rootless concepts; wasted in service
Spiel irgendwelcher Systeme und “wissenschaftlicher to the tangled confusion of easily
Philosophien” – die sogar den fatalen Scheinvorzug constructed “dialectical” relations, it is
haben, meist richtig – beileibe aber nicht im geringsten the playground for randomly selected
wahr zu sein. Doch diese Unphilosophie nur die Folge systems and “scientific
der Verwesung des Seins. Durch diese das Dasein aus philosophies” – even such as have the
der Bahn geworfen und abgesetzt in der dumpfen Ruhe apparent advantage of being correct,
einer vielfachen Ungefahr – darin alles Große verzehrt, for the most part – without being in the
ohne Maß und Richtung – zerfahren und gestaltlos und least sense true. Yet this
ohne inneres Gesetz der Nation –. Und wo sie im unphilosophical philosophy is only
Aufbruch, da bleibt die eigentliche Disziplin und Zucht the consequence of the decomposition
ihrer Zuständigkeit (Geist und Leib) ein Nachtrag, of being: and hence Dasein is thrown
dessen leichte Erledigung übelster Pfuscherei from its path and sent astray into the
übertragen wird. echoless quietude of a varied life
without hazard. And so everything
great is consumed, without measure,
directionless – distracted without issue,
formless, lacking the immanent
measure of the nation ... and where it
awakens, the spheres of competence
(in body and spirit) of authentic
discipline and its cultivation are just
added on, given over to be quickly
managed and thoroughly bungled.
Winke x Überlegungen (ii) und Anweisungen Intimations X, Ponderings II and Directives

§ 218 [129–130], S. 92: § 218 [129–130]:
Weder die Unmittelbarkeit zum “totalen” Staat, Neither the immediacy of the “total” state,
noch die Erweckung des Volkes und die nor yet the awakening of the people and the
Erneuerung der Nation, erst recht nicht die renewal of the nation, still less the salvation
Rettung der “Kultur” als Nachtrag zu Volk und of “culture” as supplement to the people and
Staat und vollends nicht die Flucht in den the state, and least of all the flight to
christlichen Glauben und das fürchterliche Christian belief and the horrific project of
Vorhaben einer christlichen Kultur können und Christian culture can be, nor should ever be,
dürfen im Ersten und Letzten bestimmend sein. the decisive beginning and end.
Es muß vielmehr die weit aus dem Verborgenen Rather, greatly nourished by what is
genährte Unumgänglichkeit des Werkes der concealed and sheltered, what is needed is the
Wesensermächtigung in den wenigen Einzelnen experience and the safekeeping of the
erfahren und verwahrt werden. Das vertrauende unavoidable work of the empowerment of the
Behüten der Möglichkeit des Erwirkens solchen ownmost being of the few in their
Werkes muß ungezwungen gesichert sein. singleness.The guardians to which this
Gerade weil es sich nicht darum handeln kann, possibility of the evocation of such work is
eine “Grundlegung” zu schaffen, sondern das entrusted must be preserved without
Seiende im Ganzen zu Raum und Bahn eines imposition of constraint. Precisely because it
großen Daseins zu bringen. (S. 131). cannot be a matter of “laying down
Ohne das bleibt alles ein zufälliges und uferloses foundations”, but rather of bringing beings in
Gezerre und ein kleines Behagen ohne Maß und the whole to stand in the site and within the
Rang – trotz aller Erweckung der Massen zur horizon of the greatness of Dasein (page
gewachsenen Einheit von Volk und Nation. 131).
Wenn wir uns nicht dahin bringen, daß unsere Lacking this, haphazard and boundless
Geschichte wird ein Erkämpfen des Zuspruchs contention and little pleasure without order of
einer wesentlichen Weite und Tiefe des Da-seins rank or measure is all that remains – despite
aus dem verschwiegenen Wesen des Seins, dann the awakening of the masses into the maturity
| haben wir das Ende verwirkt, und zwar ein of their unity as a people and a nation. If we
kleines und lächerliches Ende. do not reach the point of turning our history
into a struggle for a grant of an essential
measure and depth of Dasein out of the
ownmost reserve of being, then we will have
forfeited the goal, and indeed [what follows],
is a small and risible end.
Überlegungen und Winke iii Ponderings and Intimations III

§ 46 [18], S. 121: § 46 [18]:
Weg von den Geschäften, die andere viel besser Avoidance of dealing and transactions,
machen, heißt nicht: Abseitsstehen von der which others are much better at, does not
Bewegung. Soll unser Volk nach wenigen Jahren an mean standing aside from the Movement.
den ständigen Schlagworten und Phrasen Must our people starve on a constant diet
verhungern – oder werden wir einen wirklichen of slogans and phrases within a few
geistigen Adel schaffen, der stark genug ist, die years – or are we going to create a
Überlieferung der Deutschen aus einer großen spiritual nobility, one strong enough to
Zukunft zu gestalten? shape the tradition of the Germans from
Ist es eine natürliche Folge, daß heute notwendig out of a great future?
die Gestalt des künftigen Geistes verkannt wird und Does it follow by nature that the
daß man innerhalb der nationalsozialistischen necessary gestalt of the spirit of the future
Bewegung die Anfänge verkennen muß, die in ihr must be misunderstood today? That one
zu einer wirklichen gewachsenen Verwandlung der must, within the National Socialist
Kräfte und Wege und Werke drängen? movement, misconceive those beginnings
in this Movement, which drive on toward
the genuine and mature transformation of
powers, of paths, and works?

§ 68 [31–38], S. 130–133: § 68 [31–38]:
Welche Einrichtungen und Strebungen jetzt The institutions and objectives that presently
(Dezember 1933) die Universität bestimmen (December 1933) determine the University
(vgl. S. 68): (see p. 68):
1. die Deutsche Studentenschaft; 1. the German student body;
2. die (in der Bildung begriffene) Deutsche 2. the German academic staff (grasped in
Dozentenschaft; formation);
3. das S.A.-Hochschulamt. 3. the S.A. office for higher education.
Diese Organisationen wirken nach ihrer In accordance with the formation of their
Willensbildung und Haltung nicht aus dem objectives and their governing attitudes, these
wirklichen geschichtlichen Leben der organizations do not effectively relate to the
einzelnen Hochschulen, sondern kommen von genuine historical life of any specific
außen her, aus rätemäßigen Ansprüchen auf university; they rather arrive as outsiders and
die einzelnen Hochschulen zu. Diese approach the universities guided by demands
“Organisationen” arbeiten innerhalb der typical of radical workers’ councils. Within any
einzelnen Hochschulen nur mit Funktionären, given university, these “organizations” work
von denen verlangt wird, nach der Führung solely with functionaries who are instructed to
sich zuerst zu richten. Der Blick für die je above all follow the directives of the leadership.
eigenen Aufgaben | einer Hochschule – nach An eye for the distinctive tasks of a particular
Landschaft, Geschichte, university – each of which will be different in
Lehrkörperzusammensetzung, Art des accordance with its geography, history, the
Studentenzuzugs je verschieden – wird nicht composition of its teaching staff, the character
frei – d. h. eigentlich politische of its student body – never comes into play.
Entscheidungen können gar nicht vollzogen And this means that authentically political
werden. Es fehlt die Eignung und Kraft zur decisions cannot be made at all. The aptitude,
Besinnung auf die Lage; es fehlt vor allem the energy and attention to the concrete
jedes eigentliche weitgreifende Vorauswollen. situation are all lacking; lacking, above all, is
Die Verzettelung und Verschnürung in any genuine, far-reaching sense of wanting to
Augenblicks-”aktion” ist unvermeidlich – reach into the future. Given the demand to
zumal ja verlangt wird, daß etwas “make something happen”, instantaneous
“geschieht”. responses inevitably lead to piecemeal
4. der nationalsozialistische Ärztebund; initiatives and blockages.
5. der nationalsozialistische Juristenbund; 4. the National Socialist medical confederation;
6. der nationalsozialistische Lehrerbund. 5. the National Socialist legal confederation;
Diese berufsständischen Organisationen 6. the National Socialist teaching confederation.
sichern sich einen wesentlichen These professional organizations are securing
Einflußbereich auf die Hochschule. Sie themselves essential fields of influence within the
bestimmen mit die Auswahl der Lehrkräfte, University. They co-determine the selection of
die Anlage und Verteilung des Lehrstoffes, die the teaching staff, the arrangement and order of
Gestaltung des Prüfungswesens. Sie setzen distribution of the teaching material, the design
mit die Maßstäbe für die Arbeit und das Urteil and configuration of the examination system. By
in der Hochschulwirklichkeit. Auch hier wird helping to set benchmarks for competence and
nicht politisch aus jeweiligen for proper evaluation they co-determine the
Notwendigkeiten und Lagen und reality of the University. Here again, decisions
Entwicklungsstufen und Widerständen are not made on the political basis of necessary
entschieden, | sondern aus den rechnenden requirements, of situations, of levels of
Gesamtbedürfnissen der allgemeinen development and degrees of resistance, as the
berufsständischen Ansprüche. case may be, but on the basis of a calculative
evaluation of the totality of requirements dictated
by the demands of the professions in general.
7. Die Ministerien übernehmen 7. The ministries have assumed the

verwaltungsmäßig die Hochschulen. Sie management of the universities. They solicit,
fordern, regeln, gleichen aus all die regulate, counter-balance all the tendencies and
Strebungen und Vorschläge und Forderungen proposals and research projects of the
der genannten Einrichtungen. Als Sicherung above-named institutions. The Office of the
ist in der Hochschule die Rektoratsverfassung Rector functions in the University as a back-up,
eingeschaltet. Sie soll eine Führung der safeguarding measure. The Rector’s function is
Hochschule gewährleisten. Der Rektor wird merely to mediate these organizations. He also
aber lediglich zur Vermittlungsstelle jener has the questionable task of taking
Organisationen. Er hat allenfalls die responsibility for everything taken up by the
fragwürdige Aufgabe, für alles, was in die University. It makes for only a relative – not
Hochschule hineingetragen wird, die an absolute – distinction if in the course of
Verantwortung zu übernehmen. Es ist nur ein this the Rector is a National Socialist, or not.
verhältnisweiser – kein schlechtinniger – In the latter case, the organizations
Unterschied, ob dabei der Rektor mentioned actually operate more smoothly,
Nationalsozialist ist oder nicht. Im letzten for by reason of caution, if not downright
Falle arbeiten sogar die genannten fear, everything is affirmed and brought to
Organisationen leichter, weil schon aus completion.
bloßer Vorsicht, wenn nicht gar Angst, alles 8. The University in and of itself is no longer
bejaht und zur Durchführung gebracht capable of genuine “self-affirmation”; it no
wird. longer understands this demand; it loses itself
8. Die Hochschule selbst bringt eine in the mere maintenance of its traditional
eigentliche “Selbstbehauptung” nicht mehr business, as assimilated to the present
auf; sie versteht diese | Forderung gar nicht inevitability of renewal and conformity. It will
mehr; sie verliert sich in das bloße Beibehalten no longer find its way back to the experience of
des überkommenen Betriebes mit den jetzt the necessity of originary knowing, nor make
unvermeidlichen Gleichschaltungen und the shaping of knowing its own task. The
Neuerungen. Sie findet nicht mehr dahin University has no inkling of a self-affirmation
zurück, die Notwendigkeit des Wissens that would have to undertake nothing less than
ursprünglich zu erfahren und daraus ihre the fundamental confrontation with the great
Aufgabe zu gestalten. Sie weiß nichts davon, historical and spiritual tradition of the worlds of
daß eine Selbstbehauptung nichts Geringeres Christianity, of socialism as communism, and
bedeuten müßte als die grundsätzliche of the modern enlightenment, which even today
Auseinandersetzung mit der großen geistig- constitute reality.
geschichtlichen Überlieferung, wie sie durch 9. The seven institutions and associations
die Welten des Christentums, des Sozialismus named above (number 1–7) know nothing of all
als Kommunismus und die neuzeitliche this. For precisely this reason they can come to
Aufklärungswissenschaft heute noch terms with the dominant scientific enterprise,
Wirklichkeit ist. as long as it ensures, as part of its required
9. Von all dem wissen aber auch all die contribution, a certain level of political
vorgenannten (1–7) Einrichtungen und Stellen education. Still worse: it’s not just a matter of
nichts; weshalb sie sich genau mit dem tolerating the essential character of
herrschenden Wissenschaftsbetrieb abfinden, contemporary science; what prevails and what
wenn er nur eine gewisse politische Erziehung is even nourished is the will to refuse anything
als notwendige Mit-Leistung sicherstellt. Noch of spirit – that is, all that one previously
mehr: es bleibt nicht nur bei der Duldung des misconstrued as intellectualism. Aversion to any
wesentlichen Charakters der bestehenden form of spiritual struggle counts as strength of
Wissenschaft, es herrscht sogar und wird character and as evidence of being “close to
gepflegt ein Widerwille gegen allen | Geist, den life”. This closeness, however, amounts to
man zuvor als Intellektualismus mißdeutet hat. nothing but philistine conformity saturated with
Die Abneigung gegen jeden geistigen Kampf sentiment. This would be a trivial matter did it
gilt als Charakterstärke und als Sinn für die
“Lebensnähe”. Diese ist aber im Grunde nur not unconsciously derail and nullify the spirit
eine mit Rückgefühlen geladene of the entire Movement, which light-heartedly
Spießbürgerei. Sie wäre sogar belanglos, wenn came to terms with its own lack of sharp and
sie nicht unbewußt die ganze Bewegung in decisive weapons for the spiritual struggle
eine geistige Ohnmacht abdrängte, die den ahead by relying upon vacuous theories and its
Mangel an jeglichen scharfen und harten inherited intellectual baggage.
Waffen für den bevorstehenden geistigen 10. The entire situation, seen from the narrow
Kampf noch vollends als Unbeschwertheit mit standpoint of the destiny of one university over
Wissenskram und leeren Theorien sich the course of one year, may be a transitional
zurechtlegte. state and soon dissipate. But it can also be
10. Diese Gesamtlage mag ein alsbald interpreted as the quickly corrosive and yet
verschwindender Übergangszustand sein, unheeded inception of a great failure to address
gesehen aus der Enge des Geschickes einer the most urgent task of all – the education of
Hochschule in der knappen Zeitspanne eines German youth to knowledge in the national,
Jahres. Sie kann aber auch gedeutet werden als historical and spiritual sense. Such knowledge
der rasch und unbeachtet weiterfressende no longer means competence in concepts and
Anfang eines großen Versäumnisses in der skills, but rather a way of being – a knowledge
Inangriffnahme der dringlichsten of self that seizes itself in the concept to
Erziehungsaufgabe an der deutschen Jugend: become equal to the great and therefore
der volklich, geschichtlich, geistigen difficult future of our people.
Wissens-|erziehung, für die Wissen nicht mehr 11. What shall we do in response to this
bedeutet: unverbindlicher Besitz an situation?
Kenntnissen, sondern ein Sein – das sich (a) In this harsh reality, unreservedly to press
begreifende und im Begriff ergriffene forward and to set to work; that is, not to be
Gewachsensein gegenüber der großen und caught up and entangled in the formalities of
deshalb schweren Zukunft unseres Volkes. so-called leadership positions and thereby to
11. Was sollen wir in dieser Lage tun? fail of genuine effectiveness, which is
a) Unmittelbar in der harschen Wirklichkeit dependent upon germination and maturation.
nach vorne drängend mitarbeiten, d. h. sich And so: in concert with a company of
nicht in den Formen sogenannter Führerstellen companions, struggle to transform it into a
verfangen und sich um die echte – auf Keimen company of leaders working in small groups
und Reifen angewiesene – Wirkung bringen. and quietly to prepare the arrival of what is to
Also: aus der Mannschaft heraus, sie come.
umbildend im Kampf sich eine Führerschaft (b) Wherever possible, push for the creation of
werden und aus kleinen Bezirken heraus und a small number of simple and flexible
im Stillen das Kommende in seinem Werden institutions, which above all offer the assurance
vorbereiten. that within their structures new beginnings can
b) Wo möglich, auf wenige, einfache, im Fluß form; that genuine centers of energy crystalize,
zu haltende Einrichtungen und deren and that so, slowly and constantly, new spiritual
Schaffung drängen, die vor allem die Gewähr measures of evaluation are posited, are made
bieten, daß sich in ihrer Ordnung neue known and enacted in ways of comportment,
Anfänge herausbilden, echte Kräfte are brought to manifestation in word and
zusammenschließen und so langsam | und action.
stetig die höchsten geistigen Maßstäbe gesetzt, (c) In both respects, it will only be possible to
in Gesinnung und Haltung vertraut gemacht, in act effectively and to hold out if the University
Wort und Werk zur Erscheinung gebracht in its present form is negated, while affirming
werden. the inception of a completely different kind of
education in essential knowing.
c) Nach beiden Weisen kann nur gehandelt und {It finally has to be understood, that powers of
durchgehalten werden, wenn die Universität reaction, which cling to what is, as well as new
als Vorhandenes verneint, aber der Auftrag der forms of organization, which merely rearrange
ganz anderen Wissenserziehung bejaht wird. present realities, both work to bring about the
{Wenn begriffen wird, daß sowohl die unstoppable dissolution and final disintegration
Reaktion, die am Bestehenden hängt, als auch of the University.} As long as this insight is
die neuen Organisationen, die das Bestehende lacking, the work of education for a new kind
nur umschalten, an der unaufhaltsamen of knowing cannot break into the open and
Auflösung und endgültigen Zersetzung der establish itself on fertile soil.
Universität arbeiten}. Solange diese Einsicht World-historical spiritual powers cannot be
fehlt, kommt alle Arbeit für die neue overcome by turning one’s back on them or by
Wissenserziehung nicht ins Freie und nicht auf trying to bind them through mutual
einen wachstumspendenden Boden. – accommodation.
Geschichtlich-geistige Welten und Mächte The fundamental failure of the “political
werden nicht dadurch überwunden, daß man education” – a tautology – of today does not
ihnen den Rücken kehrt oder durch consist in this, that too little is brought about,
Abmachungen in Ketten legt. and this only reluctantly and uncertainly, but
Der Grundmangel der heutigen “politischen rather that one rashly wants to do too much, all
Erziehung” – eine Tautologie – liegt nicht in a flash. As if National Socialism were a
darin, daß zu wenig und dieses nur zögernd coating of paint that quickly can be applied
und unsicher geschieht, sondern daß zuviel everywhere.
und zu überstürzt im Handumdrehen als neu When are we going to understand something of
gemacht werden will. Als sei der the simplicity of ownmost essence and the calm
Nationalsozialismus ein Anstrich, der allem continuity of its unfolding from generation to
jetzt schnell aufgetragen wird. generation?
Wann begreifen wir etwas von der Einfachheit We ever stagger from one aberrant and
des Wesens und der bedächtigen Stetigkeit entrenched objective to another, only
seiner Entfaltung in Geschlechtern? superficially setting future-oriented goals.
Wir taumeln je nur in abwegigen und {To recognize the necessity of a multitude of
überkommenen, nur scheinbar vorgreifenden tasks, to grasp their order of rank, and yet to
Zielsetzungen. hold on to the singleness of one’s ownmost
{Vielspältige Aufgaben anerkennen und in calling. Not to betray the extraordinary, the
ihrer Notwendigkeit und Rangstufe begreifen originary security of the creative. The latter not
und doch das Eine der eigensten Berufung to be confused with the powers of
festhalten. Keine Untreue gegenüber der machination.
nichtalltäglichen ursprünglichen Sicherheit des No “classes”, but rank order.
Schöpferischen. Dieses nicht mit den Not “strata” but orders of pre-eminence}.
Machenschaften verwechseln.
Keine “Klassen”, aber Rang.
Keine “Schichten”, aber Überlegenheit}.

§ 69 [39–40], S. 133–134: § 69 [39–40]:
Eine beliebte Redeweise: der One often hears that National Socialism did
Nationalsozialismus ist nicht zuerst als not develop, first of all, as “theory”, but
“Theorie” ausgebildet worden, sondern hat mit rather began as praxis. Good. But does it
dem Handeln begonnen. Gut. Aber folgt daraus, follow that “theory” is superfluous; does it
daß die “Theorie” überflüssig ist; folgt daraus even follow that “otherwise,” or “moreover”,
gar, daß man sich “sonst” “im übrigen” mit one tarts oneself up with bad theories and
schlechten Theorien und “Philosophien” “philosophies”? One does not recognize that
aufputzt? Man sieht nicht, daß “Theorie” hier “theory” is taken in two different senses – as
zweideutig genommen wird – je nach Bedarf – needed – and that in consideration of one’s
und daß man also gerade in der Deutung des own doing one is making a theoretical error:
eigenen Tuns “theoretisch” fehlgreift; denn: for were not the many campaign “speeches”
waren die vielen “Reden” im Kampf nicht theoretical? For what did one do, but this:
“Theorien” – was wurde denn getan, als dies: die to re-educate people and members of the
Menschen und Volksgenossen zu anderen community into holding other opinions; for
Anschauungen umzuerziehen, z. B. vom Arbeiter example, of workers, of the economy,
und Arbeiter, von Wirtschaft, von Gesellschaft, society, the state – the community of the
von people – honor – history?
Staat – Volksgemeinschaft – Ehre – Geschichte? “Theory” as a mere abstraction of thought,
“Theorie” als abgelöster bloßer Gedanke, der nur that only is as thought, and “theory” as the
gedacht wird, und “Theorie” als vorgreifende anticipatory projecting-open of knowing
Wissensforderung dürfen nicht must not be confused. And accordingly, the
zusammengeworfen werden; je nachdem ist auch meaning of praxis will be different.
der Sinn von Praxis ein anderer; Einsatz ist nicht Commitment is not merely praxis; and nor
bloße Praxis; und bloßes Losbrechen und yet are breaking free of constraints and just
Umsichschlagen ist auch kein Einsatz. Der letting loose evidence of commitment. The
Unbegriff von “Theorie” kann praktisch die perversion of the concept of “theory” can in
verhängnisvollsten Folgen haben; denn Praxis practice have the most disastrous
wird dann nur “Betrieb” = schlecht verstandene consequences; for then praxis just becomes a
“Organisation”. matter of “business” = poorly understood
Jetzt ist aber nicht der Endzustand – auch nicht “organization”.
einfach der Abschnitt einer bloßen Ausbreitung We have not reached the end-state. Nor yet
desselben im ganzen Volk über Partei hinaus – the stage of propagation [of a way of
sondern jetzt gerade Einsatz in diesem thinking] beyond the Party to encompass the
vermeintlichen Theoretischen – weil da die entirety of the people. But rather [now is the
Grundstimmungen sich verwurzeln und aus time] for commitment within the supposedly
diesen heraus die geschichtliche Welt geschaffen theoretical – because that is where
werden muß. fundamental forms of attunement are rooted,
Je ursprünglicher und stärker die sinnbildliche it is the source of formation from whence a
Kraft der Bewegung und ihre Arbeit, umso historical world arises.
notwendiger das Wissen. Aber dieses nicht in The more primordial and stronger the
seiner satzmäßigen Folgerichtigkeit und symbolic power of the movement and its
Berechnung – sondern als Grundstimmungsmacht work, so the greater the necessary of
der Weltüberlegenheit a. knowledge. But the latter not in its
propositional consistency and its
calculability – but as the superior power of
the fundamental attunement of a world.
a
Here it is easy to see that an entire series of remarks are set forth without claim to accomplished
style, rather being framed in vernacular mode: this is reflected in the use of the semi-colon (;), the
mathematical symbol (=), the dash (−), and sentences without a verb. This also pertains to other
passages

§ 70 [40–41], S. 134–135: § 70 [40–41]:
Wir wollen nicht den Nationalsozialismus We do not want to establish a “theoretical”
“theoretisch” unterbauen, etwa gar, um ihn erst foundation for National Socialism, in order
so vermeintlicherweise trag- und bestandsfähig to supposedly give it, in this fashion,
zu machen. viability and make it sustainable.
Aber wir wollen der Bewegung und ihrer But we want to anticipate possibilities of
Richtkraft Möglichkeiten der Weltgestaltung und world-formation and development
der Entfaltung vorbauen, wobei wir wissen, daß commensurate to the Movement and its
diese Entwürfe als solche, d. h. zu “Ideen” directional force, knowing full well that
umgefälscht, keine Wirkfähigkeit besitzen; wohl these proposals as such, that is, falsified into
aber dann, wenn sie geworfene in der “concepts,” will be devoid of efficacy; but
Bewegungskraft | und ihrem Feld entsprungene they can be effective as a comportment of
und darin verbleibende Fragehaltungen und questioning and as language when they are
Sprache sind. projected into the field of energy out of
Die stimmende und bildschaffende Kraft des which they arose as motive power.
Entwurfs ist das Entscheidende – und das läßt What is decisive is the attuned, symbol-
sich nicht errechnen. {Stimmung und Bild – aber generating power of projecting-open – and
muß dem verschlossenen Gestaltwillen des this cannot be calculated in advance.
Volkes entgegentreten}b. {Attunement and image: but [one has] to
confront the occluded will to formation of
the people}
b
The singular verb (muß ) cannot be referred to “Stimmung und Bild”; another subject must be
hypothesized (for instance “man”, impersonal, therefore: “One must oppose ...”)

§ 71 [41], S. 135: § 71 [41]:
Ist es ein Wunder, daß allenthalben die Is it surprizing that everywhere philistine
Spießbürgerei hochkommt, eingebildete attitudes arise, conceited pseudo-culture,
Halbkultur, kleinbürgerliche Scheinbildung – petit-bourgeois semblances of culture – that
daß die inneren Forderungen des deutschen the essential demands of German
Sozialismus gar nicht erkannt und daher auch socialism are not even recognized and that
nicht gewollt werden – am wenigsten aus dem therefore they cannot be sought after – least of
vielberufenen Charakter heraus? Die billigste all on the grounds of much-invoked qualities
Plattheit als volksverbundenes Denken! Aber of character? The cheapest platitude
solche Zustände sind nicht zu umgehen. given out as the authentic sentiment of a
Mittelmäßigkeit muß sein – nur darf man sie people. But such circumstances cannot be
nicht bessern wollen; sie ist gestraft genug; am avoided.
härtesten dadurch, daß sie um ihre Elendigkeit Mediocracy must be – only, one should
nicht weiß und ihrem eigenen Gesetz nach nicht not try to improve it; it is already penalized
darum wissen darf. enough, and most severely by this,
that it has no conception of its own misery, for
based on its own law it must not be
conceivable.

§ 72 [42], S. 135: § 72 [42]:
Der geistige Nationalsozialismus ist nichts Spiritual National Socialism is nothing
“Theoretisches”; er ist aber auch nicht der “theoretical”; nor is it the “better” or even
“bessere” und gar “eigentliche”; wohl aber ist er the “authentic” National Socialism; and
ebenso notwendig wie der der verschiedenen nonetheless it is just as necessary as the
Organisationen und der Stände. Wobei zu sagen National Socialism of the various
ist, daß die “Arbeiter der Stirn” nicht weniger organizations and estates. Which is to say,
weit vom geistigen Nationalsozialismus entfernt that the “work of thinking” is no less distant
sind wie die “Arbeiter der Faust”. from spiritual National Socialism than the
{Deshalb durchstehen mit den geistigen “work of the hand”.
Forderungen,} und wenn auch dieses Wollen {For this reason, continue to insist on
noch so oft und leicht von oben her als making demands of the spirit,} even if this
Nachträgliches belächelt und nach gut demand is often ridiculed from above and
marxistischer Denkweise als bloßes slighted as merely supplemental, and in good
“Mitläufer”wesen beiseitegeschoben wird. Marxist fashion, put off as the trademark of
“fellow travelers”.

§ 73 [42], S. 136: § 73 [42]:
Die drohende Verbürgerlichung der Bewegung The danger to the Movement represented by
wird gerade dadurch wesentlich unmöglich, daß the bourgeoisie essentially becomes
der Geist des Bürgertums und der durch das impossible because the bourgeois spirit and
Bürgertum verwaltete “Geist” (Kultur) von einem the “spirit” (culture) it administers is being
geistigen Nationalsozialismus her zerstört wird. destroyed by a spiritual National Socialism.

§ 78 [50–51], S. 140–141: § 78 [50–51]:
Die Herabsetzung des Nationalsozialismus zu The deformation of National Socialism into a
einem “Dreh”, mit Hilfe dessen man jetzt, als “trick”, which like a new lantern can be used to
einer neuen Laterne, die bisherige Wissenschaft scan previous scientific achievement, quickly
und ihre Stoffe absucht und, entsprechend illuminate it anew and prepare it for the market:
prompt neu beleuchtet, auf den Markt wirft. Das aside from facile possibilities of success, this
hat neben bequemen Erfolgsmöglichkeiten offers the additional advantage that one can
überdies noch den Vorteil, daß man als pass oneself off as a National Socialist and be
Nationalsozialist gilt und für die Massen durch recommended to the masses by the press. {In
die Presse empfohlen wird. {Durch all das bringt this way, the Movement is reduced to a torpor}
man in die Bewegung eine Erstarrung}c – unter belied by an illusion of spiritual vitality.
dem Schein der geistigen Verlebendigung. This immobility constitutes a mere state of
Die Erstarrung schafft einen bloßen Zustand – d. affairs and as such suppresses every
h. unterbindet alle vorgreifenden Antriebe und anticipatory motivation and attunement: it
Stimmungen | und versetzt in eine displaces one into a comfortable, mutually
gleichgeschaltete Behäbigkeit, die schlimmer ist coordinated state of sedation, which is worse
als die vorige. Zuguterletzt schafft man sich eine than what came before. And finally, one
Wissenslage, von der aus man überlegen establishes a superior knowledge base for
vorrechnen kann, daß ja der Nationalsozialismus oneself, which allows one to demonstrate that
eigentlich immer schon da gewesen und yes, indeed, National Socialism has always
vorbereitet sei. Und von da entbindet man sich been the case, it was being-prepared and on
erst vollends von der Grundstimmung der its way to us. And so, one absolves oneself
Übernahme eines ganz neuen und unerhörten completely of the fundamental attunement of
geistigen Auftrags. taking upon oneself an entirely new and
previously unheard-of spiritual mission.
c
Not accurate syntax, but typical of colloquial style. Rather, the passive should be used: “Durch all
das wird Erstarrung in die Bewegung gebracht”.

§ 79 [51–52], S. 141: § 79 [51–52]:
Entscheidend bleibt, ob die geistig- What remains decisive is whether the
geschichtlichen Ausgriffe und fundamental forms of attunement, and what is
Grundstimmungen so ursprünglich und grasped in advance, spiritually and
zugleich so klar sind, daß sie eine schöpferische historically, are primordial and yet
Umschaffung des Daseins erzwingen –; und unequivocal enough to compel the creative
dafür ist Voraussetzung, daß der new-formation of Dasein; and this
Nationalsozialismus im Kampf bleibt – in der presupposes that National Socialism continue
Lage des Sich-durchsetzen-müssens, nicht nur in struggle – in the condition of having to
der “Ausbreitung” und des “Anwachsens” und prove itself and to prevail, not just set upon
Behauptens. “propagation”, “growth”, and assertion.
Wo steht der Feind und wie wird er geschaffen? Where stands the enemy, and how did he come
Wohin der Angriff? Mit welchen Waffen? to be formed? In what direction the attack?
Bleibt alles im Zustand des Behauptens des With what weapons?
Errungenen, des vorzeitigen Nur-ausbauens Will everything remain in the state of
hängen? {Beachted die übertriebene Betonung maintaining past accomplishments, stuck in
des bisherigen Kampfes, als | sei es nun zu pre-mature elaboration of what already is?
Ende}. {Consider well the exaggerated emphasis on
Wer sich nur noch behauptet und dabei einer the bygone struggle, as if the matter were
hohlen Überlegenheit verfällt, der ist am finished}.
wenigsten gefeit gegen jene Urteilslosigkeit, die Whoever merely asserts himself, and thereby
eines Tages wahllos all das schluckt und preist, indulges a hollow sense of superiority, is least
was vordem angeblich bekämpft wurde. of all impervious to such lack of judgment as
will one day indiscriminately assimilate and
praise all that once had supposedly been
contested.
d
“Beachte” = “Consider”: We may assume that Heidegger addresses the reader – or perhaps himself

§ 80 [52], S. 142: § 80 [52]:
Wir kommen jetzt in die Zeit der schnell We are now entering a period of the
angepaßten “Ideologie” für den accelerated customization of an “ideology” for
Nationalsozialismus; {heute besonders leicht}. National Socialism; {particularly easy
Die Gefahr dieser: einerseits unerheblich und today}. The danger of this ideology: on the
gerade deshalb die Vielen irreleitend, anderseits one hand, it is inconsequential, and precisely
erheblicher und dann von Anderen abgelehnt, thereby it misleads many; on the other hand,
{was zur Verneinung zugleich des Geistigen somewhat more significant and therefore
wird}e. Alles bewegt sich {doch}f in bürgerlich- rejected by others {immediately transposed
liberalen Vorstellungsformen. into a denial of the spiritual}. {Yet} everything
depends upon bourgeois-liberal forms of
representation.
e
The structure should be: “Was zugleich zur Verneinung des Geistigen wird”
“doch” is a filler word that is typical of spoken language and means “you know very well that”,
f
“right?”, “you know better than me that…”


§ 81 [52–56], S. 142–144: § 81 [52–56]:
Man kann heute schon von einem Nowadays one can already speak of “vulgar
“Vulgärnationalsozialismus” sprechen; damit National Socialism”; by this I mean the world,
meine ich die Welt und die Maßstäbe und the standards and attitudes of appointed and
Forderungen und Haltungen der zur Zeit cherished newspaper-writers and producers of
bestallten und geschätzten Zeitungsschreiber culture. This gives rise – naturally with
und Kulturmacher. Von hier geht, unter brainless invocation of Hitler’s “Mein
hirnloser Berufung natürlich auf Hitlers Kampf” – to a specific doctrine of history and
“Mein Kampf”g eine ganz bestimmte of humanity, which is passed on to the people.
Geschichts- und Menschenlehre ins Volk; This doctrine may best be described as ethical
diese Lehre läßt sich am besten | als ethischer materialism, which doesn’t mean the injunction
Materialismus bezeichnen; damit sei nicht to live the life of the senses as the highest law
gemeint die Forderung von Sinnengenuß und of Dasein {no, not at all}; the designation is
Ausleben als höchstes Daseinsgesetz; explicitly set in opposition to Marxism and its
{beileibe nicht}h. Die Kennzeichnung dient als economic-materialistic concept of history.
bewußte Abhebung gegen den Marxismus und According to this designation, materialism
dessen ökonomisch-materialistische signifies that so-called character, which is
Geschichtsauffassung. certainly not identical with narrow-mindedness
Materialismus bedeutet im obigen Titel: daß and brutality, but something constituting the
der sogenannte “Charakter”, der ja doch mit alpha and omega of action, is posited as an
Brutalität und Engstirnigkeit nicht identisch objective reality upon which everything
ist, der aber als das A und O gilt – eben wie depends. “Character” can mean: {a bourgeois
ein Ding angesetzt wird, um das sich alles comportment of honest dealing; a steadfast
dreht. “Charakter” kann {ja}i besagen: operational capability inconspicuously focused
{bürgerliche Biedermannigkeit; oder aber on commitment to one’s work and the
einsatzbereite, auf seine Arbeit und knowledge that it requires; but it can also
Sachkenntnis unauffällig beschränkte und signify an aptitude for clever machinations,
unentwegte Einsatzfähigkeit; kann auch which as such conceal the tenuousness of one’s
bedeuten: Geschicklichkeit in allen knowledge and skills, a lack of seriousness and
Machenschaften, die nach etwas aussehen of maturity of attitude. In short: character is not
und die Dürftigkeit des Könnens und die something present-at-hand, like stones and
Ernstheit und Gewachsenheit der Gesinnung – automobiles; nor can it be generated and
so sie fehlen – gut verdecken. Kurz: Charakter shaped, short-term, in training centers – it
ist ja nicht vorhanden wie Steine und Autos – rather comes to unfold itself out of itself by
er wird auch nicht nur gebildet in being tested and confirmed over time,
Kurzschulungslagern – | sondern entfaltet sich co-constituting history itself, although by no
in der Bewährung innerhalb der Geschichte, means solely of itself. In any case not as
die er so oder so mitgestaltet – aber beileibe present-at-hand power – but if at all – then as
nicht allein – jedenfalls nicht als vorhandene being-in-the-world – i.e., the power of the
Kraft – sondern wenn überhaupt – dann als capacity of a knowledgeable, spiritual, and
In-der-Welt-sein – d. h. Kraft der Fähigkeit der natural confrontation with beings}.
wissenden, geistigen und natürlichen Ethical materialism in this sense indeed stands
Auseinandersetzung mit dem Seienden}. higher than economic materialism – at least
Dieser ethische Materialismus – steht zwar inasmuch as one elevates morality over
höher als der ökonomische – sofern man das economics – but this itself requires
Sittliche über das Wirtschaftliche stellt – was demonstration and cannot decided on the basis
ja auch erst begründet werden muß und mit of “character”. This ethical materialism,
“Charakter” nicht entschieden werden kann. therefore, is by no means immune to economic
Dieser ethische Materialismus ist daher materialism – above all in regard to this, that it
keineswegs gefeit gegen den ökonomischen – conceives itself as supporting and determining
vor allem nicht in der Hinsicht, daß er sich als foundation, and everything else is misconceived
Unterbau und als Tragend und Bestimmend in advance as “superstructure”.
ansieht und alles andere von vornherein als
“Überbau” mißdeutet.
Mit diesem reichlich bürgerlichen Together with this exaggerated, bourgeois

Charaktergetue, das eines Tages an seiner pretense about character, which could collapse,
eigenen Unfähigkeit scheitern könnte – one day, due to its own inadequacy, one now
verbindet sich nun ein trüber Biologismus, der combines a cloudy biologism which
dem ethischen Materialismus doch die rechte nonetheless supplies ethical materialism with
“Ideologie” verschafft. its proper “ideology.”
Man verbreitet die irrsinnige Meinung, die One spreads about the crazy idea that the
geistig-geschichtliche Welt (“Kultur”) wachse historical and spiritual world (“culture”) would
pflanzenhaft aus dem “Volk” heraus, gesetzt, grow plant-like out of “the people” on the mere
daß man nur die Hemmnisse wegschafft – also condition that certain impediments be set aside:
z. B. die bürgerliche Intelligenz fortgesetzt and consequently, for example, one continues
schlechtmacht und auf die Unfähigkeit der to denigrate the middle-class intelligentsia and
Wissenschaft schimpft. to rant about the incapacity of the sciences.
Was wird aber so allein erreicht? Das dergestalt But what does this achieve? The “people,” thus
vor der “Intelligenz” gerettete “Volk” verfällt in saved from “intellectualism,” falls prey to its own
seinem dunklen Drang in die ödeste dark urges and into the most desolate philistinism;
Spießbürgerei und drängt auf Nachahmung und it is driven to imitate and appropriate bourgeois
Eignung der bürgerlichen Vorrechte und deren privileges and acquire their prestige; it seizes
Ansehen; das verfügbar Vorhandene Herrschende upon what is immediately available as an
wird aufgegriffen, um sich damit selbst zur instrument of power in order to empower itself.
Herrschaft zu bringen; “man” scheut den “One” avoids the struggle that pushes forward
Kampf, der nach vorne ins Ungewisse stößt und into the unknown, not knowing that greatness
der weiß, daß nur aus dem Verschlossenen und will only be disclosed to the few and to solitary
Erlittenen durch Wenige und Einzelne das ones in the face of suffering and what remains
Große erschlossen wird. Wobei wir die Frage undisclosed. In all this, we still leave aside the
noch ganz beiseitelassen, wie weit eine question of how, and to what extent, a primordial
Ursprünglichkeit des “Volkes” heute überhaupt sense of “the people” can be achieved by these
auf solchem Wege erreicht wird – etwa durch means – perhaps by taking our leave of the
Abstreichen der Intelligenz, durch Hervorholen intelligentsia, or by reviving worn-out folklore,
des abgelebten Volkskundlichen und dergleichen. and other things of this sort. Whatever, the masses
Es bleibt dann | immer noch eine of the petit-bourgeoise and the proletarian masses
Kleinbürgerliche Masse und die Masse der would still remain – and they can only be
Proletarier – die nur in einem transformed over the course of history, and not at
Geschichtsverlauf – aber nicht durch the ballot-box. Even if these groups were no
Abstimmung umgeschafft werden können. Wenn longer split up and divided into classes, and
diese Gruppen auch nicht mehr in Klassen organized into parties, as historically founded
zerteilt und aufgeteilt und in Parteien organisiert ways of comportment, and as communal powers
sind – als geschichtliche Haltungen und they would still persist. Only very slowly can they
volkliche Mächte sind sie noch da und werden be overcome: first of all, by way of the youth [of a
nur langsam überwunden: einmal von der Jugend new generation], secondly, out of the
her und dann durch geistig-geschichtliche fundamental, spiritual and historical attunement
Grundstimmung und Leidenschaft unseres and passion of our existence (Dasein), and finally
Daseins und schließlich durch den through the essential transformation of labour and
Wesenswandel der Arbeit und des Besitzes. relations of property.
Und all dieses soll ohne “Geist” geschaffen And all of this is to be achieved in the absence
und nur mit “Charakter” gepredigt werden? of “spirit”, just by preaching “character”?
Und all das soll “von selbst” aus dem Volk Everything is to sprout and flourish “of itself”,
hervorwachsen – ohne daß es zur from a people that has not been compelled to
Entscheidung gezwungen und in die decide nor shaped by disciplines of knowledge?
Wissenszucht genommen wird. The elimination of obstructions, of itself, has
Aus bloßer Beseitigung von Hemmungen ist never given rise to anything, not to mention
noch nie etwas – geschweige denn etwas anything of greatness – greatness comes of
Großes entstanden – sondern nur durch future-directed engagement and struggle, and
vorgreifenden Kampf – d. h. Leiden und that means of danger and suffering, meaning –
Gefahr und d. h. Wissen! knowing awareness!
g
Adolf Hitler: Mein Kampf, Bd. 1, − Eine Abrechnung (München: Eher, 1925); Bd. 2, Die nation-
alsozialistische Bewegung. Fr. Eher Nachfolge (München: Eher, 1927)
h
“beileibe nicht” is an expression of the spoken language. Here it corresponds to “not at all”, “what
the hell are you saying?!”
i
“ja” is a filler word similar to the above mentioned “doch” (see supra, note f )

§ 83 [60–62], S. 146–147: § 83 [60–62]:
{Das sozialistische Getue der {The socialist posturing of student
Studentenschaften – blödeste Romantik: associations: romanticism at its silliest.
Zusammenhocken und Saufen mit “Arbeitern”; Lounging about and boozing with “workers.”
das Besichtigen und Herumstehen in | Visiting, inspecting, and standing around in
Betrieben – wo man genau weiß, daß man hier factories – when one knows very well that one
nie auf die Dauer leben und gar arbeiten is never, for any length of time, going to live
wird – all das ist genau so dumm, wie wenn der this life and actually do this work. All this is
Bauer zur Zeit der Ackerbestellung oder Ernte just as silly as a farmer who leaves his fields
in die Universitätsstadt zöge und sich zu during the seasons of planting or harvest to
Studenten-Kommersen einladen ließe, um so take up an invitation from a student fraternity
von sich aus die Volksverbundenheit zu in a university town – thus to personally
bekunden; inzwischen gehen Acker und Ernte demonstrate his bond of fidelity with the
zum Teufel – oder einige Frauen schinden sich people. Meanwhile, field and harvest go to
zu Tode – Sozialismus?!} j Wenn sich die hell – or a few women work themselves to
Studenten um die Wissenserziehung einen death – socialism!?} Students don’t give a
Teufel kümmern; statt in der Vorbereitung zu damn about the cultivation and disciplining of
einer echten Mitwissenschaft mit dem Wissen knowledge; [if they did] then they would be
des Volkes diesem handelnd im Beruf und von concerned with the preparation of authentic
diesem aus dienstbereit zu sein und seine ways of knowing in cooperation with the
geschichtlich-geistige Welt mitzubauen, den people. In their vocational praxis, acting on it
Geschmack vor der endgültigen Verkommenheit to be in service to the people, they would seek
im Spießerischen zu bewahren, um echte to shape a spiritual and historical world
Bedürfnisse zu wecken und zu hegen – durch together with the people. They would seek to
einfach dienende Vorbildlichkeit, die freilich preserve standards of taste from complete
eine lange Erziehung verlangt und nur aus degeneration into philistinism, to awaken and
einem höheren und überlegenen echten Wissen to nurture genuine needs through their own
entspringt. good example as set by their service. And this
Gerade als “Student” ist der heutige Student requires, to be sure, an extensive education
kein Nationalsozialist, sondern ein and can only arise out of a higher, superior,
ausgemachter Spießbürger; denn in der and genuine knowledge.
Wissenserziehung rettet er sich zur billigsten Precisely as “student” the student of today is
und üblichsten Aneignung eines no National Socialist, but rather an utter
“Wissensbesitzes”, den er irgendwoher philistine. For in practice his cultivation of
bezieht – ohne wissende Haltung, die in sich knowledge is dependent upon the most facile
“sozialistisch” genannt werden könnte – d. h. and commonplace appropriation of a “body of
von Verantwortung bewegt und durch wahrhafte knowledge” that he indiscriminately draws on
Überlegenheit gesichert und handlungsbereit from somewhere or other – without any kind
wäre. of informed attitude that in itself could be
Dieses “sozialistische” Getue ist nur der called “socialist” – that is, motivated by a
Deckmantel für eine Flucht vor der eigentlichen sense of responsibility, and secured by
Aufgabe und vor der eigenen Unfähigkeit. veritable superiority and readiness for action.
This “socialistic” posture is only a guise,
disguising the flight from real tasks at hand
and one’s own incompetence.
j
The entire passage was evidently composed in an excited state of mind; this is reflected in incom-
plete sentences, exclamations, the use of colloquial speech (“blöd”, “hocken”, “saufen”, “zum
Teufel gehen”, “sich zu Tode schinden” etc.)

§ 88 [64–65], S. 148–149: § 88 [64–65]:
Wir sind durch die wirtschaftliche Welt-Not We have undergone a global, economic order
hindurchgegangen und stehen noch in ihr of distress and are still bound by it; we are
(Arbeitslosigkeit), wir sind der geschichtlich- subject to the historical distress of the state
staatlichen Not verhaftet (Versailles), wir (Versailles); we have gradually come to
kennen langsam die Verkettung dieser Nöte – understand the concatenation of one distress
aber wir spüren noch nichts von der geistigen with another, but we still feel nothing of the
Daseinsnot – und daß wir noch nicht spiritual distress of Dasein. That we are still
erfahrungs- und leidensfähig und d. h. noch incapable of experiencing and of suffering this
nicht groß genug für sie sind, gerade das ist die distress – that is, still not strong enough,
größte Not. Denn man ist jetzt dabei, jeden precisely this is the most dire distress. For one
Anbruch dieser Not schnell und grob is now at work quickly and crudely to erase this
auszuwischen entweder durch eine verlogene distress, either by way of one’s self-deceiving
Flucht in ein leer gewordenes Christentum flight into the emptiness that Christianity has
oder durch ein Ausrufen einer geistig become, or through the proclamation of a
fragwürdigen und in ihrer Herkunft National Socialist “worldview”, which is as
zweifelhaften nationalsozialistischen | spiritually questionable as its origin is
“Weltanschauung”. Und deshalb wird auch dubious. Consequently, these events are
das Geschehen verkleinert und nicht frei diminished instead of being liberated to unfold
gemacht zu seiner geistig existenziell their spiritual, existentiell power of
bedrängenden Macht. Deshalb wird alles compulsion. And therefore everything is
herabgesetzt in ein billiges Schelten gegen debased to the level of cheap scolding – of
“liberalistische Wissenschaft” und dergleichen. “liberal science”, and the like. As if our own
Als ob es in unserer eigenen Geschichte nur history offered nothing except what philistines
dieses gegeben hätte, was die Spießbürger can see.
sehen. {When will we be beset by the great distress of
{Wann kommen wir in die große Not des Dasein?”
Daseins? How can we consummate the direst duress as
Wie vollbringen wir die große Nötigung in die our greatest distress?
größte Not? When will we seriously confront the question-
Wann machen wir Ernst mit der worthiness of Dasein and earnestly face the
Fragwürdigkeit des Daseins und mit der great anxiety that arises with this wager? When
großen Angst, die vor dem Wagnis aufbricht? will we shatter that raucous small-mindedness
Wann zerschmettern wir die lärmende und of the “have-nots,” which passes for
“besitzlose” Kleingeistigkeit, die sich für “character” today? Shall we accomplish the
“Charakter” ausgibt? Wann schaffen wir die veritable encounter of the German “worker”
wahrhafte Begegnung des deutschen with his, and his people’s German tradition?}
“Arbeiters” mit seiner und seines Volkes
deutscher Überlieferung?}k
k
Questions upon questions, posed randomly, and unintegrated into a structured train of thought;
these are momentary reflections that require further development.

§ 96 [70–71], S. 152–153: § 96 [70–71]:
Studentenschaft und “Dozentenschaft” betreiben The student association and the “teachers’
jetzt denselben Berufungs- und association” are now in charge of the same
Besetzungsbriefwechsel, den früher die bösen file – the correspondence relating to
Ordinarien besorgten. Nur ist jetzt der academic vacancies and appointments – that
Unterschied, daß was formerly handled by the nasty full
1. jetzt noch weit mehr Leute mit solchen An- professors. The difference is that now:
und Rück-|fragen beschäftigt sind, 1. far more people are involved in treating
2. daß demzufolge die Beliebigkeit der such questions and inquiries,
Urteilenden und die Unnachprüfbarkeit ihrer 2. in consequence, the arbitrariness of the
Eignung zum Urteil sich steigert, judgments of the judges, and the
3. daß die jetzt Urteilenden noch weit unverifiability of their aptitude to make
unerfahrener sind, judgments is also increasing,
4. daß sie noch weniger als früher auf das Ganze 3. those who are making the decisions are
der Hochschule ausgerichtet sind – weil sie nichts far more inexperienced,
übersehen, 4. and still less than before are they attentive
5. daß sie unter dem Deckmantel eines oft recht to the needs of the university as a whole,
fragwürdigen Nationalsozialismus aus einer because they have no sense of what is
unberechtigten Selbstsicherheit heraus den happening,
Gerichtshof spielen und so im Ganzen den 5. using the excuse of an often very
völligen Mangel an Gestaltungsfähigkeit nach questionable National Socialism and guided
vorne verdecken und auf dem besten Wege sind, by a quite unjustified sense of self-
eine unübertreffliche Mittelmäßigkeit zu assurance, they play at being judge and jury;
“organisieren”. and so, in respect to the university as a
whole, they try to cover up their complete
lack of aptitude in shaping and planning for
the future while putting themselves on track
to achieve the unrivalled “organization” of
mediocrity.

§ 101 [74–76], S. 154–155: § 101 [74–76]:
Die wesentliche Erfahrung des zu Ende The essential experience of the rectorial year
gehenden Rektoratsjahres: now coming to an end:
Das ist das unaufhaltsame Ende der Arising out of its incapacity for genuine
Universität in jeder Hinsicht aus der Unkraft “self-affirmation”, which remains the last,
zu einer echten “Selbstbehauptung”. Diese fading echo of a demand that found not the least
bleibt als letzte verhallende Forderung ohne response, this is the relentless end of the
jeden Widerhall. University in every respect.
Aus den Formen und Einrichtungen der The still flickering activity of its previous life
Hochschule – erst recht nach der more and more withdraws from the forms and
Verfassungsänderung – zieht sich das noch institutions of the University, especially now,
flackernde bisherige Treiben mehr und mehr with the modification of its constitution.
zurück. Was sich als “neu” gebärdet, ist der Gestures of “renewal” are not equal to the task;
Aufgabe nicht gewachsen; das “Alte” ist what is “old”, is exhausted, and cannot find its
müde und findet in keinen Ursprung zurück; way back to the origin; too timid to once again
zu ängstlich, sich noch einmal der vollen to expose itself to the full question-worthiness of
Fragwürdigkeit der bisherigen previous forms of scientific endeavour; too
wissenschaftlichen Arbeit auszusetzen; zu greatly bound by one’s own specialized area,
sehr auf das eigene Fach und Gebiet und region of accomplishment and professional
Leistungsbereich und Fachwelt festgebunden, horizon to find the will to freely engage oneself
als daß ein freier Gefolgewille erwachen in a community of knowledge. Good intentions
könnte; unfruchtbares Wohlwollen ist wertlos. that bear no fruit are worthless.
Das bloße Reagieren mit A merely reactive approach, drawing upon
nationalsozialistischen Machtmitteln | und National Socialist means of power and its
den dazugehörigen Funktionären kann associated functionaries, may offer the
vielleicht nach Außen die Behauptung einer semblance of the self-assertion of a dominant
Machtstellung vortäuschen; was soll das, wo position to outsiders; but what is the point, when
das ganze Gebilde in sich ohnmächtig ist the entire construct is inherently powerless;
und ihm überdies die Zufuhr neuer junger when, furthermore, the university is denied the
Kräfte oder auch nur die Erhaltung bildsamer addition of young, new teaching forces and even
Lehrkräfte versagt bleibt. the retention of creative teachers?
Der Zeitpunkt meines Einsatzes war zu früh, The moment of my engagement was too early;
oder besser: schlechterdings überflüssig; die or, better said, completely superfluous: timely
zeitgemäße “Führung” soll es nicht auf “leadership” should not be directed toward inner
inneren Wandel und Selbsterziehung transformation or self-development – but rather
absehen – sondern auf möglichst sichtbare toward the most publicly visible aggregation of
Anhäufung neuer Einrichtungen oder auf new institutions, or toward the convincing
eindrucksvolle Änderung des Bisherigen. Es modification of what still persists. In doing all
kann bei diesem Tun aber das Wesentliche this, however, the essential can remain
ganz beim Alten bleiben. unchanged.
All dieses muß sich auslaufen; die It all has to run its course: “spectators” will
“Zuschauer” müssen an ihrer eigenen waste away of their own boredom; and
Langeweile verkümmern; inzwischen meanwhile the power of Dasein concentrates
sammelt sich die Daseinskraft zu neuer itself into a new founding of the German
Gründung der deutschen Hochschule. university.
Wann sie kommt und auf welchen Wegen – When this will happen, and in what ways – we
das wissen wir nicht. Gewiß ist nur: wir do not know. Only one thing is certain: for our
müssen an unserem Teil das Kommende part, we must do what we can to prepare its
vorbereiten. Wir dürfen uns nicht an der coming. We must not allow ourselves to be used
Fortführung des Bisherigen verbrauchen, wir up in furthering the persistence of what has been.
können uns nicht die geheime Sicht auf das We cannot allow the secret, reserved aspect of
Kommende verunstalten lassen. Wir werden the to-come be deformed. Nor will we ever stand
auch nie beiseite stehen, wo das rechte Wollen aside, when and where right willing, and
auf – und Können – sich ans Werk macht. Wir capability, set themselves to work. We will
werden in der unsichtbaren Front des remain part of the invisible front of hidden,
geheimen geistigen Deutschland bleiben. spiritual Germany.
§ 169 [114], S. 180: § 169 [114]:
{Wie “reaktionär” das alles ist und wie sehr {How “reactionary” all this is, and how
Nach-|vorne-denken – in seinem Sinne – das forward-thinkingm (in their perspective) the
sichere Arbeiten der Jesuiten, die mit den careful work of the Jesuits: drawing upon
modernsten literarischen Mitteln eine “Literatur” the most up-to-date literary means, they
hinstellen, der gegenüber der Ruf “lest die present a body of “literature”, which by
nationalsozialistische Presse” eines Tages nur comparison will one day make the
noch komisch wirkt – gesetzt, daß man sich nicht injunction – “read the National Socialist
entschließt, auch im Geiste revolutionär zu sein, press” – sound simply comical; supposing
statt den Geist “politisch” zu verfälschen}l. that one cannot decide to actually be
revolutionary in spirit, rather than falsifying
spirit into something “political”}.
The logical structure of this remark requires syntactical reconstruction.
l
m
The point here could be understood as a proclamation: “How reactionary all this is and how pro-
gressive the work of the Jesuits!”.

§ 183 [121–122], S. 185: § 183 [121–122]:
Die Leicht-fertigkeit der Stellungnahmen. The thoughtless recklessness of positions and
1. Man vermißt im Nationalsozialismus den attitudes:
“Geist” und befürchtet und beklagt seine 1. One laments the absence of “spirit” in
Zerstörung; ja aber was versteht man da unter National Socialism and fears its destruction:
Geist? Irgendeine unklare Berufung auf irgendein well then, what is meant by spirit? A cloudy
Bisheriges – was in seiner Zeit Geltung hatte. appeal to the authority of something that
Dieses unklare Vermissen und schwache was – something that had validity in its time.
Sichberufen gibt sich den Anschein des This inchoate sense of missing something,
Überlegenen und Höheren – und vermag doch this feeble invocation affirms the semblance
nichts zu schaffen; man ist leicht-fertig mit dem of its own, greater eminence. And yet it has
Geschehenden und dem, was “gesollt” werden no creative power; one recklessly makes
“soll”. Und man hat bei solcher Leichtfertigkeit quick work of events and matters that
auch immer leicht jederzeit wieder Anhalt und “should” be “confronted” in their necessity.
Nahrung, um sich fortgesetzt in solchem Tun zu And such heedlessness easily and repeatedly
betätigen. lends itself to giving further support and
2. Man verteidigt einfach Bisheriges und gleicht sustenance to the same path of action.
es dem Geschehenden an; man betreibt eine 2. One simply defends what has hitherto
schlaue Vermittlung, die sogar wie Aufbau been and assimilates it to current events; one
aussieht, und doch ist es kein Wagen; kein cleverly engages in a work of mediation that
Ernstmachen mit wirklicher Verwandlung. Man looks constructive, while wagering nothing
versteift sich auf Solches, was man überdies at all – one is not serious about initiating real
selbst gar nicht geschaffen, sondern nur transformation. One rigidly clings,
übernommen hat; man ist gar nicht in der Lage furthermore, to what one did not in any
jener, die das Kommende schaffen wollen. respect create, for one received it from the
Mit der Leicht-fertigkeit geht die Leicht- past; one is not at all in the position of those
mütigkeit zusammen. Statt wahrhaft zu who want to create what is to come.
bestehender Not, herrscht nur die sittlich Thoughtlessness and recklessness are of a
entrüstete Verdrießlichkeit der Ausgeschalteten piece. What rules is not the real existing
und die enge und glatte betriebsame distress that is to be endured, but the morally
Begnüglichkeit der Eingeschalteten. indignant peevishness of the disempowered,
Und doch vollzieht sich in all diesem Widrigen and the self-contentment of the empowered
und Kleinen der Außenheit [?] und des in their smooth and narrow efficacy.
unabwendbaren Massenwesens eine Wandlung. And yet, a transformative power pervades all
Aber sie darf nur als notwendig – nicht jedoch als these repulsive and trivial semblances of reality
hinreichend genommen werden; sonst bleibt es and the inevitable rise of mass consciousness.
bei einem mehr und mehr erblindenden But while this is a necessary transformation, it
Verrechnen von Erfolgen. should not be conceived as a sufficient one –
otherwise we will persist, blind and ever-more
blindly, in calculating our achievements.

§ 184 [122–123], S. 185: § 184 [122–123]:
Der deutsche Katholizismus beginnt jetzt, sich der German Catholicism is now starting to
geistigen Welt des deutschen Idealismus – appropriate the spiritual world of German
Kierkegaards und Nietzsches – zu bemächtigen, in idealism – the world of Kierkegaard and
seiner Weise und mit den klaren und festen Mitteln Nietzsche – assimilating it to itself in its
seiner Überlieferung sich anzuverwandeln. Er fashion, using the clear and rigorous means
übernimmt in seiner Weise eine wesentliche und of its tradition. In its fashion, it assumes a
starke Überlieferung und schafft sich damit im strong and essential legacy and thereby
voraus eine neue geistige “Position”; während man creates for itself a new, spiritual
im Nationalsozialismus Gefahr läuft, vor lauter “stronghold” in advance. National
Betonung des Anderen und Neuen sich von der Socialism, conversely, intent on
großen Überlieferung abzuschneiden und im emphasizing what is different and new,
Unbeholfenen und Halben sich zu verlaufen. runs the risk of cutting itself off from the
Indem man aber dem Konkordat gemäß dem great tradition, losing itself on the byroads
Kampf gegen die katholische Kirche absagt, sieht of ineptitude and half-baked measures.
man nicht das Heraufkommen des | Katholizismus However, if in accordance with the
als einer in gewisser Weise sich selbst bewußt Concordat, one calls off the battle with the
“säkularisierenden” Macht – die leicht sich mit Catholic Church, one may well fail to
den übrigen Mächten verbindet. recognize the conscious elevation of
Gegen die Kirche zu kämpfen ist sinnlos – wenn Catholicism, in a certain fashion, to a
nicht eine Macht gleicher Art dagegen aufsteht – “self-secularizing power” that can easily
aber den Katholizismus zu bekämpfen – als das in compact with other powers.
das Geistige-politische sich hinüberverwandelnde To battle the Church is pointless – unless a
Zentrum – mit dem ganzen festen inneren Gefüge power of a similar kind rises up against
seiner erstarkt kirchlichen “Organisation” – ist it – but it is an essential requirement to
Grunderfordernis. Doch dieser Kampf verlangt resist Catholicism – defined by the entire
zuerst eine entsprechende Ausgangsstellung und rigorous structure of the renewed strength
ein klares Wissen um die Lage. of its ecclesiastical “organization” – in its
self-transformation into a spiritual and
political center of power. Yet this struggle
first of all demands an adequate point of
departure and unclouded insight into the
state of the situation.

§ 190 [125], S. 188: § 190 [125]:
Man sagt, der Nationalsozialismus sei nicht durch One says that National Socialism came
Gedanken, sondern durch die Tat geworden; into being by deeds, not by thoughts;
zugegeben – folgt daraus, daß nun das Denken granted – but does it follow that thought
herabgesetzt und verdächtigt werde – oder folgt das must be degraded and held suspect – or
Umgekehrte, daß deshalb erst recht das Denken in does the opposite follow: precisely
eine ungewöhnliche Größe und Sicherheit gesteigert because of this, the depth of thought must
werden müsse? be intensified in extraordinary measure
and assurance?

§ 198 [129], S. 190: § 198 [129]:
{Inwiefern der Nationalsozialismus niemals {Inasmuch as National Socialism can never
Prinzip einer Philosophie sein kann, sondern constitute the principle of a philosophy, why
immer nur unter die Philosophie als Prinzip it must always be subordinated to
gestellt werden muß. philosophy as principle.
Inwiefern dagegen der Nationalsozialismus wohl To what extent, nonetheless, National
bestimmte Stellungen beziehen kann und so eine Socialism can indeed represent specific
neue Grundstellung zum Seynn miterwirken positions and in this way co-constitute a
kann!} fundamentally new response to beyng!}
Dieses aber auch nur unter der Voraussetzung, But this only on the condition that National
daß er sich selbst in seinen Grenzen erkennt – d. Socialism recognize its own limits – which
h. begreift, daß er nur wahr ist, wenn er imstande is to say, it has to understand that it is only
ist, in den Stand kommt, eine ursprüngliche true insofar as it is capable of coming to
Wahrheit freizugeben und vorzubereiten. stand by preparing and opening up [a site
of] originary truth.
n
Heidegger’s use of Seyn (beyng) and Sein (being) is not consistent, neither in the Contributions
or the Notebooks. In some cases, the use of “Sein” implicates the being-historical, rather than the
metaphysical sense.
Überlegungen und Winke iii, § 206, S. 136 [GA 94, S. 194]


§ 206 [136], S. 194: § 206 [136]:
Der Nationalsozialismus ist ein barbarisches National Socialism represents a barbaric
Prinzip. Das ist sein Wesentliches und seine principle. This is its essential nature and
mögliche Größe. Die Gefahr ist nicht er selbst – the source of its possible greatness. The
sondern daß er verharmlost wird in eine Predigt des danger lies not in National Socialism
Wahren, Guten und Schönen (so an einem itself – but that it be rendered harmless,
Schulungsabend). Und daß jene, die seine preaching the true, the good, and the
Philosophie machen wollen, dann nichts anderes beautiful (as per an evening training
dazu setzen als die überkommene “Logik” des course). And that those who wish to
gemeinen Denkens und der exakten Wissenschaft, pursue its philosophy rest content with
statt zu begreifen, daß jetzt gerade die “Logik” neu the received “logic” of common thinking
in die Not und Notwendigkeit kommt und neu and the exact sciences, instead of
entspringen muß. grasping that “logic” even now comes
once again into distress and suffers the
necessity of its renewed origination.
Überlegungen und Winke iii, § 207, S. 137 [GA 94, S. 194]


§ 207 [137], S. 194: § 207 [137]:
{Wurde ich da neulich gefragt: wer Baeumler {If once again I were asked: who is
sei? Antwort: ein Professor – findig und Baeumler? Answer: a professor – ingenious
gescheit – “philosophisch”: der auf den Kopf and clever – “philosophical”: Ludwig Klages
gestellte Klages. Im übrigen: ein mit upside down. Furthermore: Neokantianism
Nationalsozialismus aufgewärmter warmed up with National Socialism}. In this
Neukantianismus}. In diesem Falle sind solche case, such designations by means of
Kennzeichnungen mit Schlagworten erlaubt, buzzwords may be allowed, because there’s
weil ein wirkliches Philosophieren nicht da no evidence of genuine philosophizing – just
ist – sondern nur Spiel mit aufgegriffenen playing around with “positions” snatched up
“Stellungen” – das auch unangreifbar ist, wie from here and there – invulnerable, like every
jeder “Dualismus”; denn nach diesem Prinzip ist “dualism”, for according to this principle
alles leicht bestimmbar: wenn es das eine nicht everything is easily demonstrated: if it’s not
ist, ist es das andere. Und man ist’s zufrieden. the one, then it’s the other. And one’s
Die Karriere ist außerdem auch gemacht. satisfied. And what is more, it makes for a
successful career.
Überlegungen v Ponderings V
§ 61 [53–54], S. 348: § 61 [53–54]:
Jene Gegnerschaft der Philosophie gegen ihre Zeit Every form of philosophical opposition
entspringt nicht irgendwelchen Mängeln und to its time does not arise out of
Mißständen des Zeitalters, sondern kommt aus dem deficiencies and abuses of the time, but
Wesen der Philosophie und dies umso genötigter, je arises out of the ownmost essence of
mehr gerade und je echter das Wollen ins Künftige philosophy itself, and this all the more
Gestalt und Richtung in der Zeit gewinnt. Denn necessarily the more simply and
immer noch ist auch dann und zwar wesenhaft das authentically the will to form the future
Erdenken der Wahrheit des Seyns aller Einrichtung, direction of the age gains strength. For in
Rettung und Wiederbringung des Seienden – allem these circumstances, and indeed for
unmittelbaren Schaffen und Werken – essential reasons, the projecting-open of
vorausgesprungen. Deshalb kann auch die the truth of beyng springs in advance of
Philosophie – gesetzt, daß sie solche ist – nie the arrangement, the preservation, and
“politisch” abgeschätzt werden, weder in einem restoration of beings – of all directly
bejahenden noch in einem verneinenden Sinne. Eine effective creation and work. Therefore
“nationalsozialistische Philosophie” ist weder eine philosophy – given that it is such – can
“Philosophie” noch dient sie dem never be evaluated politically, neither
“Nationalsozialismus” – sondern läuft lediglich als negatively nor positively. “National
lästige Besserwisserei | hinter ihm her – aus welcher Socialist philosophy” is not a
Haltung schon zur Genüge das Unvermögen zur philosophy, nor does it serve “National
Philosophie erwiesen ist. Socialism” – it simply trails along
Sagen, eine Philosophie sei “nationalsozialistisch” behind, burdening National Socialism
bzw. sei dies nicht, bedeutet ebensoviel wie die with its all-knowing attitude – which
Aussage: ein Dreieck ist mutig bzw. ist es nicht – sufficiently demonstrates an ineptitude
also feig. for philosophy.
To say that a philosophy is “National
Socialist”, or, as the case may be, that
it is not, amounts to saying that a
triangle is courageous, or that it is
not – and hence cowardly.
Überlegungen vi Ponderings VI
§ 154 [135], S. 509: § 154 [135]:
Wer heute die Überflüssigkeit und Unmöglichkeit Whoever of today promulgates the
der Philosophie verkündet, hat den Vorzug der superfluity and impossibility of philosophy,
Ehrlichkeit vor allen jenen, die eine evinces the advantage of honesty in
“nationalsozialistische Philosophie” betreiben. contrast to all those who make a business
Dergleichen ist noch unmöglicher und zugleich of “National Socialist philosophy”.
weit überflüssiger als eine “katholische Something of this sort is even more
Philosophie”. impossible, and at the same time far more
superfluous than “Catholic philosophy”.
The thematic unity “National Socialism” includes all textual passages, in strict
chronological order, contained in volume GA 94. It now becomes necessary to pres-
ent Heidegger’s entire path of thought in order to understand Heidegger’s observa-
tions, while drawing on other texts to determine if his thinking exhibits evolution or
involution.
The governing framework of Heidegger’s thinking, in accordance with its own
structure, is the question concerning being. This constantly recurring theme may be
found not only in the thematic unity under consideration but manifests itself in all
observations and comments of the Notebooks. And precisely this question – the
question concerning being – can never be appropriated by “philosophy as rigorous
science”, a form of philosophy he calls “unphilosophical”. Neither flight into
“Christian belief”, nor “the horrific project of Christian culture” can offer plausible
solutions, because both are incapable of being “the decisive beginning and end”
(Intimations X, Ponderings II and Directives § 211 and § 218).
These observations respond to the precarious situation in which the university
found itself at that time, as well as to Heidegger’s attempt to advance a new figuration
of knowledge, thereby to establish the university anew and to ensure its independence
from “outside” interference. Heidegger’s rectorial address of May 27, 1933, The Self-
Assertion of the German University,2 which offered Heidegger’s gradually maturing
observations on the National Socialist “Movement”, was delivered under these cir-
cumstances. Priority is given to the idea of a form of culture that would not be “root-
less”, but rather a foundational building block, for otherwise Dasein “is thrown from
its path” (§ 211). Heidegger sharply criticizes the emergence of “scientific philoso-
phies” that play a merely functional role, nourishing themselves from “randomly
selected systems” which even have “the apparent advantage of being correct, for the
most part – without being in the least sense true” (§ 211). Allowing oneself to be
seduced by this un-philosophical culture could give sustenance to the danger that it
would be introduced into the university, after having already infiltrated the masses by
means of the media. This discrepancy of views intensifies with the lengthy section §
68 (Ponderings and Intimations III), which can only be understand, for its part, with
regard to § 211; herein Heidegger affirms that when the un-philosophical prospers
“authentic discipline and its cultivation are just added on”, for these requisite precon-
ditions of the founding of the university are lacking.
2
See Heidegger M. (2000a), § 51, pp. 107–117. English translation, pp. 470–480.
With reference to the situation of the university, which could provide conditions
of nourishment for a new discipline of knowing, the expression “ground”, or soil
(Boden), appears for the first time. For Heidegger, Boden is always conceived in
regard to standing in or on something that offers a secure foundation; in conse-
quence, Heidegger refers us to the reliability of the matter itself. The hold-giving
ground points us to the “thing itself” and this is the sole basis of its proper compre-
hension. Therefore, ground is a phenomenological concept; to recur in thought to
the ground means to return to the phenomenon. In its Heideggerian formulation in
Being and Time, the maxim of phenomenology reads “to the things themselves!”
(Zu den Sachen selbst!). As such, it is synonymous with the first formulation of this
methodological principle in the Introduction to Husserl’s Logical Investigations:
“back to the things themselves” (Auf die Sachen selbst zurückgehen).
Before dealing with the content of § 68, let us recall Heidegger’s comment that
no “awakening of the masses” of the “people”, and no “renewal of the nation” will
ever be brought about by scientific non-philosophy (Intimations X Ponderings II
and Directives, § 218).
Based on these presuppositions we can now go the heart of § 68, dating from the
December of 1933, and determine if it is still Heidegger’s intention and belief that
the university is the appropriate basis to build on in the generation of a new culture.
The framework of § 68 consists of two questions that Heidegger had recorded in
§ 46, although the answers can be found only in what follows. These two questions
are as follows: (a) is it possible that “our people” starve on a constant diet of “slo-
gans” and phrases within a few years – or are we going to create a “true nobility”,
one strong enough to shape the tradition of the Germans from out of a great future?;
and (b) must one, “within the National Socialist movement, misconceive those
beginnings (die Anfänge)”?
Before we confront Heidegger’s questions, it is important to grasp the constitu-
ent background – dimensions that require further explication – which we may find
in volume GA 95 (Ponderings XI, § 53) from 1938–1939: “In a purely “metaphysi-
cal” sense (that is, being-historical sense), in the years 1930–1934 I took National
Socialism to represent the possibility of a crossing into an other beginning and
this is how I interpreted it. With this, this “Movement” [...] was misunderstood
and underestimated”. This “faulty evaluation” of Heidegger’s will be more closely
examined in that division of this book devoted to volume GA 95. On the basis of this
constituent context, moreover, Heidegger’s questions in Ponderings and Intimations
III (§ 46), may well evoke further questions.
Let us proceed with our train of thought: in § 68, Heidegger not only described
the National Socialist movement, but also the “professional organizations” and
“corporations” that played almost the leading role in the university, along with other
external organizations which had succeeded in “securing themselves essential fields
of influence within the University”. Heidegger became aware of this and in conse-
quence he distanced himself. They are called “external” groups, not only because
they operate outside the university system, for this “holding-oneself-apart” is also a
sign of their lack of “fitness and power of reflection”, which leads them to engage
themselves merely as functionaries. These functionaries help “to set benchmarks for
competence and for proper evaluation” and thereby they “co-determine the reality
of the University” on the basis of “a calculative evaluation of the totality of require-

ments dictated by the demands of the professions in general”. The University is
reduced to a “business enterprise” (Wissenschaftsbetrieb).3
With this, Heidegger raises serious charges against those who would reduce the
university to a merely external framework of organization – in service to functionar-
ies and their haphazard “arrangements” (Abmachungen) – functionaries who are no
longer capable of nourishing a “creative” (schöpferisch), spiritual culture which
would, in turn, “compel the creative new-formation of Dasein” (§ 79). Not by acci-
dent does Heidegger record that “using the excuse of an often very questionable
National Socialism [...] they try to cover up their complete lack of aptitude in shap-
ing and designing for the future [...]” (§ 96). In consequence, the reference to the
constriction of the university to quantifiable and functional components pertains
above all to National Socialist organizations that reduce everything to the demand
to take “action” (Aktion). It would require a special study, based on the Letter on
Humanism, to show how far Heidegger’s thought is removed from the functionality
of action as the effectuation of an effect.
This confused interplay of “inner” and “outer” angers Heidegger because as rec-
tor he merely functions as the “site of mediation” of the university organization.
Only in view of this insecure situation can Heidegger’s public address of 1933 be
understood in a new way. To remain in the insecurity of this “site of mediation”,
amounts to the recognition – so Heidegger – that “it makes for only a relative – not
an absolute – distinction if [...] the Rector is a National Socialist, or not” (§ 68). For
the extent of external influence on the university is indeed greater than that of the
Office of the Rector, to whom “spiritual leadership (geistige Führung)”4 is assigned.
3
Heidegger’s inaugural lecture, held in the Aula magna of the University of Freiburg, on July 24,
1929, was already, in part, a response to a similar situation: “Today this disintegrating multiplicity
of disciplines is only held together by the technical organization of the university and the faculties;
the practical objectives of disciplines give them their sole significance. Nonetheless, the rootedness
of the sciences in their essential ground (Wesensgrund) has atrophied”. See Heidegger M. (1976),
p. 104. English translation, p. 94 (mod. B.R).
4
See Heidegger M. (2000a), p. 107. English translation, p. 470. For Heidegger, to take up the spiri-
tual leadership of the university means as much as to recover its essence through “primordial
knowledge”, which is never to be confused with “functional-instrumental” expertise. In the middle
section of this public address of 1933, we can discover the sense that Heidegger gives to “spirit” in
relation to the ownmost essence of the sciences and to the task of rector as spiritual leader of the
university: “For ‘spirit’” is neither empty cleverness, nor the noncommittal play of wit, nor the
endless drift of rational distinctions, and especially not world reason: spirit is primordially attuned,
knowing resoluteness toward ownmost being” (ibid., p. 112; English translation, p. 474, mod.
B.R.). This address anticipates the reason why Heidegger would later be seen, in the eyes of the
National Socialist “movement”, as an irksome “chess piece” who wanted to give the university a
different form to different ends. The following passages make this evident: “All science is philoso-
phy, whether it knows and wills it – or not. All science remains bound to that beginning (Anfang)
of philosophy” (ibid., p. 109; English translation, p. 472); “Such questioning (Fragen) shatters the
division of the sciences into rigidly separated specialities, carries them back from their endless and
aimless dispersal into isolated fields and corners [...]” (ibid., p. 111; English translation, p. 474);
“Knowledge does not serve the professions [...] Knowledge is not the settled taking note of
essences and values in themselves” (ibid., p. 114; English translation, p. 477); “All leading must
grant the body of followers its own strength. All following, however, bears resistance within itself”
(ibid., p. 116; English translation, p. 479).
“Spiritual” should be understood in the sense that Heidegger has in mind in reit-
eration of the concept of “self-affirmation”, which calls for a “fundamental con-
frontation with the great historical and spiritual tradition” (§ 68). Only this would
allow a “spiritual nobility” to be created “strong enough to shape the tradition of
the Germans from out of a great future” (§ 46). So, it gradually emerges how
Heidegger slowly distanced himself from the spiritual foundations of the
University, no longer finding there ground enough to put down roots. His unease
becomes evident when it becomes clear to him that under these conditions it is no
longer possible to take up the task of offering spiritual leadership. In many
respects, the role of rector would take the character of a “site of mediation” more
than that of spiritual leadership in the formation of a new ideal of education. What
could be done? In Heidegger’s opinion, one must avoid being “caught up and
entangled in the formalities of so-called leadership positions”. One should rather
“struggle to transform institutions into a company of leaders working in small
groups and quietly prepare the arrival of what is to come” (§ 68, 11a). And fur-
thermore, “wherever possible, push for the creation of a small number of flexible
institutions, which above all offer the assurance that within their structures new
beginnings can form [...]” (§ 68, 11b).
But how are we to understand Heidegger’s recurrence to the word “Kampf”
(struggle, or strife)? In Heidegger’s writings, the terms struggle, war, and strife, can
only be understood in the light of what Heraclitus has to say about Πόλεμος in
Fragment 53: “War (strife) is of all things father, king of all things. The one he
shows as god, the other as human; one he makes to be slave, the other, free”.5
Πόλεμος is the principle of being that brings beings forth out of their mutual oppo-
sition. For Heidegger, Πόλεμος, as strife, is rooted in the truth of being; in
accordance with being, strife is the counter-play of concealment and un-conceal-
ment, both of which essentially belong to the truth of being. For this reason, it is
manifest that Heidegger never drew on terms of any political ideology in his manu-
scripts, and rather constantly recurs to pre-Socratic thinkers, namely, to Anaximander,
Heraclitus, and Parmenides. For example, the word “destiny” (Geschick), which is
fundamental for Heidegger’s being-historical thought, refers us back to Parmenides’
concept of Moîra.
A university system entirely occupied by present imperatives and how to react to
them, concerned with the pursuit of momentary utilities and advantages, will ever
be incapable of recognizing the necessity of “spiritual struggle” (geistiger Kampf).
The system will in fact set itself in opposition to it. In section § 68, we find two
5
“Krieg (Kampf) ist aller Dinge Vater, aller Dinge König. Die einen erweist er als Götter, die
anderen als Menschen, die einen macht er zu Sklaven, die anderen zu Freien”. The Πόλεμος cita-
tion is also mentioned in Contributions, § 144 [see Heidegger M. (1989), p. 265. English transla-
tion, p. 186], where it is noted in relation to lectures of the summer semester 1933–1934, entitled
Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (On the Essence of Truth), now found in Being and Truth [see Heidegger
M. (2001), pp. 81–264. English translation, pp. 67–174].
passages referencing “spiritual struggle” and in what follows we discover that

“future-directed engagement and struggle”, can only be carried out in the face of
“danger and suffering, meaning: knowing awareness!” (§ 81).
With § 69 we arrive at the heart of Heidegger’s reflections on National Socialism
and the contentious question whether National Socialism is founded in “theory” –
understood as “a mere abstraction of thought”, or as pursuit of knowledge – or if it
takes its inception from praxis. National Socialism does not take theory as pursuit
of knowledge into consideration, as demonstrated by the fact that anticipatory proj-
ects, once “falsified into “concepts”, will be devoid of efficacity” (§ 70). In order to
remain sustainable, Heidegger avers, a project has to be “effective as a comportment
of questioning and as language”; as such, it will accord with the movement of his-
toricity and not just accommodate itself to the immediacy of the accidental present.
National Socialism lacks these necessary requirements and for this reason its days
are numbered: “We do not want to establish a “theoretical” foundation for National
Socialism, in order to supposedly give it, in this fashion, viability and make it sus-
tainable” (§ 70).
Heidegger strikes a new tone with the introduction of “spiritual National
Socialism”, using this terminology three times in total (twice in § 72, once in § 73).
According to Heidegger, this “spiritual National Socialism” is “nothing theoreti-
cal”, “nor is it the “better” or even the “authentic” National Socialism”; Heidegger
continues that “nonetheless it is just as necessary as the National Socialism of the
various organizations and estates” – which raises some questions. Sections §§ 72
and 73 record that Heidegger conceived a kind of spiritual National Socialism,
which he thought, or better said, which he imagined and idealized as a counter-
movement to the bourgeois infiltration of culture. For precisely this reason, he holds
that so-called spiritual National Socialism is “just as necessary” as the diverse
“organizations and estates” – which he had sharply criticized in § 68 for their
repeated interference in university affairs. This constitutes an additional reason to
clarify the necessity of spiritual National Socialism, a concept that does not make an
appearance in the remaining Black Notebooks. Heidegger’s critique emphasizes the
“conceited pseudo-culture”, the “petit-bourgeois semblance of culture” and its
mediocracy, which leads to the “cheapest platitude[s] given out as the authentic
sentiment of a people” (§ 71). At this point Heidegger is concerned only with the
“pseudo-culture” of the petit-bourgeoisie, which he believes will not succeed in
infiltrating the National Socialist movement: “The danger to the Movement repre-
sented by the bourgeoisie essentially becomes impossible because the bourgeois
spirit and the “spirit” (culture) it administers is being destroyed by a spiritual
National Socialism” (§ 73).
Such optimism persists only for a short while, and this path is first broken off and
then suddenly abandoned. Beginning with section § 78, Heidegger expresses the
certainty that in this respect there is no going back. One constant that we encounter
again and again, in the passages noted above, and until the end, is Heidegger’s
account of the consequences of what he takes to be the “deformation of National
Socialism”. National Socialism, in effect, is degraded to a “trick” “which like a new

lantern can be used to scan previous scientific achievement” and to distort its mean-
ing. This refers us back, primarily, to the functionality of the instrumentalization of
a culture determined by its adaptation to machination; one imagines making new
explanations marketable. This has the advantage, furthermore, of being recom-
mended by “the press”, which serves the purpose of propagating attitudes that gen-
erate an “illusion of spiritual vitality” and thus influence the people. National
Socialism gains in strength by attempting to create a base of knowledge that “allows
one to demonstrate that yes, indeed, National Socialism has actually always been
the case, it was being-prepared and on its way to us”, and this very procedure dem-
onstrates its fundamental limitations. Heidegger is convinced that National
Socialism is incapable “of taking upon oneself an entirely new and previously
unheard-of spiritual mission”. The poverty of its own rootlessness compels it “to
prove itself and to prevail” by overcoming itself. What counts is to continue the
struggle. But as the philosopher adds, “consider well the exaggerated emphasis on
the bygone struggle, as if the matter were finished” (§ 79). And this bygone struggle
does not have much to do with the struggle for “knowing awareness” mentioned in
section § 81.
But National Socialism is above all an “ideology” (§ 80). The passage from
“deformation” to “ideology” easily follows, because the deformation of National
Socialism arises out of and depends on the functional use of ideas that are not yet
rooted in the creative, spiritual project of Dasein; the primacy of the name over the
spirit constitutes a “negation of the spirit”. The greater the deformation, so the
greater the influence of ideas on the people, ideas not designed to make the correct-
ness of their contents manifest, but much rather designed to convince by means of a
wide and dense web of sentiments spun by the ingenuity of machinations. In the
following section, § 81, Heidegger reviews the causes leading to “vulgar National
Socialism” (Vulgärnationalsozialismus). His increasing number of references to
National Socialism consequently gain in intensity and pervade this volume through
to section § 154 (Ponderings VI). Among other matters, he touches on the question
of the university.
Although a consequence of the interventions of “journalists” (Zeitungsschreiber)
and “producers of culture”, vulgar National Socialism finally derives from the
deformation of National Socialism itself (§ 78); what emerges along with this, is
that National Socialists, using the “press” to market their ideas, assume the power
to pressure the people. In this context, Heidegger makes mention of Hitler’s Mein
Kampf and the clear goal of the writers who draw upon this book to propagate “a
specific doctrine of history and of humanity, which is passed on to the people”. This
doctrine may best be described as “ethical materialism”. Paying attention to
Heidegger’s tightly-formulated train of thought, we discover that “ethical material-
ism”, on the one hand, posits character as the pole about which everything turns; but
on the other, it can signify “an aptitude for clever machinations, which as such
conceal the tenuousness of one’s knowledge and skills, a lack of seriousness and of
maturity of attitude” (§ 81). This, so skilled and resourceful character is “not
something present-at-hand”. Heidegger adds that character “is by no means immune

to economic materialism”. As if this did not suffice, Heidegger explicitly distances
himself from the corresponding National Socialist concept of propaganda, explain-
ing what is meant by “ideology”, which was only partially explicated in § 80:
“Together with this exaggerated, bourgeois pretense about character, which could
collapse, one day, due to its own inadequacy, one now combines a cloudy biologism
which nonetheless supplies ethical materialism with its proper ‘ideology’”. In this
regard, Heidegger considers it necessary to record his critical observations, but
above he considers it urgent to ask how the misguided opinion could be propagated
that a world arises and “grows” in “plant-like” fashion. Consequently, one avoids a
“struggle that pushes forward into the unknown (Ungewisse)” (§ 81). Heidegger’s
observations on this point require some explication, since they articulate a key, not-
to-be-missed context of significance: “‘One’ avoids the struggle that pushes forward
into the unknown, not knowing that greatness will only be disclosed to the few and
the solitary ones in face of suffering and what remains undisclosed” (§ 81). In all of
volume GA 94, this is the only occurrence of the concept of the “unknown”, which
does recur in Ponderings VI, § 2. In this case, Heidegger in fact refers to beyng,
which remains “unknown”, uncertain, as long as one is not prepared to decisively
engage in “future-directed” struggle – and that means, struggle guided by knowing
awareness. What dominates is the “immediately available as an instrument of
power” and this means that “the spiritual-historical world” is not grasped under the
regime of National Socialism. This ideology has only a very limited and superficial
understanding of historicity, and this inauthentic understanding is used by National
Socialism “in order to empower itself” (§ 81). This dominant, public mode of intel-
ligibility is called the mode of being of the “They” (Man) in Being and Time (§ 27).
As an individual I do not live my life as founded in an articulated understanding of
the spiritual-historical world, as authentically disclosed to me – I live in the public
world and for this reason in the unprimordial undisclosedness common to all. I
share this common, average understanding with others; and not only with others,
but with all – in short, with the “They”. The “They” serves as designation for the
levelled and flattened understanding of the spiritual-historical world which every-
one shares with everyone else in the same way.
In the mode of being of the “They”, humanity avoids this struggle: it turns
away from disclosive projecting-open of being, which still remains undeter-
mined and “undisclosed”, and which must, therefore, be endured and suffered
by reason of its concealment. But those taking this strife – the disclosive, pro-
jective opening of being – upon themselves, especially among them thinkers
(Denker) and poets (Dichter), are always “few” and “solitary”. Those “few” and
“solitary ones”, who are engaged in the projecting-open of being, know that the
“undisclosed” and “suffered” may only be disclosed as project, and thereby a
“great” (das Große) and primordial understanding of a historical-spiritual world
may be opened up.
Being will certainly remain “vague and uncertain” for everyone who does not
personally take this decision (concerning the question of the meaning of being)
upon himself. This is quite clear to Heidegger, as evidenced by his mention of the
“few” and the “solitary ones”. These are those to whom it is given to raise the ques-
tion of the nobility of being and to think it through. This relation is already empha-
sized in § 218 (Intimations X, Ponderings II and Directives), where Heidegger
states: “Rather, greatly nourished by what is concealed and sheltered, what is needed
is the experience and the safekeeping of the unavoidable work of the empowerment
of the ownmost being of the few in their singleness”. National Socialism is respon-
sible for leading the “people” (Volk) away from the authentic path; on this path the
“uncertain” will never disclose itself, or conversely, disclose itself only to those who
have overcome the anxiety that besets interrogative thinking. Indeed, this will pose
an obstacle for many. One wants to arrive at “a primordial sense of ‘the people’
(Ursprünglichkeit des ‘Volkes’)” – but how, by what way? For Heidegger this
question is already answered by another question: “And all of this is to be achieved
in the absence of ‘spirit’, just by preaching ‘character’”? With this answer, Heidegger
distances himself from National Socialism, as his observations in section § 81
indicate.
In section § 83, Heidegger elaborates his observations on the contemporary con-
cept of culture, which derives, as we have seen, from “vulgar National Socialism”
to exert its influence on the people: in this context he refers to “the socialist postur-
ing of student associations” as “romanticism at its silliest”. This brusque comment,
which was apparently recorded in a state of agitation, in a fit of anger,6 is combined
with the observation that this posturing is intended to “demonstrate” students’
“bond of fidelity with the people (Volksverbundenheit)”, but it achieves nothing in
regard to the actual “emergence” of a “historical-spiritual world (geschichtlich-
geistige Welt)” through essential knowledge.
Section § 83, however, also contains a remark that requires explanation:
“Precisely as ‘student’ the student of today is no National Socialist”. Since
Heidegger had previously castigated the “petit-bourgeois semblance of culture”
(§ 71), the “bourgeois spirit” (§ 73), “bourgeois-liberal forms of representation”
(§ 80) and the “petit-bourgeois masses” (§ 81) are we to assume that the student
in question is an utter petit-bourgeois, and no National Socialist, because
National Socialism is something other than this composite construct? Perhaps
these remarks are motivated by the conjecture that National Socialism conceals
the possibility of overcoming this “socialist posturing”, which Heidegger evalu-
ates as follows in conclusion to this section: “This ‘socialistic’ posture is only a
guise, disguising the flight (Flucht) from real tasks at hand and one’s own
incompetence” (§ 83). One could easily conclude that Heidegger intends to
raise the alarm about this sort of self-deformation of National Socialism.
Reading on in the Ponderings, however, we soon find this concern addressed
and resolved.
In section § 88, Heidegger again urgently invokes “the spiritual distress of
Dasein (geistige Daseinsnot)” as “the most dire distress”. The context of this
6
See supra, Footnote j, where Heidegger’s terminology is discussed.
observation is supplied by the “historical distress of the state (Versailles)” – the

