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 EICHMANN
AND

THE DESTRUCTION
OF

HUNGARIAN JEWRY

by
RANDOLPH L. BRAHAM

WORLD FEDERATION OF HUNGARIAN JEWS

Magyar Zsid6k Vilagszovetsege
New York- Tel-Aviv

•
Published and Distributed
by
TWAYNE PUBLISHERS, INC./NEW YORK
: _J,-
• J

./
'. /

) .

@ 1961 by the author, New York, N. Y.

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 61-12662
Printed in the United States of Amc:rica
First Printing, March, 1961
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
.2.
,._ Page
1:C'.EWORD 6
~iFACE
'->•
7
:.i.CHMANN AND THE DESTRUCTION OF HUNGARIAN JEWRY 9
"IBLIOGRAPHY 38.
Part I. The Catastrophe Period
1. Reference Works 39
2. Comprehensive Works 39
Part II. The «Eichmann Bibliography"
1. The Capture of Eichmann 40
2. The Eichmann Case Before the Security Council 40
3. Israel's Competence to Try Eichmann 41
a. Pro-Israeli Views 41
b. Anti-Israeli Views 42
4. Preparations for the Trial 42
5. The Press on Eichmann 43
6. Eichmann's Own Story 43
7. General References 43
a.Books 43
b. Articles 43
APPENDICES 45
Documents (Facsimiles)
1. Express letter from Eichmann to Klingenfuss con-
cerning the deportation of Jews from Hungary 46
2. Express letter from Eichmann to Rademacher con-
cerning the deportation of foreign Jews from West-
ern Europe 48
3. Telegram from Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office
concerning, inter alia, Eichmann's attitude toward
the emigration of a number of Hungarian Jews 49
4. Note from Eichmann to Gunther regarding the final
solution of the Jewish question in Hungary 52
5. Note from Eichmann to the Foreign Office concern-
ing the fate of a Hungarian Jew in Germany 53
TABLE 54
MAP Inside back cover
 Foreword

The trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel has again brought to the fore
the sordid and inhuman record of the entire Nazi era. Indicted by the
State of Israel on fifteen counts, Eichmann was charged with crimes
against humanity, crimes against the Jewish people, war crimes and
membership in Nazi organizations. Prominent among the charges were
the ones relating to the destruction of Hungarian Jewry. And, indeed,
Eichmann's design to bring about "the solution of the Jewish ques-
tion," as the Nazi extermination program was called, was nowhere
as successful and efficient as in Hungary!
It is for this reason incumbent upon the World Federation of
Hungarian Jews as the main representative organ of the surviving
Hungarian Jews dispersed the world over, to focus the attention of
world public opinion on this darkest chapter in the history of Hun-
garian Jewry.

May it serve as edification for future generations.

March, 1961
FREDERIC GOROG
President
World Federation of Hungarian Jews
 Preface
The capture of Adolf Eichmann and the subsequent dispute be-
tween Israel and Argentina before the Security Council of th1e United
Nations have aroused new interest in the history of Nazi Germany in
general and of its anti-Jewish policies in particular. This interest
gained momentum as the preparations for Eichmann's trial pro-
gressed.
The 15 years that have elapsed since the end of World War ll
have brought to light a plethora of new material and made possible a
more objective evaluation of the Nazi design to liquidate the Jews
of Europe, euphemistically referred to as "the final solution of the
Jewish question."
This study has a modest aim. Its primary purpose is to present
a succinct, though informative, account of the destruction of the
Hungarian Jewish community during World War II, with special
emphasis on the role of Eichmann and his collaborators. Its scop~
and coverage are limited, for, indeed, volumes would be required
to write the definitive history of Hungarian Jewry during the Nazi
era on the basis of the recently discovered documentary and archival
material alone. Such a larger project is now under consideration.
This work does not include any sensational elements relating
to a man's life or his capture. Many books and countless articles
hav~ appeared on these aspects throughout the world; the imterested
reader may consult the selected bibliography in this respe:ct. The
present study attempts instead to present a documented portrayal
of a small though important phase in the ghastly record of Nazi
totalitarianism and the men in its service.
Based primarily on original sources, the study reveals the p!an5
and pressures of the Third Reich to bring about the "final solutio!l
of the Jewish question" in Hungary and describes the methods whic:t
were used for its implementation after the occupation on March
19, 1944.