Diktat of 1919 – as well as the distress of unemployment (and economic distress
was certainly not unknown to Heidegger); yet the “most dire distress” finds no
echo, because one is “still not strong enough” for this distress. Hence the onset of
this distress and “one’s self-deceiving flight into the emptiness that Christianity
has become”, or into the “National Socialist ‘worldview’, which is as spiritually
questionable as its origin is dubious”. In accordance with this way of thinking,
“Christianity” – and we will soon see what manner of Christianity Heidegger’s
allegations touch on – accommodates itself to National Socialism, and as such, to
“what philistines see”. The assertion that “as ‘student’ the student of today is no
National Socialist” can be understood in the light of Heidegger’s subsequent
observations: the student of the time was not a National Socialist because National
Socialism itself is rooted in a philistine way of thought and consequently the stu-
dent mentality is petit-bourgeois. To uncover the origins of National Socialism
allows us to understand why Heidegger says that the “National Socialist ‘world-
view’ [...] is as spiritually questionable as its origin is dubious”. The fundamental
problem is that National Socialist thinking is “rootless”. This manifests the dire
extent of its distress. The student cannot be a National Socialist, and his posturing
is typical of someone who makes a great effort to conceal the poverty of his own,
groundless (grundlose) existence.
In § 88, Heidegger literally and dramatically places his comments on the
“National Socialist ‘worldview’”, and its “spiritually questionable” origins
between his initial evocation of “the spiritual distress of Dasein” and his subse-
quent questions: “When will we be beset by the great distress of Dasein?”, “When
will we shatter that raucous small-mindedness of the ‘have-nots’, which passes
for ‘character’ today?”. The “distress” inherent in the spiritual project Heidegger
conceives stands in opposition to “character”. And in fact, the concept of “charac-
ter” is integral, in Heidegger’s conception, to “the essential nature of contempo-
rary science” (§ 68, n. 9); and to the “characterlessness” of “aversion to any form
of spiritual struggle” (§ 68, n. 9). It is also used to designate the much-emphasized
character of bourgeois life (§ 71); the “excessive, bourgeois posturing about char-
acter” (§ 81); and the elevated claims involved in preaching “character” and ignor-
ing “spirit” (§ 81).
Heidegger’s sense of the distress of Dasein becomes still more acute as he real-
izes that his expectations of the University were premature. His time as Rector had
to end due to the arbitrary actions of student associations, teachers’ associations and
functionaries: “using the excuse of an often very questionable National Socialism
and guided by an unjustified sense of self-assurance, they play at being judge and
jury; and so, in respect to the university as a whole, they try to cover up their com-
plete lack of aptitude in shaping and planning for the future while putting them-
selves on track to achieve the unrivalled ‘organization’ of mediocrity” (§ 96).
Considering this complete lack of ability to shape the future, Heidegger announces
not only the end of his rectorate, but “the relentless end of the University” “arising
out of its incapacity for genuine ‘self-affirmation’” (§ 101). From this point on there
is no longer any turning back for Heidegger. This long drawn-out “end” is registered
in section § 68, 83, and from section § 96 on.
Section § 101 constitutes an epilogue to Heidegger’s rectorate: the end of the
rectorate and the “end” of the university (in Heidegger’s conception) fall together.
Heidegger’s resignation constitutes the “step back” to prepare a new “beginning”.
Heidegger steps back from all of his official duties in order to give place to the
“new”. The reader will be familiar with the “new” from Heidegger’s section § 68,
where he writes that “the fundamental failure of ‘political education’” consists in
this, “that one rashly wants to do too much, all in a flash”. In section § 78, with
reference to the deformation of National Socialism, he accordingly deplores the
practice of scanning “previous scientific achievement” as with “a new lantern” in
order to influence the people. In the same section, the philosopher affirms that
National Socialism is not capable of initiating an entirely new “spiritual mission”.
Subsequently, Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes one typical characteristic, among
others, of National Socialism: it is “intent on emphasizing what is different and
new”. But not the slightest commonality may be found between this sense of the
“new” and the “new beginning” which Heidegger proposes for the University (§ 68,
n. 11b).
Indeed, seeing that what poses and propagates itself as the new has had no suc-
cess in realizing its goals, it had to become clear to Heidegger that his engagement
as rector was “too early” and “completely superfluous” (§ 101). An “inner transfor-
mation” was hardly conceivable, because “National Socialist means of power and
its associated functionaries” could “offer the semblance of the self-assertion of a
dominant position to outsiders”, but “the entire construct (Gebilde) is inherently
powerless (ohnmächtig)” (§ 101). After this short and concise statement, Heidegger
no longer addresses the theme of “the university”; he rather introduces the concept
of “construct” (Gebilde) which stands in relation to the notion of a “scientific enter-
prise” (§ 68, n. 9). In this kind of construct, Heidegger’s role becomes superfluous,
because he never ascribed to the “enterprise” model.
Heidegger’s resignation should not be mistaken for standing “aside” from
events: “Nor will we ever stand aside, when and where right willing, and capabil-
ity, set themselves to work. We will remain part of the invisible front of hidden,
spiritual Germany” (§ 101). It is remarkable that the expressions “invisible front”
(unsichtbare Front) and “hidden, spiritual Germany” (geistiges Deutschland) are
unique to this passage (§ 101) and nowhere else – not in volume GA 94, nor in
volumes GA 95, GA 96 or GA 97 – are they to be found. This statement is a hapax
legomenon (a unique source); it could refer to a common project (“we will
remain”) to stand aside and yet to remain on – what is for “many” – the unseen
margin of a Germany where only a “few” are able to take up the spiritual struggle
for essential knowledge.
Even if it is premature to anticipate a discussion of one of Heidegger’s observa-
tions (dating from 1946–1947) in Observations III [57–58] included in volume GA
97 – we will examine this passage in the context of GA 97 below – nonetheless it
seems licit to cite it now, because it offers us an indispensable key to the interpreta-
tion of our path of thought as presented above. We bid the reader to keep the follow-
ing passage in mind – no more – as helpful aid and as accompaniment to questions
and reservations that may arise in respect to Heidegger’s decision “to resign” the
Office of Rector. The correctness of this decision will be evaluated in Heidegger’s
favour in consideration of the fact that it allowed him to extract himself from obliga-
tions that he could not fulfill in consequence of the obstructive tactics of his
colleagues:
“One day, perhaps, someone will understand that in order to bring thinking back to a way
of knowing as essential knowing, the Rector’s Address of 1933 makes the attempt to antici-
pate in thought the process of the consummation of science enacted in the demise of think-
ing, but that it does not propose to deliver thinking over to Hitler. For why did the Party have
this address opposed in every political instruction center for university teachers? Certainly
not, as the world press now propagates, because it betrayed the university to National
Socialism” (Observations III [58]; GA 97).
But let us return to Ponderings and Intimations III (§ 169). This section records
no further comments on the system of the University, but nevertheless Heidegger
does make some remarks that introduce new elements into his discussion of National
Socialism. Among these we find references to the “the careful work of the Jesuits”
and the “literature” they produce; and to the (National Socialist) “injunction” to
“read the National Socialist press!”. Both positions falsify the spirit to serve politi-
cal ends. To understand this section of the Ponderings we have to bring it into rela-
tion to section § 47 of volume GA 95. The relevant context is Heidegger’s critique
of political Catholicism and its methods. We read that it “was Jesuitism that first
gave ‘the catholic’ its authentic form”. Jesuitism establishes the Occidental model,
among other things, for “rigorous decisiveness of ‘organization’ and the mastery
of propaganda”. Precisely for this reason, Heidegger essentially equates the “lit-
erature” of the Jesuits and the propagandistic “injunction” to “read the National
Socialist Press!”. Heidegger’s unspoken conviction in regard to the issue of
Catholicism (as touched on in section Ponderings and Intimations III § 184,) is that
it has been shaped by Jesuitism. On the other hand, “propaganda” is at issue for
Heidegger in the context of his contention with newspaper-writers, the politics of
cultural production, and his reflections on vulgar National Socialism. Heidegger
disputes the entire construct [of organized cultural production by means of propa-
ganda]. In the Observations I [28], speaking of “journalism” in general, Heidegger
takes a still harsher tone, as he does in his remarks on “world journalism” and
“modern journalism” (Observations II, [70–75]). What remains constant is
Heidegger’s rejection of propaganda and his conviction that thinking, devoid of
“spirit”, has been negated. This linear development of Heidegger’s position allows
us better to understand these lines from section § 183 (Ponderings and Intimations
III): “One laments the absence of ‘spirit’ in National Socialism and fears its
destruction”.
In its “thoughtlessness and recklessness”, National Socialism shows its affinity
to “German Catholicism” (§ 183) It is worth noting that Heidegger does not
criticize Catholicism as such, but rather the specific kind of Catholicism that has
transformed itself “into a spiritual and political center of power”. Having thus sec-
ularized itself, Catholicism “can easily compact with other powers” – among oth-
ers, with National Socialism (§ 184). The common denominator both parties share
is hunger for power.
After this rather extensive review of texts we are now in position, drawing on
Heidegger’s brief remarks in § 198, to get a better grip on what Heidegger is
likely to have ascribed to National Socialism. We have taken note of Heidegger’s
comments, in sections §§ 72 and 73, on “spiritual National Socialism”. In sec-
tion § 198, Heidegger claims that National Socialism “can never constitute the
principle of a philosophy”. Nonetheless, “National Socialism can indeed repre-
sent specific positions and in this way co- constitute a fundamentally new
response to beyng! But this only on the condition that National Socialism rec-
ognize its own limits – which is to say, it has to understand that it only stands in
truth insofar as it is capable of preparing and opening up [a site of] originary
truth” (§ 198).
In consequence of section § 206 of Ponderings and Intimations III, these remarks
may be considered as superseded. For in this subsequent Number of the text we
read: “National Socialism represents a barbaric principle (barbarisches Prinzip).
This is its essential nature and the source of its possible greatness (Größe)”.
Let us take note, first of all, that the use of the expression “barbaric principle”
to designate National Socialism does not occur elsewhere in Heidegger’s writings.
Therefore, it is advisable to interpret the adjective “barbaric” in the context of the
Black Notebooks while considering other contexts in which Heidegger makes use
of this concept. It occurs twice in volume GA 95: (1) “This lack of sensibility [...]
is the best defence against the ever-receding danger that such barbarism (Barbarei)
of ‘thought’ will one day find itself forced to evade its own monstrousness”
(Ponderings VIII, § 51); (2) “the earnestness of thought does not consist in sad-
ness and lament over supposedly bad times and threatening barbarism (Barbarei)”
(Ponderings XI, § 29). In volume GA 97, it also occurs twice: (1) “[...] against the
degeneration (Verwilderung) of National Socialism” (Observations I [151]), and
(2) “[...] the barbarism (Barbarei) of the ‘new world’” (Observations V [137]). In
total, five instances of this usage are to be found in the Black Notebooks, under
the assumption, however, that “Verwilderung” as used in Observations I
[151] stands as a synonym for “Barbarei”. For the remaining four – those added
to our discussion of volume GA 94 (§ 206) – the reader will latter, in its appropri-
ate place, be supplied with the relevant passage, and not just a preliminary inter-
pretation of the concept of the “barbaric” (or barbarism). Let us proceed step
by step!
The five source texts in which the word “Barbarei” appears each has a particular
context, which are: (1) National Socialism (Ponderings and Intimations III, § 206);
(2) “the machinational being of modernity” (Ponderings XI, § 29); (3) National
Socialism again (Observations I [151]); and finally (4) the Occident (das Abendland)
and the critique of the “new world” (Observations V [137]).
In the first of these source texts (Ponderings and Intimations III, § 206 and
Ponderings VIII, § 51), the word “danger” (Gefahr) is used repeatedly; this easily
leads us to establish a relation not only to National Socialism and its philosophy,
which follows “the inherited ‘logic’ of common thinking and the exact sciences” (§
206), but also with National Socialist ideology, from which Heidegger also dis-
tances himself. For example, he sharply criticizes and refutes the National Socialist
philosophy of Hans Heyse (1891–1976), a member of the NSDAP as of 1933.
Heidegger harshly refutes his misinterpretation of Sein und Zeit as National Socialist
ideology spiced and salted with “Existentialism”, a procedure Heidegger rejects as
producing a “watery soup” that is alien to his thinking.
In the third source (Ponderings XI, § 29), Heidegger focuses on the deception
practiced by “executors and law-givers of machination”: he criticizes them with
reference to modernity as the “unconditional dominion of beingness (Seiendheit)
over beings [...] which takes priority over ‘being’”. Heidegger designates their
“pseudo-philosophy” as no more than “a feeble drone”. The Occident has entered
into the epoch of the forgetting of being, yet despite its decay it still finds a hold in
the “earnestness of thought”, which does “not consist in sadness and lament over
supposedly bad times and threatening barbarism” but in the “decisiveness” of
questioning.
In the fourth source (Observations I [151]), the guiding thread is the theme of
“guilt”, or respectively, “collective guilt”. In this case, we are dealing with a deci-
sive observation, such that a preliminary explication of its content and the required
hermeneutic principles would lead us too far afield at this point. And finally, the
context of the fifth source (Observations V [137]) is still Heidegger’s critical reflec-
tion on modernity and the Occident.
We cannot help but notice that the common thread of the five sources noted
above is the concept of “pseudo-philosophy”, which is repeatedly brought into
relation with National Socialism and the “functionaries” of culture – as well as
with a thoughtlessness, which modernity in some respects shares with National
Socialism. In both cases, culture is conceived as the operational organization of
functional activity, which is put in service to the goal-directed machinations of
technicity. Everything being factored in, being falls into forgetfulness. All these
reflections may be of use to the end of evaluating and properly contextualizing the
sense of Heidegger’s claim that National Socialism constitutes “a barbaric prin-
ciple”. Based on the five textual sources above in their respective contexts, we
may postulate that what Heidegger proposed to emphasize with this formulation
is as follows: the lack, to the extent of absolute deficiency, of principles that are
necessary to found educative discipline in essential knowing. Now we must work
out the sense of the immediately following sentence. After Heidegger’s claim in
Ponderings and Intimations III (§ 206), stating that “National Socialism is a bar-
baric principle (barbarisches Prinzip)”, he adds: “that is its essence (Wesen) and
its possible greatness (Größe)”.
If we restrict ourselves to the literal sense of this locution, then the interpretation
we have advanced to this point necessarily becomes invalid. The word “greatness”
(Größe) can offer us a formal indication of the way to follow. This word is in fact
generally equivocal in Heidegger’s usage. For example: in Ponderings VII (§ 56), it
is given a positive meaning: “going-under (d. h. zur Größe) – that is, unto great-
ness”; and likewise in the Contributions (§§ 2, 11, 44, 116, 250, and 271), where
“going-under” (Untergang) always has a positive signification. In Ponderings VIII
(§ 53), on the other hand, the word “greatness” always takes on a negative sense:
“the actual greatness (Größe) of the present worldview” [is placed in the context of]
an epoch that grossly misunderstands being and reduces it to calculability on the
basis of “‘National Socialist’ pseudo-philosophy”. In Ponderings XI (§ 29), which
centers on Heidegger’s acerbic critique of the consummation of modernity under
the domination of machination (whose essence is its own “refusal of ownmost
sway”), the executors of machination “stand under a compulsion” of making-secure
that “gives them security, and this becomes the sign of their ‘greatness’ (Größe)”.
This passage unequivocally gives the word “greatness” a negative sense, just as in §
2 of the Contributions.7
One may surmise that Heidegger’s ascription of “greatness” to the National
Socialist “movement” in his Freiburg lectures of the Summer of 1935 – the
Introduction to Metaphysics – will have to be subjected to renewed interpreta-
tion on the basis of the ambiguity of the concept of “greatness” in Heidegger’s
usage. The doubts that arise [with this ambiguity] may be justified on the
grounds of his mutable stylistic practice, which allows Heidegger to modify – in
the sense of re-creating – the unequivocal sense of many fundamental words
(Grundworte) in order to open up new horizons, which will have to be expli-
cated, in turn, out of the respective spiritual contexts of his observations. In
consideration of the inception and elaboration of words in this sense, our applied
hermeneutic praxis will carefully attend to these inconvenient correspondences
and accordingly confront them.
These are only a few examples intended to show that it is impossible to give
Heidegger’s usage of concepts a literal, foundational sense. For these words are
subject to multiple gradations of color and sometimes used in a transformed sense
that can only be specified and understood in context. Let us return to the passage
introduced above: “National Socialism is a barbaric principle (barbarisches
Prinzip). That is its essence and its possible greatness (Größe)”. In consequence of
these considerations, these sentences must not be torn out of context and examined
in isolation without taking the hermeneutic issues of Heidegger’s linguistic prac-
tices into account. The explication of the sense of both sentences does not demand
elaboration beyond what has been presented in our interpretation. Yet this interpre-
tation can itself be unlocked by other keys to interpretation, as will be demonstrated
in the course of this investigation.
7
See Heidegger M. (1989), p. 8. English translation, p. 6: “[...] because man has become feeble for
Da-sein – because the unfettered hold of the frenzy of the gigantic has overwhelmed him under the
guise of ‘magnitude’ (Größe)”.
To return now to the issue of “National Socialism”: in Ponderings and Intimations

III (§ 207), Heidegger also records the judgment he had passed in response to the
question “Who is (Alfred) Baeumler?” – that is, the German philosopher
(1887–1968) and interpreter of Bachofen and Nietzsche who became a member of
NSDAP in 1933. Heidegger bluntly answers the question to the effect that he repre-
sents “Neokantianism warmed up with National Socialism”, allowing himself, in
this case, to use a “slogan”. (“In this case, such designations by means of buzzwords
may be allowed”). In Heidegger’s opinion Baeumler’s work does not offer “evi-
dence of genuine philosophizing”.
With reference to Heidegger’s aversion to the exploitation of philosophy – and
this almost brings us to the end of this division of our text – let us return to § 61 of
Ponderings V: “‘National Socialist philosophy’ is not a ‘philosophy’, nor does it
serve ‘National Socialism’ – it simply trails along behind, burdening it with its
know-it-all attitude – which sufficiently demonstrates its ineptitude for philoso-
phy”. This offers us definitive proof that Heidegger certainly does not base being-
historical thinking on National Socialism and therefore not on politics. His position
regarding the philosophy which presented itself, at that time, as National Socialist,
is still valid today for those who wish to designate Heidegger’s philosophy as
National Socialist. Whoever proceeds in this fashion will also fall prey to Heidegger’s
acerbic irony: “To say that a philosophy is ‘National Socialist’, or, as the case may
be, that it is not, amounts to saying that a triangle is courageous, or that it is not –
and hence cowardly”. With this, Heidegger emphasized that this mode of designat-
ing philosophies is pure nonsense.
Heidegger’s project of spiritual, essential knowledge, as correspondence to
being, would have little in common with the functionality of thinking to which the
culture of the time dedicated itself. Pursuit of a National Socialist philosophy is
“even more impossible, and at the same time, far more superfluous than ‘Catholic
philosophy’” (Ponderings VI, § 154).
2.2 eracination, Soil and Related Compound Words: Their

D
“Origin” and A-Political Usage
Deracination or uprootedness (Entwurzelung), soil or native ground (Boden), and

related compound words are used by Heidegger whenever he wishes to indicate the
causes of the defeat of “genuine philosophy” – defeat, insofar as these words are
used as a form of currency (evidently a term taken from “commercial” discourse) to
gain professional entrance into the academy. Discovery of the reasons leading to the
deterioration of genuine philosophy, as well as the reason for its inability to find its
way back to the history of being, is intended to help us to precisely unravel the
complexities of Heidegger’s language usage and as such to explicate its “origins” in
terms of the “contexts” out which Heidegger’s observations arose. To ignore the
respective contexts of these terms would amount to the neglect of their proper sense
and consequent deviation from the proper path – a path leading to one’s own com-
prehension while enriching the understanding of others: And therein consists the
responsibility of the “researcher”.
2.2.1 Deracination – Strong in Resistance Despite Resistance
The word “Entwurzelung” (deracination or uprooting) is used six times in total:

once in Ponderings IV (§ 269) and five times in Ponderings V (§§ 85, 86, 87, 95,
and 123). The context is defined by the crisis of originary knowledge and its
intentional displacement by the “tyranny of technicity” which is “in itself so
unsecured against itself, wavering and waning”. This displacement defines the
epoch of progress as well as the “great emptiness (große Leere)” of the ever-
present, in which mankind, fascinated and deceived by technology, thought-
lessly staggers and “teeters” (§ 123). In consequence of technicity every thing
sinks away into the functionality of the useful: man becomes the beneficiary of
a mechanism to which he too in his ignorance will also fall victim – lost in the
un-grounded (Un-grund).
The concept of “deracination” is subject to the following modifications: “[...]
to prepare a defence of the Occident against deracination” (Ponderings IV, §
269); in respect to the “tyranny of technicity”, how “deeply and extensively
must the deracination already reach for one to be torn along and entranced by
such as this?” (Ponderings V, § 85); “The historical deracination and boundless-
ness of the epoch exhibits itself most clearly in the fashionable discovery of
Hölderlin” (§ 86); “Technicity and deracination” belong together and have a
“common origin (gemeinsamer Grund)” (§ 87); an epoch “where truth is sought
not in the least, but rather nothing but validity and standing”; “for ultimately,
this is all one wants to hear of: the sounds of our beguilement in face of our
organized deracination” (§ 95); the progress of culture which will “always be
the same work of desolation of the already long-consummated deracination of
beings from being” (§ 123).
The respective contexts of these modifications will be examined more closely in
what follows. At this point let it only be noted that Heidegger offers several remarks
on Christianity and the “impotence (Ohnmacht) of Christian belief” within the the-
matic frame of “deracination” (§ 123).
But how is the concept of “deracination” to be brought into relation to the afore-
mentioned references to the context of the progress of technicity and the progress of
culture? What are the consequences of a form of knowledge that restricts itself to
historical facts and events, such as serve to make Hölderlin “useful in some relation
of value”?
Überlegungen iv Ponderings iv
§ 269 [105–106], S. 292–293: § 269 [105–106]:
Wir können nicht wissen, was im Grunde mit uns We cannot fundamentally know what is
geschieht; solches Wissen war auch noch nie happening with us; such knowledge has
einem geschichtlichen Zeitalter beschieden. Was never been granted to an epoch of historicity.
es zu wissen meint, ist immer noch ein Anderes What an epoch presumes itself to know is
als das, was geschieht. Aber wir müssen ein always something different from what is
Zwiefaches ergreifen und in seiner happening. But there are two things we need
Zusammengehörigkeit begreifen: to grasp and to conceive in their
einmal der Entwurzelung des Abendlandes die belonging-together:
Gegenwehr entgegenstellen und dann zugleich On the one hand, to prepare a defence of
die höchsten Ent-|scheidungen geschichtlichen the Occident against deracination; on the
Daseins vorbereiten. Jene Gegenwehr ist in der other, and at the same time, to prepare the
Art ihres Vorgehens und ihrer Ansprüche völlig ultimate decisions of our historical Dasein.
verschieden von dieser Vorbereitung. Jene In the mode of its practice and its demands,
braucht einen unmittelbaren Glauben und die such defence is completely different from
Fraglosigkeit der zugreifenden Gegenhandlung. the readiness of decision. The one is
Diese muß ein ursprüngliches Fragen werden, governed by the immediate actuality of
sehr vorläufig und fast – von dort gesehen – self-belief and unquestioning, counter-acting
nutzlos. Es ist nicht nötig, ja vielleicht sogar opposition. The other has to enact a
unmöglich, daß Beides zugleich aus einem primordial questioning, which will be very
höheren Wissen heraus vollzogen wird. Es ist preliminary and, in this sense, will be
sogar wahrscheinlich, daß im Gesichtskreis der seen – from the first perspective – as almost
Gegenwehr, die sich zugleich als Neu-Gründung useless. It is not necessary and may, indeed,
weiß, alles Fragen als zurückgebliebene Haltung even be impossible that both can be enacted
abgewiesen werden muß. at the same time based on higher knowledge.
Und dennoch – nur wenn die Vorbereitung der It is even likely that within the horizon of
äußersten Entscheidungen sich einen gegründeten opposition – which conceives itself as
Raum schafft – als Dichten, und Kunst überhaupt, ground-laying founding – all questioning
als Denken und Besinnung – nur dann wird die must be refused as a backward directed kind
kommende Geschichte mehr sein als nur die of comportment.
Forterhaltung der leiblichen Geschlechterfolge in And yet – only if the preparation of
einem leidlich erträglichen “Lebens”kreis. ultimate decisions opens up a grounded and
grounding site for itself – as poetry, and art
as such, as thinking and mindfulness – only
then will the history to come be more than
the preservation of the embodied succession
of generations in their mere endurance of the
circuit of “life”.
Überlegungen V, § 85, S. 78 [GA 94, S. 363]

Überlegungen v Ponderings v
§ 85 [78], S. 363: § 85 [78]:
Die Tyrannei der Technik – wo sie selbst The tyranny of technicity: and yet in itself so
gegen sich so ungesichert, schwankend und unsecured against itself, wavering and waning,
schwindend ist; im Nu durch sich selbst from moment to moment it supersedes itself,
überholt und ohne Verlaß – daß solches being without credibility – that such can
herrschen und bezaubern kann – welchen dominate and bedazzle – what kind of
Menschen setzt dies voraus? Wie weit muß die humanity does this presuppose? How deeply
Entwurzelung schon reichen, um durch and extensively must the deracination already
Solches hingerissen zu werden; denn es reach for one to be torn along and entranced
handelt sich ja nicht um Einzelne, die by such as this? For it is not a matter of just a
vielleicht noch romantisch sich wehren und few who still resist in romantic fashion and are
doch mitzermahlen werden. yet ground down along with the rest.
Technik kann verlängern, verzögern, so oder Technicity can extend, delay, be effective in
so ins Meßbare wirken – sie kann niemals one way or another in the quantitative – it can
überwinden, d. h. gründen –; sie wird selbst never overcome, that is, found; more and
mehr und mehr das stets Überwindbare, und so more, technicity itself becomes what must
gerade hält sie sich in einer Dauer – obzwar sie constantly be overcome, and as such it assures
keine Gewähr bietet, zumal wo sie gegen itself a duration—although it offers no
ihresgleichen steht. assurance, especially when it encounters its
counter-part.
§ 86 [78–79], S. 363–364: § 86 [78–79]:
Die geschichtliche Entwurzelung und The historical deracination and
Ungebundenheit des Zeitalters hat ihr boundlessness of the epoch exhibits itself
deutlichstes Kennzeichen in der Hölderlin-Mode; most clearly in the fashionable discovery of
denn entweder verrechnet | man Hölderlin auf Hölderlin: one either assimilates Hölderlin to
das “Vaterländische” oder man spielt ihn offen the “patriotic” party or reckons him, more or
und versteckt ins “Christliche” hinüber. So wird less openly, to belong to the “Christian”
die Entscheidung, die er ist, nicht nur umgangen, camp. And so the decision, which he himself
sondern überhaupt nicht ins Wissen gehoben. is, is not only avoided, it is not even
Aber jedesmal besteht der Schein, als sei sein recognized. But in any case, the illusion is
Werk nun am Höchsten gemessen, wo es doch preserved that his work is highly valued,
nur historisch gemacht und zu irgendeinem when in fact it is only historicized and made
Nutzen in Bezug gestellt ist. useful in some relation of value.
Überlegungen V, § 87, S. 79 [GA 94, S. 364]

§ 87 [79], S. 364: § 87 [79]:
Technik und Entwurzelung. – Während Radio Technicity and deracination: while radio
und allerlei Organisation das innere Wachsen und and all kinds of organizations destroy the
d. h. ständige Zurückwachsen in die immanent maturation and as such the
Überlieferung im Dorf und damit dieses selbst constant return to the sources of village life,
zerstören, errichtet man Professuren für thereby destroying the village, one
“Soziologie” des Bauerntums und schreibt establishes professorships in “sociology” for
haufenweise Bücher über das Volkstum. Dieser study of the peasantry and writes piles of
Vorgang des Schreibens über ... ist genau derselbe books on folk life and customs. This
wie das Aufreden des Radioapparats an die procedure of writing about ... functions just
Bauern mit Rücksicht auf die Bedürfnisse der like pushing the use of radio in village
städtischen Fremden, die das Dorf zunehmend life – in consideration of strangers from the
überschwemmen. city who progressively flood the villages.
Aber das Verhängnisvollste ist, daß man diese But the most fatal aspect of all this is that
Vorgänge überhaupt nicht sehen will, geschweige one does not even want to see the coming to
denn ihre Selbigkeit und ihren gemeinsamen pass of these events, and still less to
Grund. recognize their essential sameness and their
common origin.
§ 95 [86–87], S. 369: § 95 [86–87]:
Wer ahnt unter den Heutigen jenes andere Who of today has any inkling of that other law,
Gesetz, daß das Wesentlichste zuerst in der which demands that what is most essential and
Gestalt erstritten wird, die von ihm fordert, ownmost be brought to light in such gestalt as
zuvor noch einmal in das Verborgene prompts one to once again dive into the withheld
zurückzusinken als das zu Frühe? Und and concealed as that which came in advance as
vollends: wer wagt diesen Umweg in einem the too early? And more fully: who will wager
Zeitalter gar, wo nur die greifbare “Tat”, d. this detour, even in an epoch where only the
h. der Nutzen und der Erfolg, in Geltung palpable “deed” – useful and successful – has
steht – wo gar nicht Wahrheit, sondern nur any validity: where truth is sought not in the
Geltung gesucht wird. least, but rather nothing but validity and
Wann kommen die Wegbereiter der Umwege standing?
des | Zu-Frühen? (Vorerst lärmen nur die When shall they arrive – these pathfinders of the
Trompeter des Allzuspäten und sie lärmen detours of the too-early? (For the moment,
unausgesetzt und sich überlärmend, weil die nothing but the trumpeting sound of the
Ohren für den Lärm immer größer und all-too-belated, and they sound forth without
zahlreicher werden – weil man schließlich pause, one over-sounding the other, because ears
gar nichts anderes mehr hören will als – die for this noise grow ever larger and more
Betörung über die organisierte numerous – for ultimately, this is all one wants to
Entwurzelung.) hear of: the sounds of our beguilement in face of
our organized deracination.)
§ 123 [115–117], S. 387–389: § 123 [115–117]:
Wir bewegen uns immer noch im Zeitalter des We are still living in the era of progress: just that,
Fortschritts – nur daß er eine Zeitlang als for some time now, it has been sought as an
internationales Gut angestrebt wurde und heute international good, and today it is proclaimed as
als der Wettbewerb der Nationen ausgerufen proper to national competition: the “best” films, the
wird: die “besten” Filme und die “schnellsten” “fastest” airplanes – the “surest” means of never
Flugzeuge – die “sichersten” Mittel, nirgendwo dwelling anywhere and growing together with
mehr zu verweilen und auf etwas zuzuwachsen – something – but rather suddenly to possess
sondern alles unversehens in einem zu besitzen everything, all at once, and then? To teeter on the
und dann? in der großen Leere taumeln und brink of a great emptiness, out-shouting one’s
sich überschreien. own clamour.
Der Fortschritt, zum Wettbewerb eigens The proclamation of a competitive idea of progress
ausgerufen, wird jetzt zur noch schärferen becomes the pincers that grip humanity still more
Zange, die den Menschen in seine Leere firmly, seizing, clamping mankind in its void. And
einklemmt. Und was ist denn nun eigentlich what is progress, actually? The bringing-forth and
Fortschritt? Das Fort- und Wegbringen des carrying-away of what may be called beings, in
Seienden und was dafür gilt aus der an sich | accordance with an already impoverished
schon genug dürftigen Wahrheit des Seyns. understanding of the truth of beyng. So, let’s
Denn sehen wir einmal offenen Auges zu und honestly look and see and ask, where has the
fragen wir, wohin ist z. B. die neuzeitliche progress of modern natural science, for example,
Naturwissenschaft fortgeschritten? Man brought us? One might say: these three hundred
möchte sagen: seit drei Jahrhunderten so weit years it has brought us so far and so quickly and
und so rasch und sich überstürzend, daß keiner rashly that no-one can remain ignorant of this
mehr diese Bewegung übersieht. Und was motion. And what happened, in fundamental regard,
geschah im Grunde hinsichtlich des Wissens von in respect to our knowledge of nature? It has taken
der Natur? Es ist um keinen Schritt “weiter” no step in “advance” – nor could or ought it – if
gekommen, und es konnte dies und durfte es said progress is to be possible: for nature is still
auch nicht, wenn jener Fortschritt ermöglicht conceived as the inter-related spatial-temporal
werden sollte; denn noch ist Natur: der movement of mass-points (despite atomic physics
zeiträumliche Bewegungszusammenhang von and such matters).
Massepunkten – trotz Atomphysik und Yes, nature was once embedded in the ordered
dergleichen. whole of beings – now this too has vanished with
Ja anfänglich war noch diese Natur eingehalten in the progressive impotence of Christian belief.
eine Ordnung des Seienden – jetzt ist auch diese What steps in its place are the “personal”, the
mit der wachsenden Ohnmacht des christlichen “sentimental” affects of natural scientists, who
Glaubens geschwunden und [an] deren Stelle willingly admit – in response to the far more honest
treten die “persönlichen” “Sentimentalitäten” der “materialists” of the past century – that “along
Naturforscher, die natürlich gegenüber den weit with”, or “in addition” to, the objects of their
ehrlicheren und redlicheren “Materialisten” des research an “inner” realm is also “given”.
vorigen Jahrhunderts zugeben, daß es
“daneben” – “neben” ihrem
Beschäftigungsbereich – noch das “Innere”
“gäbe”.
Fortschritt beruht auf der wachsenden Progress depends on the ever-increasing forgetting
Vergessenheit des Seyns aufgrund der immer of beyng, based on the ever more inventive and
findigeren und beliebigeren berechnenden arbitrarily calculative exploitation of “nature”; it
Ausnutzung der “Natur”; bald wird auch | die won’t be long now that living nature will also be
lebendige Natur so weit sein, daß sie in die seized in the pincers of planning and destroyed. But
Zange der Planung genommen und zerstört this process is indifferent in the sense that – insofar
wird. Aber dieser Vorgang ist deshalb as it drives on toward destruction – it always brings
gleichgültig, weil er – soweit er auf die more of the same. Its potential was already exhausted
Zerstörung treibt – immer dasselbe bringt, weil with its inception: the subjection of nature to
das, was er vermag, schon in seinem Beginn calculative thinking, and the transposition of
ausgeschöpft wurde – die Übernahme der Natur mankind into the comportment of self-securing
in die Berechnung und die Versetzung des consumption. With the numerical increase of the
Menschen in die Haltung des Sichsicherns durch masses and their provision with panibus et
die Nutzung. Das Nur-noch-sich-sichern bei der circensibus, simply-self-securing becomes a
Zunahme der Massen und die Versorgung dieser self-conceived cultural achievement in its own right
panibus et circensibus nimmt sich überdies als and with this the progress of culture may be
Kulturleistung in Anspruch, so daß der considered secured. What is transpiring in this milieu
Fortschritt der Kultur nunmehr als gesichert cannot be fathomed, and yet it is always only the
gelten kann. Unabsehbar ist, was in diesem same devastation consequent on an already
Rahmen sich begibt und doch ist es immer nur long-since complete uprooting of beings from
dieselbe Verödung einer schon längst beyng.
vollzogenen Entwurzelung des Seienden aus What has to happen for history (Geschichte) once
dem Seyn. again to truly enown itself?
Was muß geschehen, damit wirklich wieder
Geschichte sich ereignet?
According to Heidegger, every historical epoch is granted an originary form of

knowledge whose foundations (Grund) are not simply derived from traditional
ontic categories such as manifest themselves phenomenologically in the things
themselves. A related difficulty, which we have to consider, is that the knowing
awareness – as originary knowing – to which Heidegger refers, “has never been
granted to an epoch of historicity” (Ponderings IV, § 269). So we are confronted
with a paramount form of knowing that is said to thread its way through history
without being dependent on being-historical, let alone object-historical categories.
Nevertheless, Heidegger does not simply abandon ontic categories, but rather re-
appropriates them in the perspective of being-historical thinking to assess and
establish them ontologically. This retrieval helps us understand Heidegger’s posi-
tion as well as the “defence” (Abwehr) that he opposes to the “deracination” of the
Occident, which was “seduced” by another, functional way of knowing “governed
by technicity” because of this deracination.
In section § 269, the words “defence (Gegenwehr)” and “preparation
(Vorbereitung)” occur no less than five times – in one case, furthermore, the word
“preparation” is not explicitly used, although it is silently presupposed. This intends
to demonstrate how necessary it is to oppose the deracination of the Occident and at
the same time to “prepare the ultimate decisions of our historical Dasein”. The
underlying-grounding problem manifests not only as the uprooting of an originary
thinking that is capable of preserving the inception of the first beginning for the
future, but also as the rapid transformation of the Occident through a different mode
of knowledge, which is positioned to re-write historical events based on an
ever-more accidental present devoid of historical insight. This implicates the danger
of the gradual rootlessness of the ontological dimension of thinking, such that the
ontic presents itself two-dimensionally. In regard to “enowning”, the consequence
is that it is lost to thought, because events are reduced to their mere givenness. It is
necessary to oppose deracination because the defence conceived is indispensably a
“ground-laying founding (Neu-Gründung)” (§ 269) – at least to the degree that it is
demanded of a way of thought that cannot be detached from the truth of beyng. Only
as such will thinking be able to take the path of rootedness that joins the “first” and
the “last” beginning and be guided by it.
The inevitable consequence of this experiment in deracination – the uprooting of
thinking – is the impossibility of finding a path of return and as such the impossibil-
ity of coming back to oneself in mindfulness. Beginning with Ponderings V,
Heidegger shortly and succinctly sketches the primary traits of the “tyranny of tech-
nicity” to compose the portrait of a mankind subjected to the logic of servitude (§
85): “in itself so unsecured against itself”, “wavering” and “waning”, from “moment
to moment it supersedes itself”, being “without credibility”. Driven to “dominate
and bedazzle”, “effective in one way or another in the quantitative” realm, “more
and more, technicity itself becomes what must constantly be overcome, and as such
it assures itself a duration”. Still more significant is the fact that technicity “can
never overcome, that is, found (a beginning)”. Heidegger’s conviction in § 85 that
technicity cannot found a beginning clearly accords with the conclusion § 152 of the
Contributions to Philosophy:
“What should technicity be? Not in the sense of an ideal. But how does technicity stand
within the necessity of overcoming the abandonment of being, respectively, of putting up
being’s abandonment to decision, from the ground up. Is technicity the historical pathway
to the end, to the last man’s falling back into the technicized animal – or can technicity be
above all taken up as sheltering and then enjoined into the grounding of Da-sein?”.8
Modernity is accordingly determined by the tyranny of technicity and therefore

by the functionality of a procedure that uses and exploits all that it encounters.
Utilitarianism in this sense always remains enclosed in immanence, without relation
to beings themselves. For example, Hölderlin comes into “fashion” when one
accounts his work “patriotic” or “reckons him, more or less openly, to belong to the
“Christian” camp”. Everything is “made useful in some relation of value” (§ 86).
Everything must be assigned a utilitarian purpose. This procedure of production
characterizes an epoch – the epoch of modernity – gone blind, become incapable of
contemplating its own fate. For the focus on the immediate present as manipulated
by mankind, which thereby becomes calculable to itself in accord with its own
tyrannical calculations, defines the crystalized temporality of the epoch. “Technicity
and deracination” (§ 87) consequently compose an indivisible unity within which
Man becomes the prime protagonist of an ahistorical present which is fated to
evolve into a mere network of progressively more opaque and uncontrollable
relations.
8
Ibid. § 152, p. 275. English translation, p. 194.
Heidegger denounces the exploitation of knowledge in conjunction with patriotic

purposes, in its complicity with “the media”, professors of “sociology”, and the
“mass publication” of clever books. The result is the destruction (zerstören) of
“immanent maturation” (§ 87). The bewitchment of the people brings about a
destructive state of confusion wherein thought is no longer able to compose itself
and worldviews are unable to ground themselves in primordial reality. The “self”,
consequently, finds its only hold in the fathomless ungroundedness of a world
reduced to the sum of its parts. Each and every thing is an isolated entity, devoid of
conceivable relation to every other. “But the most fatal aspect of all this”, Heidegger
writes, “is that one does not even want to see the coming to pass of these events, and
still less to recognize their essential sameness and their common origin”. One is
unwilling to seek the common origin of what eventuates in the mechanistic repeti-
tion of its own un-groundedness.
Consequently, the illusion is created of grasping and possessing something that
can never be cherished by a mode of thinking solely directed toward usefulness; a
mode of thinking “where only the palpable ‘deed’ (greifbare ‘Tat’) – useful (Nutzen)
and successful – has any validity: where truth (Wahrheit) is sought not in the least,
but rather nothing but validity (Geltung) and standing” (§ 95). Heidegger decisively
refutes the “logic” underlying all “validity”, because it is the basis of closed philo-
sophical systems without issue, which prevent the opening of new horizons of
meaning. As soon as philosophy, therefore, no longer understands its place in the
history of being it will necessarily be condemned to be led astray by such measures
of thought as are guided by utility to seek the “validity” of their achieved results.
The relapse of thinking into technicity and its complex mechanisms also contributes
to the intensification of this disorientation: it generates a crude mode of existence
given that the essential belonging of Dasein to the history of being is denied. With
our “seduction” and bedazzlement by technicity (§ 85) our “ears for this noise grow
ever larger and more numerous” for “this is all one wants to hear of: the sounds of
our beguilement in face of our organized deracination” (§ 95). One might suppose
the beguilement of technicity to function as a deceptive distraction: for it appears to
return humanity to a position of power through the uprising of humanity, when in
fact technicity ever more and ever more securely distances humanity from destiny.
Everything takes its course as if technicity were possessed of the power to secure
beings—and therefore to secure an epoch open to the allure of beings—an epoch
without attunement to being. But being regardless traces its path through history.
The subjection of beings to technicity offers the bleakest horizon of an already
uprooted epoch, one incapable of insight because drawn astray by the confusion that
continues to feed its operations.
Our examination of this division of the text concludes with reference to “the era
of progress” in section § 123, wherein the word “progress (Fortschritt)” occurs as
many as seven times, especially with its concluding, unavoidable references to the
“progress of culture”. This concept, which actually signifies the “bringing-forth and
carrying-away of what may be called beings, in accordance with an already impov-
erished understanding of the truth of beyng”, presupposes “the ever-increasing
forgetting of beyng, based on the ever more inventive and arbitrarily calculative
exploitation of nature”. This draws us on to “teeter on the brink of a great emptiness
(große Leere)”, held fast by a “pincers that grip humanity still more firmly, seizing,
clamping mankind in its emptiness (Leere)”. Heidegger twice recurs to the concept
of “emptiness” at the beginning of section § 123, which concludes with reference to
the “desolation of the already long-consummated deracination of beings from beyng”.
In this context, Heidegger recurs to our inability to dwell with beings, which
evokes the desire “suddenly to possess everything, all at once”. In place of the “pro-
gressive impotence of Christian belief”, become incapable of preserving the
“ordered whole of beings” within which “nature” was “once embedded”, now the
“‘personal’, the ‘sentimental’ affects of natural scientists” take precedence. That
these sentiments, in the consequence of the oblivion of beyng, become lords of
nature, follows from the “ever more inventive and arbitrarily calculative exploitation
of ‘nature’. “This course of events, driving on “toward destruction (Zerstörung)” is
intimately related to the “progress of culture”.
All of this arises in the perspective of Heidegger’s urgent question: “What has to
happen for history (Geschichte) once again to truly enown itself?”.
2.2.2 Ground and Related Expressions and Composite Words
The next and final division of our explication of volume GA 94 concentrates on the
word Boden. This final division is liable to be of especial interest to the reader in the
sense that – in the course of reading these passages – not only can Heidegger’s con-
cern for the fate of philosophy almost be experienced personally, but that one also
comes to realize how pertinent these passages still are. Heidegger’s words reach out
beyond their time to make their breakthrough into the horizon of the contempo-
rary reader.
The context in which the word “ground” and related concepts stand is composed
by the decay of philosophy: the “transitional thinker who enacts the crossing”
(Ponderings V, § 62); “philosophy” (§§ 134 and 145); “beyng” (Ponderings VI, § 3);
“what philosophy is now” (§ 31). The translation of Boden into other languages has
to take the respective contexts of this word into account: “rootedness
(Bodenständigkeit)” (Ponderings V, § 62); “rootedness (Bodenständigkeit)” (§ 134);
“collapsing ground (brüchiger Boden)” (§ 145); “Bodenständigkeit” (Ponderings
VI, § 3); “rootlessness (Bodenlosigkeit)” (§ 31).
In the present division, section § 31 is particularly important inasmuch as it
emphasizes the distinctions between “rootlessness (Bodenlosigkeit)”, “groundless-
ness (kein Grund)” (“no ground”) (the guiding question concerning the being of
beings); and, on the other hand, “grounding”, “to ground” (Gründung, gründen),
and “ground” (Grund).
§ 62 [54], S. 349: § 62 [54]:
Jeder übergängliche, den Übergang Every transitional thinker who enacts the
vollziehende Denker steht notwendig im crossing [into the other beginning] necessarily
Zwielicht der ihm eigenen Zweideutigkeit. stands in the twofold light of his own
Alles scheint ins Vergangene zurückzuweisen equivocation. Everything appears to refer back
und aus diesem errechenbar, und zugleich into the past, from whence it can be accounted
ist alles ein Abstoßen des Vergangenen und for, and at the same time, everything depends on
willkürliches Setzen eines Künftigen, dem the rejection of the past and the arbitrary positing
die Zukunft zu fehlen scheint. Er ist of something to come, something which doesn’t
nirgends “unterzubringen” – aber diese appear to have a future. Such a thinker cannot be
Heimatlosigkeit ist seine unbegriffene “accommodated” anywhere – but this
Bodenständigkeit in der verborgenen homelessness constitutes his unconceived
Geschichte des Seyns. rootedness in the concealed and reserved history
of beyng.
§ 134 [127–129], S. 395–396: § 134 [127–129]:
Jene, die meinen, man sollte an den ohnedies Those who propose that the study of “philosophy”
verendeten Universitäten die “Philosophie” should be abolished at the universities – which are
abschaffen und durch die “politische Wissenschaft” facing their own demise, in any case – and replaced
ersetzen, haben im Grunde, ohne daß sie im with “political science”, are basically completely
geringsten wissen, was sie tun und wollen, völlig justified, even if they don’t have the slightest clue as
recht. Zwar wird dadurch nicht die Philosophie to what they are doing and what they want.
abgeschafft – das ist unmöglich – aber es wird etwas Admittedly this will not result in the abolition of
beseitigt, was so aussieht wie Philosophie – es wird philosophy – that is impossible – but something that
dieser in einer Hinsicht die Gefahr genommen, looks like philosophy will be eliminated – and in a
verunstaltet zu werden. Käme es zu dieser certain sense, philosophy will be relieved of the
Abschaffung, dann wäre die Philosophie von dieser danger of being deformed. Should it come to this
Seite her “negativ” gesichert – es wäre deutlich abolition, then, in this dimension, philosophy would
künftighin, daß die Ersatzleute der be “negatively” secured: for it would be clear, for
Philosophieprofessoren nichts mit der Philosophie future reference, that the surrogate personnel of
zu tun haben, nicht einmal mit ihrem Schein – university professors have nothing to do with
gesetzt, daß nicht jener Ersatz noch mehr in den philosophy, not even with the semblance of
Schein von Philosophie versinkt. Die Philosophie it – assuming that these surrogates do not immerse
wäre verschwunden aus dem öffentlichen und themselves still more in semblance. Philosophy will
erzieherischen “Interesse”. Und dieser Zustand have vanished from the fields of public and
entspräche der Wirklichkeit – denn die Philosophie pedagogical “interest”. And this state of affairs would
gibt es da überhaupt nicht – eben dann, wenn sie ist. correspond to these realities – which are totally void
Warum also helfen wir nicht noch mit an jener of philosophy – even then, if and when philosophy is
Abschaffung? Wir tun es schon, | indem wir die at work.
Nachwuchsausbildung nach Möglichkeit unterbinden Why don’t we help along with this abolition? We are
(keine Dissertationen mehr). Aber das ist nur ein already doing this by preventing the education of
Beiläufiges, und vor allem: das kommt bereits zu successors whenever the possibility presents itself (no
spät. more writing of dissertations). But all this only in
Schon möchte man wieder jene passing, and above all – it’s already too late.
Professorenphilosophie, schon melden sich die One once again wants this professorial philosophy:
“neuen” Anwärter für dieses Geschäft – Leute, die “new” pretenders to this business have already
noch die nötige “politische” Geschicklichkeit announced themselves. Such people, moreover, who
mitbringen und nun erst recht als die “Neuen” das are possessed of the necessary “political”
Bisherige in seiner Bisherigkeit bestätigen und cleverness – such “new ones” who will with certainty
festigen. Denn sie alle sind noch weiter entfernt von confirm and approve what was in its pastness. For
allem Fragen und “verpflichten” sich zu einem they are still further removed from all questioning;
sacrificium intellectus, demgegenüber das they commit themselves to a sacrificium intellectus
mittelalterliche überhaupt nicht zählt; weil das such as the Middle Ages never dreamed of – for the
Mittelalter überhaupt kein ursprüngliches Fragen und Middle Ages knew not of primordial questioning and
seine Notwendigkeiten kannte – und nichts erfahren its necessity, nor could it have an experience of what
konnte von dem, was Nietzsche ins Wissen heben Nietzsche had to raise into consciousness. But for
mußte. Aber dieser ist ja auch den Heutigen nur ein those of today, Nietzsche is just an expedient, a
Notbehelf und je nach Bedarf eine Fundgrube, aber treasure trove to draw upon as needed, but nothing
nichts, was sie zu einem Ernst und auch nur zu that could impel them unto earnestness and drive
seiner Besinnung zwingen könnte. them to reflect upon themselves.
Man “hat” ja die Wahrheit. Beweis: man tut jetzt so, After all, one “has” the truth. The proof thereof: one
als müßte “geforscht” werden. Jedesmal dann und now acts and does as if “research” has become a
erst dann, wenn man sich im Besitz der Wahrheit | necessity. For every time that one knows oneself in
weiß, macht sich die Bejahung der “Wissenschaft” possession of the truth, and only then, does one avail
geltend. Und es ist der “Wissenschaft” noch nie so oneself of the affirmation of “science”. And “science”
gut gegangen wie heute; es bedurfte nur eine has never had better days than today; the only thing
Zeitlang des Geschimpfes über die needed was a short season of abuse – of the
“Intellektuellen” – nur so lange, bis man selbst weit “intellectuals” – just long enough to bring oneself
genug war und zahlreich genug, deren Stellen zu along and to become numerous enough to occupy
besetzen. Täuschen wir uns nicht über die their positions. Let us not fool ourselves concerning
unabsehbare Bisherigkeit der “neuen” the incalculable pastness of the “new” science – let us
Wissenschaft – verkennen wir nie ihre never mistake or underestimate its rootlessness and
Bodenlosigkeit und ihre Ferne zu aller Philosophie. its distance from all philosophy. And let us know,
Und wissen wir, daß dieses zu wissen immer nur ein that to know this is only something incidental,
Beiläufiges ist, weil wir wissen: die Geschichte der because we know: the history of the truth of beyng
Wahrheit des Seyns geschieht in ihrem eigenen happens in its own dimension and has its own
Bereich und hat ihre eigene “Chronologie”. “chronology”.
§ 145 [137–138], S. 401: § 145 [137–138]:
Diejenigen, die heute noch den letzten Rest von Those who currently falsify the last
Philosophie zur Weltanschauungs-scholastik remnants of philosophy to produce a
umfälschen, um sich zeitgemäß zu machen, sollten scholastic worldview, thereby to remain
mindestens noch so viel Einsicht und Geradheit des contemporary, should at least muster
Denkens aufbringen, daß sie den heiligen Thomas von enough honesty and insight to nominate
Aquino zu ihrem – ihnen allein gemäßen – the blessed Thomas Aquinas as their one
Schutzpatron erheben – um an ihm zu lernen, wie and only, their uniquely commensurate
man im großen Stil unschöpferisch sein und doch sehr patron saint. They could learn how one
klug wesentliche Gedanken in den Dienst des can remain uncreative in grand style and
Glaubens stellen und diesem ein entscheidendes yet very wisely compose thoughts in
Grundgefüge geben kann. Warum geschieht das service to belief, giving it a strong and
nicht? Weil sogar zu dieser großzügigen decisive fundamental design. Why
Unselbständigkeit des Denkens die Kraft und vor doesn’t this happen? Because the energy
allem die handwerkliche Sicherheit fehlt. Die and above all the assured handicraft
Verwirrung ist so groß, daß man nicht einmal erkennt, necessary to bring about this
daß diese “politischen” und “volksverbundenen” magnificent design for the subjection of
Philosophien kümmerliche Nachbilder der Scholastik thought is lacking. The confusion is so
sind. great that one does not even realize that
Die Groteske wird vollständig, wenn zu all dieser these “political” philosophies of
Verworrenheit noch der “Kampf” gegen die traditional “folkways” are just
katholische Kirche kommt – ein “Kampf”, der impoverished imitations of
seinen Gegner noch gar nicht gefunden hat und auch scholasticism.
nicht finden kann, solange er so kurz und so klein It gets still more grotesque when the
denkt von dem, was die Grundlagen dieser Kirche “battle” against the Catholic Church is
ausmacht: die abgewandelte Metaphysik des added to the confusion; a battle that has
abendländischen Denkens überhaupt, | in der diese yet to find its opponent, an opponent
“Weltanschauungskämpfer” so sehr verstrickt sind, who cannot even be found as long as
daß sie nicht ahnen, wie sehr sie denselben brüchigen one conceives the foundations of this
Boden [Fraglosigkeit des Seins, Grundlosigkeit der Church in such a derivative and
Wahrheit, Wesensbestimmung des Menschen] mit superficial manner; foundations founded
ihrem “Gegner” teilen. in the modified metaphysics of
Occidental thought in its entirety. The
antagonists in this “struggle of
worldviews” are so entangled in this
metaphysical thinking that they have no
inkling to what extent they share the
same collapsing ground [an assumed
certitude regarding being, the
ungroundedness of truth, the essential
definition of human being] with their
“opponents”.
Überlegungen vi Ponderings vi
§ 3 [1–3], S. 421: § 3 [1–3]:
Das Seyn. – Die aus ihm quellende Beyng: we, those who are passing-over [into
Überhöhung des Seyns selbst erfahren wir the other beginning], experience the self-
Übergänglichen in der Verweigerung. – surpassing intensification of beyng itself,
In dieser Überhöhung entspringt der springing-forth of itself, as the refusal of being.
Spielraum des Zwischen, das die The open interplay of the between, which
Verweigerung als Zuweisung des Da-seins allows refusal, as assignment of Da-sein’s
er-eignen läßt. Und in der Zugewiesenheit enowning, arises with this intensification. And
reicht das Da als Wahrheit des Seyns über die with this being-assigned, the Open of the Da, as
Verweigerung hinaus in die zu ihr gehörige the truth of beyng, reaches beyond the refusal
Abgründigkeit der Erzitterung. toward the lack-of-ground of the trembling that
Aus dem Grunde des Volkes, aus seiner belongs to it.
Geschichte, und aus dem Grunde seiner To speak out of the ground of the people, out
Geschichte, aus dem Da-sein, gegen das of its history; and out of the ground of its
Volk – das die Wahrheit nie wissende – history to speak from Da-sein against the
sprechen. Nur so kommt es zu seinem people – which does not ever know the truth.
“Raum”! Womit wir freilich zuerst immer nur Only thus does it enter into its “space”! Which
den Platz meinen, an dem die Vielen we admittedly, first of all, simply take to be the
Zusammengedrängten sich ausbreiten können. location in which the many, pushed together as
Wie aber, wenn dieser Platz uns a mass, can take up room for themselves. What
zurückgegeben wäre eines Tages und trotzdem if, however, this location were one day granted
die Raumnot anhielte, ja vielleicht erst us again and the lack of space continued, even
ausbräche. Wenn das Volk nur das Volksein perhaps first broke forth. If a people has as its
zum Ziel hat, das zu bleiben, was es als sole goal, in being-a-people, to continue to be
Vorhandenes schon “ist”, hat dieses Volk dann what it already is, is it then not determined by
nicht den Willen zum Volk ohne Raum, d. h. this will to be a people without space – that is,
ohne den Entwurfsbereich, in dessen bereft of the realm of projecting-open, the
Abgründen erst es die Höhe findet, sich zu realm which gives it to find the heights to grow
überwachsen und die Tiefen, um Wurzeln ins beyond itself, and the depths to push roots into
Dunkle zu treiben und ein Sichverschließendes the darkness – to find what withholds and
als das Tragende zu haben (wahrhaft eine closes itself off as the sustaining ground (a
Erde)? Oder dürfen wir meinen, wenn nur erst veritable earth)? Or may we assume, that
der “Platz” gesichert sei, dann falle dem Volk having once secured our “location”, then of
der Raum von selbst zu? Elende itself a people will be assured its space?
Verblendung? Jener “Platz” für die immer zahlrei- Miserable delusion? Such a “location” of the
cher werdenden Allzuvielen müßte erst recht ever-increasing all-too-many would with great
jede Raum-not völlig ersticken und damit die certainty completely suffocate the need for this
Möglichkeit einer geschichtlich-|-schaffenden space, and therewith also the possibility of
Bodenständigkeit. Weit hinaus muß daher die historical-founding rootedness. Far in advance,
Besinnung der Wenigen gehen über die therefore, going beyond the shocks of today,
jetzige Aufrüttelung, damit ihr von weither ein will the mindfulness of the few have to reach,
langes Ziel zustoße und ihr die Blendung that a distant goal may befall them and guard
durch das Jetzige verwehre. (Vgl. S. 30 f.). them against the blinding glare of the present.
(See page 30 f.).
Überlegungen vi Ponderings vi
§ 31 [24–27], S. 435–438: § 31 [24–27]:
Was “Philosophie” jetzt noch ist: What remains of “philosophy” today:
1. Anhäufung von historischer und systematischer 1. The accumulation of historical and
Gelehrsamkeit. (Und wie sollte nicht aus systemic erudition (And how would the
Beseitigung aller Fehler einer elimination of the errors of a two
Denküberlieferung von zwei Jahrtausenden thousand years old tradition of thought
schließlich sich das “richtige” “Werk” einer not finally allow us the compilation of
sehr eifrigen Schulmeisterei zusammenstellen “correct works” of most zealous
lassen). didacticism).
2. “Scholastik” – aber natürlich das Neueste 2. “Scholasticism” – but naturally as the
aufgreifende apologetische Verarbeitung von most up-to-date, apologetic elaboration
“Gedankengut” beliebigster Herkunft – im of received ideas of random origin – in
Dienste der christlichen Kirchen – der service to Christian denominations –
Mischmasch von verhältnismäßig ordentlichem producing a hodgepodge of relatively
“Niveau” als Grundsatz der “decent quality,” which is conceived as
Zusammenrechnung. the underlying principle of the
3. “Scholastik” – aber noch auf der Suche nach aggregation.
ihrem Aristoteles – im Dienste der politischen 3. “Scholasticism” – still in search of its
Weltanschauung (Grundsatz die Verdeckung Aristotle – in service of a political
und Verleugnung aller “Quellen”, aus denen worldview (governing principle:
diese Philosophie kommt). “Gemeinschaft” als concealment and denial of all “sources”
Prinzip des Diebstahls – die Auswahl der from which this philosophy derives).
möglichst Unverbildeten – sprich “Community in common” as the
Ahnungslosen als “Publikum”. Die constituting principle of the theft. A
Organisation der wechselweisen Belobigung. selection of the most uneducated – that
4. “Philosophie” als Geschimpfe auf die is, of the clueless – for one’s “public”.
Philosophie und deren Umknetung in The mutual organization of one’s
nachhinkendes Weltanschauungsgefasel. | reciprocal praiseworthiness.
(Grundsatz: angeblicher Kampf gegen das 4. “Philosophy” as the abuse of philosophy
Christentum – ohne daß man je selbst Christ and its refashioning into the hamstrung
war und durch eine Auseinandersetzung talk, the drivel of worldviews.
hindurch mußte). (Underlying principle: supposed
5. Journalistische Geschicklichkeit der struggle with Christianity – without
Verarbeitung aller dieser Arten von ever having been a Christian, without
“Philosophie” mit verschiedener Dosierung je ever having had to go through a personal
nach den Umständen – (die Reste von Literaten confrontation with it).
der “Frankfurter Zeitung” und anderer Blätter). 5. Journalistic dexterity in the processing
of all these modes of “philosophy” – in
Lauter Gleichgültigkeiten – für sich genommen –; different dosages, as circumstances
aber in ihrer nicht zufälligen demand – [practiced by] (the last
Zusammengehörigkeit (die bis zum remnants of the literati, in the
ausgesprochenen Einverständnis geht) sind alle Frankfurter Zeitung and related
diese Un-arten von “Philosophie” doch das productions).
Wesentliche der “geistigen” und
“kulturpolitischen” Situation. Alle zusammen
haben das gemeinsame und je anders und je
gleich schlecht verhüllte Interesse, das wirkliche
Fragen, das auf erste Entscheidungen und
Besinnungen hindrängt, hintanzuhalten und vor
aller Fragwürdigkeit des Seyns und vor jeder
Ungeschütztheit des Seienden die Augen zu
schließen. Und deshalb steht diese
“Kameradschaft” der Un-philosophie
“geschlossen” bereit zum “Einsatz” im Dienst der
Verfestigung der Seinsverlassenheit des Seienden
und ihrer Vorform – des Nihilismus.
Aber | all dies wäre nicht nur zu hoch, sondern Merely matters of indifference – taken in
vor allem verkehrt geschätzt, wollte einer dadurch themselves – but in their less than
sich zu einer ausdrücklichen unmittelbaren accidental, mutual fellowship (which
Bekämpfung verleiten lassen, zumal diese extends to the open acknowledgement of
“Philosophie” ein notwendiges Mittel der their common understanding), all these
Mittelmäßigkeit bleibt. Alles Mittelmäßige, was deviant forms of “philosophy” constitute
in sich kein Gewicht hat und nie Wurzeln the essence of the “spiritual” and the
schlagen kann, bedarf von Zeit zu Zeit einer “politico-cultural” situation. All of them
aufgedrungenen Bestätigung seiner have the common, always different and
Unentbehrlichkeit, um so immer mittelmäßiger always poorly concealed interest to
und brauchbarer zu werden. sidetrack and delay such genuine
Was die “Philosophie” in den genannten Arten questioning as impels us toward primordial
jetzt noch ist, das bezeugt nur, daß sie schon seit decisions and mindfulness, while closing
Jahrzehnten aus der großen Bahn ihrer ersten our eyes in face of the question-worthiness
Geschichte herausgeworfen wurde und nicht mehr of beyng and to any sense of the
die Gefahr wagen kann, durch Einschwenken in defenselessness of beings. And for this
diese Bahn sich einer wesentlichen reason, this “comradeship” of the
Auseinandersetzung zu stellen, durch die sie in Un-philosophical stands, “ranks closed”
ihre Bodenlosigkeit verwiesen wird (daß die and “deployed in readiness for action” in
Leitfrage nach dem Seienden – so sie überhaupt service to the consolidation of the
noch gefragt wird – keinen Grund hat, es sei abandonment of the being of beings and its
denn, sie erwachse aus der Grundfrage nach der preliminary form – nihilism.
Wahrheit des Seyns). But all of this would be accounted too
Was freilich mit dieser Frage heraufzieht, fordert highly, and above all incorrectly, if one
eine Verwandlung des Menschen und fordert das were to allow oneself to be drawn into
Einzige und Höchste aller Philosophie, daß sie in expressive, unmediated conflict with these
der Gründung der Wahrheit des Seyns sich selbst “philosophies”, especially since they
aus diesem den Ursprung gibt und damit auf jede continue to constitute a necessary medium
Krücke und Anlehnung und jede Bestätigung of mediocrity. All mediocrity, which has no
weight in itself, and which can never put
down roots, from time to time requires a
forceful confirmation of its indispensability
in order to become still more mediocre and
still more serviceable.
What “philosophy” of the genres noted
above now is bears witness that for decades
it has been thrown off the great trajectory
of its first beginning; nor can it take the
risk of swinging back into this trajectory to
enter into essential confrontation with it,
for this would only make its ungrounded
rootlessness manifest. For the guiding
question [of metaphysics] concerning
beings – insofar as it is still asked –
remains ungrounded – unless it arises out
of the grounding question concerning the
truth of beyng.
Verzicht tut –. Dieses ist am schwersten zu What comes into play with this question,
begreifen: | Das Erdenken des Seyns wagt den admittedly, demands the transformation of
Ursprung aus dem Nichts (dem Schatten des human being, demands the unique and the
Seyns): das Seiende im Ganzen als Seiendes. Das highest of all philosophy, which it grants
Seyn ist zu wagen – ob der Mensch die Wahrheit itself out of the origin as the founding of
des Seyns gründend [sich] selbst in diesen the groundedness of the truth of beyng;
Grund und seine Erhaltung – d. h. Entfaltung and as such it dispenses with every crutch
verwandle. Mit dem Ergriff und der Vorbereitung and support and confirmation. This is the
dieser Aufgabe steht und fällt die Philosophie. hardest of all to grasp: enthinking of beyng
Sich der Philosophie in dieser Aufgabe zukehren, ventures the origin out of the nothing (the
heißt: sich abkehren von jedem Versuch zu einer shadow of beyng): beings in the whole as
unmittelbaren Verständigung mit dem Noch beings. Beyng is to be ventured—if
Gültigen und Betriebenen oder auch nur aus humanity, grounding the truth of beyng, is
diesem und aus dem Gegensatz zu ihm. Diese to transform itself through this grounding
Abkehr gerät aber außerdem, vom Geläufigen und and its safekeeping, which is to say, its
seinen Sachwaltern her gesehen, in den Anschein unfolding. Philosophy stands or falls with
der verdrießlichen Abwendung und des the embrace and the preparation of this
Eigensinns. task.
Die Abkehr kann nicht ihr Wesentliches und To turn to philosophy in the fulfilment of
Erstes und Tragendes zeigen: die ursprünglich this task means to turn away from every
er-eignete Zukehr zur Wahrheit des Seyns – die attempt to achieve an unmediated, common
Inständigkeit des Da-seins. understanding together with what still
remains effective in its actuality; or
conversely to hold to this [philosophy]
alone, in opposition to the validity of the
actual. In addition, however, this turn away,
seen from the perspective of customary
practice and its administrators, will evoke
the appearance of peevish refusal and
obstinacy.
The turn away cannot manifest its
ownmost, its primordiality and its
supporting ground: the originary, en-owned
turn into the truth of beyng – the
steadfastness of Da-sein.
One of the most important sections of our text focuses on “ground”, or “native
soil” (Boden) especially in view of the necessity of countering the bad press which
the supposedly political usage of this word by Heidegger has generated. A record of
all the passages in which this word appears offers the advantage of presenting, in
succinct fashion, Heidegger’s reflections on the fate of philosophy and “what it is
now”. We become witnesses of the drama of the historical moment during which
these reflections matured, and yet this retrospective view does not so much take us
back into the historical past, as make us aware of a continuous past that still informs
the present state of philosophy and its faulty development, which has remained
unchanged. Arising out of a specific time and place, Heidegger’s insights nonethe-
less offer the possibility of turning toward the future in order to illuminate, as noted,
our own present – particularly in the sense of warning us of the danger of the politi-
cal misuse and derailment of thinking – a danger Heidegger himself did not entirely
escape. Philosophy takes an aberrant course when (today as yesterday) many come
to think that “philosophy” is nothing other than “philosophy according to circum-

stances” to be politically used and exhausted. In my opinion, section § 31 (Ponderings
VI), which closes this division of the text, could be considered as the directive that
Heidegger offers every truth-seeking reader of and beyond any particular temporal
moment. In order to grasp this, it will be necessary to take the path back into the
past, even if our eyes are unavoidably turned toward the future. Keeping this in
mind, then it will be much easier to look back and to justify what is successively
presented. In addition, if this approach is to succeed, we will have to follow
Heidegger, at a proper distance, in order to avoid unnecessary, overlapping
presentation.
One symbolic figure is the “transitional thinker who enacts the crossing”
(Ponderings V, § 62). In the context of the history of being, passing-over, or the
crossing (Übergang), refers to Heidegger’s own speculative passing-over from the
question of being of the first beginning (being as the beingness of beings) to the
transformation of the question of being in the other beginning: beyng as truth, clear-
ing, unconcealment or openness of being; as the self-enowning truth of being
(enowning); enownment as the enowning throwing-open of the truth of being
through the opening-project of the truth of being enacted in the enownment of
Da-sein.
In section § 62, Heidegger outlines the character of a thinker deserving to be
called a thinker of the crossing into the other beginning. He shows how the work of
such a thinker would be received and misconceived as a merely historical, calcula-
tive, accounting of the past. Whoever wishes – today, in the terminal stage of the
history of the first beginning, that is, of the history of metaphysics – truly to think,
and this includes Heidegger in reference to himself – is called upon to be a “transi-
tional thinker who enacts the crossing”. Such a thinker would return in thought to
the history of the first beginning and its heritage to seek out the unsaid and the
unthought, which being appropriately elaborated, could give the impetus for another
inception of history – to be this inception of the other beginning for which the ques-
tion of the truth of being as enowning moves into the focus of thought. With this,
beyng is given primacy. The thinker is granted the possibility of setting forth into the
other beginning only on the condition that beyng is granted word. In contrast, how-
ever, to Husserl and the authentic thrust of his phenomenology, Heidegger is not
prepared to entrust this task to subjectivity. The return to the inception cannot follow
from the starting point of intentionality in Husserl’s sense. The task of phenomenol-
ogy, rather, is to seek out a path of thinking leading thought to our originary belong-
ing to beyng. According to Heidegger, other approaches failed in their respective
undertaking, and philosophy itself went astray, inasmuch as it concealed what it was
intent upon bringing into the light of un-concealment. This implicates the shipwreck
of a philosophy that lives in the shadow of the oblivion of the fundamental question:
“how does beyng hold sway?” (wie west das Seyn?) From this we may conclude,
following Heidegger, that conventional categories, which may be sought in the soli-
tary and benighted thinking of human beings, cannot grasp the imperative of the
experience of the pre-eminence of beyng. Under the supremacy of individualiza-
tion, humanity is long set astray on the path of a deceptive tradition of thought that
limits itself to human being to finally unfold itself in ever more refined forms of
anthropology.
The path of the “transitional thinker who enacts the crossing”, furthermore,
arises in the context of a thinking that prepares the passage-over and attempts to
enact it – that is, seen from “outside”, which is to say in relation to the “new” and
its accounting in terms of influences and of renewal. From the perspective of the
“new” the path of the transitional thinker will either be seen as the re-appropriation
of the legacy of the tradition, or as a supplement to this tradition, or then again as an
arbitrary perspective on the future – a future conceived without regard to its own-
most essence. For in Heidegger’s sense, the future is not what follows the present,
nor is it what can be foreseen and calculated in advance; it is the capability of appro-
priating the ever-unforeseeable grant of being in the moment of vision.
Because the essential thinker oscillates between mindfulness of the first begin-
ning and the enactment of another path of thought, this thinking may indeed seem
arbitrary. It can be assimilated neither to a specific framework of interpretation nor
to this or that philosophical method; nor can it be designated by an “-ism”. It cannot
be integrated anywhere because it is not to be classified by reference to any deter-
mined or calculable context derived from historical interpretation. Such a thinker is
characterized by “homelessness (Heimatlosigkeit)”. This “homelessness” conceals
and shelters a veritable depth of grounded “rootedness (Bodenständigkeit)”: such
thought is intimate with the truth of being. And this gives it unshakable ground from
whence it may unfold and from whence it may establish a bond with our having-
been. Not erudition, but the historicity of our engaged confrontation with the tradi-
tion allows a future to be realized.
In Heidegger’s usage, the words “homelessness” and “rootlessness” pertain
solely to the history of being, and therefore demand the wager of mindful thought.
Other applications of these words, or recourse to ideological constructs that depart
from Heidegger’s terminology, implicate significant hermeneutic misunderstanding
and will lead one astray.
Following this attempt to characterize the “transitional thinker who enacts the
crossing”, Heidegger acknowledges the unavoidable decay of philosophy, which
has become so redundant that “the study of ‘philosophy’ should be abolished at
the universities – which are facing their own demise, in any case” (§ 134). This
simple sentence, placed at the beginning of the section, sets an important marker
in a persistent, twofold reflection: on the one hand, consideration of what can be
said to constitute philosophy, and on the other, its surrogates. On the one hand to
remain outside (outside of the university); and on the other, to rest inside (of the
history of being). The counter-play of the two paths instigates their ever-sharper
division, terminating with the commemoration of the “task” that must be under-
taken if indeed philosophy is to have a destiny (Ponderings VI, § 31). As already
indicated, in presentation of this matter it is particularly difficult to determine the
relevant tenses in the succession of verb forms, for Heidegger’s discourse belongs
to a temporal dimension that does not simply reflect on the historical past – rather
beholding it in turning our own present toward a having-been that first gives us to
understand the present.
The universities are on the way to replacing philosophy with “political science”.
“Admittedly this will not result in the abolition of philosophy – that is impossible –
but something that looks like philosophy will be eliminated – and in a certain sense,
philosophy will be relieved of the danger of being deformed” (Ponderings V, § 134).
The danger threatening philosophy can be deflected by withdrawing from the politi-
cal realm and its utilitarian mode of thinking.
This mode of thought is used, Heidegger writes, by the “new (neu) pretenders
to this business” in order to inaugurate a “professorial philosophy”: in the case of
Nietzsche and more generally what is proposed to thought as knowledge serves
only as “an expedient, a treasure trove to draw upon as needed” (§ 134). The
emphasis on the “new” and the measureless greed for it, is directly related to the
state of the university in National Socialism, as Heidegger propounded in
Ponderings and Intimations III (§§ 68, 78, and 184). All of this pertains to
Heidegger’s distantanciation from these “new” forms of cultural production and
its entrepreneurs. One need only pay attention to Heidegger’s recurrent mention
of this “business” in Ponderings and Intimations III (§ 46): stay away from “deal-
ing and transactions, which others are much better at [...]”. This is taken up again
in Observations I [28]: “The modern historian, whose business consists in a kind
of journalism, has to read so many books and documents, and constantly reviews
so many published books, and he himself must compose so many books, that one
cannot expect of him, on top of this business, to gather his thoughts and to reflect,
thereby running the risk that reflection could result in the retardation of his busi-
ness enterprise”.
And in Observations V [143]: “Meanwhile the doings of the tiller of the soil, the
farmer, are subjected to the grasp of industrial technology and he quickly finishes
his business in the fewest possible days, hours, achieving the greatest possible profit
with ever quicker machines”. How far removed Heidegger is from such “business”
because it obstructs the awakening of all questioning – is certain, just as his political
ineptitude in such matters and his resistance to them is certain. “Let us not fool
ourselves concerning the incalculable pastness (Bisherigkeit) of the ‘new’ science –
let us never mistake or underestimate its rootlessness (Bodenlosigkeit) and its dis-
tance from all philosophy” (Ponderings V, § 134). This serves to indicate that the
“new”, which asserts itself in its groundlessness, offers a pretense of its validity in
order to justify its measures.
Philosophy is not only in danger of being “deformed” (§ 134) – it also runs the
risk of being “falsified” (§ 145). Then what is left of philosophy? Not much. For it
is now being replaced by new “political sciences” – which are, according to
Heidegger, “just impoverished imitations of scholasticism”. Imitative efforts of this
kind lead to the falsification of what remains of philosophy and whoever offers his
service to such efforts does not know that he stands on “unstable ground (brüchiger
Boden)”. In his critique of “political philosophies” of national rootedness, Heidegger
subtly positions himself against the concept of National Socialist philosophy. The
ineptitude of these philosophers is also manifest in silent pursuit of their objectives:
they lack the insight to organize thinking in service to their vain beliefs and convic-
tions. In all this, they even show themselves incapable of achieving their
instrumental objectives. Their own “lack of autonomy” entangles them in great

“confusion”, to the point of not even realizing that their achievement is just a pitiful
“imitation” of a past that they draw upon, without the ability, however, of fully
affirming it. All that they achieve consists in the falsification of another “world-
view” – which in its negative variation of significance may be classified with the
fourfold “‘worldviews’ of today”,9 which Heidegger subjects to a systematic and
differentiated evaluation in the Contributions.
Section § 3 (Ponderings VI) offers further elucidation: “If a people has as its
sole goal, in being-a-people, to continue to be what it already ‘is’, is it then not
determined by this will to be a people without space – that is, bereft of the realm
of projecting-open [...]”. In this comment, Heidegger draws on National Socialist
discourse of “the people” only to show that, and how, this concept of “the people”
only wills to confirm its own persistence, without relation to “the realm of project-
ing-open” – that is, without relation to such truth of being as Dasein first projects-
open and discloses to grant a people its heights and its depths. This means that
Heidegger speculatively seeks something quite distinct from all that is loudly
propagated by National Socialism: an a-political ground and founding, solely in
accord with being, and therewith a genuine renewal of the people within the com-
pass of its sitedness.
Then [a people is] “determined by this will to be a people without space [...]” this
reference to the people leads us to relate the issue to section § 242 of Contributions:
“Time-Space as Ab-Ground”.10 The people is called upon to enroot itself in its pri-
mordial space, that is, in a genuine site and ground. But what is this veritable site?
Nothing other, as noted, than the truth of being, which Heidegger calls “time-space”
or “abground”. This “time-space”, or “abground”, unfolds itself as the two-fold of
two moments: clearing and concealment, refusal and bestowal. The truth of being
9
Ibid. § 7, pp. 24–25. English translation, p. 18, where Heidegger lists four kinds of “worldviews”:
“1. The transcendent one (also imprecisely called ‘transcendence’) is the God of Christianity; 2.
This ‘transcendence’ is denied and replaced by the ‘people’ itself – however undetermined the later
is in its way of being – as goal and direction for all history. This ‘counter-Christian worldview’ is
only apparently unchristian; for it is essentially in agreement with that way of thinking that is
called ‘liberalism’; 3. The transcendent that is meant here is an ‘idea’ or a ‘value’ or a ‘meaning’,
something for which one does not put one’s life on the line, but which is to be realized through
‘culture’; 4. Any two of these meanings of the transcendent – peoples’ ideas and Christianity or
peoples’ ideas and a culture-oriented politics or Christianity and culture – or all three of these
couplings are mixed up in various degrees of definitiveness. And this mixed product is what is
today the average and dominant ‘worldview’, which intends everything but can no longer make a
decision about anything”. Constant reference to the Contributions is necessary in order to give
depth to what is only sketched in its basics in the Black Notebooks: § 14 (‘Philosophy and
Worldview”: [ibid. pp. 36–41. English translation, pp. 26–29]); § 15 (“Philosophy as “Philosophy
of a People’”: [ibid. pp. 42–43. English translation, pp. 29–30]); § 268 “Beyng (Differentiation”):
“(whereby one must nonetheless ask who they are who find such things correct and even erect ‘sci-
ences’ such as biology and ethnology of race upon such correctnesses, and thus with these sciences
seemingly undergird a ‘worldview’ – an undergirding which is always the ambition of any ‘world-
view’)” ([ibid. p. 479. English translation, p. 337]).
10
See ibid. pp. 379–388. English translation, pp. 264–271.
always belongs together with ownmost projecting-open of Dasein, which is

grounded in thrownness (Geworfenheit).
With section § 31, this thematic thread is brought to conclusion. Heidegger com-
poses a balance sheet of what remains of “philosophy” and notes the different varia-
tions that have condemned it to silence. Philosophy becomes “erudition”,
“scholasticism”, and “journalistic dexterity” – as manifested, for example, by “the
last remnants of the literati, in the ‘Frankfurter Zeitung’ and related productions”.
In these unfavourable conditions, philosophy remains dependent on “circum-
stances”, in which the drivel of worldviews wins the upper hand over the search for
truth. Midst this uproar, “genuine questioning” is obstructed; everything accommo-
dates itself to the “spiritual-political” perspectives of a time in which “the ‘com-
radeship’ of the un-philosophical” can assert itself because it “constitute[s] a
necessary medium of mediocrity”. We witness a change of course – the university is
transformed into an uncreative space, receptive to the rough-hewn, unphilosophical
discourses of those ever more greedily seeking recognition for the fruits of their
insights, which are brought to market and propagated with journalistic dexterity.
What the Many take to be “new” knowledge stands in no relation to genuine ques-
tioning; it is simply the object of comprehensive marketing. Knowing shrouds and
“conceals” itself in semblance; it stands eyes closed before the “questionableness of
beyng”. Faced with this comic theatre, Heidegger seeks to pass beyond the blindly
flippant ramblings and incidental notions of those who only seek to justify their own
mediocrity and indecisiveness. The procedure of the new philosophy, oriented to the
furtherance of utility, remains external to the history of being; it cannot “enter into
essential confrontation” with this history, “for this would only make its ungrounded
rootlessness (Bodenlosigkeit) manifest”. “For the guiding question concerning
beings – insofar as it is still asked – remains ungrounded – unless it arises out of the
grounding question (Grundfrage) concerning the truth of beyng”.
“What comes into play with this question, admittedly, demands the transforma-
tion of human being, demands the unique and the highest of all philosophy, which
it grants itself out of the origin as the founding of the groundedness of the truth of
beyng; and as such it dispenses with every crutch and support and confirmation”.
This passage is of key significance in regard to the hermeneutic concept of “ground-
ing (Gründung)”,11 for it expresses a recognition of the genuine task of philosophy.
“Grounding” indicates an understanding of being that seeks out the ground of
things, and thereby approaches the truth of being. In all of this, Heidegger especially
emphasizes that being-historical thinking is not colored by National Socialism or
any other political and ideological perspective. “What comes into play with this
question”: that is, what emerges with the grounding question of the truth of being,
“demands the transformation of human being” into Dasein – inabiding in the “Da-”
as the site of the truth of being. As such, it “demands the unique and the highest of
all philosophy, which it grants itself out of the origin as the founding of the
11
Again, it is necessary to refer to the Contributions: See ibid. §§ 187–188, pp. 307–308. English
translation, pp. 216–217.
groundedness of the truth of beyng”. This passage unequivocally states that being-
historical thinking does not have its origin in anything outside itself – not in the
political, not in ideological perspectives, nor yet in a worldview. Therefore this
thinking, as such, cannot be associated with anti-Semitism. It finds its measure
solely in the enownment of the presencing of the truth of beyng as enowning; which
is to say, in the enowning throw of the truth of beyng as granted to philosophical
(disclosive) projecting-open in response to the letting-arrive of enowning in and
through us – even thus, as the letting-arrive of the truth of being.
3 Ponderings VII-XI: The Black Notebooks 1938–193912
3.1 eidegger’s Explicit “Distanciation” from National

H
Socialism and the Reason for His Reticence
The language of being-historical thinking underlies the thematic structure of this

sub-section of our text and therefore we now propose to refer to the Contributions
at shorter intervals. This pertains, in particular, to those sections of the Black
Notebooks that address questions of the “university”, in its relation to, and depen-
dence upon, National Socialism. This, direct, relationship may be intuited based on
the vocabulary Heidegger uses: “the ‘Reich-university’” (beginning of Ponderings
VII, § 6); “gigantic (riesenhaften) apparatus” (in the same context) is used five times
in this sub-section; “enliving (Erlebnis)” (twice), “Christian cultural politics” (three
times); the “business of philosophy” (once), in relation to the university, and in the
same context.
But in parallel, we come upon the “National Socialist worldview” along with
Heidegger’s conclusion that it lacks mindfulness, and consequently, knowing
awareness. The course of these reflections continue with comments on National
Socialist ideology and the courage of “slogans”, which “sprout of a condition
prepared by the modern epoch, which has already lost the vigor of mindful thought
and set bloated turns of phrase in its place”; and it concludes with a crescendo of
allied terms – the “barbarism” of thought, “decay”, and “alienation”. This dense
network of signification reflects Heidegger’s unavoidable recognition that the cur-
rent state of the university can with difficulty be extricated from its relation to
National Socialism and its intellectuals – such intellectuals who in certain respects
may share the National Socialist worldview with “modern”, or “contemporary”
thinkers. And just as an aside, it may be noted that the adjective “contemporary”
is given a negative valence.
While essential knowledge is considered a danger, the “bustling enterprise” of
“‘National Socialist’ pseudo-philosophy” (Ponderings VIII, § 53) takes shape
more and more, seeking “to establish its validity and social status by means of its
12
See Heidegger M. (2014b).
3 Ponderings VII-XI: The Black Notebooks 1938–1939 99
unbridled, noisy, and predatory ‘literature’” (§ 55). The picture outlined here
is supported by many more complex arguments in those sections of the texts that
will be analyzed by coming back to the Contributions. I urge the reader to con-
sider with utmost attention §§ 51 (Ponderings VIII) and 53 (Ponderings XI), both
of which indicate why Heidegger did not want to publicly oppose National
Socialism (§ 51). Above all, note how Heidegger’s initial illusions concerning the
“movement” are inseparably linked to an “additional misconception”, which
was “the opinion that the university could still be transformed into a site of mind-
fulness, a site of its ownmost contention, returning the Occident to the knowing
awareness of its own questionableness” (§ 53). It is Heidegger himself who cir-
cumscribes his “mistake”, but it will be necessary to return to these elements with
a detailed analysis.
Überlegungen vii Ponderings vii

§ 6 [5–7], S. 6–7: § 6 [5–7]:
Es gibt noch kindische Romantiker, die vom We still hear of childish romantics who wax
“Reich” und gar der “Reichs”-universität enthusiastic about the “Reich” and even the
schwärmen im Sinne der “Reichs”-Vorstellung idea of a “Reich-University” in the sense of
Stephan [sic] Georges. Woher die Angst dieser Stephan [sic] George. What of the fear of these
angeblich Angstfreien vor dem Reich als der supposedly fearless ones in the face of the
riesenhaften Apparatur des Partei- und des Reich as the gigantic apparatus of Party and
Staatsapparats in ihrer Einheit? Kann das State in their unity? Can the metaphysical
metaphysische Wesen der Neuzeit und damit der essence of modernity and therefore of the near
nächsten Zukunft eine mächtigere Einheit future manifest any more-powerful unity than
zeitigen als den Apparat der Einheit von this apparatus of the comprehensive unity of
Apparaten? Wer hier bloße Veräußerlichung apparatuses? Whoever thinks solely in terms
wahrnimmt und sich in ein nie Gewesenes – of the external form and who longs for
vielleicht Mittelalterliches – | zurück sehnt, der something that never was – something of the
vergißt, daß ja im Riesenhaften dieses Middle Ages, perhaps – seems to have
Apparates (deutsch: Zu-rüstung) die forgotten that through the gigantic
riesenhaften Möglichkeiten des “Erlebens” monstrosity of this apparatus [(in English)
geöffnet werden und keinem kein Erlebnis to-make-ready-for] gigantic possibilities of
versagt bleiben soll, daß in dieser Zurüstung erst “enliving” are opened up and prepared: no-one
die “Kultur” als Erlebnisveranstaltung shall be denied any functional mode of the
zurüstungsmäßig gesichert ist. Deshalb ist auch enliving of life that might secure “culture” as
das ständige Bekenntnis zur Kultur keine the organization of enliving in accordance
“Phrase” und der Portier am Kinotheater hat ein with arming oneself for life. For this reason,
vollkommenes Recht darauf, sich als the constant affirmation of culture is no “empty
“Kulturträger” zu wissen. phrase” and the usher in the cinema is
Man weiß nicht, was man will, wenn man aus completely justified in regarding himself as a
Kultur-besorgnis sich glaubt, eine “bastion of culture”.
Gegnerschaft zum “Nationalsozialismus” One does not know what one is doing when out
einreden zu müssen. of concern for culture one feels oneself
impelled to oppose “National Socialism”.
Allerdings wächst der Raum dieser Besorgnis Certainly, the extent of this concern, and the
und die Zahl derer, die ihn füllen, stärker und numbers of those concerned, grows greater and
rascher als die Verantwortlichen – trotz aller more quickly than people in charge – despite
Hinweise darauf – sehen möchten. Und dieser all evidence thereof – would like to admit. And
Raum ist schon überdacht und geschützt durch this extended field of concern is already
den christlichen Kulturbetrieb, der allerdings conceptually penetrated and supported by the
sich täuscht, wenn er meint, dadurch die Christian organization of culture, although it
Christlichkeit zu erneuern –. Aber diese deceives and fools itself into thinking that
Meinung ist vielleicht nur eine Maske – man Christianity can be renewed by these means.
will die Herrschaft im Kulturbetrieb – nicht But perhaps this position is only a mask of
in der “Politik”. deception – and what one really wants to
Wie, wenn dann der christliche Kulturbetrieb achieve is the dominion of cultural
nur die als Lichtseite ausgegebene Kehrseite organization – not of “politics”.
dessen wäre, was | der Bolschewismus als And then, what if the Christian organization
Kultur-zerstörung betreibt – des Vorgangs, of culture, the dimension of light, as it
durch den die Neuzeit sich auf ihre Vollendung presents itself, were in fact nothing but the
einrichtet und um eine Zurüstung für diese reverse mirror image of the cultural
kämpft. destruction propagated by Bolshevism – and
Die nächste Entscheidung ist deshalb allein as such, the process though which modernity,
diese: welche der riesenhaften Zurüstungen arming itself in preparation, seeks its
des neuzeitlichen Weltbildes sich als die consummation.
siegende einrichten wird. Therefore, the upcoming decision concerns this
Die Fronten und Formen dieses Kampfes um alone: which of these gigantic armament-
diese Entscheidung liegen noch nicht fest. Wir projects of the modern worldview will establish
dürfen ihn auch nicht und lediglich als ein itself as victorious.
künftiges Vorkommnis historisch voraus- The deciding forms and battle-fronts of this
rechnend betrachten, sondern müssen in decision are still to be determined. Nor ought we
wachsender Besinnung das Wesen der Neuzeit simply assume that this is a future event that can be
im Ganzen ihrer geschichtlichen Bahn wissen, historically regarded and anticipated. Much rather
gesetzt, daß den Deutschen der Vollzug einer must we, growing in mindfulness, gather essential
Entscheidung aufbehalten ist, durch die in der knowledge of the ownmost path of modernity in
Vollendung der Neuzeit die Not eines the unity of its historicity. All this presupposes that
Übergangs erwacht. Dann müssen jene bereit the enactment of a decision concerning the
sein, denen die Not der Geschichte nicht ein consummation of modernity is granted the
Jammer, aber auch kein Vergnügen, sondern Germans to awaken the distress of necessary
ein Stoß des Seyns selbst ist. over-passing. For there must be such as stand in
readiness, for whom the distress of history is not a
reason for lamentation, nor yet a delight, but the
very impact of beyng.

§ 21 [23–25], S. 17–19: § 21 [23–25]:
Alle Besinnung, je wesentlicher sie ansetzt, All mindfulness, the more authentic its
bewirkt die Gefahr, wesentliche Vorstufen inception, runs the danger of bypassing
des geschichtlich Notwendigen zu essential, precursory moments of the
überspringen. Deshalb muß sie die Kraft historically necessary. For this reason, it must
haben, im Vorsprung bleibend doch exhibit the fortitude of holding to the inceptual
zurückzuspringen und das Übersprungene leap, while springing-back to gather what has
eigens in den Vorsprung einzuholen. Die been passed-over in the leap. “The Self-
“Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Assertion of the German University” errs
Universität”o irrt, sofern sie die insofar as it passes over the essential character
Wesensgesetzlichkeit der “heutigen” of the “contemporary” university in silence. It
Wissenschaft überspringt. Sie irrt noch errs again by assuming that by this passing
einmal, indem sie im Überspringen meint, over we can return once again to “science”,
wieder zur “Wissenschaft” zu kommen, wo when in fact “science” reaches its terminus
eben doch mit der Neuzeit auch “die with the consummation of modernity. We do
Wissenschaft” zu Ende ist und wir die not know what mode of knowledge is to
Weise des künftigen Wissens und seiner follow, nor do we know the manner of its
Gestaltung nicht wissen – wir wissen nur, formation; we know only this, that a mere
daß eine bloße “Revolution” im Seienden “revolution” in the dimension of beings,
ohne Verwandlung des Seyns keine without a transformation of beyng, cannot, any
ursprüngliche Geschichte mehr schafft, more, give inception to originary history, but
sondern lediglich das Vorhandene verfestigt. only secure the stock of what already is. For
Deshalb brauchte auch der erste Schritt | zur this reason, the first step in preparation of the
Vorbereitung einer Verwandlung des Seyns transformation of beyng did not have to wait
nicht erst auf den “National- sozialismus” for the advent of “National Socialism”; and
zu warten, sowenig wie jenes Fragen just as little does this questioning assume any
beanspruchen kann, als “National Socialist” validity. This were to
“nationalsozialistisch” zu gelten. Hier sind bring dimensions together that do not stand in
Bereiche in Beziehung gebracht, die sich un-mediated relation, although indirectly and
unmittelbar nichts angehen, aber mittelbar in different ways, each presses toward a
zugleich in verschiedener Weise auf eine decision regarding the ownmost determination
Entscheidung über das Wesen und die of the Germans, and as such, the destiny of the
Bestimmung der Deutschen und damit das Occident. A mere accounting of “positions”
Geschick des Abendlandes drängen. Das will only find “opposites” and in fact such
bloße Verrechnen von “Standpunkten” kann opposites as it is not even “worthwhile” to
hier nur “Gegensätze” finden und recount, for the dominion of the National
Gegensätze sogar, die zu beachten gar nicht Socialist worldview stands decisively
“lohnt”, da ja die Herrschaft der established.
nationalsozialistischen Weltanschauung
entschieden ist.
Und es gehört zum Wesen der And it belongs to the essence of a worldview
Weltanschauung, daß sie über diesen Sieg that it cannot will to think beyond the limits set
hinaus gar nicht weiter denken kann und by its own victory. For it must, given that it has
nicht will, denn sie muß sich, wenn sie sich understood itself, “unconditionally” posit itself
selbst versteht, aus ihrem ihr gemäßen in accordance with the “self-consciousness”
“Selbstbewußtsein” heraus, als “unbedingt” proper to itself. A Pope, who is prepared to
setzen. Ein Papst, der sich auf das negotiate matters of dogma is not the
Verhandeln im Dogmatischen einläßt, ist “representative” of Christ on earth. On the other
kein “Stellvertreter” Christi auf Erden – hand, however, he only functions as the chief
aber er ist andererseits nur dann Oberhaupt executive of the Church when as such he takes
der Kirche, wenn er zugleich dafür sorgt, care that the Church, ever in accordance with
daß sich die Kirche, je nach den changing times, is empowered to authorize any
wechselnden Zeitläufen, alles Mögliche und possible thing, even what is contrary to itself, to
sogar sich Zuwiderlaufende gestatten kann, the end that Christianity as cultural Christendom
damit ent-|sprechend dem Gang der may be preserved in accordance with the
abendländischen Geschichte in die “Kultur” “cultural” transformations of Western history –
das Christentum als Kulturchristentum sich which greatly facilitates the salvation of
erhalte, wodurch das Seelenheil der believers. Protestantism is going under, having
Gläubigen besonders gut geschützt wird. been incapable of grasping the extent to which
Der Protestantismus geht daran zugrunde, the assemblage of “belief” and “cultural
daß er nicht begriff, inwiefern die Einheit production” necessarily calls for the
von “Glauben” und “Kulturschaffen” implementation of double-entry book-keeping,
notwendig zur Durchführung eine doppelte an accomplishment of creative accounting that
Buchführung verlangt, für deren requires considerable training. In concordance
Bewältigung die Rechenkünstler lange with modern forms of being-human – in line
erzogen sein müssen. In den neuzeitlichen with worldviews – the assemblage of “belief”
Formen des Menschseins – in der and “culture” makes a prominent appearance,
Weltanschauung – kommt, nicht nur wegen and not only due its dependency on things
ihrer Abhängigkeit vom Christlichen, die Christian. Explicitly conceived institutions of
Einheit von “Glauben” und “Kultur” training and of education, the strictly organized
verschärft zum Vorschein. Schulung und “surveillance” of education in service to a
Erziehungsanstalten als bewußte worldview – such are not arbitrary or artificial,
Einrichtung, “Überwachung” der not abusive inventions – rather necessities of
weltanschaulichen Erziehung als straffer essence of a worldview that has entered into the
Betrieb – das sind nicht willkürliche und decisive stage of its “self-consciousness”. To the
künstliche oder gewalttätige Erfindungen – worldview, mindfulness is alien, and inevitably
sondern Wesensnotwendigkeiten einer in an impediment.
die Entschiedenheit ihres
“Selbstbewußtseins” eingetretenen
Weltanschauung. Die Besinnung ist ihr
fremd und notwendig eine Fessel.
o
Martin Heidegger, Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität, in Reden und andere Zeugnisse
eines Lebensweges. GA 16. Hrsg. von Hermann Heidegger. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann
2000, pp. 107-117.
Überlegungen viii Ponderings viii

§ 51 [122–124], S. 170–172: § 51 [122–124]:
Zur Feststellung: mit der “Existenzphilosophie” A brief observation: I have nothing in
habe ich nichts zu tun und schon gar nicht mit common with “existentialism”, and least of all
derjenigen von Heyse p. Ob dessen aus with the existentialism of Heyse. Whether or
Mißverständnissen von “Sein und Zeit” zum not his misunderstanding of Being and Time,
siebenten Mal aufgekochte und mit salted and flavoured with “National Socialist
“nationalsozialistischem Gedankengut” ideas” and cooked up into a watery soup for
versalzene Wassersuppe etwas mit mir zu tun the seventh time has anything to do with me, I
hat, darüber nachzudenken überlasse ich diesem leave to the contemplations of this “thinker”.
“Denker”. By way of contrast, I do have something in
Wohl dagegen habe ich mit dem Ernst der common with the earnest disposition and
Gesinnung und Besinnung von Karl Jaspers zu meditations of Karl Jaspers – from whose
tun, von dessen “Philosophie” allerdings meine “philosophy”, albeit, the fundamental question
Fragestellung in “Sein und Zeit” durch einen of Being and Time is separated by an abyss –
Abgrund getrennt bleibt – eine Tatsache, die die and yet this fact does not in any way detract
Verehrung und Dankbarkeit in keiner Weise from the respect and the gratitude that I bear
antastet, die ich ihm bewahre. him.
Hans Heyse: Idee und Existenz. Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt: Hamburg 1935 [GA, ed.]
p
Pascal nennt den Menschen einmal ein Pascal once called the human being a
“denkendes Schilfrohr”q; vielleicht ist Heyse, “thinking reed”; perhaps Heyse is also such a
der sich mit seinen eigenen Phrasen Mut zu reed, drawing courage for his remarkable
seiner merkwürdigen “Haltung” macht, auch ein “comportment” from his own phrases – only
solches “Rohr” – nur daß er nicht denkt. Solche that he does not think. Such literary
Schriftstellerei ist aber nur deshalb productions, however, are only worth
erwähnenswert, weil sie aus einem Zustand des mentioning because they sprout of a condition
neuzeitlichen Zeitalters aufschießt, der bereits prepared by the modern epoch, which has
die Kraft zur denkerischen Besinnung verloren already lost the vigor of mindful thought and
und das Aufgeblähte der Redensart an seine set bloated turns of phrase in its place. Yet
Stelle gesetzt hat, so zwar, daß | jedermann dies no one takes offense at this, and no one
in Ordnung findet und niemand mehr ein echtes remains capable of experiencing a genuine
Bedürfnis nach Anderem zu empfinden vermag. need of something else. In this state of the
Diese Empfindungslosigkeit, vor deren “Augen” lack of sensibility – wherein one “gazes”
sich ein “lebendiges”, “geistiges” “Ringen” upon a spectacle of “spiritual struggle” – one
abspielt, ist der beste Schutz gegen die freilich will find the best defence against the
immer geringer werdende Gefahr, daß eine ever-receding danger that – one day – such a
solche Barbarei des “Denkens” sich eines barbarism of “thinking” will yet be
Tages doch noch gezwungen sieht, vor ihrer compelled to shrink back in the face of its
eigenen Unheimlichkeit auszuweichen – wohin? own uncanniness.
In den Schutz der politischen Wirklichkeit. Within the safeguard of political actuality.
Nicht diese und nicht der bloße nur noch Not this, and not the merely imitative decay of
nachmacherische Verfall des Denkens, sondern thinking, but this alone, that such decay
allein dies, daß solcher Verfall sich deckt und gar actually presents itself as an advance of thinking
als Aufstieg ausgibt mithilfe einer Wirklichkeit, die (coinciding with the assistance of an actuality of
anderer Herkunft ist, bezeugt dies Ausmaß von another origin), offers evidence of the extent of
Entfremdung gegenüber dem eigentlichen the alienation of thought from authentic
Denken. Nicht das Aufkommen solcher thinking. Not the advent of such botched
Machwerke – die noch bei ihrem Entstehen concoctions – at the time of their production
(vor 1933) ganz andere “Zielsetzungen” (before 1933) they had completely different
hatten – ist beachtenswert, sondern die “objectives” – is worthy of note, but rather the
Bereitschaft der Ahnungslosen, die so etwas willingness of the unwitting, who take such
“ernst” nimmt, was man eben noch “Ernstnehmen” productions “seriously” – even that which is still
im Felde des Denkens nennen kann. Alles, was called “taking-seriously” in matters of thinking.
sich da begibt, ist nicht “Schuld” des Heutigen, Everything now coming to pass, in this respect,
sondern nur breitester und flachster Auslauf eines is not the “fault” of those of today, but only the
zurückliegenden und verhüllten Ereignisses. broad and shallow run-off of a concealed and
distant event.
Blaise Pascal: Pensées. Édition par Léon Brunschvicg. Paris: Hachette 1904, n. 346 ff. [GA, ed.]
q
Deshalb darf einer höchstens seinen Standort Therefore, the most one should do is to state
dagegen feststellen, aber niemals in eine one’s position, without ever allowing
Auseinandersetzung sich wegwerfen. Ja selbst oneself to be thrown off track and drawn
jene Feststellung darf nur als Feststellung into confrontation. Yes, even this statement
eigener Besinnung gelten, niemals auch nur zu of observation ought simply to advance one’s
einer öffentlichen Absetzung dagegen dienen; own considered reflections, without ever
denn auch diese könnte nur dazu gebraucht serving as a public dismissal of another
werden, den Betrieb des “Geisteslebens” mit position. For even this will only be used to
“Neuigkeiten” zu versorgen und ihm seine supply the business of the “humanities” with
vermeintliche Unentbehrlichkeit zu bestätigen. “news”, and thereby will confirm it in its
supposed indispensability.

§ 53 [125], S. 172–173: § 53 [125]:
Der “Rationalismus” des Descartes bedeutet, daß “Rationalism” in the sense of Descartes
sich das Wesen des Seins aus der Gewißheit des means that the essence of being determines
Denkens, aus der Selbstsicherheit der Denkbarkeit itself out of the certitude of thinking, out of
bestimmt. Das Sein erhält jetzt ausdrücklich den the self-certainty of what can be thought. At
bis dahin zurückgehaltenen oder erst grob this point, being explicitly receives the
gefaßten Charakter der Berechenbarkeit – der character of calculability – of producibility,
Machbarkeit – im weitesten Sinne. Diese in the widest sense, which previously had
Auslegung des Seins wird zur Grundbedingung been held back and only vaguely grasped.
der Neuzeit und des neuzeitlichen Menschen. This interpretation of being becomes the
Diese Grundbedingung jedoch kommt erst zu ground-laying condition of the modern
ihrer ungeschmälerten Macht, wenn dieses epoch and of the humanity of modernity.
Zeitalter zu seiner eigenen Vollendung ansetzt. In This fundamental condition of possibility,
diesem Zeitpunkt steht die Geschichte des however, only comes to unrestrained power
jetzigen Menschen. with the onset of the consummation of this
Daher ist es eine fast irrsinnige Verkennung des epoch. The history of contemporary
jetzigen Zeitalters und seiner nur ihm eigenen mankind is determined by this juncture.
Weltanschauungen, wenn man von diesem her Therefore, it is an almost insane
(auf Grund einer “nationalsozialistischen” misconception of the present epoch and its
Scheinphilosophie z. B.) versucht, gegen den unique worldview to attempt to critically
“Rationalismus” Descartesʼ anzugehen, vermutlich confront the “rationalism” of Descartes –
weil Descartes ein Franzose und “Westler” ist. presumably because Descartes was French
Vielmehr ist es die eigene Größe der jetzigen and a “Westerner” – from a standpoint of
Weltanschauungen und ihres thought based on this worldview (for
“Totalitäts”anspruches, daß sie den metaphysisch example, in form of the pseudo-philosophy
begriffenen “Rationalismus” (vgl. oben) als die of “National Socialism”). In fact, the proper
innerste Macht ihres Machtwillens zur Geltung greatness of the present worldview and its
bringen und alle künstliche “Mystik” und claim to “totalization” consists in this, that
“Mythik” ablehnen. Descartes’ Rationalismus ist it actualizes the full import of
weder “französisch”, noch westlich – sondern metaphysically understood “rationalism”
abendländisch und das Französische, wenn man es (see above) as the innermost impulse of will
schon wissen will, besteht darin, daß es das to power, while rejecting every form of
Vermögen ins Spiel brachte, zum erstenmal jene “mysticism” and “mythology”. Rationalism
Auslegung des Seins wißbar zu machen. Das is neither “French”, nor “Western” – but
Wißbare selbst ist weder französisch, noch rather Occidental, and the French
deutsch, noch italienisch, noch englisch, noch component, if one really wants to know,
amerikanisch – wohl aber der Grund dieser consists in the capacity of bringing this
Nationen! interpretation of being into play and making
it known for the first time. The knowable
itself is neither French, nor German, nor
Italian, nor English, nor American – but it
is, to be sure, the ground of these nations!
Überlegungen x Ponderings x
§ 47 [79–80], S. 325–326: § 47 [79–80]:
Warum wenden sich jetzt Viele – vielleicht sogar Why are so many people – possibly even
schon der ganze noch bestehende Protestantismus – all those still left to Protestantism – now
der katholischen Kirche zu? Aus Furcht vor turning to the Catholic Church? For fear
dem – Katholizismus. Der politische of – Catholicism. Political Catholicism
Katholizismus ist durch eine “katholische” Politik has been replaced by “Catholic” politics.
abgelöst worden; das Wesen des “Katholischen” The essence of “Catholicism” is not to be
liegt weder im Christlichen, noch im Kirchlichen found in the “Christian”, nor in the Church
als solchem – sondern καθόλον heißt – über das as such – for καθόλον means – dominion
Ganze herrschend – das “Totale”. Die katholische over the whole – over the “totality”. The
“Kirche” täuscht sich, wenn sie meint, die ihr Catholic “Church” deceives itself when it
Zulaufenden seien von “religiösen Bedürfnissen” opines that those who turn to her are driven
getrieben, und der Nationalsozialismus sollte sich by “religious needs”; and one should not
nicht darüber verwundern, daß er zum be surprised to learn that National
Schrittmacher dieses Zulaufes werden muß. So Socialism must become the pacesetter of
werden die Bereiche kommender Entscheidungen this influx. So domains of future decision
wiederum nur verdeckt – das “Katholische” war are once again merely covered up – but
aber niemals, vor allem nicht im “christlichen” | “the catholic” was never, and least of all in
Mittelalter, der Ursprung eines gestalterischen the “Christian” Middle Ages, a wellspring
Kampfes um das Sein – er liegt für immer of shape-giving struggle for the sake of
verborgen in der Einsamkeit einiger Namenloser. being – the source lies for ever concealed
Das “Katholische” gewann erstmals die eigentliche in the solitude of a few nameless ones.
Form im Jesuitismus; hier ist das abendländische It was Jesuitism that first gave “the
Vorbild für allen unbedingten Gehorsam, die catholic” its authentic form. Jesuitism
Ausschaltung jedes Eigenwillens – die became the Occidental model for all
Entschiedenheit der “Organisation” und die unconditional obedience, for the final
Beherrschung der Propaganda und die extinction of self-will – for rigorous
Selbstrechtfertigung durch die Herabsetzung des decisiveness of “organization” and the
Feindes für die Nutzbarmachung aller Mittel des mastery of propaganda; for self-
“Wissens” und Könnens, für die Umfälschung justification through the diminution of the
dieser zur eigenen Entdeckung, für die historische enemy; for skillful utilization of every
Zurechtmachung der Geschichte, für die means of “knowledge” and of practical
Verherrlichung des Willens und der Strammheit ability, falsifying them as one’s own
des Soldatischen innerhalb des Katholischen, für discoveries; for object-historical
die Grundhaltung des Gegen... (Gegen- accounting of history; for the glorification
reformation). Das “Katholische” in diesem of the will and martial rigour within
wesentlichen Sinne ist seiner geschichtlichen catholic organization; for the fundamental
Herkunft nach römisch – spanisch –; ganz und gar comportment of the counter-to... (Counter-
un-nordisch und vollends undeutsch. Reformation). In its historical provenance,
“the catholic” in this essential sense is
Roman – Spanish – utterly un-Nordic and
completely un-German.
§ 59 [100–103], S. 338–340: § 59 [100–103]:
“Entscheidung” – nennen sie jetzt die Flucht in “Decisions” – that’s the name they give to
ein längst Entschiedenes – das als something decided long ago – decisions of
Kulturchristentum seine Widersinnigkeit zuletzt cultural Christianity that last gave evidence of
während des ersten Weltkrieges bewiesen hat. their absurdity during the first World War. One
Man redet von “Entscheidung” und verzichtet talks of “decision” and renounces in advance
vorher auf jedes Fragen und die Erfahrung der any kind of questioning and the experience of
Notwendigkeit des wesentlichen Fragens –; the necessity of essential questioning... One
man spielt die alte christlich-katholische plays up old Christian-Catholic apologetics
Apologetik in neuzeitlich-protestantischer in modern, Protestant form against a
Form gegen ein “Heidentum” aus, dem alles “paganism” lacking everything necessary to be
fehlt, um auch nur dieses zu sein – die Götter such – the gods and divine, creative power.
und die gottschaffende Kraft. Man führt – One stages – presumably with the greatest
vermutlich mit der größten “subjektiven” “subjective” honesty – “literary” spectacles,
Ehrlichkeit – ein “literarisches” Schauspiel auf and all “reviews” of the “boulevard press”
und alle “Rezensenten” aller “Blätter” und and the “newspapers” greedily devour this
“Zeitschriften” sind | gierig darauf, das Gerede empty talk about “decisions of the West.”
über “Abendländische Entscheidung” nicht zu But in the final analysis, this talk of “decision,”
versäumen. which is founded in the failure to question
Aber schließlich ist dieses auf der Fraglosigkeit what needs to be questioned – and only then
alles erst Zu-fragenden und dann erst noch in brought to decision – is just the echo of an
die Ent-scheidung zu Stellenden gegründete equally superficial “National Socialist
“Entscheidungs”gerede nur der Widerhall der philosophy” that tries to pretend, drawing on
gleich-oberflächlichen hyperbolic phrases and catchwords, to have
“nationalsozialistischen Philosophie”, die mit overcome “Christendom”. And now it poses
Hilfe aufgedonnerter Redensarten und supposed “decisions”, having made such
Schlagworte das “Christentum” überwunden “sacrifice of thought” as would make the
zu haben vorgibt und angeblich “thinking” of a Catholic vicar sound
“Entscheidungen” stellt, nachdem sie ein free-spirited.
“Opfer des Denkens” zuvor dargebracht hat, What have the Germans come to? Or have they
im Vergleich zu dem das “Denken” eines simply remained where they always were and
katholischen Vikars noch Freigeisterei genannt where Hölderlin last found them, and where
werden darf. Nietzsche still encountered them – Nietzsche,
Wohin sind die Deutschen geraten? Oder sind who thus far has only succeeded in this, that
sie nur erst immer noch dort geblieben, wo sie they found the “pride” of standing in “life” –
schon immer waren und wo sie zuletzt the life in which, despite “exceptions”, they
Hölderlin fand und Nietzsche noch antraf, der have always stood. But perhaps this is the way
freilich bisher nur erreichte, daß sie sich einen of being of the Germans, and perhaps all that
“Stolz” angewöhnten, in dem “Leben” zu they are “capable” of first comes to light in
stehen, in dem sie – trotz ihrer “Ausnahmen” – their still more thoroughly practiced
stets gestanden. Aber vielleicht ist dies das “Americanism”, in their still more “restlessly”
Wesen der Deutschen – und vielleicht kommt es engaged “Romanism” – so that they are only
durch den von ihnen noch gründlicher geübten called the “people” of thinkers and poets
“Amerikanismus” und durch den noch because as a “people” they do not want this
“rastloser” vollzogenen “Romanismus” | erst thinking and poeticizing – in effect, they are
ans Licht, was sie alles “können” – daß sie das not prepared to seek their ground in the
“Volk” der Denker und Dichter nur deshalb midst of such danger. But rather still going
heißen, weil sie als “Volk” dieses Denken und on, and ever more unknowingly going on, they
Dichten nicht wollen, d. h. nicht in solcher glorify and imitate “the foreign” – and who
Gefahr ihren Grund zu suchen bereit will then say that a “people” must be and could
sind – sondern immer noch und immer be that which prepares the site of the truth of
unwissender – “das Fremde” verherrlichen und beyng?
nachmachen – doch wer will dann sagen, daß
ein “Volk” jenes sein müßte und könne, was
dem Seyn die Stätte seiner Wahrheit bereitet? –
Denken wir den Menschen nicht immer noch Do we not still conceive human being too
nur tierhaft, wenn wir ihn als “Volk” “denken”? much in its animality when we “think” it as
Ist diese Anschauung, trotz ihrer unantastbaren “people”? Is this view, despite its
“Richtigkeit”, nicht doch der ins Riesige unimpeachable “correctness”, not the
eingerichtete Abfall von jener anfänglichen comprehensive organization of our falling-off
abendländischen Bestimmung des Menschen in from the inceptual determination of Occidental
die Zugehörigkeit zum Seyn – so daß die humanity in terms of its belonging to beyng?
abendländische Entscheidung niemals dort fällt, And as such, the decision of the Occident can
wo nur ein innerhalb der schon entschiedenen, never be engaged within a domain dominated
d. h. hellenistisch-jüdischen “Welt” erst recht by the refusal of decision – which is to say,
Entscheidungsloses sich die Herrschaft within the dominion of the Judeo-Hellenistic
angemaßt hat –; daß die Entscheidung niemals “world” as the realm of the already-decided.
sein kann die zwischen Christentum und And for this reason, the decision can never fall
“Heidentum”, weil beide schon aus der between Christendom and “paganism”,
Entscheidungsunkraft überhaupt ihren Bestand because both secure their substance in the
sichern. – disempowerment of decisiveness as such.
Die Entscheidung ist aber diese: ob der Mensch This is the decision we face: the humanity of
des Abendlandes sich dem Seienden als the Occident either entrusts itself to beings in
Gegenstand überläßt oder ob er das Seyn als their objectivity, or it wins its way to beyng as
Ab-grund erringt und aus diesem die Not einer refusal of ground, from whence may arise the
Gründung seines Wesens aus der distress of the need to ground the ownmost of
Zugewiesenheit zum Sein. Weil solches in human being out of its allotment to being.
einem ersten Anfang bei den Griechen Because it was granted, in the first beginning,
glückte – weil sie aus dem Sein sich zu to the Greeks to achieve this – because they
bestimmen wagten, mußte, solange dieses dared to determine their being out of being,
Wagnis gewagt wurde, jene kurze und einzige this short and unique history had to became
Geschichte möglich sein. Alles “Blut” und alle possible as long as this wager was waged. All
“Rasse”, jedes “Volkstum” ist vergeblich und “blood” and “race” and each and every
ein blinder Ablauf, wenn es nicht schon in “folk community” are all in vain, blindly
einem Wagnis des Seins schwingt und als running their course of expiration, unless
Wagendes dem Blitzstrahl sich frei stellt, der es attuned to a wager for the sake of being – that
dort trifft, wo seine Dumpfheit as a venture of being they set themselves into
auseinanderbrechen muß, um der Wahrheit des the open to be so struck by such a lightning-
Seyns den Raum einzuräumen, innerhalb dessen shaft as must shatter their stolidity – and open
erst das Seyn ins Werk des Seienden gesetzt a site for the truth of beyng, out of which
werden kann. beyng can come to first set itself to work in
beings.
Überlegungen xi Ponderings xi
§ 53 [76], S. 408–409: § 53 [76]:
Rein “metaphysisch” (d. h. seynsgeschichtlich) In a purely “metaphysical” sense (that is,
denkend habe ich in den Jahren 1930–1934 den being-historical sense), in the years 1930–1934 I
Nationalsozialismus für die Möglichkeit eines took National Socialism to represent the
Übergangs in einen anderen Anfang gehalten possibility of a crossing into an other beginning
und ihm diese Deutung gegeben. Damit wurde and this is how I interpreted it. Therewith I
diese “Bewegung” in ihren eigentlichen Kräften mistook and underestimated this “Movement” in
und inneren Notwendigkeiten sowohl als auch in terms of its actual potential and immanent
der ihr eigenen Größengebung und Größenart necessities, as well as in terms of the form and
verkannt und unterschätzt. Hier beginnt vielmehr dimension of its greatness. What it initiates,
und zwar in einer viel tieferen – d. h. however, and in fact in a far deeper way – a more
umgreifenden und eingreifenden Weise als im extensive and more intrusive way – than fascism,
Faschismus die Vollendung der Neuzeit –; diese is the consummation of modernity. This indeed
hat zwar im “Romantischen” überhaupt actually began in the spirit of “Romanticism” – in
begonnen – hinsichtlich der Vermenschung des view of the humanization of human being as
Menschen in der selbstgewissen Vernünftigkeit, grounded in self-certain reason – but what is
aber für die Vollendung bedarf es der required of the consummation is the decisiveness
Entschiedenheit des Historisch-Technischen im of historical-technical rationality in service to the
Sinne der Vollständigen “Mobilisierung” aller comprehensive “mobilization” of all capacities of
Vermögen des auf sich gestellten Menschentums. a humanity reliant entirely on itself. One day it
Eines Tages muß auch die Absetzung gegen die will also become necessary, in accordance with a
christlichen Kirchen vollzogen werden in einem “Protestantism” without Christianity, to carry out
christentumslosen “Protestantismus”, den der the overthrow of the Christian churches, which
Faschismus von sich aus nicht zu vollziehen fascism cannot accomplish in line with its own
vermag. principles.
Aus der vollen Einsicht in die frühere In consequence of this deeper insight into my
Täuschung über das Wesen und die earlier misconception concerning the nature and
geschichtliche Wesenskraft des the historical essence empowering National
Nationalsozialismus ergibt sich erst die Socialism, the necessity of its affirmation arises,
Notwendigkeit seiner Bejahung und zwar aus | and indeed, on philosophical grounds. Which also
denkerischen Gründen. Damit ist zugleich means that this “Movement” remains independent
gesagt, daß diese “Bewegung” unabhängig bleibt of its respective contemporary forms and of the
von der je zeitgenössischen Gestalt und der duration of their present manifestations. But how
Dauer dieser gerade sichtbaren Formen. Wie can it be that such essential affirmation is valued
kommt es aber, daß eine solche wesentliche less, or not at all, in contrast to mere consent, for
Bejahung weniger oder gar nicht geschätzt wird the most part superficial and soon again clueless,
im Unterschied zur bloßen, meist baffled, or yet again blind? Responsibility rests, at
vordergründlichen und alsbald ratlosen oder nur least in part, with the empty arrogance of
blinden Zustimmung? Die Schuld trägt zum Teil “intellectuals”, whose nature (or unnaturing)
die leere Anmaßung der “Intellektuellen” – certainly does not consist in protecting knowledge
deren Wesen (oder Unwesen) ja nicht darin and educational formation against praxis as such,
besteht, daß sie das Wissen und die Bildung or against the lack of education; what rather
verteidigen gegenüber dem nur Handeln und der characterizes them is that they take “the sciences”
Unbildung, sondern daß sie die “Wissenschaft” for the sole actuality of knowing and as such as the
für das eigentliche Wissen und den Grund einer basis of “culture” – while neither knowing nor
“Kultur” halten und vom wesentlichen Wissen capable of knowing anything of knowing
nichts wissen wollen und können. Die größere awareness. The still greater danger of
Gefahr des Intellektualismus ist, daß er die intellectualism is that it threatens the possibility
Möglichkeit und den Ernst des echten Wissens and the seriousness of genuine knowing, not that
bedroht, nicht aber, daß er das Handeln it weakens practical activity. For action knows how
schwächt; dieses weiß sich zu helfen; der Kampf to defend itself, but today the battle against science
für das Wissen gegen die Wissenschaft dagegen for the sake of knowing, by contrast, is hopeless:
ist heute aussichtslos, weil die Forscher nicht because of themselves, on the basis of science,
einmal von sich selbst, von der Wissenschaft, researchers do not sufficiently know things
hinreichend Wesentliches wissen, um sich im essential to seriously form an opposition and to
Ernst zu einer Gegnerschaft zu stellen. stand their ground.
Daher sind überall alle Fronten ineinander Consequently, all these fronts are interlocked in
verwirrt: Die Universitäten zeigen die reinste mutual confusion: the universities exhibit this
Gestalt dieser Verwirrung; hier ist der Grund confusion in its purest form; this is where we have
ihrer Ohnmacht zu suchen – | aber auch die to seek the source of their incapacity – as well as
Ursache der mißleiteten Ansprüche. Sie selbst the source of their misdirected demands. They are
bedingen die Entschlußlosigkeit, die den einzigen themselves determined by the lack of decisiveness,
Schritt verhindert, der jetzt getan werden müßte: which obstructs the sole step that would now have
die ausdrückliche Abschaffung und Ersetzung to be taken: the express abolition [of the
durch Forschungsbetriebe und technische university] and its replacement by research
Lehranstalten: chemische und alemannische organizations and technical colleges: “institutes”
“Institute”. Eine weitere Täuschung war daher for chemistry, for Alemannic studies. An
die Meinung, die Universität ließe sich ja noch zu additional misconception was the opinion that
einer Stätte wesentlicher Besinnung verwandeln, the university could still be transformed into a site
um ein Wesen zu behaupten, darin das of mindfulness, a site of its ownmost contention,
abendländische Wissen in seine eigene returning the Occident to the knowing awareness
Fragwürdigkeit sich zurückstelle, um einen of its own questionableness in order to help
anderen Anfang der Seynsgeschichte mit prepare another beginning of the history of being.
vorzubereiten. Ein von hier ausgedachter Begriff On this basis, the construct of “science”, evaluated
von “Wissenschaft” ist, sowohl von der in terms of the university as well as in terms of
Universität her gesehen wie aus der historical reality, is a pure “phantom”.
geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit geschätzt, das Illusions – thought through and suffered in all their
reine “Phantom”. Täuschungen – durchdacht abysmal ends – are paths on the road to what “is”.
und durchlitten in allen ihren Abgründen – sind (See p. 110).
Wege zu dem, was “ist”. (Vgl. S. 110).
§ 55 [77–78], S. 410: § 55 [77–78]:
Die erste und somit allem vorausgreifende und sich The ground-laying and all-anticipating
ständig verschärfende Einsicht des denkerischen insight of mindful thought, which
Denkens muß sein: jeder Denker, der in der constantly seeks to refine itself, has to be:
Geschichte des abendländischen Denkens eine every thinker of Occidental philosophy
Grundstellung gründete, ist unwiderlegbar; das will who founded a fundamental position is
sagen, die Sucht des Widerlegens ist der erste Abfall irrefutable. Which is to say, addiction to
vom eigentlichen Denken. An solchem Maß refutation is the first falling-off from
gemessen bleibt aller Philosophiebetrieb, zumal der authentic thinking. By this measure, the
“nationalsozialistische”, außerhalb des Bezirks entire business of philosophy, especially
wesentlichen Wissens. Das hindert nicht, daß solche that of “National Socialism”, remains
Betriebsamkeit in einer maßlosen und lärmenden outside the realm of knowing awareness.
und – räuberischen “Literatur” sich eine This does not prevent this bustling
öffentliche | Geltung zu verschaffen versucht, die enterprise from seeking to establish its
aufs Haar jener Schriftstellerei entspricht, die sich validity and social status by means of its
als “katholische Philosophie” bei den “Gebildeten” unbridled, noisy, and predatory
aller “Konfessionen” und “Stände” einen Eingang “literature” – a pursuit which closely
verschafft hat. Wie lange diese Betriebe wohl noch corresponds to what “Catholic
dauern mögen? Ob mit der Vollendung der Neuzeit philosophy” has achieved with its
erst ihre Zeit gekommen ist? acceptance among “literati” of all
“confessions” and “estates”. How much
longer is this business liable to stay up
and running? Could it be that its time is
just begun, now, with the consummation
of the modern epoch?
The passages collected above belong to a very complex thematic division inas-
much as they express Heidegger’s sense of the urgency of posing the question of
being. Whatever the focus of Heidegger’s reflections may be, this discourse will
only become comprehensible on the basis of the Contributions to Philosophy.
National Socialism and the university, which compose an inextricable unity, will
now be subjected to a fuller analysis. Our objective is to demonstrate how both
components of this complex of ideas are quite distinct from a completely different
path of thought, one which we cannot follow here. And in fact, Heidegger’s lan-
guage use appears to function like a solid wall, creating an invisible and insur-
mountable barrier, once separated from the unity of being-historical thinking.
In section § 6 (Ponderings VII), using the language of being-historical thinking,
Heidegger harshly criticizes the Reich and the National Socialist Party. Let us con-
sider the following statement: “What of the fear of these supposedly fearless ones in
the face of the Reich as the gigantic apparatus of Party and State in their unity?”.
The word “gigantic” (riesenhaft) is used a total of four times in this section. In
the Contributions it always appears in relation to the causes of the oblivion of being
and the abandonment of being.13 In the Black Notebooks, rediscovering the same
13
Heidegger M. (1989), § 14 “Philosophy and Worldview”: “The ways and risks that belong to
what was once creating are arranged according to the machination’s gigantic (Riesenhaftes) char-
acter, and the machinational gives the appearance of the liveliness of creating” (ibid. pp. 40–41.
English translation, p. 29); § 45 “The ‘Decision’”: “The transition to a technicized animal, which
begins to replace the instincts, which have already grown weaker and less refined by the gigantism
(Riesenhaftes) of technicity” (ibid. p. 98. English translation, p. 68); § 70 “The Gigantic
(Riesenhaftes)”: “But as soon as machination is in turn grasped being-historically, the gigantic
(Riesenhaftes) reveals itself as ‘something’ else” (ibid. p. 135. English translation, p. 94); § 71
“The Gigantic (Das Riesenhafte)”: (ibid. p. 138. English translation, p. 96); § 72 “Nihilism”:
“Anxiety in the face of beyng has never been greater than today. Proof for this is the gigantically
(riesenhaft) organized event for shouting down this anxiety” (ibid. p. 139. English translation,
p. 97), “Of course to be mindful of this process already requires a standpoint which avoids attribut-
ing a deception [...] to all ‘the good’ ‘the progressive’, and ‘the gigantic’ (Riesenhaftes) [...]” (ibid.
p. 140. English translation, p. 98); § 76 “Propositions about ‘Science’”: “With the growing consoli-
dation of the machinational-technical essence of all sciences, the objective and methodical differ-
ence between the natural and the human sciences will recede more and more. Natural sciences will
become part of machine technology and its operations; human sciences will unfold as a compre-
hensive and gigantic (riesenhaft) newspaper science, in which ‘enliving’ will continually be inter-
preted historically (historische) and in which publicness will be conveyed to everyone by this
interpretation, as quickly and as accessibly as possible” (ibid. p. 155. English translation, p. 107),
“In all its present gigantic (riesenhaft) expansion and certainty of success and sturdiness, ‘science’
does not at all meet the presuppositions of an essential rank on the basis of which it could ever
move into opposition to the knowing of thinking” (ibid. p. 156. English translation, p. 108, mod.
B.R.); § 155 “Nature and Earth”: “And finally what is left was only ‘scenery’ and recreational
opportunity and even this still calculated into the gigantic (Riesenhaftes) and arranged for the
masses. [...] Why does the earth keep silent in this destruction? Because earth is not allowed the
strife with a world, because earth is not allowed the truth of beyng. Why not? Because, the more
gigantic (Riesending) that giant-thing (riesiger) called man becomes, the smaller he also
becomes?” (ibid. pp. 277–278. English translation, p. 195); § 250 “The Ones to Come”: “But what
is not ownmost to going-under takes its own course and goes another way – and is an abating, a
no-longer-being-able-to-do, ceasing, after the appearance of the gigantic (Riesenhaftes) and the
dimension of language use, therefore, calls for its closer consideration with indis-
pensable reference back to the Contributions.
Just to take the examples of section § 75 (Ponderings VII): “The dreadfulness of
this organization of nature [...] can only be grasped when we [...] think it through to
its provenance in the abandonment of the being of beings, which unfolds its proper
power in gigantism (Riesenhaftigkeit) and the ruthlessness of its calculative
encroachments in service of utility”; section § 73 (Ponderings XIII): “will both fun-
damental forms of the consummation of modernity, independently of one another,
successfully and unconditionally consolidate the abandonment of the being of
beings (understood as the gigantism – Riesenhaftes – of the technical, historical,
and political amalgamation of all institutions, forms of discipline and indoctrina-
tion), and thereby become the Same in the style of gigantism (riesenhaft)”; and
finally, section § 128 (Ponderings XIII): “What matters the upsurge of the gigantic
(riesenhaft) frenzy of machinational desolation and the ‘deeds’ it generates [...]?”.
Heidegger elaborates his subtle irony by referring to the Reich as “the gigantic
apparatus of Party and State”, using a dense network of words to indicate his deter-
mination to ridicule the banality of a system condemned to failure: “through the
gigantic monstrosity of this apparatus [...] gigantic possibilities of ‘enliving’
(Erlebnis) are opened up and prepared: no-one shall be denied any functional mode
of the enliving of life that might secure ‘culture’ as the organization of enliving
(Erlebnisveranstaltung) [...]”. These possibilities of living, imprisoned in degener-
ate forms of existence without a future, ought not be unfolded. Incarcerated in the
rigidity of a present consisting of the enliving of experience, “culture” is reduced to
massive and following the priority of establishment over against that which should fulfill it” (ibid.
p. 397. English translation, p. 278); § 255 “Turning in Enowning”: “Man with his machinations
might for centuries yet pillage and lay waste to the planet, the gigantic (Riesenhaftes) character of
this driving might ‘develop’ into something unimaginable and take on the form of a seeming rigor
as the massive regulating of the desolate as such – yet the greatness of beyng continues to be closed
off, because decisions are no longer made about truth and untruth and what is their ownmost” (ibid.
pp. 408–409. English translation, p. 287, mod. B.R.); § 260 “The Gigantic (Riesenhaftes)”: “The
gigantic (Riesenhaftes) is grounded upon the decidedness and invariability of ‘calculation’ and is
rooted in a prolongation of subjective re-presentation unto the whole of beings” (ibid. p. 441.
English translation, pp. 310–311), after describing the four forms of “gigantism”, Heidegger con-
tinues: “In all of these interrelated forms of the gigantic (Riesenhaftes), the abandonment of being
holds sway [...]” (ibid. p. 442. English translation, p. 311); “In the gigantic (Riesenhaftes), one
recognizes that any manner of ‘greatness’ in history arises from the unspoken ‘metaphysical’ inter-
pretation of happening (ideals, deeds, creations, sacrifice) and therefore its ownmost actuality is
not historical (geschichtlich) but rather historical (historische)” (ibid. p. 443. English translation,
p. 312); § 262 “‘Projecting-Open’ Beyng and Beyng as Projecting-Open”: “[...] knowing aware-
ness awakens and sees that, in the face of the gigantism (Riesenhaftes) of the lack of history, it is
only by passing through utmost deciding that a history is still rescuable” (ibid. p. 450. English
translation, p. 317, mod. B.R.); § 274 “A Being and Calculation”: “And in the moment when plan-
ning and calculation have become gigantic (riesenhaft), a being in the whole begins to shrink. The
‘world’ becomes smaller and smaller [...]. The metaphysical diminishing of the ‘world’ produces
a hollowing-out of man” (ibid. p. 495. English translation, p. 348).
the mere organization of itself. The negative signification that Heidegger gives to
received concepts of phenomenology – such as “lived (Erlebnis) experience” [as
enliving], and “organization of enliving (Erlebnisveranstaltung)”14 – have nothing
14
Coming back to the Contributions, we quickly discover the negative connotations of the keyword
“enliving” (Erlebnis), of related compounds and cognates, along with their respective thematic
networks. See Heidegger M. (1989), § 5 “For the Few and the Rare”: “They appeal to the shallow
pools of ‘lived-experiences’ (Erlebnisse), incapable of estimating the broad jointure of the arena
of thinking, incapable of thinking the depth and height of beyng in such an opening. And when
they believe themselves superior to ‘enliving’ (Erlebnis), they do so with an appeal to an empty
cleverness” (ibid. p. 19. English translation, p. 14, mod. B.R.); § 6 “The Grounding-Attunement”:
“It is only because for a long time now ‘psychology’ has limited what the word attunement dem-
onstrates, only because today’s on-going mania for ‘enliving’ (Erlebnis) would all the more con-
fuse whatever is being said about [...] attunement [...] [therefore must] an orienting word [...] again
and again be said ‘about’ attunement” (ibid. p. 21. English translation, p. 15, mod. B.R.); § 7
“From Enowning”: “What is thus nearest is so near that every unavoidable pursuit of machination
and of enliving (Erleben) must have already passed it [what is nearest] by and thus can also never
immediately be called back to it. Enowning remains the most estranging” (ibid. p. 27. English
translation, p. 20, mod. B.R.); § 14 “Philosophy and Worldview”: “‘Worldview’ is always ‘machi-
nation’ over against what is handed down to us, for the sake of overcoming and subduing it, with
the means that are proper to worldview and which it has itself prepared, though never brought to
fruition – all of this slid over into ‘enliving’ (Erlebnis)” (ibid. p. 38. English translation, p. 27,
mod. B.R.), “[...] What is ownmost to worldview in terms of machination and enliving (erlebni-
shaft) forces the shaping of each worldview to vacillate in the broadest of opposites and therefore
also always to solidity itself through adjustments” (ibid. p. 39. English translation, p. 28, mod.
B.R.); § 18 “The Powerlessness of Thinking”: “2. that machination and enliving (Erlebnis) claim
to be all that is effective and thus ‘powerful’ and that they leave no room for genuine power” (ibid.
p. 47. English translation, p. 33, mod. B.R.), “4. that, with the growing deadening vis-à-vis the
simplicity of an essential mindfulness and with the lack of perseverance in questioning, every turn
on the path is disregarded if in its first stage it does not bring some result – a result with which
something is ‘to be made’ or by which something is to be ‘enlived’ (erleben)” (ibid. English trans-
lation, mod. B.R.); § 19 “Philosophy (On the Question: Who Are We?)”: “From this it becomes
clear that the who-question, as the enactment of self-mindfulness, has nothing in common with a
curious ego-addicted lostness in the full-fledged brooding over ‘one’s own’ lived-experiences
(Erlebnisse)” (ibid. p. 51. English translation, p. 36, mod. B.R.); § 30 “Inceptual Thinking (As
Mindfulness)”: “But an initial mindfulness must, in the utmost ways of being-human, try to distin-
guish the otherness of Dasein over against all ‘enliving’ (Erleben) and ‘consciousness’” (ibid.
p. 68. English translation, p. 48, mod. B.R.); § 34 “Enowning and the Question of Being”:
“‘Temporality’ (Temporalität) is never meant as a correction of the concept of time, as the familiar
substitution of the calculable time-concept with ‘experienced-time’ (Erlebniszeit) (Bergson-
Dilthey). All such [thinking] remains outside the acknowledged necessity of crossing from the
guiding-question conceived as such, to the grounding-question” (ibid. p. 74. English translation,
p. 51); § 44 “The ‘Decisions’”: “[...] whether truth as correctness degenerates into the certainty of
representation and the security of calculating and enliving (Erleben) [...] whether art is an exhibi-
tion for enliving (Erlebnisveranstaltung) or the setting-into-work of truth [...] whether nature is
degraded to the realm of exploitation by means of calculation and ordering, degraded to an occa-
sion for ‘enliving’ (Erleben) or whether as self-closing earth it bears the open of the imageless
world” (ibid. p. 91. English translation, p. 63); § 50 “Echo”: “Where does machination lead? To
enliving (Erlebnis). How does this happen [...]? By disenchanting beings, as it makes room for the
power of an enchantment that is enacted by the disenchanting itself. Enchantment and enliving
(Erlebnis)” (ibid. p. 107. English translation, p. 75, mod. B.R.); § 51 “Echo”: “And this is live-
experience (Erleben) which decrees that all of this should turn into [...] ‘enliving’ (Erlebnis),
in common with Da-sein, for they are of a different provenance, and subsequently
he will associate them with machination (Machenschaft). The point of Heidegger’s
irony is to relate these concepts to the decomposition of culture and the aberrant
course of the modern epoch that follows from this. Heidegger’s position on the dis-
course of enliving, as documented here (see footnote 14), offers necessary clarifica-
tion regarding his taking of distance from all anthropological thinking. The impact
of this question can hardly be over-estimated, for Heidegger’s related remarks in the
Black Notebooks must be considered as the expression of “categories” that are fun-
damentally distinct from those pertaining to beings. Any other line of interpretation
easily lends itself to object-historical readings, empowered by machination, which
reduce human being to a mere being among beings, and which consequently instru-
mentalize and smother the thinking of beyng and consign it to oblivion. One need
only turn to sections §§ 69 and 214 of the Contributions, in order to clarify for
oneself that Heidegger never envisioned a “history of humanity”, nor did he seek to
support his thought by reference to the history and destiny of this or that “people”.
To claim otherwise, amounts to misconceiving the at times somewhat difficult turns
of Heidegger’s path, which is fundamentally directed toward the overcoming of “the
concept of an essential, object-like human entity (such as subject, person and related
concepts)” (Contributions, § 214).
Despite the fact that a “culture” based on the “organization of enliving” is doomed
to failure, it is mandated by “Christian cultural organization”. The term “organiza-
tion” (Betrieb) signifies the organized character of a form of knowledge directed
solely toward usefulness for the people; in external perspective it is structured as
propaganda, and as such it generates a deceptive appearance and seeks to achieve the
unity of the people by means of the dictatorship of the They. In section § 6, the word
“Betrieb” is used three times; and in different formulations it may also be found in
always into larger, more unprecedented, more screaming ‘enliving’ (Erlebnis). ‘Enliving’
(Erlebnis) is understood here as the basic kind of machinational representing and of residing
therein; ‘enliving’ (Erlebnis) means making what is mysterious, i.e., what is stimulating, provoca-
tive, stunning and enchanting – which makes the machinational necessary – public and accessible
to everyone. [...] here, in all desolation and terror, something of the essential sway of beyng (as
machination and enliving [Erlebnis]) dawns” (ibid. pp. 109–110. English translation, pp. 76–77,
mod. B.R.); § 52 “Abandonment of Being”: “Do we grasp this important teaching of the first begin-
ning and its history: what is ownmost to beyng as refusal, utmost refusal in the unprecedented
openness of machinations and ‘enliving’ (Erleben)?” (ibid. p. 112. English translation, p. 78, mod.
B.R.); § 55 “Echo”: “Forgottenness of being is not aware of itself; it presumes to be at home with
‘beings’ and with what is ‘actual’, ‘true’ to ‘life’, and certain of ‘enliving’ (Erleben)” (ibid. p. 114.
English translation, p. 80, mod. B.R.); § 58 “What the Three concealments of the Abandonment of
Being Are and How They Show Themselves”: “But now, since beings are abandoned by beyng, the
opportunity arises for the most insipid ‘sentimentality’. Now for the first timeeverything is ‘expe-
rienced live’ (erlebt) and every undertaking and performance drips with ‘lived-experiences’
(Erlebnisse). And this ‘enliving’ (Erleben) proves that now even man as a being has incurred the
loss of beyng and has fallen prey to his hunt for lived-experiences (Erlebnisse)” (ibid. pp. 123–124.
English translation, p. 86, mod. B.R.); § 61 “Machination”: “And a second law is coupled with this
first one, namely, that the more decidedly machination hides itself in this way, the more it insists
on the pre-dominance of that which seems to be totally against what
other passages of the Black Notebooks. For example, in section § 55 (Ponderings

XI), Heidegger writes that “the entire business of philosophy, particularly that of
‘National Socialism’, remains outside the realm of knowing awareness”. [Elsewhere
Heidegger writes that] “today we find educated and supposedly insightful Germans
is ownmost to machination and nevertheless belongs to its ownmost: enliving (Erlebnis) [...]. Then
a third law joins these two: The more unconditionally enliving (Erleben) becomes the measure of
correctness and truth (and thus for ‘actuality’ and constancy), the less is the prospect of gaining,
from this vantage point, a knowledge of machination as such. [...] If machination and enliving
(Erlebnis) are named together, then this points to an essential belongingness of both to each other
[...]. Machination and enliving (Erlebnis) are formally the more originary version of the formula
for the guiding-question of Western thinking: beingness (being) and thinking (as re-presenting
com-prehending)” (ibid. pp. 127–128. English translation, pp. 89–90, mod. B.R.); § 62 “Self-
Dissembling of the Abandonment of Being by Machination and ‘Enliving’” (ibid. p. 129. English
translation, p. 90); § 65 “What Is Not Ownmost to Being” (ibid. p. 130. English translation, p. 91);
§§ 66–68 “Machination and Enliving” (ibid. pp. 131–134. English translation, pp. 91–93); § 69
“Enliving and ‘Anthropology’”: “What enliving (Erlebnis) is! How its mastery leads to an anthro-
pological way of thinking! How this is an end, because it unconditionally confirms machination”
(ibid. Footnote, p. 134. English translation, p. 93, mod. B.R.), And in the main text: “[...] so will
today’s time of ‘enliving’ (erlebend ) make even less fuss about this boring and pedestrian stereo-
typing of its own superficiality” (ibid. p. 135. English translation, p. 94, mod. B.R.); § 72
“Nihilism”: “[...] in this drunken stupor of ‘enliving’ (Erlebnis) – precisely there is the greatest
nihilism: methodically disregarding human goallessness [...]. Beyng has so thoroughly abandoned
beings and submitted them to machination and ‘enliving’ (Erleben) [...]” (ibid. pp. 139–140.
English translation, p. 97, mod. B.R.); § 76 “Propositions about ‘Science’”: “‘Newspaper’ and
‘machine’ are meant essentially as the dominant ways of ultimate objectification, which forges
ahead (in modernity, the objectification that advances to completion) by sucking up all concrete-
ness (Sachhaltigkeit) of beings and taking these [beings] only as an occasion for enliving
(Erleben)” (ibid. p. 158. English translation, p. 109, mod. B.R.); § 123 “Beyng”: “Only after enor-
mous ruinings and downfalls of beings do those beings which are already pressured into machina-
tion and enliving (Erleben) and rigidified into non-beings yield to beyng and thus to its truth”
(ibid. p. 241. English translation, p. 170, mod. B.R.); § 129 “The Nothing”: “When now abandon-
ment of being belongs to the ‘beings’ of machination and enliving (Erleben), should we be sur-
prized if the ‘nothing’ is misconstrued as what is simply nihilating? [...] When the affirmation of
‘making’ and of ‘enliving’ (Erleben) so exclusively determines the actuality of the actual, how
unwelcome then must all ‘no’ and ‘not’ appear!” (ibid. p. 246. English translation, p. 174, mod.
B.R.); § 214 “The Essential Sway of Truth (Openness)”: “That is why the path of mindful delibera-
tion on correctness and on the ground of possibility of correctness is also at first not very convinc-
ing [...], because one does not get rid of the representations of a human-thing (subject, person, and
the like) and accounts for everything only as enliving (Erlebnis) of man and these experiences in
turn as events in man himself” (ibid. p. 340. English translation, p. 238, mod. B.R.); § 254
“Refusal”: “[...] machination takes what is not-being into the protection of a being; and thereby the
unavoidably enforced desolation of man is made up for by ‘enliving’ (Erlebnis)” (ibid. p. 406.
English translation, p. 286, mod. B.R.); § 256 “The Last God”: “[...] that god no longer appears
either in the ‘personal’ or in the ‘enliving’ (Erlebnis) of the ‘masses’ but solely in the ‘space’ of
beyng itself – a space that is held to abground” (ibid. p. 416. English translation, p. 293, mod.
B.R.); § 262 “‘Projecting-Open’ Beyng and Beyng as Projecting-Open”: “‘Life’ is swallowed up
by enliving (Erleben), and this itself is intensified by organizing enliving (Erleben). Organizing
enliving (Erlebnis) is the utmost enliving wherein ‘one’ (man) comes together” (ibid. p. 450.
English translation, p. 316, mod. B.R.); § 274 “A Being and Calculation”: “Enliving (Erleben)
attains the utmost of what is its ownmost, lived-experiences (Erlebnisse) are lived. The lostness
into beings is lived as capability of transforming ‘life’ into the calculable whirlwind of empty cir-
cling around itself and of making this capability believable as something ‘true to life’ (Lebensnähe)”
(ibid. p. 495. English translation, pp. 348–349, mod. B.R.).
who think that once militarism and the National Socialist terror have been excised,
‘poetry and thought’ will awaken in the people of itself, forgetting that ‘poetry and
thought’ still bear the same old stamp of yesterday – that of the ‘insane Nazi
regime’” – which is to say, the stamp of cultural politics (Observations I [126]). As
another product of its time, the regime shares with organs of the organization of
culture the inability to recognize the urgency of the crossing [into an other inception
of history]. Both are all the less able to recognize this urgency inasmuch both affirm
the glorification of beings, elevating such glorification, powerless as it is, to an abso-
lute end in itself. It is hardly possible to even take notice of the urgency of a “deci-
sion” as long as one is driven solely by the blandishments offered by entities. A
series of recurring cultural instrumentalizations lays out the course the Reich sets for
itself: one need only mention the “childish romantics (kindische Romantiker)” who
wax enthusiastic about the “Reich and even the idea of a ‘Reich-University’” –
thinking to make use of the work of German poet Stefan George (1868–1933) – Das
neue Reich (1928) – for their own propagandistic purposes. For Heidegger, it is
entrusted to thought and poetry to open up new horizons of sense. Philosophy should
never accommodate itself to one or another mode of thought and its political appli-
cations, let alone assent to being nourished by the acclamations of the propaganda
organs of the regime. In this regard journalism is on par with propaganda!
In the discourse reconstructed here (Ponderings VII, § 21), Heidegger indicates a
point of no return defined by the impossibility of “reflection (Besinnung)” or better
said, by the distance from all reflection that is constituted by the regime of self-
centered consciousness. The key word, expressive of Heidegger’s commentary, and
indicative of this withdrawal, is the concept of “self-consciousness
(Selbstbewußtsein)”. The German university retrenches itself, withdraws, assuming
that “the essential law of ‘contemporary’ science” can be ignored and that this will
allow it to focus on a science devoted to the securing of beings in all ignorance of
the history of being. The sole space of this university is reduced to the extended
duration of an ahistorical present; while the “leap” (that projects-open a future) “is
to dare an initial foray into the domain of being-history”.15
However, if the university is not up to such a leap, then “National Socialism” will
also remain estranged from “the preparation of a transformation of beyng”, “for the
dominion of the National Socialist worldview stands decisively established”. It
stands to reason that the conservation of resources produced by the regime, without
ever putting them into question, will realize their highest actuality of being in the
resoluteness of “self-consciousness”. In this way we arrive at a new perspective on
“reflection” which has nothing in common with the “passage” brought into consid-
eration by Heidegger. In consequence of modernity, mankind is fitted with an inter-
pretation of itself which allows it to understand itself on the basis of its egoist
self-consciousness. Heidegger’s project of human being is fundamentally different,
for he holds that the ego-focused concept is inadequate to found and to ground
the “self”:
“Thus the openness and the grounding of the self springs forth from within and as the truth
of beyng. [...] It is neither the analysis of human beings in another direction nor the announc-
15
Ibid. § 115 “The Guiding-Attunement of the Leap”, p. 227. English translation, p. 161.
ing of other ways of their being – all of which is, strictly speaking, improved anthropol-
ogy – that brings about self-mindedness; but rather it is the question of the truth of being
that prepares the domain of selfhood [...]”.16
Because it “belongs to the essence of a worldview that it cannot will to think

beyond the limits set by its own victory” (Ponderings VII, § 21), the question of
being must remain alien to National Socialism. Thanks to the shallowness of self-
hood of a humanity founded in itself – that is, through the “humanization of human-
ity” – each and every possibility of establishing a ground in being is erased, and the
“passage” is a danger to be avoided at all costs.
It is not by accident that this kind of misinterpretation necessarily leads to the dimi-
nution of Dasein and the assignment of Heidegger’s thinking to “existentialism”
(Ponderings VIII, § 51). For this reason, Heidegger distances himself from Heyse’s
misconceived looting of Being and Time, “salted and flavoured with ‘National Socialist
ideas’ and cooked up for the seventh time”. As the crown prince of philosophy in the
new regime, Heyse mimics the character of the regime by “drawing courage for his
remarkable ‘comportment’ from his own phrases” rather than thinking. The incapacity
of National Socialism is reflected in its followers, who share the common bond of not
being able to think the matter through (Ponderings VII, § 21); among these, Heyse is
the thinker who “does not think” (§ 51). And in fact, Heyse is a child of the modern
epoch: the courage of his phrases, the “bloated turns of phrase”, to which he takes
recourse, are far removed from the distress of originary thinking. They belong to the
“barbarism of ‘thought’ (Barbarei des ‘Denkens’)”. Heidegger therefore takes it upon
himself to clarify that Being and Time does not implicate such misconceived interpre-
tations; or better yet, that it has nothing in common with “National Socialist ideas”.
This clarification pertains to the substantial differences between his thought and so-
called “National Socialist philosophy” – which are separated by an abyss.
The conclusion to section § 51 offers the attentive reader – to the surprize of
many – a further occasion for reflection. Although a life dedicated to thought
demands a certain asceticism, Heidegger nonetheless considers it appropriate to
“state one’s position” in distinction from an opposing position; doing this, however,
without ever allowing oneself to be “thrown off track and drawn into confrontation”.
What may perhaps be surprizing, is that “this statement of observation” ought never
serve “as a public dismissal of another position”. In section § 51, unequivocally in
regard to National Socialism, Heidegger’s refusal of engaging in “public dismissal”
is remarkable for insisting that such engagement “will only be used to supply the
business of the ‘humanities’ with ‘news’, and thereby will confirm it in its supposed
indispensability”. This is crucial, for it discloses Heidegger’s actual intention, to
avoid every public dismissal or public resistance to the Party, because such confron-
tation presupposes what is lacking in opposition – the capability of engaging in
thought. For Heidegger there is no question of throwing himself into a “confronta-
tion”. The verb wegwerfen not only signifies, in this context, to throw oneself away
for a negligible matter, or to degrade oneself, but also to allow oneself to be thrown
16
Ibid. § 30 “Inceptual Thinking (As Mindfulness)”, p. 67. English translation, p. 47.
off one’s proper track – and indeed in the truest and worst sense of the word. If we
took time to pause, then this unequivocal observation would necessarily lead us see
that the position of many of Heidegger’s critics, who have postulated that Heidegger’s
silence signifies his assent to National Socialism, would have to be revised.
Heidegger’s “dis-enchantment” also pertains to the modern epoch, “modern”
humanity and “‘National Socialist’ pseudo-philosophy” (§ 53), which attempts to
restrict the knowable to what might be reducible to German ethnicity. With this
initiative, thinking is subjected to still greater danger of instrumentalization: it is
subordinated to calculability, understood as a fundamental feature of the temporal
structure of our epoch. Defined by an ahistorical present, temporality is neither
closed nor open [to past and future]. This way of thinking is challenged by Heidegger
as follows: “The knowable itself is neither French, nor German, nor Italian, nor
English, nor American – but it is, to be sure, the ground of these nations!”. The
essential ground (Grund) cannot be found in the artificial construct of ethnic unity,
as if on the model of a totality designed to conceal a sense-less construct. Every
founding, moreover, remains impossible as along as the historical indeterminacy of
still extant ethnic unities and their political will to power encapsulates itself in the
final fixation of entities, degrading the people to the highest being among beings.
“Political Catholicism” was beset by a still more sophisticated form of political
instrumentalization: the satisfaction of “religious needs” is set aside in favour of the
pursuit “Catholic politics” (Ponderings X, § 47). Heidegger’s reference to the “char-
acter” of “the ‘Catholic’” goes beyond the common sense of the word and its cor-
responding ontic category. Heidegger continues by stating that “the Catholic” takes
the form of “Jesuitism”, which, like National Socialism, propagates a model of
“rigorous decisiveness of ‘organization’ and the mastery of propaganda [...]” and of
“the glorification of the will and martial rigour”. There is no reason to be surprized
that the recurring themes of propaganda and organization, as elements of National
Socialism, are also ascribed by Heidegger to a modality of Catholicism that having
forgotten the satisfaction of “religious needs”, turns its attention to political objec-
tives. The word “catholic” in fact names a new category: the “essence of Catholicism”,
or of “the catholic” is “not to be found in the Christian, nor in the Church as such –
for καθόλον means – dominion over the whole – over the ‘totality’” (§ 47). It is
precisely the use of this word – “the ‘totality’” – that helps us determine what
Heidegger means by “the essence of the Catholicism”.
This calls for a further reference to Contributions, and in particular to section § 14:
“Every ‘total’ posture that claims to determine and regulate every kind of action and
thinking must unavoidably reckon as oppositional and even demeaning everything
that presumes to go beyond this [totality] to claim its own necessity”.17 Take note that
according to Heidegger it would be erroneous to assume that these Catholics were
motivated by “religious needs” (Ponderings X, § 47). And he adds: “So domains of
future decision are once again merely covered up – but ‘the catholic’ was never, and
least of all in the ‘Christian’ Middle Ages, a wellspring of shape-giving struggle for
the sake of being” (§ 47). Further correspondence with section § 14 of Contributions
17
Ibid. § 14 “Philosophy and Worldview”, p. 40. English translation, p. 28 (mod. B.R.).
may be noted: “It should come as no surprise that, even though they are incompatible,
total political faith as well as total Christian faith are nevertheless engaged in adjust-
ment and tactics. For they share the same way of being. Because of their total posture,
total political belief and total Christian faith are based upon renouncing decisions.
Their struggle is not a creative one but rather ‘propaganda’ and ‘apologetics’”.18
In this context, it becomes evident what Heidegger means by the concepts of
“catholic”, “Christian” (in character, or comportment), and therefore his concep-
tion of the incompatibility of belief and of politics – of whatever persuasion.
Furthermore, the “shape-giving struggle” that Heidegger mentions in Ponderings X
(§ 47) and in section § 14 of Contributions, remains completely alien to the “essence
of Catholicism”. This “shape-giving struggle” is negated by “propaganda” and
refused all public discussion.
The “old Christian-Catholic apologetics”, which “renounces in advance any kind
of questioning”, brings about an extreme construction of egoist selfhood; it under-
mines all attempts to elucidate the question and it repels all effort to bring about a
“decision”. Through its obstructive agenda it furthers a species of “idle talk” that is
“just the echo of equally superficial ‘National Socialist philosophy’” (Ponderings X,
§ 59). The noise of this ungrounded talk may be ascribed to the “sacrifice of thought”.
Thus the German people are led to abstain from essential decisions, to abstain from
thinking and from poeticizing because these constitute a danger to be avoided. For
concerted questioning could well demonstrate its superiority over the long-success-
ful practice of a closeness to life defined by its functionality and efficacy.
The Germans are “not prepared to seek their ground in the midst of such danger”
(§ 59). But what is the ownmost of the Germans? “Who” are “we”? What does “the
people” designate, what calls a people into being? Questions upon questions that arise
out of section § 59, which only become comprehensible in the light of section § 1919
of Contributions. Otherwise it becomes difficult to interpret two passages in which
Heidegger claims that “the decision of the Occident can never be engaged within a
domain dominated by the refusal of decision – which is to say, within the dominion of
the Judeo-Hellenistic ‘world’ as the realm of the already-decided”; and that “all
‘blood’ and ‘race’ and each and every ‘folk community’ are all in vain, blindly run-
ning their course of expiration, unless attuned to a wager for the sake of being [...]”.
To follow up on the question of the “we”, therefore, calls for coming back in clari-
fication to the question of the “self”:
“This self-mindfulness has left all ‘subjectivity’ behind, including that which is most dan-
gerously hidden in the cult of ‘personality’. [...] And does one want to ground the ability to
say I biologically? [...] Self-mindfulness as grounding selfhood occurs outside the doctrines
just mentioned”.20
The question of “who we are”, Heidegger writes, is subjected to dangerous

obstruction when the question, under the dominion of subjectivism, has already
18
Ibid. p. 41. English translation, p. 29.
19
See ibid. § 19 “Philosophy (On the Question: Who Are We?)”, pp. 48–54. English translation,
pp. 34–38.
20
Ibid. pp. 52–53. English translation, p. 37.
been decided. Being-a-people does not properly allow itself to be derived from the
Hellenistic-Judaic tradition nor from a biologically understood membership in an
ethnic community. Both approaches are inadequate, and in consequence the danger
expressed in the posing of the question has to be met by integrating this question
into the fundamental question, which is, “how does beyng hold sway”?21 For this
reason, neither the biological question concerning race, nor yet the religious tradi-
tion, are by any means sufficient even to pose the question of “who are we?”. The
Greeks alone were the only ones to defy the danger posed by the question itself
“because they dared to determine their being out of being” (Ponderings X, § 59).
The paramount import of this passage is that Heidegger decisively repudiates the
possibility of the self-determination of selfhood based on coincidental factors, be
they of biological or ethnic-religious provenance.
Heidegger’s confessio or admission concerning his underestimation of the
“Movement” follows promptly: “In purely ‘metaphysical’ terms (which is to say, in
beyng-historical regard), in the years 1930–1934, I took National Socialism to rep-
resent the possibility of a crossing into the other inception and gave it this signifi-
cance” (Ponderings X, § 53). This interpretation was in fact mistaken. In the
perspective of Heidegger’s project of the history of being, certainly, any subsequent
inclination to correlate this history and political questions would be fully and com-
prehensively resisted. At an earlier point, this faulty interpretation was called an
“error”. Clearly this interpretation stands in relation to the early stages of National
Socialism and only in regard to the then current state of the university as the sole site
of a hope soon succeeded by disenchantment. The point is not to offer an interpreta-
tive key. We remain faithful to the context of § 53, however, inasmuch as it records
not only the time-period of this misconception, but also the locality it involved –
which is to say, the university as a site founded in essential knowing. Other path-
ways and perspectives of interpretation, in view of their frugal use of the source
texts, may allow themselves free reign.
Clearly this misconception had to be acknowledged as such. It combines with
another – that is, Heidegger’s forsaken hope that his efforts could be serviceable
to the founding of an originary way of knowing in the university. None of this
bore much fruit since the university had abandoned “genuine knowing” to posit
science as the basis of culture. This process is accounted the work of the “empty
arrogance” of un-essential (or de-natured) “intellectuals”, who neither know “nor
[are] capable of knowing anything of essential knowledge”. Not by accident does
Heidegger return to the topic of his self-deception in this statement: “An addi-
tional misconception was the opinion that the university could still be transformed
into a site of mindfulness, a site of essential contention, returning Occidental
knowing to its own questionableness in order to help prepare another beginning of
the history of being”. The use of word “misconception (Täuschung)” in reference
to Heidegger’s relation to National Socialism, and then in regard to the university,
clarifies how this mis-conception is tied to the fundamental issue of the preserva-
tion of essential knowing and the possibility of its founding. In the lack of this
21
essential condition, National Socialism and the university still remain dependent
on a ground, which is nothing other than “the ground of their incapacity”. The
mutual rapprochement of the historical actuality of National Socialism and the
university – the two are bound together by the same (self-), deception – is still
more clearly expressed in conclusion to section § 53: “On this basis, the construct
of ‘science’, evaluated in terms of the university as well as in terms of historical
reality, is a pure ‘phantom’”.
The guiding thread that links section § 53 and § 55 consists in Heidegger’s obser-
vations on the complete lack of essential knowing: “By this measure, the entire
business of philosophy, especially that of ‘National Socialism’, remains outside the
realm of essential knowing. That does not prevent this bustling enterprise from
seeking to establish its validity and social status by means of its unbridled, noisy,
and predatory ‘literature’ [...]”.
3.2 “ Modern Humanity” Compared to the “Humanity

of the Future”
This division of the text, concerned with Heidegger’s references setting “modern
humanity” in opposition to “future humanity”, will consider all passages that could
lead to misunderstanding when torn out of context.
The relevant concepts are as follows: “desolation (Verwüstung)”, “deracination
(Entwurzelung)”, “generality (Vergemeinerung)”, “destruction (Zerstörung)”,
“blood (Blut)”, “race (Rasse)”, “calculability (Rechenhaftigkeit)”, “ground or native
soil (Boden)”, “enemy (Feind)”, “godless (Gottlosen)”, “Jewry (Judentum)”, “Jews
(Juden)”, “worldlessness (Weltlosigkeit)”, “worldless (Weltlos)”, and “not-ownmost
(Unwesen)”.
Treatment of these questions is all the trickier inasmuch as the Afterword of the
German editor of volume GA 95 is responsible for a significant misunderstanding
in regard to the word “Judentum (Jewry)” as used in section § 5 of the Ponderings
VIII. In this context, he writes: “The background of these comments on ‘Jewry’ as
well as the interpretation of everyday life under National Socialism is clearly con-
stituted by Heidegger’s thinking as known to us from his being-historical treatise,
‘Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)’ (GA 65, 1936–1938), which was
composed at the same time”.22 This excerpt of the German editor subsequently
mentions four other works of Heidegger. Nevertheless, it seems at this time appro-
priate to me to take just Contributions into account. In any case, the aforemen-
tioned German editor obviously betrays the fact that he is not at all familiar with
this text, for the passages in volumes GA 94 and GA 95, which document refer-
ences of Contributions to the Ponderings, are without any relation whatsoever,
stated or implied, to matters of National Socialism or the Jewish question. We
demonstrate this in the fourth chapter of this book, Concerning Certain Unpublished
22
Trawny P. Nachwort des Herausgebers (Editor’s Afterword): See Heidegger M. (2014b), p. 452
(our translation).
Letters Received by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann.23 What followed from this

catastrophic misunderstanding and its subsequent instrumentalization by the
German editor – and here we draw directly on Heidegger’s words – was irrespon-
sible, a “gigantic stage-show” designed to propagate the opinion in the mass media
that Heidegger’s philosophy were “contaminated” by being-historical anti-Semi-
tism since the time of composition of the Contributions. Insofar as these notions of
the German editor are not substantiated in Heidegger’s texts, they have become a
fons iniquitatis, a wellspring of a world of injustice, which facilitates the prolifera-
tion of still more “misunderstandings”. That a trace of this kind of unsupported
misunderstanding remains inscribed in the Afterword of the volume in question is
a scandal.

§ 56 [75–76], S. 52: § 56 [75–76]:
In welcher Weise und in welcher Absicht dürfen In what way and to what end should we of
wir heute noch “über” die Künste nachdenken? today think “about” the arts? Inasmuch as we
Indem wir fragen, ob nicht gewagt werden ask, if we should not take the risk – without
muß – ohne den Kunstbetrieb dem “Seienden” reference to the art business – of opening
sich einmal auszusetzen und so die ourselves just once to “beings”, thus to bring
Vordergründlichkeit alles “Erlebens” in seiner the superficiality of all “enliving”, in its
Aufspreizung ins Licht der Besinnung zu heben expansive flourishing, into the light of
und alle, die sich durch Beteiligung am mindfulness; and thereby to expose all of
Kunstbetrieb eine Beschäftigung und eine those who give themselves importance by
Bestätigung geben – auch die Kunsthistoriker –, means of their participation in the art
in ihrer Zufälligkeit und Verlassenheit von jeder business – including the art historians – to a
Not bloßzustellen. Ob nicht dieses Wagnis in sense of their own fortuitousness and their
die Nähe des Seyns zwingt und allen absence of distress. Could such a wager
Kulturbetrieb in Frage stellt? In Wahrheit strebt compel us to enter into the nearness of beyng
dieser genau dasselbe an, was in seiner Weise and put the entire art business into question?
der bodenlose “Kulturbolschewismus” In truth, this business aspires to exactly the
befördert, und was einstmals notwendige Wege same thing as promoted by rootless “cultural
waren auf einem bestimmten und begrenzten Bolshevism” in its fashion. And what was
und zum Untergang (d. h. zur Größe) once a way, defined by its own necessity, and
berufenen Gang, das sind jetzt in sich gerundete limited by its mission and the course it had to
Ziele und “Werte” als Gelegenheiten, sich den run to its going-under – that is, on its own
geschichtlichen Entscheidungen zu entziehen path of greatness – is now a self-conceived
und lediglich den Menschen als Subjektum zu goal and a “value” designed to avoid
sichern. Weil der Schritt dazu im Wesen der historical decisions and to secure humanity
Neuzeit liegt, ausdrücklich aber erstmals im 19. as a subject, and nothing more. Because this
Jahrhundert in der ganzen Breite der process is inherent in the essence of
historischen Veranstaltung der Geschichte modernity, although in its full extension as the
unternommen wurde, muß auch eine Zeit – | historical organization of historicity it was
und zwar sehr bald – sich einstellen, in der das originally introduced as the express work of
20. Jahrhundert zur Verteidigung gerade des 19. the 19th century, the time will very soon be
Jahrhunderts sich entschließen muß. Ohne diese upon us when the 20th century will have to
würde das 20. seine vordergründlichen decide whether or not to defend the nineteenth
Veranstaltungen und Vorhaben mißdeuten und century. For otherwise the 20th century will
verkennen. misinterpret and misconceive its own
[...] superficial self-presentation.
[...]
23
See infra, Chapter Four, Endnote 9.

§ 71 [110–111], S. 73–74: § 71 [110–111]:
Eine Hemmung – nicht aber eine Gefahr – An inhibition – although not a danger – to the
könnte bald für das Denken des Seyns dadurch thinking of beyng could soon assume
sich breitmachen, daß die “Erde” und was zu widespread proportions inasmuch as the
ihr gehört zum Gegenstand der “Philosophie” “earth” and what belongs to it is declared an
erklärt wird; daß Goethes Naturbezug zum object of “philosophy” – and that Goethe’s
Leitfaden einer Philosophiegelehrsamkeit relation to nature is reduced to a matter of
herabsinkt. philosophical research and erudition.
Diese “geistige” Durchdringung der “Natur” ist This “spiritual” permeation of “nature” sows
beirrender als jede Art des rohen “biologischen” more confusion than any kind of crude
Deutens, dessen Rechenhaftigkeit sogleich an “biological” thinking, for its calculative
den Tag kommt. Jene Hemmung wird aber accounting quickly comes to light. Yet this
durch die herrschende “Erlebnis”-sucht fast suspension of thinking is practically called
herbeigerufen und sie wird in dem, was man into play by the governing addiction to
“das Leben” nennt, die unmittelbare “enliving”, which will always find an
Bestätigung und Bekräftigung ihrer unmediated confirmation and reassertion of
Scheinwahrheit finden. (Vgl. ob. Schelling, 86 its semblance of truth in what one calls life
ff.). Die Gefahr droht der Erde selbst, weil (see above, Schelling, pp. 86ff). The earth
solche Art ihrer Vergeistigung eine Form der itself is put into danger because this mode of
Verwüstung darstellt, die unmittelbar gar nicht sublimation represents a form of desolation
aufzuhalten ist, weil sie vom herrschenden that cannot, directly, be contained because the
Menschenwesen zu dessen eigener Sicherung dominant character of humanity institutes and
eingerichtet und befördert wird. furthers it in service of its own self-securing.
Wiederum liegt geschichtlich all dem weit In the perspective of historicity, what
voraus, was Hölderlin “die Erde” nennt und was Hölderlin calls “the earth” is far advanced
nur historisch verdeutlicht ist, wenn wir es mit beyond all this, and in historical terms one
der “Gäa” zusammenbringen. Geschichtlich – d. can only clarify it by bringing it into relation
h. den künftigen Menschen tragend – kann die to “Gaia”. The earth can only enter into its
Erde nur werden, wenn der Mensch zuvor in die historicity – thereby granting future humanity
Wahrheit des Seyns gestoßen ist und ihm aus its supporting ground – when humanity has
dem | Erdenken des Seyns die Götter und er already been thrust into the truth of beyng and
selbst in die Stätte des Kampfes um ihre enthinking of beyng becomes the site of
Bestimmung eingehen, aus welchem Kampf erst contention out of which the gods and
die Welt aufblitzt und die Erde ihr Dunkel humanity receive their determination; for of
zurückgewinnt. this differentiating confrontation a world
flashes-forth and the earth recovers the shelter
of its darkness.

§ 75 [115–121], S. 77–80: § 75 [115–121]:
“Naturverbundenheit”. – Allenthalben, auf “Love of nature”: everywhere, in different ways,
verschiedenen Wegen, wechselnder Ausdauer changing in constancy, human beings today seek
verlangt den heutigen Menschen nach dem and demand “the real” – or perhaps this
“Wirklichen” oder dieses Verlangen wird ihm inclination is implanted, one is talked into it by
von Einigen eingefühlt und aufgeredet. Dieses certain others. This inclination could indicate a
Verlangen könnte einen Vorgang anzeigen, auf course of events on the surface of which people
dessen Oberfläche der heutige Mensch sich of today make their way, without recognizing
fortbewegt, ohne die Ebene seines Weges als this path as the surface level of something else.
Oberfläche eines Anderen zu erkennen. Es It could be like that, but everything else suggests
könnte so sein, aber alles andere deutet dafür, that it is not. What remains confused above all is
daß es nicht so ist. Vor allem bleibt verworren, what we are to understand by the reality of the
was denn die Wirklichkeit des “Wirklichen” “real”, if and how it measurably presents itself.
sein soll, ob und wie sie maßstäblich sich What this names, and what one seeks to find
anbietet. Was man unter diesem Namen sucht, would have to be the opposite of what one flees
muß ja wohl das Gegenteilige dessen sein, as the unreal. And again the question arises, if
was man als das Unwirkliche flieht. Und the “unreal” is not appraised as such because the
wieder ist zu fragen, ob nicht das reality of the real has not been decided.
“Unwirkliche” so eingeschätzt wird, weil [...]
über die Wirklichkeit nicht entschieden ist. And yet – what is given with this “love of
[...] nature” and its management? The woods and the
Und dennoch – wie steht es mit dieser brook, the mountain and the meadow, the winds
“Naturverbundenheit” und ihrer Einrichtung? and the sky, the sea and the island are taken
Den Wald und den Bach, den Berg und die today as an excuse for distraction, a means of
Wiese, die Lüfte und den Himmel, das Meer relaxation, as an objective means of recreation
und die Insel nimmt der Mensch jetzt als that has its regulated forms of organization and
Ablenkungsanlaß, als Beruhigungsmittel, als its necessary amenities. At best, we take nature
Gegenstand seiner Erholungstätigkeit, die ihre as “landscape”, which we encounter in the course
festen Betriebsformen und beanspruchten of a short excursion or in quick passage. Perhaps
Einrichtungen hat. Wenn es hochkommt, it will remain in fading memory as a topic of
nimmt der Mensch das Genannte als conversation. Nowadays we may also seize upon
“Landschaft”, die er bei kurzem Aufenthalt the landscape, incited by historical and ethnic
oder auf der eiligen Durchfahrt sich zur and pre-historical curiosity, by our obsession
Kenntnis bringt und vielleicht als späteren with comparing everything with everything, and
Unter-|haltungsstoff in sein Gedächtnis so opine oneself superior to those who simply
verstaut. Neuerdings überfällt der Mensch die enjoy nature. Compounding the two leads to the
Landschaften außerdem mit seiner conceit – on the basis of this perhaps slanted
historischen und volkskundlichen und capacity for enjoyment and our historical
prähistorischen Neugier und observations – henceforth to belong to the rooted
Vergleichungssucht und meint sich so jenem ones and to be contributors to our common
bloßen Naturgenuß überlegen. Beides rootedness. [...]
gemischt bewirkt die Einbildung, nunmehr auf
Grund dieser vielleicht noch ungeraden [?]
Genußfähigkeit und der historischen
Kenntnisse zu den Bodenständigen zu
gehören und an der Erzeugung der
Bodenständigkeit mitzuwirken. [...]
Wer ahnt die Entwurzelung der letzten Who has an intimation of the deracination of
spärlichsten Wachstümer, die es noch gab? Wer the last meagre growths that lately still were?
will überhaupt ahnen, daß hier etwas vor sich Who even wants to see that there is something
geht, was vollends mißdeutet wäre, wollte man happening here that would be completely
es nur als einen Verlust der “guten alten Zeit” misunderstood were it simply accounted in regret
feststellen, berechnend bedauern. Die of the loss of “the good old days”? The
Furchtbarkeit dieses nach außen vergnüglichen dreadfulness of this organization of nature, so
Naturbetriebs ist erst dann begriffen, wenn wir | pleasant to external view, can only be grasped
sie ohne Gefühlsschwärmerei zurückdenken in when we, without rhapsodies of emotion, think it
jenen Vorgang der Seinsverlassenheit des through to its provenance in the abandonment of
Seienden, der seine Eigenmacht in der the being of beings, which unfolds its proper
Riesenhaftigkeit und Rücksichtslosigkeit des power in gigantism and the ruthlessness of its
Vordringens der Berechnung und des Betriebs calculative encroachments in service of utility.
entfaltet. Dieses ist das Wirkliche, das This is the real that no-one sees, and no-one
niemand sieht und keiner sehen will; weil diese wants to see. For these progressives of the new
Fortschrittlichen der neuen Zeit im Grunde am epoch cling most ferociously of all to
zähesten am mißdeuteten Alten hängen und die misconceptions of what was. They are the actual
eigentlichen “Romantiker” sind; wer wie sie die “romantics”. Those who grasp the historicity of
Geschichte historisch und nur so nimmt, history, historically and only historically, as they
vermag auch in der eigenen Gegenwart und do, will be the least capable of experiencing their
hier am meisten das “Wirkliche” nicht zu own present, and still less “the real” of the
erfahren. present.

§ 4 [8–9], S. 96–97: § 4 [8–9]:
[...] [...]
Im Geschichtslosen kommt dasjenige, was In the domain of the ahistorical, all that which
nur innerhalb seiner zusammengehört, auch belongs only within this domain most easily
am ehesten in die Einheit der völligen finds its commonality and unity with everything
Vermischung; das scheinbare Aufbauen und else of its kind in one comprehensive
Erneuern und die völlige Zerstörung – intermixture. The semblance of construction and
beides ist dasselbe – Bodenlose – dem nur renewal, and complete destruction – both are
Seienden Verfallene und dem Seyn one and the same: groundless and uprooted –
Entfremdete. Sobald das | Geschichtslose forfeited to beings and alienated from beyng. As
sich “durchgesetzt” hat, beginnt die soon as ahistoricity has made its “break-through
Zügellosigkeit des “Historismus” –; das and imposed itself”, “historicism”, rampant and
Bodenlose in den verschiedensten und unrestrained, sets to work: groundlessness in
gegensätzlichsten Gestalten gerät – ohne sich the most varied and contradictory forms –
als gleichen Unwesens zu erkennen – in die unable to recognize the commonality of their
äußerste Feindschaft und Zerstörungssucht. refusal of what is ownmost – are caught up in
Und vielleicht “siegt” in diesem “Kampf”, in the most extreme animosity and frenzy of
dem um die Ziellosigkeit schlechthin destruction.
gekämpft wird und der daher nur das Zerrbild And perhaps the “victory” in this “struggle”,
des “Kampfes” sein kann, die größere which is the battle for the sake of
Bodenlosigkeit, die an nichts gebunden, alles purposelessness itself, and therefore no more
sich dienstbar macht (das Judentum). Aber than a distorted imitation of “struggle”, will go
der eigentliche Sieg, der Sieg der Geschichte to the greater rootlessness – which not being
über das Geschichtslose wird nur dort bound to anything, makes everything serviceable
errungen, wo das Bodenlose sich selbst to itself (Jewry). But genuine victory, the
ausschließt, weil es das Seyn nicht wagt, victory of historicity over the ahistorical can
sondern immer nur mit dem Seienden rechnet only be achieved where the uprooted excludes
und seine Berechnungen als das Wirkliche itself because it does not venture beyng, solely
setzt. and always reckoning with beings and positing
its accounting as the real.

§ 5 [9], S. 97: § 5 [9]:
Eine der verstecktesten Gestalten des Riesigen und One of the most concealed and perhaps
vielleicht die älteste ist die zähe Geschicklichkeit des oldest forms of the gigantic is the
Rechnens und Schiebens und tenacious dexterity in calculating,
Durcheinandermischens, wodurch die Weltlosigkeit hustling, and interblending through
des Judentums gegründet wird. which the worldlessness of Jewry is
grounded.

§ 39 [108], S. 161: § 39 [108]:
Das völkische Prinzip zeigt sich in seiner The gigantic, modern significance of the
riesigen neuzeitlichen Bedeutung, wenn man es principle of ethnicity becomes manifest when
als Abwandlung und Nachkommenschaft der it is grasped as the progeny and modification
Herrschaft der Soziologie der Gesellschaft of the dominion of the sociological study of
begriffen hat. Ist es Zufall, daß der society. Is it by accident that National
Nationalsozialismus die “Soziologie” als Name Socialism has decreed the eradication of the
ausgemerzt hat? Warum wurde die Soziologie name of “sociology”? Why was sociology
mit Vorliebe von Juden und Katholiken pursued with passion by Jews and Catholics?
betrieben?