7
 I
!
I
1
In his autobiography, Adolf Eichmann claimed that he was
"merely a little cog in the machinery that carried out the directives
and orders of the German Reich." This fully do,cumented study, in I
the author's view, belies this claim. It shows that Eichmann and ,
his German and Hungarian collaborators, far from being "mere
cogs" were actually among the originators of, and the ones primarily
responsible for the destruction of Hungarian Jewry.
Most of the documents cited in the text stem f1rom the archives of
the Inland II section of the German Foreign Offic:e (Volumes Inland
Ilg 58/1 , 58/2, 58/3, A/B 71/1 , A/B 71/2, A/B 72/3, and A/B
72/4). Some of these were also selected for use: in the trial of the
major war criminals in Nuremberg in 1945-46, and in the "Trials of
War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Con-
trol Council Law No. 10." These documents are cited by their trial
reference numbers (e.g., NG-2586; 736-D; N0-0.30, etc.); all others
are cited by their original archival reference numbers.
I am indebted to Mr. Emery Jacoby for his painstaking work in
preparing the map, and to my wife, Elizabeth, for her help in pre-
paring the manuscript.
New York
March, 1961
Randolph L. Braham
 EICHMANN
and the Destruction of
Hungarian Jewry

The German occupation of Hungary on March 19, 1944, brought

an end to what had once been one of the most flourishing Jewish
communities in Europe. The destruction of Hungarian Jewry was
the culmination of the insistent and ever-increasing pressure of the
Third Reich to bring about the "final solution of the Jewish question"
in Hungary. One of the Nazi leaders most responsible for the imple-
mentation of this program was SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Adolf Eich-
mann, head of Section IV B 4 of the Reich Security Main Office
in charge of "Jewish affairs."
Eichmann's mind was set on the liquidation of Hungarian Jewry
long before Hitler even thought about the occupation of Hungary.
On July 21, 1942, General Alfred Jodi of the Wehrmacht trans-
mitted to the Reich Security Main Office (through Department D
III of the Foreign Office) a request by a certain General Heszlenyi
of the Hungarian Army that approximately 100,000 Jews "who had
entered Hungary illegally" be deported to Transnistria. 11 Eventually
the matter came before Eichmann, who rejected the idea of mobiliz-
ing the entire deportation apparatus for a mere 100,000 Jews and
suggested instead to wait until all the Jews could be taken care of. 2
In the summer of the same year, when the Nazi hierarchy decided
to extend the anti-Jewish measures in German-occupied Western
Europe to Jews of foreign citizenship, Eichmann went out of his way
to see that the Hungarian Jews in these areas would be included.

10 III 4364.
2IV B 4 a 3433/42g (1446) . This letter was dated September 25, 1942 (see
facsimile, 1). It is interesting to note that two months later, Himmler seems
to have changed his mind and in a letter to Ribbentrop (IV B 4-3433/42g
( 1446) suggested that he was willing for this purpose to assign Dieter
Wisliceny, "the expert responsible for clearing Slovakia of Jews," to the
German Embassy in Budapest.