§ 48 [118–119], S. 168–169: § 48 [118–119]:
Descartes. – Der Angriff auf Descartes, d. h. das Descartes. The attack on Descartes, which is
seiner metaphysischen Grundstellung gemäße to say, a counter-questioning appropriate to
Entgegenfragen aus einer grundsätzlichen his fundamental metaphysical position based
Überwindung der Metaphysik, kann nur aus dem on the ground-laying overcoming of
Fragen der Seinsfrage vollzogen werden. Der metaphysics, can only be carried out by
erste Angriff solcher Art ist versucht in “Sein und asking the question of being. The first attack
Zeit” (1927). Er hat mit der vormaligen und of this kind is attempted in Being and Time
nachmaligen “Kritik” des “Cartesianismus” (1927). It has nothing in common with
nichts gemein. Dieser Angriff setzt durch die previous and subsequent “critique” of
Wahl des Gegners diesen erst in seine “Cartesianism”. By way of the choice of this
unantastbare Größe innerhalb der Geschichte des opponent, the attack first affirms the opponent
abendländischen Denkens. Dieser Angriff weiß, in his indisputable greatness in the history of
daß mit “Widerlegungen” hier nichts auszurichten Occidental thinking. This attack recognizes
ist, daß vielmehr durch die Ursprünglichkeit des that nothing in this realm can be achieved by
Angriffs der Angegriffene erst recht in seine “refutations”. Rather this, that by the
geschichtliche Unerschütterbarkeit zu stehen primordiality of the attack the one who is
kommt und deshalb immer weniger als “erledigt” attacked comes all the more to stand in his
gelten kann, wenn anders dem Abendland noch being-historical unshakability, and therefore
eine Zukunft des denkerischen Fragens all the less can he be accounted as “finished”,
aufbehalten bleibt. Daher hat dieser Angriff given that the Occident is still granted a future
(obzwar er seitdem von Juden und of thoughtful questioning. Therefore this
Nationalsozialisten gleich stark ausgebeutet attack (although since exploited without
wird, ohne doch in seinem Wesenskern begriffen understanding of its core essence by Jews and
zu sein) keine Gemeinschaft mit den jetzt ins National Socialists) does not share anything
Kraut schießenden dummdreisten Bekrittelungen with the now mushrooming, petty brazenness
Descartes’ aus “völkisch-politischen” of fault-finding directed against Descartes
Gesichtspunkten durch übereifrige und noch from “ethno-political” perspectives – and this
lehrstuhllose Privat-|dozenten “der Philosophie”. by super-keen, untenured professors of
Auch ist es unnötig, wie manche es gern sehen “philosophy”. Moreover, it is unnecessary, as
möchten, sich öffentlich gegen solche some would dearly like to see, to publicly set
Schriftstellereien abzusetzen. oneself apart from such literary productions.
Überlegungen ix Ponderings ix
§ 81 [104–105], S. 247–248: § 81 [104–105]:
Nietzsche – verkannte, daß seine Umkehrung des Nietzsche – misjudged how his reversal of
Platonismus, d. h. die Ansetzung “des” Lebens Platonism, that is, the posit “of” life as exclusive
als der ausschließlichen Grundwirklichkeit, die fundamental reality, which also invalidates the
auch Unterscheidbarkeit von Diesseits und distinction of this-worldly and other-worldly,
Jenseits hinfällig macht, im Grunde seiner basically had to work against his innermost intent
innersten Absicht auf den höheren, as directed toward a higher, well-formed human
wohlgeratenen Menschen (die großen being (the great exemplars). For with this posit,
Exemplare) entgegenarbeiten mußte; denn mit the collective reality of the living and the
jener Ansetzung ist die Massenhaftigkeit des life-drive as such is justified; the
Lebenden und seines Lebensdranges an sich acknowledgement of this reality as the ground
gerechtfertigt; die Anerkennung derselben als and source of resistance for individuals is simply
Boden und Widerstand für den Einzelnen aber a semblance, because the individuals themselves
ist nur ein Schein, weil die Einzelnen selbst | sich will quickly come to identify themselves solely as
alsbald nur als Beauftragte des “Lebens”, und d. the delegated of “life” – and that means, engage
h. für die Massen und deren Wohl und Glück, themselves for the masses, their well-being, and
wissen können. Ihrem eigenen Willen bleibt nur their happiness. The individual will endures only
das Echo “des Lebens” und seiner Steigerung, as the echo “of life” and its intensification, and
und jeder “Lebende” wird als solcher den every “living being”, as such, will register a claim
Anspruch auf Lebensrecht anmelden und der to the rights of life and the increase of these
wachsende Anspruch wird “das Leben” steigern. claims will enhance and accelerate “life”.
§ 84 [108], S. 249: § 84 [108]:
[...] [...]
Die Vieldeutigkeit und willkürliche Bedeutung The ambiguity and arbitrary significance of
solcher Namen (Glauben, Wissen, such names (belief, knowledge, science,
Wissenschaft, Kultur und so fort) ist schon kein culture, and so on) no longer indicate merely
bloßes Schwanken mehr innerhalb eines in sich the interplay of meaning within a well-
gegründeten Bedeutungsspielraumes – (sofern grounded realm of signification (inasmuch as
alle Sprache ursprünglich diese Ausschläge der all language primordially possesses and gives
Bedeutung als Wesenskraft besitzt und kein play, in its ownmost, to these oscillations of
Zeichensystem und gar ein “genormtes” sein sense, and can never be a system of signs and
kann), sondern das Anzeichen einer still less a standardized one) – but rather are an
Entwurzelung der Wahrheit des Seyns – falls indication of the deracination of the truth of
je schon eine Verwurzelung im Seyn selbst beyng, given that such rooted stand in beyng
bestand –; die Folge davon, daß “Sprache” und has ever been. In consequence, “language” and
“Denken”, “Begriff” und Vorstellung “thought”, “concept” and representation, have
psychologisch-biologisch zu Mitteln der been externalized, reduced to psycho-
Einrichtung der Lebensbewältigung biological means of the organization of life
herabgesunken und veräußerlicht sind. Nicht, and its coping mechanisms. Not, that one
daß man sich nicht “einigen” kann auf cannot “agree” on essential goals and their
wesentliche Ziele und deren begründete reasoned constitution (Satzung), but that
Satzung, sondern daß überhaupt der perspectives of experience concerning beings,
Erfahrungsblick auf das Seiende verwirrt und as such, are not only confused, but that this
diese Verwirrung als gefahrlos ausgegeben ist, confusion is passed off as harmless; for utility
da der unmittelbare Nutzen Jegliches in all matters in and for itself justifies
rechtfertigt und der “Schaden” und der everything, while the “harm done” and the
“Fehlgriff” als solcher nicht berechnet wird. “false conception” of things is not itself taken
into account.
§ 91 [116–117], S. 254–258: § 91 [116–117]:
Nietzsche – die entscheidende Überwindung Nietzsche – the decisive overcoming of
Nietzsches (nicht etwa die immer Nietzsche’s thought (not “refutation”, which
unphilosophische “Widerlegung”) kann nie is always unphilosophical) can never be
unmittelbar durchgeführt werden; sie besteht directly achieved; it rather consists in the
vielmehr in der Erschütterung undermining (denial of ground) of Occidental
(Grundentziehung) | der abendländischen metaphysics as such; and thereby the posit of
Metaphysik als solcher; dadurch wird die “life” as definitive of beings in the whole
Ansetzung “des Lehens” als des Seienden becomes ungrounded – because “beings” in
bodenlos – weil das “Seiende” überhaupt den their totality lose their primacy.
Vorrang verliert. [...]
[...]
§ 92 [123], S. 258: § 92 [123]:
Man findet es befremdlich, daß die Besinnung auf One finds it disconcerting that mindful reflection
ein ganz Anderes hinausfragen könnte, auf das can be directed to something quite different, toward
Sein und seine Wahrheit und deren Gründung being and its truth and its grounded founding and
und Grundlosigkeit – so daß Besinnung als its groundlessness; and thus, that mindfulness as
Selbst-besinnung nichts zu tun hätte mit einer being-mindful need not concern itself with the
Begutachtung der Erlebnishintergründe; die Form assessment of the conditions of enliving. This form
dieser Zergliederung ist geblieben, auch nachdem of self-dissection endures even after Jewish
man die jüdische “Psychoanalyse” vorgeschoben “psychoanalysis” came to be given prominence.
hat. Diese Form muß bleiben, solange man sich This form of self-dissection will endure as long as
als Erlebnismensch nicht selbst aufgibt. Solange one refuses to abandon one-self as a being of
aber ist Besinnung im denkerischen Sinne enliving. But even so long does mindfulness in the
unmöglich. realm of thought remain impossible.
§ 14 [10], S. 282: § 14 [10]:
Denker – ist jener, der eine die Wahrheit des A thinker – is one who so casts a question
Seyns wagende Frage ohne den möglichen wagering the truth of beyng – without
Anhalt an einem Widerhall so zwischen die sich possibility of supporting echo – into the midst
fortwälzende Neugier der immer Fraglosen of the perpetual curiosity of the ever-
wirft, daß sie in sich stehen bleibt als ein unquestioning that it stands in itself like an
ragender Abgrund inmitten des Gut abysmal pillar in the midst of those
Errechneten, geschickt Gestützten und supposedly rooted ones and all they account
gemeinten Bodenständigen. to be good and solidly supported.
§ 15 [10–11], S. 282: § 15 [10–11]:
Die Kennzeichnung von Stein, Tier und The definition of stone, animal, and human
Mensch durch die Art des Weltbezugs (vgl. being based on their respective modes of
Vorlesung 1929/30) ist im Frageansatz world-relation (see GA 29/30) is to be retained
festzuhalten und dennoch unzureichend. Die as perspective of questioning and nonetheless it
Schwierigkeit hängt in der Bestimmung des is insufficient. The problem lies with the
Tieres als “Weltarm” – trotz der determination of the animal as “world-poor” –
vorbehaltenden Einschränkungen des even despite reservations restricting the concept
Begriffes “Armut”; nicht: weltlos, weltarm, of “poor”. Therefore, not worldless, world-
weltbildend, sondern: feld- und weltlos, / poor, world-forming, but rather: worldless and
feldbenommen-weltlos, / und weltbildend- without environing field; worldless and
erderschließend / sind die angemesseneren benumbed within an environing field; world-
Fassungen | der Fragebezirke. Dabei verlangt shaping and earth-disclosive – are more
die Kennzeichnung des “Steins” als feld- und appropriate formulations. The designation of the
weltlos zugleich und zuvor die eigene “stone” as worldless and without environing
“positive” Bestimmung. Aber wie ist diese field, nevertheless, also requires its own
anzusetzen? Doch von der “Erde” her – dann “positive” and prior determination. But what is
aber vollends gar aus “Welt”. our starting point to be? Indeed, beginning with
the “earth”, but then all the more from out of a
“world”.
Überlegungen x Ponderings X
§ 39 [59], S. 312: § 39 [59]:
[...] [...]
Hierbei ist nicht gedacht an die erst diesem We are not thinking of the subsequent,
Vorgang nachträglichen gelehrten Erneuerungen learned renewals of Hegel’s philosophy,
der hegelschen Philosophie und Nachmachungen and the imitation of Nietzsche’s doctrines
nietzschescher Gedanken und Stellungnahmen – and positions, which followed on this
sondern gerade die gemeingeistige – alltäglich- process, but rather of a common attitude of
öffentliche Vorstellung und Wertung des Seienden spirit – the everyday-public representation
wird – ohne daß es zu einem Wissen davon zu and valuation of beings, which passes
kommen braucht – von jener Vollendung der without needing to be explicitly
Metaphysik getragen. Die verborgen conceptualized – through which this
geschichtliche Kraft ihrer untergründigen consummation of metaphysics is
Zusammengehörigkeit aber ist die Metaphysik von actualized. The concealed historical power
Leibniz – freilich in der Form der groben und that underlies their commonality of thought
weitmaschigen Vergemeinerung, die ihr seit is the metaphysics of Leibniz, admittedly
Herder und Goethe zuteil wurde. Die Vollendung in the form of the crude and broad
der abendländischen Metaphysik ist deshalb eine generalizations through which it has been
durch und durch deutsche Notwendigkeit, in der represented since Herder and Goethe. For
Descartes sowohl wie der Platonismus und this reason, the consummation of
Aristotelismus des Abendlandes und damit die Occidental metaphysics is a thoroughly
geistigen Bereiche des Mittelalters und des German necessity, in which Descartes, as
neuzeitlichen Kulturchristentums zu einem letzten well as Platonism and the Aristotelianism
Anlauf des metaphysischen Denkens of the Occident – and as such, the spiritual
zusammengeschlossen sind. domains of the Middle Ages and the
cultural Christianity of modernity are
united in the last onset of metaphysical
thought.
§ 44 [74], S. 322: § 44 [74]:
Solange das Wesen des Menschen durch die As long as the ownmost of humanity is
Tierheit (animalitas) vorbestimmt bleibt, kann predetermined by animality (animalitas) we
immer nur gefragt werden, was der Mensch can only ask what the human being is. The
sei. Nie ist die Frage möglich: wer der Mensch question – who is the human? – can never be
sei? Denn diese Wer-frage ist als Frage schon asked. For this Who-question is already, as a
die ursprünglich andere und einzigartige question, the primordially other and unique
Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Menschen – answer to the question concerning the human.
dieses Fragen selbst setzt den Menschen in The question itself posits the human being in
seinem Wesen an als die Inständigkeit in der its ownmost as steadfast in the truth of beyng.
Wahrheit des Seyns. Sie ist jene Frage nach It is the form of the question concerning the
dem Menschen, die nicht etwa nur über ihn human that does not, for example, pass beyond
hinaus fragt nach seiner Ursache und to seek a cause and such matters. The question,
dergleichen, sondern die überhaupt nicht nach rather, does not ask about the human being, for
ihm, des Menschen wegen fragt, sondern um the sake of the human, at all, but it asks for the
des Seyns willen, da dieses in die Entgegnung sake of beyng; because beyng, in the encounter
zum Menschen als dem Gründer der Wahrheit with human being, dis-places the human being
versetzt. Erst diese Frage überwindet die to become the founding site of truth. This
neuzeitliche anthropologische Bestimmung des question alone overcomes the modern,
Menschen und mit ihr alle voraufgegangene, anthropological determination of human being
christliche hellenistische – jüdische und and therewith all preceding Christian-
sokratisch-platonische Anthropologie. Hellenistic, Jewish and Socratic-Platonic
anthropology.
Überlegungen x Ponderings X
§ 46 [77–78], S. 324: § 46 [77–78]:
Aber auch Nietzsche “denkt” als Künstler und But Nietzsche also “thinks” as an artist, and in
d. h. hier aesthetisch-wagnerisch- this context this means that when he posits
schopenhauerisch, wenn er den “Genius” als “genius” as the purpose of humanity he thinks
Ziel der Menschheit – ansetzt – er bleibt in der aesthetically and in line with Wagner and
Umzäunung der biologischen Metaphysik Schopenhauer. His thought remains confined
hängen und deshalb kann man mit dem gleichen in the enclosure of biological metaphysics,
Recht auf dem Boden dieser Metaphysik auch and in consequence one would be justified,
in der Umkehrung “das Volk” als den Zweck grounded in this metaphysics, but in reversal
seiner selbst ansetzen – beides ist “dasselbe” – of his thesis, to posit “the people” as its own
und erst damit erreichen wir den Bereich, von goal; the two are “the same”. And therefore
dem das nur zunächst vordergründlich we enter a domain from which cultural
genommene Kulturtreiben | stets und einzig production – in the first instance grasped
seine Begründung empfängt und ohne sein superficially – constantly and solely receives
Wissen die eigentlichen Anstöße: die Herrschaft its grounding justification and without its
der neuzeitlichen Metaphysik in der Endform knowledge, its impulses: that is, the domain of
der Vermenschung des Menschen. Alle the domination of modern metaphysics in its
Kulturpolitik und Kultur der Kultur sind die terminal form as the humanization of
Sklaven dieser ihnen verborgenen Herrschaft humanity. All of cultural politics and
des Subjectum (des Menschen als des education in culture unknowingly remains
historischen Tieres). enslaved to the dominion of the subject (to
humanity as historical animal).
§ 46a [79], S. 325: § 46a [79]:
Jeder Dogmatismus, er sei kirchlich-politisch Every form of dogmatism, be it political and
oder staatspolitisch, hält notwendig jedes von ecclesiastical, or a politics of state, necessarily
ihm scheinbar oder wirklich abweichende conceives all thinking and doing that apparently
Denken und Tun für eine Zustimmung zu dem, or in fact deviates from it as an assent to
was ihm, dem Dogmatismus, der Feind whatever this dogmatism designates as inimical
ist – seien das die Heiden und Gottlosen oder to itself: be it the pagans and the godless, or
die Juden und Kommunisten. In dieser the Jews and the communists. This mode of
Denkweise liegt eine eigentümliche Stärke – thinking possesses a peculiar strength – not of
nicht des Denkens – sondern der thought – but of the implementation of what it
Durchsetzung des Verkündeten. promulgates.
§ 1 [1–5], S. 360–362: § 1 [1–5]:
Der neuzeitliche Mensch hat die Sicherung Modern man made the security of his essence
seines Wesens darauf angelegt, einstmals ein dependent upon one day becoming a component
Teil der Maschine zu werden, damit er im of the machine, so that in service to the
Dienst für die Sachlichkeit und Berechnetheit objectiveness and calculability of this mechanism
ihres Laufens seine mühelose Sicherheit, he might find his effortless security, his
seine Antriebe und seine Lust finde. Dieses motivation and his pleasure. This assimilation of
Sicheinlassen auf das Maschinenwesen ist essence to the essence of the machine is
etwas Wesentlich Anderes als der bloße something fundamentally different from the mere
Gebrauch “technischer” Möglichkeiten; hier use of “technical” possibilities. What is happening
begibt sich die äußerste Anverwandlung des here is the most extreme trans-formation of the
Menschenwesens in die Rechenhaftigkeit nature of humanity in accordance with the
des Seienden. Mit all dem kommt erst der potential for calculability of beings. With this
Geist (d. h. das Verstand- und Rechenhafte the spirit (that is, the rationality and calculative
der Tierheit) zu seiner höchsten Macht; die character of our animality) first assumes its
Herrschaft des Maschinenwesens ist weder greatest degree of power. The dominion of
“Rationalismus” noch “Materialismus” – machine-essence is neither a form of
nicht die Verödung des leeren Verstandes und “rationalism” nor “materialism”: not the
nicht die Heiligung des bloßen Stoffes. desiccation of the mere intellect, nor the
Vielmehr vollzieht sich in dieser sanctification of mere materiality. What really
Anverwandlung an das Maschinenwesen comes to pass in this assimilation to the essence
jenes Sichloslassen in das Seiende, das of the machine is such self-abandonment to
keiner “Bilder” mehr bedarf für einen beings as no longer requires an “image” to give
“Sinn” – weil die Anschaulichkeit sich zur itself a “sense”. The manifest visibility (of beings)
völligen Berechenbarkeit ausgefaltet hat und has transformed itself into comprehensive
in ihr stets gegenwärtig ist, weil der “Sinn” calculability, constantly present and actual in what
in der sich fortzeugenden Plan-|mäßigkeit zu is, for in this way the “meaning” of self-
einer einzigartigen Beweglichkeit verfestigt production according-to-plan, in its peculiar
hat. Der neuzeitliche Mensch bedarf keiner mobility, secures itself. The humanity of
Sinnbilder mehr, nicht weil er den Sinn modernity no longer requires symbolic images,
verleugnet, sondern ihn beherrscht als die not because it denies the meaning they give, but
Ermächtigung des Menschen selbst zu der because it is dominated by machination of beings
rechnenden Mitte aller Einrichtungen in the whole, through which humanity itself is
jeglicher Machenschaft für das Seiende im empowered to become the calculative center of all
Ganzen. Der neuzeitliche Mensch braucht institutions of every kind of machination.
das Sinnbild nicht mehr, weil er das Modern man no longer has need of sense-giving
Anschauliche und Schaubare ganz in die symbols because he has constricted what
Macht seines Herstellens alles Machbaren manifests itself to show itself in light of the power
(und nirgends Unmöglichen) eingezwungen of the production of the producible (which
hat. Sinnbild ist nur dort möglich und nötig, excludes any sense of the impossible). The
wo die Metaphysik das Sein über das symbol is only possible and needed insofar as
Seiende stellt und durch dieses jenes metaphysics sets being above beings and the one
darstellen muß –; sobald aber, wie im must be represented by the other. However, as
Zeitalter der Vollendung der Metaphysik, das soon as – in the epoch of the consummation of
Seiende selbst alles Sein übernimmt und nur metaphysics – beings themselves overshadow
Seiendes in seiner Vor- und Herstellbarkeit being and assume its place, and only beings in
kennt, wo das “Wirkliche” und “Lebendige”, their representedness and producibility are
die “Tat” und der Erfolg das “Wahre” acknowledged – when “the real”, and “the living
ausmachen, entfällt jede Möglichkeit und being”, and “act” and success determine “the
Notwendigkeit eines Sinnbilds. Wer solches true”, then the very possibility and necessity of
neuzeitlich – d. h. auf dem Wege der symbols become redundant. Whoever wants to
historischen Nachrechnung und Nachma- recuperate the symbol, in modern fashion – that
chung – wieder einführen möchte, täuscht is, by way of historical research and imitation –
einen flachen | Tiefsinn vor und verkennt offers a deceptive and superficial appearance of
gerade die eigentliche Wesenstiefe des something profound and misunderstands the
eigenen Zeitalters. actual profundity of essence of our own epoch.
“Sinnbilder” sind jetzt in mehrfachem Sinne “Symbolic, sense-giving images” have become
unmöglich: 1.) weil das, was ihr Wesen ist, impossible in a number of senses: 1.) because
in einem tieferen Sinne und entschiedener what is essential to the symbolic happens in a
geschieht (die Gleichsetzung von Sinn und deeper and more decisive way by positing the
Bild in der einrichtbaren Berechnung des equivalence of sense and image through
Seienden und d. h. der Rechenhaftigkeit institutions of the calculative accounting of
seines Seins); 2.) weil, wenn man schon eine beings – that is, by positing the calculability of
Sinnbildschaffung für nötig halten möchte, the being of beings; 2.) given that one suppose
diese einen bildlosen und bildfordernden the creation of symbols to be necessary, such
Sinn voraussetzt – d. h. eine creation presupposes the distinction between the
Wesensbestimmung des Seins, das erst im imageless and image-producing meaningfulness;
ganz Anderen eines Seienden sich darstellen which is to say, a determination of the sway of
müßte. Aber gerade diese Voraussetzung being that must necessarily represent itself in the
wird nicht mehr gesetzt und kann nicht mehr entirely other of a being. But precisely this
gesetzt werden, wenn der Mensch selbst sich presupposition is no longer posited and cannot
als Tier (Rasse – Blut) zum Ziel seiner be posited once the human being, conceived as
selbst gesetzt und die Planbarkeit seiner animal (race and blood), posits itself as its own
Geschichte in seinen Willen genommen hat. goal and undertakes to make history accountable
Wo der Sinn in das Sinnlose gelegt wird, wo to its will. When meaning is assigned to the
das Seiende jegliches Sein überflüssig meaningless, when beings have rendered being
gemacht hat, fehlt jede Quelle für eine in every sense redundant, then any source of the
sinnbildende Kraft; 3.) weil selbst dann, sense-shaping power of the image will be
wenn auch noch dem Sinnlosen und lacking; 3.) and even if one were to grant (which
Seinsverlassenen eine Spur | sinnbildender is impossible) the sense-less, and beings
und bildschaffender Kraft zugestanden abandoned by being, a trace of sense-shaping
werden dürfte (was unmöglich ist), die and symbol-creating power, the creation of
Bildschaffung nie erweckt und vollzogen symbolic images will never be reawakened and
werden könnte durch ein historisches enacted by historical research – by digging up
Ausgraben vergangener Symbole und the ancient symbols and symbolic worlds of our
Symbolwelten auf dem Wege der ancestors. Those who suppose themselves to be
Volkskunde. Die angeblich Heutigen wissen of today know nothing of the presence of their
gar nichts von der Gegenwart ihrer historicity, rather using the romantic means of
Geschichte, sondern erfinden sich historical research (“pre-history” and historical
“romantisch” mit den romantischen Mitteln “folklore”) to “romantically” invent for
der Historie (“Volkskunde” und themselves a past to serve as an ideal for the
“Vorgeschichte”) ein Gewesenes als Ideal future.
einer Zukunft. One constantly expresses one’s contempt for
Man macht ständig den “Intellektualismus” “intellectualism”, and simultaneously staggers
verächtlich und taumelt gleichzeitig in den about in orgies of uncommon historicism while
Orgien eines ungewöhnlichen Historismus closing oneself off to the essential knowledge of
und verschließt sich dem Wissen dessen, that which actually is.
was eigentlich ist. One preaches “blood” and “soil” while making a
Man predigt “Blut” und “Boden” und business of the urbanization and destruction of
betreibt eine Verstädterung und Zerstörung the village and the farm in such measure as not
des Dorfes und des Hofes in Ausmaßen, wie long ago one could never even have imagined.
sie vor kurzem noch niemand zu ahnen One talks of “life” and “enliving”, and
vermochte. everywhere one obstructs growth, any kind of
Man redet von “Leben” und “Erleben” und risk-taking, hinders the freedom to go astray and
unterbindet überall jegliches Wachstum, to fail, every opportunity for mindfulness and the
jegliches Wagnis und jegliche Freiheit des distress of the need to question. One knows
Irrens und Scheiterns, jede Möglichkeit der everything, is already familiar with everything,
Besinnung und jede Not der Befragung. Man and one values every thing in accordance with its
weiß und kennt Alles und schätzt Jegliches | outcomes, holding that alone which promises
nach dem Erfolg und hält nur noch das für success to be real.
wirklich, was einen Erfolg verspricht.
§ 29 [32–43], S. 380–386: § 29 [32–43]:
Kein Zeitalter läßt sich durch die An epoch cannot be grasped by offering a
Abschilderung einer “gegenwärtigen description of the “present situation”. In
Situation” fassen. Seine Geschichte wissen principle, we can never know its history
wir überhaupt nie unmittelbar. Die Frage nach directly. The question concerning its
dem Wesen seiner Geschichtlichkeit (und historicity (and lack of historicity) asks how it
Ungeschichtlichkeit) fragt, wie es sich zum decides for beings as such and in the whole
Seienden als solchem überhaupt und im and in what mode of truth this decision
Ganzen entscheidet, in welcher Wahrheit diese becomes decisive. All this pertains to the era
Entscheidung maßgebend wird. Vom Zeitalter of modernity in a still more exclusive sense,
der Neuzeit jedoch gilt alles dieses in einem even as modernity more abruptly passes over
noch ausschließlicheren Sinne und das, je jäher into the unconditional unfolding of its
es in den Abschnitt seiner Vollendung, d. h. way-to-be, which is to say, its consummation.
unbedingten Wesensentfaltung übergeht. Die The unconditional decomposition and
unbedingte Zersetzung und Zerstörung alles destruction of all that was, evaluated from the
Bisherigen wird aus dem bereits maßstablosen already disorientated perspective of “previous
Gesichtskreis des “Bisherigen” als einer Folge history”, is seen as the consequence of the
von “Kulturzeitaltern” im Sinne eines “succession of cultural epochs” and
Niedergangs abgewertet. Man übersieht dabei, devaluated in the sense of a decline and fall.
daß in der “Zersetzung” und “Zerstörung” With this, one ignores that what is essentially
gar nicht die bloße Beseitigung des bislang inherent in “decomposition” and
Gültigen wesentlich ist, sondern die “destruction” is not the mere eradication of
Unbedingtheit, Berechenbarkeit, Planbarkeit what was long held to be valid and true, but
und innere Wandelbarkeit des the unconditional nature, the calculability,
Zerstörungsvorganges selbst. Das will sagen: predictability and inherent mutability of the
Die Seiendheit des Seienden – das processes of destruction themselves. And this
Machenschaftliche als solches und seine means: the beingness of beings – machination
unbedingte Gesetzlichkeit | bestimmen das, as such in its unconditional lawfulness
was ist. Alles seitdem “Wirkliche” und noch determines what is. Everything once real, and
dafür gehaltene, die “Kultur” und ihre Güter what is still taken for reality – “culture” and
verschwinden nicht, sondern rücken nur in den its spiritual goods – do not disappear, they
Vordergrund dessen, was die Vor-wandr only move into the foreground to cloak what is
abgeben muß, um jenen Zerstörungsvorgang in order to conceal this process of destruction
nicht in seinem eigentlichen Sein hervortreten in the actuality of its being. For like all being,
zu lassen; denn dieses ist, wie jedes Sein, nur this can be known and endured only by the
Wenigen ertrag- und wißbar – hier in der few – in the epoch of the consummation of
vollendeten Neuzeit nur denjenigen, die selbst modernity, solely by those who are themselves
in der Machenschaftlichkeit des Seienden engaged in the machinational
stehend von ihr als die richtenden Vollstrecker transformation of beings and assigned by
gefordert sind. machination to be its governing executors.
Da sich eine solche Vollendung eines Zeitalters Since such a consummation of an epoch and
/ und hier des neuzeitlichen Zeitalters / nicht in this case the epoch of modernity can no
mehr nur in Teilbereichen menschlichen longer unfold solely in specific sectors, but
Betreibens abspielen kann, sondern Alle und d. must envelop all of them – and this means that
h. das neuzeitliche Massenwesen des it must include the collective essence of
Menschentums einbegreifen muß, bedarf es modern humanity – it requires institutional
wesentlicher Einrichtungsformen und structures and forms of experience able to
Meinungen, die die Massen über den bloßen elevate the masses above and beyond their
Herdencharakter hinausheben; nicht damit sie mere herd-like existence. Not to the end that
einer bisher ihnen versagten höheren Kultur they may be led to the enjoyment of a higher
zugeführt werden und die “Segnungen” der culture that was previously denied them, nor
Wohlfahrt und des Glückes erfahren – sondern just to experience the “blessings” of material
damit sie im Scheine dieser Einrichtungen welfare and happiness, but that in the light of
unbedingt für die Machenschaft verfügbar these forms of organization they may become
werden und dem Ablauf der Zerstörung | unconditionally available for the work of
keinen Widerstand mehr entgegensetzen, da machination and therefore without resistance
alles, was in voraufgegangenen Jahrhunderten to the course of destruction. Because
der Neuzeit in einzelnen Wirkungsgebieten everything of previous centuries of the modern
und Schichten des Menschentums als “Kultur” epoch that was valued as a “cultural good” in
galt und einheitliche Zielsetzungen eines particular domains of activity and classes of
Schaffens und Genießens enthielt, jetzt society, having been assigned a comprehensive
ausgehöhlt und ohne eigene bestimmende purpose guiding its creation and enjoyment,
Kraft ist, eignet es sich am besten dazu, um has now been emptied of content and its own
jetzt den Massen als der Schein ihrer höheren formative power, it is best suited to supply the
Berufung zugeführt zu werden, in welchem masses with the semblance of a higher calling;
Schein-erleben und Rausch sie sich zu einer and infused with this semblance of life, as in a
unbedingten – bedingungslosen Aufgabe aller rapture, the masses hold themselves in
Herrschaftsansprüche für das Zeitalter absolute readiness for the sake of the epoch
bereithalten. and the unconditional mission of the
realization of its claim to dominion.
“To cloak” translates “Vor-wand”, used here in the original sense of “der Vorwand”, L. praetexta (toga)
r
Daher ist z. B. alle gut gemeinte Ausgrabung For this reason, for example, the well-
früheren Volksgutes, alle biedere Pflege des meaning, archeological excavation of our
Brauchtums, alles Besingen von Landschaft people’s heritage, all conscientious concern for
und Boden, alle Verherrlichung des “Blutes” traditional customs, all laudatory song in
nur Vordergrund und Vorwand und zwar praise of landscape and native soil, all
notwendig, um das, was eigentlich und allein glorification of the “blood” – remain
ist, die unbedingte Herrschaft der Machschaft superficial, a pretext, and indeed a necessary
der Zerstörung als in sich gesetzlicher one, designed to keep the road open and clear
Vorgang, für die eigene vollständige and to conceal from the many what solely and
Vollendung seines Wesens frei zu halten und d. really is – the unconditional empowerment of
h. den Vielen zu verhüllen. Diese machinational destruction in accord with the
vordergründliche Verhüllung ist nun aber nicht inherent, historical necessity of its own
etwa eine bloße Täuschung und gar ein comprehensive consummation. This superficial
Schwindel und eine Schauspielerei von Seiten concealment, however, is by no means a mere
| jener, die Vollstrecker und Gesetzgeber der deception or just a scam, play-staged on the
Machenschaft bleiben, vielmehr ist dieser part of those who remain the executors and
Vor-wand als eine vom eigentlichen Geschehen law-givers of machination. Rather, this screen
der Zerstörung völlig schon losgelöste of deception, functioning as a semblance fully
Vor-wand durch den Vorgang der Vollendung released from the actual course of destruction,
der Machenschaft von ihren Vollstreckern is required by the executors of machination
selbst gefordert – diese stehen in einem themselves in service to the consummation of
Müssen, das ihnen jene Sicherheit gibt, die machination. These executors are subject to a
jedesmal das Zeichen der “Größe” wird. necessity that in any given case gives them
Dieses Müssen der Vollstreckerschaft hat in such security as manifests their “greatness”.
sich das Wissen dessen, was in diesem Vorgang The necessity inherent in executive enactment
jeweils in eigentümlichen Formen der Sprünge is informed by knowledge of what has become
unumgänglich geworden (Aufhalten der inevitable in the peculiar, unexpected leaps of
Zerstörung sowohl, wie weitvorgreifendes the course of machination – delays in the
Vorbereiten einer solchen durch die course of destruction, as well as far-reaching
unscheinbarste Zersetzung) – die Größe dieses preparation of such by way of the most
Wissens – als einer einzigartigen Gewißheit, in unapparent means of decomposition. The
der sich das ego cogito – sum Descartes’ greatness of this way of knowing – understood
innerhalb des Seienden im Ganzen und für as an exceptional certainty in which the ego
dieses vollendet – hat darin seine innere, cogito sum of Descartes consummates itself
gestaltgebende Grenze, daß es nicht vermag, within and for beings in the whole – has its
das Wesen der eigenen Geschichtlichkeit zu inner, form-giving limit in this, that it is
wissen. incapable of knowing the ownmost of its own
Dieses Unvermögen ist von der Herrschaft der historicity.
Machenschaft aus gesehen kein Mangel, In the perspective of the dominion of
sondern die eigentliche Stärke des machination, this incapacity is no defect, but
Handelnkönnens und der Unbedenklichkeit. rather exhibits the real strength of the ability to
Aus einem wesentlich anders gegründeten und act without restraint. In the view of knowing as
gearteten Wissen jedoch, dem denkerischen, | thinking, however, which is founded and
ist zu erkennen, daß hier, in diesem Vorgang formed in an essentially different way, it is
der Vollendung der Neuzeit, die Seiendheit des evident that in the course of the consummation
Seienden als Machenschaft nur das in die of modernity the beingness of beings as
Einheit des unbedingten Wesens und Unwesens machination only establishes the unity of the
bringt, was in der abend-ländischen – durch die unconditional essence and refusal of the
“Metaphysik” getragenen Seinsgeschichte ownmost of that which has already been
vorgezeichnet liegt. Die unbedingte Herrschaft inscribed in the history of being of the
der Seiendheit über das Seiende in der Gestalt, Occident by “metaphysics”. The unconditional
daß überall dieses Seiende als das Wirkende domination of beingness over beings is given
und Wirksame den Vorrang über das “Sein” such form that beings, as actual and effective,
“hat” und dieses als letzten Dunst des bloßen “have” priority over “being”, while being is
Denkens ausgibt. given out to be the final haze of mere thinking.
Diese Herrschaft treibt ohne ihr Wissen zu Without its knowledge, this dominion drives
einer Entscheidung über das Seyn – welche on towards a decision regarding beyng – a
Entscheidung sie selbst nicht mehr stellen decision that it itself can no longer decide.
kann. {Sie vermag nicht mehr ihrerseits einen {For this dominion can no longer create the
Entwurfsraum für ein anderes Fragen zu site of projecting-open for another kind of
schaffen und keine “Zeit” für die questioning, and no “time” for the
Fragwürdigkeit des Seyns selbst als des questionability of beyng itself as the most
Fragwürdigstens}. Zugleich aber wird den questionable}. At the same time, it becomes
Wissenden (in der Art der Vollstrecker und evident to the knowing ones (to those who are
anders denen in der Art des Seynsdenkens) klar, executors, and in another mode, to those who
daß alle biedere und gefühlsverzwungene, think beyng), that all well-meaning intensity of
sentimentale Betreibung von Volkstum und feeling and sentimental concern for folklore
Volkskunde – abgelöster und nur mittelhafter and ethnology is only a derivative and
Vordergrund ist, ein “abstraktes” Erleben, das instrumental pretense, an “abstraction” of
gar nie erlebt und – auch nie erleben soll, was enliving, that does not experience – and is
eigentlich ge-|schieht und ist. intended never to experience – what is actually
Die Meinungen, die in solchem Betreiben von happening and really is.
Blut und Boden und dem darin vermeintlich Those who are of the opinion that such
Erreichten und Er-lebten, die eigentliche operational concern for blood and soil and
Wirklichkeit sehen möchten, verkennen nicht what can be achieved and lived by it touches
nur das, was ist und allein ist, sie sind, wenn sie on what is authentically real, not only mistake
anmaßend auftreten, eine Herabsetzung und what solely is, but – insofar as it becomes
Verharmlosung des einzigen Seins des overbearing – they also further the diminution
Zeitalters, die Verkleinerung des Seienden, die and trivialization of the unique being of the
aller-dings wiederum von diesem selbst epoch. Moreover, this diminution of beings is
betrieben und für wünschbar gehalten wird. Zur practiced and considered desirable by those
Zeit ist vielleicht überhaupt kein größerer who themselves pursue these operations.
Gegensatz ausdenkbar als derjenige, der sich z. Presently there is perhaps no greater
B. zwischen der Welt in Wagners conceivable opposition between, for example,
“Meistersinger” und dem eigentlichen Sein des the world of Wagner’s “Meistersinger” and the
Zeitalters ausspannt, der aber nur von ganz actual way of being of the epoch, a relation of
Wenigen ausgehalten und getragen und nur von tension that can only be endured and supported
Einzelnen, Seltenen in seiner by very few and understood in its being-
seynsgeschichtlichen Wahrheit begriffen wird. historical truth only by the solitary and
Daß man aber dieses Wissen bei Gelegenheit extraordinary. The fact that this knowing
vielleicht als eine “vornehme Abstraktheit” awareness may be, upon occasion, described
auf die Seite schieben kann zugunsten der as a “noble abstraction” and marginalized in
“Lebensnähe” des historisch wieder favour of the “proximity to life” of
hervorgeholten Volks- und Brauchtums –, das historically re-constructed folk customs also
gehört gleichfalls in die Wirkungskreise der belongs to the field of operation of the
unumgänglichen Blendung und Verblendung inevitable bedazzling and deception of all
aller, die mehr und weniger abgestuft und those, in their various intermediate gradations,
mittelbar der Vollstreckerschaft des who are called upon to fulfill the course of
machenschaftlichen Seins der Neuzeit dienen | execution of the machinational being of
müssen. modernity.
Daß bei dieser unumgänglichen Dienerschaft It should come as no surprize that in the
die “Wissenschaften” alles an Harmlosigkeit unavoidable course of service to these
und Ahnungslosigkeit des Wissens übertreffen, operations the “sciences” will out-do
darf nicht verwundern. Sie sind die everything else in rendering knowledge
echtbürtigen Nachkommen des beginnenden harmless and devoid of insight. They are the
neuzeitlichen Geistes und werden auch true-born offspring of the inceptual spirit of
schonungslos in der von ihnen selbst modernity, and they too will be mercilessly
beförderten, aber nie wißbaren pulverized – that is, assimilated to mere
Wesensgleichheit von Historie und Technik instrumentality – by the essential equivalence
zerrieben, d. h. zum Verschwinden im bloßen of history and technology, which they
Instrumentalen gebracht werden. Daß sich in themselves have propagated without ever
all dem noch etwas Ansehen zu verschaffen being able to know and comprehend what they
sucht, was den Namen “Philosophie” sich have done. That in all this there is something
zugelegt hat, ist das Zeugnis für den that still seeks to acquire prestige by assuming
vollendeten Triumph der Ahnungslosigkeit. the name of “philosophy” bears witness to the
Heute wird, wie vormals im Mittelalter, der consummate triumph of ignorance. Today, as
Name “Philosophie” in Anspruch genommen in the Middle Ages, the name of “philosophy”
als Aushängeschild für die meist unwissentlich is claimed to showcase the mostly unknowing
betriebene Anbahnung des völligen Verzichtes initiation of the complete renunciation of
auf das Denken und die Denkfähigkeit im thinking and capacity for thought in the sense
Sinne des denkerischen Denkens. Wogegen das of commemorative thinking. Whereas
rechnende Denken – der logos – eine Höhe calculative thinking – the logos – has
und Sicherheit und Macht erreicht hat, die alles achieved such a height and certainty and
Bisherige wesentlich übertreffen. Verglichen power as to essentially surpass all that has
mit diesem rechnenden Denken ist die been. Compared to this, to calculative
“Scheinphilosophie”, die im Kulturbetrieb thinking, the “pseudo-philosophy” welcome
gern zugelassen wird, nur ein schwacher Lärm in organized cultural studies offers no more
mit erborgten Worten und Begriffen, denen than a feeble drone of borrowed words and
niemand mehr | ernstlich nachfragt, weil hier concepts. No-one even bothers anymore to
am ehesten noch gespürt wird, wie völlig dies seriously put such studies into question,
nur eine nachgetragene Kulisse bleibt, allein because here one is most likely to sense that
schon im Verhältnis zur Volkskunde und all this is just a supplemental back-drop, if
Historie und Biologie, die ihrerseits ja, nur only in relation to folklore and history and
ungewußt, lediglich als Vor-wände ihre Rolle biology, which for their part simply and
spielen. unwittingly play the role of concealing
pre-text.
Doch gibt es ein Wissen vom Sein aus dem Yet there is a way of knowing from and of
Erfragen der Seynsgeschichte und der being, arising out of the question of the history
Geschichte des Wesens der Wahrheit, welches of beyng and the essential sway of truth; a
Wissen zugleich das Wesen des Zeitalters weiß knowing that also comprehends the ownmost
und eine Vorbereitung seiner Zukunft schon ist, of the epoch, and as such it already prepares
ohne daß ein Bild dieser und ein Planbares the future, which is not to say that the future
nach dem Sinn des noch herrschenden can be conceived and planned in the
Rechnens bereitgestellt werden könnte. Die calculative manner that still dominates today.
Geschichte des Abendlandes vollzieht unter der In the guise of ethnic and national community,
Decke der völkischen und nationalen the history of the Occident silently and
Sammlungen jene hintergründliche und essentially gathers itself to fulfill the
wesentliche Sammlung auf die letzte machinational essence of beingness: as
Ausfaltung des machenschaftlichen Wesens self-representing production this essence
der Seiendheit – die als das vorgestellte comes to itself through the comprehensive,
Sichherstellen in der ausnahmslosen, organized and calculable availability and
eingerichteten, berechenbaren Verfügbarkeit disposability of beings in the whole and
über Jegliches im Ganzen und über dieses through the whole itself – to the point of
selbst ihr Wesen findet und im unbedingten – finally demanding, in its blindly unconditional,
blinden sich zur Verfügungstellen und functional availability, its own dissolution in
Aufgehen in der Machenschaft die letzte machination – as such, its own first and final
Forderung stellt, die in ihr selbst schon die erste fulfillment. Herein beingness over-powers
und endgültige Erfüllung darbietet. Die itself to elevate itself into the height of power;
Seiendheit übermächtigt sich hier, um sich zur and through this process, by which any given
höchsten Macht zu erheben | und diesen stability of power is successively over-
Vorgang der sich je und je übermächtigenden powered, the essence of beingness is
Machtbeständigkeit als ihr Wesen im Seienden incorporated into beings to the point where
auszubreiten dergestalt, daß eine Frage nach any questioning concerning the truth of this
der Wahrheit dieses Wesens und ihrer essence and its justification becomes
Begründung grund- und anstoßlos geworden. groundless and without substance. The
Der Mensch dieses Zeitalters kommt in einen humanity of this epoch finds itself in such a
Wahrheitslosen Bereich zu stehen, indem schon domain of truthlessness as finds sufficient
die Übermächtigung des einen Zustandes durch self-justification in the constant over-powering
den nächsten so genug der Rechtfertigung of any given condition of empowerment by its
enthält, daß sogar der Sinn auf diese über der successor to the extent that the question of the
Machtentfaltung vergessen und ausgerottet meaning of the deployment of power is
wird. uprooted and forgotten.
Kein Widerspruch liegt darin, daß die höchste There is no contradiction in saying that the
Herrschaft des Seins als Machenschaft die supreme dominion of being as machination
völlige Seinsvergessenheit um sich breitet. establishes the complete oblivion of being in its
Und gesetzt – es wäre ein “Widerspruch” – was wake. And supposing that it were a
liegt schon in diesem Herrschaftsbezirk an “contradiction”, what does a contradiction
einem Widerspruch? Er kann nur noch als ein amount to in this domain of mastery? It would
jeweils zu spät gekommener “Gedanke” gelten, amount to no more than a belated “thought”, one
der noch versucht, auf dem Wege des which attempts to exclude itself from the course
nachträglichen oder begleitenden Vorstellens of the self-surpassing constancy of dominion by
aus dem Vorgang der sich übermächtigenden means of supplemental or concomitant concepts.
Machtbeständigkeit herauszuhalten – ein Yet an epoch for which truth cannot be a genuine
Versuch, der nur scheinbar gelingt. Ein need – given the primacy of the real and the
Zeitalter jedoch, dem die Wahrheit auf Grund efficacious – and which, accordingly, must also
des Vorrangs des Wirklichen und Wirksamen experience truthlessness as asset rather than as
kein Bedürfnis mehr sein kann, dem sonach die deficit, will also evaluate any sort of clinging to
Wahrheitlosigkeit keine Einbuße, sondern what was once a “truth” as a vain impulse that
höchstens ein Gewinn sein muß, macht might reassure inconstant individuals. But such
zugleich jedes Sichanklammern | an zuvor as these clearly have no voice within the domain
geglaubte “Wahrheiten” zu einem eitlen of being as machination, and still less do they
Beginnen, das vielleicht den Einzelnen, manifest the capability to help prepare the
Flüchtigen noch einen Ausweg der Beruhigung crossing [into the other beginning].
verschafft, in der Herrschaft des Seins als At the same time, however, the epoch of
Machenschaft freilich nicht mehr mitspricht truth-lessness is compelled to unfold a
und noch weniger die Eignung zeigt, den comprehensive semblance of its incontrovertible
Übergang vorzubereiten. possession of the truth, thereby creating and
Das Zeitalter der Wahrheit-losigkeit muß aber maintaining the appearance that it were
zugleich den vollendeten Schein des unbedingten superfluous and shameless to pose questions
Wahrheitsbesitzes um sich legen, der es jederzeit concerning the ownmost essence of this epoch
als überflüssig und zudringlich erscheinen läßt, and its determination within the history of beyng.
das Zeitalter selbst auf sein Wesen und seine Far and wide this epoch still evinces the
Bestimmtheit innerhalb der Seynsgeschichte zu thrashing-about, the convulsions, of those who
befragen. Weit umher macht sich in diesem cannot see what is – those who, for their part,
Zeitalter noch ein Gezappel Jener geltend, die think to save themselves by the semblances
nicht sehen können, was ist und die ihrerseits auf which they propagate, supposing that these
einen Anschein sich retten, daß, was sie nur noch possess historical weight because they advance
vertreten, deshalb schon eine Geschichtskraft them. In its recklessness, the epoch of the
besitze. Das Zeitalter der vollendeten, um sich consummate oblivion of being and of
selbst unbekümmerten Seinsvergessenheit und truthlessness is unique in its ownmost historical
Wahrheitslosigkeit ist so einzig in seinem essence: because herein the unbounded horizon
geschichtlichen Wesen, weil hier die of the claim to empowerment of beingness
schrankenlose Weite des Machtanspruchs der combines with the contraction of being to the
Seiendheit sich in eins setzt mit einer mere void – the truthless nothing. As a
Schrumpfung des Seins auf das nur nichtige – self-referential marker of identity, all the epoch
wahrheitslose Nichts. Zur Selbstkennzeichnung has to offer is a calculation of its
des Zeitalters bleibt ihm nur noch der historische incomparability – derived by way of historical
Vergleich als Herausrechnen seiner comparison – and technical planning to the end
Unvergleichlichkeit und die technische Planung of preventing any kind of standstill. For granted
als Verhinderung jedes | Stillstandes – der the priority of essence given to self-overpowering
sogleich beim wesentlichen Vorrang der empowerment and its self-certainty, stand-still
Übermächtigung und ihrer Selbstgewißheit als could immediately open up sectors of
eine Unsicherheit sich vordrängen könnte. Die uncertainty. The most profound power of
tiefste Zerstörungskraft eines Zeitalters (seine destruction inherent in an epoch (the
im Anschein der Stärke verhüllte “Schwäche”) “weakness” concealed in the semblance of its
besteht darin, daß es sich nicht zur strength) consists in this, that it cannot confront
Wahrhaftigkeit gegenüber seiner verborgensten its most intimate and ownmost necessity in
Wesensnot entschließen kann. truthfulness.
Wie aber, wenn diese Entschlußunfähigkeit als Yet – what if this incapacity-to-decide, as the
Bejahung des Fraglosen das Wesen eines affirmation of the unquestioned, constituted
Zeitalters – das Neuzeitliche seiner Vollendung the ownmost essence of an epoch – the epoch
ausmachte? Dann darf hier nicht von einem of modernity in its consummation? Then we
“Versagen” und einem “Mangel” gesprochen should not talk of “failure”, or “lack”.
werden; wissend müssen wir hier die eigene Knowing this, we are called to recognize the
Größe – die Riesenhaftigkeit einer ownmost greatness of an epoch – to
geschichtlichen Bestimmung anerkennen und acknowledge the gigantism of its (being-)
jedes Ansinnen kurzrechnender Verurteilung historical determination, while repudiating
aus Verdrießlichkeit und Unverstand poorly-calculated notions and judgments
zurückweisen – denn entscheidender als das arising of peevishness and incomprehension.
Behagen der längst Gesättigten, weil niemals For more decisive than the ease of the
echt Hungrigen, wesentlicher als die Erhaltung satiated – who have never been truly hungry;
der längst Überflüssigen ist der Aufstand des more needed than the maintenance of the
Wissens von dem, was ist; denn hier verbirgt superfluous – is the uprising of essential
sich das Versprechen eines Wissens der anderen knowing from out of that which is. For here it
Wahrheit, in die der künftige Mensch sich is that the promise of a way of knowing of
aufmachen muß. another truth lies concealed, a truth unto which
Ernst des Denkens ist nicht Betrübnis und the human being of the future will have to set
Klage über vermeintlich schlechte Zeiten und forth.
drohende Barbarei, sondern die The seriousness of thinking does not consist in
Entschiedenheit des fragenden | Ausharrens im sadness and lament over supposedly bad times
Unerrechenbaren und eigentlich Wesenden und and threatening barbarism, but in the
in sich schon Zukünftigen. Wenn einer darauf decisiveness of questioning endurance in the
verzichtet, die vielen und oft zurückgelegten midst of the incalculable and what is actually
Wege eines Suchens des Selben als Funde coming-to-be, which is in itself already the
öffentlichvorzugeben und auszubreiten, dann arrival of the to-come. When one refrains
sammelt sich all seine Wegschaft in einen from publicly presenting and propagating the
einfachen Standort, dessen einziger Zeit-Raum discoveries of the many, sometimes abandoned
entbreitet wird durch die Pflicht des Ausharrens paths of searching, on the road to the Same,
in der Fragwürdigkeit des noch Fraglosen: des then all one’s pathways may be gathered into
Seyns und der Gründung seiner Wahrheit. one site, whose time-space unfolds itself in the
duty to endure the questionableness of the still
unquestioned: the question of beyng and the
grounding of its truth.
Incomplete sentence, second clause lacks a verb.
s
§ 40 [52–53], S. 393: § 40 [52–53]:
Nun, da glücklich selbst die “Einsamkeit” zur Now, since “solitude” itself is happily
öffentlichen Einrichtung werden soll, dürfte publicly recognized and supported, it should
erwiesen sein, daß die Zersetzung aller be evident that the decomposition of all
bisherigen wesentlichen Haltungen und essential ways-to-be of human
Stimmungen des Menschen und ihre Auflösung comportment and attunement, their
in den unterschiedslosen Erlebnisbetrieb dissolution into the undifferentiated
vollständig geworden ist. Zwar meint man auf business of enliving, has come to full
solche Weise (durch die Einrichtung der fruition. Admittedly one supposes by these
Einsamkeit zu einer | veranstaltbaren, öffentlich means – through the organization of solitude
zuteilbaren und berechneten Zuständlichkeit) dem as a promoted, allotted and accountable
allzu großen Betrieb der bloßen public responsibility – to counter the
Gemeinschaftsarbeit zu entfliehen und “das all-too-encompassing operations of
Andere” zu sichern; in Wahrheit aber werden so communal labor and so to secure its “other”.
nur die letzten Inseln von den Fluten der In fact, however, all one achieves is to
unaufhaltsamen Vermengung und swamp the last remaining islands of solitude
Vergemeinerung überschwemmt; denn under relentless inundations of
Einsamkeit kann man nicht “machen” und auch commonality, blending all-with-all into one.
nicht “wollen” – Einsamkeit ist das Seltenste und For one cannot “produce” “solitude” on
eine Notwendigkeit des Seins – sofern es sich in demand, nor can one “will” it to be –
seinen Abgründen in das Da-sein des Menschen solitude is of the rarest and a necessity of
verschenkt. being – inasmuch as being in its depths
Was “man” also “machen” kann, ist höchstens grants solitude to the Da-sein of human
eine Vorbereitung des Wissens, daß nur eine being.
Verwandlung des Seins als solchen, d. h. eine What “one” can perhaps “do” is to prepare
Überwindung des Zeitalters der vollendeten the knowledge that only a transformation of
Seinsverlassenheit, die Möglichkeit von einsamen being, the overcoming of the epoch of the
Menschen als Gründern und als die wesentlich consummate forgetting of being, could open
Tragenden eröffnet. Dagegen vollzieht sich in der up the possibility of solitary ones as
Veröffentlichung der Einsamkeit zu einer founders and ownmost bearers. The social
Einrichtung die Beseitigung der letzten Dämme publication of solitude, by way of contrast,
gegen das Anwogen der Machenschaft des Seins. works to tear down the last dykes set against
Jener Vorgang – unscheinbar vielleicht und wie the swelling seas of machination. This
das Aufzucken verspäteter Romantiker – ist nur course of events – hardly noticed, perhaps,
das Zeichen eines seynsgeschichtlichen Vorgangs, like the twitching of belated Romantics – is
gegen den alle zeitgeschichtliche only an indication of a being-historical
“Weltgeschichte” ein Kinderspiel bleibt. destiny compared to which contemporary
Und fernste Götter lächeln über diesen Taumel. “world history” is child’s play.
And most distant gods smile upon this
frenzy.
Überlegungen XI, § 42, S. 55 [GA 95, S. 394–395]

Überlegungen XI, § 42, S. 56 [GA 95, S. 395]

Überlegungen XI, § 42, S. 57// [GA 95, S. 395–396]

§ 42 [55–60], S. 394–397: § 42 [55–60]:
Das, was künftig mit dem Namen brutalitas That which in future will go by the name of
(nicht zufällig römisch) benannt werden muß, brutalitas (not by accident of Roman
die Unbedingtheit der Machenschaft des Seins, origin) – the absoluteness of the machination
hat nichts zu tun mit einer abschätzigen und of being – has nothing to do with such
bürgerlich “moralischen” Bewertung negative, “moralistic” valuations of bourgeois
irgendwelcher vordergründlicher Begebenheiten, origin, as people still living in the past, and
an deren “Verurteilung” die zurückbleibenden those of Christian sentiment, may direct in
Bisherigen und die christlichen Gemüter sich judgment against whatever ostentatious
berauschen, um dabei ihren Eigenwert sich occurrences in order to excite themselves and
zurückzuzahlen, an den sie doch nicht mehr ganz to assure themselves of their own worth –
glauben. Brutalitas des Seins ist der even if they no longer quite believe in it.
Widerschein des Wesens des Menschen, der Brutalitas of being is the reflection of the
animalitas des animal rationale – also auch und essence of humanity, of the animalitas of the
gerade der rationalitas. Nicht als sei jene animal rationale – in effect, also and precisely
brutalitas die Folge und die Übertragung einer the reflection of rationalitas. It is not as if
menschlichen Selbstauffassung in den Bezirk der brutalitas in this sense were the consequence
nichtmenschlichen Dinge – sondern: daß der and the transference of a self-conception of
Mensch als animal human being into the realm of the non-
human; rather, that the human being had to
be determined as animal rationale,
rationale bestimmt werden mußte und daß die and that the brutalitas of beings would one day
brutalitas des Seienden eines Tages in ihre be compelled to consummate itself – have one
Vollendung sich vortreibt; das hat denselben and the same unique ground in the metaphysics
und einen einzigen Grund in | der Metaphysik of being.
des Seins. This essence of beings and the whole, such as
Von diesem Wesen des jetzt für das Zeitalter determines the epoch of the consummation of
der vollendeten Neuzeit gültigen Seienden modernity, is known today only in two
und Ganzen wissen heute nur und in jeweils fundamentally different ways: for one, it is
grundverschiedener Weise: einmal Jene known by those essential ones – that is, those
wesentlichen (d. h. jenem Wesen unbedingt who unconditionally are of this essence and
und unverstört zubestimmten und decisively allotted unto it – who in action and
zugehörigen) Menschen, die handelnd- design shape the epoch; and by those equally
planend das Zeitalter gestalten; und dann jene few of originary knowing who have sprung in
gleich Wenigen, die bereits aus einem advance into the dimension of the
ursprünglichen Wissen in die Fragwürdigkeit questionability of being itself. What is “brought
des Seins selbst vorgesprungen sind. Was sich to pass” [by others] aside from these in their
außerhalb dieser Wissenden “tut”, ist knowing, is unavoidable, and they in their
unentbehrlich und wird in seiner collectivity will become ever more
Massenhaftigkeit immer unentbehrlicher – indispensable – yet without ever partaking in the
ohne doch jemals das Sein mitzubestimmen. determination of being.
All diese Niemals-zu-Vielen brauchen die All these never-ever-too-many need the
Romantik vom “Reich”, vom Volkstum, vom romanticism of the “Reich”, of folk community,
“Boden” und von der “Kameradschaft”, von der of “native soil” and of “comradeship”, need the
Beförderung der “Kultur” und dem “Blühen” romanticism of the advancement of “culture”
der “Künste”, und wenn das nur die Artisten and of the “flowering” of the “arts”, even if this
und Tanzweiber des Berliner Wintergartens amounts to no more than acrobats and dancing
sind. All diese Nie-zu-Vielen brauchen die girls in the Wintergarden in Berlin. All of these
unausgesetzte Gelegenheit zum “Er-leben” – never-too-many require continuous
denn was sollten sie sonst mit ihrem “Leben” opportunities of “en-living” – for what should
anstellen – wenn sie es nicht erlebten. Dabei they make of “life” if they don’t live it out? And
gibt es dann noch “Christen”, die, | weil sie then there are such “Christians” as have no
nichts ahnen, von dem, was wirklich ist, inkling of what really is, who opine that they are
meinen, sie lebten in den “Katakomben”, living in the “catacombs”,
während sie doch noch vor kurzem, als überall although not long ago, when they had
Gelegenheit war zur politischen Machtbeteiligung, widespread access to political power, they
sich im “Himmel” wußten. Das Pharisäertum von were convinced that they were in
Karl Barth und Genossen übertrifft noch das “heaven”. The pharisaism of Karl Barth
Altjüdische um jene Ausmaße, die mit der and his comrades even surpasses that of
neuzeitlichen Geschichte des Seins notwendig the Jews of antiquity, in accord with and
gesetzt sind. Dieser Anhang meint, das möglichst to the degree necessarily set by the
laute Schreien von dem längst toten Gott führe modern history of being. This addendum
jemals in einen Bereich der Entscheidung über die advances the idea that the loudest possible
Gottschaft der Götter. Sie meinen, weil sie sich in clamor about a long-dead God will with
ein Vergangenes “dialektisch”-redend – flüchten, certainty lead us into the realm of decision
aus der Zeit in die “Ewigkeit” gehoben zu sein – concerning the godhood of the gods.
während sie nur als die eigentlichen Zerstörer “die Taking refuge in the past by way of their
Zukunft” (nicht den Fortschritt) des Menschen “dialectical” talk, they suppose that they
untergraben. In Wahrheit sind sie dennoch die ganz have elevated themselves out of time into
abseitigen und unwissenden Beförderer der “eternity” – when in fact they are the real
brutalitas – sie gehören in ihrer Weise zu den destroyers of “the future” (not of
Unentbehrlichen, sofern sie das wesentliche Wissen progress). And yet, in truth, they are just
mitverhindern und der brutalitas des Seins mit die marginal and unknowing promoters of
Bahn freihalten. brutalitas – in their fashion they belong
Die brutalitas des Seins hat zur Folge – nicht etwa to the indispensable ones, inasmuch as
zum Grund – daß der Mensch selbst sich als they too obstruct knowing awareness
seienden eigens | und durchaus zum factum brutum while clearing the path for the brutalitas
macht und seine Tierheit durch die Lehre von der of being.
Rasse “begründet”. Daher ist diese Lehre vom The brutalitas of being has the
“Leben” die pöbelhafteste Form, in der die consequence – by no means is it the
Fragwürdigkeit des Seyns – ohne diese im cause – that human being makes itself, as
geringsten zu ahnen – als Selbstverständlichkeit a being, out to be the factum brutum and
ausgegeben wird. Die Erhöhung des Menschen thus it rationalizes and “justifies” its
durch die Flucht in die Technik – das Erklären aus animality by racial doctrine. For this
der Rasse – die “Ni- reason, the doctrine concerning “life” is
the most scurrilous form in which the
question of beyng – without recognizing
this in the least – is represented as
something self-evidently already answered
and known. The elevation of human being
by way of its flight into technicity –
explanations based on race – the
“leveling”
vellierung” von allen “Erscheinungen” auf die of all “appearances” down to the basic form of
Grundform des “Ausdruckes” von ... – das “(x is) the expression of ...” all this is always
alles ist immer “richtig” und für jeden “correct” and “plausible” to all – because
“einleuchtend” – weil es hier nichts zu fragen questions cannot arise when the question
gibt, da im Voraus die Frage nach dem Wesen concerning the essential sway of truth remains
der Wahrheit unzugänglich bleibt. Diese inaccessible in advance. This “doctrine” is
“Lehre” unterscheidet sich von den sonstigen distinct from other “scientific worldviews” only
“naturwissenschaftlichen Weltanschauungen” because it apparently affirms everything
nur dadurch, daß sie alles “Geistige” “spiritual” and makes it “efficacious” – and yet,
scheinbar bejaht, ja erst zur “Wirkung” bringt at the same time, it profoundly negates the spirit
und doch zugleich und im Tiefsten verneint in in the form of a negation that approaches the
einer Verneinung, die dem radikalsten most radical nihilism. For in the “final
Nihilismus zutreibt – denn alles ist “letzten analysis”, which is to say from its inception,
Endes”, d. h. schon an seinem Beginn, everything is an “expression” of race. In the
“Ausdruck” der Rasse. Im Rahmen dieser framework of this teaching, everything and each
Lehre ist alles und jedes, je nach Bedarf, thing, as required, is a teachable construct, and
lehrbar und dieses wiederum muß als Folge this again has to be recognized as a
der brutalitas erkannt werden. consequence of brutalitas.
“Totale Mobilmachung” – aber nie als frei “Total mobilization”: but not as freely embraced
ergriffene und wissend bewältigte Folge der and knowingly mastered consequence of the
Machenschaft des Seienden – sondern nur machination of beings – rather only as an
als unumgängliche Zeiterscheinung neben unavoidable manifestation of the times along
Wagnerischer | Kulturpolitik und with Wagnerian cultural politics and the
wissenschaftlicher Weltanschauung des 19. scientific worldview of the nineteenth century.
Jahrhunderts. Aber dieser “Synkretismus” ist But this “syncretic construct” is only the
doch nur der Vordergrund der eigenen Größe foreground of the authentic greatness of an
dieses Zeitalters, das sein unausgesprochenes epoch whose unspoken principle lies in its
Prinzip hat in der völligen Besinnungs- complete lack of mind-fullness. Its
losigkeit; dem entspricht in der Lehre vom corresponding anthropological doctrine is the
Menschen: das Prinzip der Rasse als racial principle as fundamental truth. This
Grundwahrheit. Dieses Prinzip wird jetzt vom principle, now first of all derived from human
Menschen erst gewonnen und für sein being, is posited as the ground and temporal
Menschentum als Zeit und Grund angesetzt – principle of humanity. A principle from whence
ein Prinzip – aus dem die Tierheit der Tiere the animality of the animal lives – in and “of
“von selbst” lebt. itself”.
“Menschheit” und “Persönlichkeit” sind selbst “Humanity” and “personality” are themselves
nur Ausdruck und Eigenschaften der only expressions and properties of animality.
Tierheit – das Raubtier ist die Urform des The beast of prey is the original form of the
“Helden” – denn in ihm sind alle Instinkte “hero” – for whom all instincts remain whole,
unverfälscht durch “Wissen” – und zugleich unfalsified by “knowledge”, and yet, at the
gebändigt durch seinen jeweils rassisch same time, restrained and directed by their
gebundenen Drang. Das Raubtier aber mit den respective, racially constrained impulse. But a
Mitteln der höchsten Technik ausgestattet – beast of prey, furnished with means of the most
vollendet die Verwirklichung der brutalitas advanced technology – consummates the
des Seins, so zwar, daß in ihrem Dunst auch actualization of the brutalitas of being – yet
alle “Kultur” und die historisch aufrechenbare so, that all of “culture” and object-historically
Geschichte – das Geschichtsbild – gestellt reckoned views of history are left behind in its
wird – dann gibt es noch einmal für die dust. And then – a “happy” era of discovery
“Wissenschaften” eine “fröhliche” Zeit sich upon discovery, once again, for the “sciences” –
jagender Entdeckungen und dann? Welche and there after? What convulsion shall be
Erschütterung ist wesentlich genug, um eine fundamental enough to give rise to
Besinnung entspringen zu lassen? Oder behält mindfulness? Or will brutalitas have the last
die brutalitas das letzte Wort? Hat sie | es word? But perhaps it has already spoken, and
vielleicht schon gesprochen, so daß alles nur all that follows is only a meaningless delirium
noch der leere Taumel in das lange Ende of long-delayed demise – an end in fate-
ist – in die Untergangslosigkeit als die lessness, this abortive construct of “eternity”?
Mißgestalt der “Ewigkeit”?
§ 88 [119–123], S. 438–440: § 88 [119–123]:
Rainer Maria Rilke. – Man fordert von mir Rainer Maria Rilke: again, and again, one
immer wieder eine Auslegung der “Duineser invites me to offer an explication of the
Elegien”t und die “Stellungnahme” dazu. Man Elegies along with a “statement” of my own
vermutet Verwandtschaft und sogar Gleichheit position. One supposes a certain similarity or
der Stellung – all dies bleibt im Äußerlichen – even identity of standpoints – all this is
die “Elegien” sind mir unzugänglich – wenn ich marginal – for the Elegies are inaccessible to
auch ihre dichterische Kraft und Einzigkeit me – even though I sense and cherish their
inmitten dieser dichtungslosen Jahr- poetic power and uniqueness in these
unpoetic decades.
t
Rainer Maria Rilke: Duineser Elegien. Insel-Verlag: Leipzig 1923 [GA ed.]
zehnte ahne und verehre. Ein dreifach Three essential matters separate my thinking
Wesentliches trennt mein Denken vom from the poet, calling for a wide-ranging
Dichter – d. h. macht ein Gespräch sehr dialogue which still seems premature to me:
weitläufig und läßt es heute noch als verfrüht The first is the a-historicity of his poetry. And
erscheinen: this is to say – it speaks of a humanity
Das Erste ist die Geschichtslosigkeit seiner enveloped in embodiment and animality but
Dichtung – will sagen: die Leib- und nonetheless unwhole, partially excluded from
Tierversunkenheit des Menschen, der unrein aus this realm. The other is the humanization of
diesem Bezirk Ausgewichener bleibt. Das the animal – which doesn’t contradict the
andere ist die Vermenschung des Tieres – was first. The third is the lack of essential
dem ersten nicht widerspricht –. Das Dritte ist decisions, even if the Christian God has been
das Fehlen wesentlicher Entscheidungen, overcome. Although essentially and poetically
wenngleich der christliche Gott überwunden ist. more authentically rooted, no more than
Rilke steht, obwohl wesentlicher und Stefan George does Rilke travel the path of
dichterischer in seinem Eigentlichen, so wenig the “the poet’s calling” initiated by Hölderlin,
wie Stefan George in der Bahn der von which no-one has hitherto taken up. Even less
Hölderlin gegründeten, aber noch nirgends than George has Rilke overcome Western
übernommenen Berufung “der Dichter”. Rilke humanity and its “world” on the path of poetic
hat nicht – und noch weniger George – thoughtfulness. In and for his own self he is
dichterisch-denkend den abendländischen more heroic – governed by an unclarified
Menschen und dessen “Welt” bewältigt – er “fate” that childlike seeks to reach back to
trägt für sich – “heroischer” als viele der heute pre-history – than the many, the loud,
lauten “Helden”, die Heroismus mit der bloßen “heroes” of today, who confuse heroism with
Brutalität eines Straßenkampfes verwechseln – the simple brutality of a street-fight. Despite
ein ungeklärtes – in das Vorgeschichtliche – all this, his “works” will survive, even if
Kindhafte Zurückwollendes “Schicksal”. certain artistic turns, which flourish in George
Trotzdem wird sein “Werk” bleiben, wenn auch in a different way, need to be left behind. If
Manches Artistische, das bei George noch ganz only his contemporaries would leave off with
anders wuchert, abfallen muß. Wenn nur die their obtrusive “interpretations” and find other
zudringlichen “Interpretationen” der Heutigen things to occupy them.
anderen Beschäftigungen sich zuwenden [...]
wollten.
[...]
Doch vorläufig wird noch jedes Schweigen For the time being, reticence is still taken in a
auch nur historisch genommen als bloße historical sense as simple reserve, or evasion,
Zurückhaltung und als Ausweichen, als or as an indication of not-belonging – one still
Nichtdazugehören – man mißt es weiterhin am judges it by the public norms of the public
öffentlichen Betrieb der Öffentlichkeit und sphere. And one remains incapable of
vermag noch nicht zu wissen, daß Schweigen understanding that reticence, as the saving
schon zur Rettung und Zuweisung des index of the sought-for word, a word of simple
gesuchten, Einfaches nennenden, Wortes in die naming, points us toward the grounding of
Gründung des Seyns geworden. Wie Vieles beyng. How much more and how completely
aber muß und wie völlig erst der Zerstörung must things fall prey to destruction before the
anheimfallen, bevor an die Stelle der distress of beyng dis-places the needs of life’s
Lebensnot und der Wünschbarkeiten die Not necessities and its desirable pleasures. Only so
des Seyns rückt, um so die frühere Stelle, die can the former place, the “world” of humanity,
“Welt” des Menschen, zu verwandeln in die be transformed into the site of a struggle – that
Stätte eines Kampfes, der vielleicht Kriege may not, perhaps, exclude times of peace and
und Friedenszeiten nicht ausschließt, aber times of war – which does not, however, ever
niemals aus dem nur “Kriegerischen” sich determine itself by way of the warlike. For the
bestimmt, das ja jetzt erst sich in seiner “warlike” now, in its modern manifestation, is
neuzeitlichen Gestalt als Folge, nicht als the consequence of the machination of
Beherrschung der Machenschaft des beings, not the mastery thereof. As the
Seienden, herausstellt. Durch den consequence of the exclusive primacy of
ausschließlichen Vorrang des machination – of warlike, technical, and
machenschaftlichen – kriegerisch- object-historical “struggle” – the epoch must
technisch-|-historischen “Kampfes” entfernt of necessity distance itself, in its innermost
sich das Zeitalter notwendig in einer essence and to the most extreme degree, from
Wesensweite am weitesten vom Wesen des the ownmost sway and dominion of struggle
Kampfes als der vieltorigen Pforte des Seyns as striving for the sake of the many-gated
zur Erstreitung der Lichtung, in der sich das clearing of beyng. The clearing is the site of
Fremdeste sein Wesen entgegnet – versagend ownmost encounter of the most strange –
verschenkt und aus der höchsten Milde bindet. withholding itself it gives itself, binding
Deshalb aber ist auch das fernste Wort des mildly and nobly. And therefore is the most
Dichters ein Wink in das Ungegründete – reserved word of the poet also a sign, pointing
Erst-zu-Nennende – deshalb ist er Geschichte, to the ungrounded – the yet-to-be-named –
will sagen, Zu-kunft und Ankunft einer Not, therefore, is this word history-founding,
die das Seyn selbst in das unseiend gewordene saying, it arrives out of the to-come of a
“Seiende” reißt. Deshalb bedürfen wir der distress that inscribes beyng itself into
befremdlichen Vorboten und sollten sie nicht “beings” that have become unbeings. For this
in die Plattheit des Zeitgemäßen reason, we have need of these disconcerting
hinüberrechnen und dann in Brauchbares precursors. Nor should we recount and
und Unbrauchbares zerteilen und so der translate their word into contemporary
unausweichlichen Verwüstung platitudes, and so, dividing these into portions
anheimgeben. usable and unusable, inescapably give the
word over to desolation.
Despite its composite structure, based in the interrelation of several concepts

requiring further consideration, the present division of the text is related to the inter-
section of the incompatible concepts, as Heidegger believes, of the domination of
“modern humanity” and the solitude of “future humanity”. It will be reserved to the
reader to take note how Heidegger comes to recognize this explicit opposition and
how he nonetheless proposes to see beyond the terminal stage of his time into
the future.
The last word shall not be left to the brutality of machination, but to a new begin-
ning that is to be prepared by “future humanity”. In the counter-positioning of these
two forms of humanity, the Occident either stands or falls into decay and with it the
fate of Heidegger’s projecting-open of a “new beginning”. In order to pre-empt pos-
sible misconceptions, our first objective is to circumscribe the concept of “modern
humanity”. Long-sought essential knowing always remains in the background, and
in fact, in such fashion, that no related concept can be separated from this context.
All conjecture would be misleading; and for this reason, the text requires a step by
step reading to clearly establish – without any commentary whatsoever – the precise
course of Heidegger’s reflections. Hence Heidegger’s critique of an era dominated
by technology, and as such, his consequent critique of instrumental reason, his
uncompromising position on “racial doctrine” and the “warlike, technical, and
object-historical” interpretation of “struggle”. Heidegger’s reliance on the concept
of “struggle” is far removed from the least concession to the dominion of the
machinery of war in his time. The urgency of essential questioning from out of the
“solitude” of a “necessary turn unto being (Notwendigkeit des Seins)” becomes ever
more urgent. Heidegger’s reflections sharply evoke a sense of the decay of the time
along with a certain, resonating attunement of reticent-attentive solitude.
Let first of all consider variations on the concept of “modern humanity” to get a
better sense of its fundamental character: “the human being as subjectum”
(Ponderings XIII, § 34 [23]); “the dominant character of humanity” (§ 71); “the
dominion of the subject (to humanity as historical animal)” (Ponderings X, § 46);
“modern humanity”, which appears three times in the first, long section of
Ponderings XI (§ 1); “to the humanity of this epoch” (§ 29). In consideration of the
fact that the context of this division is constituted by the crossing of modern human-
ity [into the other beginning], we can already anticipate Heidegger’s critique of
subjectivity, for it gives human being an absolute priority arising out of its blindness
to the necessity a return to the question of being.
The individualistic isolation of modern man is the natural consequence of the
humanization of humanity, as is intimated by a number of key terms that Heidegger
uses: recurrent references to “enliving” (Ponderings VII, § 56); “the governing
addiction to ‘enliving’, which will always find an unmediated confirmation and
reassertion of its semblance of truth in what one calls ‘life’” (§ 71); an intensive
demand for the real and “the reality of the real (Wirklichen)” along with the fantasy
of belonging “to the rooted ones (Bodenständigen)” and “contributors to our com-
mon rootedness (Bodenständigkeit)” (§ 75); the talk of “life” and “enliving”
(Ponderings XI, § 1); (5) the predilection for “closeness to life” (§ 29); “the decom-
position of all essential ways-to-be of human comportment and attunement, their
dissolution into the undifferentiated business of enliving [...] all one achieves is to
swamp the last remaining islands under relentless inundations of commonality” (§
40); “continuous opportunities of ‘en-living’” (§ 42). The use of this vocabulary
elucidates the ownmost essence of modern humanity and its position in a world that
bears witness to the fundamental incapacity of this way of being to experience
events as anything other than a historical process, within which man “lives” and
“enlives” his life. In all this, it is not yet clear – assuming this is even possible – to
“whom” Heidegger’s critique of “modern humanity” is actually intended to apply.
The way to the clarification of this issue is prepared by section § 44 (Ponderings
X). “As long as the ownmost of humanity is predetermined by animality (animali-
tas) we can only ask what the human being is. The question – who is the human? –
can never be asked”. This question proves itself impossible as long as the question
does not arise out of the truth of being. The question concerning mankind and for
the sake of mankind is as such impossible, and for this reason Heidegger offers a
critique of the manipulation of national community or any possible concept of
national community presupposing the modern concept of mankind. Section § 44 is
decisive in this regard. First of all, the question as a wager with the truth of being:
“This question alone overcomes the modern, anthropological determination of
human being and therewith all preceding Christian-Hellenistic, Jewish and Socratic-
Platonic anthropology”.
Heidegger concentrates entirely on modern humanity and its doings and designs,
for this is the theatre that evokes the urgent mission of those who have taken it upon
themselves to prepare knowing awareness. For this precisely is the task of “future
humanity”. This is the sole point of departure from which a new “beginning” may
be founded. Furthermore, as a number of occasional remarks indicate, Heidegger’s
critique of “modern humanity” has nothing in common with [the affirmation of]
folk community.
More substantial evidence for this can be found in section § 4 of Ponderings
VIII. Contemporary “ahistoricity (Geschichtslosen)” is supported by “destruction
(Zerstörung)” and “uprootedness (das Bodenlose)”. Their blending derives of the
“same refusal of the ownmost (Unwesen)”. Heidegger’s use of the concept of
Unwesen can decisively help us to gradually identify the targets of his discourse: “It
is evident that in the course of the consummation of modernity the beingness of
beings as machination only establishes the unity of the unconditional essence and
refusal of the ownmost of that which has already been inscribed in the history of
being of the Occident by ‘metaphysics’” (Ponderings XI, § 29); “Responsibility
rests, at least in part, with the empty arrogance of ‘intellectuals’, whose nature (or
unnaturing) [Wesen (oder Unwesen)] certainly does not consist in protecting knowl-
edge and educational formation [...]” (§ 53); passing from volume GA 95 to GA 97,
Heidegger refers to the “mystery of non-essencing (des Unwesens) – ‘cognition’
and ‘knowledge’ that is offered to us by the ‘sciences’ and ‘praxis’” (Observations
I, [28]); “But the Germans, confused and driven by malign destiny to assume what
is not their ownmost (Unwesen)” (Observations I, [97]); “the unnatural (Unwesen)
irresponsibility with which Hitler raged and wreaked havoc across Europe”
(Observations III, [46]). One only has to follow this train of thought in order to see
how Heidegger understands Hitler’s “essence” from his “non-essence”. Hitler is
said to exemplify “non-essencing”.
Before we tackle the theme of Jewry as presented in section § 4 of Ponderings
VIII, I propose to clarify Heidegger’s position regarding “ground, foundation, or
native soil (Boden)”, “blood (Blut)”, of “race (Rasse)” and the “doctrine of race”. In
section § 59 of Ponderings X, which I already explicated in chapter III, section 3.1.,
we came upon a passage wherein Heidegger quite explicitly explains how alienated
he is from the futile politics of his time: “All ‘blood’ and ‘race’ and each and every
‘folk community’ are all in vain, blindly running their course of expiration, unless
attuned to a wager for the sake of being [...]”. This is the basis from which to recon-
struct the context and to elucidate the difficulties raised by Heidegger’s scattered
observations on Jewish matters. Otherwise, we run the risk of tearing the word
“Jewry”, and related words, out of context, giving free rein to such instrumental
interpretations as will be refuted below as unjustified. Heidegger’s reflections
include many passages difficult to reconcile with interpretations that confidently
assert the anti-Semitic “contamination” of the Black Notebooks.
Let us return to the first section of Ponderings XI (§ 1), whose context is consti-
tuted by a “modern humanity” that is defined by its relation to the calculability of
beings, only to ultimately fall prey to becoming calculable to itself “once the human
being, conceived as animal (race and blood), posits itself as its own goal”. Thus,
being is forgotten, and history is planned by a being that is constantly driven by its
addiction to flighty “reality (Wirklichen)” even as it remains ignorant of “un-reality
(Unwirklichen)”. We take note of another dichotomy that can help us to understand
the relation between “ground (Boden)” as native soil, “blood (Blut)”, and “race
(Rasse)”, on the one hand, and on the other, a category of “reality (Wirklichen)” that
has nothing to do with the “un-reality (Unwirklichen)” to which Heidegger will later
return. This dichotomy between the superficially “real” and the “unreal”, which also
appears in section § 75 of Ponderings VII, should be read in relation to section § 262
of Contributions: “But in the meantime, beings in the shape of what is objective and
extant have become ever more powerful. Beyng is confined to the final pallor of the
most abstract generality, and everything ‘general’ comes under the suspicion of
being aesthetic and unreal (Unwirklichen), of being what is merely ‘human’ and
therefore ‘inessential’. [...] One has come so far as to ‘get along’ without beyng”.24
Only on the basis of a concept of “the real” encapsulated in the abstraction of the
fixity of the merely present could the opinion arise that “such operational concern
for blood and soil and what can be achieved and lived by it touches on what is
authentically real” (Ponderings XI, § 29). Modernity is fated to live out a mere sem-
blance of living; for in their reliance on the palpably “real”, the conceptual assis-
tance of the sciences, which appropriates for itself the life of the real, only generates
the slow process of the “deracination (Entwurzelung)” of beyng, wherein calcula-
tive thinking secures its victory over speculative thinking: “Herein beingness over-
powers itself to elevate itself into the height of power. [...] Yet an epoch for which
truth cannot be a genuine need – given the primacy of the real and the effective – and
which, accordingly, must also experience truthlessness as asset rather than as defi-
cit, will also evaluate any sort of clinging to what was once a ‘truth’ as a vain
impulse [...]” (§ 29).
Although the constellation of forces defining the epoch are not easy to manage,
due to the inexorable measures of machination that human beings establish, by
24
Heidegger M. (1989), § 262, p. 449. English translation, p. 316.
which in turn they are subjugated, Heidegger insists on enduring “the questionable-
ness of the still unquestioned: the question of beyng and the grounding of its truth”
(§ 29). Who shall be entrusted with this mission of re-construction is a question we
shall soon encounter; and in this fashion the fundamental design of the new begin-
ning may be delineated.
In section § 42 of Ponderings XI, brutalitas is designated as “the absoluteness of
the machination of being” that enables the production of being according-to-plan in
accordance with certain categories derived from the legacy of metaphysics. These
categories constantly recur to a tradition that cannot lead us back onto the path of
beyng. Neither these categories, nor whatever dogmatic formulations, are of use in
this undertaking. They are far removed from “knowing awareness” because they
presuppose that everything has already been decided, designed and ordered,
whereas essential knowing seeks a path of questioning that received modes of
thinking cannot exemplify. Heidegger’s way of questioning does not rest upon
received postulates but consists in a seeking that is inherently a ceaseless
questioning.
One only needs to glace through section § 42 of Ponderings XI to find categories
that are far removed from the projecting-open of a future from out of a “primordial
knowing of the questionableness of being”. First of all, the “never-ever-too-many
(Niemals-zu-Vielen)”, that is, the romanticists of “the ‘Reich’, of folk community,
of ‘native soil’ and of ‘comradeship’”. “Folk community” as collective concept is to
be understood, in this context, as referencing national or ethnic character; on the
other hand, the translation of Judentum into foreign languages is not so easy. The
“never-ever-too-many” in Heidegger’s view, include the “Christians” – presumably
those Christians, or hangers-on, who have taken the first available opportunity of
achieving political influence – and those of old Judea. What is Heidegger’s intent in
calling “Christians” and those of ancient Judea “marginal and unknowing promot-
ers of brutalitas”, who also “obstruct essential knowing while clearing the path for
the brutalitas of being”? The question this poses should be considered in the light of
section § 84 of Ponderings IX: “The ambiguity and arbitrary significance of such
names (belief, knowledge, science, culture, and so on) no longer merely indicate the
interplay of meaning within a well-grounded realm of signification [...], but rather
are an indication of the deracination of the truth of beyng, given that such rooted
stand in beyng has ever been”.
This unequivocal position clearly demarcates the distinction between belief and
essential knowing, given that belief and the dogma arising out of belief presupposes
a particular perspective; on the other hand, however, it should not be overlooked that
concepts of “racial doctrine” were quite alien to Heidegger’s thought, even as those
who supported such doctrines remain ignorant of essential knowing. Consequently,
in section § 42 of Ponderings XI, Heidegger offers the following remarks on
“Christians” and the “ancient Jewish” sensibility: “The brutalitas of being has as
consequence – by no means is it the cause – that human being makes itself, as a
being, out to be the factum brutum and thus it rationalizes and ‘justifies’ its animal-
ity by racial doctrine. For this reason, the doctrine concerning ‘life’ is the most
scurrilous form in which the questionability of beyng [...] is represented as
something self-evidently already known. The elevation of human being by way of

its flight into technicity – explanations based on race – the leveling of all ‘appear-
ances’ down to the basic form of ‘(x is) the expression of’ [...] all this is always
‘correct’ and ‘plausible’ to all – because questions cannot arise when the question
concerning the essential sway of truth remains inaccessible in advance”. It doesn’t
require much insight to see how far Heidegger is removed from the racial principle
dominating the culture of the time and from a politics of the primacy of rootedness
as the sole presupposition of survival. In the same section – § 42 – he therefore adds
[that the “syncretic construct” of “total mobilization”] “is only the foreground of the
authentic greatness of an epoch whose unspoken principle lies in its complete lack
of mindfulness. Its corresponding anthropological doctrine is the racial principle as
fundamental truth”.
Heidegger cannot be indifferent to the doctrine of race because it reflects the
decay of politics into brutality, ultimately reaching its apex in technicity, and as
such it can only be countered by the counter-thrust of mindfulness. This is the rea-
son, the sole reason, why he poses this question: “What convulsion shall be funda-
mental enough to give rise to mindfulness?”. We have come to the point where we
need to elucidate the word “Jewry (Judentum)” and its implications. Then we can
conclude our discussion of this division of the text with some thoughts leading us –
as far as possible – closer to the intended meaning of “solitude” and of “future
humanity” and their relation to the decay of the times.
However that may be, first of all let us explicate an aspect of the text that we
cannot afford to ignore. In section § 4 of Ponderings VIII we come upon the term
Judentum, grammatically speaking a collective neuter noun, ending in “-tum” and
so analogous to Russentum (Russianness), Christentum (Christianity), Slawentum
(Slavic tradition), Amerikanertum (American tradition), all of which occur in vol-
ume GA 95. As I have already repeatedly emphasized in my previous explication
of GA 94, Heidegger does not use ontic designations in the common manner. In
each case, the collective term refers to the “character”, “attitude”, “ethos”, the
“comportment” that underlies and supports individual determinations; these
should not be confused with ideological or sectarian traits of behaviour, and still
less with ethnic belonging. In Heidegger’s usage, these collective concepts point
to something that goes beyond all the layers of meaning that have accumulated in
the course of their historical interpretation. To rest content with “superficial”
senses of these terms will inevitably lead to misconceptions. The Italian translator
of volume GA 95 falls into such error, when she writes: “Heidegger’s use of the
collective noun in regard to the entities that busily hurried across the world stage
in the years before and during the World War refer to specific ethnic and national
communities – Russentum, Slawentum, Chinesentum, Amerikanertum, and so
forth. These terms are translated here by of ‘Russian’, ‘Slavic’, ‘Chinese’, or
‘American’ character. A sole exception, however, was made in the case of the
term Judentum: clearly not coined by Heidegger, this word, sensitive and thorny,
makes its appearance (scabrosa comparsa) in the second volume of the Black
Notebooks and will always be translated by ‘ebraismo’ (Hebraism)”.25 Given this

exception in translation for the term Judentum, and based on her assertion that the
term “clearly was not coined” by Heidegger, we may conclude that she was not
aware of Heidegger’s guiding directive not to reduce the meaning of such terms to
ethnic or national identity. Her presupposition contradicts the fundamental prin-
ciple at issue, which calls for the transformation of these ontic concepts, differen-
tiating them from worldviews that reduce beings to the reality of the present and
to designations of national identity. The anticipatory guideline of her translation,
which is confirmed by the exception made for the translation of das Judentum –
forcefully tearing it out of its extensive and differentiated context – requires a
preconceived supposition. This supposition clearly comes to word in the transla-
tion at issue: “A sole exception, however, was made in the case of the term
Judentum [...] a word, sensitive and thorny, [that] makes its appearance (scabrosa
comparsa) in the second volume of the Black Notebooks”.26 If the adjectives “sen-
sitive and thorny” are used to modify the Judentum as it appears in the Notebooks,
and if this word is isolated from related concepts, and if this is done with the
intention of signifying the rejection of the “Jewish character” (inherent in das
Judentum) then it becomes plain that the Italian translation is governed by a pre-
judgment based upon an ideological instrumentalization of the Black Notebooks.
And this indicates an approach that far exceeds what Heidegger intended to
communicate.
In this book, the use, or misuse, of each these collective nouns, be it Russentum,
Slawentum, Chinesentum, or Amerikanertum, has more extensive signification than
in common usage. This is in accordance with Heidegger’s opinion that these words,
ending in the suffix “-tum” refer to the character of these collectives, and this also
applies without distinction to the Jewish “character” as expressed in das Judentum
(Jewry).
In this regard, return to section § 19 of Contributions is relevant in order to coun-
ter falsification of the texts. When Heidegger poses the question, asking, “Who are
we?” the “we” does not refer to just one people: for “we are not the only ones but a
people among other peoples”.27 A question of this kind, furthermore, refers us
beyond the “we” toward a much more fundamental question, which shatters the
foundations of the original posing of the question: “The will to self-being (Selbst-
sein) renders the question futile”.28 And furthermore: “This self-mindfulness has
left all ‘subjectivity’ behind, including that which is most dangerously hidden in the
cult of ‘personality’”.29 Heidegger’s approach is clear enough and avoids being
entangled in the finely-spun net of subjectivism, not to mention in the net of the
25
Iadicicco A. Avvertenza della traduttrice (Translator’s Foreword): See Heidegger M. (2016), p.
xi (our translation).
26
Ibid.
27
28
29
systematic development of an idea of the people, in whatever form – as if it were

possible to refrain from postulating a plural concept of the “we” by way of a concept
of the being of selfhood. This approach remains inadequate as long as the grounding
question (Grundfrage) is not considered: “Above all the question ‘who are we?’
must remain purely and fully enjoined (eingefügt) with the inquiry into the ground-
ing question: How does beyng hold sway?”.30
This recurrence to the perspective of questioning of section § 19 of the
Contributions is decisive for the additional reason that while the collective nouns
“Jewry (Judentum)” and “Russianness (Russentum)” occur only once in this opus,
“Christianity (Christentum)” appears twice, in section § 19 (which is our present
focus) and in section § 72 of Contributions. With reference to “the final form of
Marxism”, Heidegger writes: “insofar as the dominance of reason as equalization of
all people is merely the consequence of Christianity and Christianity is fundamen-
tally of Jewish origins [...], Bolshevism is actually Jewish; but then Christianity is
fundamentally Bolshevist!”.31
Leaving aside that in the Italian translation “Russianness” is rendered as
“Russia”, significant here is the close relation between Jewry and Christianity, or
rather, the derivation of the latter from the former. Remarking on the “character” of
Jewry and of Christianity, and the proximity of both to Bolshevism, Heidegger tends
to equate the two based on stereotypes of the period; these will not appear in
Heidegger’s subsequent woks (there is nothing in extant text to suggest otherwise).
Heidegger’s criticism in section § 19 of Contributions focuses on “the dominance of
rationality” and the impossibility of posing the philosophical question “who are
we?” as long as “the Occident has not been justified on grounds of its own history”.32
Above all the question “who are we?” must remain purely and fully enjoined with
the grounding question: “How does beyng hold sway?”.33
Based on section § 42 of Ponderings XI, in which Heidegger distances himself
from “doctrines of race”, and in consideration of the significance “Jewry” as collec-
tive noun, the position of those who seek to discover the systematic anti-Semitic
“contamination” of being-historical thinking in Heidegger’s reflections can only be
validated with great difficulty. The attempt to substantiate this theory indeed finds
itself confronted with great difficulties, because our interpretation just touches on
the present division of the text, and yet includes all passages that could offer mate-
rial in support of the supposedly undeniable thesis of anti-Semitism in the Black
Notebooks. These passages are far more profound, although their scope will escape
those readers who remain alien to “knowing awareness” as projected-open in
Heidegger’s thinking. Furthermore, on the basis of what Heidegger himself writes
in Ponderings (1938–1939), we may also set aside the thesis that Heidegger’s think-
ing “fundamentally accords” with that of the National Socialist movement. The
30
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid. (mod. B.R.).
33
Ibid.
essential problem of the Notebooks consists solely and entirely in the respective
stratification, or complexity, of many basic concepts of Heidegger’s philosophy, as
well as the constant requirement of needing to integrate Heidegger’s observations
into their proper context. For example, consider section § 5 of Ponderings VIII:
“One of the most concealed and perhaps oldest forms of the gigantic is the tenacious
dexterity in calculating, hustling, and interblending through which the worldless-
ness (Weltlosigkeit) of Jewry (des Judentums) is grounded”.
This is the only passage in the Notebooks that uses the word “worldlessness
(Weltlosigkeit)”. In Heidegger’s philosophy, “worldlessness” is not exclusive to
Jewry (Judentum), it belongs to the modern epoch as such, for one cannot con-
ceive modern humanity except in terms of an understanding of world defined by
the calculative thinking that permeates the epoch. In fact, the word “worldless-
ness” is also used in the Freiburg lectures of the Winter semester 1929/1930 in the
context of a comprehensive investigation of the following, threefold division: the
stone is “worldless”, the animal is “poor in world”, human being is “world-
forming”.34 “World” is a context of significance, while the stone, in accordance
with its being and in contrast to the animal, remains enclosed in itself; the animal,
although receptive to a world, lives its benumbment and remains entirely excluded
from understanding of being and of world. For the animal, the respective environ-
ment, or encompassing world, constitutes its only world-openness, and therefore
it is said to be “world-poor”. Modern humanity – to which Jewry also belongs – is
subject to the privation of world-significance, and the fundamental helplessness to
which it leads, for its existence is accountable to calculative thinking. Significance
of world arises out of the ground of being-historical thinking, which can never be
experienced by calculative thinking. The equation of thinking with calculation,
however, by no means pertains solely to Jewry, for it touches all of modern human-
ity in its epoch. In section § 15 of Ponderings X, Heidegger once again recurs to
the concepts, presented here, which relate back to GA 29/30. On this basis, we
may come to understand how “worldlessness” is to be overcome by enowning;
although the topic addressed there relates to section § 5, Ponderings VIII, matters
of Jewry are not even mentioned. In what follows, the discussion is elaborated in
Ponderings XI, focusing on the opposition of “modern” and “future” humanity.
The substantially critical aspects pertaining to modernity are never understood in
such fashion, as if to counter or refute them, for they constitute the basis of their
own decay. This is clear from section § 71, of Ponderings VII: they represent “a
form of desolation (Verwüstung) that cannot, directly, be contained because the
dominant character of humanity institutes and furthers it in service of its own
self-securing”.
For Heidegger, the “new beginning” is characterized by a “future humanity” that
has set itself on the path of the truth of being; the “‘semblance of truth’ of what one
calls ‘life’” (§ 71) and “pseudo-philosophy” generated by calculative thinking sets
itself in opposition to “future humanity” (Ponderings XI, § 29). An additional
34
See Heidegger M. (1992), pp. 261ff. English translation, pp. 176ff.
reference to Contributions can help us understand the ownmost essence and primary
features of “future humanity”: “They reside in masterful knowing, as what is truth-
ful knowing. [...] this knowing-awareness has no ‘value’; it does not count and can-
not be directly taken as a condition for the current enterprise”.35
Other fundamental characteristics of the “future ones” emphasize their opposi-
tion to the typical forms of comportment of the instrumental thinking that marks
modernity. In sections § 248 through § 252 of Contributions the future ones are
characterized as follows: as “strangers”, “the stillest witness[es] to the stillest still-
ness”; “lingering and long-hearing founders”; they “are the inabiding ones who
ceaselessly expose themselves to questioning”; they know not “noisy ‘optimism’”;
the seekers, the “few (Wenige) to come [who] count among themselves the essen-
tially unpretentious ones”.36
Since “the future ones” have been assigned to take the step back to the inception,
the present division of our text offers characteristic observations that illuminate the
author of these Ponderings – a kind of self-portrait. For example, in section § 14 of
Ponderings X: “A thinker – is one who so casts a question wagering the truth of
beyng – without possibility of supporting echo – into the midst of the perpetual
curiosity of the ever-unquestioning that it stands in itself like an abysmal pillar in
the midst of those supposedly rooted ones and all that they account to be good and
solidly supported”.
A questioning that wagers the truth of beyng has ever dispensed with the possi-
bility of an echo and should not be confused with the functional in-difference of
forms of action working in conjunction with “enliving”. In talk of the “real”, such
wager as this – in solitude to hear the call of beyng – is inconceivable. “For one can-
not produce ‘solitude’ (Einsamkeit) on demand, nor can one ‘will’ it to be – solitude
is of the rarest and a necessity of being” (Ponderings XI, § 40).
“The epoch of total lack of questioning does not tolerate anything worthy of
questioning and destroys any and all solitude. [...] This epoch of total lack of ques-
tioning can be withstood only through an epoch of simple solitude, in which pre-
paredness for the truth of beyng itself is being prepared”.37 In such “solitude”,
reticence becomes the openness, the receptivity, for the hearing of beyng. It plausi-
bly suggests itself that Heidegger found his way into this other kind of questioning,
in which one ever again “seeks” in the to-come what was founded in the inception:
“If a history is still to be granted us, i.e., a style of Da-sein, then this can only be the
sheltered history of deep stillness, in and as which the mastery of the last god opens
and shapes beings”.38 Ways of thinking that could help us to intimate a little better,
even if from afar, Heidegger’s standpoint in the highly contentious epochal situation
in which he found himself – in that time of “the exclusive primacy of machination –
of warlike, technical, and object-historical ‘struggle’” (Ponderings XI, § 88).
35
36
Ibid. pp. 395–401. English translation, pp. 278–281.
37
38
4 Ponderings XII-XIV: The Black Notebooks 1939–194139
4.1 he National Socialist Worldview: Consequences of Their

T
“Culture – Destroying Impact”
Heidegger returns to the question of National Socialism, its “historical essence” and
the consequences of its “worldview”, which are addressed in serval passages of
Ponderings XIII (§§ 77 and 90), as well as Ponderings XIV ([12]), [41–42], [74–75]
and [106]).
According to various formulations in Ponderings XIII, National Socialism, and
fascism, make their appearance as correlative forms of “authoritarian ‘socialism’”
(§ 73); National Socialism, Bolshevism, and fascism are related forms of “machina-
tion (Machenschaft)” and as such “consummate forms of modernity in its gigan-
tism” (§ 90).
In Ponderings XIV, on the other hand, the theme of the “National Socialist world-
view”, in its inescapable effect on the masses, is approached directly: based on the
opposition of “the people (Volk)” and “the masses (Massen)”, it becomes clear how
the people, endangered by the instrumental way of thinking inherent in machina-
tion, is being manipulated and reduced to a faceless mass. Only with this phase does
a worldview, as the combination of politico-military power and economic control
achieve a stable form. In this context, with regard to Hitler’s address of January 30,
1940, Heidegger refers to “the allegation that the National Socialist worldview is
effectively “destructive of “culture”” (Ponderings XIV [12]). Furthermore, the tran-
sition from “National Socialism” to “rational socialism” ([41–42]), as well as the
essential identity of “Christian philosophy” and “National Socialist philosophy”
([74–75]) are based on their common reliance on “calculative (Rechnung)” thinking.
The word “destruction (Zerstörung)”, and indeed with reference to “culture”,
appears in Ponderings XIII (§ 73); reference to “calculation” may be found in
Ponderings XIV ([41–42] and [74–75]) still in regard to National Socialism and
“Christian philosophy”.
I propose deal with the question of τέχνη, as introduced in Ponderings XIV
([41–42]), in the context of Heidegger’s elucidations in Contributions.
39
See Heidegger M. (2014c).
4 Ponderings XII-XIV: The Black Notebooks 1939–1941 161
Überlegungen xiii Ponderings xiii

§ 73 [42–43], S. 109–110: § 73 [42–43]:
Der Bolschewismus (im Sinne der despotisch- Bolshevism (as Soviet, despotic-proletarian
proletarischen Sowjetmacht) ist weder power) is neither “Asiatic” nor Russian – it
“asiatisch” noch russisch – sondern gehört in rather belongs to the consummation of the
die Vollendung der in ihrem Beginn westlich Western inception of modernity.
bestimmten Neuzeit. Entsprechend ist der Correspondingly, authoritarian “socialism”
autoritäre “Sozialismus” (in den Abwandlungen (in its Fascist and National Socialist
des Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus) eine variations) is a similar (not identical) form of
entsprechende (nicht gleiche) Form der the consummation of modernity.* Bolshevism
Vollendung der Neuzeit*. Der Bolschewismus and authoritarian socialism are metaphysically
und der autoritäre Sozialismus sind the Same and are founded in the dominion of
metaphysisch dasselbe und gründen in der the beingness of beings (see earlier entries to
Vormacht der Seiendheit des Seienden (vgl. Ponderings). The next historical decision to
die früheren Überlegungen). Die nächste come is as follows: will both fundamental
geschichtliche Entscheidung ist: ob beide forms of the consummation of modernity,
Grundformen der Vollendung der Neuzeit independently of one another, successfully
unabhängig voneinander die Seinsverlassenheit and unconditionally consolidate the
des Seienden (und d. h. das Riesenhafte der abandonment of the being of beings
technisch-historisch-politischen Ab- und (understood as the gigantism of the technical,
Einrichtungen) in den unbedingten Erfolg historical, and political amalgamation of all
verfestigen und so in riesenhaftem Stil mit institutions, forms of discipline and
oder ohne ausdrücklichem “politischen” indoctrination), and thereby become the Same
Zusammenschluß dasselbe sind, oder ob durch in the style of gigantism (with or without
sie in einer vermittelten Mittelbarkeit eine | expressive “political” association); or will –
rückgewinnende Befreiung des Russentums zu by way of a mediated mediation – Bolshevism
seiner Geschichte (nicht “Rasse”) und eine and authoritarian socialism initiate the
abgründige Frag-Würdigkeit des Deutschtums liberating recovery of the Russians to their
zu seiner Geschichte sich anbahnt, wobei die historical tradition (not to “race”), and open
Geschichte beider aus demselben verborgenen up the path, in turn, to the ungrounded
Grunde einer anfänglichen Be-stimmung question-worthiness of German tradition in
kommt: die Wahrheit des Seyns (als Er-eignis) relation to its history? Wherein the history
zu gründen. – (Geschichte) of both arises out of the same
* Der Name “Sozialismus” bezeichnet nur dem concealed and reserved ground of inception,
Schein nach noch und für das “Volk” einen attunement and determination: to ground and
Gefühlssozialismus im Sinne der sozialen to found the truth of beyng as en-owning. –
Fürsorge; gemeint ist die politisch-militärische- * Only in appearance does “socialism” still
wirtschaftliche Organisation der Massen. designate, in consideration of the “people”,
Klasse: herrschende Schicht. the socialism of common belonging and
community; what is meant here is the
political, military, and economic organization
of the masses. Class: the ruling elite.

§ 90 [68], S. 126–127: § 90 [68]:
Demarkationslinien zwischen Rußland und Lines of demarcation between Russia and
Deutschland verschleiern nur die Abgründe von Germany only serve to conceal the chasm of
Vorbedingungen für eine noch nicht einmal preconditions – and the necessary questions
erfragte Ent-scheidungu über das Wesen der that have not even been asked – needed to
abendländischen Geschichte. Trennungsstriche bring about a decisive differentiation of the
haben das Verfängliche, das, was im Wesen essence of Occidental history. Dividing lines
dasselbe ist, in seiner Selbigkeit gerade offenbar have the uncomfortable quality of revealing
zu machen. Der Nationalsozialismus ist nicht the sameness of things in essence the same.
Bolschewismus und dieser ist kein Faschismus – National Socialism is not Bolshevism, and
aber beide sind machenschaftliche Siege der Bolshevism is not fascism – but both are
Machenschaft – riesige Vollendungsformen der machinational victories of machination –
Neuzeit – ein errechneter Verbrauch von consummate forms of modernity in its
Volkstümern. gigantism – the calculated expenditure of
historically-founded peoples.
u
Word play: Ent-scheidung = Here it indicates division, differentiation; the Italian translation “de-
cisione” (from lat. de-caedo > decīdo, tagliar via) is only partially equivalent to the value of the
German original. Compare modern English “decision”, ultimately from Latin decisionem “a deci-
sion, settlement, agreement”, from past-participle stem of decidere “to decide, determine”, literally
“to cut off”, from de “off” + caedere “to cut”. The emphasis is on a choice that closes, or cuts off,
other possibilities.
Überlegungen xiv [12], S. 177: Ponderings xiv [12]:

Gegen den Vorwurf der “kultur”-zerstörerischen According to the newspapers, the
Wirkung der nationalsozialistischen allegation that the National Socialist
Weltanschauung ist nach der Zeitung jetzt ein worldview is effectively destructive of
klares Zeugnis aus der Führerrede vom 30. Januar “culture” can be countered by the
1940 festzuhalten, worin auch die “Dichter und unequivocal evidence offered by the
Denker” als “Arbeiter” anerkannt sind: “>Der Führer’s speech of January 30, 1940, for
Dichter und Denker braucht außerdem nicht soviel herein “thinkers and poets” are also
Nahrung als der Schwerstarbeiter<. (Heiterkeit).”v acknowledged as “workers”: “The thinker
and the poet, furthermore, does not require
as much food as the manual labourer
(laughter)”.
v
Max Domarus: Hitler. Reden und Proklamationen 1932–1945. Bd. ii. Untergang. Erster Halbband.
Süddeutscher Verlag: München 1965, S. 1456. Es heißt: “[...] wie der Schwerarbeiter” [GA ed.]
Überlegungen xiv [41–42], S. 195: Ponderings xiv [41–42]:

Vom National-sozialismus zum Rational- From National-socialism to rational-socialism:
sozialismus, d. h. zur unbedingten which is to say, we are on the way to a
Durchrechnung und Verrechnung des calculative settling of accounts of the
Zusammenseins der Menschentümer in sich belonging-together of national-historical
und miteinander. communities, within themselves and with each
Diese Rationalität verlangt die höchste other.
Geistigkeit. Das Wesen des abendländischen This form of rationality demands the highest
Geistes als τέχνη. degree of spirituality. The essence of the Occident
as τέχνη.
Überlegungen xiv [74–75], S. 214–215: Ponderings xiv [74–75]:

Die “christliche Philosophie” ist so jedesmal die In effect, “Christian philosophy” always
Koppelung zweier “Halbheiten”. Und man demands the coupling of two “half-
könnte versucht sein, sich auszurechnen, daß measures”. One might be tempted to reckon
zwei “Halbheiten” doch ein Ganzes ergeben that two “halves” must, after all, compose
müßten. Aber diese Rechnung geht fehl, wenn one whole. Yet this calculation does not
sie übersieht, daß dieses errechnete Ganze nur compute, because it overlooks the fact that
eine ganze – d. h. vollständige Halbheit sein this form of accounting can only produce a
kann, in der die Halbheiten nicht beseitigt, complete – that is, a comprehensive,
sondern so gesteigert sind, daß das Ganze die half-measure; the reckoning, therefore, does
völlige Nichtigkeit der Vorstellung einer not result in setting these half-measures
“christlichen Philosophie” dartut. – Freilich aside, but augments them to the point that the
erkennt man nur selten das Unmögliche dieses whole it produces – the idea of a “Christian
Begriffes in seiner Schärfe, weil man sowohl mit philosophy” – sets itself forth in its absolute
dem “Christlichen” als auch mit der nullity. Admittedly one rarely recognizes the
“Philosophie” nie ernst macht, statt dessen aber impossibility of this concept in all its
harmlosere Begriffe unterstellt und dadurch sich pointedness, because one is not really serious
bestätigt hält in solchem Meinen, daß es about the “Christian”, any more than one is
“faktisch” dergleichen ja doch | “gibt” – d. h. es serious about “philosophy”. Instead one
wird von Leuten, die hieran ihr wohlberechnetes interprets this concept in a harmless way and
Interesse haben, ständig verkündigt. Vollends thus confirms the opinion that there is “in
möchte Vielen zunächst schwer eingehen, daß fact” such a thing [as Christian philosophy] –
sich der Wesensart nach eine after all it is constantly proclaimed by people
“nationalsozialistische Philosophie” in Nichts who have a finely-calculated interest in
von der “christlichen Philosophie” unterscheidet. saying so. All the more will many find it
Jeder politisch klar Denkende lehnt daher auch difficult to accept that in its essential way of
folgerichtig jede “Philosophie” innerhalb der being “National Socialist philosophy” is
“Weltanschauung” ab; sie kann höchstens eine indistinguishable from “Christian
rein technisch-scholastische Bedeutung haben. philosophy”. Everyone, therefore, who has a
clear conception of the political will logically
refuse to countenance any kind “philosophy”
in association with a “worldview”, for in this
context it could, at most, have no more than
technical and scholastic significance.

Welcher Unterschied besteht zwischen folgenden What is the difference between the
Vorgängen: Barmat und Kutiskerw machen sich ein following course of events: Barnat and
gutes Geschäft aus der Nachkriegsdemokratie. Kutisker make post-war democracy work
Volksschullehrer werden mit Hilfe der for them to make a good business for
nationalsozialistischen Weltanschauung zu themselves; primary school teachers,
“Philosophen”, um die sich ein ernsthafter Mensch relying on the National Socialist
nie kümmerte? Es besteht kein Unterschied; denn worldview, become “philosophers” to
hier ist das geschichtliche Wesen des whom no serious person ever gave notice?
Nationalsozialismus gleichwenig begriffen, wie There is no difference: for in the one, the
dort das geschichtliche Wesen der historical essence of National Socialism
parlamentarischen Demokratie. is no more grasped than in the other the
historical essence of parliamentary
democracy is grasped.
w
Independently of one another, Ivan Baruch Kutisker (1873–1927) and Julius Barmat (1887–1938)
were sentenced to prison for substantial financial crimes in which politicians were also involved
[GA ed.]
In this division of the text, Heidegger works out some of the nuances of the term
National Socialism. Reviewing our previous explication of the same theme in vol-
umes GA 95 and GA 96, we immediately discover that these more extensive inter-
pretations do not touch on all of the fundamental terms already examined in
Ponderings XIII and XIV: a number of concepts designed to define National
Socialism make their reappearance. For example, reference to the “gigantic
(Riesenhaften)” in Ponderings XIII (§ 73), leads us to our explication of volume GA
9540 and in addition draws upon two further concepts – those of “calculation
(Rechnung)” and “machination (Machenschaft)”. Based on the primacy of the
beingness of beings, this generates a conceptual blockage that necessarily leads to
the “destruction” of culture. The consequences for the German people of the “world-
view” arising out of National Socialism are correspondingly destructive; for the
people, as noted, will be reduced to a faceless collectivity to the degree that neces-
sary questioning becomes dependent upon the political logic of responding to nov-
elty. At this point, the satisfaction of the needs of life becomes the unconditional
goal of an inadequate worldview, which nonetheless insists on its absolute validity.
In all this, executors of machination remain ignorant of “the grounding of the truth
of being (as enowning)”. They gradually prepare, both actively and passively, the
logic of power and its instrumentalization. Thanks to their own incapacity, they are
excluded from the nobility of the grounding question, which arises out of
mindfulness.
It is difficult to see if the distress of being can arise out of the ab-ground – that is,
the ground-lessness – that emerges with the absolute dominion of the beingness of
beings. For one can only become aware of this distress when one has come to the
decision to stand outside the subtle calculations that strengthen the dominion of
totalizing thinking over one’s at least temporarily isolated and encapsulated life.
The transitory and the groundless do not pertain solely to a life caught up in the
fleeting moments of enliving; they are also immanent in “abandonment”. For the
absolute mentioned above must hold dominion in order to overshadow what is –
hence these ways of thought are condemned to failure because this absolute stands
at the edge of ground-lessness and the abandonment of the being of beings. Beset
by this abandonment modernity rushes toward its consummation.
Anticipations of the “National Socialist worldview” and its destruction of “cul-
ture” (Ponderings XIV [12]) arose in the universities. However, considering that
only the securing of what is certain, useful, and functional is given validity, and that
this weakens the necessity of knowing awareness, the consequences of this world-
view for the masses are far-reaching. In order to understand this, it is important to
consider section § 76 of the Contributions more closely, wherein Heidegger
addresses the unavoidable defeat of university culture (even as he does in the
Notebooks):
“‘Universities’ as ‘sites for research and teaching’ (in this way they are products of the
nineteenth century) become merely operational institutions – always ‘closer and closer to
40
See supra, Endnote 13.
reality’ – in which nothing comes to decision. They will retain the last remnant of a cultural
decoration only as long as, for the time being, they must continue to be the instrument for
‘cultural-oriented political’ propaganda. Anything like what is ownmost to the ‘university’
will no longer be able to unfold from them – on the one hand, because the political-national
mobilization renders superfluous such essential thinking; but on the other because scientific
operation maintains its course far more securely and conveniently without the will to
mindfulness”.41
The unavoidable destruction of culture and the lack of “mindfulness”, however,

characterize not only the decline of the universities; these are primary features of an
epoch ruled by the political and military organization of the masses, who live
according to the misconception that the claim to a national character suffices for
contemporary life. What escapes the advancement of a purely realist cultural poli-
tics in service to this unquestionable organization? Without a doubt, it needs to
avoid the lack of certainty that arises with the fluidity of mindfulness, for mindful-
ness as a way of thinking goes beyond the accidental certainties of life, giving itself
and losing itself to the un-real that escapes calculation. For the many this “giving
and losing of oneself” is simply impossible; in consideration of the unquestioned
value of the punctual presence of the real in its absolute stolidity one cannot under-
take and endure this. The “being-on-the-way” of thinking remains un-graspable as
long as one holds oneself in the domain of certainty of palpable reality. The continu-
ous difficulty that besets being-on-the-way consists in its temporally discontinuous
movement, a going that can often be confusing and hard to hold in mind.
In this division of the text, it will be worth our while to pay attention to the
repeated references to everything pertaining to “reason” – for example, Christian
philosophy, as “the coupling of two ‘half-measures’”. This reference to Christian
philosophy – and its long, Judeo-Christian tradition – shows how it mirrors an out-
dated “techno-scholastic” construct according to which definitio (definition) is the
sole measure that secures the beingness of constant presence, thereby elevating the
calculation of measurability to guiding principle. And this becomes the closed cir-
cuit upon which everything depends.
Distancing himself from this way of thinking, Heidegger seeks to prepare the
path to another beginning, one in which being is no longer thought in terms of the
calculability of beings. Since the ownmost essence of human being is grounded in
being, this ownmost implicates the over-passing of beingness and the calling-into-
question of ens as ens creatum. On this basis, we can understand why the discussion
of Christian philosophy belongs in the context of Heidegger’s reflections on ratio-
nalism and why they are always related to “calculation”; for the same reason, he
refers us to the dominion of beingness, as the ground that gives modernity the stabil-
ity that it justifies on the basis of the “certitude” of its own objectivity.
Let us now assess the following passage from Ponderings XIV [41–42]: “This
form of rationality demands the highest degree of spiritual acumen. The essence of
the Occident as τέχνη”. I propose to interpret the term “τέχνη” on the basis of
41
Heidegger M. (1989), pp. 155–156. English translation, p. 108.
references in the Contributions and their systematic treatment.42 For the Notebooks
are limited by their lack of systematic argument in regard to this topic; consequently,
it is pointless to treat Heidegger’s reflections in the Notebooks as if they were draw-
ing conclusions from premises.
With the transformation of modern humanity by a new kind of spirituality, τέχνη
is integrated into the domain of machination: enliving allows the development of a
strategy for the complete domination of beings in service to utility. Knowledge of
beings and the exhaustion of their being in utility generates the deception that every-
thing in the world can be dominated and manipulated by will to power. This domin-
ion and the manipulation that it generates is only possible insofar as human beings
became in-capable of seeing beyond, seeing through, the stolidity of a world of
beings become absolute in itself and reduced to this single plane. Dependency on
beings and their consumption creates an isolated human being – no longer able to
experience the distress of the question of being, this entity is not even aware of lack-
ing an eye for being. In the context of a much more developed and more dominating
phase of τέχνη, the mechanisms of the manipulation of beings are often not even
recognized as such, because the hegemony of beings leads to such encapsulated
42
See ibid. § 50 “Echo”: “What does machination mean? Machination and constant presence:
ποίησις – τέχνη. Where does machination lead? To enliving. How does this happen (ens creatum –
modern nature and history – technicity)? By disenchanting beings, as it makes room for the power
of an enchantment that is enacted by the disenchanting itself. Enchantment and enliving. The
definitive consolidation of the abandonment of being in the forgottenness of being. The epoch of
total lack of questioning and of aversion to any setting of goals. Averageness as rank” (ibid.
pp. 107–108. English translation, p. 75, mod. B.R.); § 61 “Machination”: Machination, the “mak-
ing (ποίησις, τέχνη), which of course we recognize as a human comportment. [...] That something
makes itself by itself and is thus also makeable for a corresponding procedure says that the self-
making by itself is the interpretation of φύσις that is accomplished by τέχνη and its horizon of
orientation, so that what counts now is the preponderance of the makeable and the self-making [...]
in a word: machination. [...] what [with the medieval concept of actus] belongs to machination now
presses forward more clearly and that ens becomes ens creatum in the Judaeo-Christian notion of
creation, when the corresponding idea of god enters into the picture” (ibid. pp. 126–127. English
translation, p. 88); § 64 “Machination” (ibid. p. 130. English translation, p. 90); § 67 “Machination
and Enliving”: “Machination is the domination of making and what is made. [...] This names a
certain truth of beings (their beingness). Initially and for the most part this beingness is compre-
hensible for us as objectness [...]. But machination grasps this beingness in a deeper way, more
inceptually, because machination refers to τέχνη. At the same time, machination contains the
Christian-biblical interpretation of beings as ens creatum – regardless of whether this is taken in a
religious or a secular way” (ibid. pp. 131–132. English translation, p. 92); § 70 “The Gigantic”:
“[...] that beingness is determined in terms of τέχνη and of ἰδέα” (ibid. p. 135. English translation,
p. 94); § 91 “Thinking (Certainty) and Objectness (Beingness)”: “[...] τέχνη [becomes] [...] a
basic characteristic of knowledge, i.e., the basic relation to beings as such [...]. The first beginning
is not mastered; and the truth of beyng, in spite of its essential shining, is not expressly grounded.
And this means that a human fore-grasping (of asserting, of τέχνη, of certainty) sets the standard
for the interpretation of the beingness of beyng” (ibid. p. 184. English translation, p. 129, mod.
B.R.); § 97 “Φύσις (τέχνη)” (ibid. pp. 190–191. English translation, pp. 133–134); § 99
“Movement as Presencing of What Reverts as Such”: “But [Aristotle’s interpretation of move-
ment] already presupposes the interpretation of beings as εἶδος – ἰδέα and thus μορφή – ὕλη, i.e.,
τέχνη, which is essentially related to φύσις” (ibid. p. 193. English translation, p. 135).
isolation that what lies beyond this realm cannot even be considered as goal or pur-
pose. Each and all functions within the ontic vacuity of the here and now and so
consumes itself. In all of this, production is dependent on enliving. The radius of
action, within which the project of τέχνη constantly intensifies, is due to the interi-
ority of the ontic subject; and as such, human being is not only the agent of this
productive project, but also the recipient.
Whatever human being produces by means of the adroitness of machination will
always be enhanced by means of enliving; hence human being itself will be stamped
with the character of its own accomplishments. To give beings primacy, in opposi-
tion to being, signifies the transposition of beings into the absolute realm of domin-
ion of human machination (and this also implicates the act of creation), and to
banish being as the completely alien. Even for this reason, mankind lives out the
abandonment of being: not only has mankind become numb to this distress, it is not
even aware of the loss. No longer capable of creating or experiencing the turning
necessity of such distress, the human being will be dominated by its own achieve-
ments and by the certainty of its representations. The re-presentations and produc-
tions of the human being lead to the opinion that in the course of the control and
manipulation of beings something is being made, or produced, and this machination
has the consequence that every relation to being, and as such, its grounding, will be
destroyed. The ontological domain remains inaccessible. The calcified plane of the
dominion of beings encourages the manipulation of this mode of the being of beings
with the result that all receptiveness for the truth of beings is silently destroyed.
Thus the human being is gradually transformed into an object within the field of
objectivity of represented beingness: this unstoppable decay will later bring
Heidegger to modify his judgment regarding τέχνη: for τέχνη does not only
empower itself of the ontic plane of the things present-at-hand. It also constitutes
the dynamic counter-thrust of the unconcealment and concealment of being (its
counter-play of the constancy of its giving and its refusal). Heidegger’s lectures in
Bremen (1949) and in Freiburg (1957) once again begin again: the phenomenon of
technicity is no longer conceived in terms of the machinational challenge of human-
ity, but as the unconcealment of beyng in bringing-forth (Hervorbringen).
4.2 I nvisible “Desolation (Zerstörung)” as the Concealed

Precondition of Visible “Destruction (Verwüstung)”
This division of the text will deal with certain concepts as represented in context in
volume GA 96. Since these concepts – for example, the concept of “desolation
(Verwüstung)”, which I have found to be of great significance – find no mention in
the Contributions, they will be the first to be listed here, and interpreted in what
follows:
Desolation (Verwüstung) Appears 36 times. 10 times in Ponderings xii: [a] <2
times>, § 8 < 3 times>, § 10 (“verwüsten” and “Verwüstungsvollstrecker”),
§ 24, § 26, § 35 (desolation as “Ver-wüstung”); 6 times in Ponderings xiii: § 34,

§ 124, § 128 < 2 times>, § 129, § 134; 8 times in Ponderings xiv: [7], [10] (“geis-
tigen Verwüstung”, spiritual desolation), [31], [41] <2 times>, [86]
(“Sprachverwüstung”, desolation of language), [93], [119–121]; 12 times in
Ponderings xv: [6] (“Selbstverwüstung”, self-desolation), [8–11] <5 times>,
[12], [14] <3 times>, [24, 25–26] <2 times>.
Machination (Machenschaft) Appears 12 times. 8 times in Ponderings xii: § 8, § 10,
§ 13, § 24, § 35, § 38 < 3 times>; 3 times in Ponderings xiii: § 101 < 2 times>, §
128; 1 time in Ponderings xv [14].
Destruction (Zerstörung) Appears 9 times. 4 times in Ponderings xii: [a] <2 times>,
§ 24, § 35; 4 times in Ponderings xiii: § 124, § 128, § 129, § 134; 1 time in
Ponderings xiv [119].
Jew (Jude) Appears 8 times. 2 times in Ponderings xii: § 24 (“Judentum”, Jewry), §
38 (“Die Juden”, the Jews); 1 time in Ponderings xiii: § 101 (“internationale
Judentum”, international Jewry); 4 times in Ponderings xiv: [79] (“des Juden
“Freud”“, the Jew “Freud”), [120] (“Der Jude Litwinow”, the Jew Litwinow),
[121] (“Weltjudentum”, world Jewry) <2 times>; 1 time in Ponderings xv [17]
(“Weltjudentum”, world Jewry).
Desert (Wüste) Appears 7 times in Ponderings xii (§ 8).
Annihilation (Vernichtung) Appears 4 times. 2 times in Ponderings xiv [41]; 2 times
in Ponderings xv [14] (“Vernichtung”; “vernichten”).
Deracination or Uprooting (Entwurzelung) Appears 3 times. Ponderings xii (§ 36);
Ponderings xiv [121]; Ponderings xv [9].
Generalization, commonality (Vergemeinerung) Appears 3 times. 2 times in
Ponderings xii (§ 13, § 24); 1 time in Ponderings xiv [9].
Race (Rasse) Appears 3 times in Ponderings xii (§ 38, “Rasse (Race)”,
“Rassegedanken (racial thinking)”, “Rasseprinzip (racial principle)”).
Increase in power (Machtsteigerung) Appears 1 time in Ponderings xii (§ 24).
Calculative capacity (Rechenfähigkeit) Appears 1 time in Ponderings xii (§ 24).
Calculative (mentality) (Rechner), rapacious person (Raffer), calculability
(Berechenbarkeit). The use of these terms in the context of Ponderings XIII (§
34) prove to be decisive to the determination of their proper referents.
Überlegungen xii [a], S. 3: Ponderings xii [a]:

Zerstörung ist der Vorbote eines verborgenen Destruction is the herald of a concealed and
Anfangs, Verwüstung aber ist der Nachschlag reserved beginning; but desolation is the final
des bereits entschiedenen Endes. Steht das blow of an end already decided. Does the
Zeitalter schon vor der Entscheidung zwischen epoch stand before the decision between
Zerstörung und Verwüstung? Aber wir wissen destruction and desolation? Yet we in
den anderen Anfang, wissen ihn fragend – (vgl. knowing awareness, in questioning, know the
S. 76–79). other beginning (see pp. 76–79).
Überlegungen xii Ponderings xii

§ 8 [16–18], S. 14–15: § 8 [16–18]:
Nietzsche hat vorausdenkend die Wüste jener The anticipatory thinking of Nietzsche led him
Verwüstung betreten, die mit der into the desert of desolation, which becomes
Unbedingtheit der Machenschaft einsetzt und manifest with the onset of unconditional
im ausschließlichen Subjektcharakter des machination. Machination comes to its first,
Tieres Mensch als Raubtier ihre ersten “successful” fruition in the exclusive
“Erfolge” zeitigt. Die Wüste ist die subjectivity of the human animal as beast of
Versandung und Verstreuung aller prey. Desert signifies the siltation and dispersal
Möglichkeiten der wesentlichen Entscheidung. of all possibilities of ownmost decision. The
Die Entschiedenheit aber zur völligen decision in favour of the comprehensive
Entscheidungsunmöglichkeit liegt in der Lehre impossibility of decision, however, is inherent
von der ewigen Wiederkehr; deshalb ist sie das in the doctrine of eternal return. For this reason,
Endhafteste im Ende der abendländischen it constitutes the most definitive end of the end
Metaphysik – das letzte Metaphysische, was of Occidental metaphysics – the last
im Abendland gedacht werden konnte und metaphysical thought that the Occident
mußte – der Gedanke aller Gedanken could – and had to – bring forth – Nietzsche’s
Nietzsches; kein “religiöses” Ersatzgebilde – thought of all thoughts. Not a “religious”
sondern nur im entschiedensten ersatz-construct, but such thought as only the
metaphysischen Denken denkbar. Diese most decisive metaphysical thinking could
vorausbetretene und nur langsam sich öffnende bring forth. This anticipatory glimpse and
Wüste ist der verborgene Grund für das traversal of a desert gradually revealing itself is
Verzehrende des Nietzscheschen Denkens, das the concealed ground of what is consuming in
trotz aller Widrig-|keit seine Notwendigkeit Nietzsche’s thinking, something that preserves
bewahrt. Das Abstoßende und Lähmende und its necessity despite its repulsiveness.
Verödende dieses Wüstenhaften darf jedoch Nevertheless, all that is repellent and
die denkerische Auseinandersetzung keinen debilitating and wasting of the desert must not
Augenblick von ihrem Weg abbringen und be allowed to dissuade thinking from its path in
dazu verleiten, das Wüstenhafte selbst zu its contention and confrontation with the desert,
einem Grund der Ablehnung Nietzsches zu not for a moment, nor induce it to make what is
machen. of the desert a reason to repudiate Nietzsche.
[...] [...]
Aber muß erst, bevor wir und die Künftigen But must it be, before we and the future ones
in der “uralten Verwirrung” inständig zu become capable of steadfastly dwelling in
werden vermögen, die allerjüngste “primordial confusion”, that the most recent
Verwüstung durchschritten werden? Dürfen desolation must be experienced and traversed?
wir dies als ein Zeichen nehmen, daß die Shall we receive this as a sign that the history
Geschichte der Verweigerung des Seyns in of the refusal of beyng enowns itself in
abgründig abgesetzten Sprüngen sich ereignet discontinuous, abysmal leaps, a coming and a
und ein Vorgang und Fortgang ist, als welche passing, and that the flat surface composed by
Fläche nur der historisch-technischen the historical and technical organization “of”
Betreibung “des” sogenannten “Lebens” so-called “life” is promoted to this end, that life
zugeschoben wird, damit es nicht ahne, wie might not even guess how fully thrust and
weit weggeschleudert von der Geschichte des thrown aside the history of beings runs its
Seyns die Historie des Seienden verläuft? course, far removed from the history of beyng?
Daher führt kein Weg von der Verwüstung der No way leads, therefore, from the desolation of
Wüste | (der völligen the desert (the consummate needlessness of
Entscheidungsunbedürftigkeit) in die decision) into the confusion of errancy – even if
Verwirrung der Irre – wenngleich die the traversal of the desert is necessary. The
Durchschreitung der Wüste notwendig ist. steps of this passage must be superseded by
Ihre Schritte müssen abgelöst werden durch another leap, which for its part cannot rest
einen anderen Sprung, der wiederum nicht content with merely renewing Hölderlin’s
Hölderlins Stiftung nur erneuern könnte. legacy.

§ 10 [28–29], S. 21–22: § 10 [28–29]:
Denker-sein heißt wissen, daß nicht die To be a thinker means to know that neither the
Richtigkeit oder Unrichtigkeit eines correctness or incorrectness of a “world
“Weltbildes” und die Verbindlichkeit und picture”, nor the binding obligation, or the lack
Unverbindlichkeit einer “Weltanschauung” zur thereof, invoked by a “worldview”, is what
Entscheidung stehen, daß sich die Besinnung demands decision; that mindfulness does not
nicht daran kehren darf, ob und inwieweit ein concern itself with the degree of utility or lack
Gedanke einen Lebensnutzen sicherstellt oder of utility of ideas, but much rather that it
der Nutzlosigkeit verfallen ist, daß vielmehr prepares the sole thing necessary that must be
nur das Eine zur Entscheidung vorbereitet und brought to decision: whether unleased
einst geführt werden muß: ob die machination of beings carries all that is into
losgebundene Machenschaft des Seienden the nothingness of desolation; whether
Alles in das Nichts verwüste und der Mensch mankind, under the security and protection of
im Schutze der Tierheit des Raubtieres zu the animality of the beast of prey, shall evolve
einem gleichgültigen, alles berechnenden und into an undifferentiated, all-calculating and
jeder Schnelligkeit habhaften Einrichtungstier well-organized herd-animal (swift of
der bestgeordneten Herdenhaftigkeit sich contrivance in every dimension, from time to
entwickle, aus welcher Herde zuweilen noch time the herd still assembles itself in packs to
Rudel der Verwüstungsvollstrecker sich execute its desolation); or shall beyng gift the
zusammenrotten – oder ob das Seyn die grant of the grounding of its truth to mankind –
Gründung seiner Wahrheit als Not verschenke as the distress of a necessity – arising out of
und dem Menschen die Notwendigkeit another beginning to take the ownmost being of
zuwerfe, aus einem anderen Anfang die all things into its care; so that it may gather
Einfachheit des Wesens aller Dinge in eine strength in maturation unto the inabiding
Bewahrung zu nehmen, kraft deren er reifen Between of the history of beyng, honored with
kann zur Inständigkeit inzwischen der such going-under as is the inception of the last
Geschichte des Seyns, die ihn eines god.
Untergangs würdigt, der ein Anfang des
letzten Gottes ist.

§ 13 [49], S. 34: § 13 [49]:
Je mehr das metaphysische Wesen des As the metaphysical essence of the human
Menschen – das vernünftige – gefühlvolle (d. animal – in its rationality and sensibility
h. “erlebende”) Tier zur Macht kommt (feeling and “enliving”) – comes to power in
innerhalb der unausweichlichen Anbahnung the course of the inevitable initiation of the
der unbedingten Ermächtigung der unconditional empowerment of machination,
Machenschaft, umso deutlicher drängt sich so all the more decisively the commonality of
auch innerhalb des Massenhaften des this essence, as inherent in the collectivity of
Menschentums die Vergemeinerung dieses humanity, expresses and manifests itself:
Wesens heraus: Das Tierhafte sowohl wie das animality in conjunction with modes of enliving
Erlebnisartige schaffen sich ihre Form der create their specific form of public sphere, of
Gemeinheit: Der Mensch ist animalisch und community. The human being is simultaneously
sentimental zugleich – das eine entspricht dem animalistic and sentimental – the one
anderen – beide bestätigen sich wechselweise corresponds to the other – each reciprocally
und nehmen für sich den Besitz der “Kraft” confirms the other, and both mutually benefit
und der “Tiefe” (des “Erlebens”) in Anspruch. from the possession of “power” and “depth” (of
Die Einrollung des Menschen auf dieses sein “enliving”). The integration of the human being
vermeintlich vollständiges und fragloses Wesen into this supposedly comprehensive and
ist die Vermenschung des Menschen. unquestioned essence constitutes the reductive
humanization of the human.

§ 24 [64–65, 67–68], S. 44–47: § 24 [64–65, 67–68]:
Die Geschichte des abendländischen The historical course of Western humanity –
Menschen – gleichgültig ob er sich in Europa without exception whether in Europe or
aufhält oder anderswo – hat sich langsam auf elsewhere – has slowly maneuvered itself into a
eine Lage vorgeschoben, in der alle sonst situation in which all once familiar realms,
vertrauten Bezirke wie “Heimat”, “Kultur”, such as “homeland”, “culture”, “people”, as
“Volk”, aber auch “Staat” und “Kirche”, aber well as “state” and “church”, no less than
auch “Gesellschaft” und “Gemeinschaft” die “society” and “community”, deny their refuge.
Zuflucht verweigern, weil sie selbst zu bloßen For these have themselves been reduced to
Vorwänden herabgesetzt und dem beliebigen pretenses and foster arbitrary interests whose
Vorschub preisgegeben sind, dessen motive powers remain unknown. These powers
bewegende Mächte unkenntlich bleiben und betray their game only to the extent that they
ihr Spiel lediglich darin verraten, daß sie den compel people to accommodate themselves to
Menschen in die Gewöhnung zur je ever more obtrusive manifestations of a
aufdringlicheren Massenhaftigkeit zwingen, collectivity whose “happiness” exhausts itself
deren “Glück” sich darin erschöpft, ohne in learning to subsist without making
Entscheidungen auszukommen und in der decisions – benumbed by sentiments of the
Meinung sich zu betäuben, immer mehr in need to accumulate goods and pleasures, even
ihren Besitz und Genuß zu bringen, weil das as what remains worthy of possession grows
Besitzwürdige stets geringer und gehaltloser ever less, and less, substantial.
wird. [...]
[...] How, in this situation, could even the trace of
Wo könnte hier noch eine Spur jener Angst such anxiety awaken and come to recognize
erwachen, die erkennt, daß eben die Vormacht that the supremacy of beings in their being-
des Vorhandenen und die Unbedürftigkeit present and the lack of the need to face
gegenüber Entscheidungen, das ungreifbar um decisions – along with the intangible
sich greifende Anwachsen der Bestimmung zu determination, growing in tangibility, of being
dieser Lage bereits und allein nicht nur destined to this condition – constitutes more
Zerstörung, sondern die Verwüstung ist, than destruction, constitutes such dominion of
deren Herrschaft durch Kriegskatastrophen desolation that catastrophes of war and
und Katastrophenkriege nicht mehr angetastet, catastrophic wars cannot overthrow it, but
sondern nur noch bezeugt werden kann. Ob merely serve to bear it witness. Whether the
das Herdenwesen des Menschen, sich selbst collective herd of humanity, left to itself and
überlassen, durch seine Vergemeinerung den the formation of its collective being, drives
Menschen zur Vollendung seiner Tierheit humanity unto the consummation of its
treibt, oder ob Rudel von Gewalthabern die auf animality; or whether the violence of packs of
das Höchste durchgegliederten und power-holders impels the masses – thoroughly
“einsatzbereiten” Massen der völligen ordered in rank and file and “prepared for
Entscheidungslosigkeit zujagen, ob also eine action” – into a state of the complete lack of
“Rangordnung” innerhalb des endgültig decisiveness; whether an “order of rank” within
festgestellten Tieres im Sinne des the definitively determined animal in the sense
“Übermenschen” noch aufgezüchtet werden of the “over-man” can still be cultivated – or
kann oder nicht, das bringt in den not – cannot bring about an essential change in
metaphysischen Charakter des Seienden im the metaphysical character of beings in the
Ganzen keine wesentliche Änderung. whole.
[...] [...]
Aus demselben Grunde aber ist auch jeder For the same reason, all forms of “pacifism”
“Pazifismus” und jeder “Liberalismus” and of “liberalism” are incapable of advancing
außerstande, in den Bezirk wesentlicher into the domain of essential decisions because
Entscheidungen vorzudringen, weil er es nur they only stand in opposition to a genuine, or
zum Gegenspiel gegen das echte und unechte falsely conceived, culture of war. The
Kriegertum bringt. Die zeitweilige temporary increase in the power of Jewry,
Machtsteigerung des Judentums aber hat however, has its basis in Western metaphysics,
darin ihren Grund, daß die Metaphysik des and especially in its modern development, for it
Abendlandes, zumal in ihrer neuzeitlichen offers the point of departure for the
Entfaltung, die Ansatzstelle bot für das dissemination of an otherwise empty rationality
Sichbreitmachen einer sonst leeren Rationalität and calculative capacity, which on this path
und Rechenfähigkeit, die sich auf solchem enabled it to secure accommodation in the
Wege eine Unterkunft im “Geist” verschaffte, “spirit” without ever being able, on its part, to
ohne die verborgenen Entscheidungsbezirke understand the concealed realms of decision.
von sich aus je fassen | zu können. [...] (So ist [...] (Consequently, Husserl’s initiation of
Husserls Schritt zur phänomenologischen phenomenological seeing, his setting aside of
Betrachtung unter Absetzung gegen die psychological explanation and the historical
psychologische Erklärung und historische accounting of opinions is of enduring
Verrechnung von Meinungen von bleibender significance – and nonetheless, it does not ever
Wichtigkeit – und dennoch reicht sie nirgends enter into the ownmost realms of decision,
in die Bezirke wesentlicher Entscheidungen, rather consistently presupposes the historical
setzt vielmehr die historische Überlieferung der tradition of philosophy. The necessary
Philosophie überall voraus; die notwendige consequence, soon coming to light, is its
Folge zeigt sich alsbald im Einschwenken in die accommodation with neo-Kantian
neukantische Transzendentalphilosophie, das transcendental philosophy, which ultimately
schließlich einen Fortgang zum Hegelianismus made its passage to Hegelianism in the formal
im formalen Sinne unvermeidlich machte. Mein sense inevitable. My “attack” on Husserl is not
“Angriff” gegen Husserl ist nicht gegen ihn directed against him alone, and remains without
allein gerichtet und überhaupt unwesentlich – essential import – the attack, rather, is directed
der Angriff geht gegen das Versäumnis der against the neglect of the question of being, that
Seinsfrage, d. h. gegen das Wesen der is, against the essence of metaphysics as such,
Metaphysik als solcher, auf deren Grund die for on this ground the machination of beings
Machenschaft des Seienden die Geschichte zu is enabled to determine history. [...])
bestimmen vermag. [...])

§ 26 [69], S. 47: § 26 [69]:
Das Äußerste an Verwüstung ist dann vorbereitet, The extreme of desolation is also
wenn auch dem Nihilismus im wesentlichen prepared when nihilism in the essential
Sinne – als der dünkelhaften Ahnung des sense – as the dark intimation of the
Geheimnisses des Seyns aus der weitesten mystery of beyng out of the greatest
Entfernung zu ihm, die Möglichkeit eines distance – is denied the possibility of
Durchgangs versagt wird und er nicht in seinem passage and its metaphysical essence does
metaphysischen Wesen zum Austrag kommt. not come to full term.

§ 35 [79–80], S. 54: § 35 [79–80]:
Die “Bild”- und “Ton”-“Reportage” der Machination’s “reportage” in “image”
Machenschaft ist der planetarische “Mythus” des and “sound” constitutes the planetary
Vollendungsabschnittes der Neuzeit. Die Welt des “mythology” of the concluding segment
abgelegensten deutschen Bauernhofes wird nicht of the epoch of modernity. The world of
mehr durch das Geheimnis der Gezeiten des Jahres, the most remote German farmstead is no
durch die “Natur” bestimmt, in der noch die Erde longer shaped by the secret of the seasons
waltet, sondern durch das illustrierte Blatt mit der of the year – nor is “nature” attuned to the
Darstellung von ausgezogenen Film- und earth – but by illustrated magazines
Tanzweibern, von Boxern und Rennfahrern und featuring half-dressed dancing broads
sonstigen “Helden” des Tages. Hier handelt es sich from the movies, by boxers and race-car
nicht mehr nur um Zerstörung der “Sittlichkeit” drivers and assorted “heroes” of the day. It
und des “Anstandes”, sondern um einen metaphysi- is no longer just a matter of the
|schen Vorgang, um die Ver-wüstung jeder destruction of “morality” and “decency”,
Möglichkeit des Seyns in das Gemächte des but of a metaphysical process set upon the
machbaren – her- und vorstellbaren Seienden. Zum desolation of every possibility of beyng in
elektrischen Pflug und zum Motorrad, das in einer the transformation of beings into
Stunde zur nächsten Großstadt befördert, gehört das things-made and producible – the
amerikanisch aufgemachte “Magazin” und production and representation of beings.
illustrierte Blatt, gehört die Angleichung der Sitten The motorized plow and the motorcycle,
der Bergbewohner an diejenigen des which conveys one to the next city within
großstädtischen Sport- und Bar-betriebs. an hour, belong to the same realm as
“magazines” tarted up in the American
style, as illustrated newspapers, as does
the assimilation of the customs of
hill-country people to those of the sports
bars of the big city.

§ 36 [80–81], S. 55: § 36 [80–81]:
Aufklärung, Despotismus, schrankenlose Enlightenment, despotism, unbounded
Verdummung: sind metaphysisch begriffen ein stultification: metaphysically conceived, these
einziger Vorgang; die Entwurzelung aus dem compose one and the same process:
Seyn, die Ersetzung des Ursprungs durch deracination from beyng; the origin is
Machtentfaltung, die Einrichtung auf das replaced by the enhancement of power and the
Sichbegnügen mit | dem je Vorgestellten – satisfaction of one’s own representations – the
durchgängig die Vor-macht des Seienden. comprehensive, uniform primacy of beings.

§ 38 [82–83], S. 56: § 38 [82–83]:
Daß im Zeitalter der Machenschaft die Rasse That “race” should be explicitly elevated and
zum ausgesprochenen und eigens propagated to be the “principle” of history (or
eingerichteten “Prinzip” der Geschichte (oder rather of object-historical research) in the epoch
nur der Historie) erhoben wird, ist nicht die of machination, is not the arbitrary discovery of
willkürliche Erfindung von “Doktrinären”, the “doctrinaire”, but rather the consequence of
sondern eine Folge der Macht der the power of machination, which must reduce
Machenschaft, die das Seiende nach allen all beings in every domain to what can be
seinen Bereichen in die planhafte Berechnung planned and calculated. Racial doctrine is the
niederzwingen muß. Durch den means through which “life” is integrated into the
Rassegedanken wird “das Leben” in die Form domain of disciplinary planning, which
der Züchtbarkeit gebracht, die eine Art der constitutes a form of calculation. Given their
Berechnung darstellt. Die Juden “leben” bei expressively calculative endowment, the Jews
ihrer betont rechnerischen Begabung am have “lived” according to racial principles the
längsten schon nach dem Rasseprinzip, longest, which is why they are also offering the
weshalb sie sich auch am heftigsten gegen die most vehement resistance to its unrestricted
uneingeschränkte Anwendung zur Wehr setzen. application. The organization of racial discipline
Die Einrichtung der rassischen Aufzucht does not derive from “life” as such, but from the
entstammt nicht dem “Leben” selbst, sondern over-powering of life by machination. What
der Übermächtigung des Lebens durch die machination organizes by means of such
Machenschaft. Was diese mit solcher Planung planning is the comprehensive deracination of
betreibt, ist eine vollständige Entrassung der the nations by constraining and fixing them in
Völker durch die Einspannung derselben in die the uniformly constituted dimension of the
gleichgebaute und gleichschnittige Einrichtung organization of all beings. Deracination goes
alles Seienden. Mit der Entrassung geht | eine hand in hand with the self-alienation of
Selbstentfremdung der Völker in eins – der peoples – the loss of their historicity – which
Verlust der Geschichte – d. h. der means, the loss of the realms of decision in and
Entscheidungsbezirke zum Seyn. for beyng.

§ 34 [23], S. 94: § 34 [23]:
Wo die Sinnlosigkeit zur Macht | gelangt und When senselessness comes to power, namely
zwar durch den Menschen als Subjektum, den through the human being as subjectum – the
Rechner und Raffer seiner und aller Dinge self-calculative sum of itself and the calculative-
Berechenbarkeit, da muß die Beseitigung rapacious gathering of all things in their
alles Sinnes (d. h. der Frage nach der Wahrheit calculability – then the disposal of all meaning
des Seyns – bzw. ihres Anklangs in der (the question of the truth of beyng, or respectively
Seiendheit und ihrer Entwerfung) ersetzt its echo in beingness and its projection-open) must
werden durch Solches, was allein noch als be compensated for by the solely appropriate
gemäßer Ersatz zulässig bleibt: durch ein ersatz still admissible: through forms of
Rechnen und zwar durch das Rechnen mit calculation, and especially calculation with
den “Werten”. Der “Wert” ist die “values”. A “value” transposes the essentiality of
Übersetzung der Wesenheit des Wesens in das the ownmost into the quantitative and the gigantic,
Mengenhafte und Riesige, die Auslieferung giving beings over to their accountability and
des Seienden in die Verrechnung. (Werden calculability. Now, when these values – by means
nun gar diese Werte (durch die nachtretende of subsequent philosophical erudition in the
Philosophie-gelehrsamkeit – d. h. historisch- historical-platonic mode – are declared to be
platonisch) zu Werten “an sich” erklärt und als values “in themselves” that can be objectively
erschaubare Gegenstände ausgegeben und in intuited and ordered and accounted one against
riesigen Tafeln und Rangordnungsschematen another in comprehensive tables and schematically
verrechnet, dann schlägt die Vollendung der ranked, then the consummation of metaphysics
Metaphysik zugleich um in die Verwüstung immediately converts itself into the desolation of
des Denkens, dessen Folge sich als thinking – which manifests itself in consequence
Kulturschwindel zeigt und als Vernutzung der as the fraud of culture and its exploitation as a
Kultur zu einem Mittel der Propaganda). means of propaganda.

§ 101 [77], S. 133: § 101 [77]:
Daher kann sich auch beider das For this reason, both [imperial or pacifist]
“internationale Judentum” bedienen, die eine parties can make use of “international
als Mittel für die andere ausrufen und Jewry” and call upon the one as a means to
bewerkstelligen – diese machenschaftliche the other and set them to work; this
“Geschichts”-mache verstrickt alle Mitspieler machinational, calculative and deceptive
gleichermaßen in ihre Netze –; im Umkreis der making of “history” entangles all its players
Machenschaft gibt es “lächerliche Staaten”, equally in its net. Within the circuit of
aber auch lächerliche Kulturmache. In der machination, there are “ridiculous states” –
anrückenden abendländischen Revolution but also ridiculous pretensions to cultural
werden die ersten neuzeitlichen Revolutionen production. In the approaching Occidental
(die englische, amerikanische, französische und revolution, the first modern revolutions (the
ihre Nachspiele) erst auf ihr Wesen English, American, French, and their sequels)
zurückgebracht; der “Westen” wird zuletzt und will finally be reduced to their essence; the
am entschiedensten von ihr ergriffen; so zwar, “West” will be the last, and the most
daß er noch meint, sie zu bekämpfen. decisively, to be caught up therein – even so,
that it still thinks to oppose this revolution.

§ 124 [97], S. 147: § 124 [97]:
Die unsichtbare Verwüstung wird in diesem In this second world war, the invisible
zweiten Weltkrieg größer (eingreifender) sein desolation will be greater – more far-reaching
als die sichtbaren Zerstörungen. and immanent – than its visible
destructiveness.

§ 128 [109–111], S. 155–156: § 128 [109–111]:
Was bedeutet das Erscheinen des riesenhaften What matters the upsurge of the gigantic
Taumels der machenschaftlichen Verwüstung frenzy of machinational desolation and the
und der von ihr ausgelösten “Taten” gegenüber “deeds” it generates, weighed against the
dem Kommen des letzten Gottes und der ihm coming of the last god and the quiet
zugewiesenen stillen Würde der Erwartung? Aber nobility of anticipation given the god? But
der Gott – wie denn dieser? Frage das Seyn und in the god – how then? Ask of beyng, and in
dessen Stille als dem anfänglichen Wesen des this stillness, as the originary ownness of
Wortes antwortet der Gott. Alles Seiende mögt ihr the word, the god will answer. All of beings
durchstreifen, nirgends zeigt sich die Spur des may you search out, nowhere does a trace of
Gottes. Wie jedoch wirst du ein Fragender, der the god show itself. Yet how shall you
das Seyn fragt? Nur durch die Stimme der Stille, become a questioner as one who questioning
die dein Wesen zur Inständigkeit im Da-sein seeks beyng? Only through the voice of
anstimmt und den Gestimmten in das Aufhorchen stillness, which attunes your being unto the
auf das Kommen erhebt. [...] Die Zuversicht ist inabiding of Da-sein and raises the attuned
[...] stark genug, das Erschrecken vor der to listen for the to-come. [...] Confidence is
Seinsverlassenheit des Seienden in das Wesen der [...] strong enough to take up the shock in
Zuversicht aufzunehmen. In ihrer Langmut face of the abandonment of the being of
errichtet sie die Großmut gegen die unsichtbare beings into the ownmost of confidence. In
Verwüstung des Wesens des Seyns, | die schon its forbearance, it arises in greatness of
allelosbrechende Zerstörung des Seienden heart, setting it against the unseen
übertroffen hat. desolation of the ownmost of beyng, which
has already out-stripped all destruction of
beings now breaking forth.

§ 129 [112], S. 157–158: § 129 [112]:
Ein Volk kann seine “Zeit” haben, in der es A people can have a “time” as its own that is
gerade zum Untergang zu spät ist, da ihm die barely too late for going-under, because the
Wesenshöhe fehlt, aus der noch es stürzen essential height of being, from which it must
müßte. Und wenn dann nur noch die langsame fall, is lacking. And then, when all that
Gewöhnung an das unauffällige Sinken der remains is long habituation to the unapparent
verborgenen Maße bleibt und die unmerkliche sinking of concealed measures and the
Eingewöhnung in das Verflachen der Ansprüche, imperceptible accommodation to reduced and
dann ist eine Zerstörung “des” Seins im Gange trivialized demands, then such destruction
der Zukunft, und alle äußere Verwüstung kann “of” being is set into motion that external
nur noch als das leere Schauspiel eines zu spät desolation amounts to no more than the
gekommenen Nachtrags gelten. [...] belated epilogue of a meaningless spectacle.
[...]

§ 134 [114], S. 159: § 134 [114]:
Zu einer Zeit, da die unsichtbare Verwüstung In an epoch in which unseen desolation is
eingreifender ist als die sichtbaren Zerstörungen, more consuming than visible destruction,
müssen selbst die Wege des täglichen Bedenkens the paths of daily concern themselves must
ihre Richtung in das Unsichtbare nehmen. [...] turn in the direction of the unseen.
[...]

Heute, will sagen für das Kommen des Today, which is to say, for the sake of the
Kommenden, gilt nur, was im Äußersten steht arrival of what is coming-to-be, only what
und was weiß, daß darum gekämpft wird, ob stands in extremity still pertains; and one
das Menschentum ein Knecht der Verwüstung knows that the struggle to be fought will decide
bleibt oder ob es in einer anders gegründeten whether humanity will remain the slave of
Geschichte zum Widerklang der Stimme des desolation, or become the resonance of the
Gottes wird. voice of a god in a history otherwise grounded.

Eine neue “Gattung” von “Literatur” macht sich A new “genre” of “literature” is now
jetzt breit: die Nachmachungen von Nietzsches making the rounds: imitations of
“Also sprach Zarathustra” mit Hilfe von Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra with
Wortschwällen, aus Hölderlin und George und the help of word-surges brewed up with the
Rilke zusammengebraut; gut gemeintes, aber aid of George and Rilke; well-meaning, but
wüstes Zeug, das eine Verherrlichung des rude stuff, which wants to glorify “life” and
“Lebens” und des “Krieges” und von Allem sein “war”, and everything else that once had the
will, was Große einmal genannt und geschätzt name of greatness and was cherished; the
haben; die verfänglichste Form der geistigen most seductive form of spiritual
Verwüstung, wo nicht und nie die Spur war einer desolation, now and forever lacking every
einfachen und langen Besinnung, wo alles trace of long and onefold mindfulness. All
zwischen Urlauten (vermeintlichen) umhertaumelt this flounders about in primordial tones
und Jegliches ins Reden gebracht wird, (supposedly) and brings everything to
großtönend und mächtig einherschreitend, Götter word – grandly ringing and mightily
anrufend und allwissend und doch nur ein thundering forth, calling the gods – all-
grundloser Traum eines blinden Rausches, der knowing, and yet only an ungrounded
sich als Wissen gebärdet. dream of blind ecstasy passing itself off as
knowledge.
Überlegungen xiv [31], S. 188–189: Ponderings xiv [31]:

Wenn der Abscheu gegen das Denken den When revulsion from thinking has reached
gleichen Grad erreicht hat wie die Unfähigkeit the same degree as the incapacity to think,
dazu, dann “machen” die verunglückten then disastrous professors of medicine and
Professoren der Medizin und die mißratenen wayward public-school teachers go about
Volksschullehrer die “Systeme” der “composing” “worldviews” into “systems”,
“Weltanschauung”, was man dann für and these are then touted as “philosophy”.
“Philosophie” hält. Warum bringt jeder Sieg im Why does every victory in the domain of
Seienden über das Seiende notwendig eine beings over beings necessarily bring about
Verwüstung des Seyns? the desolation of beyng?

Metaphysik. Metaphysics.
Alles muß durch die völlige Verwüstung Everything has to pass through complete
hindurch, der eine Vernichtung in der schärfsten desolation, which is preceded by
Gestalt der scheinbaren Erhaltung der “Kultur” destruction in the most acute form of the
voraufgeht. Nur so ist das zweitausendjährige apparent preservation of “culture”. This is
Gefüge der Metaphysik zu erschüttern und in den the only way in which two millennia of the
Sturz zu bringen. Die Vernichtung und structure of metaphysics can be shaken and
Verwüstung haben aber selbst noch die brought to a fall. Both destruction and
Einrichtungsform der Metaphysik (“Ideen” und desolation, however, still have the
“Werte”). organizational form of metaphysics (“ideas”
and “values”).
Überlegungen xiv [79–80], S. 218: Ponderings xiv [79–80]:

Man sollte sich nicht allzulaut über die One shouldn’t all too vocally get indignant
Psychoanalyse des Juden “Freud” empören, wenn about psychoanalysis and the Jew “Freud”,
man und solange man überhaupt nicht anders über if and as long as one generally “thinks”
Alles und Jedes “denken” kann | als so, daß Alles about everything in terms of “expressions”
als “Ausdruck” “des Lebens” einmal und auf of “life” which “derive from instincts” and
“Instinkte” und “Instinktschwund” “zurückführt”. “atrophy of instinct”. This way of
Diese “Denk”-weise, die überhaupt im voraus kein “thinking”, which in principle cannot admit
“Sein” zuläßt, ist der reine Nihilismus. “being”, is purest nihilism.

Unter dem “Regime” der Sprachverwüstung Under the “regime” of the desolation of
gilt jedes Bauen als “unnatürlich” und language, every form of planting and building
“unorganisch”. Hier öffnet sich überdies ein is said to be “unnatural” and “inorganic”. This
Durchblick in die Folgerichtigkeit, die allem opens a perspective, furthermore, on the
Bösartigen in höherem Grade eignet. consistency that is suited to all perniciousness
in higher degree.

Ausdehnung und Vorbereitung und in ihrem Expansion and preparation, and in their
Gefolge die Vergemeinerung sind die wake, generalization are the invincible
unüberwindlichen Feinde des Wesenhaften und enemies of ownmost being and the
von hier gedachten “Großen”. “greatness” arising from it.

Eine Lehrerschaft, die der Anstrengung des A body of teachers that avoids the exertion
wahrhaften Denkens und der langen Besinnung of earnest thinking and sustained
ausweicht, darf sich nicht wundern, wenn “das mindfulness shouldn’t wonder when the
illustrierte Blatt” und “das Kino”, wenn bloße “illustrated magazine”, the “cinema”, when
Tabellen und Kurven zu den bevorzugten mere tables and graphs are elevated to the
Bildungsmitteln sich aufschwingen und die preferred means of instruction and the
Verwüstung des Geistes für den Geist selbst desolation of spirit is acclaimed as spirit
gehalten wird. itself.

Das untrüglichste Zeichen für die The most trustworthy sign for the
Ursprünglichkeit und Gediegenheit eines primordiality and dignity of the ownmost
wesenhaften, geschichtegründenden way of being of a history-founding people is
Menschentums ist sein Bezug zum Wort. Wo its relation to the word. Whenever this
dieser Bezug unbestimmt wird und ins relation remains undetermined and becomes
Gleichgültige fällt, sind bereits alle indifferent, all ownmost grounds of a people
Wesensgrunde des Volkes erschüttert. Äußere are already shattered. External destruction
Zerstörungen sind nur späte Folgen einer schon is only a belated consequence of the
bestehenden Verwüstung. desolation that already pervades.
[...] [...]
Zugleich kommt jetzt die “Hinterhältigkeit” der At the same time, the “deceptive
bolschewistischen Politik an den Tag. Der Jude underhandedness” of Bolshevik politics
Litwinowx taucht wieder auf. Zu dessen 60. now comes to light. The Jew Litvinov makes
Geburtstag schrieb der Chefredakteur der his reappearance. On the occasion of his
Moskauer “Iswestija”, der bekannte Kommunist 60th birthday, Radek, well-known
Radeky, folgenden Satz: “Litwinow hat bewiesen, communist and editor-in-chief of Izvestiya
daß er es versteht, nach bolschewistischer Art, (Moscow), writes as follows: “Litvinov has
wenn auch nur zeitweilig, Bundesgenossen zu demonstrated that he knows how, in
suchen, wo sie eben zu finden sind”. Bolshevik fashion, to find allies – wherever
they may be found, if only for a time.”
x
Maxim Maximowitsch Litwinow (1876–1951), Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
and subsequently as of November 1941, Soviet Ambassador to Washington [GA ed.]
y
Karl Radek (1885 to probably 1939), a member of the Central Committee of the KPDSU in the
1920s, journalist, sentenced to ten years in prison in a Moscow show trial in 1937, then disap-
peared [GA ed.]
[...] [...]
Auch der Gedanke einer Verständigung mit Furthermore, the idea of coming to terms
England im Sinne einer Verteilung der with England in the sense of an “equitable”
“Gerechtsamen” der Imperialismen trifft nicht ins division of imperial spheres of influence
Wesen des geschichtlichen Vorgangs, den England does not touch upon the ownmost of the
jetzt innerhalb des Amerikanismus und des historical process that England now plays
Bolschewismus und d. h. zugleich auch des out to its conclusion within Americanism
Weltjudentums zu Ende spielt. Die Frage nach der and Bolshevism; and that also means
Rolle des Weltjudentums ist keine rassische, within world Jewry. The question
sondern die metaphysische Frage nach der Art von concerning world Jewry is not a racial
Menschentümlichkeit, die schlechthin ungebunden question: rather, it is the metaphysical
die Entwurzelung alles Seienden aus dem Sein als question concerning the kind of humanity
weltgeschichtliche “Aufgabe” übernehmen kann. that being completely unbound can take up
as world-historical “task” the uprooting
all beings from being.
Überlegungen xv [6], S. 256: Ponderings xv [6]:

Wir haben eine Aufgabe. Die Frage bleibt nur, ob We have a mission. The only question is
wir selbst es vermögen, diese Aufgabe selbst zu whether we ourselves are capable of being
sein: Jeder deutsche Mann ist umsonst gefallen, this mission: every German soldier will have
wenn wir nicht stündlich dafür wirken, daß über fallen in vain, if we do not daily strive – in
die jetzt ganz losgelassene und endgültige face of this now unleashed and final
Selbstverwüstung des gesamten neuzeitlichen self-desolation of the entirety of modern
Menschentums hinaus ein Anfang des deutschen humanity – to work through it and to salvage
Wesens gerettet wird. an inception of the ownmost way of being of
the Germans.
Überlegungen xv [8–10], S. 257–258: Ponderings xv [8–10]:

Der Amerikanismus ist die historisch feststellbare Americanism is the historically
Erscheinung der unbedingten Verendung der ascertainable manifestation of the
Neuzeit | in die Verwüstung. Das Russentum hat in unconditional consummation of modernity
der Eindeutigkeit der Brutalität und Versteifung as desolation. Despite its unequivocal
zugleich ein wurzelhaftes Quellgebiet in seiner brutality and rigidity, the Russian world
Erde, die sich eine Welteindeutigkeit vorbestimmt nonetheless has a source of rootedness in
hat. Dagegen ist der Amerikanismus die its earth, which calls it to the formation of
Zusammenraffung von Allem, welche a world. By way of contrast, Americanism
Zusammenraffung immer zugleich die consists in the gathering and bundling
Entwurzelung des Gerafften bedeutet. together of everything, a gathering that
[...] always, all the same, signifies the
Das Russentum ist trotz allem zu bodenständig und deracination of the bundled and secured.
vernunftfeindlich, als daß es imstande sein könnte, [...]
die geschichtliche Bestimmung der Verwüstung zu Despite everything, Russianness is too
übernehmen. Um die Seinsvergessenheit zu rooted and hostile to reason as ever to be
übernehmen und als eine solche einzurichten und capable of taking up and actualizing the
als Haltung zu beständigen, dazu bedarf es einer im historical task of desolation. To assume
höchsten Grade fertigen und alles berechnenden the task of the abandonment of the being
Vernünftigkeit, die man, wenn man will, auch noch of beings, and as such to organize it and to
“Geistigkeit” nennen kann. Nur dieser “Geist” concretize it as a firm comportment,
bleibt der geschichtlichen Aufgabe der Verwüstung requires consummate and all-calculating
gewachsen. Die Bedientenrolle innerhalb | dieser rationality in the highest degree – which
Verwüstung hat das “Herrenvolk” der Engländer one can, if one will, also call “spirituality”.
übernommen. Die metaphysische Nichtigkeit ihrer This “spirit” alone is up to the historical
Geschichte kommt jetzt an den Tag. Sie suchen nur task of desolation. The subaltern role
diese Nichtigkeit zu retten und leisten damit ihren within desolation has been assumed by
Beitrag zur Verwüstung. the English “master-race”. The
metaphysical nullity of their history now
sees the light of day. All they still seek is
to rescue this nullity and therewith they
render their contribution to desolation.

Die Seuche dieses scheinbar selbstverständlichen The plague of the apparently self-evident
und überall gültigen Anspruchs auf and universally valid demand of assertion
“Durchsetzung” als Maßstab der Wesenhaftigkeit and “performance” as the measure of
eines Jeglichen, verdirbt schon die Möglichkeit ownmost selfhood of each and all corrupts
der Besinnung. Und hier hat schon die the very possibility of mindfulness. And
Verwüstung begonnen. Was ist dann nach der with this, desolation is already set into
“Auseinandersetzung” mit Amerika? motion. And what is to follow from this
“confrontation” with America?

Dieser aber ist der Planetarismus: der letzte Schritt But this is globalism: the last step of the
des machenschaftlichen Wesens der Macht zur machinational essence of power toward
Vernichtung des Unzerstörbaren auf dem Wege the destruction of the indestructible on the
der Verwüstung. Die Verwüstung vermag das path of desolation. Desolation is capable
Unzerstörbare zu vernichten, ohne daran gehalten of destroying the indestructible without
zu sein, dieses überhaupt je zu fassen. Verwüstung ever having to grasp it. Desolation
aber untergräbt die Möglichkeit des Wesens eines undermines the possibility of the ownmost
Anfänglichen. Denn das Unzerstörbare ist nicht das of the originary. For the indestructible is
irgendwo vorhandene Beständige, sondern das not found somewhere in the constancy of
Anfängliche. the present-at-hand, it is the originary.

Das Weltjudentum, aufgestachelt durch die aus Incited by emigres who were allowed to
Deutschland hinausgelassenen Emigranten, ist leave Germany, world Jewry is everywhere
überall unfaßbar und braucht sich bei aller untouchable, and in all its deployment of
Machtentfaltung nirgends an kriegerischen power nowhere needs to take part in military
Handlungen zu beteiligen, wogegen uns nur action, whereas nothing remains for us but
bleibt, das beste Blut der Besten des eigenen to sacrifice the blood of the best of our own
Volkes zu opfern. people.
Überlegungen xv [24, 25–26], S. 266–267: Ponderings xv [24, 25–26]:

Verbrechen: das ist kein bloßes Zerbrechen, Crime does not merely shatter and break,
sondern die Verwüstung von Allem in das it is the desolation of all in its brokenness.
Gebrochene. Das Gebrochene ist vom Anfang The brokenness of the broken is broken off
abgebrochen und in den Bereich des Brüchigen from the inception and dispersed into a realm
verteilt. Hier bleibt nur noch die eine of brittle defectiveness. This leaves only
Möglichkeit des Seins – in der Weise der one possibility of being – in the mode of a
Ordnung. Das Ordnen ist nur das Gegenspiel des regulated order. Organization is only the
seynsgeschichtlich (nicht etwa juristisch- counter-play of being-historically conceived
moralisch) begriffenen Verbrechertumsz. criminality (not to be confused with
legal-moral concepts).
z
These variations on the verb “brechen” (to break) can only with difficulty be translated into
another language.
[...] [...]
Wenn man sich aber in den Glauben an But if one proposes to take refuge in one’s
“Christus” rettet, entsteht die Verlegenheit, daß belief in “Christ”, then one is caught in the
dieser Glaube in der “Philosophie”, die man zu predicament that this belief has no place in
betreiben vorgibt, nicht vorkommen kann. Man the “philosophy” one pretends to pursue. For
nennt sich daher, statt sich als gläubigen this reason, rather than confessing oneself to
Christen zu bekennen und dann auch die be a believing Christian, and consequently
“Philosophie” als eine “Torheit der Welt” abandoning “philosophy” as “the foolishness
preiszugeben, einen “unverbesserlichen of this world”, one calls oneself an
Platoniker”. Dabei beklagt man sich noch über “incorrigible Platonist”. And all the while one
die Falschmünzerei des Bolschewismus. In | still complains about the counterfeiting
solchem Treiben zeigt sich erst die Verwüstung. tactics of Bolshevism. In such dealing and
deception, desolation begins to germinate.
The question I propose to address is Heidegger’s language use, and in particular

the concept of “desolation (Verwüstung)”. As noted, this term does not occur in
Contributions. In order to explicate the concept of “desolation” more closely, and
indeed, to the end of bringing this interpretation to its conclusion, we need to begin
with the concept of “desert (Wüste)”. Consequently, it will be emphasized how
“desolation” and “destruction (Zerstörung)” stand in relation: the two terms do not
coincide, nor can they be derived from subjective conceptions of space and time.
The proper point of departure is the term “desert”, which appears only in
Ponderings XII, § 8. With explicit reference to Nietzsche (although substantial dif-
ferences in regard to “nihilism” should not be underestimated), Heidegger writes:
“Desert signifies the siltation and dispersal of all possibilities of ownmost decision.
[...] Nevertheless, all that is repellent and debilitating and wasting of the desert must
not be allowed to dissuade thinking from its path in its contention and confrontation
with the desert, not for a moment, nor induce it to make what is of the desert a rea-
son to repudiate Nietzsche”. And then again, Heidegger refers to the “consummate
needlessness of decision” in “the confusion of errancy (Irre) – even if the traversal
of the desert is necessary”.
Aside from these, there are no other sources in the Ponderings that could be of
help to us. But now we have to address to concept of “errancy (Irre)” in order to put
an end to the many misconceptions of what Heidegger’s usage of the word entails.
The concept of “errancy” is present not only from Ponderings XII, § 10 and
Ponderings XIV ([53, 82, 109]); but also from Contributions,43 wherein there is no
reference whatsoever back to the wanderings of the Hebrews in the desert. One only
has to read the passages which recur to the concept of “errancy” – in the Notebooks,
and above all in Contributions – to ascertain that the waxing misconceptions
attached to this term are based on ignorance of Heidegger’s texts, resulting in “sub-
stantial misconceptions” that do them violence.44
43
See ibid. § 87 “History of the first Beginning (History of Metaphysics)”: “Because this knowing
awareness thinks nihilism still more originarily into the abandonment of being, this knowing is the
actual overcoming of nihilism; and history of the first beginning thus completely loses the appear-
ance of futility and mere errancy (Irre). Only now the great light shines on all the heretofore
[accomplished] work of thinking” (ibid. p. 175. English translation, p. 123); § 226 “Clearing of
Sheltering-concealing and ἀλήθεια”: “The origin of errancy (Irre) and the power and possibility
of abandonment by being, concealing and dis-sembling, domination of the unground – all of this
now becomes all the more clear” (ibid. p. 351. English translation, p. 245); § 259 “Philosophy”:
“Only the chill of the boldness of thinking and the night of errancy (Irre) of questioning lend glow
and light to the fire of beyng” (ibid. p. 430. English translation, p. 303, mod. B.R.).
44
The reader is requested to carefully consider what Donatella Di Cesare achieves with her inter-
pretation of the word “desert (Wüste)”. One quickly realizes that her description, “based” on the
Notebooks, is in no way supported by Ponderings XII (§ 8), the only source she cites. It is impor-
tant to work through her description in detail to the end of evaluating the import of a reading that
ascribes words to Heidegger that he never used, whether in the Notebooks or elsewhere. Her mis-
conception and falsification of the Notebooks is reflected in this arbitrary, scenic evocation: “Dry,
desolate, waste, stony, uncultivated, uninhabitable, lifeless, void and empty, formless, measureless
and borderless space, site of sin and place of temptation, of evil and of the demonic: this is the cast
of Heidegger’s desert, such it is” [See Di Cesare D. (2014), p. 127. English translation, p. 100]. In
train of her falsifications, the author proposes to translate the word “Verwüstung (desolation)” liter-
ally as desertificazione – and thereby she proves that she has no grasp of the essence of the distance
separating Nietzsche and Heidegger, which is to say, the dimension of truth (Wahrheit) or clearing
(Lichtung), as Heidegger understands it. For this literal and yet untrue translation serves the pur-
poses of her thesis [to translate the word Verwüstung]: “Thus, it is not correct to translate this term
as ‘drying up’ or ‘devastation’, not only because the reference to the ‘desert’ is lost, but also
because it reduces the phenomenon that, if it has a political weight, nevertheless had for Heidegger
ontological relevance and was inscribed within the history of Being” (ibid. p. 126. English transla-
tion, p. 99). But with this usage she overlooks once again the fact, that if Verwüstung belongs to the
history of being, then the reference to “Wüste” – which is what ties Heidegger to Nietzsche – is
overtaken by Heidegger’s [being-historical] approach. This requires no further explication and
support for the reason that the author is in fact concerned with quite different matters, as we
quickly see: “[...] what is important is the echo and the evocation of the word Wüste, desert. It is
Heidegger inherited the expression “the desert grows (Die Wüste wächst)” from
Nietzsche. Nonetheless, the question of “desolation (Verwüstung)” has to be inte-
grated into the question of nihilism, while keeping substantial differences between
the two authors in mind. For Nietzsche, “nihilism” basically means the “devaluation
(Entwertung)” of highest values, all of which is conceived within the dimension of
“values”; “values (Werte)” signify the being of beings in the sense of beingness. In
this perspective of thinking, Nietzsche demands “the revaluation of all values
(Unwertung der Werte)”. This perspective is clearly unrelated to the dimensions of
“truth (Wahrheit)”, “the clearing (Lichtung)”, “the open (Offenheit)”, and the
“unconcealment (Unverborgenheit)” of being as Heidegger understands them. It
follows that “nihilism” can never be understood as the devaluation of highest val-
ues, but rather as enowning passage of the ownmost essence of being. The “noth-
ing” of “nihilism”, the “nihil” of desolation, obstructs an other inception of the
essential swaying (Wesung) of the truth of being. If the enowning sway of the own-
most of being is desolated, then the unfolding of beings into the openness of their
own way-to-be is at an end. The ontological differentiation immanent in beings, or,
in other words, the difference between being and beings (“ontological difference”)
first comes to rule the twofold movement that accompanies the “desolation” of the
truth of being in relation to the “destruction” of beings in their “unconcealment
(Unverborgenheit)”. In consequence, “desolation” and “destruction” are not at all
identical. “Desolation” signifies the refusal of every possibility of originary
decision,45 and therewith it ensures the permanence of decisionlessness. Desolation
is devoid of any possibility of originary decisiveness, which is to say that this deci-
sionlessness immures the necessity of originary decisiveness by capturing the acci-
dental flow of life: it attempts to hold fast to life and to secure its invariable presence.
Ponderings XII-XIV allow us to specify the primary characteristics of “desola-
tion” as Heidegger understands them. These are as follows: “The anticipatory think-
ing of Nietzsche led him into the desert of desolation, which becomes manifest with
the onset of unconditional machination. [...] But must it be, before we and the future
ones become capable of steadfastly dwelling in ‘primordial confusion’, that the
most recent desolation must be experienced and traversed?” (Ponderings XII, § 8);
“How, in this situation, could even the trace of such anxiety awaken and come to
recognize that the supremacy of beings in their being-present and the lack of the
need to face decisions – along with the intangible determination, growing in tangi-
bility, of being destined to this condition – constitutes more than destruction
not difficult to perceive in desertification the ultimate symbol of Judaism” (ibid. p. 127. English
translation, p. 100). The forcible incarceration of “desolation” in the “desert” will prove useful to
the author in violation of Heidegger’s language use and in service to her own thesis – and indeed,
in service to her arbitrary and in certain respects highly imaginative thesis, which is at all costs
intent upon imposing the substantial presence of Jewry on being-historical thinking.
45
Heidegger M. (1999), § 136 “The Nothing and De-solation”: “Wüste: the constancy of the refusal
of the inception. De-solation as the securing of the enduring and comprehensive uprooting of all
that is, namely, that what was will yet be preserved; that one practices ‘cultural politics’ in service
to de-solation” (ibid. p. 146. Our translation).
(Zerstörung), [it] constitutes [...] desolation [...]” (§ 24); “The extreme of desolation
is also prepared when nihilism in the essential sense…is denied the possibility of
passage (Durchgang) and its metaphysical essence does not come to full term” (§
26); “Machination’s ‘reportage’ in ‘image’ and ‘sound’ constitutes the planetary
mythology of the concluding segment of the epoch of modernity [...] illustrated
magazines featuring half-dressed dancing broads from the movies. [...] It is no lon-
ger just a matter of the destruction (Zerstörung) of ‘morality’ and ‘decency’ but of
a metaphysical process set upon the desolation (Ver-wüstung) of every possibility of
beyng in the transformation of beings into things-made and producible – the pro-
duction and representation of beings” (§ 35); “When senselessness comes to power,
namely through the human being as subjectum [...] then the disposal of all meaning
must be compensated for [...] through forms of calculation, and especially calcula-
tion with ‘values’”. [And] “then the consummation of metaphysics immediately
converts itself into the desolation of thinking” [...] (Ponderings XIII, § 34); “In this
second world war, the invisible desolation will be greater – more far-reaching and
immanent – than its visible destructiveness” (§ 124); “What matters the upsurge of
the gigantic frenzy of machinational desolation and the “deeds” it generates,
weighed against the coming of the last god [...]?” – “Confidence is [...] strong
enough to take up the shock in face of the abandonment of the being of beings into
the ownmost of confidence. In its forbearance, it arises in greatness of heart, setting
it against the unseen desolation of the ownmost of beyng, which has already out-
stripped all destruction of beings now breaking forth” (§ 128); “And then, when all
that remains [to a people] is long habituation to the unapparent sinking of concealed
measures and the imperceptible accommodation to reduced and trivialized demands,
then such destruction ‘of’ being is set into motion that external desolation amounts
to no more than the belated epilogue of a meaningless spectacle” (§ 129); In relation
to § 124, Heidegger once again emphasizes how “unseen desolation is more con-
suming than visible destruction” (§ 134); And for this reason (as stated in
Ponderings XIII, § 134), “one knows that the struggle to be fought will decide
whether humanity will remain the slave of desolation, or become the resonance of
the voice of a god in a history (Geschichte) otherwise grounded” (Ponderings XIV
[7]); With reference to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, [Heidegger writes of] this flounder-
ing about as “the most seductive form of spiritual desolation, now and forever lack-
ing every trace of long and onefold mindfulness” ([10]); “Why does every victory
in the domain of beings over beings necessarily bring about the desolation of
beyng?” ([31]); “Everything has to pass through complete desolation, which is pre-
ceded by destruction (Vernichtung) in the most acute form of the apparent preserva-
tion of ‘culture’” ([41]); “Under the ‘regime’ of the desolation of language, every
form of planting and building is said to be ‘unnatural’ and ‘inorganic’” ([8]); In
relation to § 35, Heidegger once again remarks on how the “‘illustrated magazine’,
the ‘cinema’, [...] are elevated to the preferred means of instruction and the desola-
tion of spirit is acclaimed as spirit itself” ([93]); “External destruction is only a
belated consequence of the desolation that already pervades” ([119]); “In face of
this now unleashed and final self-desolation (Selbstverwüstung) of the entirety of
modern humanity”, Heidegger writes, our task is “to work through it and to salvage
an inception (Anfang) of the ownmost way of being of the Germans” (Ponderings

XV [6]).
In conclusion to this lengthy review, let us pause and consider a short passage
from Ponderings XV [8–11, 12]. Heidegger observes that while the modern epoch
as a whole is defined by desolation, its “historically ascertainable manifestation”
becomes evident in Americanism. “The subaltern role within desolation”, in turn,
“has been assumed by the English ‘master-race’”. Of course, this a historical, and as
such, a questionable view. Yet it is of relevance to our attempt to define Heidegger’s
understanding of modernity and its immanent desolation: beyond the visible
destruction inherent in the historical essence of National Socialism, the desolation
inherent in modernity, which arises with a way of thinking ungrounded in being,
already anticipates National Socialism. Destruction is only the historical manifesta-
tion of a desolation coming from afar, and therefore its intervention is all the more
transformative. In certain respects, Heidegger’s critique of modernity does not
restrict itself to his time. In my opinion, Heidegger’s critique of England and its role
in the World War serves to warn us that historically “visible” destruction only com-
poses the foreground of events; nor does it suffice to find a solution to “what has
happened” on this level. The fundamental question is to be sought on a much deeper
level and as such will remain concealed for many – namely, the question of the
desolation that is masked by visible destruction. The consequences of destruction
unavoidably lead to the obstruction of the possibility of the experience of the
belonging-together of beings and being: for beings will be rigidly secured in their
beingness. This destruction is not visible and quantitative. Things remain as they
were, yet transformed in accordance with a new spirituality that claims modern man
and calls upon him to live out his time in the indecisiveness and loquacious vacuity
of his material existence. The hegemony of beings, immanent in processes of
destruction, may well be maintained, but only under the condition that the delusion
of reason fails to take in the catastrophic consequences of inexorable desolation.
Not only the ontological difference between desolation and destruction is in play
here, but also the increasingly acute priority of the former over the latter.
Furthermore, in respect to England and America, Heidegger remarks on the
“apparently self-evident and universally valid demand” to make “performance” “the
measure of ownmost selfhood of each and all” (Ponderings XV [12]). The historical
situation generated by the state of war, Heidegger avers, requires a different per-
spective, if a future grounded in historicity is to be possible. Merely to rise above the
one-dimensional plane of object-historical thinking were inadequate: what is
required is a comprehensively new orientation, passing above and beyond manifest
destruction.
Heidegger expands his thoughts on “desolation” elsewhere in Ponderings XV:
“Desolation undermines the possibility of the ownmost of the originary” ([14]).
“Crime (Verbrechen) does not merely shatter and break, it is the desolation of all in
its brokenness. The brokenness of the broken is broken off from the inception and
dispersed into a realm of brittle defectiveness” ([24]). And finally, “to take refuge in
one’s belief in ‘Christ’”, and to complain about the “counterfeiting tactics of
Bolshevism” furthers such “such dealing and deception [as allows] desolation [...]
to germinate” ([26]).
This long investigation, which we have kept as concise as possible, never devi-
ated from our theme, for it allows us to understand more clearly how Heidegger’s
reflections develop on two related planes: on the one hand the plane of desolation,
on the other the plane of destruction. The evident visibility of destruction generates
the illusion that its effects are ultimate, when in fact, they constitute the foreground
of a far more profound desolation in regard to the question of being. What is
Heidegger’s perspective on this conjunction? The following question leads us into
the matter: “But must it be, before we and the future ones become capable of stead-
fastly dwelling in ‘primordial confusion’, that the most recent desolation must be
experienced and traversed?” (Ponderings XII, § 8). The traversal of the field of deso-
lation is of far greater import than the mere determination of destruction. It proves
impossible to restrict oneself to schemata of a categorial worldview because such
never enter the realm of decision of being. In order to take concrete form, not only
does decision demand our inabiding in the question of being; it also calls upon us to
endure the open exposure of the essential swaying of the truth of being.
The grounding question is immanent in categorical worldviews and persists as
long as one tries to find refuge in “once familiar realms, such as ‘homeland’, ‘cul-
ture’, ‘people’, as well as ‘state’ and ‘church’, no less than ‘society’ and ‘commu-
nity’” (Ponderings XII, § 24). These domains represent delimited sites of security
and as such fortify the machinational course of beings in their historical deracina-
tion. But what is thereby strengthened and maintained? The loss of meaningfulness.
“When senselessness comes to power, namely through the human being as subjec-
tum – the self-calculative sum of itself and the calculative-rapacious gathering of
all things in their calculability” (§ 34), then the desolation of thinking makes its
breakthrough. Within this precisely delimited frame the human being becomes a
subject, and as subject, the pivot of beings. According to Heidegger, this empowers
the desolation of thinking.46
With consideration of several passages from Ponderings XII (§§ 24 and 38), from
XIII (§ 101), from XIV ([121]), and from XV ([17]) we reach the end of this division
of the text.
In Ponderings XII (§ 24), the “temporary increase in the power of Jewry” intro-
duces the theme of Jewry, which is said to have its “basis in Western metaphysics,
and especially in its modern development, for it offers the point of departure for the
dissemination of an otherwise empty rationality and calculative capacity, which on
this path enabled it to secure accommodation in the ‘spirit’ without ever being able,
on its part, to understand the concealed realms of decision” (§ 24, [67–68]). In con-
sideration of this passage we have to attend to the context to which it belongs, which
is the “historical course of Western humanity”, its accomplishments, and the fact
that “all once familiar realms, such as ‘homeland’, ‘culture’, ‘people’, as well as
§ 34 (Ponderings xii) is to be investigated starting from the Contributions: See Heidegger

46
M. (1989), § 260 “The Gigantic” (ibid. pp. 441–443. English translation, pp. 310–312) and § 261
“The Opinion about Beyng” (ibid. pp. 443–446. English translation, pp. 312–314).
‘state’ and ‘church’, no less than ‘society’ and ‘community’, deny their refuge”;
where the “happiness” of the “collectivity” “exhausts itself in learning to subsist
without making decisions – benumbed by sentiments of the need to accumulate
goods and pleasures” (§ 24, [64]). It proves to be impossible to evaluate the import
of the reference to “Jewry” without taking the beginning of section § 24 into consid-
eration. Of much greater weight is Heidegger’s observation – drawing on the then-
popular stereotype of “calculative capacity (Rechenfähigkeit)” – that calculability
pertains to modernity as such, as the epoch of rationality and of metaphysics in its
received forms (“ideas” and “values”).
In this section (§ 24), Heidegger explicitly states that “the temporary increase in
the power of Jewry, however, has its basis in Western metaphysics [...] [and] offers
the point of departure for the dissemination of an otherwise empty rationality and
calculative capacity” ([67]). But it will not suffice to tear this remark out of context,
as Donatella Di Cesare does in her supposed elucidations: “The abyss that opened
up imposed the necessity of identifying the Jew as the metaphysical enemy”.47 The
fact that calculative ability has its ground in the metaphysics of the West is the rea-
son why Heidegger holds that it cannot access the domain of decision. Otherwise it
remains unclear what the genuine basis of Heidegger’s distance from Husserl is and
why it is expressed as it is in section § 24. In Heidegger’s perspective, his “attack”
is not directed solely against Husserl; it rather pertains to “the neglect of the ques-
tion of being, that is, against the essence of metaphysics as such”. Therefore, in
consideration of this domain of decision, these remarks on “Jewry” need to be
related to a much wider context; only extreme violence of interpretation and meta-
physical pretense allows this contextual relation to be distorted and forcibly inte-
grated into metaphysics.
However that may be, this mendacious failure of interpretation finds no support
in Ponderings XII (§ 24). In order to ascribe a metaphysical content to “the Jews”,
thereby to stage a metaphysical clash – between Heidegger and “the Jews” – Di
Cesare resorts to the ruse of digging up, with some effort, the use of the word
“enemy (Feind)” in Ponderings and Intimations III (§ 79): “Where stands the enemy,
and how did he come to be formed? In what direction the attack? With what weap-
ons?”. And likewise, in Ponderings VI (§ 91): “Devoted to philosophy, the thinker
(Denker) stands against an enemy – against what is not ownmost (Unwesen) to
beings, which [...] shows itself to belong to the ownmost sway of being, with which
the thinker must fundamentally be befriended”.48 This extrapolation serves to sup-
port the following thesis: “For Heidegger, the philosopher’s task was to remain
rooted in the soil of Being in order to bring the conflict to light, to disentangle the
contrast”.49 The word “thinker” is intentionally replaced by “philosopher” because
Heidegger addresses the metaphysical clash of philosophers, its delimitation and
47
Di Cesare D. (2014), p. 99. English translation, p. 79.
48
See ibid. p. 100. English translation, p. 79: “an enemy that, without ever abandoning its malevo-
lence, shows itself as appertaining to what the thinker must radically befriend (the essence of
beyng)” (bold by F. Alfieri).
49
Ibid.
dissolution. Had the author, Donatella Di Cesare, read a little further into section §
91, she would have noticed that Heidegger sharply criticizes all those who approach
and appropriate philosophy from an external perspective; those who “snack” on
philosophy, or all those who only use philosophy to supply their own needs.
Proceeding in this fashion, one finally becomes, in my opinion, to the point of beg-
garing sense. It is remarkable that the author, while seizing on volume GA 94,
seems unaware that the context in which Heidegger introduces the word “enemy”
deals with National Socialism and that there is no reason to believe that the word
“Jew” refers us back to an “enemy”. All regardless, she insists that “Jew” must be
identified with “enemy” and hence it follows that – according to her – Heidegger
becomes the judge and executioner of the Jews as the perpetrators of deracination.
Actually, it would have sufficed to stay with volume GA 96 to properly understand
the word “enemy” in Heidegger’s usage: “Expansion and preparation, and in their
wake, generalization are the invincible enemies (Feinde) of ownmost being and the
‘greatness’ arising from it” (Ponderings XIV [91]); “Despite everything, Russianness
is too rooted and hostile to reason as ever to be capable of taking up and actualizing
the historical task of desolation” (Ponderings XV [10]). This may serve to alert us to
the danger arising from allowing the instrumentalization of the Notebooks – to giv-
ing free reign to free-floating and arbitrary generalizations based on selected pas-
sages to the end of fortifying one’s own pre-judgments. What results is the extensive
falsification of the sources. Furthermore, the conclusion to Ponderings XIV [121] is
far removed from the erroneous path of race mythology, as pursued by National
Socialism: “The question concerning world Jewry (Weltjudentum) is not a racial
question: rather, it is the metaphysical question concerning” [a certain] “kind of
humanity [...]” [and therefore it] is far removed from a mythology of race, as
intended by National Socialism. The reference to “the metaphysical question con-
cerning the kind of humanity” does not import that world Jewry has a specific meta-
physical ground. Much rather are Heidegger’s remarks hermeneutically to be read
in the light of ontological difference, like his critique concerning the different
epochs of metaphysics: it is necessary to clearly and distinctly understand that [the
reference to those who] “being completely unbound can take up as world-historical
‘task’ the uprooting all beings from being” does not exclusively and in all serious-
ness pertain to “Jewry”, to “world Jewry”, let alone to “Jews”. Nowhere in the
Notebooks can we find the least trace of evidence that Heidegger ascribed a meta-
physical essence to the Jews.
In furtherance of this instrumentalizing intent, one faulty interpretation leads to
another in an effort to find an excuse to defend the indemonstrable. This motif con-
stantly repeats itself in each Afterword of the German editor. So he claims, for
example, in the Afterword to volume GA 96: “The way in which Heidegger con-
ceives ‘machinational signs’ should in no case be considered as reflections of his
political position. What is really at issue, is a being-historical interpretation of
events, which leads Heidegger to take a particular perspective. Hence he considers
the increasing intensity of the means of warfare in terms of the ‘consummation of
technicity’, whose ‘final result’ will be that ‘the planet blows itself up’, leading to
the disappearance of ‘contemporary humanity’. But this would be ‘no misfortune,
but rather the first step in the purification (Reinigung) of being from the profound
deformation brought about by the hegemony of beings’”.50
Based on the “purification of being (Reinigung des Seins” (Ponderings XIV
[113]), a phrase that only serves him as point of departure, he compiles a hoard of
passages from Ponderings XII and XV that refer to “Jewry” and “world Jewry” –
passages which we have thoroughly integrated into their respective contexts – and
he then again returns to the concept of “purification”, as : “In such remarks on
‘Jewry’ it becomes evident how much Heidegger entangles himself in the thought
of a ‘purification of being’”.51 This excuse for an argument, which was subsequently
generated by this fabricated relation between “purification” and “Jewry” so that the
gigantic machinery of instrumentalization might be reactivated, is now evident for
all to see.52 What “purification of being” signifies is clearly stated in Contributions:
“Overcoming of Platonism in this direction and manner is a historical decision with
the widest dimension. This overcoming simultaneously founds a philosophical his-
tory of philosophy that is different from Hegel’s. What unfolds as ‘destruction’ in
Being and Time does not mean dismantling as demolishing,53 but as purifying
(Reinigung) in the direction of freeing basic metaphysical positions. But consider-
ing the enactment of echo and playing-forth, all of this is a prelude”.54
One would have expected the German editor of volume GA 96 of the Complete
Edition – who argues for the anti-Semitic “contamination” of being-historical think-
ing as of 1936, which would include the Contributions – to have taken this into
consideration. However, upon further reflection, this would have undermined his
entire series of claims, which merely consist of incomplete sketches presented with
the intention of sowing doubt; and as such, they cannot be refuted, for they do not
stand in any relation to Heidegger’s texts.
50
Trawny P. Nachwort des Herausgebers (Editor’s Afterword): See Heidegger M. (2014c), p. 281
(our translation).
51
Ibid. pp. 282–283 (our translation).
52
Di Cesare D. (2014), § 24 “The Jew and the ‘Purification’ of Being” (pp. 213–217. English
translation, pp. 169–172). With reference to Trawny, the author turns to the passage in question
(Ponderings XIV [113]), closing her account in a flash of lightning: “As he [Heidegger], at the
beginning of the 1940s, composed the Reinigung des Seins – the purification of Being – had
already become Vernichtung, annihilation” (ibid. p. 217. English translation, p. 172). This claim
cannot be subjected to thorough examination, for now we have come to a point where [Di Cesare’s]
arbitrary and calamitous use of random expressions makes its breakthrough, and indeed, with the
intention of locking the thinker up in her borderline-hermeneutics.
53
Here it is translated with “demolishing”, while in other passages in the Contributions it has usu-
ally been translated with “destruction”: See Heidegger M. (1989), § 155 “Nature and Earth”: “The
growing – or better, the simple rolling unto its end – destruction (Zerstörung) of ‘nature’” (ibid.
p. 277. English translation, p. 195).
54
Ibid. § 110 “ἰδέα, Platonism, and Idealism” (ibid. p. 221. English translation, p. 154).
5 Observations I-V – The Black Notebooks 1942–194855
5.1 o Give Heidegger the Floor: “I Mention This Not

T
in Defence, But Only as a Statement of Fact”
Having considered the Ponderings gathered together in volumes GA 94 through GA

96, we now come to volume GA 97 and the Observations. The reader will find that
this section is marked by a different tone: in volume GA 97 Heidegger speaks
directly and openly, offering personal remarks on a historical period characterized
by the baleful brutality of Hitler. With the help of these passages we can establish
the proper context and actual significance of the sometimes fateful stereotypes pro-
duced by manipulative, political interpretations of the person of Heidegger. The
excerpts cited below speak for themselves: the unequivocal clarity of these
Observations will leave those who confront them, to put it plainly, speechless; or
more precisely stated, they would render anyone speechless who did not know them
to be written by Heidegger.
Moreover, we ought not forget that the writer of these remarks had been worn
down by countless misconceptions concerning his person (which he still had to
overcome), and for this reason he found it necessary to record the essential dates of
his life. It is also important to remember that this section makes no effort to defend
Heidegger: it focuses on Heidegger’s annotations and takes its guideline from
Heidegger’s written account of his relation to the Jewish philosopher Husserl: “I
mention this not in defence, but only as a statement of fact” (Observations V
[52–54]). An attentive reading of the Observations leads to the conclusion that these
“annotations” are “not (nicht) intended for public consumption (Öffentlichkeit)”.
They are not designed to be read by that category of person, who, shamelessly plun-
dering the text, knows full well that one will discover nothing more than the arro-
gance of one’s own lack of seriousness. “But the rule of public opinion is already so
dictatorial, that every comment of this kind is declared to be “Nazi”, and thereby
rendered ineffective” (Observations V [49]).
First, let us undertake a comparative review of a series of textual correspon-
dences that may be of help:
Hitler The “secret brutality”56 – which “far outstrips Hitler’s” (Observations i
[127]; Context: “the case of my professorship”; “The actual error of my rectorate of
1933 was not so much that I, like others cleverer than myself, did not recognize
‘Hitler’ in his ‘essence’57 (Wesen) [...] but rather that I supposed it were now the
55
56
The term brutality, here in reference to Hitler (Observations I [127]), was used earlier in the text
in reference to the Third Reich: “in the numbing brutality (in der stumpfen Brutalität) of the ‘Third
Reich’” (Observations I [162]).
57
In what follows the “essence (Wesen)” of Hitler is designated as his “unnatural (Unwesen) irre-
sponsibility” (Observations III [46]).
5 Observations I-V – The Black Notebooks 1942–1948 191
time to assume the task of a historical inception, not through Hitler’s doing (nicht
mit Hitler) but through the awakening of the people to its Occidental destiny”
(Observations i [149]); “[...] the issue is not if Hitler or Mussolini or whoever was
‘right’, but rather that we experience what is, and that the coming generation is
given not only the ‘opportunity’ of poverty, but the chance of experiencing what is
and [is]to be in being [...]” (Observations ii [29]); “Hitler and his accomplices
(seine Helfershelfer) [...]”, this “[...] does not (nicht) ‘justify’58 Hitler [...]”
(Observations ii [62–63]); “[...] do we not perhaps stand on the edge of an abyss
(Abgrund )? [...] and not only since yesterday, and not all ‘because’ of Hitler, just as
little as ‘through’ Stalin, or ‘through’ Roosevelt’ (Observations ii [72]; Context:
“‘My philosophy’ [...] is said to be ‘a philosophy of the abyss’” Heidegger responds
to this allegation; “Subsequently the gentlemen of the universities and colleges
came to wonder how the ‘Hitler Youth’ could win such influence in the schools”
(Observations ii [78–79]); The “[...] irresponsibility with which Hitler raged and
wreaked havoc across Europe. Stalin needs to bring only a minimum more of clev-
erness into play than Hitler [...]. Hitler turned into a catastrophe (Katastrophe) [...].
Hitler, who was himself, after all, only a sign (Merkzeichen) of the fatality of the
world epoch” (Observations iii [46–47]; Context: “The clueless dancing-about of
the ‘Western Powers’ in their attempt to formulate European policy”; “One day,
perhaps, someone will understand that in order to bring thinking back to a way of
knowing as essential knowing, the Rector’s Address of 1933 makes the attempt to
anticipate in thought the process of the consummation of science enacted in the
demise of thinking, but that it does not propose to deliver thinking over to Hitler”
(Observations iii [57–58]); “Hitler’s criminal insanity (verbrecherischer
Wahnsinn)” (Observations v [21]); “[...] the criminal character (das ver-
brecherische Wesen) of Hitler [...]. It is hard to determine [...] if those, who were for
Hitler [...] were already – against (gegen) Hitler” (Observations v [48–49]); “[...]
nor, as was also mandated and followed in other seminars, was a portrait of the
‘Führer’ exhibited” (Observations v [53]).
Nazi “The opinion that if revenge upon a people (Volk) is possible, revenge
should be taken, recoils back on us. How shall we find a response to the blind-
ness of nationalism (nationalistische Verblendung) [...]” (Observations i [75],
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the “people” meant here is the Jewish peo-
ple); “The terror of raging violence (Gewalt), that extinguishes ‘life’ and desolates,
persists in manifesting its brutishness. [...] Terror in the form of the application of
raw force (rohe Gewalt) and public destruction is stupid” (Observations i [113–114]);
“Today we find educated and supposedly insightful Germans who think that once
militarism and the National Socialist terror have been excised ‘poetry and thought’
58
Shortly before Heidegger wrote that “this thought should in no wise be taken as a ‘justification’
of National Socialism – whose comparable historical (geschichtliche Ahnungslosigkeit) clueless-
ness is hardly to be surpassed [...]” (Observations II [40–41]). This statement in regard to Hitler as
to National Socialism – let us take all this into consideration – is an undeniable fact, which serves
to confound any doubt in regard to Heidegger’s position on these matters.
will awaken in the people of itself, forgetting that ‘poetry and thought’ still bear the
same old stamp of yesterday – that of the “insane Nazi regime” (verruchtes
Naziregime)” (Observations i [126]); the “inescapable consequences of the system
of terror” (Observations i [129]); “the massive brutality (massive Brutalität) of
ahistorical (geschichtslos) ‘National Socialism’” (Observations i [134]); “[...] the
exaggerated scribbling of some former National Socialist writer, some hack journal-
ist?” (Observations i [135]; Context: those, who gain “their legitimacy from having-
stood-apart” as Sternberger did – Observations i [135]); “Either this, or the horror
(Greuel ) of National Socialism. But this either/or is the true misconception”
(Observations i [149]); On the one hand those who denounce “[...] the barbarity
(Verwilderung) of National Socialism. [...] [on] the other (die anderen), the party
of those who recur to the position of National Socialism, guided by the opinion that
it had ‘been right, after all’” (Observations i [151]); “Had the German mind not
been reduced to an extreme of idiocy well before 1933, ‘one’ would have been
capable of recognizing that so-called National Socialism, unknown to itself and to
its doctrinaire defenders, was driven by a completely different reality, but that no-
one was free (frei) and insightful (wissend)” enough to recognize this (Observations
ii [28]; Context: Heidegger’s decision of 1933); “‘National Socialism’ and
‘Fascism’ could have been, with luck, the path of making ‘Europe’ and its ‘spirit’
prepared and ripe for ‘communism’” (Observations ii [31–32]); “One cannot voice
one’s outrage about the decay (Zerfall ) of ‘science’ and of ‘truth’ during the reign
(Herrschaft) of National Socialism loudly enough [...]” (Observations ii [39]); “[...]
this thought should in no wise be taken as a ‘justification’ of ‘National Socialism’ –
whose comparable historical cluelessness (geschichtliche Ahnungslosigkeit) is
hardly to be surpassed. [...] It is [...] irresponsible to attack National Socialism with-
out ever thinking seriously about ‘socialism’ [...]. One turns up one’s nose at the
‘Nazis’ and their terror; one clings to the obvious and undeniable repulsiveness
of particular Party functionaries and institutions [...]” (Observations ii [40–41]);
“‘The error of 1933’ [...] did not consist in venturing ‘National Socialism’”
(Observations ii [58]); “For from the beginning there was no intention of staying
with National Socialism as such, as an institution for all eternity. [...] that the
machinery of death (Tötungsmaschinerie) which has now been brought into play in
Germany [...] in only the ‘punishment’ for National Socialism, or the mere spawn
of vengeance, one may sell for a time to a few fools” (Observations ii [59–60]);
“‘Catholic philosophy’ – is that so different than ‘National Socialist science’ [...]”
(Observations ii [75]); “Now, rigorously ‘denazifying’ (entnazifizieren), one still
doesn’t have a clue that for decades our own ‘scientific education’ was far worse
than the foolish speeches of Party leaders” (Observations ii [78–79]); “All this
accords with the contemporary ruin of the ambiance of thought. This ruin brought
forth ‘National Socialism’, which very quickly and relentlessly became one path of
criminal aberration59 (eine der Abirrungen ins Verbrecherische) among others”
The term “criminal (verbrecherisch)” has already been used twice with reference to Hitler:
59
“Hitler’s criminal insanity (verbrecherischer Wahnsinn)” (Observations V [21]); and “the crimi-
nal character (das verbrecherische Wesen) of Hitler” (Observations V [48–49]).
(Observations ii [139]); “‘National Socialism’, which is to say, in the form of the

wretched aberration of its essence, merely despised ‘the spirit’ [...]” (Observations
ii [154–155]); “For why did the Party have this address opposed in every political
instruction center for university teachers? Certainly not because it, as the world
press now propagates, betrayed the University to National Socialism”
(Observations iii [58]); “My Nietzsche lectures are neither justifications of National
Socialism nor yet an attack on Christianity – they pursue thinking solely for the sake
of thought, and that means for the sake of the what is given to thought” (Observations
iv [100]); “But the rule of public opinion is already so dictatorial, that every com-
ment of this kind is declared to be “Nazi”, and thereby rendered ineffective”
(Observations v [49]); “[...] just as little as any National Socialist books – for
example, by Rosenberg, or others like it – were acquired [...]” (Observations v [53];
Context: the time-period of the rectorate).
Jew/Christ/Concentration Camp “In the epoch of the Christian Occident, that is,
in the epoch of metaphysics, the world of Jewry (Judenschaft) constitutes the prin-
ciple of destruction (Zerstörung). [...] This renders the measure for what the com-
memoration of the first, Greek inception – which remained outside of Jewry
(Judentum) and hence outside of Christianity (Christentum) – means for thinking
as the thought of the reserved, inceptual and ownmost essence of the history of the
Occident” (Observations i [29–30]); “The terror of this consummate nihilism is
still more uncanny than the violence of the hangman and the concentration camp
(Kz)” (Observation i [89]); “[...] not a still more essential ‘guilt’ (Schuld ) and ‘col-
lective guilt’ (Kollektivschuld ), of such an immeasurable degree that it cannot even
be compared in its essence to the atrocity of the ‘gas chambers’ (Gaskammern); a
guilt – more terrific than all publicly denounced ‘crimes’ – which certainly no one
in future should excuse. [...] even now the German people, this land is one compre-
hensive concentration camp (Kz)” (Observation i [151]); “I never undertook the
slightest thing against (gegen) Husserl. [...] His books were never removed from the
library of the Philosophical Seminar, as was mandated in regard to other Jewish
authors; [...] Never did I advance a word of critique, which was, of course, possible
and justified, and no crime, in either the lectures or the seminars [...]. I ignored
Husserl; that was a painful necessity. [...] it seems to me, however, that my attempts
since Being and Time are the worthiest witnesses for what I owe to Husserl: that I
learned from him and bore witness for his way of thought by not remaining his
disciple [...]. But precisely this offended against the governing code of conduct long
before there was talk of National Socialism and persecution of the Jews
(Judenverfolgung)” (Observations v [52–54]).
Anti-Semitism “That the greatest prophets are Jews (Juden) is a fact the secret of
which has yet to be thought. (Footnote for donkeys [Esel ]: this remark has noth-
ing to do with ‘anti-Semitism’. This is as foolish and reprehensible as the bloody
and above all bloodless procedures of Christianity against the ‘pagans’. That
Christianity itself brands Anti-Semitism as ‘unchristian’ bears witness to the refined
elaboration of its techniques of power)” (Observations ii [77]).
Professors/ Philosophers / Acrobats / Public Opinion “Without batting an eye,

today’s university professors (Universitätsprofessoren) sign ‘declarations’ soaked
with moral sentiment whose only purpose is to render everything harmless and bor-
ing and as such manageable and ‘secured’” (Observations i [126]); “[...] those who
remained standing apart from events now take center stage, gaining their legitimacy
from having-stood-apart [...] and today they make a business of their former refusal
to act” (Observations i [135]); “The sole hindrance on the way ahead is the offi-
ciousness of supposedly well-meaning people who will attempt to seize upon every-
thing said and done with a view to the future in order to save the ‘culture’ and forms
of ‘education’ of the past. Even now they still believe that the disaster (Unheil )
could have been avoided if only the executors of the calamity had been more
“refined” [...]. Still the same acrobats (Fassadenkletterer) everywhere, again”
(Observations ii [25]); “It belongs to the exceptional happiness of dummies (die
flache Köpfe) that they are not able to conceive as such the disaster that sweeps them
away, for with their accounting of guilty and not guilty they assign guilt to deriva-
tive phenomena and remain invested in the spectacle produced by the public
media (der öffentliche Meinungsbetrieb)” (Observations ii [29]); “[...] one allows –
not just any lecturer in philosophy – but recognized philosophers (als anerkannter
Philosoph) to blather on in their seminars to ignorant and disrespectful youths about
“Plato” and “Hegel” as if they were talking about common journalists; one doesn’t
simply tolerate, one sows and cultivates insolence in regard to history and in respect
to thought and the rigour of reflection and expression [...]” (Observations ii [39]);
“Subsequently the gentlemen of the universities and colleges came to wonder
(wundern sich) how the “Hitler Youth” win such influence in the schools. [...] one
still doesn’t have a clue that for decades our own “scientific education” was far
worse [...]. Thoughtless oneself, one encouraged every conceivable form of thought-
lessness (Gedankenlosigkeit)” (Observations ii [78–79]); “In the past few years, one
has often let oneself become violently excited because some “intellectuals” did not
immediately recognize the criminal character of Hitler. It is hard to determine, if
those, who think themselves so far-sighted (Vorausschauende), were not in fact
irked by something rather different, something that irritated their vanity (Eitelkeit)
and lust for power (Herrschsucht). [...] But the rule of public opinion (Herrschaft
der öffentlichen Meinung) is already so dictatorial” (Observations v [48–49]);
“Because even now in the year 1948, defamation (Verunglimpfungen) and vitu-
peration (Schmähungen) are put into play [...] let this be recorded once again, not
for the public (Öffentlichkeit)” (Observations v [54]).
How did Heidegger propose to approach the monstrosity of Hitler and the enor-
mous consequences brought on by National Socialism? In response to this question,
Heidegger castigates those who “could not see past” themselves “and beyond Hitler,
who was himself, after all, only a sign of the fatality of the world epoch, and there-
fore you thought to get through and past (vorbeikommen) Hitler just by standing-
aside (Danebenstehen) or by belated revolt (verspätetes Revoltieren) against him”
(Observations III [47]). This vital indication can give us a better understanding of
the decisive manner in which Heidegger stood to “standing-apart” under the
conditions of the time. The conclusion of section § 51 of Ponderings VIII (GA 95)
clarifies as follows:
“Therefore, the most one should do is to state one’s position, without ever (niemals) allow-
ing oneself (sich wegwerfen) to be drawn into confrontation. Yes, even this statement of
observation ought simply to advance one’s own considered reflections, without ever serv-
ing as a public dismissal of another position. For even this will only be used to supply the
business of the “humanities” with “news”, and thereby will confirm it in its supposed
indispensability”.
Anmerkungen i [29–30], S. 20: Observations i [29–30]:

Der Anti-christ muß wie jedes Anti- aus Like every “anti-”, the Anti-Christ must arise out
dem selben Wesensgrund stammen wie das, of the same essential ground as that against which
wogegen es anti- ist – also wie “der Christ”. it stands – so also “the Christ”. The Christ arises
Dieser stammt aus der Judenschaft. Diese out of the Jewish world. In the epoch of the
ist im Zeitraum des christlichen Christian Occident, that is, in the epoch of
Abendlandes, d. h. der Metaphysik, das metaphysics, Jewry constitutes the principle of
Prinzip der Zerstörung. [...] destruction. [...]
Von hier aus ist zu ermessen, was für das This renders the measure for what the
Denken in das verborgene anfängliche commemoration of the first, Greek inception –
Wesen der Geschichte des Abendlandes das which remained outside of Jewry and hence
Andenken an den ersten Anfang im outside of Christianity – means for thinking as
Griechentum bedeutet, das außerhalb des the thought of the reserved, inceptual and
Judentums und d. h. des Christentums ownmost essence of the history of the Occident.
geblieben.
Anmerkungen i [31], S. 21: Observations i [31]:

Die Absage an das Aufmerken auf die The refusal of attentiveness to our belonging
Zugehörigkeit in das Sein ist die grimmigste to being besets our ownmost historicity with
Verwüstung unseres eigenen geschichtlichen the most ferocious desolation.
Wesens.

Die Moral, die meint, Gerechtigkeit bestehe in A moral sense that conceives justice to inhere
der Rache. Die Meinung, sich an einem Volk in revenge. The opinion that if revenge upon a
rächen zu können und deshalb sich rächen zu people is possible, revenge should be taken,
müssen, schlägt auf uns zurück. Was haben wir recoils back on us. How shall we find a
auf die nationalistische Verblendung zu response to the blindness of nationalism, if
antworten, wenn wir jetzt vielleicht versuchen, we now attempt, with time, to somehow and
mit der Zeit irgendwo ein international somewhere to find internationally defined
bestimmtes Unterkommen zu finden? shelter and security?

Seht ihr immer noch nicht oder gar immer Do you still not see, or ever less see, how an
weniger, wie die Unwelt sich breit macht, in unworld in which thinking may no longer be
der kein Denken mehr gewagt werden kann, ventured grows and expands because the
weil das Wesen des Denkens und der Freyheit ownmost of thought and of freedom has gone
verschollen ist im Staub der Verwüstung? under in the dust of desolation?

Der Nihilismus tritt jetzt erst in das Stadium Only now does nihilism enter, step by step,
seiner eigentlichen, d. h. durch und durch into its essential, all-devouring stage to take
täuschenden und verfänglichen und verführenden the gestalt of thorough, insidious deception, of
und niederziehenden, Zug um Zug auszehrenden seduction and degradation. This creeping,
Gestalt. Der schleichend-unkenntliche unrecognized, and devouring nihilism follows
auszehrende Nihilismus als die Folge des upon a nihilism easily manifest to all because
gröbsten | und für jeden handgreiflichen und of its extreme crudity, and for this reason it is
darum jeden auch sogleich übertölpelnder also very deceptive. For the devouring stage of
Nihilismus. Endgültig ist der auszehrende nihilism only enters into its consummate stage
Nihilismus erst, wenn er diejenige when it has achieved that degree of security in
Täuschungssicherheit erlangt hat, die ihm erlaubt, deceptiveness enabling it to take “belief”,
auch den “Glauben” und das Christentum und Christianity, and morality into its service and
die Moral in seinen Dienst zu nehmen und dafür to find itself affirmed and advanced because of
bejaht und gefördert zu werden. Der Terror des it. The terror of this consummate nihilism is
endgültigen Nihilismus ist noch unheimlicher als still more uncanny than the violence of the
alle Massivität der Henkerknechte und der Kz. hangman and the concentration camp.

Die Deutschen aber, die ein böses Geschick in But the Germans, confused and driven by
ihr Unwesen verwirrte, klagen nur einander malign destiny to assume their own non-
und sich selbst an vor einem Richter, der die essence, only accuse each other and
Gerechtigkeit selber sein soll. Wo ist da themselves before a judge who supposedly
größere Anmaßung, im Verbrechen oder im stands for justice itself. Where in all this is the
Richten? Wo ist bei all diesem Treiben die greater presumption, in the crime, or in the
Zugehörigkeit ins Seyn – wo zuvor die Absage judgment? Where in all this ferment and
an alle Sicherung und Unsicherheit – die nur dealing the belonging to beyng that sets aside
dem Aufstand der Eigensucht des all security and insecurity? Does such securing
Menschenwesens entstammt, durch den der and insecurity not derive solely from the
Mensch dem An-fang entwichen ist, um sich in insurrection of selfishness by which man
der geordneten Verwüstung der Erde evades the inception – only to find his place
unterzubringen? in the ordered whole of the systematic
desolation of the earth?
The word “Unwesen” is used here in multiple senses: as “mischief (Unfug)”, “rep-
aa
rehensible action”, but also as “misshapen, fierce being (entity)” that is driven by its
own “unownedness (Unwesen)”

Der Terror der wütenden Gewalt, die “Leben” The terror of raging violence, that
auslöscht und verwüstet, bleibt grausig. Seine extinguishes “life” and desolates, persists in
Grausamkeit hat, um Grauen zu erregen, den manifesting its brutishness. Its atrociousness
Vorteil des Greifbaren und der “Tatsachen” – has the advantage, in evoking horror, of the
des wirkenden Wirklichen. Und dennoch ist perceptible and of the “facts” – of the
dieser Terror, angefüllt mit Unheil, noch nicht actuality of the real. And yet this terror,
das Heillose und der eigentliche Schrecken. Das abundant in harm, is not yet the unholy and
Heillose zeigt sich nicht im Gewalt-tätigen und the authentically horrific. The unholy does not
Rohen des Wütenden; es zeigt sich überhaupt manifest in the doing of violence and in
nicht, sondern verbirgt sich im Anschein der raging brutality; it does not show itself at all,
gerechten Verteilung der Ansprüche der Macht rather concealing itself in the appearance of
und der Mächtigen. [...] Der Terror der rohen the equitable distribution of powers and the
Gewalt und öffentlichen Verwüstung ist dumm. claims of the powerful. [...] Terror in the form
Der Terror des Wahrheitsbesitzes aber ist of the application of raw force and public
gescheit und stellt das Unauffällige und die destruction is stupid. The terror inherent in
Besorgnis um das Heil der Welt in den Dienst the possession of the truth, however, is clever,
seiner Listen. and puts things inconspicuous and the concern
for the good of the world in service to its
cunning.
Anmerkungen I, S. 126 [GA 97, S. 82]


Man nennt das die “Erziehung des deutschen One calls this degradation to helots the
Volkes” und die Herabwürdigung zu Heloten. Die “education of the German people”. Without
Universitätsprofessoren unterschreiben heute, batting an eye, today’s university professors
ohne mit der Wimper zu zucken, “Erklärungen”, sign “declarations” soaked with moral
die von Moral triefen und nur dazu gemacht sind, sentiment whose only purpose is to render
alles ins Harmlose und Langweilige und d. h. everything harmless and boring and as such
Beherrschbare “sicher” zu stellen. Sie manageable and secured. Today they submit
übernehmen heute zustimmend Zumutungen, die to such impositions and insults as even the
ihnen selbst in der stumpfen Brutalität des numbing brutality of the “Third Reich”
“Dritten Reichs” nie angesonnen wurden. Man never demanded of them. One talks of the
redet jetzt wieder von der Würde der dignity of the person again and pushes one’s
Persönlichkeit und treibt die Charakterlosigkeit lack of character to a new extreme. Today
auf die Spitze. Heute gibt es Gebildete und we find educated and supposedly insightful
angeblich einsichtige Deutsche, die meinen, Germans who think that once militarism
wenn der Militarismus und der and the National Socialist terror have been
nationalsozialistische Terror beseitigt seien, daß excised “poetry and thought” will awaken in
das “Dichten und Denken” im Volk von selbst the people of itself, forgetting that “poetry
erwache, wobei man “Dichten und Denken” and thought” still bear the same old stamp of
immer noch in der Prägung des Bisherigen, yesterday – that of the “insane Nazi
zumal des “verruchten Naziregimes”, genau als regime”, or more precisely, they are still
“Kulturbetrieb” auffaßt und als nichts conceived in terms of the “culture
außerdem – d. h. eben wie vormals: ad maiorem industry”, and nothing else. So all remains
gloriam, will sagen, violentiam et potestatem just as it was: ad maiorem gloriam, that is to
ecclesiae. Vgl. 138f. say, violentiam et potestatem ecclesiae. See
138f.


Inzwischen hat sich auch die Kirchenbehörde mit Meanwhile the church authorities have
dem Fall meiner Professur beschäftigt. Man ist busied themselves with the case of my
sich – mit Herrn Jaspers – darüber einig, “das professorship. One is – along with Mister
Gefährliche” des an dieser Stelle der Universität Jaspers – of one mind to render the “danger”
gepflogenen Denkens unschädlich zu machen. of the wonted thought of this University
Einige, in denen über aller geheimen Brutalität, chair harmless. Despite the secret brutality
die diejenige Hitlers an Geschicklichkeit weit of these proceedings, which far outstrips
übertrifft, noch nicht ein Geringstes an Anstand Hitler’s in artfulness, a number of them who
erstorben ist, versuchen diesen großartig are by no means dead to decency have
angelegten und praktizierten Hinauswurf meiner attempted to put the best face on this grandly
Person etwas zu beschönigen. planned and executed expulsion of my
person.
Anmerkungen i [128–130], S. 83–85: Observations i [128–130]:

Wohin ist es mit den Deutschen gekommen? What have the Germans come to? To that
Nur dahin, wo sie schon immer waren – daß sie point where they have always been – only that
jetzt nur noch blöder und immer blöder die now they still more stupidly and ever more
eigene Seele leugnen und, im Hohn der stupidly deny their own souls, mimicking the
Fremden mithöhnend, ahnungslos das mockery of strangers they mock themselves
verborgenste Wesen preisgeben. So fürchterlich and ignorantly surrender their ownmost
zum Ertragen Zerstörung und Verwüstung reserved essence. Terrible as it is to endure
sind, die jetzt über die Deutschen und ihre the destruction and the desolation that has
Heimat gekommen, all das reicht nie an die now come upon the Germans and the
Selbstvernichtung, die jetzt im Verrat am homeland, all this can never come close to
Denken das Dasein bedroht. touching the self-annihilation that now
[...] Die Deutschen stehen jetzt in der threatens Dasein in treason to thinking.
Beschattung durch die eigene gegen sich selbst [...] One should not try to invoke the
betriebene Verräterei am eigenen Wesen – ein inescapable consequences of the system of
Vorgang, der sich nicht auf unvermeidliche terror that has vanished into the past to
Folgen des Terrorregiments des excuse the work of treason to which the
verschwundenen Systems berufen darf – ein Germans now give themselves against
Verhalten vielmehr, das blindwütiger ist und themselves, shadowing their ownmost
zerstörerischer als die weithin sichtbare essence with treason – a comportment more
Verwüstung und die in Plakaten an-|schaulich blind with violence and more destructive
zu machenden Greuel. than extensively visible desolation and the
horrors depicted on the posters for all to see.

Wie erbärmlich ist dies ratlose Kriechen unter der How pathetic, this witless groveling-
Beschattung durch den planetarischen Terror einer about shadowed by the planetary terror
Weltöffentlichkeit, mit dem verglichen die massive of the global media, compared to which
Brutalität des geschichtslosen the massive brutality of ahistorical
“Nationalsozialismus” die reine Harmlosigkeit “National Socialism” was harmlessness
ist – trotz der unübersehbaren Handgreiflichkeit der in itself – and this despite the undeniable
von ihm mitangerichteten Verwüstung? violence of the desolation it unleashed
together with others.

Statt dessen machen sich nur jene breit, die sich Instead of this, those who remained
für das Abgestandene dadurch legitimieren, daß standing apart from events now take center
sie beiseite gestanden und schon 1932 nichts stage, gaining their legitimacy from
begriffen und jetzt aus dem Abgestandenen einen having-stood-apart. Even in 1932 they
Betrieb gemacht haben. Ist etwa das lose understood nothing, and today they make a
Geschwätz des Herrn Sternbergerab mehr wert und business of their former self-
anders im Grunde, als das aufgespreizte Gerede marginalization. Is the loose talk and gossip
eines vormaligen nationalsozialistischen of Mister Sternberger, for example, worth
Schrift-stellers und Zeitungsmachers? more, or essentially different, than the
exaggerated scribbling of some former
National Socialist, some hack journalist?
Dolf Sternberger (1907–1989) studied theater arts and German in Kiel, Frankfurt am Main, and
ab
Heidelberg. He was awarded his doctorate in 1931 under the direction of Paul Tillich, writing his
dissertation on the topic of “Der verstandene Tod. Eine Untersuchung zu Martin Heideggers
Existenzialontologie”. After the War he became co-editor of a monthly journal entitled “Die
Wandlung”. He is recognized as one of the founders of political science in Germany [GA ed.]


Der eigentliche Irrtum des “Rektorats 1933” The actual error of my “rectorate of 1933”
war nicht so sehr, daß ich, wie andere Klügere, was not so much that I, like others cleverer
nicht “Hitler“ in seinem “Wesen” erkannte und than myself, did not recognize “Hitler” in
mit jenen in der Folgezeit grollend daneben his “essence”, only to resentfully stand aside
stand, im Bereich der Willen-losigkeit – d. h. im along with them in the domain of
selben Bereich mit den Wollenden – sondern daß willlessness (that is, in the same realm as the
ich meinte, jetzt sei die Zeit, nicht mit Hitler, willing) in what followed, but rather that I
aber mit einer Erweckung des Volkes in seinem supposed it were now the time to assume the
abendländischen Geschick anfänglich – task of a historical inception, not through
geschichtlich zu werden. Vgl. die Rektoratsredeac. Hitler’s doing, but through the awakening
[...] of the people to its Occidental destiny. See
Die jetzt Zusammenstehenden, die nichts gelernt the “Rector’s Address”.
haben; es sieht in der Tat so aus, als sei sonst in [...]
den 12 Jahren nichts geschehen bei uns – die The solidarity of those who haven’t learned
Anknüpfung der Gescheiterten beim Zustand von anything: in fact, it seems as if nothing else
1932 und die Zustimmung des Auslands dazu! has happened these past 12 years – just this,
Man kennt nur dieses oder die Greuel des that with the addition of the approbation of
Nationalsozialismus. | Aber dieses Entweder- foreigners these failures of 1932 propose to
Oder ist der eigentliche Irrtum. restore the situation that was! Either this, or
the horror of National Socialism. But this
either/ or is the true misconception.
ac
Martin Heidegger: Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität, in Reden und andere
Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges. GA 16. Hrsg. von Hermann Heidegger. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann 2000, pp. 107–117 [GA, ed.]
Anmerkungen i [151], S. 99–100: Observations i [151]:

Wäre z. B. die Verkennung dieses Geschickes – Were not, for example, the misapprehension
das uns ja nicht selbst gehörte, wäre das of this destiny – which does not, after all,
Niederhalten im Weltwollen – aus dem Geschick belong to us – were not its repression by the
gedacht, nicht eine noch wesentlichere “Schuld” global will – thought in terms of this
und eine “Kollektivschuld”, deren Größe gar destiny itself, not a still more essential
nicht – im Wesen nicht einmal am Greuelhaften “guilt” and “collective guilt” of such an
der “Gaskammern” gemessen werden könnte –; immeasurable degree that it cannot even be
eine Schuld – unheimlicher denn alle öffentlich compared in its essence to the atrocity of
“an-prangerbaren” “Verbrechen” – die gewiß the “gas chambers”; a guilt – more horrific
künftig keiner je entschuldigen dürfte. Ahnt than all publicly “denounced” “crimes” –
“man”, daß jetzt schon das deutsche Volk und which certainly no one in future should
Land ein einziges Kz ist – wie es “die Welt” excuse. Does “one” know that even now the
allerdings noch nie “gesehen” hat und das “die German people, this land is one
Welt” auch nicht sehen will – dieses Nicht-wollen comprehensive concentration camp –
noch wollender als unsere Willenlosigkeit gegen such as “the world”, however, has never
die Verwilderung des Nationalsozialismus. | Was seen, and as “the world” does not want to
könnte die Folge sein; daß auf der einen Seite die see – this not-willing to see more willing
einen zurück-fallen auf die Zeit vor 1932 und die than our willlessness in face of the
anderen auf den Nationalsozialismus erneut sich degeneration of National Socialism. What
verstehen, in der Meinung, daß er “doch recht” could follow in consequence: on the one
gehabt habe. hand, one party falls back upon the time
before 1932, and on the other, the party of
those who recur to the position of National
Socialism, guided by the opinion that they
had “been right, after all”.
Anmerkungen ii [25], S. 125: Observations ii [25]:

Das einzige Hindernis auf dem Weg ist jetzt die The sole hindrance on the way ahead is the
Betulichkeit der vermeintlich Gutmeinenden, die officiousness of supposedly well-meaning
versuchen, das, was inskünftig gesagt sein muß, people who will attempt to seize upon
ins Bisherige zurückzuzerren und alles everything said and done with a view to the
aufzubieten, um “Kultur” und “Bildung” zu future in order to save the “culture” and
“retten” – sie glauben immer noch, das Unheil forms of “education” of the past. Even now
wäre vermieden worden, wenn die Vollstrecker they still believe that the disaster could have
des Unheils “gebildeter” gewesen wären. Damals been avoided if only the executors of the
wie jetzt – wagt sich das Denken nicht in äußerste calamity had been more “refined”. Then as
Positionen und zwar auf dem Wege now – thinking does not dare the ultimate
ursprünglicher Verwindung der bisherigen and this, to be sure, on the path of the
Geschichte. Überall noch und wieder die gleichen originary transformation of previous history.
Fassadenkletterer. Still the same acrobats everywhere, again.
Anmerkungen ii [27–29], S. 127–128: Observations ii [27–29]:

“Man” wird daher auch nicht sobald begreifen, “One” is not likely, therefore, to easily grasp
was das eigentliche Bestimmende war in meinem what determined my decision of 1933, which
Schritt 1933, der gleichwohl ein Irrtum wurde; nonetheless was in error; not in respect to
nicht in dem eben Gesagten, sondern hinsichtlich what was just said, but in regard to the
der Möglichkeit im National-Sozialismus und possibilities of National Socialism and the
hinsichtlich des Augenblicks und der Eignung historical moment, as well as the aptitude of
eines Denkenden zum verwaltungsmäßigen a thinker for administrative action in an
Handeln in einer Anstalt des öffentlichen institute of public instruction – the essence of
Unterrichts – das Wesen des imperialistischen imperial materialism.
Materialismus. [...]
[...] Had the German mind not been reduced to
Wäre die Versimpelung der Deutschen nicht an extreme of idiocy well before 1933, “one”
schon vor 1933 ins Unmaß gestiegen gewesen, would have been capable of recognizing that
dann hätte “man” erkennen müssen, daß der so-called National Socialism, unknown to
sogenannte National-sozialismus, ohne daß itself and to its doctrinaire defenders, was
dieser und seine parteimäßigen Verfechter es driven by a completely different reality, and
wußten, von einer ganz anderen Wirklichkeit that no-one was free and insightful enough –
gestoßen war und daß niemand frei und thoughtful enough, to lead it into the open
wissend – denkend genug war, um ins Freie und and into the dimension of those decisions
in die Dimension derjenigen Entscheidungen zu that have long been needful, those that still
führen, die seit langem da sind und jetzt trotz | today, despite “anti-fascism”, drive us
“Antifaschismus” dennoch ins Äußerste treiben. toward the ultimate. Today also the issue is
Aber auch jetzt handelt es sich nicht darum, ob not if Hitler or Mussolini or whoever was
Hitler oder Mussolini oder sonstwer “Recht” “right”, but rather that we experience what
behält oder nicht, sondern, daß erfahren wird, is, and that the coming generation is given
was ist, und daß das künftige Geschlecht nicht not only the “opportunity” of poverty, but the
nur die “Chance” der Armut bekommt, sondern chance of experiencing what is and what it
die Chance, zu erfahren, was ist und zu seyn im: means to be in being.
Seyn. [...] [...]
Es gehört zum besonderen Glück der flachen It belongs to the exceptional happiness of
Köpfe, daß sie das Unheil, das sie wegfegt, nicht dummies that they are not able to conceive
als solches zu denken vermögen, daß sie as such the disaster that sweeps them away,
vielmehr bei ihrem Rechnen nach schuldig und for with their accounting of guilty and not
nicht schuldig immer abgeleiteten Erscheinungen guilty they assign guilt to derivative
die Schuld geben und sich am Schauspiel des phenomena and remain invested in the
öffentlichen Meinungsbetriebs beteiligen. spectacle produced by the mass media.
Anmerkungen ii [31–32], S. 130: Observations ii [31–32]:

Kommunismus. – Der “Nationalsozialismus” und Communism: “National Socialism” and
“Faschismus” wären, wenn es geglückt | wäre, ein “Fascism” could have been, with luck,
Weg gewesen, “Europa” und seine “Bildung” und the path of making “Europe,” its
seinen “Geist” für den “Kommunismus” reif und “culture” and “spirit” prepared and ripe
bereit zu machen. Aber – das war zu früh; denn alles for “communism”. But – all that came
wurde nur “politisch” gesehen; nicht einmal too soon. For everything was interpreted
metaphysisch, geschweige denn seynsgeschichtlich. “politically”; not even metaphysically,
let alone being-historically.

Man kann sich nicht laut genug entrüsten über One cannot voice one’s outrage about the
den Zerfall der “Wissenschaft” und der decay of “science” and of “truth” during the
“Wahrheit” während der Herrschaft des reign of National Socialism loudly enough,
Nationalsozialismus und zugleich läßt man – and at the same time one allows – not just
nicht beliebige Privatdozenten der any lecturer in philosophy – but
Philosophie – als anerkannter Philosoph, in den recognized philosophers to blather on in
Übungen ahnungs- und ehrfurchtslose Jünglinge their seminars to ignorant and disrespectful
in einer Stunde über “Platon” und “Hegel” in youths about “Plato” and “Hegel” as if they
Thesen daherreden, als seien das irgendwelche were talking about common journalists; one
Zeitschriftenartikelschreiber; man duldet nicht doesn’t simply tolerate, one sows and
nur, man pflanzt und pflegt systematisch eine cultivates insolence in regard to history and
Frechheit gegenüber der Geschichte und in respect to thought and the rigour of
gegenüber dem Denken und der Strenge der reflection and expression; one pursues and
Besinnung und des Sagens, man betreibt eine excuses such desolation as cannot be
Verwüstung unter angeblicher “Wandlung” des outdone – supposedly for the sake of the
verruchten Bisherigen, die durch nichts mehr zu “transformation” of the wickedness that
überbieten ist und gegenüber dem früheren nur was – when in fact it exceeds the past only
dieses voraus hat, daß es sich mit “Moralismus” in this, that it cloaks its own decrepitude
und alten Fetzen von “Bildung” und “Geistigkeit” with “moralism” and worn-out tatters of
in seinen eigenen Zerfall verhüllt und einen “education” and “spirituality” to loudly
lauten Betrieb entfaltet und von einer in gleicher unfold its operations and to find acclaim
Weise urteilslosen und sachfremden with a public equally ignorant and devoid of
Öffentlichkeit bejaht wird. standards of judgment.

Man kann daraus sich leicht ausrechnen, was Based on this, one can easily imagine what
diese wieder auferstandenen Herrschaften these resurrected gentlemen could have
geleistet hätten an wachsender Ahnungslosigkeit, achieved in their waxing ignorance had they
wenn sie 1933 weiter “an der Macht” geblieben remained “in power” in 1933 – this thought
wären – mit dieser Überlegung soll in keiner should in no wise be taken as a
Weise der “Nationalsozialismus” – d. h. dessen “justification” of “National Socialism” –
gleichfalls kaum überbietbare geschichtliche whose comparable historical cluelessness is
Ahnungslosigkeit “gerechtfertigt” werden. [...] hardly to be surpassed. [...]
Es ist billig, aber auch töricht und, um moralisch It is cheap, but also foolish, and to speak
zu reden, vielleicht doch verantwortungslos, über morally, perhaps also irresponsible to attack
den National-sozialismus herzufallen, ohne sich National Socialism without ever thinking
je einen ernsthaften | Gedanken über den seriously about “socialism”, which is not
“Sozialismus” zu machen; dieser ist nicht eine simply a matter of party “politics”, but a matter
bloß “politische” Parteisache, er ist die of modern anthropology as defined by
neuzeitliche Anthropologie innerhalb der technicity; it is a fundamental component of
Technik – er ist ein Grundstück der Vollendung the consummation of the essence of modernity.
der Wesensgeschichte der Neuzeit. Man rümpft One turns up one’s nose at the “Nazis” and
die Nase über die “Nazis” und ihren Terror und their terror; one clings to the obvious and
hängt sich an alles Vordergründige und unleugbar undeniable repulsiveness of particular Party
Scheußliche der einzelnen Parteifunktionäre functionaries and institutions and deceives
und -einrichtungen und – man täuscht sich oneself concerning that which was willed, and
darüber, was hier, ohne rechtes Wissen des had to be willed, without ever being known as
Nationalsozialismus selber, gewollt war, gewollt such to National Socialism. So, with the help
sein mußte – man mogelt sich so mit Hilfe der of one’s indignation and moral explanations
Entrüstungen und moralischen Erklärungen one cheats oneself of understanding what
darüber hinweg, was eigentlich ist und rettet sich actually is – one takes refuge, if possible, in
womöglich noch ins 18. Jahrhundert oder return to the 18th century, or whenever, and
sonstwohin und sieht nicht, was schon da ist – does not see what has already arrived – not
nicht erst vielleicht “kommt”. what may “come”.

“Der Irrtum von 1933” – es ist nötig, daß man “The error of 1933”: it is imperative not to
sich über diesen Irrtum keine irrige Vorstellung come to false conclusions regarding this
mache. Der Irrtum bestand nicht darin, daß ein error. The error did not consist in venturing
Versuch gewagt wurde mit dem “National Socialism” – understood as one
“Nationalsozialismus” als einer Gestalt der form of the unavoidable actualization and
unumgänglichen Verwirklichung und Einrichtung establishment of the absolute metaphysics of
der absoluten Metaphysik des Willens zum the will to power. For this venture sought to
Willen, um diese selbst aus sich und damit das prepare the crossing into the overcoming of
Weltgeschick vorzubereiten in den Übergang zur metaphysics out of metaphysics and thus out
Überwindung der Metaphysik. of world-destiny itself.

Der Irrtum war nicht ein bloß “politischer” in The error was not merely “political” in
dem Sinne, daß man sich in der “Partei” versah; the sense that one was mistaken about the
politisch im weltgeschichtlichen Sinne war die “Party”: in the world-historical sense the
Entscheidung kein Irrtum; denn es sollte im decision was not a political error. For from
vorhinein nicht beim National-sozialismus als the beginning there was no intention of
solchem bleiben, als einer Einrichtung für die staying with National Socialism as such, as
Ewigkeit; er war gedacht als Ende der an institution for all eternity. It was
Metaphysik, als Übergang, der selbst nur aus dem conceived as the end of metaphysics, as a
Anfang zu überwinden sein wird. passage that could only be over-come out
[...] the inception.
Daß die jetzt in Deutschland, im besetzten [...]
wohlgemerkt, in Gang gebrachte Only liberal democrats and so-called
Tötungsmaschinerie etwas anderes leisten soll Christians could have us believe that the
als die vollständige Vernichtung, das können nur machinery of death which has now been
noch liberale Demokraten und sogenannte brought into play in Germany, in occupied
Christen glauben machen wollen. Daß diese Germany, bear in mind, has any other
Maschinerie nur die “Strafe” für den objective than our complete annihilation.
Nationalsozialismus sei, oder auch nur die bloße That this machinery is only the
Ausgeburt einer Rachsucht, möge man noch eine “punishment” for National Socialism, or
Zeit lang einigen Törichten glauben machen. Man the mere spawn of vengeance, one may sell
hat in Wahrheit die erwünschte Gelegenheit for a time to a few fools. In truth, one has
gefunden, nein, in den letzten zwölf Jahren found the desired opportunity, no, over the
mitorganisiert und zwar bewußt, um diese last twelve years, and indeed knowingly, this
Verwüstung in Gang zu bringen. Wenn dabei desolation has been collectively organized
Verzögerungen eintreten, dann entspringen sie in order to be brought into operation later. If
nur der Berechnung, die darauf sieht, daß diese in future this should involve delays, these
Maschinerie das eigene Geschäftsgebahren nicht will arise only out of calculation, with a
noch zu plötzlich stört. view not to have one’s own affairs too
suddenly disrupted by this machinery.

Angenommen (eine Rechnung, die schon Given that Hitler and his accomplices had
ungeschichtlich “denkt”) Hitler und seine not “come” to power (a calculative,
Helfershelfer seien nicht auf – und “an” die ahistorical way of “thinking”) and thereby not
Macht und durch diese ver-kommen, | wäre been perverted by power, would the reality of
dadurch die Wirklichkeit von Amerika und America and Russia as it is, in the slightest
Rußland, wie sie ist, im Geringsten, (wesentlich essential sense, be different? On the contrary:
gedacht) geändert worden? Im Gegenteil: der the onslaught of this reality would only have
Andrang dieses Wirklichen wäre nur been veiled and perhaps it would be even
verschleiert und vielleicht noch schrecklicher more terrible. This does not “justify” Hitler
geblieben. Dadurch ist Hitler nicht before destiny, which in itself is a
geschicklich “gerechtfertigt”, was wiederum questionable undertaking. Aside from this,
ein fragwürdiges Vorhaben ist. Überdies stehen America and Russia for their part are subject
Amerika und Rußland ihrerseits in einem to a world destiny that they do not make, but
Weltgeschick, das sie nicht machen, sondern only carry out.
nur vollziehen.

“Meine Philosophie” – falls der törichte “My philosophy” – if this foolish expression
Ausdruck gebraucht werden darf – sei “die may be used – is said to be “a philosophy of
Philosophie des Abgrunds” – ich frage zurück: the abyss” – and I ask in response: do we not
stehen wir etwa nicht am Abgrund? Nicht nur perhaps stand on the edge of an abyss? Not
wir, die Deutschen, nicht nur Europa – sondern only us, we Germans, not only
“die Welt”? Und nicht nur seit gestern und Europe – but rather “the world”? and not only
schon gar nicht “durch” Hitler, so wenig wie since yesterday, and not at all “because” of
“durch” Stalin oder “durch” Roosevelt. – Hitler, just as little as “through” Stalin, or
“through” Roosevelt. –
Anmerkungen ii [75], S. 157–158: Observations ii [75]:

“Katholische Philosophie” – das ist nicht viel “Catholic philosophy” – is that so different
anders als “nationalsozialistische than “National Socialist science” – a square
Wissenschaft” – ein viereckiger Kreis, ein circle, an iron of wood, that, laid into the fire,
hölzernes Eisen, das, wenn es ins Feuer kommt, decomposes unto ashes instead of being
zur Asche zerfällt, statt gehärtet zu werden. tempered to hardness?

“Prophetie” ist die Technik der Abwehr des “Prophecy” is in essence a technology of the
Geschicklichen der Geschichte. Sie ist ein refusal of the historicity of history. It is an
Instrument des Willens zur Macht. Daß die instrument of will to power. That the greatest
großen Propheten Juden sind, ist eine Tatsache, prophets are Jews is a fact the secret of
deren Geheimes noch nicht gedacht worden. which has yet to be thought. (Footnote for
(Anmerkung für Esel: mit “Antisemitismus” hat donkeys: this remark has nothing to do with
die Bemerkung nichts zu tun. Dieser ist so “anti-Semitism”. This is as foolish and
töricht und so verwerflich, wie das blutige und reprehensible as the bloody and above all
vor allem unblutige Vorgehen des Christentums bloodless procedures of Christianity against
gegen “die Heiden”. Daß auch das Christentum the “pagans”. That Christianity itself brands
den Antisemitismus als “unchristlich” anti-Semitism as “unchristian” bears
brandmarkt, gehört zur hohen Ausbildung der witness to the refined elaboration of its
Raffinesse seiner Machttechnik.) techniques of power).

Nachträglich wundern sich die Herren an der Subsequently the gentlemen of the
Universität und an den höheren Schulen darüber, universities and colleges came to wonder
weshalb die “Hitlerjugend”ad in den Schulen how the “Hitler Youth” could win such
solchen Einfluß gewinnen konnte. Man influence in the schools. Now, rigorously
The “Hitler Youth” was the youth and training organization of the NSDAP. It was founded in
ad
1926 and disappeared with the collapse. See Enzyklopädie des Nationalsozialismus. Hrsg. von
Wolfgang Benz, Herman Graml und Hermann Weiß. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag 3/1998, p. 513
[GA ed.]
“entnazifiziert” kräftig und ahnt nicht im “denazifying”, one still doesn’t have a clue
Entferntesten, daß man mit der eigenen that for decades our own “scientific
“Wissenschaft” seit Jahrzehnten | Schlimmeres education” was far worse than the foolish
betrieben hat, als es die törichten Redereien der speeches of Party leaders. Thoughtless
Partei vermochten – man hat, selber gedankenlos – oneself, one encouraged every conceivable
die Gedankenlosigkeit in jeder Gestalt form of thoughtlessness.
großgezüchtet.

Sprachliche Begabung ohne eine lange Übung im Without long practice in the craft of
Handwerk des Denkens ist für den Begabten und thinking, a gift for language is a misfortune
seine Umgebung ein Unheil. for the talented and their entourage.
Anmerkungen II, S. 139 [GA 97, S. 199–200]

Anmerkungen ii [139], S. 199–200: Observations ii [139]:

Aber der Mensch kann sich “wandeln”; auch der But human beings – even the
“Philosoph” – er kann, wenn auch nicht “philosopher” – can “change”: he can, even
christlich-theologisch, doch christlich-sentimental if no longer Christian in the theological
werden und aus dem “Scheitern”, das vom sense, become Christian in the sentimental
Verzicht auf das unbekannte Denken lebt, eine sense, and make a religion of a “failure”
Religion machen. Das ist alles in der Ordnung bei that lives upon the abandonment and
der heutigen Zerrüttung der Atmosphäre des ignorance of thought. All this accords with
Denkens, aus welcher Zerrüttung der the contemporary ruin of the ambiance of
“Nationalsozialismus” sehr rasch und thought. This ruin brought forth National
unaufhaltsam eine der Abirrungen ins Socialism, which very quickly and
Verbrecherische wurde. Wenn man nun die relentlessly became one path of criminal
Deutschen von dieser Pest reinigt, was bleibt aberration among others. If the Germans
dann? Etwa das Reine? Allerdings – der reine are now to be purified of this plague, what
vorherige und bisherige Sumpf der remains? The pure, perhaps? Yes,
geschichtslosen Angst vor dem Denken. indeed – the pure swamp, which was and
still is, of the ahistorical fear of thinking.

Im “Nationalsozialismus”, d. h. in der “National Socialism”, which is to say, in
erbärmlichen Abirrung seines Wesens, wurde “der the form of the wretched aberration of its
Geist” nur verachtet – das war wenigstens essence, merely despised “the spirit” – at
eindeutig. Jetzt aber wird er geistiger- und least this was plain and unequivocal. Today
“geistlicher”-weise ruiniert. the spirit is ruined by “spiritual” and
clerical means.
Anmerkungen III, S. 46 [GA 97, S. 250]

Anmerkungen III, S. 47 [GA 97, S. 250–251]

Anmerkungen iii [46–47], S. 250–251: Observations iii [46–47]:

Man sehe sich das ratlose Gezappel an, mit Consider the clueless dancing-about of the
dem heute die “Westmächte” Europapolitik “Western Powers” in their attempt to formulate
machen. Manche von ihnen meinen, wir lebten European policy. Some of them seem to
noch im 17. Jahrhundert. Die Verantwortung believe that we are still living in the 17th
solcher Gedankenlosigkeit, oder ist es schon century. The lack of responsibility shown by
mehr: Unvermögen des Denkens?, übersteigt such thoughtlessness, or still worse – an
um viele tausende von Graden das incapacity of thought? exceeds the unnatural
unverantwortliche Unwesen, mit dem Hitler irresponsibility with which Hitler raged and
in Europa umhertobte. Stalin braucht nur ein wreaked havoc across Europe by thousands
Geringes mehr an Klugheit ins Spiel zu bringen of degrees. Stalin needs to bring only a
als Hitler: er braucht nur zu warten. Die minimum more of cleverness into play than
Torheit seiner nicht erst heutigen Gegner spielt Hitler: all he has to do is wait. The folly of his
ihm alles zu. Deren erste Niederlage, daß er sie opponents, who are not just of today, plays
nämlich zum Bündnis mit sich brachte, hat into his hands. Their first defeat, the fact that
schon alles entschieden. [...] he induced them to ally themselves with him,
Zwar | ist dieser Weg der billigste, um sich von has already decided everything. [...]
seiner damaligen Ahnungslosigkeit zu Admittedly, this is the easiest way by which
distanzieren und sie gar noch zu heroisieren; one can try to distance oneself from one’s
denn, sagt man, Hitler ist zur Katastrophe previous lack of insight and even to glorify it;
geworden. Nein – ihr Tugendbolde, eure for, as one says, Hitler turned into a
Ahnungslosigkeit und Kurzsichtigkeit, die catastrophe. No, you paragon of virtue, your
nicht weiter sah als bis zu den Aufmärschen cluelessness and short-sightedness led you to
und zum Teil üblen Erscheinungen, die euch see nothing but the rallies and the to some
und eure Behäbigkeit störten, die nicht zuließ, degree unpleasant manifestations that
daß ihr über euch hinaus und über Hitler disturbed your sluggishness; hence you could
hinaus dachtet, der doch selber nur ein not see past yourselves and beyond Hitler,
Merkzeichen des Weltalters war, weshalb er who was himself, after all, only a sign of the
zum Verhängnis wurde, nur durch fatality of the world epoch, and therefore you
Danebenstehen oder durch verspätetes thought to get through and past Hitler just by
Revoltieren, an ihm vorbeizukommen. Das standing-aside or by belated revolt against
heutige christlich-liberale Weltverhältnis zum him. The relation of Christian-liberal thought
Kommunismus ist genau so töricht und to communism is just as misguided and
ahnungslos und – selbstgefällig, wie das clueless and self-indulgent as the comportment
Gebahren der allzu gescheiten und vornehmen of the all-too-sensible and distinguished
bürgerlichen Herren in Deutschland gegenüber bourgeois gentlemen of Germany in regard to
dem Nationalsozialismus. Man merkt immer National Socialism. While one allowed
noch nicht, während man sich von dem oneself to be supported by this wicked system
verruchten System aushalten ließ und and accepted appointments of its ministers to
Berufungen durch seine Minister annahm und undertake journeys for them, one still did not
für sie auf Reisen ging, daß in diesen recognize that in its brutal and powerful
wuchtigen und brutalen Erscheinungen das manifestations the essence of technicity of the
eigene technische Weltwesen, in dem die world-epoch, which underlies bourgeois-
bürgerlich-industrielle Gesellschaft steckt, industrial society, approaches in its authentic,
dieser in seiner eigentlichen und d. h. and that means, in its productive
produktiven Fragwürdigkeit entgegenkommt. questionableness.


Anmerkungen iii [57–58], S. 258: Observations iii [57–58]:

Vielleicht kommt eines Tages doch jemand One day, perhaps, someone will understand that
dahinter, daß in der Rektoratsrede von 1933 in order to bring thinking back to a way of
der Versuch gemacht wurde, diesen Prozeß knowing as essential knowing, the Rector’s
der Vollendung der Wissenschaft in der Address of 1933 makes the attempt to anticipate
Verendung des Denkens vorauszudenken, in thought the process of the consummation of
Wissen als Wesenswissen wieder ans Denken science enacted in the demise of thinking, but
zu bringen, nicht aber an Hitler auszu- that it does not propose to deliver thinking
|liefern. Warum ließ denn die Partei in allen over to Hitler. For why did the Party have this
Dozentenlagern diese Rede bekämpfen? Doch address opposed in every political instruction
wohl nicht deshalb, weil sie, wie die center for university teachers? Certainly not, as
Weltöffentlichkeit vorgibt, die Universität the world press now propagates, because it
an den Nationalsozialismus verraten hat. betrayed the University to National
Socialism.
Anmerkungen iii [125], S. 307: Observations iii [125]:

Das Unheil der Verwahrlosung liegt nicht in The mischief of decay does not reside only in
der ungepflegten Sprache; es hat sich in der uncultivated speech; it has ensconced itself
gepflegten fast noch gefährlicher eingenistet. almost more dangerously in the cultivated. The
Das Unheil besteht darin, daß die Sprache, ob mischief consists in this, that language, be it
gepflegt oder ungepflegt, nicht mehr Sprache cultivated or uncultivated, is no longer
ist, noch nicht Sprache sein kann. language, cannot yet be language.

Gleichwohl dürfen wir dieses Furchtbare der Nevertheless, let us consider this appalling
Verworfenheit des Menschen nur am Rande depravity of humanity only in the margin of the
der äußersten Verweigerung der Wahrheit des most extreme refusal of the truth of being. For
Seyns erwähnen; denn schon ist in der in this refusal, the unique of enowning
Verweigerung das Einstige der ereignenden disownment is already thought as the silence of
Enteignis gedacht als die Stille des Ratsals, a mystery in comparison to which the chaos of
der gegenüber die Verwirrende Verwüstung desolation unleashed upon the planet, brought
des Erdballs in die Verwahrlosung doch nur on by the desolation of untruth, is no more than
das nichtige Nichts bleibt, das bezeugt, daß es the void nothing, bearing witness to the nullity
mit dem Seienden, das vermeintlich in seiner of beings; for nothing comes of beings,
Realität für sich genommen sei, gerade nichts although taken for real in and for themselves.
ist. Vermutlich ist dies so, weil es sogar mit Presumably this is so because even of beyng
dem Seyn nichts ist, weil das Seyn als das nothing comes, because beyng as beyng is of
Seyn des Seyns ist: die Eschatologie seiner beyng: the eschatology of itself arising in the
selbst aus dem Ereignis des Brauchs. enownment of necessity, of need and usage.

Noch haben wir wenig Mut, dem Unheil, das die Still we have too little courage to confront the
Wissenschaft befördert, ins Gesicht zu sehen und disaster promoted by science and to
mit dem Durchdenken dieses Geschicks ernst zu earnestly take up the task of thinking this fate
machen [...]. through [...].
Anmerkungen iv [62], S. 369: Observations iv [62]:

Zur Götterlehre. – Jehova ist derjenige der On theology: Jehovah is that god among gods
Götter, der sich anmaßte, sich zum who presumed to declare himself the chosen
auserwählten Gott zu machen und keine god and who refuses to countenance any other
anderen Götter mehr neben sich zu dulden. Die gods beside him. As such, only a few can
Wenigsten erraten, wie dieser Gott auch so guess how this god must, and indeed
noch und zwar notwendig sich unter die Götter necessarily, reckon himself as one among
rechnen muß; wie könnte er sonst sich other gods; for how else could he single
aussondern. Daraus wurde dann der eine himself out? From this emerged the one
einzige Gott, außer dem (praeter quem) unique god, aside from whom (praetor quem)
überhaupt sonst keiner sei. Was ist ein Gott, der there are no others whatsoever. What kind of
sich gegen die anderen zum auserwählten god is this who sets himself against the others
hinaufsteigert? Jedenfalls ist er nie “der” Gott to elevate himself as the chosen? In any case,
schlechthin, gesetzt, daß das so Gemeinte je he can never be “the” god per se, given that
göttlich sein könnte. what is meant in this way could ever be divine.
Anmerkungen iv [99–100], S. 394–395: Observations iv [99–100]:

Oder gehört gar beides zusammen im Or do the two belong together in
andenkenden Denken? Doch wie hält man es commemorative thinking? But what does one
mit Nietzsches Philosophie? Man schmäht sie make of Nietzsche’s philosophy? One reviles
und hält sie mit der Beseitigung des it and regards it as overcome along with the
Nationalsozialismus für überwunden. Oder sie eradication of National Socialism. Or they
sagen, Nietzsches Denken sei nicht so schlimm –; say, Nietzsche’s thought is not so bad – this
dieses, anscheinend objektive Reden, ist das kind of apparently objective talk is the worst
Schlimmste und gehört mit jener Auslegungsart and belongs with those explications that place
zusammen, die Nietzsche zu Kierkegaard stellt Nietzsche with Kierkegaard and conceives
und diese als Ausnahmen vorstellt – them as exceptions – exceptions to what rule?
Ausnahmen von welcher Regel? ([...] My Nietzsche lectures are neither
([...] Die Nietzsche-Vorlesungen sind weder justifications of National Socialism nor yet an
eine Rechtfertigung des Nationalsozialismus, attack on Christianity – they pursue thinking
noch ein Angriff auf das Christentum –. Sie solely for the sake of thought, and that means
sind ein Denken, rein um des Denkens willen for the sake of what is given to thought).
und d. h. des Zu-Denkenden.)
Anmerkungen V, S. 21 [GA 97, S. 444]

Anmerkungen v [21], S. 444: Observations v [21]:

Das deutsche Volk ist politisch, militärisch, Through Hitler’s criminal insanity, as
wirtschaftlich und in der besten Volkskraft ruiniert, well as through the delayed, and finally
sowohl durchden verbrecherischen Wahnsinn successful, will to annihilation of foreign
Hitlers als auch durch den endlich “zum Zuge powers, the German nation is politically,
gekommenen” Vernichtunsgwillen des Auslandes. militarily, and economically ruined, along
Man mache sich nichts vor. So töricht es ist, die with the better part of the people’s inherent
Geschichte jetzt erst von 1945 ab zu rechnen und power. Let us not fool ourselves. As foolish
über Unterdrückung und Ungerechtigkeit zu as it is to reckon history from 1945 and to
jammern, so töricht ist es, statt dessen erst mit complain of subjection and injustice, so
1933 zu beginnen. foolish is it to begin with 1933 instead.

Beruht die Zukunft der Menschheit auf der Will the future of humanity be decided by
endgültigen Auseinandersetzung zwischen a final reckoning between America and
Amerika und Rußland? Worüber geht und in Russia? What shall it involve, and in what
welcher Dimension geht sie? Ist sie der letzte dimension come to pass? Shall it be the
Schritt in die Endgültigkeit der Verwüstung? last step into the finality of desolation?


Anmerkungen v [48–49], S. 460: Observations v [48–49]:

Man hat sich in den letzten Jahren oft und In the past few years, one has often let oneself
heftig darüber erregt, daß um 1933 manche become violently excited because circa 1933
“Intellektuelle” nicht sogleich das some “intellectuals” did not immediately
verbrecherische Wesen Hitlers erkannten. Es recognize the criminal character of Hitler. It
ist schwer auszumachen, ob diejenigen, die sich is hard to determine, if those, who think
zu den Vorausschauenden rechnen, sich nicht themselves so far-sighted, were not in fact
an ganz anderem gestoßen | haben, was nur irked by something rather different, something
ihrer Eitelkeit und Herrschsucht zuwiderging. that irritated their vanity and lust for power.
Ebenso schwer ist zu erörtern, ob diejenigen, It is equally difficult to elucidate, if those, who
die für Hitler waren, nicht gerade anderes und were for Hitler, did not in fact see further and
weiteres und Wesentlicheres sahen und eben something more essential and other than those
nicht am Vordergründigen haften blieben. who remained fixated upon superficial
Vielleicht waren einige von diesen in einem appearances. Perhaps a number of these
echten Sinne schon und früher als die persons were already – against Hitler – in a
späteren – gegen Hitler. Aber solche genuine sense, long before those who came
Überlegungen nehmen sich nicht als later. These reflections are not intended as a
Verrechnungen, sondern nur als Hinweis reckoning of accounts, but only serve to
darauf, daß jetzt die Intellektuellen erst recht indicate that the intellectuals of today have
und im ganzen vor Demokratie und politischem completely and thoroughly capitulated to
Christentum kapitulieren und übereifrig nur das democracy and political Christianity, only to
wollen und befördern, was man mit ihnen zealously support and desire that which one
will. – Es ist ein förmliches Gelaufe nach wants to make of them. They are literally
internationalen Kongressen. Aber die running en masse to international conferences.
Herrschaft der öffentlichen Meinung ist But the rule of public opinion is already so
schon so diktatorisch, daß jede Überlegung dictatorial, that every comment of this kind
dieser Art einfach als “nazistisch” erklärt is declared to be “Nazi”, and thereby
und damit unwirksam gemacht wird. rendered ineffective.

Anmerkungen V, S. 53 [GA 97, S. 462–463]


Anmerkungen v [52–54], S. 462–463: Observations v [52–54]:

Husserl. – Seitdem Husserl von 1930/31 Husserl: Ever since Husserl, starting in
öffentlich in Vorträgenae, die schon eher 1930/1931, began to position himself against
Kundgebungen waren (Berlin und Frankfurt), me in public lectures that amounted to public
gegen mich Stellung nahm und meine Arbeit rallies (in Berlin and Frankfurt) and to reject
als Unphilosophie zurückwies (vgl. das my work as unphilosophical (consult the
Nachwort zu seinen “Ideen” (1930/31)), bin ich afterword of the Ideas of 1930/1931), I came
an ihm vorbeigegangen. Ich habe nie das to ignore him. I never undertook the slightest
Geringste gegen Husserl unternommen. Man thing against Husserl. One lies, when one
lügt, ich hätte ihn aus der Universität vertrieben says that I drove him from the University and
und die Bibliothek verboten. Husserl war seit forbid him access to the Library. In 1928,
1928 emeritiert auf eigenen Wunsch; er hat Husserl retired from teaching of his own
seitdem nie mehr gelesen oder eine Übung accord; after this he did not hold lectures or
gehalten; er hat nie die Universitätsbibliothek seminars; he never again used the University
benutzt, von wenigen Ausnahmen in den Jahren Library, apart from a few instances in the
1920 ff. abgesehen. Was gab es da zu 1920s. What was done to drive him from the
vertreiben? Seine Werke sind niemals aus der University? His books were never removed
Seminarbibliothek entfernt worden, wie das für from the library of the Philosophical Seminar,
jüdische Autoren vorgeschrieben war; | as was mandated in regard to other Jewish
sowenig wie je ein authors; just as little as
ae
See Edmund Husserl, Phänomenologie und Anthropologie. In: Aufsätze und Vorträge
(1922–1937). Hua xxvii. Hrsg. von Thomas Nenon und Hans Rainer Sepp. Dordrecht et al.:
Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989, pp. 164–181 [GA ed.]
nationalsozialistisches Buch, z. B. Rosenbergaf any National Socialist books – for example,

und dergleichen, angeschafft oder, wie by Rosenberg, or others like it – were
vorgeschrieben und auch in den übrigen acquired; nor, as was also mandated and
Seminaren befolgt war, ein “Führerbild” followed in other seminars, was a portrait of
aufgehängt wurde. Ich nenne dies nicht zur the “Führer” exhibited. I mention these
Verteidigung, nur als Feststellung, wozu auch things not to defend myself, but as a simple
dieses gehört, daß ich zwischen 1933 und 44 statement of fact. Add to this, that between
genau wie früher in der gleichen Sachlichkeit 1933 and 1944, I emphasized the significance
auf die Bedeutung der Phänomenologie of Husserl’s phenomenology and the necessity
Husserls und die Notwendigkeit des Studiums of studying the Logical Investigations with the
der “Logischen Untersuchungen” hingewiesen same objectivity that I had previously. Never
habe. Es ist nie ein Wort der Kritik, was ja did I advance a word of critique, which was of
möglich und berechtigt und kein Verbrechen course possible and justified, and no crime, in
gewesen wäre, gefallen, weder in den either the lectures or the seminars.
Vorlesungen noch in den Übungen. I ignored Husserl; that was a painful
Ich bin an Husserl vorbeigegangen; das war necessity. Any other comportment on my part
eine schmerzliche Notwendigkeit. Man hätte would have been interpreted as a mere gesture
auch jede andere Haltung von mir nur als of politeness. But whoever talks of despicable
höfliche Geste ausgelegt. Wer aber von treason to Husserl, knows not, that he talks
verabscheuungswürdigem Verrat redet, weiß revenge, and knows nothing of what happened
nicht, daß er nur Rache redet und von dem, was earlier: that my own path of thought was
früh geschah, nichts weiß: daß mein eigener interpreted as apostasy, that one took recourse
Weg des Denkens als Abfall ausgelegt wurde, to propaganda when it could not be impeded
daß man zur Propaganda die Zuflucht nahm, als in other ways. What is being staged now is a
mein Weg anders nicht aufzuhalten war. Man great falsification of history.
inszeniert jetzt eine große Geschichtsfälscherei. It seems to me, however, that my attempts
Mir scheint aber, daß meine Versuche seit “Sein since Being and Time are the worthiest
und Zeit” das würdigste Zeugnis für das sind, witnesses for what I owe to Husserl: that I
was ich Husserl verdanke – daß ich von ihm learned from him and bore witness for his way
lernte und für seinen Weg zeugte dadurch, daß of thought by not remaining his disciple,
ich nicht sein Anhänger blieb, der ich auch nie which in fact I never was.
war. Aber ge-
Alfred Rosenberg: Der Mythus des
af
xx. Jahrhunderts. München: Hoheneichen-Verlag 1930
[GA ed.]
nau dieses verstieß gegen die Hausordnung, But precisely this offended against the
lange vor dem, daß von Nationalsozialismus governing code of conduct long before there
und Judenverfolgung die Rede war. Weil auch was talk of National Socialism and
noch im Jahre 1948 die Verunglimpfungen und persecution of the Jews. Because even now
Schmähungen im Schwange sind, niemand sich in the year 1948, defamation and
die Mühe nimmt, sachlich aus Sachkenntnis zu vituperation are put into play, and no-one
urteilen oder gar auf meine Schriften takes the trouble to judge factually based
einzugehen und die sonst viel benutzten upon knowledge of the subject, or actually to
Vorlesungen als Zeugnisse meines Denkens engage with my texts and to cite my otherwise
anzuführen, sei dies noch einmal vermerkt, nicht much used lectures as witnesses to my
für die Öffentlichkeit, nicht zur Verteidigung, thought – let this be recorded once again, not
sondern als Feststellung. for the public, and not in self-defence, but as
a statement of fact.

Der letzte Akt der Verwüstung. The most recent act of desolation.
Der Roman im Übergang zur Berichterstattung. The novel in transition to reportage.

Das Unheil der Psychologie – sie ist die The disaster of psychology – it is the popular
populäre und gemeine Form des and vulgar form of subjectivism – it demands
Subjektivismus – sie verlangt noch weniger still less thoughtfulness and offers the
Nachdenken und gibt den Anschein einer letzten pretence of the ultimate superiority of a final
Überlegenheit einer letzten Reserve. reserve.

Alle Feinde sind einträchtig in ihrer Feindschaft; All enemies stand in concord in their enmity;
sie verschleiern diese oder bekennen sie in den they disguise this or confess it in a great
verschiedensten Formen. Ins Ganze gesehen diversity of forms. In general regard, they
leisten sie der Barbarei der “neuen Welt” den serve to advance the barbarity of the “new
bequemsten Vorschub und zögern dann auch world” with greatest ease, nor do they
nicht, mit dieser ihre gemeinsame Sache zu hesitate to make common cause with it.
machen.

Inzwischen gerät das Tun des Ackerbauers, der Meanwhile the doings of the tiller of the soil,
Landwirt ist, in die Zangen der the farmer, are subjected to the grasp of
Industrietechnik und erledigt seine Geschäfte industrial technology and he quickly finishes
rasch in möglichst wenig Tagen und Stunden his business in the fewest possible days,
mit möglichst viel Gewinn mit immer rascheren hours, achieving the greatest possible profit
Maschinen. with ever quicker machines.
Inzwischen verläuft im Feldweg die Spur von Nowadays the tracks of tractors leave their
Traktoren. Diese Verwüstung ist in ihrem trace on the field path. This desolation is
Bezirk mit ihren Mitteln unaufhaltsam. unstoppable in its dimension and by its
means.
The passages collected and printed at the beginning of this section were selected
in the course of an exhaustive review of the notebooks comprising volume GA 97.
Careful consideration of these passages would already suffice to allow a clear and
well-balanced evaluation of Heidegger’s annotations between 1942 and 1948. And
this entails achieving an understanding that is not based upon false generalizations
arrived at by tearing specific passages out of context to falsify their meaning. The
imperative presentation of all passages in sequence and without exception shows
clearly and unequivocally that Heidegger totally rejected the criminal insanity of
Hitler’s European rampage, which “is not (nicht), it should be emphasized, histori-
cally (geschicktlich) to be ‘justified’” (Observations II [62–63]). Heidegger’s deci-
sive rejection of Hitler is expressed in the vocabulary of “monstrosity”, “criminal
character”, and “criminal insanity”, finally culminating in the judgment that “Hitler
has become a catastrophe (Katastrophe)” (Observations III [47]).
In the Observations, Heidegger pronounces a number of judgments on Hitler that

had to be clear to everyone: nevertheless, what is manifest and obvious to all will
not necessarily lead to asking the requisite question as to how not only Germany, but
all of Europe came to stand on the edge of the abyss. The problem cannot be reduced
to the rejection of National Socialism and its terror. The reader of these annotations
is called upon to win sufficient distance from events, for otherwise their significance
risks being distorted. In Heidegger’s view, the catastrophe unleashed by Hitler and
the horrific policies of National Socialism are the indices of a unworld in which
thinking is no longer ventured. Going beyond the manifest and undeniable destruc-
tion wrought by Hitler, Heidegger consistently points to the historical responsibility
of the United States and Russia. His comments are often provocative: “Given that
Hitler and his accomplices had not ‘come’ to power (a calculative, ahistorical way
of ‘thinking’) and thereby been perverted by power, would the reality of America
and Russia as it is, in the slightest essential sense, be different?”. (Observations II
[62–63]). In this sense, not only Hitler, National Socialism, and real-existing
America and Russia are subjected to criticism, but also the manner in which the lat-
ter two regulated the postwar world. In Heidegger’s opinion, denazification is no
magic formula. It is not enough to eliminate those who contributed to the implemen-
tation of Hitler’s criminally insane policies – as underlined by the explicit reference
to “Hitler and his accomplices (seine Helfershelfer)!” – because this still fails to
earnestly consider the ultimate grounds that enabled this barbarism.
Furthermore, Heidegger assesses the extent of the damage caused by the “his-
torical cluelessness” of National Socialism and “the obvious and undeniable repul-
siveness of particular Party functionaries and institutions” (Observations II [40–41]).
National Socialism and its “criminal aberrations” (Observations II [139]) contrib-
uted to the systematic unfolding of Hitler’s brutality. In this respect, the following
passage from Observations I [75] is typical of Heidegger’s attitude: “The opinion
that if revenge upon a people is possible, revenge should be taken, recoils back on
us”. “Certainly no one in future should excuse” (Observations I [151]) what hap-
pened in the extermination camps; the horrific gas chambers are despicable. For
these reasons, it comes as no surprize that Heidegger describes anti-Semitism as
“foolish and reprehensible” (Observations II [77]). This comment only emphasizes
how alien this way of thinking is to Heidegger, not to mention the extreme brutality
of the excesses of the regime, which led to the harm of the Jewish people and to
humanity in a measure that can never be atoned.
In the present section, reference to Jewry and Judaism must always be placed in
the context of all texts under review: “This renders the measure for what the com-
memoration of the first, Greek inception – which remained outside of Jewry
(Judentum) and hence outside of Christianity (Christentum) – means for thinking as
the thought of the reserved, inceptual and ownmost essence of the history of the
Occident” (Observations I [29–30]). Judaism, “and that means Christianity”,
according to Heidegger, remained outside the history of being, which extends from
the first beginning (whose inception goes back to the Greeks) and the other begin-
ning, which it is incumbent upon the Germans to take up. It follows, that nothing
pertaining to this context in its several dimensions should be taken for itself, as
absolute, unbound from the whole. Just as Judaism and Jewry cannot be separated
from Christianity (with which it always stands in relation), so in Heidegger’s con-
ception Jewry and Christianity cannot be integrated into being-historical thinking.
This furnishes the evidence that the insinuations of the German editor of the
Notebooks only serve to prove his own inability to master the theoretical relation
between the first and the other beginning. “In the epoch of the Christian Occident,
that is, in the epoch of metaphysics, this world (die Judenschaft) constitutes the
principle of destruction (Zerstörung)”, Heidegger writes (Observations I [29–30]).
This statement points to the insolvable unity of Jewry – and not only Christianity –
but even the unity of “the Christian Occident”, and that means, as Heidegger adds,
the unity “of metaphysics”. Even as Jewry cannot be separated from the Christian
Occident, so it cannot be integrated into metaphysics; claims to the contrary, amount
to a knowing distortion of the texts. This kind of subjective interpretation of the text
leads to its distortion and to the danger of the disfiguration of Heidegger’s entire
philosophy. Heidegger’s statement that Jewry constitutes a “principle of destruc-
tion” has to be understood in the context of his critique of the Christian Occident
and as such, of modernity. As has been repeatedly demonstrated by our analysis,
moreover, the principle of destruction signifies the principle of the maintenance of
the unchangeable inviolability of beingness in its self-sufficiency.
“Destruction” is to be conceived in the sense that the beingness of beings com-
pletely separates itself from being. The claim that the Observations advance the
thesis that the principle of destruction is inherent in the Jewish people shows that the
reader has not understood the categories and expressions used by Heidegger in his
very tightly constructed syntactical formulations. Still more unequivocally do the
annotations collected in volume GA 97 refute the claim that Heidegger was more or
less involved in the annihilation of the Jews. Reading these passages, it becomes
abundantly clear that Heidegger is intent on refuting the accusations directed against
him: his determined opposition to Hitler, to National Socialism and the madness of
those who participated in the planned annihilation of the Jews is, today as yesterday,
unmistakable. Only “public opinion”, the “gentlemen” of the University, his own
colleagues, and the “acrobats” who distorted the facts with their slanderous accusa-
tions, mistake him, and thereby come to contribute to the staging of this grand his-
torical falsification. This happened in the course of the political interpretation of
Heidegger’s rectorate. Heidegger does not hesitate to acknowledge that his assump-
tion of the rectorate was an “error (Irrtum)”, while adding that “it is imperative not
to come to false conclusions regarding this error” (Observations II [58]). In the
Observations I through III and V, Heidegger almost compulsively returns to the
error of his rectorate, as if he wanted to emphasize how much his path of thought,
from the very beginning, was and remained alien to that of the “Movement”, only to
find that his clarifications gave rise to ever new misconceptions. Nor did the histori-
cal distortions brought into play by his antagonists hold back in respect to
Heidegger’s relations to the Jewish philosopher Husserl: in this case we are con-
fronted by such a manipulation of historical facts that Heidegger feels himself obli-
gated to precisely recount events that had been overlooked by a dictatorial “public
sphere”. Despite this, Heidegger insists that his annotations are not meant for the
“public (Öffentlichkeit)”. These remarks are not meant for the public inasmuch as
his annotations will remain inaccessible to those who remain incarcerated in the
pre-judgments of their self-centered lives – those who attempt to dissimulate the
impression of insight using the weapons of their fractured grasp of reality. For it is
impossible to pretend that one has understood Heidegger, when one has in fact con-
tributed to the construct of this catastrophic confusion. Once having arrived at this
point, then we may intimate the new face of dictatorship in the measureless, invisi-
ble arrogance of meaninglessness with which the public sphere has made its peace.
What Heidegger wrote regarding Husserl in the Observations V [52–54] was
reproduced in the Speeches (1950), and later found their way into volume GA 16 of
the Complete Edition. It is worthwhile to present the full text here, because it expli-
cates Heidegger’s position in regard to National Socialism, to Husserl, and to his
Jewish students. In respect to what Heidegger has left us in the notebooks collected
in volume GA 97, this material is given a somewhat forced explication, at least to
the effect that Heidegger marginally modifies some of his previous comments on his
relation to Husserl (“my master”). But let us give Heidegger the floor:“I never
belonged to the S.A. or the S.S., nor to any other military formation; and hence –
with the exception of my four years in the first World War – I have never worn a
uniform.
I have never had – neither before, nor after 1933 – personal relations or relations of corre-
spondence to Party offices or activists of the National Socialist movement. Even in the
course of performing my functions as rector I seldom had contact with Party representa-
tives, some few, and only on occasions of official duty.
I never participated in any kind of anti-Semitic measures whatsoever; on the contrary, at
the University of Freiburg in 1933, I forbid the anti-Semitic proclamations of the National
Socialist student association, and likewise I prohibited a demonstration against a Jewish
professor. I extensively engaged myself on behalf of those of my Jewish students who were
to emigrate; in many respects, my recommendations facilitated their way.
That I, as rector, bared Husserl access to the University Library is a particularly vile
slander. I never ceased to regard Husserl with gratitude and admiration as my teacher. My
philosophical works, however, had so distanced themselves from his position that in his
highly significant address of 1931 in the Berlin Sportpalast he publicly attacked me. So a
loosening of our friendly relations had set in long before 1933. Then, in 1933, when the first
legislation against the Jews came into effect (which severely shocked me and many oth-
ers) – my wife sent a bouquet and a letter, also in my name, to Frau Husserl, expressing our
unchanged gratitude and admiration, along with our condemnation of these strict measures
against the Jews. On the occasion (1941) of a new edition of Being and Time the publisher
informed me that the work would only be allowed to appear if the dedication to Husserl
were removed. I accepted this stipulation on the condition that actual dedication on page 38
remain untouched and unchanged. And this is what afterwards happened. As Husserl was
dying, I lay sick in bed. I did not, admittedly, write Frau Husserl upon my convalescence,
which was undoubtedly a failure; the reason was my painful shame in regard to that which
had in the meantime – far in excess of the first law – been undertaken against the Jews,
things which one was powerless to oppose.
On the occasion of Frau Husserl’s 90th birthday, I did, however, write her a letter
expressly biding her to excuse my omission at the time of her husband’s death – an omis-
sion that had most painfully oppressed me over the years”.60
60
Heidegger M. (2000b), § 211, pp. 468–469 (our translation).
The divergence of Heidegger and Husserl from each other arose much earlier
than 1927 and the publication of Being and Time. This is substantiated by Husserl
in his letter of 1921 to the Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden: “Although I don’t
reject the Ideas I (except in certain specific explications that remain below the level
of my manuscripts), I have come much further. Hence, I have developed the system-
atic aspects so much further and much refined them in all fundamental respects. I
have become quite confident. God will help us on. Heidegger has also more com-
pletely unfolded his powerful and remarkable, idiosyncratic character and makes a
strong impression. Whatever becomes of him will be of superior quality”.61
Heidegger’s approach to philosophy did not accord with Husserl’s hopes and
posed an obstacle to Husserl’s project of laying the foundations of philosophy as
“rigorous science” in the form this increasingly took after the publication of the
Logical Investigations. Husserl’s other students, first among them Hedwig Conrad-
Martius, wanted to restrict Husserl’s project to accord with the model of the Logical
Investigations; after the publication of Ideas I, they distanced themselves from the
Master and criticized his position as idealist insofar as he restricted his analyses to
the dimension of essences. With Heidegger, however, we bear witness to the com-
plete inversion of Husserl’s project from first principles. Consequently, Heidegger’s
distance from Husserl reflected his philosophical independence, but this never
excluded his gratitude to Husserl, nor the memory of the powerful effect the study
of the Logical Investigations had had on him. Hence the philosophical path of
Husserl’s disciples is fundamentally different from Heidegger’s own. For the for-
mer, the issue is to transform phenomenology and its method, whereas for Heidegger
the issue is to invert the starting point of phenomenology and to begin anew with the
question of being (Seinsfrage).62 Not only Heidegger, moreover, but at that time
Hedwig Conrad-Martius also distanced herself from Husserl’s project of philoso-
phy as laid out in Ideas.
Certainly the “eidetic reduction” offered a genuine possibility of overcoming the
position of Kantian critique, which had long maintained the impossibility of the
investigation of the “givenness of the given” in order to arrive at its “essence
(Wesen)”. Husserl’s phenomenology, as presented in the Logical Investigations, had
initiated a new flowering of philosophy while opposing tendencies to “reduce given-
ness” to the merely functional level of pure subjectivity. In this context, Conrad-
Martius decides for a realist phenomenology, which is to be won from the “research
into essences (Wesenforschung)” as inherent in reality itself in its different domains,
as defined by Husserl.
For genuine philosophical speculation, founded in the givenness of things, not
only requires acknowledgement of the empirically given, but also and above all
demands the intuition of the essence (Wesensschau) of the real that is to be
61
Husserl E. (1968), pp. 23–24 (Letter of Dec. 24, 1921).
62
Iso Kern’s thorough investigation of Husserl’s study of Being and Time during the decade of
1925–1935 which Husserl undertook in his attempt to arrive at a “solid and comprehensive posi-
tion in regard to Heidegger’s philosophy” is particularly relevant, as attested by a number of manu-
scripts (A vii 3; A vii 24; B iii 5, B i 32); see Kern I. (1973), pp. xxii-xxvii and lii-lv.
interpreted.63 Under these conditions, it is easily understandable that the primary

reason Conrad-Martius was led to follow Husserl was his success in overcoming
psychologism – and indeed, naturalist psychologism, which assigned pride of place
to “psychophysical” contents of experience to the neglect of the real givenness of
what shows itself, “here and now” to our “embodied existence”. The profit of the
resulting phenomenology consists in the “balance” achieved by way of the non-
dualist relation that is established between a “knowing subject” and the “real as it
concretely manifests itself”. Only as such is the “real” once again given its proper
place and ceases to be consigned to the “domain” of consciousness.
Consequently Conrad-Martius is motivated to take up Husserl’s philosophical
investigations once again, encouraged by the conviction that his phenomenology is
not one philosophical direction among others, but rather a mode of research that has
its source in the things themselves, rather than in the tradition of philosophy.
Research should be directed by the things, and as such orient the perspective of the
observer. The primacy of the matter is of considerable significance, especially when
one considers Husserl’s cultural background and how it informed his research.
Husserl opposes the rigour of his style of research to mere factuality
(Tatsächlichkeit) and unbridled research. This style serves to anticipate his attempt
to establish a model of philosophical “science” that will give consideration not only
to the way ahead, but above all, one that will enact every act of knowing
(Erkenntnisakt) with attention to its objectivity (Sachlichkeit) and veracity.
“Objectivity” and “veracity” are components of reality, and for this reason research
should take every form of givenness, every given form of intuition (Anschauung)
into account. In this way, the “path of thought” becomes the ground which preserves
phenomenology, even if the results of research become new pathways, to “another
beginning”. In this respect Husserl left us – with his slogan “ever again (immer
wieder)” – the maxim that governs the Husserlian method.
In this fashion, the new attitude of phenomenology directs its gaze, for the first
time, upon the things themselves. The “observer” does not force the thing to submit
to his preconceived concepts in one form of constructionism or another; the right
manner of approach, rather, is “given” to the observer by the relevant forms of
givenness of the self-presentation of the matter.
With the publication of the Ideas – which contain the five lectures that Husserl
gave in Göttingen in 1907 – these “hopes” again became questionable. From now
on, the first harbingers of unfolding “misunderstanding” between Husserl and his
students began to manifest themselves. In these lectures Husserl emphasizes the
“stream of consciousness” and subjects it to reduction, according to the model of
the eidetic reduction, leading his students to anticipate a return to transcendental
idealism. Certainly, the thought of Husserl is not exhausted in the phenomenologi-
cal realism of the Logical Investigations. The whole of Husserl’s phenomenology
cannot be derived from this key work. At issue is the meaning of the idea of Husserl’s
phenomenology as rigorous “science”. Phenomenological realism could hardly be
63
See Conrad-Martius H. (1957), pp. 116–128.
called “scientific”, inasmuch as it was determined by a descriptive method that does

not take the entire sphere of intentionality into account. With regard to the entire
structure of Husserlian phenomenology, Conrad-Martius concerns herself only with
pure eidetic phenomenology. This accounts for the difficulty of access to her analy-
ses. This difficulty does not only derive from the use of an uncommonly difficult
terminology, but also from a philosophical attitude that derives from Husserl, yet
does not allow recourse to the transcendental reduction. She accepts only the first
moment of the reduction – for example, her ontology is static-descriptive, to put it
mildly, “geometric”, with the consequence that concepts of sites and spheres of
being can only be established in the course of multi-layered construction of the
ontologically real. This is a difficult matter, for one will not find in the works of
Conrad-Martius a demonstration of the relation of the static aspects of the eidetic
method and the “genetic” dimension of intentionality. She denies this dimension her
favour because it could recall the “return” of reality in its dependence on the ego.
Consequently, intentionality again becomes the genuine and decisive axis upon
which phenomenology turns.
With particular regard to the “incomprehensible return to transcendental philoso-
phy, to subjectivism, almost to psychologism”,64 Conrad-Martius expresses her criti-
cal attitude toward Husserl (the Master) ever more explicitly. This attitude evoked
Husserl’s disapprobation of the fact that several of his students had not thoroughly
understood what he conceived a “fundamental beginning” in philosophy to be.
In a letter of 1921 to Ingarden, Husserl expressed this disappointment – and not
only in respect to Heidegger. In the first part of this letter he writes: “Honestly speak-
ing, I repeatedly considered whether I ought not resign from the Jahrbuch”.65 The
decision to resign his leading position with the Jahrbuch may be interpreted based on
a few things Husserl communicated to Ingarden. In particular, Husserl expresses his
disappointment about several representatives of the Munich School and some associ-
ates, who had not understood his “perspective of research”:
“[As with Miss St(ein)], so also in regard to the new work by Mrs C[onrad]-Mart[ius].66 I
was likewise disappointed. But she was never actually my student and explicitly rejected
the spirit of ph[ilosophy] as ‘rigorous sci[ence]’. [...] Even Pfänder’s phen[omenology] is
something essentially different from my own; and since he has never really understood the
problems of constitution, he ends up with a dogm[atic] metaphysics, despite his otherwise
solid and honest work. Even Geiger is only one-quarter phenomenologist. But you
[R. Ingarden], in my opinion, are one hundred percent. How sad, that you did not come here
two years later and participate in our four intensive seminars”.67
Husserl’s disappointment pertains not only to Heidegger, but Conrad-Martius,

Pfänder, and Geiger as well. The situation with Edith Stein is entirely different, even
if she gradually revised the classic phenomenology of Husserl – at least to the extent
that in her research she worked out an explicitly metaphysical dimension of this
64
Conrad-Martius H. (1963–1965), p. 395 (our translation).
65
Husserl E. (1968), p. 23 (our translation).
66
In all likelihood, Husserl is thinking of the Metaphysische Gespräche (1921).
67
Husserl E. (1968), p. 23 (our translation).
phenomenology. This is more strongly marked in Stein than in Husserl, given that
by “metaphysics” we mean classic metaphysics, upon which Stein falls back as a
valuable support for phenomenology. Her Potenz und Akt – in which she quickly
distances herself from Kantian transcendental idealism and from Husserl – is to be
understood in this sense. It may well be that this critique – as I have shown else-
where – primarily derives from her failure to grasp the inner essence of Husserl’s
theory of knowledge (Erkenntnistheorie): the principle of the relation of “con-
sciousness-to-world”, which in Husserl cannot in any way be grasped as
“consciousness”-of-“the world”.68
“Distance”, “distancing (Entfernung)”, “revision of the Husserlian project” –
these components only partially pertain to Heidegger’s relation to Husserl. More
generally, they touch Husserl’s relations to his students and stand in close connec-
tion with their respective research projects in phenomenology. These projects bring
them back to Husserl’s published works, and then to those versions of Husserl’s
phenomenology which he had formulated first in Göttingen, and then in Freiburg,
where he applied for emeritus status one year before his obligatory retirement.
5.2 “Self-Destruction (Selbstvernichtung)”:

From the Ponderings69 to the Observations70
In this final subsection, our objective is to interpret the concept of “self-destruction

(Selbstvernichtung)” in its relation to the concept of “destruction (Vernichtung)”
and indeed on the basis of all passages in the Notebooks where this relation appears.
In fact, “self-destruction” as used in the Observations cannot be understood except
in relation to the Ponderings. Since the term does not appear in Contributions to
Philosophy, the Notebooks serve us as our sole source of interpretation. The follow-
ing list presents the respective contexts and sources of the passages in question:
Ponderings xiii [107–109]
Context: Communism and the English State
― Communism: “In which period the self-destruction (Selbstvernichtung) of com-
munism begins to manifest itself as a process moving towards its conclusion [...]”;
“Self-destruction (Selbstvernichtung) takes form, first of all, in this, that ‘commu-
nism’ presses toward the outbreak of warlike entanglements”.
― The Bourgeois-Christian form of English “Bolshevism”: “without the destruc-
tion (Vernichtung) thereof [...]”; “the ultimate destruction (Vernichtung), however,
can only take the form of its essential self-destruction (Selbstvernichtung), which
68
For a thorough investigation of this topic see: Alfieri F. (2015), pp. 41–99.
69
See Heidegger M. (2014c).
70
is most decisively advanced by the exaggeration of its own deceptive appearance

of playing the role of the savior of morality”.
Ponderings xiv [18–19]
Context: The essence of subjectivity (“rushes” and “hurtles” [...])
― “The self-destruction (Selbstvernichtung) of humanity does not consist in its
self-elimination, but rather that time and again it breeds a generation of such a
character as confirms its own majesty, for without this bedazzlement its blindness
would be exposed [...]”.
Ponderings xv [12–14]
Context: The human being of “modernity”
― “‘Politics’ is defined by the essence of modernity and as such is always power-
politics [...]. The highest form and supreme act of politics consists in luring the
opponent into a situation that compels him to undertake his own self-destruction
(Selbstvernichtung)”.
― The planetary. And this [common foundation] is globalism: “the last step of the
machinational essence of power in the destruction (Vernichtung) of the indestruc-
tible on the path of desolation”.
― “Neither destruction (Vernichten) nor the design and arrangement of a world
order or a new world order can accord with the ownmost claim of our historicity.
Only this alone: to bring the ownmost of being to word in poetry in the enactment
of well-founded belonging to being”.
Explication – the opponent: “Americanism”; the “indestructible”: “the inception”.
Observations i [26–31]
Context: Technicity; the Christian Occident
― Technicity: “Technicity has reached its highest stage when, as a process of con-
sumption, it has nothing left to consume – except itself. What form does this self-
destruction (Selbstvernichtung) take? [...] its immanent essence drives it relentlessly
on to the ever-new, that is, to consume itself”.
― The Christian Occident: “Only when the essentially ‘Jewish’, in the metaphysi-
cal sense, enters into conflict Jewishness, has the summit of self-destruction
(Selbstvernichtung) in history been reached; it being understood that the ‘Jewish’
has everywhere seized power, such that the fight against ‘Jewishness’, and it first of
all, has become subject to the Jewish”.
Observations ii [66–75]
Context: Thought (Denken)
― “What now unfolds under the name of ‘philosophy’ constitutes the self-destruc-
tion (Selbstvernichtung) of thinking, either as organized by church and party, or as
induced by feeding upon its own bewilderment and impotence”.
― “The atom bomb [...] destroys (Vernichtung) itself along with everything it sim-
ply reduces to dust. But public opinion constantly extricates itself from its own
processes of destruction (Vernichtungsgeschäft)”.
― “More devastating than the heat-wave of the atom bomb is the ‘spirit’ in the form
of the world media. The one merely destroys (vernichten) by extinguishing; the
other annihilates (vernichten) by simulating an appearance of being founded in the
apparent ground of unconditional rootlessness”.
― “The fundamental defeat does not consist in the dismemberment of the ‘Reich’,
in the reduction of the cities to rubble, in the incremental murder of our people by
an invisible machinery of death, but in this, that the Germans allow themselves to be
driven into the self-destruction (Selbstvernichtung) of their ownmost way-to-be by
others, and by themselves, under the plausible pretense of eliminating the horrific
spirit of ‘Nazism’”.
Überlegungen xiii [107–109], S. 154–155: Ponderings xiii [107–109]:

Ist der “Kommunismus” die metaphysische If the metaphysical constitution of peoples in
Verfassung der Völker im letzten Abschnitt der the final phase of the consummation of
Vollendung der Neuzeit, dann | liegt darin, daß modernity is constituted by “communism”,
er bereits im Beginn der Neuzeit sein Wesen, then this implicates that the essence of
wenngleich noch verdeckt, in die Macht setzen communism must have empowered itself even
muß. Politisch geschieht das in der with the inception of the modern epoch, if
neuzeitlichen Geschichte des englischen only in a concealed way. Politically this came
Staates. Dieser ist – auf das Wesen gesehen und to be with the modern history of the English
von den zeitgemäßen Regierungs- und state. This state is – with reference to its
Gesellschafts- und Glaubensformen abgese- essence, as distinct from historically specific
hen – dasselbe wie der Staat der vereinigten forms of rule, of social structure, and of
Sowjetrepubliken – nur mit dem Unterschied, belief – the same as the state of the Union of
daß dort eine riesenhafte Vorstellung in den Soviet Republics – with this difference, that
Schein der Moralität und Völkererziehung alle the former, supported by a powerful semblance
Gewaltentfaltung harmlos und of dedication to the moral advancement of
selbstverständlich macht, während hier das humanity makes its deployment of power seem
neuzeitliche “Bewußtsein” rücksichtsloser, harmless and natural, whereas the latter, while
wenngleich nicht ohne Berufung auf also invoking human happiness, expresses
Völkerbeglückung, sich selbst im eigenen modern “consciousness” in its utmost
Machtwesen bloßstellt. Die bürgerlich- ruthlessness to nakedly manifest itself in its
christliche Form des englischen very essence as the empowerment of power.
“Bolschewismus” ist die gefährlichste. Ohne The bourgeois-Christian form of English
die Vernichtung dieser bleibt die Neuzeit “Bolshevism” is the most dangerous. Short of
weiter erhalten. Die endgültige Vernichtung its destruction, modernity will remain intact.
kann aber nur die Gestalt der wesenhaften Its ultimate destruction, however, can only
Selbstvernichtung haben, die am stärksten take the form of its essential self-destruction,
durch die Übersteigerung des eigenen which is most decisively advanced by the
Scheinwesens in die Rolle des Retters der exaggeration of its own deceptive appearance
Moralität befördert wird. In welchem of playing the role of the savior of morality. In
historischen Zeitpunkt die Selbstvernichtung which historical period the self-destruction of
des “Kommunismus” einsetzt zu einem “communism” begins to manifest itself as a
sichtbaren Vorgang und Ende, ist gleichgültig process moving towards its conclusion is a
gegenüber der seynsgeschichtlich schon matter of indifference in view of the being-
gefallenen Entscheidung, die jene historical decision, which has already fallen,
unausweichlich macht. Die Selbstvernichtung that this self-destruction is inevitable.
hat ihre erste Form darin, daß der Self-destruction takes form, first of all, in
“Kommunismus” | auf den Ausbruch this, that “communism” presses toward the
kriegerischer Verwicklungen in das outbreak of warlike entanglements in the
Unaufhaltsame ihrer vollständigen inexorable course of the comprehensive
Machtloslassungen hinausdrängt. (Vgl. oben S. expansion of power. (See above p. 88 “Der
88 “Der Krieg ...” bis S. 89). Krieg ...” to p. 89).
Als bewußte Taktik ist die Beförderung von Lenin was the first to recognize, advance,
Weltkriegen als erstes von Lenin erkannt, and practice the promotion of world wars as
gefördert und ausgeübt worden. Sein Jubel über an explicit tactical measure. His jubilation
den Ausbruch des Weltkrieges im Jahre 1914 upon the outbreak of the World War in 1914
kennt keine Grenzen; je neuzeitlicher solche knew no bounds. The more these world wars
Weltkriege werden, umso rücksichtsloser are determined by the essence of modernity,
fordern sie die Zusammenfassung aller so the more relentlessly they demand the
kriegerischen Gewalten in die Machthaberschaft concentration of all war powers, held in the
Weniger. Dies bedeutet jedoch, daß überhaupt dominion of a few. But this means that
nichts mehr, was irgend zum Sein der Völker nothing whatsoever belonging to the being of
gehört, davon ausgenommen werden könnte, a people can be exempted from being a
ein Element der kriegerischen Gewalt zu sein. component part of the violence of war. And
Und gerade diese von Lenin erstmals als “totale precisely this constitution of beings, first
Mobilmachung” erkannte und auch so genannte recognized and designated by Lenin as their
Einrichtung des Seienden auf die unbegrenzte “total mobilization”, stands in service to the
Versteifung der Machtentfaltung in die unconditional affirmation of the measureless
Maßlosigkeit des Umfassens von Jeglichem extension of power to encompass all beings,
wird durch die Weltkriege verwirklicht. Sie and this is brought to realization by world
trägt den “Kommunismus” auf die höchste war. These wars elevate “communism” to the
Stufe seines machenschaftlichen Wesens. Diese highest dimension of its machinational
höchste “Höhe” ist die allein geeignete Stätte, essence. This highest “height” is the sole site
um in das von ihm selbst bereitete Nichts der adequate to its plunge into the nullity of the
Seinsverlassenheit hinabzustürzen und das abandonment of being that it prepared for
lange Ende seiner Verendung einzuleiten. Alle itself to initiate the slow demise of its
Völker des Abendlandes sind je nach ihrer ending. All peoples of the Occident, each
geschichtlichen Wesensbestimmung in diesen according to its ownmost historical destiny,
Vorgang einbezogen, sei es, daß sie ihn are implicated in this passage, be it to
beschleunigen oder hemmen, sei es, daß sie an accelerate or to impede it, be it to work to
seiner Verhüllung | arbeiten oder an seiner disclose or to conceal it; be it that they give
Bloßstellung, sei es, daß sie ihn scheinbar the appearance of resisting it, or that they
bekämpfen oder versuchen, außerhalb seines attempt to remain outside its boundless field
grenzenlosen Wirkungsfeldes zu bleiben. of operation.

Die Selbstvernichtung des Menschentums The self-destruction of humanity does not
besteht nicht darin, daß es sich beseitigt, consist in its self-elimination, but rather that
sondern daß es sich jeweils die Geschlechter time and again it breeds a generation of such a
züchtet, | in denen ihm seine Herrlichkeit character as confirms its own majesty, for
bestätigt wird, ohne daß diese Blendung als without this bedazzlement its blindness would
Verblendung sich bloßstellen ließe. Das Wesen be exposed. In this self-configuration, the
der Subjektivität treibt und rast in dieses essence of subjectivity rushes and hurtles
Sicheinrichten in der unbedingten toward the unconditioned abandonment of
Seinsverlassenheit. (Vgl. Vom Wesen der being (see “Vom Wesen der φύσις”, p. 10).
φύσις, S. 10)ag. Das Sichselbstzurechtstellen The innermost essencing of subjectivity
der geeigneten Selbstbestätigung ist die consists in self-positing self-regulation in
innerste Wesung der Subjektivität. Daher muß achievement of its necessary self-confirmation.
diese von Grund aus erschüttert – d. h. die Therefore this [self-securing] must be
Metaphysik als solche muß überwunden shattered in its very foundation – in other
werden. words, metaphysics as such must be overcome.
Warum läßt sich jedes wesentliche denkerische Why does every attempt in essential, ownmost
Denken “dialektisch” einebnen und dadurch thought allow itself to be “dialectically”
scheinbar verschärfen und zuspitzen? Weil reduced to a single plane, thereby to all
diese Art der Zerstörung notwendig dort als appearances sharpening and intensifying it?
Gefahr sich verschärfen muß, wo gerade Because this kind of destruction must
Gründung und Anfang am ursprünglichsten necessarily pose a danger, in greater degree,
walten. Zu einer Zeit, die alle Sprache nur als whenever founding and inceptual thinking
Verkehrs- und Organisationsmittel kennt und most primordially prevail. In an epoch that
alles Denken als “Rechnung”, ist der Überfall knows language only as means of
der Dialektik und der “dialektischen” Verödung communication and organization, and thinking
auf jeden Sproß und Keim am ehesten ohne only as “reckoning”, the assault of dialectics
Hemmung, ja im Recht. Die wesenhafte and the “dialectical” desiccation of every
Wehrlosigkeit gegen diese Zerstörung, weil sprout and seed knows no inhibition and
jede Abwehr schon in den Bezirk des Flachen follows with a certain justification. Because
sich begeben und das Eigenste aufgeben muß; every defence has already betaken itself to the
durch Absteigen wird nie ein Gipfel erreicht, flatlands, having had to surrender its ownmost,
geschweige denn innebehalten im Sinne der [thought is] essentially defenceless against this
stillen Überhöhung. destruction. For a summit will never be
reached by descending, to say nothing of the
reserve of stillness that carries one beyond
oneself.
Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen und Begriff der Φύσις. Aristoteles, Physik B, 1, in Wegmarken. GA
ag
9. Hrsg. v. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann 2/1996, p. 241 [GA ed.]
Überlegungen xv [12–14], S. 259–260: Ponderings xv [12–14]:

Der “neuzeitliche” Mensch ist im Begriff, sich “Modern” man is on the way to making
zum Knecht der Verwüstung zu machen. himself the slave of desolation.
Wer als geschichtlicher Mensch geschichtlich Whoever needs to act historically as a human
handeln muß, der bedarf allem zuvor der being of historicity, above all has need of
Inständigkeit im Wesenhaften, | die schon das inabiding in the ownmost, which has already,
Wesentliche alles Wesens anfänglich zum rooted in the inception, brought the ownmost
Austrag gebracht hat. of unfolding essence to term.
“Politik” ist neuzeitlichen Wesens und ist als “Politics” is defined by the essence of
solche stets Machtpolitik, d. h. die Einrichtung modernity and as such is always power-
und der Vollzug der Ermächtigung der Macht in politics, that is, the establishment and
dem von ihr übermächtigten Seienden. Die implementation of the empowerment of
höchste Art und der höchste Akt der Politik power in and through the disempowerment of
bestehen darin, den Gegner in eine Lage beings. The highest form and supreme act of
hineinzuspielen, in der er dazu gezwungen ist, politics consists in luring the opponent into
zu seiner eigenen Selbstvernichtung zu a situation that compels him to undertake his
schreiten. Hierbei muß die Politik einen langen own self-destruction. To this end, politics
Atem und einen langen Arm haben und imstande must plan in the long term, be able to work
sein, längere Zeit hindurch Schläge discretely and indirectly, and be capable of
hinzunehmen; sie darf sich durch zeitweilige absorbing setbacks for longer periods of time.
Niederlagen nicht irre machen lassen. Politics cannot allow itself to be bewildered
Nicht “bilden” und keine “Typen”, sondern and sent astray by temporary defeats.
Übereignen in das Sein und Gleichmütige der Not the “formation” of character “types”, but
wesentlichen Ahnung. enownment unto being and like-minded
Man entdeckt jetzt erst und spät genug und nur companions in courage for the ownmost
wieder halb als eine politische Gegnerschaft den intimation.
“Amerikanismus” (vgl. ob. S. 8). Das Fehlen Only now and late enough, and then again
jeder Selbsterkenntnis bringt es mit sich, daß die only inadequately, one discovers
Wesensgleichheit dieser Erscheinung mit allen “Americanism” as political opponent (see
übrigen auf dem Planeten unbegriffen bleibt und p. 8, above).
der Geschichtsgrund aller nicht bestimmt wird. It belongs to the lack of all self-knowledge
Dieser aber ist der Planetarismus: der letzte that the essential identity of this manifestation
Schritt des machenschaftlichen Wesens der with others on the planet remains ungrasped,
Macht zur Vernichtung des Unzerstörbaren auf its common historical foundation with others
dem Wege der Verwüstung. Die Verwüstung undetermined. And this [common foundation]
vermag das Unzerstörbare zu vernichten, ohne is globalism: the last step of the
daran gehalten zu sein, dieses überhaupt je zu machinational essence of power in the
fassen. Verwüstung aber untergräbt die destruction of the indestructible on the path
Möglichkeit des Wesens eines Anfänglichen. of desolation. Desolation is empowered to
Denn das Unzerstörbare ist nicht das irgendwo destroy the indestructible without being at all
vorhandene Beständige, sondern das compelled to grasp it. But desolation
Anfängliche. undermines the possibility of the ownmost
Weder Vernichten noch Ordnen noch unfolding of the originary. For the
Neuordnen ist wesentliches Genügen einer indestructible is not the constancy of the
geschichtlichen Bestimmung, sondern allein das constant, somewhere in its being-present, but
Dichten am Wesen des Seins und das Erbauen rather the inception.
einer gegründeten Zugehörigkeit in dieses. Neither destruction nor the design and
arrangement of a world order or a new world
order can accord with the ownmost claim of
our historicity. Only this alone: to bring the
ownmost of being to word in poetry in the
enactment of well-founded belonging to being.
Anmerkungen i [26–31], S. 18–21: Observations i [26–31]:

Der Denker kommt weiter nur auf die Art, daß Thinking only advances in this fashion, that the
er der Nähe des Nächsten und jedesmal von thinker approaches more nearly the nearness of
den Gedankenlosen übersehen näher kommt. the nearest, which the thoughtless constantly
Weitergehen ist hier das stete Nichtverlieren overlook. In this sense, going-forward remains
des Anfangs. constant in not-losing the beginning.
Die höchste Stufe der Technik ist dann Technicity has reached its highest stage when,
erreicht, wenn sie als Verzehr nichts mehr zu as a process of consumption, it has nothing left
verzehren hat – als sich selbst. In welcher to consume – except itself. What form does this
Gestalt vollzieht sich diese self-destruction take? We may anticipate its
Selbstvernichtung? Erwarten dürfen wir sie self-destruction based on this, that its immanent
auf Grund der in ihr Wesen eingeschlossenen essence drives it relentlessly on to the ever-new,
Unaufhaltsamkeit zum immer “neueren” – d. that is, to consume itself.
h. verzehrenderen. For us of today it more accords with our
Heute ist es wesentlicher, wahrhaft da-zu-sein, ownmost to truly be-in-being, than to be
statt zu “wirken”. Es wird zu viel gewirkt. Das “effective”. We are too much concerned with
eifervolle Bereden dessen, was denn künftig making things effective. Eager discussion of
werden solle und wie die Geschichte what the future should bring us, of the “shape”
“aussehen” werde, wie man sich die Zukunft history will take, of how the future is to be
zu denken habe, all das sind Bekümmernisse conceived – all these concerns accord in kind
nach der Art des ordnenden Planens. Es sind with planful ordering and design. They all fall
Rückfälle in das Überwundene. Im Zeitalter back on what has been overcome. In the era of
der Vollendung der Metaphysik ist es the consummation of metaphysics it is essential
wesentlich, zu wissen, daß wir im einfachen to learn to see that we must simply be in being
Wissen des Seyns einfach da sein müssen. Das in the simple knowing of being. To respond to
langsame Wort des Seyns zu denken ist the quiet saying of being is difficult, if we can
schwer, falls man darauf noch denken darf, ob still speak of what is easy and what is difficult.
etwas schwer oder leicht sei. In jeder Lage ist In any given situation, this way of thinking and
dieses Denken und seine Inständigkeit its inabiding is more difficult than any kind of
schwerer als jede Art von Heroismus. heroism.
Wir nähern uns dem Augenblick der We are approaching the world-historical
weltgeschichtlichen Prüfung der Deutschen, moment of the testing of the Germans: Whether
ob sie es vermögen, den Bereich jenseits von or not it is given to them to experience a realm
Rationalismus und Irrationalismus zu erfahren of dwelling beyond rationality and irrationality.
und wohnbar zu machen. Warum hindern wir Why do we obstruct ourselves in the awakening
uns selbst an dem Geschick, heutige Kräfte zu of powers and in the fashioning of forms that
erwecken und ihre Gestalt zu bauen? accord with this destiny?
“Revolution” – ihr Wesen müssen wir endlich “Revolution” – we must finally understand its
doch revolutionär verstehen und d. h. worthaft essence in a revolutionary way, and that means,
als die Rückwälzung des Wesens in das literally, as the turning-back-again of our
Anfängliche. Der eigentliche Revolutionär ownmost being upon the inception. The genuine
bringt weder Neues, noch bewahrt er Altes, er revolutionary brings nothing new, nor does he
erweckt das Anfängliche. preserve the old, he awakens the inception.
Im Denken der Denker ist einfaches Da-sein, The thinking of the thinker is simplest
sofern sie ihr Sagen an der Quelle des being-open to being; saying holds itself to the
Erfahrens halten, für das sich ereignet, was well-spring of experience, and this enowns what
ungesagt bleibt. Der Denker, der reden muß remains unsaid. The thinker, who must speak
und des Wortes nicht entbehren kann, hat and who cannot do without the word, is
gleichwohl die einfache Zuweisung in ein nonetheless allotted such “action” as precedes
“Handeln”, das vor allem Tun und Machen all doing and making and effecting: [and this is]
und Wirken bloßes Da-sein ist. Nur in diesem mere being-open to being. Solely in this
Bereich der Geschichte des Denkens erfahren dimension of the history of thought can we
wir, was sich ereignet. experience that which enowns itself.
Das Geheimnis des Unwesens – The secret of what is not ownmost –

Das “Erkennen” und “Wissen”, das uns von The “cognition” and the “knowledge” that the
den “Wissenschaften” und der “Lebenspraxis” “the sciences” offer us is in truth consistently a
angeboten wird, ist in Wahrheit überall τέχνη, τέχνη, or know-how, that “knows” to the degree
die als das Sichauskennen überall jegliches that it exceeds the known by way of an
“kennt”, in dem es das zu Kennende durch explanation, thereby to establish its superiority
eine Erklärung überholt und ihm dadurch to the end of the mastery of the known.
überlegen wird zu Zwecken einer Meisterung. Thoughtful knowing does not seek to exceed
Das denkerische Wissen will nicht das beings by producing new, explanatory entities.
Seiende überholen durch Beschaffung des Thoughtful knowing simply follows a path
neuen Seienden, das erklärt. Das denkerische leading to being, that it might step back before
Wissen geht nur den Gang, um beim Sein its unconcealment. This step back is
anzukommen und vor seiner Wahrheit fundamentally different, in its ownmost nature,
zurückzutreten. Dieser Rückschritt ist from the progress indispensable to all sciences
grundverschieden im Wesen von dem für alle and their applications.
Wissenschaften und alle Praktiken The most concealed essence of power is
unentbehrlichen Fortschritt. insecurity— and anxiety in the face of it.
Das Verborgenste Wesen der Macht ist die The modern historian, whose business consists
Unsicherheit und die Angst vor ihr. in a kind of journalism, has to read so many
Der moderne Historiker, dessen Geschäft eine books and documents, and constantly reviews
Form des Journalismus ist, muß so viel so many published books, and he himself must
Bücher und Akten lesen und fortgesetzt soviel compose so many books, that one cannot expect
gelesene Bücher besprechen und so viel of him, on top of this business, to gather his
Bücher selbst verfertigen, daß ihm nicht auch thoughts and to reflect, thereby running the risk
noch zugemutet werden kann, bei diesem that reflection could result in the retardation of
Geschäft einen Gedanken zu fassen und ihm his business enterprise.
nachzudenken und dabei Gefahr zu laufen, The ownmost way of being of Greece, that is,
daß das Nachdenken eine Verzögerung in den the estrangement of Greek being in the midst of
Geschäftsbetrieb bringen könnte. beings: this, and they themselves, and the
Das reine Wesen des Griechentums, d. h. das relation of being to them—to experience and to
Seiende, inmitten dessen die Griechen als show this in the simplicity of its essential
seiende fremd gewesen, dieses und sie selbst swaying arising in ἀλήθεια. Μῦθος and
und der Bezug des Seins zu ihnen – in der λόγος – every word and image purely, but not
einfachen Wesung von der ἀλήθεια her zeigen forced, not schematically and pedantically – to
und erfahren. Den μῦθος und λόγος – jedes be experienced as arising in ἀλήθεια.
Wort und Gebild rein, aber nicht erzwungen und Every day anew let us rest our gaze upon the
schematisch-pedantisch – aus ἀλήθεια erfahren. indestructible. All movement arises of this
Wir müssen jeden Tag neu den Blick im repose.
Unzerstörbaren ruhen lassen. Aus dieser Ruhe Like every “anti-”, the Anti-Christ must arise
entspringt alle Bewegung. out of the same essential ground as that against
Der Anti-christ muß wie jedes Anti- aus dem which it stands – so also “the Christ”. The
selben Wesensgrund stammen wie das, Christ arises out of the Jewish world. In the
wogegen es anti- ist – also wie “der Christ”. epoch of the Christian Occident, that is, in the
Dieser stammt aus der Judenschaft. Diese ist epoch of metaphysics, this world constitutes the
im Zeitraum des christlichen Abendlandes, d. principle of destruction. Destructiveness in the
h. der Metaphysik, das Prinzip der Zerstörung. reversal of the consummation of metaphysics –
Das Zerstörerische in der Umkehrung der that is, the reversal of Hegel’s metaphysics by
Vollendung der Metaphysik – d. h. der Marx. Spirit and culture become the
Metaphysik Hegels durch Marx. Der Geist superstructure of “life” – which means,
und die Kultur wird zum Überbau des of the organization of the economy,
“Lebens” – d. h. der Wirtschaft, d. h. der and hence of the biological, which is to say, of
Organisation – d. h. des Biologischen – d. h. “the people”.
des “Volkes”.
Wenn erst das wesenhaft “Jüdische” im Only when the essentially “Jewish”, in the
metaphysischen Sinne gegen das Jüdische metaphysical sense, enters into conflict with
kämpft, ist der Höhepunkt der Jewishness, has the summit of self-destruction
Selbstvernichtung in der Geschichte erreicht; in history been reached; it being understood that
gesetzt, daß das “Jüdische” überall die the “Jewish” has everywhere seized power,
Herrschaft vollständig an sich gerissen hat, so such that the fight against “Jewishness”, and it
daß auch die Bekämpfung “des Jüdischen” first of all, also becomes compliant with the
und sie zuvörderst in die Botmäßigkeit zu ihm [metaphysically] Jewish.
gelangt. This renders the measure for what the
Von hier aus ist zu ermessen, was für das commemoration of the first, Greek inception –
Denken in das verborgene anfängliche Wesen which remained outside of Jewry and hence
der Geschichte des Abendlandes das outside of Christianity – means for thinking as
Andenken an den ersten Anfang im the thought of the reserved, inceptual and
Griechentum bedeutet, das außerhalb des ownmost essence of the history of the Occident.
Judentums und d. h. des Christentums The darkening of a world can never touch the
geblieben. tranquility of the light of being.
Die Verdüsterung einer Welt erreicht nie das Let us now not entertain “historical” talk and
stille Licht des Seins. discourse “about” the Occident, for it rather
Wir dürfen jetzt nicht “über” das Abendland pertains to be of this “land of evening,” that is,
ein “historisches” Gerede und Geschreibe to let the inception spring forth more originarily.
machen, sondern es gilt, abendländisch zu To turn aside from calculations of power. To
sein, d. h. anfänglicher den Anfang anfangen enter into the expectation of the play of the
lassen. time-site of the enowning of destiny.
Vorbeigehen am Rechnen der Macht. Einkehr Being compelled to reckon and to think in terms
in die Erwartung des Spielzeitraums des of goals, values, assignments, contributions,
Geschichtsah. shows the manner in which the grant of destiny
Daß in Zielen, Werten, Aufträgen, Beiträgen has already been abandoned for the sake of the
gerechnet wird und gedacht werden muß, un-destined. Ownmost historicity has no need
zeigt, in welcher Weise das Geschicht schon of goals. It is founded in truth.
in die Ungeschichte verworfen ist. The ownmost of historicity does not consist in
Wesentliche Geschichte bedarf nicht der the preservation of the teaming masses and the
Ziele. Sie ruht in der Wahr-heit. securing of their standard of living – their
Nicht, daß eine wimmelnde Masse erhalten economic well-being – but that being, as the
und ihr Lebensstandard – auch nur das open clearing of the realm of presencing and
wirtschaftliche Auskommen – gesichert bleibt, departure be safeguarded unto us in mortal
ist das geschichtlich Wesentliche – sondern, encounter, letting the truth of being become our
daß das Sein – als das sich lichtende Gefild ownmost.
der Anwesung und Abwesung der Blickenden The refusal to take heed of belonging to being
gewahrt und die Wahrheit des Seins zum witnesses the most ferocious desolation of our
Eigentum wird. ownmost historicity.
Die Absage an das Aufmerken auf die What is without being-historical significance
Zugehörigkeit in das Sein ist die grimmigste enjoys the support of worldwide, historically
Verwüstung unseres eigenen geschichtlichen constituted public opinion.
Wesens. “Homecoming” is the future of our ownmost
Das seynsgeschichtlich Belanglose genießt historicity. Herein “goals” are not decisive. Now
den Vorzug der historischen attunement to the inception is all. The
Weltöffentlichkeit. disclosure of the dissipation of truth.
“Heimkunft” ist die Zukunft unseres
geschichtlichen Wesens. Hier bestimmen nicht
“Ziele”. Jetzt stimmt einzig der Anfang. Die
Preisgabe in die Verwahrlosung der Wahrheit.
ah
“Geschick” (neutrum), MHG for Geschichte (history): does not signify the events of history as
world-history, but the grant of enowning

Landschaft. – Man kann sie “sehen” und The landscape. One can “see” it and discover
entdecken | und beschreiben und ins Gerede and describe it, give it over to talk and
und in den Verkehr bringen – nach der Art aller communication – as strangers do – and it
Zugereisten – sie wird zu etwas für alle Welt becomes a matter for all the world and is
und von aller Welt Gesichtetem und bekommt viewed by all the world; and so it takes on the
ihr Allerweltsgesicht (so läßt sich der Titel aspect of being common to all the world – is
Panorama verstehen) oder – einer gehört dem this not what “panorama” means to say? Or,
Land, braucht es nicht anzugaffen und dabei one belongs to the land – no need to gawk, and
meinen, er gehöre kraft des Gaffens dazu – er to opine that one belongs to it by the power of
steht in ihr schweigend und so als kennte er sie gawking. One stands silently within it, as if one
nicht. Daß sie aber in ihm spricht – nicht er took no notice of it. That the landscape speaks
über sie – kommt in Anderem zur Sprache. in him – not he about it – comes to word in
Und selbst diese Überlegung sollte nicht other ways. And even this comment should
aufgezeichnet sein. not be written down.
Wer unvertraut bleibt mit dem Denken, meint, Whoever remains unpracticed in thinking may
dieses sei, weil es den Anschein von believe that because it gives the appearance of
“Reflexion” zeige, eingeweiht in sein Wesen. “reflection”, reflection suffices to become
Nur das halbwüchsige Denken beobachtet sich intimate in thinking. Only an unripe way of
selbst und gerät noch auf den Einfall, mit einer thinking observes itself and even falls into the
“Logik” sich den Abschluß zu schaffen. error of believing that a train of “logical
Die seltsamste und vielleicht stärkste Wirkung, operations” can give it the closure it seeks.
die ein Denken ausübt, ist jene, die in den The strangest and perhaps most powerful effect
Gegnern wider deren Wollen und Wissen of thought touches an adversary against his will
erfolgt. Kaum aber sind sie je so geartet, daß and without his knowledge. But adversaries are
ein Denken von ihnen lernen | könnte. Die hardly ever so composed in mind that thinking
Gegnerschaft ist zu abhängig von dem could learn from them. Too dependent upon the
Trugbild, gegen das sie angeht und das sie mirage that it opposes, the attitude of
notwendig auf eine Ebene des Prekären opposition devolves into precariousness.
hinabstößt. Weil der Lärm der Gegnerei nicht Because the noise of opposition cannot
eine innere Dauer eines sachhaltigen Gewichts summon up the matter of thought in its
aufbringt, muß er immer neu und immer lauter sustaining weight, this noise must be ever
gemacht werden. Schließlich meint sogar dann renewed and intensified. The end result is that
eine aufwachsende Jugend, “hören” sei nichts the youth of today come to believe that “to
anderes als das Weitertragen von Lärm. hear” signifies nothing other than the
Was jetzt unter dem Namen “Philosophie” propagation of commotion.
sich breitmacht, ist die kirchlich und What now unfolds under the name of
parteimäßig organisierte oder aber aus “philosophy” constitutes the self-destruction
Ratlosigkeit und Unvermögen gespeiste of thinking, either as organized by church and
Selbstvernichtung des Denkens. Als das party, or as induced by feeding upon its own
Denken bei den ersten Denkern des bewilderment and impotence. When the
Abendlandes, d. h. bei den ersten und einzigen thought of the first thinkers of the Occident,
Denkern zu Ende war, mit und nach dem which is to say, the first and only thinkers,
Denken der Griechen (Aristoteles), entstand came to an end with the Greeks (Aristotle),
die “Logik”. “logic” arose.
“Philosophie” ist jetzt der Name für die “Philosophy” has become the name for the
Ausreden einer organisierten Angst vor dem excuses of organized anxiety in its opposition
Denken. to thinking.
― ―
Im Denken warte des Wohnens im Geschick. Thinking awaits dwelling in destiny.
Das Denken stiftet andenkend das Licht des Commemorative thinking founds the lightening
Einst. clearing of the arrival of what is granted.
Schule und Historie setzen das Denken dem School and historicism subject thinking to ruin.
Verderb aus. We learn to let-go and to leave-aside only in the
Das Weglassen lernen wir nur im Seyn-Lassen letting-be of being.
des Seyns. Still more dependant than debtor upon creditor,
Abhängiger noch als die Schuldner von ihren is a creditor upon his debtor. In any case,
Gläubigern sind diese von jenen. Gerechnete calculative relations are unfree. Such do not
Verhältnisse sind ohnedies unfreie. Der Dank reap gratitude. And when thankfulness is
fällt nicht in sie. Und wo die Pflicht zum Dank declared a duty, then the thanks given in
geltend gemacht wird, ist der Dank, der ihr response is no more thanks; for it does not arise
entspricht, schon nicht mehr Dank; denn er of thoughtfulness.
entspringt nicht im Denken. In a time when fear of thinking counts as
In einer Zeit, da die Angst vor dem Denken als “philosophy”, then everyone who still lives in
“Philosophie” gilt, muß jeder, der noch aus relation to the matter of thought must clarify
einem Bezug der Sache des Denkens lebt, sich for himself the first issue to be decided. And
über die erste Entscheidung klar sein. Sie that is: to keep one’s distance. This only
heißt: wegbleiben. Sie ist aber nur im appears to be negative. It arises out of the
Anschein negativ. Sie kommt aus dem ability to wait. To wait: certainty not to await
Wartenkönnen. Warten: freilich nicht auf eine the subsequent endorsement of public opinion;
spätere Zustimmung einer Öffentlichkeit; but to wait, even beyond a lifetime, for a
sondern warten, über die eigene Lebenszeit glimpse of the clearing of being, which enowns
hinaus, auf den Blick einer Lichtung des human being to itself.
Seyns, der sich dem Menschen ereignet. It lies in the nature of the matter that the matter
In der Natur der Sache liegt es wohl, daß die of thought, which is indeed the matter of
Sache des Denkens, die wohl die Sache des human being, constantly withdraws from
Menschen ist, sich dem Menschen ständig humans; and as such it draws us on,
entzieht und ihn so gerade anzieht, damit das commending itself to thought.
Denken ein An-denken werde. To stay with the matter, entail what it will, cost
Bei der Sache bleiben, koste dies, was immer whatever it may. For in this there is no more of
es koste. Denn hier wird nicht mehr gerechnet. accounting.
Eine “wörtliche” Übersetzung besteht nicht A “literal” translation does not consist in
darin, daß man die entsprechenden “Wörter” composing “words” in corresponding number
nach Anzahl und grammatischer Form setzt, and grammatical form, but rather in finding
sondern daß wir “das Wort” treffen und zwar “the word”, and indeed in its provenance out of
im Herkommen aus dem Sagen der the saying of the language of translation.
übersetzenden Sprache. In this global epoch of wars and destruction it
Im Weltalter der Kriege und Zerstörungen ist is necessary to protect and preserve the
es nötig, das Kostbare zu schützen. Der beste precious. The best safeguard remains to keep it
Schutz bleibt, daß es unauffällig im unknown in inconspicuousness. In the world of
Unbekannten gehalten wird. Die größte today, the media has appropriated to itself the
Zerstörungskraft eignet heute der greatest power of destruction. For it destroys by
Öffentlichkeit. Denn sie zerstört, in dem sie assembling a semblance – as if it were due to
den Anschein errichtet, als baue sich in ihr und its own doing and through itself that a world
durch sie eine Welt auf. Die Atombombe läßt comes to be. The atom bomb, for its part,
dagegen nur alles in Staub zerfallen, in dem destroys itself along with everything it simply
sie selbst in die Vernichtung eingeht. Die reduces to dust. But public opinion constantly
Öffentlichkeit aber arbeitet sich aus ihrem extricates itself from its own processes of
Vernichtungsgeschäft ständig heraus. Dieses destruction. This constitutes its proper
ist ihr Element. Es gilt, vor dieser Zerstörung element. In the face of this destruction, it
das Kostbare, das Denken als Andenken, in pertains to preserve the precious, thinking as
das Unbekannte zurückzunehmen, gleichsam commemoration, to bring it back into the
zu vergraben. unknown, almost to bury it.
Wir können das Seyn nie erzwingen, aber We can never compel being, but we can
erwarten: im Austrag des Behütens seiner anticipate it: by taking up the dispensation of
Wahrheit eine Ankunft bereiten. the sheltering of its truth we can prepare its
Oft faßt einen das Grauen bei der Aussicht, arrival.
daß auf Jahrzehnte hinaus bei uns kein One is often filled with horror at the prospect
Denken mehr sein wird, sondern nur ein that for decades to come thinking will not have
zuchtloses “Weltanschauungs”-gerede, das a place here – nothing but a measureless
noch gar nicht merkt, wie sehr es sich mehr “ideological” babble that isn’t even aware how
und mehr in die Botmäßigkeit dessen begibt, more and more it subjects itself to the sway of
was man als “verruchtes System” ausrotten the “wicked system” it seeks to eradicate.
möchte. Man schaltet zwar dessen “Inhalte” Admittedly one excises the “contents” and
aus und beseitigt die vormaligen Anhänger. removes or eliminates the followers of the old
Dafür behält man jedoch um so system. But for all that one retains the old style,
entschiedener den Stil zurück und umgibt now circumscribed with Christian and
ihn mit christlichen und humanitären humanitarian phrases, all the more completely.
Phrasen. Verheerender als die Hitzewelle More devastating than the heat-wave of the
der Atombombe ist der “Geist” in der atom bomb is the “spirit” in the form of the
Gestalt des Weltjournalismus. Jene world media. The one merely destroys by
vernichtet, indem sie nur auslöscht; dieser extinguishing; the other annihilates by
vernichtet, indem er den Schein von Sein simulating an appearance of being constructed
errichtet auf dem Scheingrund der upon the spurious rationale of unconditional
unbedingten Wurzellosigkeit. Der absolute rootlessness. Journalism, systemic and
Journalismus betäubt die heute Stil all-encompassing, numbs the now barely felt
gewordene Angst vor dem Denken und fear of thinking and in this way
sorgt so für die gründlichste Ausrottung accomplishes the most thorough eradication
des Denkens. Wir müssen uns und die of thinking. We have to make ourselves and
Kommenden darauf bringen, daß inskünftig those to come aware that for a long time to
für lange Zeit das Denken ein kostbarer come thinking will remain a precious treasure;
Schatz bleibt, den man am besten hütet, it can best be preserved by being deeply buried,
wenn man ihn tief vergräbt. Mit guarded in the earth. This has nothing to do
“Pessimismus” hat das nichts, aber viel mit with “pessimism” and much to do with
Nüchternheit zu tun. (Später erwähnt in sobriety. (Later mentioned in a letter to
einem Brief an Manfred Schröterai.) Manfred Schröter).
Manfred Schröter (1880–1973), doctorate with a work on Schelling. Later the editor of the
ai
Munich Edition of Schelling (1927–1928), he was married to a Jewish woman and therefore forced
to give up his position at the Technical University München during the NS period [GA ed.]
Rettungen und Verteidigungen gegenüber der Rescue missions and defensive measures in
| Öffentlichkeit sind unnötig. Aber nötig ist die face of the mass media are unnecessary.
Ruhe für die Unruhe des Denkens. Needful is the peace of mind suited to the
Im Denken ist es gut, öfter und dabei, wie neu unease of thinking.
ankommend, dorthin zurückzukehren, wohin der In matters of thought it is good, frequently
Weg schon einmal gelangte. and arriving as ever anew, to come back to
Weshalb gelangen wir denkend nur so weit im the place where the path of thought had once
Element des Seyns, wie weit das Geschick der taken us. Why does our thinking reach only
Wahrheit des Seyns aus diesem herkommt? Das so far into the element of being as the grant
Maß im Einst. of the truth of being arrives out of being? The
Im Bereich des Einfachen sind wir unversehens measure arises of the originary grant of
und ohne daß sich etwas in seiner Unmöglichkeit arrival.
genügend anzeigt, auf dem Irrweg. Wir finden In the realm of the simple we can
uns dann bei einem Vorhaben, das dem Versuch unexpectedly, in the absence of a sufficient
gleicht, auf einem Baum Fische zu fangen. indication of the impossibility of some
Eine Gesetzgebung des Da-seins, die das Gesetz matter, end up on the wrong track. Then we
aus dem Geschick des Da-seins erst werden find ourselves in a situation comparable to
und – im Werden läßt, auf die Gewähr, daß sich the attempt to harvest fish from a tree.
sogar das Wesen von Gesetz wandelt. Legislation arising out of being-open to being
Das Zu-Denkende: which lets the law first come to be out of the
Der Unterschied im Geschick des Einst. grant of being-open – and leaves it to its
Meine Personalakten in der Philosophischen becoming – with the assurance that even the
Fakultät Freiburg sind verschwundenal. Vielleicht ownmost essence of measure transforms
beweist ein späterer Historiker der itself.
Universitätsgeschichte auf Grund dieses Fehlens What is granted to thought:
der Akten, daß meine dreißigjährige Tätigkeit an The difference in the grant of arrival.
der Universität eine Fiktion sei. My personal file with the Philosophical
“Meine Philosophie” – falls der törichte Faculty of the University of Freiburg has
Ausdruck gebraucht werden darf – sei “die disappeared. Based on this missing file, in
Philosophie des Abgrunds” – ich frage zurück: times to come a historian of the University
stehen wir will prove, perhaps, that my thirty years of
service to the University were just a fiction.
“My philosophy” – if this foolish expression
may be used – is said to be “a philosophy of
the abyss” – and I ask in response: do we not
The file was found in the early 1990s in the former abode of the Philosophical Faculty of Freiburg
al
University (Erbprinzenstraße 13), in a bathtub, along with other personal files. See
Acknowledgements in the afterword of the editor [GA ed.]
etwa nicht am Abgrund? Nicht nur wir, die perhaps stand on the edge of an abyss? Not only
Deutschen, nicht nur Europa – sondern “die us, we Germans, not only Europe – but rather
Welt”? Und nicht nur seit gestern und schon “the world”? and not only since yesterday, and
gar nicht “durch” Hitler, so wenig wie not at all “because” of Hitler, just as little as
“durch” Stalin oder “durch” Roosevelt. – “through” Stalin, or “through” Roosevelt. –
Ist ein Denken gefährlich, das denkt, was ist? Is a thought that thinks what is – dangerous? Or
Oder will man “denken”, was nicht ist? Will will one rather “think” what is not? Would one
man überhaupt nicht denken, sondern faseln, rather not think at all, but rather waffle –
die Faselei über “das Wirkliche” fortsetzen? continue to waffle on about “the real”? This
Man will nur dieses. Man steht immer noch alone is what one wants. One is still not
nicht am Abgrund, man will gar nicht wissen, standing at the edge of the abyss and no-one
was das ist. Gleich als hetzte da eine geheime even wants to know what that is. As if an
Angst davor, daß der Mensch mit dem Blick unacknowledged fear drives us on. Only with a
in den Abgrund gerade nur erst beginnt, zu glimpse of the abyss does man first begin to
erfahren, erfahren zu lernen, was ist. Gleich learn, learn to experience what is. As if the
als hätten die Rechner und Zersetzer, | die accountants and decomposers of thought,
alles durch ihre Intellektualität zerreiben, whose intellectual function cuts everything to
Angst vor jener Leere, in der ihr Gefasel und shreds, were afraid of that void in which their
ihre organisierte Zerstörerei auch bei denen, organized power of destruction and their drivel
die törichter sind als die Deutschen, nichts no longer captures anything at all – not even
mehr verfängt. among those who are still more fatuous than the
Die eigentliche Niederlage besteht nicht Germans.
darin, daß “das Reich” zerschlagen, die The fundamental defeat does not consist in the
Städte zertrümmert, die Menschen durch dismemberment of the “Reich”, in the reduction
unsichtbare Tötungsmaschinerien of the cities to rubble, in the incremental murder
hingemordet werden, sondern daß sich die of our people by an invisible machinery of
Deutschen durch die Anderen in die death, but in this, that the Germans allow
Selbstvernichtung ihres Wesens treiben themselves to be driven into the self-destruction
lassen und sie selbst betreiben unter dem of their ownmost way-to-be by others, and by
plausiblen Anschein, das Schreckensregiment themselves, under the plausible pretense of
des “Nazismus” zu beseitigen. Man wird eliminating the horrific spirit of “Nazism”. This
dieses, zumal wenn es hinreichend präpariert spirit – especially when it has been historically
und geschichtlich isoliert worden ist – als sei isolated, and sufficiently prepared for display –
es ohne Zu-tun der Anderen, plötzlich im one will always find occasion to parade this
Januar 1933 vom Himmel gefallen, um sich, well-prepared specimen of shame, and rightly
ebenso isoliert, in den nächsten zwölf Jahren so, for all the world to see. As if, in January of
zu entwickeln – man wird dieses so 1933, Nazism suddenly fell out of the clear sky
präparierte Gebilde jederzeit mit Recht der without the doing or input of others, in order to
Weltöffentlichkeit als Schande vorführen unfold itself, isolated unto itself, for the next
können. twelve years.
– Aber es wird schwer sein, den Blick so frei und – But it is going to be difficult to win a
überlegen zu machen, daß er erkennt, wie eben perspective free enough to see that precisely this
dieses Rechthaben – im Grunde eine planetarische insistence on being right is in fact a planetary
Irreführung darstellt, die alles in die Verwirrung deception, enveloping all things in confusion.
treibt. Perhaps “one” knows very well that this ensures
Vielleicht weiß “Man” sehr gut, daß auf diesem that what is stigmatized as “Nazism” will be
Wege am sichersten der zugleich gebrandmarkte encouraged to still more balefully unfold itself.
“Nazismus” noch unheilvoller angereizt und This too, carefully planned in advance, is what
gezüchtet wird. Man wird auch dieses, von langer one wants, in order to unleash once again a final
Hand vorbereitet, wollen, um dann noch einmal zur measure of extermination, accompanied by still
letzten Maßnahme der Ausrottung unter noch loader proclamations of humanity.
lauterem Humanitätsgeschrei auszuholen. And while this demonic game “gets underway”,
Und das Christentum versucht, während diese the Christian establishment attempts to score
Teufelei “anläuft”, noch da und dort seine points, here and there, on the cultural market.
kulturellen Geschäfte zu machen. Man verzeichnet One registers with satisfaction that the manager
mit Genugtuung über soviel neu erreichte of the society for research in television
Modernität, daß der Leiter der media – what a leap forward into the modern
Fernsehforschungsgesellschaft – ein Katholik sei. age – is a Catholic. At the same time, one
Man predigt zugleich, die Technik müßte dem preaches that technology must serve mankind.
Menschen dienen. Man wagt es gleichzeitig, One dares to talk such nonsense and
solches törichtes Zeug zu reden und den “Joseph simultaneously to pillory “Joseph Goebbels” as a
Goebbels” als einen Lügner an den Pranger einer liar on the extremely questionable stage of world
äußerst fragwürdigen Weltöffentlichkeit zu stellen. opinion.
Im wirklichen Gehen, zumal im Gang des In truly going, especially in the going of a path
Denkens – können wir nie zugleich hinter uns of thought, one cannot both go, and go lurking
hergehen, um auch dieses Gehen noch zu belauern. along behind, stalking oneself in the going.
Ob sich bald wohl einige noch finden, die sich | If some few will not soon come together, who
mit einem merkbaren Ruck von dem elenden will turn away, with a sensible jolt, from the
Zeitschriftengeschwätz abkehren und der miserable prattle of the journals to show a
nachwachsenden Jugend noch einmal zeigen, new generation, once again, what the labour
was Arbeit im Geiste ist? Werkstatt, nicht of spirit entails? Workroom, not prattling
Faseleien. about.
Aber auch dieses Zeigen ist schon zu spät. But to show this is also already too late.
“Katholische Philosophie”, dieses Gebilde, und “Catholic philosophy”, this construct, and still
eher noch sein Aushängeschild, wagt sich jetzt more its flagship, now more obtrusively dares to
aufdringlicher hervor. Daß sich schon im bloßen make itself felt. That the mere label reveals its
Titel die bare Unmöglichkeit kundtut, scheinen die impossibility has not yet been remarked by those
noch nicht zu merken, die meinen, es sei nötig, mit who support the necessity of this exercise in
dieser Form von Spiegelfechterei sich einzulassen. shadow-boxing. “Catholic philosophy” is that so
“Katholische Philosophie” – das ist nicht viel different than “National Socialist science” – a
anders als “nationalsozialistische Wissenschaft” – square circle, an iron of wood, that, laid into the
ein viereckiger Kreis, ein hölzernes Eisen, das, fire, decomposes unto ashes instead of being
wenn es ins Feuer kommt, zur Asche zerfällt, statt tempered to hardness? But it never even comes
gehärtet zu werden. Aber es geht nicht einmal ins to the point of being tested by fire. It raises a
Feuer. Es erhebt nur ein großes Geschwätz nach great clamour of empty words, in line with the
dem Vorbild des modernen Journalismus – auch model of modern journalism – the
vor der “Aneignung” dieser Erscheinung schreckt appropriation of even this manifestation shows
man nicht zurück. “Katholische Philosophie” – that one will stop at nothing. “Catholic
dieser Titel erklärt schon, falls man ihn denkt, die philosophy” – the title itself proclaims, if one
unbedingte Bereitschaft zum – Verzicht auf das gives it a thought, an unconditional readiness –
Denken, aber hinter der Fassade und mit dem to do without thinking, but to use the façade and
Aufwand der Terminologie des jeweils gerade to employ the terminology of whatever mode of
gängigen “Philosophierens”, das auch nicht immer “philosophizing” happens to be in fashion; and
schon Denken ist. that does not yet always constitute thinking.
“Communism”, the “English state”, the “essence of subjectivity”, the human

being of “modernity”, “technicity”, the “Christian Occident”, and finally “think-
ing”: in the Notebooks, these are the dramatis personae that Heidegger sets on stage
in their relation to “destruction (Vernichtung)” and “self-destruction
(Selbstvernichtung)”. In order to elucidate the use of these figures in the Observations
I-II (1942–1946) we have to expand our investigation to include the Ponderings.
One obstacle to the substantive examination of the meaning of the concept of
“self-destruction” in its contexts is that some readers took only the first lines of the
passage in question into consideration (see Observations I [30]). As these
Observations were recorded as of 1942, the temptation naturally arose to read them
on the basis of their first lines, to restrict oneself to this, as opposed to reading the
entire text. It is undeniable that the sole key to the interpretation of the Observations
after their publication became this point of departure and various arbitrary interpre-
tations of the concept of “self-destruction”. For this reason, the multi-layered con-
tents of the Observations were not thoroughly examined – with the result that the
entire contextual argument laid out here, in section 5, was overlooked. The prejudi-
cial interpretation of “self-destruction”, which was powerfully intensified through
the mass media, resulted in hindering in-depth consideration of the text to produce
one-sided distortions of meaning. The all-to-literal sense that many readers gave to
this word became a general snare, entrapping many more. For this reason, it is per-
haps understandable why the contents of Observations I-V were suppressed and
merely passed over in survey. Because otherwise the instrumentalization of the text,
which is based solely on this concept, would have been undermined. This procedure
has contributed to minimalize and ultimately to erase the significance of the remain-
ing content. But the preferential treatment given to Observations I [30], as the
source for the interpretation of “self-destruction” has not produced the results many
expected. As shown here, it only served to generalize the hermeneutic distortion of
this concept and its context. In principle it is not possible to undertake a systematic
interpretation of the Notebooks while hanging on to one’s own “worldview”.
“Self-destruction” is a form of “destruction”. “Self-destruction” is conceived in
the context of “communism” and the “English state” (Ponderings XIII [107–109]).
It should not be interpreted as literal self-destruction, but rather signifies the main-
tenance and intensification of these two historical realities in the course of their
achieving absolute form. Consequently, self-destruction unmasks itself in the praxis
[of these realities], indicated as follows: communism “presses toward the outbreak
of warlike entanglements”; the Bourgeois-Christian form of English “Bolshevism”
“most decisively” advances “its essential self-destruction [...] by the exaggeration
of its own deceptive appearance”. In similar fashion, in reference to “the essence of
subjectivity” “self-destruction” is conceived as self-securing self-affirmation; and
for this reason, a form of humanity is said to destroy itself in that “time and again it
breeds a generation of such a character as confirms its own majesty” (Ponderings
XIV [18–19]).
Taking this new form, the essence of subjectivity “rushes and hurtles toward the
unconditioned abandonment of being”. In accordance with this mode of thought,
“modern man” (Ponderings XV [12–14]) experiences the dominion of metaphysics,

which is to say, the institution and consummation of “the empowerment of power in
and through the disempowerment of beings” (Ponderings XV [18–19]). Self-
destruction becomes the supreme form through which this play of power articulates
itself, and herein beings attain to their highest degree of empowerment: for whatso-
ever destroys itself, maintains itself in ever new successions of manifestations.
Given that the beingness of beings, as a process of destruction, is understand in
terms of the conceptual schema of over-powering power, then self-destruction con-
sists in this, that each and every strategy of securing this schema of thought in its
constancy over-powers itself.
The perspective of the Ponderings is set forth in the Observations, with particu-
lar reference to “technicity”, “the Christian Occident”, and “thinking” as the sites of
manifestation of self-destruction. Thus “technicity” is said to achieve the highest
stage of self-destruction “when, as a process of consumption, it has nothing left to
consume – except itself”. For “its immanent essence drives it relentlessly on to the
ever-new, that is, to consume itself”. In consequence, self-destruction amounts to
the constant expansion of the play of machination, which drives the will to power to
empower itself of ever new domains, thereby to maintain, strengthen, and confirm
its dominion by way of this intensified self-empowerment.
Reference to the “Christian Occident”, or to Jewry and the Jewish world has no
explicit or implied relation to anything that could lead one to intimate (within
acceptable limits of interpretation) that Heidegger was referring to the Jewish peo-
ple as such. For the apex of self-destruction is reached when “the essentially
‘Jewish’, in the metaphysical sense, enters into conflict with Jewishness”, and as
such turns against itself. This is to say, that the highpoint of self-destruction is
reached when self-entrapment in the rigidity of calculability (which is a widely
affirmed concept of our age) opposes itself to its own essence. This summit of self-
destruction corresponds to the highest stage of metaphysics of the Christian
Occident and characterizes the “world-view” of the refusal of the history of being.
The contextual background is always the Christian Occident and the categories on
which Heidegger draws to describe how self-destruction remains a constant that
arises in the course of history to ever emerge in new forms. With reference to “think-
ing”, the self-destruction of thinking constitutes a new form of destruction: it now
takes power “under the name of ‘philosophy’ to constitutes the self-destruction of
thinking [...] [as] organized by church and party” (Observations II [66-75]). And
finally, reference to the public sphere and its enterprise of destruction once again
alerts us that self-destruction works systematically to assure that the definitive
“worldview” of modernity, based on the over-powering of beings, on the one hand,
and Heidegger’s project of the founding of essential knowing, on the other, are
incompatible.
6 Postscriptum
This postscript offers independent, completely separate analyses from those pre-
sented above, at least insofar as certain of the questions it elucidates are dependent
on a perspective of thinking far removed from worn-out clichés and received sche-
mata of thought. To distance oneself from these means to stand apart from the mad-
ness of a confusion that assimilates thinking with domains to which it would never
willingly give itself. Only mindfulness transforms this distance into an active move-
ment, or unrest of thought, which always consists in going beyond any determinable
limit. In its imperfection, language shows itself as pliable in the sense that it is not
able to gather into one and to appropriate the fullness of the “beyond”. Looking
back upon some pauses on the path of our questioning, one becomes aware that our
view of the world has changed and that another perspective enables us to identify
new components, which it now pertains to acknowledge.
Let us return to subsection 3.2. and the still unresolved question regarding the
Afterword of volume GA 95. In particular, let us consider the following assertion of
the German editor of this volume:
“The background to these remarks on ‘Jewry’, as well as the interpretation of everyday life
under National Socialism, is constituted by a discourse known to us from the being-histor-
ical treatises that were composed at the same time: ‘Contributions to Philosophy (From
Enowning)’ (GA 65, from 1936–1938); ‘Mindfulness’ (GA 66, 1938–1939); as well as
‘The History of Being’ (GA 69, 1939–1940); ‘Of the Inception’ (GA 70, 1941); ‘The
Event’ (GA 71, 1941–1942). We constantly hear echoes of these texts in the ‘Ponderings’”.71
The editor associates the Überlegungen with volumes GA 65, GA 66, GA 69,
GA 70, and GA 71 of the Complete Edition. This association, however, is only an
excuse to raise doubts that I propose to quickly dispel. Since the Ponderings as well
as the Black Notebooks generally arose during the same time period as the great
being-historical treatises, it simply stands to reason that the one would continuously
refer to the other. With this claim, the German editor wishes to insinuate that these
“remarks on ‘Jewry’, as well as the interpretation of everyday life under National
Socialism” are inscribed in Heidegger’s project of the history of being. These are
grave, but unfounded accusations, and for this reason they simply cannot be ignored.
In his subsequent book, Heidegger and the Mythos of a Jewish World Conspiracy,
the German editor claims that “they [the Black Notebooks] are displaced into a
being-historical topology or autotopography [...] according to which they are
assigned a particular, a specific significance, and this significance is of anti-Semitic
nature”.72 The contentious point at issue should not be left unaddressed, for thereby
it only assumes gigantic proportions to amplify still more the grave accusations of
71
Trawny P. Nachwort des Herausgebers (Editor’s Afterword): See Heidegger M. (2014b), p. 452
(our translation).
72
Trawny P. (20153), p. 15. English translation, p. 6 (mod. B.R.).
6 Postscriptum 255
the German editor: and this comes to word in the claim that Heidegger and being-
historical thinking are anti-Semitic. Beginning with his Afterword, he has voiced a
series of allegations, which – unjustifiably – were integrated into his subsequent
publications; and so – lacking all self-restraint – he contravened the directives
explicitly set forth by Heidegger in regard to the publication of the Complete
Edition.73
73
This argument was intensively discussed in my Freiburg conversations with F.-W. von Herrmann.
Heidegger’s contractually determined directives with Vittorio Klostermann in regard to the publi-
cation of the volumes of the Complete Edition are clear and unequivocal and are also binding on
the translators of these volumes into foreign languages: The editors and translators are not empow-
ered to write a foreword, only an afterword. “The afterword of the editor shall be limited to the
respective text in the function of editor and refrain from interpretation of the content of the vol-
ume”. Furthermore, “a translator may speak to the work of translation while refraining from obser-
vations and interpretation of the matter of the translation”. These directives are binding no less for
Franco Volpi when it came to sending a copy of the proof-sheets of his Italian translation of the
Beiträge – Contributi alla filosofia (Dall’Evento) – to Klostermann Press. Since von Herrmann, as
director-in-chief of the Complete Edition kept himself informed of the case of Volpi, I propose to
give a full account of our conversation: “As administer of the estate, Hermann Heidegger became
aware that Volpi in his functions as translator and editor had contravened the directives noted above
by writing a foreword that offered an interpretation of the volume in question. He was conse-
quently asked to rewrite the afterword as a ‘Notice of the Editor for the Readers of the Italian
Edition’ (Avvertenza del Curatore dell’editione italiana / Hinweis des Herausgebers für den Leser
der italienischen Ausgabe) and all the expository remarks of his own interpretation were simply
and completely deleted. These measures were taken in consort by Klostermann Press and Hermann
Heidegger”. At a later point in time, the complete and original version of the Avvertenza was pub-
lished: see Volpi F. (2011), pp. 267–299. A comparison of both versions shows that following
passages were deleted: first of all, the subdivisions in eight sections, as well as source references
with 57 footnotes of the editor; [secondly]. F. Volpi’s own interpretation – comprising a substantial
portion of the complete version (ibid. pp. 268–280 and from the last three lines of p. 283 to p. 285,
and pp. 286–299) – was greatly revised in order to be accepted into the Italian edition as Avvertenza
del Curatore. Everything else was removed, along with Volpi’s references to the “personal crisis”
Heidegger suffered during the years 1936–1938. Footnote number 1, which reads: “According to
Pöggeler, this crisis drove Heidegger to think of suicide” – was also removed. The editor and trans-
lator, as such, is not entitled to such references, no more than to allusions to the private correspon-
dence of Heidegger and Elizabeth Blochmann during the years 1932, 1935, and 1938 (see ibid.
pp. 273 and 275) – that is, during the period of the composition of the Contributions. One might
suppose that this reference to Blochmann is not so lacking in modesty, but nonetheless it was
removed, for her “affair” with Heidegger was not at that time, common knowledge, as it is now
(see below, Heidegger “Epilogue” by Hermann Heidegger). Aside from this correspondence with
Blochmann, Volpi also considers other correspondence, for example, that of Hannah Arendt with
Karl Jaspers in 1950 (see ibid. pp. 274–275) as well as her correspondence with Jaspers in 1949,
in which Arendt recounts: “I read the Letter against (gegen) (sic) humanism, very questionable and
in many respects equivocal, but the first thing that is up to the old standard (Here I read about
Hölderlin and miserable, gossipy Nietzsche lectures). This life in Todtnauberg, scolding civiliza-
tion and writing Sein with a ‘y’ is in truth just the mouse-hole which he has made his refuge” [ibid.
p. 284; compare Arendt H. and Jaspers K. (1985), p. 178]. Now we understand why this original
version, in accord with the explicit will of Hermann Heidegger, was “censored”: for along with
elements of Volpi’s interpretation of the contents, we find things that are completely inappropriate
to a “Notice to the Reader” in regard to the Contributions. With this we refer to several turns of
expression of Volpi’s – which were also removed from the Adelphi edition of 2007 – concerning
the book translated, for example: “In addition we should take note of the first efforts that gave rise
On the basis of the contents of the Notebooks, the thesis of Heidegger’s supposed
anti-Semitism has been comprehensively refuted. And this is the heart of the matter,
for the supposed anti-Semitism of Heidegger has been postulated only since the
publication of the Notebooks.
With the refutation of this thesis, it still remains to clarify, however, why the
German editor chose to put volumes GA 65, GA 66, GA 69, GA 70, and GA 71 of
the Complete Edition into question. The seeds of doubt he sows are intended to
fundamentally undermine Heidegger’s path of thinking as of 1936 and in a certain
sense to focus our attention on the Notebooks: these collectively constitute the mas-
terpiece, the secretive work, in which the most peripheral anti-Semitic – and conse-
quently the most Nazi-friendly – sayings may be found. In these volumes, the
building blocks of Heidegger’s thought as laid out in the five great being-historical
treatises that are enumerated in his Afterword are already in evidence. If these insin-
uations were true, then free of doubt, or misgiving, we would find certitude. But we
are confronted with nothing but unfounded assertions and reservations, which the
German editor has hitherto been unable to justify by means of supportive evidence
for his claims. Our task is to travel in reverse direction in order to determine the
scope and impact of these accusations: since we may find observations and com-
ments in the Notebooks that were taken up again and developed in greater depth, we
want to determine if and how references to the Ponderings or to the Observations
may be found in the five treatises listed above. Clearly a considerable portion of the
material discussed in the Notebooks was taken up and considered in greater depth in
the treatises. The following list records these references:
to the clandestine circulation of the manuscript among devotees, as well as to the conviction that
these pages contained the key to the decryption of the thought of the “second” Heidegger” [see
Volpi F. (2011), p. 267]. What is most significant, however, is the content of the conclusion of his
text, wherein the author recurs to the concept of “savage” clearing: “[Heidegger’s] ingenious
experiments in language implode: he comes to look ever more like a tightrope dancer, even like
someone who constantly masticates ever the same thing. His use of etymology proves to be a mis-
use. His conviction that genuine philosophy can only be done in ancient Greek and German (and
why not Latin?) is exaggerated. In praise of the role of the poet he is also given to overestimation,
as he is in the great hope he sets on poetic thinking, which has remained a pious wish. His anthro-
pology of the clearing (Lichtung), wherein the human being functions as the shepherd of being, is
inadmissible and impossible to realize. The mystery is not so much the thought of the late
Heidegger as the subaltern attitude and often uncritical admiration that has been granted to some-
one, and that has brought forth such scholastic productions” (ibid. pp. 298–299). From these short
but significant insinuations we may draw a well-founded conclusion, based on the following ques-
tion: does such a judgment, or shall we say, Volpi’s statement of position, regarding Heidegger
have its proper place of publication in the Contributions? This problem had already been painfully
anticipated during Heidegger’s lifetime and for this reason it was very important for him to record
his directives and to have them conscientiously followed by editors and translators. In the case of
Volpi, Hermann Heidegger and von Herrmann, in cooperation with Klostermann Press, were able
to guarantee that Heidegger’s directives were strictly followed. The situation created by the
German editor of the Notebooks first escaped careful analysis, presumably because its conse-
quences were underestimated.
6 Postscriptum 257
Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) (GA 65)74 – 21 references to

Ponderings ii, iv, v, vi; Ponderings iv [85 ff.]; Ponderings iv (on the inception and the
crossing); Ponderings iv [90]; Ponderings iv [96]; Ponderings iv [83]; Ponderings vi
[33, 68, 74]; Ponderings iv [115 ff.]; Ponderings ii, iv, v, vi, vii; Ponderings v [17 ff.,
34, 51 ff.]; Ponderings v [82 ff. “Plato”]; Ponderings v [44 ff.]; Ponderings vii [47
ff.]; Ponderings v [35 ff.]; Ponderings vii [97 ff., Hölderlin – Nietzsche]; Ponderings
vii [90 ff.]; Ponderings vi, vii, viii; Ponderings vi, vii (Hölderlin); Ponderings vii [78
ff.]; Ponderings iv [1 ff.]; Ponderings viii.
Mindfulness (GA 66)75 – 13 references to Ponderings xii [29]; Ponderings viii
[64 ff., 89]; Ponderings xi [24]; Ponderings x [70 ff.]; Ponderings ix [86]; Ponderings
vii; Ponderings ix [40 ff., 44 ff.]; Ponderings x [47 ff.]; Ponderings x [55 ff.];
Ponderings xiii [36]; Ponderings xiii; Ponderings xiii [41 ff.]; Ponderings and
Intimations ii-iv-v.
The History of Being (GA 69)76 – 3 references to Ponderings xii, xiii; Ponderings
xiii (§ 81, § 89); Ponderings xiii [6 ff.].
74
See Heidegger M. (1989), “i. Preview” (ibid. p. 1. English translation, p. 1); § 16 “ Philosophy”
(ibid. p. 43. English translation, p. 31); § 23 “Inceptual Thinking: Why Thinking from within the
Beginning?” (ibid. p. 57. English translation, p. 40); § 40 “The Work of Thinking in the Epoch of
the Crossing” (ibid. p. 83. English translation, p. 57); § 52 “Abandonment of Being” (ibid. p. 112.
English translation, p. 77); § 56 “The Lingering of the Abandonment of being in the Concealed
Manner of Forgottenness of Being” (ibid. p. 118. English translation, p. 81); § 76 “Prepositions
about ‘Science’” (ibid. p. 147. English translation, p. 102); § 105 “Hölderlin – Kierkegaard –
Nietzsche” (ibid. p. 204. English translation, p. 143); “iv. Leap” (ibid. p. 225. English translation,
p. 159); § 136 “Beyng” (ibid. p. 255. English translation, p. 180); § 171 “Da-sein” (ibid. p. 294.
English translation, p. 208); “vi. The Ones to Come” (ibid. p. 393. English translation, p. 275); §
251 “What is Ownmost to a People and to Da-sein” (ibid. p. 398. English translation, p. 279); §
257 “Beyng” (ibid. p. 421. English translation, p. 297); § 258 “Philosophy” (ibid. p. 422. English
translation, p. 297); § 265 “En-thinking of Beyng” (ibid. p. 456. English translation, p. 321); § 267
“Beyng” (ibid. p. 473. English translation, p. 333); § 272 “Man” (ibid. p. 491. English translation,
p. 345).
75
See Heidegger M. (1997), § 8 “On Mindfulness” (ibid. p. 15. English translation, p. 11); § 11
“Art in the Epoch of Completion of Modernity” (ibid. p. 30. English translation, p. 23); § 15 “Self-
mindfulness of Philosophy as Historically Dissociating Exposition (Dissociating Exposition of
Metaphysics and Being-historical Thinking” (ibid. p. 68. English translation, p. 55); § 58 “The
Question put to Man” (ibid. p. 148. English translation, p. 126); § 64 “‘History’ and Technicity”
(ibid. p. 183. English translation, p. 161); § 69 “The History of Beyng” (ibid. p. 224. English trans-
lation, p. 198); xxii. “Beyng and Becoming (The Completion of Occidental Metaphysics)” (ibid.
p. 279. English translation, p. 247); § 97 “The Beyng-historical Thinking and the Question of
Being” (ibid. p. 339. English translation, p. 302; § 98 “The Beyng-historical Thinking” (ibid.
p. 358. English translation, p. 318); § 129 “The Final Rise of Metaphysics” (ibid. p. 400. English
translation, p. 353); “The Wish and the Will (On Preserving What is Attempted)” (ibid. p. 420.
English translation, p. 371). In this work Heidegger refers to notebooks that have now appeared as
volumes GA 94 and 95 of the Complete Edition, as recorded in the Afterword of F.-W. von
Herrmann (see ibid. p. 433).
76
See Heidegger M. (1998), § 87 “Geschichte (History)” (ibid. note 1, p. 101); § 89 “Der letzte
Gott (The Last God)” (ibid. note 1, p. 105); § 93 “Ereignis (Enowning)” (ibid. note 1, p. 107).
On the Inception (GA 70)77 – 3 references to Ponderings xv [17, 20]; Ponderings

xv [22]; Ponderings xv.
The Event (GA 71)78 – One single reference to the Ponderings (GA 94–96).
One only needs to review these references in the five treatises at issue to assure
oneself that they pertain to only a few of the passages from the notebooks that are
inscribed in GA 94 and GA 95; and that these deal exclusively with the theoretical
structure of being-historical thinking, without reference to the politics of National
Socialism, let alone with themes related to the Jewish people, be it in ideological or
in religious perspective.
Certainly the absence of such references to the Observations (which the author
could have used subsequently) is no accident. These passages bear witness to
Heidegger’s confrontation with National Socialism, with the criminal insanity of
Hitler, and repeatedly recur to the error of 1933 and Heidegger’s decision to accept
the Office of Rector. It follows that the notebooks served the purpose of recording
transitory thoughts to which Heidegger wished to return on his path of thought. And
indeed, some thoughts were taken up and developed, others remained solitary
insights (hapax legomena) that make their sole appearance in the notebooks. As
noted, in the five treatises under review, there are no explicitly political references
to find; and still less issues related to the Jewish people; not even implicit remarks
that could contradict what has been presented here. The German editor of the
Notebooks insinuates that these being-historical treatises are “contaminated” by
anti-Semitism without, however, offering the least shred of evidence for this claim.
And for good reason: there is nothing to support it. Based on such unfounded
assumptions, the conclusions the German editor draws are unjustified, for their
point of departure is the allegation that Heidegger’s writings, beginning with the
composition of the Contributions in 1936, manifest concrete evidence of anti-
Semitic “contamination”. Whoever takes this position only proves that he or she
wishes to reserve judgment in the “case of Heidegger”. One refuses to decide and to
take a clear and unequivocal stand in regard to Heidegger’s legacy. Let us recall that
Günther Figal was so seduced by this interpretative proposal that he expressed his
willingness to take this direction. Whoever takes a clear and theoretically founded
position on this matter will certainly run the risk of being branded as a “denier”, or
even worse, as a “Neo-Nazi” – even if it can be proved that there is no trace of anti-
Semitism to be found in Heidegger. It follows, that no argument will ever suffice to
frame an unpolemical discussion of the issue, because over the course of time
unfounded allegations have promoted clichés that interpret Heidegger in terms of a
supposed legacy of anti-Semitism, a legacy which supposedly reaches its apex and
consummation in Heidegger himself. To summarize: Figal’s position, along with
those associated with it and those who put their faith in the supposition that
77
See Heidegger M. (2005), § 16 “Der neuzeitliche Wesensaufenthalt des Menschen Planetarismus
und Idiotismus (The Essential Sojourn of Modern Humanity: Globalism and Idiotism)” (ibid. note
1, p. 34); § 79 “Aufriß der Sage des Anfangs (dieser Aufriß eher zu einer Hinleitung) (Sketch of the
Saga of the Inception)” (ibid. note 1, p. 100).
78
See Heidegger M. (2009), § 363 “Thinking” (ibid. p. 320. English translation, p. 277).
6 Postscriptum 259
Heidegger’s entire Complete Edition has to be read in search of hidden anti-Semi-

tism – this position, clearly reflects the effort (even if unknown to itself) – to free
oneself of a difficult interpretive framework that has long since degenerated into
making unfounded accusations. Those who decide to undertake the effort of work-
ing through Heidegger’s multilayered texts will not be spared such accusations:
“[...] von Herrmann denies [Heidegger’s] anti-Semitism. In this regard, we affirm
that whoever insists on denials and negations, without distancing himself from Nazi
discourse, thereby already ascribes to Neo-Nazism”.79
The point of recounting these remarks is to clarify how difficult it was for many
intellectuals to critically engage the controversies of the “Heidegger Case”. Many
kept their distance to avoid being branded, even if further examination of the
Notebooks revealed all this to be a misunderstanding. For to deny Heidegger’s anti-
Semitism is understood to mean to have already discovered a trace of it, somewhere.
Otherwise one runs the risk of wanting to discover something at any cost, which
clearly applies to political readings based on numerous unclarified suggestions.
Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, François Fédier, and the Heidegger family, as
well as the author of these lines, are clearly far removed from Nazi trains of
thought – and it is certainly inadmissible and insulting to subject the serious work
of philosophical research to these convenient notions, or still worse, to reduce
everything to the level of politics, thereby instrumentalizing the pain of the Jewish
people.80 Intellectual honesty, however, also requires that one follow a path com-
mensurate with the complexities and multiple levels of Heidegger’s thought, guided
by a sense of responsibility for its density of expression, rather than falling back on
simplistic constructs that only pose a burden to understanding.
To close this chapter, allow me to recall the following passage of Heidegger’s,
which may be helpful in consideration of the comprehension of an author and the
difficulties of translation and interpretation:
“A ‘literal’ translation does not consist in composing ‘words’ in corresponding number and
grammatical form, but rather in finding ‘the word’, and indeed in its provenance out of the
saying of the language of translation”. (Observations II [69]).
79
Di Cesare D. (2015), pp. 23, 25 (our translation).
80
See ibid. p. 27: “obviously there are a great many right-wing people among them. At the top of
the list are – presumably – the grand heirs, like von Herrmann and Fédier” (our translation). Such
remarks reveal how Donatella Di Cesare’s position in regard to Heidegger’s Notebooks emerges
out of a “culture of resentment” and consequently how this informs a faulty perspective that is
determined to reduce the interpretation of Heidegger to the political level – and sparing no effort
in this, the works of Heidegger’s colleagues are not spared either.
References
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Concerning Certain Unpublished Letters
Received by Friedrich-Wilhelm von
Herrmann
Francesco Alfieri
1 Preface: Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger
The first draft of this book did not plan for the publication of several unpublished
letters from Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Following our conversations in
Freiburg in the late fall of 2015, we confirmed our intention to concentrate on the
explication of the Black Notebooks. But upon our reading and re-reading of the
Notebooks we became more aware of what Heidegger had clearly and distinctly
pointed out – that the temptation to instrumentalize his philosophy had always been
great and that this danger would bring forth false interpretations. Consequently, I
asked von Herrmann if documents were not available which could help us better
assess the difficulties involved in the future study of his manuscripts. It seemed to
us that the title “Black Notebooks” was already obscure enough. It could lead some
readers astray to imagine that these notebooks contained some deeply hidden “bur-
ied treasure” concerning Heidegger’s person – a secret that would finally be “dis-
closed” with the publication of the Notebooks. For the publication of the Notebooks
was not accompanied by an authentic grasp of Heidegger’s notes and observations.
We soon concluded that the expression “Black Notebooks” – which describes their
external appearance, not their content – unfortunately results in making Heidegger’s
reflections in these notebooks still more mysterious and inaccessible. When we con-
sider, moreover, that significant passages were intentionally and unnecessarily con-
cealed by the media, remaining unknown to the public, then we may safely conclude
that the perfected, finely-spun network of the anticipated instrumentalization of the
Notebooks had already been conceived. This file of manuscripts, which were pub-
lished as volumes GA 94 through GA 97 should rather be described, as Heidegger
does, as Ponderings and Observations. Between the two of us, nonetheless, it had
almost become customary to designate these notebooks as the “Black Notebooks”
although we were aware that this locution would generate more confusion than clar-
ity in the mind of the reader.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69496-8_4
264 Concerning Certain Unpublished Letters Received by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann
Not much effort, however, is required to dispel the prejudicial judgments of those
intent on “playing the intellectual” to the end of presenting Heidegger as closely
implicated in National Socialism and Hitler’s insane policies. For example, all that
is needed is to cast an eye back on the Göttinger Phenomenological Circle, and in
particular, on Edith Stein, one of its representatives. This Jewish philosopher, a
student of Husserl’s, made the decision in 1922 to become a Catholic, and subse-
quently entered the Carmelite order. Ultimately, she took the terrible fate of her own
people upon herself, being deported to the concentration and extermination camp of
Auschwitz where she died on August 9, 1942. But how are Edith Stein’s and Martin
Heidegger’s biographies, in their highs and in their depths, related to each other?
Indeed, the conditions of life and the fates of the two are incomparable in many
ways. And yet a common spiritual contribution joins them during the dark epoch of
National Socialism, its seizure of power and its evermore inevitable moral decay on
the crooked path of insanity and horror.
In the years 1935–1937, Edith Stein composed Finite and Eternal Being. An
Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being, a significant and genuine philosophi-
cal masterpiece. The author described this masterful work as her “farewell gift to
Germany”.1 But in the present context what is particularly relevant is that the manu-
script encompassed two supplements, the first of which is entitled: “Martin Heidegger:
Existenzphilosophie”. The manuscript was entrusted to Borgmeyer, publisher in
Breslau, who divided it into two volumes, the second one containing the supplement
on Martin Heidegger. Or, to be precise, it should have contained it. In fact, in the year
1938, the proofs had already been prepared for the press (one copy is preserved in the
Edith Stein Archive in Cologne) when production was interrupted by increasing anti-
Semitism in the political arena, especially in train of the events of Kristallnacht in
November 1938. Edith Stein’s major work was published later, in the 1950s, but
again without the supplements: unfortunately, this was also the case with succeeding
editions.2 One will have to wait for the new edition of the Edith Stein Complete
Works (ESGA),3 which is to publish the original proofs, together with the supple-
ments in one volume.4 It remains unclear why the first publishers could not – or did
not wish to – include the supplements. However that may be, it remains marginal in
the present context. The important issue is to pose the key, relevant, question: why
did Edith Stein add a supplement on Martin Heidegger to the end of her treatise on
Finite and Eternal Being? Had she known that Heidegger, in one fashion or another,
were implicated in National Socialism, would she have engaged in dialogue with a
supporter of Nazism, adding it to the conclusion of her work? And this in the course
of the years 1935–1938 as National Socialism came to reveal its increasing hostility
toward Jewish intellectuals and regime critics? Let us assume that Edith Stein had
time enough, in the course of reading the proofs, to remove this supplement.
1
See Stein E. (2006b2). Brief vom 9.xii.1938, p. 324: “Sollte es noch möglich sein, so würde es
mein Abschiedsgeschenk an Deutschland sein” (“Should it still be possible, then this will be my
parting gift to Germany”) (mod. B.R.).
2
See Stein E. (1950, 19622, 19863).
3
See Stein E. (2006a).
4
See ibid. pp. 445–499.
1 Preface: Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger 265
The relationship between Edith Stein and Heidegger actually goes back to 1931,
when she showed him a manuscript entitled “Potenz und Akt”,5 (Potency and Act)
which she had written in pursuit of her Habilitation at the University of Freiburg. She
refers to this in a letter of December 25, 1931 to her Polish friend, Roman Ingarden:
“I definitely have to tell you about the Freiburg philosophers. Honecker, although he hardly
knows me, took great pains for me. He tried – in vain! – to get the ministry to create a pri-
vate lecturer stipend for me and spent hours discussing this with me and with Husserl.
Because, people of my age who are not financially self-sufficient are no longer admitted to
the Faculty, he finally advised me not to submit [my application] in order to avoid being
rejected. Throughout, Heidegger was friendly even though he told me it was hopeless. He
believed that a year ago it would have gone through without any difficulties. And he kept
my work [Potency und Act] to read and recently spoke with me for more than two hours
about it in a very stimulating and fruitful manner. I am very thankful to him”.6
Given that Edith Stein’s biography connects her with Heidegger’s in 1931 (with
Potenz und Akt) and that this connection continues until the end of 1938 (with Finite
and Eternal Being), then how is it conceivable that this former student of Husserl’s
never took Heidegger’s supposed implication in National Socialism into consider-
ation? Furthermore, based on Edith Stein’s testimony concerning her possible
Habilitation in Freiburg, as well as Heidegger’s and Husserl’s support for the suc-
cessful culmination of her efforts, how should one evaluate several precipitous con-
clusions putting Edith Stein’s spiritual path into question based on the supposition
that she “took her departure from philosophy” when she became a Carmelite nun?7
But why would the failure to complete the Habilitation result in “taking depar-
ture” from philosophy? As if Edith Stein took her departure from philosophy
5
See Stein. E. (2005a).
6
Stein E. (2005b2), pp. 225–226. English translation, pp. 312–313 (mod. B.R.).
7
This refers us to recent pronouncements by Donatella Di Cesare, which are not substantiated in
Edith Stein’s philosophy nor in such sources as are available to us: “One need think, not only of the
academic shipwreck that Edith Stein suffered as Husserl’s assistant, playing as she did the role of
eternal script-girl, lifelong secretary, the role of the ‘girl’ – whose task would consist in transcrib-
ing the notes of the Master into clean copy – which often enough landed in the waste basket. That
Stein was not able to reach the stage of the Habilitation, because [the state of] Baden-Württemberg
did not extend this right to women was basically self-evident for Husserl. His successor was
Heidegger – not Stein. What remains, is well-known, even as are the consequences of the Master’s
neglect: his student remained faithful, but all the same she took her farewell, not only from philoso-
phy, but also from the world in an inner flight into herself that, paradoxical as it may sound, ulti-
mately imprisoned her, and whose terminal station is called Auschwitz” [Di Cesare D. (2015),
p. 64 (our translation)]. In tune with this hasty and in many respects fictional narrative, the influ-
ence that Stein had, as assistant, in the reworking of a number of Husserl’s manuscripts, is left
completely out of consideration. Th. Vongehr (collaborator with the Husserl Archive in Louvain)
has not just coincidently expressed the desirability of opening up a touchy and necessary new
research perspective dealing with the E. Stein’s substantial influence in the course of the reworking
of the Master’s manuscripts during the time of her assistantship. Regarding this topic, he writes:
“A desideratum of Stein, respectively Husserl research, which Imhof, for example [...] had already
called for in 1987, still consists in the detailed description of the specific projects assigned to Stein
during the period of her assistantship. To this end, a comprehensive investigation would consider
not only the works published in the framework of the Husserliana but would also seek out traces
of Stein’s [influence] in Husserl’s unedited literary estate. This is the only way to take measure of
Edith Stein’s impressive accomplishment and the extend of her elaborations” [Vongehr Th. (2008),
p. 273, note 4 (mod. B.R.)].
because of her failed Habilitation, or Martin Heidegger took his because he was
prohibited from teaching [in 1945].
In our conversations, all these considerations and questions often came to mind.
This was one reason, for us, to keep thinking about the “Heidegger Case” as well as
the way in which it had been treated – through the application of broad generaliza-
tions and hasty judgments unsupported by textual evidence. These did not even
spare Heidegger’s colleagues of Jewish origin, namely Edith Stein and her teacher
Edmund Husserl. As we came upon the claim that “the rest of the story” is already
“known”,8 it became clear to us that we would have to put this idea of the so-called
“known” into question. We realized that precisely what is taken for “known”
because of its unclarified signification is in fact “unknown” to its defenders.
But let us return to the previous question: did von Herrmann have, perhaps,
access to other documents, such as might be able to help us in our investigation? As
I asked him this question, he reminded me that although the Notebooks were already
known to him, Heidegger did not commission him to care for their publication.
For von Herrmann was to concentrate on the publication of Heidegger’s chief
works in the framework of the Complete Edition initiated with Klostermann in
1975. Furthermore, von Herrmann was also aware of the content of these Notebooks,
at least to extent that he knew that Heidegger had written down thoughts and com-
mentaries pertaining to himself – things that were to become known only after the
publication of the manuscripts. Heidegger himself believed the Notebooks con-
tained nothing but simple notes – and for this reason – that they should be published
only after all the other volumes. Their content, however, was never considered “pri-
vate” or “secret” as is clear from references to the Notebooks in Heidegger’s works.9
8
Di Cesare D. (2015), p. 64.
9
For example, one only needs to open the Contributions to know that Heidegger refers to the
Ponderings now published in volumes GA 94 and GA 95 of the Complete Edition. Among others,
consider: “Ponderings IV, 83” [Heidegger M. (1989), p. 118. English translation, p. 82];
“Ponderings II, IV, V, VI, VII” [ibid. p. 225. English translation, p. 159]; “Ponderings VII, 97ff.
(Hölderlin – Nietzsche) and Ponderings VII, 90ff.” [ibid. p. 421. English translation, p. 297];
“Ponderings VI, VII, VIII. [...] VI and VII Hölderlin” [ibid. p. 422. English translation, pp. 297–298].
All of these references concern themselves with being-historical thinking, not political matters, let
alone something that can be called “anti-Semitic”. Consequently, we are confronted by a false
statement when Peter Trawny, in the Introduction to his Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World
Conspiracy [see Trawny P. (20153)], claims that “they [‘the Jews’] are displaced into a being-
historical topology or autotopography [...] according to which they are assigned a special, a par-
ticular significance, and this significance is of anti-Semitic nature” (ibid. p. 15. English translation,
p. 6). With this elucidation, Trawny in effect admits that he is not entirely certain of being on the
correct path, for he comes to speak of an anti-Semitic “contamination”, of being-historical think-
ing. He concludes his Introduction as follows: “For this reason, one, or another evaluation of
[Heidegger’s] may be too one sided, could even be in error. Subsequent discussions may refute or
correct my interpretations. I would be the first to welcome this” (ibid. p. 16. English translation,
p. 7, mod. B.R.). This statement is of significance to the extent that Trawny, first of all, advances
an anti-Semitic contamination theory of Heidegger’s being-historical thinking. He therewith
defends a thesis that in regard to the Notebooks, and with special regard to the complete works, can
hardly be supported by the texts and proves unjustified even on the basis of Trawny’s own thesis.
For the Introduction, which speaks of “contamination” contrasts with his conclusion (his “attempt
1 Preface: Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger 267
In any case, let it be emphasized that Heidegger along with his wife Elfride, were
very glad to be able to rely on the assistance of Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann.
From the time of von Herrmann’s dissertation of 1964, Heidegger felt that von
Herrmann of all people understood his philosophical path the best. That Heidegger
also financially supported his private assistant also helps us to understand that this
choice was made at a decisive point: for Heidegger realized that he needed a trust-
worthy person to aid him in his work, and especially in the initiation and planning
of his Complete Edition.
During our conversation, von Herrmann unexpectedly invited me – and this is
why its worth mentioning – to come back to his office. Then he took a file from a
shelf near his typewriter and opened it. This is where he kept his correspondence
with Heidegger. So, with the help of Frau von Herrmann, we began to examine these
letters. After we had selected the letters that the reader will find in the third section
of this chapter, Professor von Herrmann decided not to publish them, saying to me:
“it suffices to publish the Black Notebooks, further material is unnecessary. Whoever
really wishes to understand does not need additional material”.
So I was surprized all the more as I discovered three letters on my desk the fol-
lowing day. I immediately understood that these letters were just those that I had
seen the day before. On an attached slip of paper von Herrmann had written: “It is
necessary to publish at least these three letters in our book”.
Initially it was intended that the chapter containing unpublished documents
would conclude with these letters. Nevertheless, upon the occasion of my second
visit to Freiburg in Breisgau in January 2016, we examined them again after we had
made the decision to consider further correspondence for inclusion – that is, letters
from Hans-Georg Gadamer, who had been Heidegger’s secretary in Marburg, to von
Herrmann. Well did we know that this would delay the publication of the present
book, which was planned for the 27th of January, the “Day of Remembrance”.
Nevertheless, we considered it necessary to evaluate this correspondence as well,
because it offered new food for thought. We were going to allow a contemporary of
Heidegger’s to come to word, for this would help ourselves, along with the reader,
to renew our investigation of the “Heidegger Case”. This supplement, furthermore,
would decisively show how Gadamer in his time reacted to the instrumentalization
of Heidegger. In the fourth section of this chapter, therefore, the reader will find
three letters from Gadamer. This correspondence is much more extensive but cannot
be published at this time because it touches on private matters pertaining to living
persons and their circumstances. However, had publication been a viable option
at an response”), where he writes: “to speak of a being-historical anti-Semitism therefore does not
imply that being-historical thinking as such is anti-Semitic” (ibid. p. 101. English translation,
p. 95). So apparently Trawny was not aware that having advanced a “contamination” theory of
anti-Semitism, he deconstructs this thesis in conclusion, thereby refuting himself. We are still left
hanging with a number of unanswered questions: in what regard, to what end, did Trawny choose
to follow a path that ultimately proves unpassable, even for himself? And beyond this: when we
take into account the discrepancy between his introduction and his conclusion, how shall it still be
possible to accord the rest of his contemplations concerning Heidegger the dignified name of a
“philosophical hermeneutics”, or a work of “intellectual honesty”?
then many issues – among others, the contentious history of the Martin-Heidegger-
Society – as well as the opinions of many an expert would be cast in a new light. But
in the present context, all that counts is to concern ourselves with this alone: how
Gadamer conceived the instrumentalization of his teacher’s work in the Farías affair
and how he managed the difficult situation of 1987. Casting our eyes back on the
1980s also very much helped us to decipher the complex machinations of the
present.
2 Criteria of the Publication of this Correspondence
A digital reproduction of the original texts and of the German translation of the
texts, followed by the English translation will be available to the reader. In the texts
the numbers of the pages are inserted in brackets, (and where it is necessary with
r = recto and v = verso), whereas line breaks will always be indicated with a special
sign (|). The originals will be identified witn Heid and Gad; in the exchange of let-
ters you’ll find only very few misprints, which we have corrected (corr ed) and also
the corrections and words inserted later by hand by the author (Gad). Our insertions
(add ed) are set in brackets (<). All the published footnotes are from the authors.
In the letter of Gadamer, dated 27 of January 1988, numerous passages are
underlined by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, to emphasize their meaning.
Because of their importance, we have decided to maintain them in the German tran-
scription as well as in the English.
3 hree Letters from the Heidegger – von

T
Herrmann Correspondence
The first letter, of the 20th February 1964, dates from the time of von Herrmann’s
association with Eugen Fink (von Herrmann was Fink’s private assistant from 1961
to 1970). In the second, of November 26, 1972, Heidegger addresses von Herrmann
who as his personal assistant is entrusted with the publication of the entire Complete
Edition. It should be noted that we did not propose to publish this letter of 1964 in
full because its content is also to be found in the notebooks, which as reported
above, will not be published in the near future. For this reason, only the first part of
this long letter is published here.
The publication of these two letters is based on the following criterion, as laid
down by Heidegger: we need to be aware that the “misconceptions” that have always
accompanied his work could survive over time to reach us in new forms, and indeed
in the form of their instrumentalization by the mass media. In 1964 Heidegger had
concluded that Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann’s dissertation took sufficient dis-
tance from the long-standing misconceptions that beclouded access to Sein und Zeit
3 Three Letters from the Heidegger – von Herrmann Correspondence 269
at that time. “Your dissertation demonstrates a thorough acquaintance with my

works and leaves long-time misconceptions behind”.
The recipient of this letter continued to follow the same method in his subsequent
works, which was not a matter of indifference to Heidegger, as we may gather from
this letter of 1972. It begins as follows: “many thanks for your letter and the essay.
The latter will not be accessible to ‘outsiders’ – and many philosophers of today still
stand ‘outside’”. Many different elements ally themselves to these “misconcep-
tions”: the methods of these outsiders, along with those contemporary philosophers
who “remain outside” thanks to their intrigues, intrigues that make every attempt at
genuine understanding impossible. In short, those who refuse the challenge of a
return to the foundations and a new beginning.
“Misconceptions” begin to take on the form of “machinational instrumentaliza-
tion”. This is brought on by an additional factor that Heidegger characterizes as
follows: “But today the socio-political element dominates everything”.
Reversion to the sociopolitical dimension falls prey to the temptation to instru-
mentalize thought and to reduce it to a hectic search for meaning. But no sense can
be derived from sociopolitical circumstances because the enticements of politicized
thinking entrap self-seeking philosophers in the fine-spun web of manipulative
thought-forms. Heidegger and von Herrmann were able to escape this danger
because they understood the consequences of such machinations – to always remain
on the surface of events, and to become the toy of political conditions and events. In
the second letter, the following concise message is worth mentioning: “Everything
else, verbally”. This already suffices to make the choice of Friedrich-Wilhelm von
Herrmann as personal assistant understandable by reason of the intense intellectual
exchange that united them.
The third document is a postcard that was sent to von Herrmann by Pastor
Heinrich Heidegger, the younger son of Fritz Heidegger, on August 15, 1978. Based
on this short note we can emphasize two points. First of all, the role of Bernhard
Welte in Heidegger’s funeral: Heidegger had requested this Catholic philosopher
and friend to perform the funeral service and to this end the two of them decided
upon the biblical passages for the service. Some of the texts chosen reflected certain
aspects of Heidegger’s private life. For example, a text of 1954, The Secret of the
Clock Tower,10 which contemplates the ringing of the bells after every hour of
prayer, and thus recalls Heidegger’s boyhood as sacristan in the Saint Mark’s
Church, which stood across from the family home in Meßkirch.
A second point that is also emphasized in the third document is how attentively
the Heidegger family followed the planned Complete Edition entrusted to von
Herrmann: “the Complete Edition is making good progress! I did not expect things
to move forward so quickly”.
In conclusion and summary: these three letters concern the disillusioned per-
ception of the danger of “misconceptions”, the ruins of philosophy reduced to
sociopolitical critique, and the decisive role that von Herrmann played in the orga-
nization of the planned Complete Edition that had been entrusted to him upon
Heidegger’s wish.
10
See Heidegger M. (1983), pp. 113–116.
Letter No. 1: Martin Heidegger to von Herrmann (Frbg. 20. Febr. 64)
(personal collection of F.-W. von Herrmann)
3.1 Martin Heidegger to von Herrmann. Letter No. 1
Frbg. 20. Febr. 64.

[1r] Lieber Herr v. Herrmann,
Ihre Dissertation bezeugt eine gründliche Durcharbeitung | meiner Schriften und
läßt die lange üblichen Mißdeutungen | hinter sich. Um vorwegzunehmen, was ich
einen Tag | vor Ihrem Besuch zu Herrn Tugendhat sagte:
“Die Kehre ist in ‘Sein und Zeit’ nicht vorgeplant – der-|gleichen ist unmöglich –
aber sie ist durch die Thematik | von ‘Zeit und Sein’ dem Denken abverlangt”. In |
dieser Thematik waren die bestimmenden Fragen: die Auslegung | des Seins als
Sein von der “Geworfenheit” und dem “Nichts” | her zu gewinnen. Ich habe daher
bei der Lektüre <Ihrer Arbeit>11 zuerst | nach diesen Phänomenen und nach der
Behandlung durch Sie | gesucht. Sie bemerken mit Recht, daß die “Geworfenheit” |
zum voraus das Transzendentale anders prägt im Unterschied | zur kantischen
Transzendentalphilosophie. Sie sprechen von | der “Bedingtheit” des Daseins – die
sich dann “steigert” und “verstärkt”.
Aber diese Charakteristik ist keine phänomenologische, sondern | eine von außen
vorstellende gegenständliche. Geworfenheit | des Daseins, das ausgezeichnet ist
durch den Entwurf von Sein – ist | also Geworfenheit in die Eröffnung von Sein
(Sinn von Sein).
[1v] [...]
***
Frbg. 20. Febr. 64
[lr] Dear Herr von Herrmann,
Your dissertation12 manifests a thorough penetration of my works and leaves
many long-held, customary misconceptions behind. To anticipate [this is] what I
said one day before your visit to Herr Tugendhat:13 “The turn is not planned in Being
and Time – such like is impossible – but it is demanded of thought by the guiding
theme of ‘time and being’”. Based on this problematic the decisive questions to
unfold became the explication of being as being from thrownness, and the “noth-
ing”. For this reason, the first thing I looked for in my reading <of your work14> was
to see how these phenomena were treated. You rightfully take note that “thrown-
ness” determines the transcendental in advance, quite differently than the transcen-
dental in the philosophy of Kant. You write of the “conditioned” being of
Dasein – which as such “intensifies” and “strengthens” itself.
This characterization, however, is not phenomenological but an external repre-
sentation and objectification. Thrownness of Dasein, which is defined by the
11
add ed.
12
This pertains to the dissertation of F.-W. von Herrmann, which he had sent to Heidegger. See
Herrmann F.-W. von (1964).
13
Refers to the philosopher Ernst Tugendhat, born 1930, former student of Karl Ulmer, who taught
at the Universities of Tübingen, Heidelberg, and Berlin. His famous Habilitation is entitled, Der
Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger [see Tugendhat E. (1970)].
14
This addition is necessary to the sense of the text.
projecting-open (Entwurf)15 of being – is as such being-thrown into the openness of

being (the meaning of being).
[1v] […]
15
Projecting-open (Entwurf) mostly signifies the enactment of Dasein; in being-historical thought,
however, the word has the meaning of a abground of the refusal or withholding of being (des sich
ent-ziehenden Seins) which throws Dasein into the [open site] of its truth. This is how it is under-
stood, for example, in section 13, paragraph 3, of the Contributions. As such “Entwurf” can be
understood as Dasein’s hermeneutic enactment or as throwing-open and refusal (Wurf und Ent-
wurf) of being itself.
Letter No. 2: Martin Heidegger to von Herrmann (Frbg. 26. XI. 72), ff. 1r-1v
3.2 Martin Heidegger to von Herrmann. Letter No. 2
Frbg. 26. XI. 72

[1r] Lieber Herr v. Herrmann,
vielen Dank für Ihren Brief und den Aufsatz. | Dieser ist für den Außenstehenden –
und wie | Viele von den heutigen Philosophen stehen noch | draußen – kaum zugän-
glich. Denn Sie haben zum | ersten Mal den Zusammenhang dessen klar | und
gründlich herausgestellt, was im Titel | Ihrer Arbeit genannt ist. Es betrifft den ein-
fachen | Sachverhalt, daß alles in S.u.Z. Gesagte (über | Dasein und Existenz) im
Horizont der Frage nach | dem Sein steht. Es braucht vermutlich noch eine | lange
Zeit, bis dies wirklich erkannt und | weitergedacht wird. Was Sie im besonderen |
über die Erschlossenheit schreiben, ist aus-|gezeichnet. –
[1v] Aber heute ist alles auf das „Gesellschaftspolitische‟ | fixiert.
Dr. Pflaumer ist Schüler von Gadamer, den ich am | Mittwoch hier spreche.
Über alles andere mündlich. Ich bitte Sie, mich | am Freitag d. 1. Dez. zwischen
17 u. 18 Uhr zu | besuchen.
Mit herzlichen Grüßen von uns
Ihr
Martin Heidegger
***
Frbg. 26. XI. 72
[lr] Dear Herr von Herrmann,
Many thanks for your letter and the essay.16 For those who stand outside – and
how many contemporary philosophers still stand outside – it will hardly be acces-
sible. For you have, for the first time, clearly and thoroughly explicated the relation
between that which is named by the title of your essay. It pertains to the simple state
of affairs that everything in Sein und Zeit (concerning Dasein and existence) is said
within the horizon of the question of being. Probably a long time will have to pass
before this is truly recognized and elaborated in thought. What you write concern-
ing disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) is especially exceptional. –
[1v] But nowadays everything is fixated on “sociopolitical” matters.
Dr. Pflauner17 is Gadamer’s student,18 I will be talking with him here on
Wednesday. Everything else, verbally. Please visit me on Friday, the 1st of December
between 5 and 6 p.m.
With our heartfelt greetings
your Martin Heidegger
Letter No. 3: Heinrich Heidegger to von Herrmann (St. Blasen, 15. 8. 78)
16
See Herrmann F.-W. von (1972), pp. 198–210.
17
Ruprecht Pflaumer was Gadamer’s student in Heidelberg.
18
Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) was Heidegger’s personal academic assistant in Marburg.
4 Hans-Georg Gadamer and the Farías Affair of 1987 275
3.3 Heinrich Heidegger to von Herrmann. Letter No. 3
St. Blasien, 15. 8. 78

[1r] Sehr geehrter Herr Professor v. Herrmann,
Ich darf in aller Kürze Ihnen antworten | auf Ihre telefonische Anfrage. Die
Schrift-|texte, die Prof. Welte vorschlug, waren folgende: | Psalm 130 “Aus den
Tiefen ...” und | Mt 7, 7–11 “Bittet, so wird ...”
Die Gesamtausgabe macht ja gute Fortschritte!
Ich hatte nicht mit dieser Schnelligkeit | gerechnet.
Mit herzlichen Grüßen
Ihr
Heinrich Heidegger
***
St. Blasen, 15. 8. 78
[1r] Esteemed Professor von Herrmann,
In response to your question over the telephone let me very briefly respond. The
passages Professor Welte19 suggested are the following: Psalm 130:1 [Geneva, 1599
(B.R., trans.)]: “Out of the deep places have I called unto thee, O Lord” and Matthew
7: 7–11: “Ask, and it shall be given you: seek, and ye shall find...”
The Complete Edition is indeed making good progress!
I had not expected such celerity.
With my heartfelt greetings,
Your
Heinrich Heidegger20
4 Hans-Georg Gadamer and the Farías Affair of 1987
Our objective now is to consider more closely the position taken by the philosopher
Hans-Georg Gadamer in defence of his teacher after he made the decision in 1987
not to leave Farías’ insults unanswered. For the instrumentalization of “Heidegger”
19
Bernhard Welte (1906–1983), Professor of Christian Philosophy at the University of Freiburg as
of 1952. In accordance with Heidegger’s wishes, Welte delivered the funeral oration at Heidegger’s
graveside. See Gedenkschrift der Stadt Meßkirch an ihren Sohn und Ehrenbürger Professor Martin
Heidegger [Commemoration of the City of Meßkirch for Its Son and Honorary Citizen Professor
Martin Heidegger]; see Welte B. (1977). Bernhard Welte and Martin Heidegger agreed to the read-
ing of two passages from the German translation of the Vulgate at the latter’s funeral, these being:
Psalm 130:1 and Matthew 7:7–11.
20
Heinrich Heidegger (born 1928) Catholic priest and dean, is the younger son of Fritz Heidegger
(1894–1980), the brother of the philosopher. He conducted the funeral services for Martin
Heidegger in accordance with Catholic ritual.
took its impetus from Farías’ inventions to generate the “Heidegger Case”, which
continues down to the present time. The elaboration of these accusations concerning
Heidegger’s entanglement in National Socialism became the basis of many interpre-
tations far removed from a balanced critical judgment on the actual content of
Heidegger’s works. After a time, the hectic search for “solid evidence” to substanti-
ate Farías’ claims became the primary goal of certain experts. The effort of travel-
ling the high road of being-historical thinking “was” and “is” inaccessible to them.
History repeats itself, for even if the “key figures” of this repetitive instrumentaliza-
tion seize upon new formulations which they derive from others, one thing remains
constant: incapable of generating and supporting theses of their own, these experts
nonetheless succeed in producing a “huge uproar” in the mass media. And all this
solely on the basis of their “superficial” reading of the texts. To follow this strategy
amounts to abandoning Heidegger’s thought and every possibility of a new incep-
tion of European thinking.
Presented below the reader will find three letters from Gadamer to von Herrmann,
dated as follows: November 30, 1987, January 27 and April 11, 1988. Commentary
would be superfluous since Gadamer expresses himself directly, without circumlo-
cution. Despite the temptation to explicate certain passages, I trust that the reader
will be able to orient himself or herself in the text to arrive at unexpected insights,
as is indeed the case whenever the writer of these lines takes up these documents.
Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to offer a few clarifications regarding French
philosopher François Fédier, whom Gadamer mentions in his letter of November
1987. The publication of Farías’ book had called forth a great variety of reactions.
Despite his poor health, Gadamer undertook to relativize the effects this book pro-
duced, especially since he denies that Heidegger “possessed any political compe-
tence”. This disturbing situation is very burdensome for Gadamer. Nevertheless, he
made every effort to communicate his position, be it privately in writing to von
Herrmann, or be it publicly upon various occasions.
The conclusion of the first letter is revealing:
“Heidegger’s errors and weaknesses were probably no other and no greater than those any-
one else would be liable to fall into in such an exposed situation. To have to talk about this
is always somewhat hypocritical, and I hate this. So I am quite unhappy to have to break my
previous practice of reserved silence. Unfortunately, it has also been very damaging to my
health”.
Of another kind and quality, although not in respect to its actual content, is the
engagement of François Fédier, who worked together with Jean Beaufret in the
wake of the publication of Sartre’s L’Être et le néant to make Heidegger’s thought
known in France. François Fédier, to whom Heidegger had assigned the responsibil-
ity of the French edition of his work, played a decisive role, based on his previous
direct contact with the German philosopher, in opposing Farías. Fédier could not
remain unaware of Heidegger’s discomfort, having been driven into isolation by the
National Socialists, to find himself threatened by an investigative committee of
denazification shortly after the capitulation. In Fédier, Farías’s book found a
decisive opponent, and his position hardened21 as he became aware that the press
followed preconceived and completely unjustified opinions such as those of
Emmanuel Faye.
In an attempt to distract from the morbid attention directed toward Heidegger,
Gadamer gives Farías’ poorly-supported insults little notice. For his part, taking up
the responsibility to refuse to leave the field to such critics, Fédier attacks quite
openly. Gadamer’s comment may be understood in this context: “I am greatly con-
cerned that M. Fédier’s examination and precise presentation of the prejudices and
the hatefulness communicated by M. Farías will achieve a totally unwelcome
effect”.
To summarize: Heidegger’s contemporaries – such as Gadamer, Fédier, and von
Herrmann – intervene in one way or another, not to the end of defending Heidegger,
but rather to expose a serious distortion of history that had been staged to the despite
of the philosopher. Over and beyond all these considerations, Gadamer is in all
likelihood correct in his evaluation, as recorded in a letter of January 27, 1988, to
von Herrmann: “In your position, and as an associate of the family, I would, all in
all, be right confident that the entire affair will pass without damage to the philo-
sophical appreciation and influence of a great thinker. In the final analysis, a man
such as Heidegger is not dependant on the approval of dummies or the so-called
masses”.
21
The compelling arguments of the French philosopher F. Fédier are recorded in Heidegger:
Anatomie d’un scandale [see Fédier F. (1988)] and Regarder voir [see Fédier F. (1995), pp. 83–117
and pp. 223–244]. See Heidegger M. (1995).
Letter No. 1: Gadamer to von Herrmann (Heidelberg, Nov. 30, 1987), f. 1



4.1 Gadamer to von Herrmann. Letter No. 1
Heidelberg, 30. November 1987

[1] Verehrter Herr von Herrmann,
Sie glauben gar nicht, wie mich die Angelegenheit Farias | aufregt. Natürlich
könnten wir uns22 in der überlegenen Haltung | fühlen, daß dieses oberflächliche und
miserable Buch für | deutsche Leser im Grunde nichts Neues enthält, jedenfalls |
nichts, was man gegen Heidegger ausspielen kann. Aber die | Wirklichkeit der
Massenmedien nötigt einen, aus der bisher | befolgten Reserve, soweit ich selbst in
Frage komme, heraus-|zutreten. Der Rieseneffekt, den das Buch von Farias in
Frank-|reich macht, zeigt eben, daß man so oberflächlich in der Welt | mit den
Dingen umgeht, und hier liegt doch auch ein Versäumnis | der deutschen Freunde in
Frankreich vor. In Wahrheit schrieb | ich in diesem Sinne an Fédier 23. Aber er scheint
das nicht so | zu sehen. Man kann in gewissem Sinne sagen, daß wir Deutschen, |
insbesondere ich selbst, uns ähnlich verhalten haben, indem24 | wir die ‘politische
Verirrung’ mit ein paar bedauernden Worten | abtaten25 und möglichst26 dem Denker
und27 seinen Fragen | sich zuwandten. Das tat aber in Deutschland keinen Schaden,
| oder nur geringen. Denn hier hat es seit langem einen Infor-|mationsstrom gege-
ben, auch einfach aus eigenem Wissen, wie | man in einem totalitären Lande lebte
und wie man Kritik an | einer herrschenden Ideologie allein betreiben konnte. So |
durfte man in Deutschland eigentlich keine nochmalige Wirkung28 | des Buches von
Farias erwarten.
Aber ich bin skeptisch geworden. Die modernen Massenmedien | sind unersät-
tlich und wissen auch Bedürfnisse zu erzeugen, | wo keine bestehen, und vollends,
wenn das Ausland bereits | in Rage ist.
So habe ich nach dem Studium des Buches keinen anderen Weg | mehr gesehen,
als die Sache gründlicher anzupacken. Das ist [2] nun freilich ein ebenso heikles
wie schwieriges Unternehmen. | Natürlich29 ist das alles Unsinn, wenn man etwa die
Stilgebung | von ‘Sein und Zeit’ als Pränazismus interpretiert. Leider hat | uns aber
die Weltgeschichte genau30 solche Schlüsse suggeriert. | Die ebenso verzweifelte
wie doch auch lebensvolle Zeit der | zwanziger Jahre ist zugleich ein Stück
Lebenszeit in der Ent-|stehung der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung gewesen. Die
| enthusiastischen Erwartungen eines Teils der Jugend und der | jüngeren
Intelligenzschichten war damals nicht so gänzlich ver-|schieden von dem, was
22
uns corr ed ] und Gad.
23
Fédier Gad2 ] Fedier Gad.
24
indem ] in dem Gad • in-dem Gad2.
25
abtaten Gad2 ] abtat Gad.
26
und möglichst corr ed ] und möglichst und möglichst Gad.
27
und Gad2 ] uns Gad.
28
nochmalige Wirkung corr ed ] nochmaligeWirkung Gad.
29
Natürlich corr ed ] Natrülich Gad.
30
genau corr ed ] genaus Gad.
Heidegger und seine Freiburger Freunde | auf dem Gebiete des Universitätslebens
sich erhofften.
So töricht31 das auch in dem Buch herauskommt, durch die Iden-|tifikation mit
dem Röhm-Putsch,32 wird suggeriert33, daß Heidegger | eine Revolution dieses
Stiles anstrebte, sozusagen mit Waffen-|gewalt. Das ändert aber nichts daran, daß
das tatsächliche Ein-|greifen34 Hitlers auf der Seite der Reichswehr und der SS
gegen | die SA in den Augen Heideggers eine Art Verrat an seiner eigenen35 |
Revolution war. So ungern man das hören mag, die schrecklichen | Vereinfachungen
von Farias treffen da einen richtigen Punkt. | Er war von der bürokratischen
Erstarrung des geistigen Lebens | unter Hitler zutiefst enttäuscht. All dem habe ich
in dem | beigelegten Text meiner 36 Antwort auf das Buch Ausdruck gegeben. | Ich
konnte nicht anders, als jetzt die Sache so darstellen, | wie ich sie seit Jahrzehnten
sehe. Ob das jetzt Gutes oder | Schlechtes oder gar nichts bewirken37 wird, weiß ich
nicht. | Meine einzige Hoffnung ist, daß sich der Fall Heidegger zum | Anlaß aus-
weiten wird, das Phänomen des Nationalsozialismus | nicht länger aus der
Vulgärperspektive anzusehen und immer | nur das Verbrecherische38 seiner
Ausartungen (und39 insbesondere | die der gewissenlosen Fortsetzung eines ver-
lorenen Krieges) zu40 | sehen.
Bei der Lage der Dinge muß ich voraussehen, daß die Sache in | der deutschen
Öffentlichkeit immer weiter diskutiert wird, und | ich bin nicht all zu zuversichtlich,
daß es mir gelingen könnte, | eine tiefere Auffassung herbeizuführen41. Den42 Begriff
des Irrtums [3] und der Verirrung kann man zunächst in dem Sinne verstehen, | daß
Heidegger keine politische Kompetenz besaß. Sodann aber | auch in dem Sinne, daß
die deutsche Geschichte dieser Zeit | sich wahrhaft verirrt hat und in ein Unheil
führte, daß43 die | heute lebende Generation überhaupt nicht mehr verstehen kann. |
Ich habe große Sorgen, daß Herr Fédier44 mit seiner Prüfung | und durchaus richti-
gen Schilderung der Voreingenommenheit und | einer gewissen Gehässigkeit von
Herrn Farias eine ganz uner-|wünschte Wirkung erzielt. Die vielen kleinen Bosheiten
und | Oberflächlichkeiten des Buches sind zwar wirklich kläglich. | Aber wer so
31
töricht ] tör icht Gad • tör-icht Gad2.
32
Röhm-Putsch, Gad2 ] Röhm-Putsch Gad.
33
suggeriert corr ed ] suggriert Gad.
34
Eingreifen Gad2 ] eingreifen Gad.
35
seiner eigenen Gad2 ] seine eigene Gad.
36
meiner Gad2 ] meine Gad.
37
bewirken ] bew irken Gad • bew-irken Gad2.
38
Verbrecherische Gad2 ] Verbrecherrische Gad.
39
Ausartungen (und Gad2 ] Ausartungen und Gad.
40
Krieges) zu Gad2 ] Krieges) zu Gad.
41
herbeizuführen Gad2 ] herbeiführt Gad.
42
Den Gad2 ] Der Gad.
43
daß Gad2 ] das Gad.
44
Fédier Gad2 ] Fedier Gad.
etwas liest, findet das alles ohne Gewicht, ver-|glichen mit der nach wie vor lasten-
den Frage, die ich nicht | so sehr als Frage in Bezug auf Heidegger kenne,45 als eine
Frage | in Bezug46 auf das deutsche Volk als Staatsvolk, das seinen | Schicksalsweg
damals verfehlt hat.
Wenn ich allein an all die mir wohlbekannten Männer denke, | die damals mit
Heideggers Rektorat zusammenarbeiteten – sie | alle haben die Schrecklichkeiten
wahrlich nicht gewollt, die | für uns und die Welt schließlich47 dabei
herauskamen.48
Ich fürchte sehr, daß die Öffentlichkeit einfach noch nicht | reif ist, hier zu einem
besseren Verständnis zu gelangen. | Die Fehler und Schwächen von Heidegger sind
vermutlich keine | anderen und keine größeren, als jeder andere Mensch in expo-
|nierten Lagen zu begehen in Gefahr ist. Davon reden zu müssen, | ist immer etwas
pharisäerhaft,49 und ich hasse das. So bin ich | recht unglücklich, daß ich meine
bisher befolgte Reserve nicht | weiter aufrechterhalten50 kann. Leider setzt es mir
auch gesund-|heitlich sehr zu. Ich bin nach meiner Erkrankung51 durchaus noch |
nicht von der alten Frische und Elastizität und bin recht be-|kümmert.
Mit den besten Grüßen
Ihr
HGGadamer
***
Heidelberg, Nov. 30, 1987.
[l] Esteemed Herr von Herrmann,
You will hardly believe how much the matter of Farías disturbs me. Of course,
we could hold fast to the superior attitude that this superficial and miserable book
contains nothing new for the German reader, or, in any case, nothing that can be
used against Heidegger. But the power of the mass media forces one, and speaking
for myself, forces me to abandon my previous reserve. The gigantic influence of
Farías’ book in France goes to show how superficially these matters are treated, and
in this respect friends of Germany in France have also missed opportunities. In fact,
I pointed this out to Fédier. But it seems that he does not see it this way. In a certain
sense, we can say that we Germans – and I myself, in particular – behaved in a simi-
lar way inasmuch as we brushed aside this “political error” with a few apologetic
words and advised attention to the thinker and his questions. In Germany this did no
harm, or very little. For here there has been a long tradition – or simply one’s own
45
kenne, Gad2 ] kenne Gad.
46
Bezug corr ed ] bezug Gad.
47
Welt schließlich Gad2 ] Weltschließlich Gad.
48
herauskamen corr ed ] herauskam Gad.
49
pharisäerhaft, Gad2 ] pharisäerhaft Gad.
50
aufrechterhalten ] Aufrecht erhalten Gad • aufrecht-erhalten Gad2.
51
Erkrankung corr ed ] ERkrankung Gad.
experience – of how one has to live in a totalitarian society and to what extent it is
possible to critique a dominant ideology. As such, one would expect that Farías’
book ought not to have a recurrent effect in Germany.
But I have become more sceptical. The modern mass media is insatiable and
knows how to generate needs where none exist; and all more when foreign countries
are already in an uproar.
For this reason, having worked through the book, I no longer saw any other
option than to thoroughly confront the issue. [2] Clearly this is a delicate and diffi-
cult undertaking. Of course it’s pure nonsense, for example, to interpret the style of
Being and Time as a preliminary exercise in Nazism. Unfortunately, world history
suggests precisely such conclusions. The period of the 1920s, both in its despair and
in its creativity, was in part also the period of the formation of the National Socialist
movement. The enthusiastic expectations of a portion of the youth and of the
younger intelligentsia at that time were not entirely different from the hopes of
Heidegger and his friends in Freiburg regarding university life.
As somewhat erroneously and ineptly formulated in this book, it is suggested that
Heidegger identified with the Röhm putsch and supported a revolution in this style,
carried out, so to speak, by force of arms. This doesn’t change the fact that Hitler’s
intervention on the side of the Reichswehr and the SS against the SA was indeed,
from Heidegger’s perspective, a kind of betrayal of his own revolution. As unwill-
ingly as we like to hear this, at least in this respect the terrible simplifications of
Farías hit the target. Heidegger was profoundly disappointed by the bureaucratic
calcification of spiritual life under Hitler. In the attached text of my response to
Farías’ book, I have given expression to all of this.52 I could do no other than to pres-
ent the issues as I have observed them for decades. Whether this will now effect
matters for good or ill, or not at all, I cannot say. My only hope is that the Heidegger
Case will become the occasion to no longer see the phenomenon of National
Socialism in such a common, simplified perspective, emphasizing only the criminal-
ity of its perversions, and in particular, the conscienceless continuation of a lost war.
Given the character of the situation, I must anticipate that the issue will continue
to be publicly discussed; and I am not at all confident that I could succeed in bring-
ing about a more profound understanding. Heidegger’s confusion and his errors
could be understood – in the first instance – to reflect Heidegger’s lack of political
competence. However, there is also the sense that German history of this period had
truly taken an erroneous path, leading to such a disaster as the contemporary genera-
tion can hardly understand. I am greatly concerned that M. Fédier’s examination
and precise presentation of the prejudices and the hatefulness communicated by
M. Farías will achieve a totally unwelcome effect. The maliciousness and the super-
ficiality of this book are truly miserable. But reading this, one will find it without
great significance in comparison with a burdensome question, now as then, which is
not so much a question about Heidegger, as it is the question concerning the German
people as a state-founding people that was unable to find its destiny at that time.
52
This refers to a still unpublished typescript of four pages by Gadamer.
When I think of all the well-known persons who worked with Heidegger in his
function as Rector – none of them, in truth, desired those horrific consequences,
which followed for us and the world.
I am very much afraid that public is simply still not mature enough to come to a
riper understanding of this matter. Heidegger’s errors and weaknesses were proba-
bly no other and no greater than those anyone else would be liable to fall into in such
an exposed situation. To have to talk about this is always somewhat hypocritical,
and I hate this. So I am quite unhappy to have to break my previous practice of
reserve and silence. Unfortunately, it has also been very damaging to my health. In
consequence of my illness, I have by no means recovered my former energy and
resilience and am quite distressed.
With my best wishes
yours truly
HGGadamer
Letter No. 2: Gadamer to von Herrmann (Heidelberg, January 27, 1988), f. 1

Letter No. 2: Gadamer to von Herrmann (Heidelberg, January 27, 1988), f. 2

4.2 Gadamer to von Herrmann: Letter No. 2
Heidelberg, 27. Januar 1988

[1] Verehrter Herr von Herrmann,
Von meiner Reise aus Italien bin ich zurück und finde hier | Berge von Post vor.
In Neapel hatte ich bei zwei offiziellen | Präsentationen53 von Neuerscheinungen zu
fungieren (das ist | eine italienische Sitte, die von den Verlagen organisiert | und von
den Kultureinrichtungen ausgeführt wird.) Im vor-|liegenden Falle war das eine die
italienische Übersetzung | von Heideggers ‘Wegmarken’, die ich zu würdigen hatte.
Das | zweite war die italienische Übersetzung meines eigenen Büch-|leins
“Heideggers Wege”, bei dem ich gewürdigt wurde, aber auch | kurz antworten
mußte. Zweimal habe ich also schon wieder | mich äußern müssen und konnte fest-
stellen, daß zwar die Massen-|medien auch in Italien dem französischen ‘Vorbild’54
folgen, | daß es aber sonst dort anders aussieht. Was ein totalitärer | Staat ist, hat man
dort noch nicht ganz vergessen, und daß | ein Denker wie Heidegger in jedem Falle
eine säkulare Er-|scheinung bleibt, ist dort den Leuten durchaus klar.
Inzwischen erwartet mich bei meiner Rückkehr nun auch etwas | in Deutschland,
nämlich die Begegnung mit Derrida und einem | seiner jüngeren Kollegen aus
Straßburg, die am 5. Februar | in der Heidelberger Universität stattfinden soll. Da
werden | wir kaum über die politischen Albernheiten zu reden haben, | sondern ich
hoffe, daß es eine philosophische Auseinander-|setzung wird. Aber auch eine solche
wird eine schwierige Sa-|che. Erstens ist mein Französisch nicht gut genug, um
einen | Schriftsteller so hohen Grades immer genau verstehen zu kön-|nen (und
meine Ohren auch nicht). Dazu kommt aber, daß Derri-|da in Wahrheit überhaupt
kein Verhältnis zur deutschen Kultur | hat, auch von mir wohl nie wirklich Kenntnis
genommen hat, | sondern immer nur an Ricoeur55 oder Heidegger denkt, den er |
‘links zu überholen’ sucht.
[2] Nun immerhin, das wird einen philosophischen Gehalt haben | hoffe ich.
Falls nicht die akademische Öffentlichkeit, die | dabei unvermeidlich ist, die Sache
umfunktioniert. Ich kenne | in dieser Sache die Heidelberger Stimmung nicht. Aber
da | Dummheit die Welt regiert, muß man skeptisch sein.
Es wird immer nur mit großem Widerstreben sein, daß ich mich | zu einer
öffentlichen Stellungnahme bereit finde. Die fran-|zösische Veröffentlichung ist
sehr verkürzt wiedergegeben, | wie man leicht feststellen kann. Doch ist jetzt sowohl
eine | französische wie eine italienische Buchveröffentlichung über | den ganzen
Fall zu erwarten, in der wenigstens ein ungekürzter | Abdruck meiner Stellungnahme
zu lesen sein wird. Aber natür-|lich beherrschen die französischen Autoren das Feld.
Immerhin | habe ich mir meinen Brief an Sie noch einmal vorgeholt, um | über Ihre
Anregung nachzudenken, meine Stellungnahme noch zu | erweitern. Vielleicht
bietet sich ein zwingender Anlaß.
53
Präsentationen Gad2 ] Präsitationen Gad.
54
‘Vorbid’ corr ed ] ‘Vorbid’, Gad.
55
Ricoeur corr ed ] Riceour Gad.
Ich möchte aber doch um Verständnis bitten, wie schwierig das | Ganze für mich
ist. Ich habe zwar mit Heidegger ein Vertrauens-|verhältnis gehabt, das kein Thema
bewußt vermied. Es war aber | umgekehrt nicht meine Gewohnheit, in den
Gesprächen mit Hei-|degger meinerseits Fragen zu stellen. So weiß ich über gar |
nichts Bescheid, was Sie oder etwa die Familie aus privatem | Umgang wissen. Es
würde mir sehr viel daran liegen, bevor ich | genötigt bin, mich etwa öffentlich zu
dem “Fall” zu äußern, | einmal zwanglose Gespräche über die Sachen zu führen. Ich
| bin ja froh, wenn man mir meinen guten Willen nicht in Ver-|dacht zieht, vermute
aber, daß doch Vieles, gerade auch bei | Nahestehenden, Anstoß erregt, was ich
geschrieben habe.
Nun, meine italienischen56 Stellungnahmen betreffen natürlich | auch nicht den
“Fall”, sondern die Philosophie Heideggers | und sind auch durch ihre Adresse mit-
bestimmt. Im ganzen würde | ich aber an Ihrer Stelle und ebenso als Angehöriger
der Fa-|milie recht zuversichtlich sein, daß die ganze Affäre für die57 | philoso-
phische58 Würdigung und Wirkung eines großen Denkers | ohne Schaden bleibt.
Schließlich ist ein Mann wie Heidegger | nicht auf den Beifall von Dummköpfen
oder der sogenannten Massen | angewiesen.
Danke für die Jahresgabe, die meine nächste Lektüre sein wird
Ihr HGGadamer
***
Heidelberg, January 27, 1988.
[1] Esteemed Herr von Herrmann,
I am back from my trip to Italy and I find stacks of mail awaiting me here. In
Naples I had to officiate at two public presentations of new releases – this is an
Italian custom organized by the press and carried out by cultural institutions. In this
case, it was first of all a matter of my contribution to the celebration of the Italian
translation of Heidegger’s Wegmarken;59 and the second matter was the Italian
translation of my own little book, Heidegger’s Ways.60 I was the guest of honor, but
I also had to give a short speech. Two times, then, I have to express myself again and
I could tell that although the mass media in Italy also follow the French “model”,
yet in other matters things are different there. One has not entirely forgotten what a
dictatorship is, and in any case, it is fully clear to people that a thinker like Heidegger
will remain a phenomenon of the century.
Meanwhile, with my return to Germany, something also awaits me here – a
meeting with Derrida and a younger colleague from Strasbourg, which is scheduled
56
italienischen Gad2 ] italienische Gad.
57
für die Gad2 ] der Gad.
58
philosophische Gad2 ] philosophischen Gad.
59
60
See Gadamer H.-G. (1994) and Heidegger M. (20032).
for the 5th of February at Heidelberg University.61 On this occasion we hardly need to
talk about political nonsense, and I hope that it will become a philosophical confron-
tation and clarification. But that will be a difficult matter. First of all, my French is not
good enough to always understand a writer of such nuance as Derrida – and my hear-
ing is not that good either. In addition, moreover, Derrida in fact has no knowledge
whatsoever of German culture, has never really paid attention to my work, and rather
always thinks of Ricoeur and Heidegger, whom he seeks to “outflank on the Left”.
[2] Well, nonetheless, the meeting will offer some philosophical content, so I
hope. As long as the academic public, which inevitably will be there, doesn’t repur-
pose the matters at issue. I don’t know the atmosphere in Heidelberg in this regard.
But since stupidity rules the world one is entitled to be sceptical.
It is only with a feeling of great reluctance that I find myself prepared to publicly
take a position. The French-language publication is greatly edited, as one can easily
substantiate. But now a French, as well as an Italian book-length publication on the
entire “case” is to be expected and therein one will be able to read the entire text of
my position on these matters. But of course, French authors dominate the field. In
any event, I have once again reviewed my letter to you and given thought to your
suggestion to expand my position-statement. Perhaps a compelling occasion for this
will come to pass.
I bid you to understand how difficult all this is for me. While I had a relationship
of trust with Heidegger that did not consciously exclude any topic, it was not my
practice to ask questions of Heidegger in the course of our conversations. So, I know
nothing at all of matters that you or the family would know in private dealings with
one another. I would very much value the opportunity to engage in open dialogue
with you concerning such matters before I am compelled to express my thoughts
publicly on this “case.” I would be happy not to have my good will become subject
to suspicion, but I anticipate that there is still much in what I have written that could
cause offence, not least of all for the immediate [family] circle.
Now, my Italian presentations, which were influenced by your address, do not
concern the “case” either, but strictly Heidegger’s philosophy. In your position, and
as an associate of the family, I would, all in all, be right confident that the entire
affair will pass without damage to the philosophical appreciation and influence of a
great thinker. In the final analysis, a man such as Heidegger is not dependant on the
approval of dummies or the so-called masses.
Thank you for the annual issue, which shall be next on my reading list
Yours HGGadamer
The younger colleague from Strasbourg was Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (1940–2007). See
61
Derrida J., Gadamer H.-G., Lacoue-Labarthe Ph. (eds.) (2014).

Letter No. 3: Gadamer to von Herrmann (Heidelberg, April 11, 1988), f. 1

Letter No. 3: Gadamer to von Herrmann (Heidelberg, April 11, 1988), f. 2

4.3 Gadamer to von Herrmann: Letter No. 3
Heidelberg, 11. April 1988

[1] Sehr geehrter Herr von Herrmann,
vielen Dank für Ihr Schreiben mit den guten Nachrichten, | die mich etwas aufat-
men lassen. Meine Erkrankung im vorigen | Herbst hatte doch die unangenehme
Folge, daß ich verschiedene | Verpflichtungen auf dieses Jahr verschieben mußte
und dabei | auf meine geschwächte Arbeitskraft stoße. Doch ich hoffe | schon, alles
uns betreffende leisten zu können. Sehr gern | würde ich das Geleitwort an die
Jahresgabe anschließen;62 | da es bis zum Beginn des Sommers Zeit hat, bin ich
zuversicht-|lich.
Heute schreibe ich vor allem wegen des Husserl-Bandes. Auch | ich bin sehr
beeindruckt von der in diesem Band geleisteten | Arbeit. Aber erlauben Sie mir ein
Wort zu dem Beitrag von Ott. | Ich hatte den Beitrag beinahe als ersten gelesen, weil
ich | nach der Erfahrung in Bochum Schlimmes befürchtete. Ich muß | Ihnen geste-
hen, ich war angenehm enttäuscht. Auch seine Kritik | an dem Buch von Farias, die
mir in die Hände kam, schien mir | ganz vorzüglich. In beiden Fällen bestreite ich
nicht, daß | ein gewisses Hintergrundressentiment zu spüren ist. Die Sache | ist mir
nur zu klar. Ott gehört zu den regional gebundenen | Katholiken, der an Heidegger
ganz zufällig durch seine Archiv-|studien geraten ist und sich da herausgefordet
fühlte. Er | hat ja damit wirklich nicht Unrecht, daß Heidegger den imperia-
|listischen63 Mißbrauch des katholischen Kirchenregiments damals | in Freiburg
seinerseits wirklich gehaßt hat. Bei unserer | Heidelberger Diskussion mit Derrida
usw. wurde in kleinerem | Kreise die interessante Frage gestellt, ob sich Heidegger
| wohl überhaupt in das politische Abenteuer 64 von 1933 einge-|lassen hätte, wenn
er damals nicht in Freiburg, sondern noch | in Marburg geblieben wäre. Auch an
dieser Frage ist etwas | Wahres.
Nun, ich möchte einfach meinen Eindruck Ihnen nicht vorent-|halten. Herr Ott in
Bochum hat mich weniger durch Gehässigkeit [2] gereizt als durch Blindheit und
methodische Torheit. Wie | kann man eine Verteidigungsschrift, wie sie der Anhang
zu | der Rektorratsrede ist, dadurch kritisieren wollen, daß sie | Auslassungen von
Belastendem oder für belastend Gehaltenem65 | enthält. Das ist ein hermeneutischer
Mißgriff des Herrn Ott, | den ich ihm auch deutlich gesagt habe. Weit schlimmer
war | aber das naive Pharisäertum der jüngeren Teilnehmer in Bochum. | Das ist
auch jetzt mein ganzer Kummer bei der Farias-Affäre. | Wie soll eine solche
pharisäische Generation, die in Frank-| reich wie bei uns geradezu gestreichelt
wird,66 die Lagen von | Druck aushalten und bestehen können, die eines Tages auf
sie | zukommen werden.
62
anschließen; Gad2 ] anschließen Gad.
63
imperialistischen Gad2 ] imperalistischen Gad.
64
Abenteuer ] Aben teuer Gad • Aben-teuer Gad2.
65
belastend Gehaltenem Gad2 ] Belastet gehaltenem Gad.
66
wird, Gad2 ] wird Gad.
Was nun den Beitrag von Herrn Ott betrifft, so möchte ich | Sie doch einmal bit-
ten, Ihren eigenen Eindruck von meinem | eigenen her zu überprüfen. Ich habe nach
Ihrem Brief den | Ottschen Beitrag mit Ihren Augen nochmals67 zu lesen gesucht. Es
ist | mir nicht gelungen. Ich fand68 die kurze Seite über den Kon-|flikt mit Husserl
maßvoll. Der Brief an Mahnke ist auf alle | Fälle ein Dokument, das man nicht
zitieren würde, wenn man | gehässig gesinnt wäre. Ferner bitte ich Sie zu beachten,
mit | welchem Takt er das Fehlen Heideggers bei der Beerdigung von69 | Husserl
unausgesprochen gelassen hat. In meinen Augen hat | er auch bei den weiteren
Angaben über die Verwaltungsakte | durchaus nicht den Eindruck zu erwecken
gesucht, als ob | dieselben auf das Schuldkonto von Heidegger gingen. Ich habe da
doch den Eindruck, daß Sie mit einer gewissen Überempfind-|lichkeit indirekte
Belastungen verleumderischer Art vermuten, | die ein unbefangener Leser so nicht
verstehen kann. Schließ-|lich bin ich doch selbst sehr sensibilisiert, und bin so viel |
Schlimmeres70 gewohnt, wenn es sich um üble Nachrede gegen | Heidegger handelt,
daß Herr Ott alles in allem als ein redlicher | Mann erscheint, der nur manchmal
seine wissenschaftliche Red-|lichkeit mit leichten Einfärbungen mischt. Auf alle
Fälle | scheint mir das aber bei ihm im Abklingen zu sein, und ich | bemühe mich
meinerseits, alle Verschärfungen von Spannungen | zu mildern. Bitte verstehen Sie
auch diesen Brief als einen | Beitrag zu diesem Ziele.
Mit den besten Grüßen!
HGGadamer
Heidelberg, April 11, 1988.
[1] Esteemed Herr von Herrmann,
Many thanks for your letter and the good news, which let me relax somewhat.
My illness of last fall had the unfortunate consequence that I had to postpone vari-
ous commitments until this year and now I find myself with a weakened ability to
work. Nonetheless I hope to be able to achieve everything that pertains to the two of
us. I would very much like to write a forward in relation to the annual issue. As it is
not due until the beginning of summer, I am confident [of completing it].
Today I’m writing you, above all, in regard to the Husserl volume. I too am very
impressed by the quality of work in this book. But allow me to say a word about
Ott’s contribution.71 It was among the first that I took up to read, because after my
experience in Bochum I feared the worse. I have to admit that I was pleasantly dis-
appointed. His critique of Farías’ book, which I happened upon, struck me as first-
rate. In both cases, I do not deny that a certain undertone of resentment makes itself
felt. The matter is all too clear. Ott belongs to those regionally bound Catholics who
67
Augen nochmals2 ] Augen Gad.
68
fand corr ed ] fan d Gad.
69
Beerdigung von corr ed ] Beerdigungvon Gad.
70
Schlimmeres Gad2 ] schlimmeres Gad.
71
Hugo Ott (born 1931), Professor Emeritus in Economic History (University of Freiburg), author
of Martin Heidegger. Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie [see Ott H. (1988)].
References 295
came to Heidegger quite accidentally through his archival studies and found himself
challenged by this milieu. He is in fact not wrong to hold that Heidegger hated the
imperial misuse of the Catholic hierarchy in Freiburg at that time. During our
Heidelberg discussion with Derrida and others the interesting question was raised,
in a small circle, if Heidegger would indeed have undertaken the political adventure
of 1933 were he still in Marburg and not, as he was at that time, in Freiburg. The
question gives voice to some insight.
Now, I don’t want to deny you my view of the matter. In Bochum, Ott irritated
me less by his malice [2] than by his blindness and methodological foolishness.
How can one criticize Heidegger’s statement of self-defence, as the Appendix of the
Rector’s Address is, for the omission of incriminating, or what are taken to be
incriminating, statements? This is a hermeneutic misstep on the part of Ott, and I
plainly told him so. But far worse was the naively hypocritical attitude of the
younger participants in Bochum. This is now my chief concern regarding the Farías
affair. How shall such a hypocritical generation, indulged in France as it is here, be
capable of standing steadfast and of overcoming the challenges which one day they
will have to face?
Concerning Ott’s scholarly contribution, I bid you once again to review your
impressions from my perspective. After receiving your letter, I tried to re-read Ott
with your eyes, and I didn’t succeed. I found the short piece on the conflict with
Husserl quite measured. The letter to Mahnke72 is, in any case, not a document one
would want to cite were one of malicious intent. Furthermore, I bid you to take into
consideration the tact that he displays in leaving unspoken Heidegger’s absence at
Husserl’s funeral. In my opinion, his handling of the facts of the administrative file
certainly did not seek to create the impression that these were to be accounted
against Heidegger. I have the distinct impression that influenced by a certain hyper-
sensitivity you intimate indirect defamation and incrimination where a more objec-
tive reader would not. Finally, I have become so attuned, and used to much far worse
in matters of the defamation of Heidegger, so that Ott strikes me, all in all, as an
honest man; only that he sometimes colors his scholarly honesty with subtle inflec-
tions. In any case, it seems to me that in his case these echoes are fading, and for my
part I make the effort to alleviate, not intensify, all such tensions. Please receive this
letter itself as a contribution to this goal.
With best wishes!
HGGadamer
References
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(1988): Heidegger, portée philosophique et politicale de sa pensée. Paris, France: Imec.
Di Cesare, D. (2015). Heidegger & Sons. Eredità e futuro di un filosofo. Turin, Italy: Bollati
Boringhieri.
72
Dietrich Mahnke (1884–1939), philosopher and historian of mathematics, as of 1927 professor
at the University of Marburg, worked on Leibniz.
Fédier, F. (1988). Heidegger: Anatomie d’un scandale. Paris, France: Laffont.

Fédier, F. (1995). Regarder voir. Paris, France: Les Belles Lettres.
Gadamer, H.-G. (1994). Heidegger’s Ways (J. W. Stanley, Trans.). Albany, NY: State University
of New York Press.
Heidegger, M. (1976). Wegmarken. In F.-W. von Herrmann (Ed.), Gesamtausgabe (Abt. 1:
Veröffentlichte Schriften 1910-1976) (Vol. 9, v ed.). Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Vittorio
Klostermann. English Edition: Heidegger, M. (1998). Pathmarks (W. McNeill Ed.). New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1983). Vom Geheimnis des Glockenturms. In H. Heidegger (Ed.), Aus der
Erfahrung des Denkens, in Gesamtausgabe (Abt. 1: Veröffentliche Schriften 1910-1976) (Vol.
13, v ed.). Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Vittorio Klostermann.
Heidegger, M. (1995). Écrits politiques 1933–1996, prés., tr. et notes par F. Fédier. Paris, France:
Gallimard.
Heidegger, M. (20032). Holzwege, In F.-W. von Herrmann (Ed.), Gesamtausgabe (Abt. 1:
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Klostermann. English Edition: Heidegger, M. (2002). Off the beaten track (J. Young &
K. Haynes, Trans.). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ott, H. (1988). Martin Heidegger. In Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie. Frankfurt am Main:
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Trans.). New York: Basic Books.
Stein, E. (1950, 19622, 19863). Endliches und ewiges Sein. In L. Gelber & R. Leuven (Eds),
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Basel, Switzerland/Wien, Austria: Herder.
Stein, E. (2005a). Potenz und Akt. Studien zu einer Philosophie des Seins, Eingeführt und bearbe-
itet von H.R. Sepp, ESGA (10). Freiburg, Germany/Basel, Switzerland/Wien, Austria: Herder.
Stein, E. (2005b2). Selbstbildnis in Briefen III. Briefe an Roman Ingarden, Einleitung von
H.-B. Gerl-Falkovitz, Bearbeitung und Anmerkungen M.A. Neyer, Fußnoten mitbearbeitet von
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English edition: Stein, E. (2014). Self-Portrait in Letters. Letters to Roman Ingarden (The
Collected Works of Edith Stein, 12) (trans.: H.C. Hunt). Washington, DC: ICS Publications.
Stein, E. (2006a). Endliches und ewiges Sein. Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum Sinn des Seins. Anhang:
Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie – Die Seelenburg, Eingeführt und bearbeitet von
A.U. Müller, ESGA (11–12). Freiburg/Basel/Wien, Germany: Herder.
Stein, E. (2006b2). Selbstbildnis in Briefen. II. Zweiter Teil: 1933–1942, Einleitung von H.-B. Gerl-
Falkovitz, Bearbeitung und Anmerkungen M.A. Neyer, 2. Auflage durchgesehen und über-
arbeitet von H.-B. Gerl-Falkovitz, ESGA (3). Freiburg, Germany/Basel, Switzerland/Wien,
Austria: Herder.
Main, Germany: Klostermann. English edition: Trawny, P. (2015). Heidegger and the myth of a
Jewish World Conspiracy (A. J. Mitchell, Trans.). Chicago, IL: University Press.
Tugendhat, E. (1970). Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger. Berlin, Germany: de
Gruyter.
von Herrmann, F.-W. (1964). Die Selbstinterpretation Martin Heideggers. Meisenheim am Glan,
Germany: Anton Hain.
von Herrmann, F.-W. (1972). Zeitlichkeit des Daseins und Zeit des Seins. Grundsätzliches zur
Interpretation von Heideggers Zeit-Analysen. In R. Berlinger & E. Fink (Eds.), Philosophische
Perspektiven. Ein Jahrbuch VI (pp. 198–210). Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Vittorio
Klostermann.
References 297
Vongehr, T. (2008). “Der liebe Meister”. Edith Stein über Edmund und Malvine Husserl.
In D. Gottstein & H. R. Sepp (Eds.), Polis und Kosmos. Perspektiven einer Philosophie
des Politischen und einer philosophischen Kosmologie. Eberhard Avé-Lallement zum 80.
Geburtstag (pp. 272–295). Würzburg, Germany: Königshausen & Neumann.
Welte, B. (1977). Gedenkschrift der Stadt Meßkirch an ihren Sohn und Ehrenbürger Professor
Martin Heidegger. Meßkirch, Germany: H. Schönebeck.
pilogue: The “Jewish Question” in the Black
E
Notebooks in the Perspective of the “Critique
of Metaphysics”
Leonardo Messinese
Introduction
The difficulty that is inherent in the philosophical explication of any given “ques-
tion” originates in the fact that the philosophical approach never possesses a secure
point of departure from which to begin, for philosophy demands that it liberate itself
from its “presuppositions”. And this difficulty only increases with consideration of
the essence of the matter at issue.
This peculiarity or special quality of philosophy may be encountered in its very
inception and its modalities were recognized in the successive epochs of its his-
tory. These different “modes” arise out of the diversity of the specific, fundamental
concepts of philosophy as conceived by different thinkers: one need only think, for
example, of Hegel and Heidegger.
By the same token, the difficulty of understanding genuine philosophical works
also comes into play when philosophy touches on other fields of thought or even
daily life. This quite other difficulty arises because the original distance of “com-
mon sense” from the structure of philosophical concepts is easily forgotten.
Consequently, nomination of different things by the same term causes a kind of
short circuit leading to the false appearance that the philosophical and the non-
philosophical concept designate the same thing.
This state of affairs, furthermore, is the cause of an unavoidable misconception
that always accompanies the dialogue of philosopher and non-philosopher.
Heidegger, for example, expresses his sense of this misconception as follows:
“Yet once philosophizing is expressed, then it is exposed to misinterpretation [...] exposed
to that substantive misinterpretation for which ordinary understanding inevitably falls. For
ordinarily understanding examines everything it finds expressed philosophically as though
it were something present at hand and, especially since it seems to be essential, takes it from
the outset on the same level as the things it pursues every day. It does not reflect upon the
fact and cannot even understand that what philosophy deals with only discloses itself at all
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69496-8
300 Epilogue: The “Jewish Question” in the Black Notebooks in the Perspective…
within and from out of a transformation of human Dasein. Ordinary understanding s truggles
against this transformation of man demanded by every philosophical step on account of a
natural idleness [...]”.1
Heidegger adds that this “natural idleness” of common understanding is some-

thing “in which each of us is caught up and which believes itself to be philosophiz-
ing when it reads and writes about, or argues with, philosophical books”.2 In order
to anticipate possible misunderstanding, Heidegger clarifies that the reason for this
is “does not lie in any lack of perspicacity on the part of the reader, nor in any lack
of readiness to examine what has been presented [...] nor [...] in any lack of incisive-
ness in the interpretation itself, but rather in the ‘natural idleness’ of the ordinary
understanding in which each of us is caught up”.3
This is not the place to show how such “transformations” of our natural attitude
as Heidegger demands are concretely to be brought about. Nor is this the place to
present the specific means by which this transformation comes to determine the
distance between perceptions of common sense “in everyday life”, such as appear
to be essential to common sense, and on the other hand, the “things” as they show
themselves to philosophical knowledge. It suffices to recall Heidegger’s observa-
tions regarding “formal indication” and the “fundamental character of philosophical
concepts”: hence the implied necessity not to treat concepts as “something present-
at-hand”, but rather as directives for the “transformation of our human being”.
Drawing on such observations, I think it important to point out a possible, funda-
mental misconception always lurking in the shadows from the moment one engages
the thought of a philosopher, especially when this thought touches us in our human
being as well as challenging our deepest convictions.
Upon reading the works of some influential experts on the subject of Heidegger’s
Black Notebooks, one comes away with the impression that this kind of “miscon-
ception”, such as always accompanies the communication of philosophers, is indeed
at work, just as Heidegger suspected it would be.
For some 40 years, beginning in 1931, Heidegger’s philosophical authorship and
academic work was accompanied by the composition of the Black Notebooks. The
publication of the first four volumes of the Ponderings within the framework of the
Gesamtausgabe initiated, as is well known, a wide-ranging, international discussion.
Indeed, I would like to note that a substantial part of this debate anticipated the
publication of the volumes in question.
In fact, samples published in the newspapers informed the general public that not
only were these Notebooks unquestionably “anti-Semitic”, but that anti-Semitism
actually constitutes their central theme.
Even were we to assume that the Black Notebooks contain elements of anti-
Semitism it is becoming ever more evident that anti-Semitism is by no means the
“centre” of the Notebooks. Even with the inclusion of “indirect” references to Jews
1
Heidegger M. (1992), § 70, pp. 422–423. English translation, pp. 291–292.
2
See ibid. p. 426. English translation, p. 294.
3
Ibid.
Epilogue: The “Jewish Question” in the Black Notebooks in the Perspective… 301
and Jewry, the culpable passages constitute no more than a minute portion of
Heidegger’s Ponderings and Observations. Our problem consists in determining if
anti-Semitism is pertinent to Heidegger’s philosophy, if it underlies the most signifi-
cant concepts of his thought, and if his works are possibly so contaminated in their
totality that they would have to be excluded from the history of philosophy.
The question whether Heidegger’s thought may rightfully be considered anti-
Semitic, or not, is certainly not new. With the Black Notebooks, this question only
acquired a more extensive public echo than that accorded by his strictly academic
audience. The Black Notebooks became the occasion and pretext of making
Heidegger’s supposed anti-Semitism the central theme of the discussion, while rais-
ing the question if anti-Semitism did not have a greater impact on his thought than
hitherto ascribed to the thinker from Meßkirch.
So, as noted, the issue is to ascertain if the anti-Semitism ascribed to Heidegger
reflects those claims that only touch Heidegger as a person, or if it informs his
thought. Furthermore, we need to clarify whether Heidegger’s philosophy, in its
very structure, is permeated by dubious anti-Semitic thinking.
oncerning Several Interpretations of the Supposed Anti-

C
Semitism of Heidegger’s Thought Before the Publication
of the Black Notebooks
Emmanuel Faye’s well-known, controversial book, The Introduction of National

Socialism into Philosophy, reviews a selection of Heidegger’s publications from
1929 through 1935 that have been held to be directly or indirectly anti-Semitic.4
Let it be clear from the start that it is not my intention to explicate the numerous
passages (and especially not the letters and public speeches of Heidegger’s vast pro-
duction) that supposedly reveal with certainty Heidegger’s so-called anti-Semitism.
I rather intend to consider certain aspects of the question of whether a relation
between Heidegger’s philosophy and anti-Semitic attitudes can at all be substantiated.
With this in mind, we can use Faye’s book as a starting point in order to highlight
the distinction between his interpretations, which he wants to substantiate on the
ground of certain documents, and on the other hand, the actual content of these
interpretations.
The author discusses an excerpt from a letter of Heidegger’s addressed to Privy
Councillor (Geheimrat) Viktor Schwoerer, dated October 2, 1929. In this letter, the
German philosopher makes issue of the necessity of becoming mindful of the fact
“that we are faced with the decision to either find authentic, historically rooted per-
sonnel and educators (bodenständige Kräfte) in the German spirit or to fully deliver
4
See Faye (2005).
[the university] over to advancing Jewification in the wider and in the narrower
sense”.5
As a preliminary note, let me remark that in the Italian translation Verjudung is
rendered as “guidaizzazzione”; as such it emphasizes only the possibly discriminat-
ing sense of the word Heidegger uses, a sense that corresponds to Faye’s other state-
ments. The word Bodenständig, moreover is translated as “provenieti del territorio”
(natives), and thereby the associated connotation of “being rooted in native soil”
which is expressed in the German word, is entirely excised.
Leaving this aside, Heidegger’s reference to “advancing Jewification”, strictly
speaking, pertains to the increasing number of Jewish professors and students in
universities and academic circles.6 In the more comprehensive sense, Faye contin-
ues, the expression denotes “everything for which Heidegger experienced revulsion
to the very end: liberalism, democracy, the ‘epoch of the I’, and subjectivism”.7
Now, if we separate the clarification that Faye offers of the senses of “Jewification”
(in the strict as in the more comprehensive sense) from the interpretation ascribing
pronounced anti-Semitism to Heidegger it becomes clear that the author (perhaps
contrary to his own intention) makes a contribution to the genuine sense of
Heidegger’s attitude as expressed in this word.8 I mean to say that what we may
conclude from Faye’s conception of the meaning of “Jewification” is that it adds
nothing to our understanding of Heidegger’s works: it reflects Heidegger’s critique
of the spiritual and political dimensions of modernity, as of “the metaphysics of
subjectivity” – and nothing else. I will come back to this point later in this essay.
Heidegger’s critique of the modern world, furthermore, can only be properly
understood by refusing to fall back on all the convenient abbreviations that desig-
nate his responses in terms of the exaggerated simplification of the “anti”: Heidegger
was anti-modern, anti-humanist, anti-Semitic, and so on.9
In this regard, Heidegger’s attitude toward the political system of democracy
may serve to clarify his critical attitudes. In the famous Spiegel interview, published
in accordance with his will in 1976, shortly after his death (it was conducted ten
years earlier), Heidegger claims that “the planetary movement of modern technicity
is a power whose magnitude in determining our historicity can hardly be overesti-
mated. For me today it is a decisive question as to how any political system – and
5
Ibid. p. 60. English translation, p. 34 (mod. B.R.). In the corresponding footnote the original
sources as well as those of the French translation are noted. See also Sieg (1989), p. 50.
6
In this regard, Rüdiger Safranski mentions a concept, conceived by Sebastian Haffner, which was
widely used at this time: “the anti-Semitism of the competitive (academic) market”. See Safranski
(1994), p. 299.
7
Faye (2005), p. 61. English translation, p. 34 (mod. B.R.).
8
In his book, Faye constantly relies on the assumption that Heidegger fully supported National
Socialism and its anti-Semitic policies; response to this would require a separate study.
9
In this regard, Heidegger’s observations on all such positions of thought as contend in the name
of the “anti” should be taken into consideration: “The ‘anti’ always thinks in terms of that to which
it is opposed, to which it is ‘anti’”. See Heidegger (1982b), p. 77. English translation, pp. 52–53.
which one – can be adapted to an epoch of technicity. I know of no answer to this

question. I am not convinced that it is democracy”.10
A little further on in this interview Heidegger explains more precisely that the
question of democracy – whether or not it could offer a path that “corresponds” to
the essence of technology (a question to which he did not know the answer) – is
more of an ethical than a political question.11 These observations correspond to
those he left us concerning features of modernity determined by the essence of tech-
nology and humanity’s inability to master it. “Of himself man cannot master” tech-
nicity. Although subject to the illusion that he controls and dominates this power, in
fact he himself is “posed, enjoined, and challenged” by it.12
David Patterson, an American scholar teaching at the University of Dallas, is
probably less known than many Heidegger critics regarding the “Jewish question”.
In an essay of 1999,13 he offers a harsh assessment of Heidegger’s thought, along
with a substantial part of Western philosophy as such, giving special regard to
German philosophy (Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger).14
The fundamental theme of the author is that these philosophers achieve the “con-
summation” of a way of thought that excises Abraham and the god of Abraham
from human life. He furthermore claims that this philosophical tradition bears sub-
stantial responsibility for the holocaust.
“The history of a major current in Western thought is the history of a struggle to eliminate
Abraham and the god of Abraham from human life. Therefore the Holocaust happened not
despite but, in part, because of Western civilization, as European philosophy has shaped it.
It came not in a breakdown of philosophy but, in part, as its consummation. And at the peak
of its consummation stood the Nazi Martin Heidegger”.15
According to Patterson, antagonism towards Jews and Judaism originated in the

historical complicity of numerous philosophers (not just Heidegger): one need only
consider aspects of the philosophies of Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche.16 Furthermore,
consider the fact that in 1940 almost half of all German professional philosophers,
as members of the NSDAP, were divided among themselves into competing groups
all set upon achieving supremacy in the National Socialist movement.17
In this perspective, Heidegger appears to Patterson to be the central figure, as
evoked by the context of interpretation offered by Levinas’ Totality and Infinity,
precisely because of the “priority” that Being and Time assigns to “ontology” over
10
Heidegger M. (2000c), p. 668. English translation, p. 55 (mod. B.R.).
11
See ibid. p. 669. English translation, pp. 55–56.
12
13
See Patterson D. (1999), pp. 148–171.
14
Patterson draws on sources whose chief representative is Emil L. Fackenheim – see Fackenheim
E.L. (1973). Patterson has devoted a study to the thought of the “last German-Jewish philosopher”.
See Patterson D. (2008).
15
Patterson D. (1999), p. 151.
16
17
See ibid. p. 156.
ethics.18 Consider this citation from the work of Levinas, cited here, which offers
substantial support for Patterson’s thesis:
“To affirm the priority of Being over the existent is to already decide the essence of philoso-
phy; it is to subordinate the relation with someone, who is existent (the ethical relation) to
a relation with the Being of the existent, which, impersonal, permits the apprehension, the
domination of the existent (a relationship of knowing), subordinates justice to freedom [...].
The relation with being that is enacted as ontology consists in neutralizing the existent in
order to comprehend or grasp it”.19
Levinas claims that the fateful consequence of this kind of attitude, “which sub-
ordinates the relationship with the Other to the relation with Being in general” leads
to “imperialist domination, to tyranny”.20 Patterson fully agrees with this hermeneu-
tic reading of Being and Time and its consequences.
In consequence of the primacy of being (as Levinas says), Patterson argues that
Heidegger’s philosophy is ruled by a “Greek-Christian prejudice” which posits “the
Other as Being.” As Lyotard already remarked, this manner of thinking has no rela-
tion to another, Jewish way of thought according to which “the Other is the Law”.21
What Heidegger subsequently has to say concerning “Volk”, Führer” and “Kampf”
is founded in the fundamental ontological structure of Heidegger’s thought22 and this
prevented him from taking a critical stance against the moral perversity of National
Socialism23:
“Indeed, if, according to Heidegger, the substance and good of human being lie in the com-
prehension of Being and not in the care for the life of our fellow human being – if the inter-
est is in freedom and not in justice, in what is and not what is lawful – then the only grounds
for criticizing any ideology are ontological and not moral grounds”.24
I chose to touch on these evaluations of the American scholar for two reasons: (1)
as a reminder that the question of Heidegger’s anti-Semitism predates the publica-
tion of the Black Notebooks25; and (2) to show how completely inadequate it is to
raise this question in the context of Heidegger’s “philosophical thought” and to use
this point of departure as the proper entrance into the reading of Heidegger.
Even if this point of departure is combined with incomprehension of the funda-
mental concepts of Heidegger’s philosophy (Dasein, being, freedom, destiny, fate,
and so on) one can still, quite conveniently, castigate Heidegger’s thought for
18
19
Levinas E. (2012), p. 36. English translation, pp. 45–46.
20
Ibid. p. 38. English translation, pp. 46–47.
21
Patterson D. (1999), p. 160; See Lyotard J.F. (1988).
22
See Patterson D. (1999), p. 160.
23
See ibid. p. 161
24
Ibid. pp. 161–162.
25
At this point let us only take note of later contributions to this discussion: Sheehan T. (1990),
pp. 30–44; Caputo J.D. (1992), pp. 265–281; Bursztein A. (2004), pp. 325–336; Hammerschlag
S. (2005), pp. 371–398.
having violated moral precepts, along with holy religion, and go on to raise the
accusation against countless other philosophers.
Patterson rejects Tom Rockmore’s solution to the problem of the supposed ethi-
cal weakness of Heidegger’s philosophy (return to the Enlightenment, represented
by the philosophy of Kant)26 as inadequate; for regarding the primacy of ontology,
which is the root of all evil in Heidegger, Patterson responds as follows to indicate
what should be set against this priority:
“The Enlightenment philosophy of Kant cannot be held up as a response to Heidegger
because [...] it led to Heidegger. What must be opposed to Heidegger is precisely the Jewish
metaphysics that the Nazis opposed: not the autonomy of the self but the sanctity of the
other, not the universal maxims of reason but the uncompromising commandments of God,
not freedom but justice”.27
In the final analysis, what Patterson has to tell us is that under the influence of
philosophy such as omits to think the image of God in mankind, and with the turn
of our finite being away from the infinite (for which philosophy bears the primary
responsibility, according to Patterson) all ethics is abolished to give free rein to the
most abominable actions, culminating in the holocaust of the Jews.28
In this fashion, however humane and noble the motives may be that led Patterson
to attack Heidegger and the chief representatives of German philosophy, Patterson
has perhaps unintentionally erected a wall between religion and philosophy. None
of this is particularly helpful in our attempt to understand purely “conceptual” or
historical events in their complexity.29
Being-Historical Anti-Semitism: Peter Trawny’s Thesis
Let us continue our investigation by considering several studies that draw on pas-
sages in the Black Notebooks touching on Jewish matters to trace the presence of
anti-Semitism in Heidegger’s thought as a whole, based on a renewed scrutiny of his
philosophy.
As a valid point of departure, let us take the opinions of the editor of the first four
volumes of these works, Peter Trawny, who supplemented his function as editor
with commentary and a series of essays and scholarly contributions. These texts are
26
See Rockmore T. (1992), pp. 237–238.
27
Patterson D. (1999), p. 164.
28
Ibid. pp. 152–153: “This assault on the divine image of the human being was conceived by phi-
losophers and carried out by the SS. First conceptual and then actual, it is an assault on divinity,
humanity, and the people chosen to attest to the divine closeness of every human being”.
29
In this regard, it is worth noting that Patterson’s more recent work proposes to investigate the
“metaphysical origins” of anti-Semitism and its relation to the human danger of succumbing to the
temptation “to become as gods”: See Patterson D. (2015). In this book, Patterson again recurs to a
discussion of modern philosophy (see ibid. pp. 107–134) and Heidegger in the context of National
Socialism (see ibid. pp. 135–146).
intended to defend and clarify his primary thesis – the thesis of Heidegger’s “being-
historical anti-Semitism”. Let us begin with this passage: “The concept of being-
historical anti-Semitism is in no way intended to signify a highly elaborated or
sophisticated form of anti-Semitism. Basically, Heidegger relies upon widely-
known forms. However, he gave these a philosophical, that is to say, a being-
historical interpretation”.30
With this reference to “being-historical” thought, Trawny draws on Heidegger’s
“narrative” of the history of being from the “first beginning” with the earliest Greek
thinkers to the “other beginning” that Heidegger expected of the Germans.
The “other beginning” is thought in relation to the “consummation” of the his-
tory that began with the “metaphysical thinking” of the Greeks – the people of the
“first beginning”. In Heidegger’s eyes metaphysics failed to think being as the hori-
zon of possibility of metaphysics and remained focused on beings in the whole.
Metaphysics failed to conceive logic thoroughly enough because the “sources” of
logic were not clarified. After passing through various stages (“Roman”, “Christian”
thinking and the metaphysics of subjectivity of modernity) metaphysics embodied
itself in the state forms of modernity – in the liberal-democratic United States and
in the Bolshevik-communist Soviet Union. Metaphysics also embodied itself in the
apparatus of technicity, which is able to dominate and co-ordinate the entire planet
through its ability to master every “difference”, however great these natural and
cultural “differences” may be.31
In this context, Trawny’s discourse of “being-historical anti-Semitism” refer-
ences negative attitudes toward Jews that Heidegger assimilated, including such
common anti-Semitic clichés as found their way, in his opinion, into the narrative of
the “history of being”.
And thus, Trawny adds that “the Jews appear [...] as agents in the history of
being” – just as in other epochs of philosophy, European and non-European peoples
and successive states play a role in Heidegger’s narrative of the decay of the “first
beginning”.
Trawny’s interpretation is guided by his typology of three different forms of
being-historical anti-Semitism, which he extracts from the Black Notebooks.
In the first type the Jew appears “as worldless, calculative subject, dominated by
‘machination’”.32 In Trawny’s reconstruction of Heidegger, the “worldlessness of
Jewry” is grounded in the “tenacious skillfulness at calculating and trafficking and
intermixing” that constitutes one “of the most hidden forms of the gigantic”, of
“machination”, that is, “the self-totalizing rationalization and technologizing of the
world”.33 In this first typological figure, Heidegger ascribes a specific “ worldlessness”
30
Trawny P. (2015b3), p. 31. English translation, p. 18 (mod. B.R.). The author’s position is elabo-
rated in Trawny P. (2015a), pp. 9–37.
31
Concerning the relation between “modernity” and its philosophical foundations, with special
reference to the first configurations of the “metaphysics of subjectivity”, consult the following
study by Messinese L. (20042).
32
Trawny P. (2015b3), p. 39. English translation, p. 23.
33
Ibid. pp. 34–35. English translation, p. 20.
to the Jews and thus transforms “his banal anti-Semitic characterization” into an
“archetype” (Denkfigur) of the history of being.34
The second type is introduced in connection with a passage wherein Heidegger
references Jews in relation to “race”. Trawny remarks that “Heidegger’s distance
from race thinking [...] pertains to the theoretical absolutization of one moment of
thrownness among other moments, but not to the view that ‘race’ belongs to
Dasein”.35 And so we may conclude from these comments in the Black Notebooks
that “the enmity between the Jews and the National Socialists […] results from a
being-historical competition” and this on racial grounds.36
Trawny identifies the third type, finally, in Heidegger’s notes on “World Jewry”.
This concept ascribes to Jews fundamental characteristics that oppose “all that
which Heidegger sought to save” and all that his own critique of modernity identi-
fies and opposes. For Trawny the Jew is “the antagonist as such of Heidegger’s
thought”.37 In the scattering of the Jewish people across the entire globe, Heidegger
perceived “an enmity set against the ‘rootedness’ of the Germans”.38
Regarding the specifics of Trawny’s typology, as briefly explicated here, it seems
to me that all the critical components in the passages that refer to Jews in the “anti-
Semitic” sense can also be applied to other objects of Heidegger’s criticism: thus
anti-Semitism, anti-Americanism, anti-Bolshevism, and subsequently anti-National
Socialism, all of which Heidegger brought into play over the years, are essentially
equivalent. Hence, what this comparative table shows, is that reference to the Jews
has some essential relation to Heidegger’s philosophy, but only insofar as, rightly or
wrongly, negative characteristics are ascribed to them, just as to other targets of
Heidegger’s critique. To this extent, talk of “being-historical anti-Semitism” seems
to be a dramatization of the Jewish Question as applied to Heidegger.
However, Trawny advances a thesis that at the first glance deviates from those
that have been presented here in outline. Thus, he claims: “there is a being-historical
34
See ibid. pp. 33–35. English translation, p. 20. Donatella Di Cesare, whose thesis we shall con-
sider in the following section, also emphasizes the theme of Heidegger and the worldlessness of
the Jews with reference to his The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics [See Heidegger
M. (1992)] of the winter semester of 1929–1930, wherein he distinguishes between the “world-
less” stone, the animal “poor in world”, and “world-forming” humanity, which leads [Di Cesare]
to assert – “so the Jew is worldless, like the stone” [Di Cesare D. (2014), p. 207. English transla-
tion, p. 164 (mod. B.R.)]. Yet the question calls for reconsideration based on the clarification that,
for Heidegger, the human being first becomes “world-forming” when he has experienced the
“transformation of Dasein”, and indeed, “only within and out of a prevailing world” [See Heidegger
M. (1992), p. 514. English translation, p. 354]. Therefore, worldlessness according to Heidegger,
is not something pertaining to Jews, but rather a condition that can only be overcome in an enown-
ing “event” for which everyone needs to prepare (see ibid.).
35
See Trawny P. (2015b3), pp. 39–40 English translation, p. 23 (mod. B.R.).
36
37
Ibid. p. 53. English translation, p. 34 (mod. B.R.).
38
Ibid. English translation, p. 35 (mod. B.R.).
anti-Semitism in Heidegger that appears to contaminate not just a few dimensions

of his thinking”39; he calls this a “specific anti-Semitism”.40
Such turns of phrase no longer sound like references to Trawny’s “typology of
the Jews” in the context of being-historical thinking, but rather imply the imputation
of a general, anti-Semitic tone to Heidegger’s philosophy as such, an imputation
more or less aligned with Trawny’s other interpretations as critically presented here.
Upon closer examination, admittedly, what Trawny actually means by the impu-
tation of the “anti-Semitic contamination of Heidegger’s philosophy”41 does not
suffice to touch the core of being-historical thinking. It only affects its “weakest
element”, as expressed in the conviction that the “other beginning” had taken its
inception with the German people.
Let us consider the entire passage in which Trawny advances the thesis that
Heidegger’s anti-Semitism is the consequence of his belief in the historical mission
of the German people,42 rather than elaborating the thesis of the “anti-Semitic con-
tamination” of being-historical thought. In this material context, anti-Semitism can
only with difficulty be conceived to be a significant “factor” of the philosophical
thinking of Heidegger. In this case, moreover, the actual extension of Trawny’s the-
sis is diminished:
“I have already indicated [Trawny writes] that I hold Heidegger’s being-historical anti-
Semitism to be the consequence of a being-historical Manichaeism (LM), which at the end
of the 1930s came to a full outburst and drove his thinking into an either/or from which the
Jews and their destiny were not spared. As Heidegger’s narrative of the German salvation of
the West – the yearning for a ‘purification of being’ – fell into a crisis (PT), the Jews
emerged on the side of the enemy. The limits of the contamination of Heidegger’s text
coincide with the limits of this being-historical Manichaeism. (PT) To the degree that
‘beyng’ and ‘beings’ were no longer alternatives, as reflected in the alternatives of ‘other
beginning’ and ‘machination’, the possibility vanished for the hypostatization of a hostile
‘world Judaism’. To speak of being-historical anti-Semitism therefore does not imply that
being-historical thinking as such is anti-Semitic. (LM)”.43
This passage may be briefly explicated as follows. Trawny refers to the conse-
quences of “the narrative of the German salvation of the West”,44 linking it to being-
historical anti-Semitism as he ultimately characterizes it. Inasmuch as he considers
how the thesis of the “limits of the contamination of Heidegger’s texts” correlates
with the thesis of the “limits of being-historical Manicheanism” (the concepts of
contamination and Manicheanism are temporally coincident) he comes to admit that
the emphasis he gave to being-historical anti-Semitism appears unjustified.
39
Ibid. p. 99. English translation, p. 94 (mod. B.R.).
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
See ibid. p. 114. English translation, pp. 94–95.
43
Ibid. pp. p. 100. English translation, p. 95 (Italics in the first and last lines of the passage by L.M.).
44
Not only that. All things considered, the thesis of being-historical anti-Semitism
(as we have seen) comprehends hardly more than “being-historical anti-American-
ism”, “being-historical anti-Bolshevism”, and so forth, to use Trawny’s terminology.
Finally, even when explicated in the light of Trawny’s thesis, the question of a
philosophical anti-Semitism in Heidegger’s thought loses much of the “drama”
associated with it in consequence of the early reviews of the Black Notebooks. It
does not follow from this thesis that Heidegger gives the Jewish people as such a
negative role in the history of being, but rather that he equated their role with that of
other peoples and other political and cultural formations.
Heidegger’s critical remarks on Jewry, like all related comments, derive in her-
meneutic perspective from the “ontological difference” and the critique of meta-
physics out of which “being-historical thinking” arose. But in this context, the Jews
do not constitute a more grievous case than any other in the unfolding of the “deraci-
nation off being”.
With this we may conclude that we have found one unique hermeneutic key to
understanding, given that we want to understand why Heidegger’s critical practice
addressed the different moments or phases of the “history of being”, the different
“epochs of metaphysics”, as well as the differently constituted “guiding concepts”
of the primacy of beings proper to “the oblivion of being”.45
he Thesis of Metaphysical Anti-Semitism as Advanced by

T
Donatella Di Cesare
A further philosophical approach to Heidegger and the Jewish Question is advanced

by Donatella Di Cesare. The key work of the author for our theme is her previously
cited Heidegger and the Jews, whose publication was preceded, followed, and
accompanied by several highly effective contributions to the Italian and the interna-
tional media. Her central thesis is that we will not find in Heidegger a racially-
motivated anti-Semitism based on “biological doctrines”, such as the theoreticians
of National Socialism were wont to propose; but we may discover a form of anti-
Semitism characterized by a specific “philosophical profile”.46 So, according to this
author, we are still confronted with such anti-Semitism as emerges out of Heidegger’s
philosophy and that may be characterized as “metaphysical”. Let us attempt to
achieve a better understanding of this thesis.
45
In line with this train of thought and the topic of anti-Semitism in the Black Notebooks, Alfredo
Roche de la Torre presented a paper to the Philosophical Seminar of the University of Pisa on the
occasion of a conference of July 1, 2014: “The anti-Semitism of the philosopher from Meßkirch is
only one expression of his conviction that the metaphysics of modernity leads to the empty ratio-
nality of calculative thinking. In this sense, democracy, communism, nationalism – and as strange
as this may sound, also organized Jewry – are all phenomena of the development of calculative
thinking and planning, and all of them, in Heidegger’s ‘political perspective’ […] amount to the
same thing”. Roche de la Torre A. (2015), p. 98.
46
See Di Cesare D. (2014), p. 6. English translation, pp. 3–4.
The author elaborates the multiple senses of the word “metaphysical” regarding
this kind of anti-Semitism in the effort to elucidate her thesis.
First of all, she shows in what sense Heidegger presents a “metaphysics of the
Jews”. By this she means to say that despite his critique of metaphysics, Heidegger’s
posing of the Jewish Question is derived from this self-same metaphysics. The cat-
egorial considerations of the philosopher, like the discriminatory sayings of his
reflections collectively function, “after all is said and done, [as] responses to the
age-old question: ti ésti; what is it?”.47
This typical metaphysical attitude, as expressed throughout Plato’s Theaetetus,
was put into question during Heidegger’s lifetime by Wittgenstein, who criticized
the belief that “there is a something, an identical essence, despite all differences and
beyond them”.48 This is, so Wittgenstein, the original “source of metaphysics”, but
one that leads philosophy into “complete darkness”.49 According to Di Cesare, this
is precisely Heidegger’s case: although he puts “the definition of identity and the
concept of essence” into question, nonetheless, in traditional metaphysical manner,
he takes over this metaphysical stance, posing questions concerning the Jews, intent
upon “defining and identifying” them.50
Used in the form of the genitivus subjectivus, the “metaphysics of the Jew”, may
also be understood another way. The “metaphysics of the Jew gives rise to the meta-
physical Jew”,51 which is to say, to an “abstract form”, “an ‘idea’ of Jew, the model
Jew, the ideal Jew”.52 According to the author, Heidegger “derives flesh-and-blood
Jews” from these abstractions.53
An additional aspect of this discourse of the “metaphysics of the Jew” leads to
the definition of Jews in terms of such “ancient metaphysical dichotomies as
Heidegger commonly put into question”.54 In this context, the Jew always represents
the negative term to the positive and as such the antipode that is to be excluded.55
Consequently, the circle is closed: “the metaphysics of the Jew produced a meta-
physical Jew, the idea of a Jew defined metaphysically on the basis of the secular
oppositions that put the Jew on the outside, pushing him into an inauthentic appear-
ance, relegating him to a soulless abstraction, to a ghostly invisibility, all the way to
nothingness”.56
47
48
Wittgenstein L. (1980). See Di Cesare D. (2014), p. 208. English translation, p. 165. Wittgenstein
(1958), pp. 86, 124–125.
49
50
Ibid.
51
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid. (Italics by L.M.), (mod. L.M.).
55
See ibid. pp. 209–210. English translation, pp. 166–167. The author sets up a comprehensive list
of these kinds of dichotomy.
56
This is the kind of “philosophical” procedure that underlies “political praxis”,

the “laws” and their “application”. And therefore, the philosopher cannot extricate
himself from the issue with the excuse that he is not the author of the laws of the
state.57 The unequivocal conclusion that Donatella di Cesare draws from this fol-
lows: “if the Jew falls outside, if he is condemned to nothingness, it is because the
philosopher decides this”.58
The conclusions drawn from the discussion specify the specific senses of the
complicated thesis of “metaphysical anti-Semitism” which the author ascribes to
Heidegger. “Real, existing Jews” were replaced by a threefold abstraction: (1) the
Jew as such (= the Jew), (2) quiddity, or the “Whatness” of the Jew (= Jewishness),
and (3) Judaism and Jewry as emptied of its “history” (= the Judaic).
After having evaluated the thesis proposed by the editor of the Black Notebooks,
Peter Trawny, Di Cesare concludes that it is preferable to speak of “metaphysical
anti-Semitism” rather than “being-historical anti-Semitism”. She offers three rea-
sons for this. First, the use of the adjective “being-historical”, given its “esoteric
tone”, and the “mystic aura” it emanates, weakens the brutality of the “discriminat-
ing gesture” of Heidegger’s response to the Jews. The second, and even more fun-
damental reason, is that reference to Heidegger’s “history of being” could lead us to
think that his position regarding Jews is merely personal and idiosyncratic, when in
fact anti-Semitism encompasses far more than this concept. And thirdly: if the “his-
tory of being” is the landscape wherein the figure of the Jew appears, the reason for
this is that in accordance with Heidegger’s reflections the Jew has been deprived of
his history – for Heidegger’s “definition” of the Jew consign him to metaphysics.59
Emphasis on metaphysical anti-Semitism allows the author to assimilate
Heidegger’s position on the theme of the Jew to other, less rigorously philosophical
and religious thinkers – and not only to those of the past.60 Given our purposes here,
it would take us too far from our primary focus to go into the analyses of these
thinkers. This brings me to the formulation of several critical observations concern-
ing the key theses of Di Cesare.
In response to her thesis, one could raise the objection that it were quite remark-
able for Heidegger, given his acerbic critique of metaphysics (at least in its histori-
cal actuality) to forget this critique precisely when it came to his consideration of
the Jewish problem. But that is not the objection to Donatella Di Cesare I would like
to raise here.
57
Ibid. English translation, pp. 166–167.
58
Ibid. p. 211. English translation, p. 167 (Italics by L.M.).
59
Ibid.
60
In the second chapter of her book the author presents an historical overview of “philosophy and
hatred of the Jews” (see ibid. pp. 29–82. English translation, pp. 22–64). The subsequent elabora-
tion of the topic is concerned with Heidegger and divided into two parts: the “relation of the ques-
tion of being and the Jewish question” (see ibid. pp. 83–220. English translation, pp. 65–174), and
Heidegger’s perspective on the Jewish question “after Auschwitz” (see ibid. pp. 221–279. English
translation, pp. 175–247).
My reservations concern another matter and I would like to express these in the
form of a question: Is it certain that Heidegger’s comments on Jews give expression
to their “metaphysical essence” and that they do this, moreover, in its negative
denotation?
In fact, one cannot do without defining the Jews, and in regard to Heidegger’s
statements regarding Jews one may emphasize this or that identifying feature. But it
does not at all seem evident to me, in the light of the evidence the author presents,
that Heidegger wants to determine the metaphysical essence of the Jew – perhaps he
rather gives expression to common and widespread clichés of his time.
In any case, it seems to me that the definitive stamp of “metaphysical essence”
has been imposed by Donatella Di Cesare on Heidegger’s statements. She does this
based on observations advanced by Waldemar Gurian in his Um des Reiches Zukunft
(1932),61 the book from which she abstracted the expression “metaphysical anti-
Semitism”. And in fact, Gurian saw in anti-Semitism, as current in the National
Socialism of his own time, a rejection of the Jews that arose based “on the entire
meaning of life”.62 In consideration of its comprehensive application this sense of
rejection could be called “metaphysical”.63
The novel thrust of the observations advanced by Donatella Di Cesare is that she
gives the syntagma “metaphysical anti-Semitism” a meaning that emphasizes the
negative signification of the word “metaphysics” – hence the sense, as is well
known, that is dominant in modern philosophy as it is in Heidegger. We have seen,
however, how problematic (to say the least) the evidence for this thesis is.
But since Di Cesare considers her thesis ascribing to Heidegger the manufacture
of the figure of the metaphysical Jew to be fully justified, she has gone on to give it
a still more profound sense in the course of her elaboration of the thesis. Hence, she
wants to show that although Heidegger criticizes, in principle, reliance on the “hier-
archical oppositions of metaphysics”, yet he relies on these oppositions of thor-
oughly “theological”64 origin to define the Jews. She claims to demonstrate that
metaphysical anti-Semitism is still ruled by the heritage of “Christian anti-Judaism”,
which “has permeated all of Western metaphysics without having been confessed”,65
and in her opinion the same anti-Judaism “can also act in a purported secular
laicism”.66
61
See Gerhart W. (1932).
62
63
Following Gurian, D. Di Cesare mentions another reason to try to justify her discourse of meta-
physical anti-Semitism: [this discourse] “is a way of considering the Jew as a figure, an apparition,
a phenomenon – as Gurian suggests – whose essence must be searched for behind and beyond,
meta [the appearances] – according to the procedure that characterized metaphysics for Heidegger”.
64
Ibid. p. 212. English translation, ibid.
65
Ibid. p. 213. English translation, ibid.
66
Ibid.
However that may be – and now we come back to Heidegger – the author consid-
ers Heidegger as a German philosopher stained by the “guilt” that he ascribed to the
history of the Occident – that is, “the guilt of metaphysics”.
Heidegger himself fell for the “philosophical” error that he ascribed to others in
putting metaphysics in question.67
Therefore, Heidegger’s statements concerning the Jews consummate the ship-
wreck of his philosophical endeavours.68
This thesis is undoubtedly suggestive, but just like Trawny’s thesis, it is informed
by a strong dose of theatricality, in my opinion. As I noted at the outset of this essay,
Heidegger strongly insists that “philosophical” concepts and everything that per-
tains to philosophical discourse should not be treated as something “present-at-
hand”, but must be made manifest in its origin. This remains valid when one
proposes to understand Heidegger’s philosophical approach to the Jewish question,
for the question remains beset with dangerous conceptual short-circuits.
In conclusion, my own thesis, which could only be intimated in this essay, may
be stated as follows: Heidegger conceived the Jewish Question in relation to the
“critique of metaphysics” and in consequence in concert with the sole, fundamental
question to which he gave thought to the end of his days: in philosophy as in every-
day life: how does beyng hold sway (wie west das Seyn)?
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Postface
Martin Heidegger Was Not an Anti-Semite
The supposed anti-Semitism of Martin Heidegger is refuted by the following facts:

1. The best friend of Elfride Heidegger’s youth, Elizabeth Blochmann, was half-
Jewish. She also became Martin Heidegger’s friend and lover and remained
befriended with the couple to her death. Upon her emigration in 1933, Heidegger’s
intervention helped her to gain an academic position in England.
2. Edmund Husserl, Jewish, was the fatherly friend of Martin Heidegger from 1919
until 1933. He dedicated Sein und Zeit to him. On their numerous journeys from
Marburg to Todtnauberg and back, the Heidegger family always spent the night
with the Husserls’ at their home on Lorettostraße Freiburg. The dissolution of
their friendship happened May of 1933 by decision of the Husserls’, who recog-
nized that Martin Heidegger had gone his own way rather than following the
path of Husserl’s phenomenology. As recently elected Rector, Heidegger’s suc-
ceeded in having the forced leave-of-absence of four Jewish professors of the
Faculty of Philosophy, as decreed by his predecessor Professor Sauer, annulled
by ordinance of the State Ministry of Baden on April 28, 1933. As early as the
summer semester of 1933, Edmund Husserl was officially informed by the
Office of the Rector under Heidegger that he had been re-instated in his right
to teach.
3. Werner Brock, who was half-Jewish, remained Heidegger’s assistant until
September 1933, whereupon he was accorded a position in England with
Heidegger’s support. So long as Heidegger was Rector, the Jewish Professor and
Director of the Medical Clinic, Thannhauser, retained his position at the
University.
4. Martin Heidegger forbid the planned book-burning of the National Socialists.
Husserl’s books remained untouched in the library of the Philosophical Seminar.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69496-8
316 Postface
5. A close friendship with the Jewish couple Szilasi endured from 1919 until the
death of Wilhelm Szilasi in 1966 and was carried forth with Lily Szilasi until
her death.
6. Upon once again seeing Martin Heidegger after the war for the first time, his
Jewish student Karl Löwith, who had taken care of Heidegger’s children in
Marburg from time to time, embraced his teacher and thenceforth remained
bound to him in friendship.
7. Hannah Arendt, his Jewish student and lover from Heidegger’s days in Marburg,
took up friendly relations with him again as of 1950. She visited the Heidegger
couple in August 1975 for the last time, dying in December 1975.
8. In the Black Notebooks, comments on Jewry are somewhat marginal and deriva-
tive of criticism of modern humanity. This critique also touches Roman
Catholicism, Americanism, and Bolshevism, as well as technology, science, the
university, and not least of all, National Socialism. Instead of allowing oneself to
be misled by calumniations, catchwords, and conceptual monstrosities, would
that the gracious reader of Heidegger’s works come to his own judgement.
Hermann Heidegger († 13.I.2020)
Translator’s Afterword
In his lectures on St. Paul, collected in Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens,

Heidegger distinguishes between the historical situation of Paul’s apostolic engage-
ment, the object-historical explanation of this situation, and its phenomenological
explication.1 The last named refers to the working-out of the temporality of Paul’s
lived world, which gives his engagement its sense and direction. The lived world is
constituted by three directions of sense, arising out of the self-world, the communal
world, and the environing world of Paul in their respective relation to the content-
sense, the relational sense, and the enactment sense of Paul’s teaching and concrete
involvement with communal and environing worlds. The genuinely phenomeno-
logical is the temporal, and temporality in its concreteness is the historical (das
geschichtliche as distinct from object-historical Historie). In regard to the historical
study of the “life of Heidegger” as recorded in the Black Notebooks and what is
known to us based on the evidence of Heidegger’s philosophical labours and his
involvement in the historical situation that we reconstruct as “National Socialist
Germany” all of these components of the having-been of a “world” also have to be
taken into account. In response to the often-posed question as to why Heidegger
attempted to engage with National Socialism at all, we need look no further than to
his understanding of the historicity of human being and ultimately of beyng in its
historicity. In Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann’s words:
This experience, that beyng itself of itself articulates itself in historicity, is another funda-
mental experience of momentous significance on Martin Heidegger’s path of thinking. The
experience of the historicity of beyng itself, and not only of the existential possibilities of
Dasein, opens up for Heidegger in 1930 [...]. After 1930, all of the 29 courses from
Heidegger’s Freiburg period belong to the newly opened perspective of being-historical
thinking.
1
See Heidegger M. (1995a, b), pp. 52, 63. English translation, pp. 35, 43. See also Radloff
B. (2008), pp. 189–214.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69496-8
318 Translator’s Afterword
Heidegger’s far-ranging critique of National Socialism, extensively documented

in this volume, focuses on the limitations of this movement with particular reference
to its reliance on anthropological concepts of humanity founded in the metaphysics
of modernity. In consequence of these limitations, the conceptual break-through to
an authentic actualization of being-a-people, in its historicity, which Heidegger
undoubtedly sought and hoped for circa 1933–1934, could not be realized. One may
observe, furthermore, that Heidegger’s observations on the politics of cultural pro-
duction and the demotion of the university to an institute of political indoctrination,
on the one hand, and a scientific center of research, on the other, eerily anticipate the
contemporary hermeneutic situation of the liberal West, even to the extent of the
attempt to make philosophy, along with scientific disciplines, serviceable and sub-
ordinate to political directives. This goes some way to support the thesis that the
consummation of modernity, in the sense of the metaphysics of machination,
encompasses all major political worldviews of our time.
In default of our engagement with the phenomenological concreteness of histo-
ricity, we are liable to be beset by fundamental errors of interpretation. The volume
translated here seeks to address a series of impediments to understanding that block
our access to the world and the phenomenological – meaning, the temporal and
(being-)historical senses – of the historicity of Heidegger’s enactment of his phi-
losophy. Readings of the “Rector’s Address”, for example, have often been charac-
terized by failure to think through the formally indicative quality of its governing
concepts, which is to say, their enactment sense, with the result that these phenom-
enological concepts are reduced to object-historical concepts misleadingly corre-
lated with political concepts of the object-historically conceived situation. The first
impediment to understanding, therefore, pertains to the confusion of different kinds
of concepts. As Leonardo Messinese writes in his contribution to this volume,
“nomination of different things by the same term causes a kind of short circuit lead-
ing to the false appearance that the philosophical and the non-philosophical concept
designate the same thing”. Once abstracted from their specific, philosophically
determined enactment sense, concepts such as Kampf, Volk, or Verwüstung can be
reduced to terms of common opinion, and what is worse, to highly-charged ideo-
logical ciphers of a worldview that may have nothing in common with their struc-
tural, philosophical import in Heidegger’s thought.
The philological explication of concepts undertaken by Francesco Alfieri in this
book is implicitly directed, in the first instance, by the hermeneutic guideline of
uncovering the factical life situation out of which the network of concepts that
Heidegger employs emerge. Factical life, however, at this stage of Heidegger’s
thinking, is conceived not only in terms of the world-shaping, thrown projecting-
open of Dasein, but also in terms of the possible grant of the historicity of a people
in its being-historical openness to the grant of being. Insofar as this dimension of
historicity is not phenomenologically considered in the explication of the “historical
situation” of Heidegger’s concrete engagements, historical explanations are liable
to fall back on pre-conceived narratives that will attempt to evade questions of
being-historical temporality. Reliance on such unfounded narratives constitutes a
Translator’s Afterword 319
second dimension of impediment blocking the way into the movement of Heidegger’s
philosophy.
The evasion of historicity manifests itself in multiple ways, and among these, the
evasion of the epochal dimension of the history of being may be especially pertinent
to our understanding of the misrepresentations of the import of the Black Notebooks.
The epoch most pointedly in question is “modernity”. In Heidegger’s conception, as
also shown by the passages from the Notebooks selected for this book, modernity is
conceived as the projecting-open of a world, as worldview, on the basis of a radical
re-appropriation of the history of metaphysics. Within this history, it marks a (rela-
tive) inception, which is to say that it originates a way of living and of being-time
and as such founds forms of comportment to being and beings in the whole. In
Heidegger’s way of thinking, this inception initiates a decisive, world-shaping dif-
ferentiation of the potentials of beings, including human being, “within” the world-
whole. The inception sets a certain potentiality into motion, which actualizes itself
as the complexus of subject and object, that is, as subjectivity, and this potentiality
is inherently constituted to pass over out of itself into the other of itself. This double
passage of the consummation (Vollendung) of modernity enacts the crossing
(Übergang). The epoch of modernity, therefore manifests – just as the history of
Occidental thinking as a whole does – a unity and inner coherence which is irreduc-
ible to the continuum of the now-sequence which is the basis of object-historical
temporality (Sein und Zeit, § 76). The third impediment, therefore, consists in
recourse to phenomenologically derivative concepts of temporality that make it
practically impossible to grasp our own hermeneutic situation and the decisions it
imposes on us.
Potentiality, inception, consummation (or actualization), and “metabolic” self-
transformation – which Heidegger will come to call the Verwindung of metaphys-
ics – compose one epochal whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. The reader
will recall that the most relevant sense of verwinden, Verwindung, in Heidegger
commonly refers to the often-painful process of healing arising out of the specific
onset and course of deployment of an illness or a traumatic event. This of course
pertains to the ontic realm of living beings. What is at stake, in turn, in speaking of
the inception of an epoch of being is the ontological concept of world-formation.
Verwindung – or Überwindung – as Heidegger writes in the “Introduction to What
is Metaphysics?” – constitutes the trans-formation of the consummation, out of and
through the working-out of the potential of the inception. The consummation does
not simply pass over from the previously “actual” Now to the newly-arrived actual-
ity of something else – it calls for a way of thinking that does not rely on temporal
sequence and causal consequence. Überwindung is a formally indicative concept
that points to the necessity of the recovery of the ground of the epoch of modernity,
which is to say, the disclosive retrieval of the life-giving soil in which the tree of
philosophy is metaphysically rooted.2 To the extent to which Verwindung (healing-
out) displaces Überwinding (over-coming) in the course of Heidegger’s reflections
2
See Heidegger M. (1976), pp. 361, 363.
on the crossing-over into the other beginning, the necessity of the endurance of the
crossing and the mindfulness proper to it is emphasized still further, along with the
difficulty of thinking the “closure” of metaphysics. In this thinking, metaphysics is
not conceived as something that was, or something that one day will be finished; it
is brought over in the course of the healing-out and remains in memory, like a scar.
Much of what Heidegger has to say in regard to Judeo-Christianity has this quality.
The evasion spoken of above may more properly called the refusal of historicity
that is proper to machination. It does not consist only in the withdrawal of insight
into the historicity of an epoch of being, although the negation of the governing
sway (Wesung) of being – its reduction to a mere abstraction of generalization from
beings – undoubtedly informs such anthropological worldviews as insist that the
“history of being” is a quasi-mythological construct without relation to “reality”.
The refusal of historicity implicates the construction of narratives designed to give
sense and direction to the void opened up by the denial of the meaningfulness of the
very question of being. Without relation to this question (except by way of the
refusal itself) these narratives must devolve into inner-worldly narratives of the
causal relation of beings, in the senses explicated in Being and Time (§ 80), theo-
logical discourses, or a combination of the two, as in fact we find in Donatella Di
Cesare’s contribution to the discussion. Without a sense for the being-historical,
epochal unity of modernity, these narratives have to draw on some concept or other
of the cohesion of the purported facts they recount, for what at least implicitly dis-
tinguishes a narrative from a mere chronicle are pre-conceived origin and telos.
Furthermore, to the extent that inner-worldly explanatory narratives – they concern
themselves with beings and nothing but beings – postulate an infinite regress of
cosmic causation, conjoined to some notion of evolutionary progress, they obviate
any sense of need, any sense of distress, to pose the question of the sense of being,
and to decide, in the enactment-sense of the differentiation of being. The virtual
infinity of signification (of beings) gives rise to the conceptual undecidability of
every Now in theoretically endless sequence. Consequently, conceptual-explanatory
narratives systematically block our openness to the question-worthiness of the his-
tory of being, and this impediment to mindfulness underlies all the others.
The narrative of “Heidegger’s being-historical anti-Semitism” is an evasive,
explanatory account of fundamental aspects of the history of modernity – calcula-
tive thinking and machination in its totality – and rather than confronting the meta-
physical provenance of this history (Geschichte) one rests content with
socio-ideological explanations and moral denunciations, often aggressively
advanced with a certain legalistic fervour, of the role of Heidegger in National
Socialism. This narrative – simply as a narrative explication of beings – cannot be
being-historical.
In the case in question – the “Heidegger Case” – intentionality and design is
ascribed to Heidegger’s remarks on Jewish matters and narrative cohesion is sup-
plied by the globalist interpretation of National Socialism that was codified in the
course of the Nuremberg Trials. This narrative is speculatively read back into the
1930s and early 1940s and Heidegger’s remarks on “world Jewry” with the objec-
tive of incriminating Heidegger’s philosophy by tying it directly to National
Socialism. The unphilosophical character of this (meta-)narrative about the Black

Notebooks comes to light by the choice of a (fictional) narrative – the “Protocols of
the Learned Elders of Zion”, which might plausibly be a called an anti-Semitic,
object-historical influence on National Socialism – used to the instrumental end of
“making sense” of how Heidegger came to think in terms of the “history of being”
during the National Socialist period. Most importantly, the introduction of the
“Protocols” serves to evade and to dissimulate the philosophical dimension of the
question of being in its fundamental relation to the question of what it means “to be
a people”. Dissimulation is integral to machination and enliving. In this particular
case, the primary function of the dissimulation is to erase the being-historical dis-
tinction between historicity and the potentiality to be a people, on the one hand, and
the calculative, socio-technical management of an extant population, on the other.
The thesis that Heidegger was ideologically contaminated by the “Protocols” is
not convincing on the biographical, object-historical level either – for in the context
of claims about Heidegger’s personal attitudes to Jews, reference to the “Protocols”
is redundant. In other words, if Heidegger were inclined to anti-Semitism it is
unlikely that he would need to discover the “Protocols” in order to become anti-
Semitic. The redundancy of this gesture of purported historical insight, furthermore,
consists in this, that if one wanted to uncover “Heidegger’s anti-Semitism” in his-
torical context it would suffice to cite Karl Marx and Theodor Herzl, whose works
are more likely to have been known to Heidegger than the “Protocols”, while being
just as serviceable as possible sources of Heidegger’s remarks in the Black
Notebooks. For in “On the Jewish Question”, Marx also expounds on Jewish finance
and calculative materialism, although systematically, not occasionally, and in far
harsher terms than anything found in Heidegger’s Notebooks. And Herzl, in turn,
emphasizes the necessity of the application of the political and financial power of
international Jewry – or, what could be called “world Jewry” – to achieve the foun-
dation of a Jewish state and the liberation the Jewish people from the relative
“worldlessness” of their existence under conditions of the Diaspora.3 In short, the
narrative advanced by a certain cohort of Heidegger’s critics is not only speculative
and unfounded, it is structurally correlated to the “Protocols” in order to contami-
nate being-historical thinking as such – not “just” with any anti-Semitism, in its
Christian form, for example – but with a specifically National Socialist anti-
Semitism that expresses itself, like the “Protocols”, in terms of the power of inter-
national Jewry and its purportedly global, nation-destroying objectives.
As Messinese points out, Trawny’s theory of being-historical anti-Semitism is
intimately linked to his ideological critique of Heidegger’s understanding of
Occidental historicity and of the mission of the German nation. What is uniquely at
stake, therefore, in this particular construct of anti-Semitism is a fundamental com-
ponent of our contemporary, Euro-American hermeneutic situation as defined by
the conflict between the affirmation of a universal-global concept of humanity,
along with its international institutions, and the traditional primacy accorded to
3
See Radloff B. (2017), pp. 277–302.
historical peoples and the nation-state since the inception of the modern era. This
conflict was already anticipated by nineteenth century Jewish responses to the alien-
ated existence of European Jewry: for while Herzl, and Moses Hess before him,
called for the creation of a Jewish nation-state, Marx promulgated a theory of the
planetary species being of humanity. To take these matters into account makes for a
complicated “narrative”, because Heidegger does not affirm, but rather calls the
traditional nation-state and the concept of collective subjectivity on which it relies,
into question:
“In the guise of ethnic and national community, the history of the Occident silently and
essentially gathers itself to fulfill the machinational essence of beingness: as self-
representing production this essence comes to itself through the comprehensive, organized
and calculable availability and disposability of beings in the whole and through the whole
itself – to the point of finally demanding, in its blindly unconditional, functional availabil-
ity, its own dissolution in machination – as such, its own first and final fulfillment”.
(Ponderings XI, § 29)
Recourse to the collective subjectivity of “ethnic and national community”,

Heidegger claims, cannot reverse or transform the course of the Occidental world
because subjectivity in its consummate phase, as the “organized and calculable
availability and disposability of beings” is in essence driven to surpass and dissolve
any and all concepts of limit. “Ethnic and national community” are political con-
cepts of limit. As the Black Notebooks substantiate, therefore, Heidegger holds that
the Western nation-state, as a construct of collective subjectivity, is destined to dis-
integrate as such and to pass over into more comprehensive (regional and global)
structures of subjectivity that will organize themselves as “populations” – not as
“peoples”. Mindfulness of the history of being in relation to the enowning of
Da-sein, which is the “condition”, in Heidegger’s philosophy, of the possibility of
the coming-to-be of a people in its historicity, is entirely inaccessible to the meta-
physics of subjectivity in any form, be they nationalist or internationalist. “All
‘blood’ and ‘race’ and each and every ‘folk community’ are all in vain, blindly run-
ning their course of expiration, unless attuned to a wager for the sake of being [...]”
(Ponderings X, § 59). Heidegger consistently expresses his deep reservations in
regard to National Socialist political culture, which is directed toward the reconsti-
tution of the nation-state in response to the disintegrating inroads of Liberalism and
Bolshevism. Both of these worldviews, in different ways, are based on metaphysical
concepts of the erasure of limits. But in its very opposition to these, fundamentally
socio-technical constructs of population management, National Socialism itself
also fatefully entangles itself in concepts of collective subjectivity, and in
anti-Semitism.
The question of anti-Semitism, therefore, in the context of “Heidegger and
National Socialism”, is really the question concerning the “fate of the nation-state”
in the era of the consummation of modernity. And consequently, it might be histori-
cally and philosophically more convincing to simply leave the “Protocols” aside,
and to introduce this question (both questions) in the contending perspectives of
Herzl and Marx – at least as a point of departure. Posed in terms of Marx versus
Herzl (as prefigured by the contention of Marx and Moses Hess) we are confronted
with one modality of the two poles of the decisive politico-metaphysical conflict of
the final phase of Euro-American modernity. The key question to which this conflict
gives rise can be posed as follows: Is the historical nation (as collective subject) still
“viable” or is it destined, as Heidegger claims, to dissolve itself into the species
being of mankind? For our purposes here, this question presupposes a few prelimi-
nary questions which may seem harmless enough. In the first instance, why exclude
Marx and his “anti-Semitism” from the discussion while insisting on the phantom
influence of the “Protocols”? Why refuse to consider the fundamental philosophical
and political division within “international Jewry” that is demarcated by the posi-
tions of Marx and Herzl? One can only speculate – in view of the assumptions of
globalism and of the understanding of human being underlying it – that a weighty
objection to bringing Marx and Herzl into the conversation would be that merely to
ask the question of the being of a people in relation to the question of the topogra-
phy of being in its historicity risks undermining the metaphysical project of global
humanity.
With all due respect to Herzl, however, the question at issue calls for a more
profound treatment, founded in the consummation of the history of Western phi-
losophy. And this brings us to Marx – and Hegel. As we know from the Notebooks,
Heidegger expressly addresses Marx’s inversion of Hegel, in effect, the inversion of
spirit and state in favour of the primacy of “life”:
“Destructiveness in the reversal of the consummation of metaphysics – that is, the reversal
of Hegel’s metaphysics by Marx. Spirit and culture become the superstructure of ‘life’ –
which means, of the organization of the economy, and hence of the biological, which is to
say, of ‘the people’”. (Observations I [26–31])
In this passage, “the people” clearly refers to a metaphysical concept of the peo-
ple as a specific demographic of “human life in general”, which is to say, a specified
“population” – and this is precisely the concept of peoplehood that Heidegger
ascribes to National Socialism and which he opposes. “Spirit” in the Hegelian sense
gives a certain primacy to the directing and ordering powers of the state as distinct
from the biological reproduction and economic maintenance of life. Heidegger’s
running critique of the politics of “life” and the “life of culture” touches all compet-
ing worldviews of the time equally: “National Socialism is not Bolshevism, and
Bolshevism is not fascism – but both are machinational victories of machination –
consummate forms of modernity in its gigantism – the calculated expenditure of
historically-founded peoples” (Ponderings XIII, § 90; my emphasis). “Historically-
founded peoples” are not derived from the life of culture, which pertains above all
to the modern epoch and is understood to encompass all that human beings bring
forth of themselves in their dialectical relation to “nature”, including their own spe-
cies being. “Culture”, in Heidegger’s conceptual vocabulary, pertains to the con-
summation of subjectivity as machination and enliving. It is a concept of mankind’s
ahistorical species being, which “in essence” is self-reproductive – in all domains,
from the biological and sociological to the “arts and sciences”. In this perspective of
metaphysical anthropology, the events of “history”, which undoubtedly does bear
witness to a great many local variations across time, along with local adaptions of
“evolutionary” import, are conceived as a derivative productions of mankind’s ahis-

torical species being. History (Historie) in this sense must not be confused with the
historicity of Dasein or the “history (Geschichte) of being”.
What does this distinction concerning “history” import for Heidegger’s under-
standing of Marx and Marxism? How does Heidegger’s comment on Marx’s inver-
sion of Hegel, which basically implies that real existing national socialism is
metaphysically the Same (not identical) with international socialism – for both are
founded in metaphysically conceived life – pertain, if at all, to Heidegger’s remarks
on Jewry?
In summary, we may take note of the confusion of a number of different levels of
discourse in the treatment of the Black Notebooks. The most significant of these are
as follows. Being-historical thinking is reduced to the level of an ideologically con-
taminated discourse in order to facilitate the attack on the person of Martin
Heidegger specifically conceived as a representative of “National Socialist
Germany”. The very notion of a Heidegger “case”, which obviously is a legal term,
echoes the Nuremberg Trials and seven-odd decades of “denazification” in service
of the purification of any trace of nationally oriented thinking from German, and not
only German, public discourse. Continued insistence on the discourse of this “case”
illustrates an incapacity to think historically – even in the object-historical sense –
for the pursuit of a “legal case” is determined by quite other imperatives than object-
historical explanations in the classic nineteenth century sense of Leopold von
Ranke, for example, which are guided by the imperative of truthfulness.
Certain aspects of the methodological incapacity for object-historical thinking
already noted are further substantiated by the deformation of the historical record
that arises out of what may be called an “essentialization” of “National Socialism”
based upon reading the judgments of the victors’ tribunal of 1945 back into the situ-
ation of 1933. By “essentialism” I mean the assumption that “Nazism” was exclu-
sively constituted by a certain core of (negative) “values”, which can broadly be
summarized as a commitment to “anti-Semitism, imperialism, and racism” and that
these “values” were inherent in the movement itself. National Socialist essentialism,
moreover, holds that the policies and decisions of this regime had nothing, or next
to nothing, do to with the actions of Germany’s numerous neighbors, and if a
“cause” is to be sought it should be sought in the peculiar history and psychology of
“the Germans”. The concomitant thesis holds that “Nazism” was one and the same
“in essence” from its inception to its downfall, and by consequence one is led to
believe that anyone who supported “Nazism” in 1933 must have full well known
what would happen in 1939 or 1942. All of this seems to me to be more of an ideo-
logical construct than a reconstruction of past events based on historiological prem-
ises. What follows from this construct is the refusal to apply comparative-contextual
methods such as are proper to object-historical studies generally and in principle, to
twentieth century German history. At this point, the structural impediments to think-
ing noted above, in the sense of reliance on unfounded narratives, unmask them-
selves as intent upon securing an ideological perspective of empowerment. Such
narratives, understood as exceptions to proper historical method, have become the
rule when it comes to discussions of “Heidegger’s politics”. Numerous versions of
the “case” of “Heidegger and National Socialism” are so exclusively focused on the
person of Heidegger in “Nazi Germany” that the historically and geographically
uninitiated reader must be hard put to identify Germany’s neighbors (any one of all
ten of them in 1933) or even to venture on what continent this “entity” might be
found. Of course, this is a rhetorical exaggeration, offered by way of illustration to
those commentators on our topic who, as Messinese writes, like to dramatize the
issues. From the historical point of view, however, it is seriously irresponsible and
misleading to treat of this subject without reference to the entire context of power
relations impinging upon the Germany of the first half of the twentieth century, giv-
ing special attention to the messianic ambitions of the Soviet Union to the East and
the Anglo-American imperium in the West. Moreover, as we recall, Heidegger him-
self made this geopolitical point in his Introduction to Metaphysics. We find that it
echoed in the Notebooks at a time when Central Europe had been extinguished as an
independent power factor:
“Only liberal democrats and so-called Christians could have us believe that the machinery
of death which has now been brought into play in Germany, in occupied Germany, bear in
mind, has any other objective than our complete annihilation. That this machinery is only
the ‘punishment’ for National Socialism, or the mere spawn of vengeance, one may sell for
a time to a few fools. In truth, one has found the desired opportunity, no, over the last 12
years, and indeed knowingly, this desolation has been collectively organized in order to be
brought into operation later”. (Observations II [59–60])
The ascription of an isolated, ahistorical essence to “National Socialist Germany”

not only colors our responses to Heidegger’s explicit or implicit political statements
by misrepresenting the concretely historical options open to him in the German-
European context. Not only does it predispose us in advance as to what will be
accepted in evidence for the constitution of a fact. Most seriously of all, it impacts
the distinction between philosophical thinking and ideological worldviews, for if
one cannot distinguish between object-historical accounts, in the classic sense, and
mere propaganda, then how can one expect to make the considerably more difficult
distinction between mindfulness of the grant and withholding of being, and object-
historical accounts of the causal relations and mutual influences of beings? How
will one be able to win sufficient freedom of thought to recognize that the essential-
ist view of “National Socialist Germany” is ultimately a metaphysical construct
based on concepts of collective subjectivity – the one presupposed as my own and
the one that I oppose as the other to mine? In this, ideological way of thinking, the
epochal dimension of National Socialism as one modus of the consummation of
modernity is covered up and along with it the need to question the dominant under-
standing of being as the global universal of the empowerment of self-securing power.
Heidegger’s critique of “National Socialism” in the Black Notebooks constantly
reiterates that the new regime is in fact too conservative, or “reactionary”, in Marxist
terms, to fulfill its being-historical destiny (as Heidegger conceived it) of preparing
the way for “communism”; it being understood that “communism” itself is con-
ceived as the perhaps long-lasting prelude to the inception of an other beginning.
For Heidegger’s understanding of the epoch of modernity holds that both its incep-
tion and its consummation are determined by “communism”:
“If the metaphysical constitution of peoples in the final phase of the consummation of
modernity is constituted by ‘communism’, then this implicates that the essence of commu-
nism must have empowered itself even with the inception of the modern epoch, if only in a
concealed way. Politically this came to be with the modern history of the English state”.
(Ponderings XIII [107–109], emphasis B.R.)
Thought in the light of the history of beyng, “communism” is a necessary, being-

historical passage. In Die Geschichte des Seyns, the essence of “communism” is
defined as the “empowerment of power to unconditioned machination”.4 The meta-
physical essence of “communism” is said to be Greek. What is empowered to come
to power are uniformity, conformity, equality. If the metaphysical essence of “com-
munism” is Greek, it cannot serve Heidegger as an anti-Semitic “trope” or “canard”
to collectively incriminate “the Jews”, as some have alleged. However, when “com-
munism” is conceived in epochal terms and with regard to the inception of the
modern epoch, as indicated here by this reference to the “English state”, then the
self-empowerment of early modern “communism” is only conceivable, so it seems
to me, in terms of Judeo-Christianity as a specific modality of political power, in
effect, as the political theology of a collective subject. The topic is clearly too
involved to be pursued here, but perhaps this notice may offer some food for thought
in consideration of the tangled web of political Christianity, Christian interpreta-
tions of Judaism, and political Jewry in the modern period.
In the epoch of the consummation of metaphysics as machination and enliving,
being empowers itself as self-overcoming power. Machinational power is integrated
into the functional totality of beings; it must not be confused with force or violence;
it is not possessed by anyone, for human beings cannot command being:
“‘My philosophy’ – if this foolish expression may be used – is said to be ‘a philosophy of
the abyss’ – and I ask in response: do we not perhaps stand on the edge of an abyss? Not
only us, we Germans, not only Europe – but rather the ‘world’? and not only since yester-
day, and not at all ‘because’ of Hitler, just as little as ‘through’ Stalin, or ‘through’
Roosevelt”. (Observations II, [72]).
The import of this statement is that one should be beware of mistaking the func-
tionaries of machination for powerholders of the destiny of the first inception of the
history of being. This could lead to the misleading claim that Heidegger, in being-
historical perspective, ascribes “power”, covert and behind the scenes, to interna-
tional Jewish organizations. On object-historical grounds, one would be hard put to
deny that certain Jewish organizations – such as the World Zionist Organization, for
example – seek to influence and are able to exert political influence in support of
their stated objectives. This is what lobbies do, everyone knows this, and there is no
need to seek out a hidden, sinister motive and intent if someone points this out.
However, when one confuses this dimension of discourse with being-historical
thinking, and as such, with mindfulness of the empowerment of being as power, one
can only go seriously astray. As Silvio Vietta writes: “No-one directs the unchained
4
See Heidegger M. (1998a), p. 191. For further discussion of this topic see Radloff B. (2007),
pp. 393–421.
unfolding of technological, industrial society. Not even a sworn group of conspira-

torial Jews [...] for Heidegger, it is self-evident that no subject agencies whatsoever,
not the Jews either, steer the processes of machination”. In the course of modernity,
the collective subject of Diaspora Jewry rather assimilated itself to these modes of
calculative thinking, along with the rest of European humanity.5 If, in being-
historical terms, the chief functionaries of global empires – Stalin and Roosevelt –
are understood, like Hitler himself, as mere “sign[s] of the fatality of the world
epoch”, then Heidegger will hardly ascribe conspiratorial “being-historical” power
to “the Jews”” (Observations III [46–47]). Of course, on another plane of discourse,
this does not exclude notice of the influence of Jewish functionaries. If such influ-
ence becomes the subject of critique, as well it might, it becomes a matter to be
examined by object-historical research in accord with standard historiographical
norms of evidence. The same criteria would apply, in this case, as claims to the
effect that Hitler, or Stalin, or Roosevelt – or some combination of all three – were
responsible for the outbreak of World War II. Should a historian who focuses on –
let us suppose – Roosevelt’s particular responsibility for WWII – be decried as
“anti-American”? this would be uncalled-for, and by the same token, to offer cri-
tiques of Jewish influence does not make one “anti-Semitic”. Vietta emphasizes that
the concept of “anti-Semitism”, as a designation of hostility to the Jewish collective,
strictly speaking pertains to antipathy motivated by religious or racial prejudice.6
Once this term is allowed to drift about into other dimensions it easily becomes
subject to unjustified overuse and misuse; in effect, use of this designation can itself
become part of a calculative strategy of domination. And this is rather too much in
evidence in the case of the “Heidegger case”.
The widespread moral condemnations of the person of Heidegger that are
brought into play with every reanimation of this “case” reflect another problem
directly related to the epoch of modernity as the era of the “worldview”. For in the
epoch of the consummation of subjectivity (as the conjunction of machination and
enliving) moral valuations claim a superior perspective of “value”. Conversely, to
ask the question of being is reduced to just one of many value-posting
perspectives:
“When senselessness comes to power, namely through the human being as subjectum – the
self-calculative sum of itself and the calculative gathering of all things – then the disposal
of all meaning [...] must be compensated for by the solely appropriate ersatz still admissi-
ble: through forms of calculation, and especially calculation with ‘values’. A ‘value’ trans-
poses the essentiality of the ownmost into the quantitative and the gigantic, giving beings
over to their accountability and calculability”. (Ponderings XIII, § 34)
A value is the focus of a perspective of interpretation, which is to say, of narrative-

explanatory temporality. Within the ideological context of a collective subject
explicitly opposed to the essentialized “National Socialism” of its own conception,
such perspectives are liable to be as silent as blind in face of the ethical missteps of
5
Vietta S. (2019), pp. 203, 205.
6
“progressive” friends and allies, for this would confuse the narrative. Consequently,
these expressions of moral outrage tend to be highly selective. The fundamental
problem inherent in the self-deception of this kind of value-oriented thinking, in our
context, is that it assumes a concept of being – as the universal, ahistorical ground
of beings – without being fully cognisant of how this unquestioned and unmastered
attunement to “reality” impinges upon one’s critique of Heidegger’s philosophy –
that is, in the form of the refusal of the question of being. In this context, moreover,
the moral condemnation of Heidegger and his philosophy works to retroactively
secure the globalist triumph of 1945, thereby to re-affirm and intensify the self-
securing of machination as dictated by global, functional networks of ahistorical
thinking. It is evident, as we have seen from the evidence presented in this book,
how the mutual intensification of political calculation and politically correct senti-
ments can easily inflect and distort the entire discussion of the Black Notebooks.
All of this points to the necessity of returning to the inception of the epoch of
modernity, out of which object-historical reckoning and its offspring, the contend-
ing ideological perspectives of the twentieth century, arise. As the excerpts from the
Black Notebooks recorded in this book also demonstrate, this inception is defined as
the self-securing truth of certitude, which ever more progressively manifests itself
in the empowerment of what Heidegger calls the historical animal. With the con-
summation of this epoch in Nietzsche’s “biological metaphysics” we “enter a
domain from which cultural production [...] constantly and solely receives its
grounding justification and without its knowledge, its impulses: that is, the domain
of the domination of modern metaphysics in its terminal form as the humanization
of humanity. All of cultural politics and education in culture unknowingly remains
enslaved to the dominion of the subject (to humanity as historical animal)”.
(Ponderings X, § 46)
The historical animal, heir to the rational animal of the entire metaphysical tradi-
tion, is the self-producing form of late-modern humanity in the era of the crossing.
“Biological metaphysics” references the cultural (re-)constitution of the rational
animal in accordance with the dictates of machination and enliving, that is, consum-
mated metaphysics. What is conceived as “biological” arises out of the cultural
self-interpretation of the human animal. The historical animal is the self-securing,
self-producing cultural animal: it accounts for the “past” out of a perspective of
value in order to secure the “future” and empower itself more securely of the “pres-
ent”. The entire “continuum” of objectified temporality is reduced to the one-
dimensional plane of human self-empowerment, which is itself empowered by the
metaphysical consummation of being as self-overpowering power. This continuum
of self-securing underlies the self-production of modern humanity in its subjectivity
and for this reason becomes the focus of Heidegger’s being-historical deconstruc-
tion. Heidegger’s remarks on the cultural productions of the collective subject of
Jewry and the mass media generally are motivated by this focus, and not by any
animus toward the potential of the Jews as a people. The same focus motivates
Heidegger’s confrontation with the institution of the university as the site of science,
cultural production, and the politics of enliving, which collectively organize the
deracination of modern mankind from being.
This consideration of the hermeneutic situation of the consummation of moder-

nity now brings us to what Heidegger calls mindfulness of our transitional, being-
historical situation and to the role of those Heidegger calls “transitional”
(übergängliche) thinkers, which is to say, those who enact the thinking of the
crossing:
“Every transitional thinker who enacts the crossing [into the other beginning] necessarily
stands in the twofold light of his own equivocation. Everything appears to refer back into
the past, from whence it can be accounted for (errechenbar), and at the same time, every-
thing depends on the rejection of the past and the arbitrary positing (Setzen) of something
to come, something which doesn’t appear to have a future. Such a thinker cannot be ‘accom-
modated’ anywhere – but this homelessness constitutes his unconceived rootedness in the
concealed and reserved history of beyng”. (Ponderings V, § 62)
“In the context of the history of being”, Francesco Alfieri writes, “passing-over,
or the crossing (Übergang), refers to Heidegger’s own speculative passing-over
from the question of being of the first beginning (being as the beingness of beings)
to the transformation of the question of being in the other beginning: beyng as truth,
clearing, unconcealment or openness of being [...]”. In the enactment sense of think-
ing, what is enacted is the formally indicative concept, as distinct from the content
sense; this enactment prepares the crossing from the representational thinking of the
being of beings to non-representational thinking as being-enowned to the dynamic
openness of beyng in its historicity.
The accounting-for of beings, and our own being, in terms of their causes and
their effects is founded in the single dimension of the threefold accounting of all
three dimensions of time as governed by the securing of temporality, and hence of
our own being-time. This uniform constitution of temporality underlies the question
of What the human being is. The What-question is “predetermined by animality
(animalitas)” as the transformation of the rational animal into the historical animal,
which is to say, the animal that recounts (narrates) its own cultural-biological ori-
gins, that accounts for itself and justifies itself for the sake of itself. The grounding
question, however, asks Who the human being is: this
“question itself posits the human being in its ownmost as steadfast in the truth of beyng. It
is the form of the question concerning the human that does not, for example, pass beyond
to seek a cause and such matters. The question, rather, does not ask about the human being,
for the sake of the human, at all, but it asks for the sake of beyng; because beyng, in the
encounter with human being, dis-places the human being to become the founding site
of truth. This question alone overcomes the modern, anthropological determination of
human being and therewith all preceding Christian-Hellenistic, Jewish and Socratic-
Platonic anthropology”. (Ponderings X, § 44)
The “positing” Heidegger speaks of, therefore, enacts the mindful questioning of
the history of being, thereby enacting the formally indicative projecting-open of a
possibility for being that arises out of our own being-historical thrownness.
The unaccommodated thinkers of the transition cannot be accommodated “in”
the nation, nor are they “of” the people because nation and people have not yet come
to be, nor can they come to be, in Heidegger’s sense, as long as these concepts are
determined by concepts of collective subjectivity and their self-securing reflection
back on themselves. This unaccommodated state is a kind of “homelessness” in the

midst of one’s own; and yet, as the enactment of the crossing-over, it already consti-
tutes a decision for the openness of the destining of being as a domain of question-
ing, a decision for “rootedness in the concealed and reserved history of beyng”. As
Alfieri writes, this “homelessness” conceals and shelters a veritable depth of
grounded “rootedness”: such thought is intimate with the truth of being. And this
gives it unshakable ground from whence it may unfold and from whence it may
establish a bond with our having-been. Not erudition, but the historicity of our
engaged confrontation with the tradition allows a future to be realized.
Conversely, Heidegger writes, “the decision of the Occident can never be engaged
within a domain dominated by the refusal of decision – which is to say, within the
dominion of the Judeo-Hellenistic ‘world’ as the realm of the already-decided”
(Ponderings X, § 59). The domain of the “already-decided” constitutes the twofold
consummation of the epoch of modernity – in the dimension of the secured or to-be-
secured, and in the dimension of the crossing, which, as such, already inheres in the
ungrounded truth of our metaphysical being (see Ponderings XI, § 29). These two
dimensions constitute the single dimension of metaphysical communism.
The metaphysical essence of human being that defines the historical animal as
the heir to the rational animal determines itself as self-producing self-securing ani-
mal: “The innermost essencing (Wesung) of subjectivity consists in self-positing
self-regulation in achievement of its necessary self-confirmation. Therefore this
[self-securing] must be shattered in its very foundation – in other words, metaphys-
ics as such must be overcome” (Ponderings XIV [18–19]). One essential component
of self-securing consists in securing the past in service to the empowerment of the
present and the future. For this reason, the control and manipulation of object-
historical discourse is integral to the consummation of metaphysics as machination
and enliving. Consequently, any challenge to the mostly unstated premise that
“human being” is metaphysically to be determined as the global-universal substance
underlying all historical particularity – which is reduced to a mere epiphenome-
non – will be perceived as a metaphysical and political aberration. Exclusive focus
on the object-historical dimension of temporality, moreover, given that this dimen-
sion concerns itself with beings and only beings, cannot grasp and refuses to
acknowledge the possibility of a more originary dimension of temporality, that is,
the historicity of beyng.
Heidegger’s remarks on Jewish matters, taken out of their proper context, have
led readers to misconceive or simply to ignore the centrality of Heidegger’s con-
frontation with the National Socialist state as recorded in the Notebooks. As Vietta
suggests, Heidegger’s break-through recognition of the being-historical “essence”
of our age arises out of his direct, phenomenological experience of real-existing
National Socialism as one modus of the consummation of modernity.7 And this
experience is presented to us in the Black Notebooks.
7
See ibid. p. 210.
This essence, however, is not unique to National Socialism – as machination and

enliving it permeated, and still it permeates, the “world” we inherited from the vic-
tors of 1945. It manifests as the exploitation of the planet and the comprehensive,
socio-technical transformation of the peoples of the earth into human resources in
service to globalism. Therefore, it is worth remembering that metaphysical liberal-
ism is another modus of the consummation of modernity – one which Heidegger
also experienced (and recorded in the Black Notebooks) in the form of the occupa-
tion of western Germany and the regimes of re-education it introduced to secure its
conquests. The “essentialization” of “Nazi Germany”, which these regimes of occu-
pation induced, posit this State as a kind of laboratory specimen to be preserved and
displayed as the completely Other to themselves. That they should do so is inherent
in machination as the consummation of modernity.
In conclusion, I trust that in the course of reading The Truth About the Black
Notebooks one may be led to a better understanding of why being-historical think-
ing constitutes a security threat to the established order of global politics and the
self-production of globalist mankind, for in its questioning openness to the destiny
of beyng it destabilizes the foundations of metaphysical humanity and the multitude
of forms in which it presently consummates itself.
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Index
A Farías, V., 7, 268, 275–277, 281–284, 293–295

Alfieri, F., 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 187, 237, 263–295 Faye, E., 277, 301, 302
Anaximander, 63 Fédier, F., 259, 276, 277, 281, 282, 284
Arendt, H., 20, 255, 316 Fehér, I., 20
Aristotle, 25, 29, 90, 166, 246 Figal, G., 258
Fichte, J.G., 4, 29
Fink, E., 268
B Finkielkraut, A., 14
Bachofen, J.J., 74 Freud, S., 178
Barmat, J., 163 Friedrich, H.-J., 28
Barth, K., 147
Bäumler (Baeumler), A., 34, 59, 74
Benz, W., 209 G
Blochmann, E., 255, 315 Gadamer, H.-G., 1, 7, 263, 267, 268, 273, 274,
Brock, W., 315 276–278, 283–285,
Brunschvicg, L., 104 288–290, 293–295
Bursztein, A., 304 Geiger, M., 236
George, S., 99, 116, 149, 177
Gerhart, W., see Gurian, W.
C Goethe, J.W., 123, 129
Caputo, J.D., 304 Graml, H., 209
Conrad-Martius, H., 234–236 Gurian, W., 312
D H
David, P., 20, 303 Haffner, S., 302
Derrida, J., 288–290, 293, 295 Hammerschlag, S., 304
Descartes, R., 29, 105, 126, 129, 136 Hegel, G.W.F., 4, 12, 20–22, 28, 129, 189,
Di Cesare, D., 182, 187–189, 259, 265, 266, 194, 206, 244, 299, 303
307, 309–312 Heidegger, A., 8, 12
Domarus, M., 162 Heidegger, E. (Petri, E.), 6, 23, 315
Heidegger, F., 269, 275
Heidegger, Heinrich, 269, 274, 275
F Heidegger, Hermann, 5, 12, 13, 102, 204, 255,
Fackenheim, E.L., 303 256, 316
F.-W. Herrmann, F. Alfieri, Martin Heidegger and the Truth About the
Black Notebooks, Analecta Husserliana 123,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69496-8
340 Index
Heidegger, M., passim Mussolini, B., 191, 205

Held, K., 11
Heraclitus, 60
Herrmann, F.-W. von, 1, 3, 8–29, 122, 241, N
255–257, 259, 263, 267, 268, 271, Nenon, Th., 228
273–278, 281–286, 288, 289, Newton, I., 19
291, 293–295 Nietzsche, F.W., 3, 21, 54, 74, 87, 95, 107,
Herzl, Th., 321–323 127–130, 169, 177, 181–183, 219,
Hess, M., 322 255, 257, 266, 303, 328
Heyse, H., 72, 103, 117
Hitler, A., 6, 7, 15, 36, 47, 49, 65, 70, 152,
160, 162, 190–192, 194, 201, 204, O
205, 208, 209, 215, 218, 221, 224, Ott, H., 293–295
230–232, 250, 258, 264, 282, 284,
326, 327
Hölderlin, J.Ch.F., 15, 28, 75, 78, 83, 107, P
123, 149, 169, 177, 255, 257, 266 Parmenides, 63
Husserl, M. (Frau Husserl), 233 Pascal, B., 20, 103
Husserl, E., 25, 29, 61, 93, 172, 187, 190, 193, Patterson, D., 303–305
228, 229, 232–237, 264, 265, Paul, A. (St.), 24
293–295, 315 Pflaumer, R., 273, 274
Pfänder, A., 236
Plato, 189, 194, 206, 257
I Pöggeler, O., 29, 255
Iadicicco, A., 156 Pre-Socratic thinkers, 63
Ingarden, R., 234, 236, 265
R
J Radek, K., 179
Jaspers, K., 103, 201, 255 Radloff, B., 317, 321, 326
Jonas, H., 20 Ricoeur, P., 288, 290
Rilke, R.M., 149, 177
Roche de la Torre, A., 309
K Rockmore, T., 305
Kant, I., 3, 4, 29, 271, 303, 305 Roosevelt, F.D., 191, 209, 250, 326, 327
Kern, I., 234 Rosenberg, A., 193, 229
Kierkegaard, S.A., 25, 54, 219, 257
Klages, L., 59
Kutisker, I.B., 163 S
Safranski, R., 302
Sartre, J.-P., 276
L Sauer, J., 315
Lacoue-Labarthe, Ph., 290 Schelling, F.W.J., 4, 12, 20, 123, 248
Leibniz, G.W. von, 19, 129, 295 Schröter, M., 248
Lenin (Vladimir Il’ič Ul’janov), 240 Schüßler, I., 18
Levinas, E., 303, 304 Schwocher, V., 301
Litwinow (Litvinov), M.M., 179 Sepp, H. R., 228
Löwith, K., 20, 316 Sheehan, T., 304
Lyotard, J.-F., 304 Sieg, U., 102, 125, 162, 302
Stalin, (Iosif Vissarionovič Džugašvili), 191,
209, 215, 250, 326, 327
M Stein, E., 263–265, 236, 237, 263–266
Marx, K., 244, 321–324 Sternberger, D., 192, 202
Messinese, L., 7, 299–313 Szilasi, L., 316
Index 341
Szilasi, W., 316 V

Vietta, S., 327, 330
Volpi, F., 255, 256
T Vongehr, Th., 265
Thomas Aquinas (St.), 88
Tillich, P., 202
Trawny, P., 10–14, 18, 22, 121, 189, 254, 266, W
267, 305–309, 311, 313 Wagner, R., 130, 137, 148
Tugendhat, E., 271 Welte, B., 269, 275
Wittgenstein, L., 310
U
Ulmer, K., 271

Analecta Husserliana: Martin Heidegger and The Truth About The Black Notebooks

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Analecta

Martin Heidegger and

The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research

Jadwiga S. Smith, Co-President of the American Division, The World

Daniela Verducci, Co-President of the European Division, The World

Published under the auspices of

Martin Heidegger and the

ISSN 0167-7276 ISSN 2542-8330 (electronic)

ideologically contaminated by such concepts of collective subjectivity as find

3 The Black Notebooks. Critical Historical Analysis Without

Translator’s Afterword������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 317

Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, and Francesco Alfieri

How shall such a hypocritical generation, indulged in France as it is here, be capable of

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 1

unequivocally reveal that the reception of these manuscripts was instrumentalized,

concerning the “Heidegger Case”, as demanded by the “defenders of dialogue”,

Reliance on the position of “metaphysical anti-Semitism” depends on occasional

confrontation with modernity in the context of being-historical thinking. Therefore,

In the course of proof-reading this book, we felt ourselves obligated to commu-

Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann

1  reliminary Remarks on the “Black Notebooks”, or

In his text of 1937/1938, “A Retrospective Look at the Pathway”, Heidegger refers

Because Heidegger emphasizes the fundamentally being-historical concept of

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 9

superficially pulling together certain remarks Heidegger that recorded, unavoidably

2  rigins of the Confused Interpretations

Heidegger takes his distance from political positions of National Socialism – as

3  he Place of Martin Heidegger’s “Notebooks” or “Black

The Appendix to Mindfulness (GA 66 of the Complete Edition), “A Retrospective

The same section Number 4, concerning “preparatory elaborations”, also has

I recommended the current editor of the Black Notebooks to the administrators of

“building blocks” – that is, components – of the structure of being-historical think-

4  he Jewish References in the Black Notebooks Are Without

As noted above, I recommended the current editor of the Black Notebooks as

5  hy Martin Heidegger’s Being-Historical Thinking

seven treatises. Not a single enowning-historical concept of these treatises is even

6  f the Greatness and Significance of Martin Heidegger’s

6.1  eidegger’s Thought as Primordial Experience

After Martin Heidegger’s first lectures in the winter semester of 1915–1916, he

6.2  eidegger’s Elaboration of a Hermeneutic

In this passage, Heidegger invokes the phenomenological method of seeing,

hermeneutic seeing and explication of the phenomena of factical life possible

6.3  he Marburg Lectures of 1923–1928 Prepare the Way

6.4  he Experience of the Historicity of Being Itself

being. Heidegger grasps arrival as the enowning of enownment, withdrawal as

Hegel, G. W. F. (1952). Phänomenologie des Geistes. Hamburg, Germany: Felix Meiner.

1 Preface. “For the Few – For the Rare Ones”

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 31

gradually and systematically. Traces of this elaboration of insights can be found in

2 Ponderings II-VI: Black Notebooks 1931–19381

2.1 Heidegger’s Firm Attitude in Regard to National Socialism

Winke x Überlegungen (ii) und Anweisungen Intimations X, Ponderings II and

Winke x Überlegungen (ii) und Anweisungen Intimations X, Ponderings II and Directives

Überlegungen und Winke iii Ponderings and Intimations III

Überlegungen und Winke iii Ponderings and Intimations III

7. Die Ministerien übernehmen 7. The ministries have assumed the

Überlegungen und Winke iii Ponderings and Intimations III

Überlegungen und Winke iii Ponderings and Intimations III

Überlegungen und Winke iii Ponderings and Intimations III

Überlegungen und Winke iii Ponderings and Intimations III

Überlegungen und Winke iii Ponderings and Intimations III

Überlegungen und Winke iii Ponderings and Intimations III

Überlegungen und Winke iii Ponderings and Intimations III

3 The Black Notebooks. Critical Historical Analysis Without

Translator’s Afterword�� 317

1 reliminary Remarks on the “Black Notebooks”, or

2 rigins of the Confused Interpretations

3 he Place of Martin Heidegger’s “Notebooks” or “Black

4 he Jewish References in the Black Notebooks Are Without

5 hy Martin Heidegger’s Being-Historical Thinking

6 f the Greatness and Significance of Martin Heidegger’s

6.1 eidegger’s Thought as Primordial Experience

6.2 eidegger’s Elaboration of a Hermeneutic

6.3 he Marburg Lectures of 1923–1928 Prepare the Way

6.4 he Experience of the Historicity of Being Itself

1 Preface. “For the Few – For the Rare Ones”

2 Ponderings II-VI: Black Notebooks 1931–19381

2.1 Heidegger’s Firm Attitude in Regard to National Socialism

2.2 eracination, Soil and Related Compound Words: Their

2.2.1 Deracination – Strong in Resistance Despite Resistance

2.2.2 Ground and Related Expressions and Composite Words

3 Ponderings VII-XI: The Black Notebooks 1938–193912

3.1 eidegger’s Explicit “Distanciation” from National

3.2 “ Modern Humanity” Compared to the “Humanity

4 Ponderings XII-XIV: The Black Notebooks 1939–194139

4.1 he National Socialist Worldview: Consequences of Their