9
In his letter to Rademacher of the Foreign Office, 3 Eichmann
specifically referred to the case of Hungarian Jews in the Nether-
lands.
The enactment of anti-Jewish measures in countries other than
Germany was effectuated by Eichmann's office with the closest
collaboration of a special section of the Foreign Office (Deutsch-
land III; later Inland II) .4 This section was particularly active in
connection with the liquidation of Hungarian Jewry. In its memoran-
dum of December 8, 1941 , entitled "Desires and Ideas of the
Foreign Office in Connection With the Intended Total Solution of
the Jewish Question in Europe,''5 prepared in anticipation of the
Wannsee Conference, 6 the Foreign Office emphasized the suggestion
relating to the "deportation of the Jews handed over . . . by the
Hungarian government . . . , [and to] the readiness to deport to
the East the Jews living in [Hungary] ."
Dissatisfied with the Hungarian government's continued insistence
that Jewish Hungarian nationals in German-occupied Western
Europe be excluded from the anti-Jewish measures and especially
3 Sec facsimile, 2 for Eichman's letter of July 9, 1942 (IV B 4 a 2686/42).
Wh]c Eichmann was working toward the deportation of all of the Jews
of Hungary, he found ample time to round up and deport individual Hun-
garian Jews in Germany and German-occupied territories (in viclation of a
German-Hungarian agreement) allegedly for their "inability to prove their
Hungarian citizenship" or for having committed "anti-German crimes." See,
for example, facsimile, 5.
4 /nland II was actua1ly a highly secret liaison office between the Foreign
Office and the Reich Security Main Office. It was headed by Martin Luther
until the middle of 1943 when he was sent to a concentration camp for con-
spiring against Ribbentrop. He was succeeded by Horst Wagner and his
assistant Eberhard Thadden; both of these played a determinant role in the
destruction of Hungarian Jewry.
SNG-2586.
6Jt was at this conference, held in Berlin (in the office of the International
Criminal Police Commission, Am Grossen Wannsee, No. 56/8) on January
20. 1942, that the "final solution of the Jewish question" was decided upon .
In addition to the then Chief of the Security Police and SO, Reinhard Hey-
drich , the conference was also attended by 14 other Nazi leaders including
Heinrich Mueller and Adolf Eichmann. For greater details on the confer-
ence, see Gerald Reidinger, The Final Solution. The Attempt to Exterminate
the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945. New York: The Beechhurst Press, 1953,
pp. 95-105.

10
with the Hungarian handling of the Jewish question, the Foreign
Office began an intensive pressure campaign to bring about the
"final solution" of the Hungarian Jewish problem as well. This cul-
minated in the Luther Memorandum of October 6, 1942,7 in which
the Hungarians were plainly told that differential treatment of Hun-
garian Jews in Germany and German-occupied territories would no
longer be tolerated, and that Germany desired the fullest imple-
mentation of anti-Jewish measures in Hungary. Specifically, it
stipulated that the "solution of the Jewish question in Hungary"
required 1) legislation for the complete elimination of the Jews
from cultural and economic life; 2) marking of Jews; 3) evacu-
ation to the East; and 4) disposal of Jewish property in accordance
with the principle of territoriality. The Hungarian government, how-
ever, flatly rejected the German request. 8 Emphasizing that as a
sovereign nation Hungary was the first to initiate anti-Jewish legis-
lation relating to the exclusion of Jews from the spiritual and cul-
tural life of the country, it maintained that abiding by the German
request would bring about the ruin of the Hungarian economy and
also harm the Reich since "80 percent of Hungarian industry is in
the service of the German economy." Miklos Kallay, the then Prime
Minister of Hungary, also insisted that the "solution of the Jewish
question" as demanded by the Germans could not be achieved, pri-
marily because the Hungarian peasants were not anti-Semitic. 9 The
attitude of the Hungarian government was found "incomprehen-
sible." In expressing Germany's ire for Hungary's "excuses," Luther
suggested that "if the marking and resettlement of Jews should dis-
rupt the economy" the Germans would come to the Hungarian's
aid. 10 At any rate, he hoped that the Hungarian Jewish question
would be solved in a radical manner before the end of the war.

7NG-1800; NG-5086; NG-5562.

8 Szt6jay's note to the German Foreign Office was submitted on December 2,
1942 (lnl. llg 58/1).
9See Jagow's note of November 13, 1942 (D III 1023.g.) to the German
Foreign Office concerning a discussion with Kallay on the Jewish question in
Hungary. At another occasion (June 2, 1943) Jagow reported that Kallay
was not inclined to deport the Jews as long as he did not know where to
relocate them (D III 1540.g.).
lOLuther memorandum of December 18. 1942 (D III 70.g.).

11
On January 16, 1943 Luther again warned Dome Szt6jay, the
Hungarian Minister to Berlin, that the Fuehrer was determined
"come what may, to remove all Jews from Europe while the war is
still on ... [and that the Germans] could not in the long run look
at the danger [of Hungary's sheltering about a miUion Jews] without
action . .. " 11 A few months later Horthy met Hith!r at Schloss Kless-
heim 12 where the Hungarian Jewish question was again brought to
the fore. Hitler told Horthy that Hungary should lfollow the example
of Poland, where "if the Jews did not want to work they were simply
shot." Upon Horthy's assertion that he could not have the Jews
killed after they were deprived of a livelihood, Ribbentrop, who
also attended the conference, replied that they should "either be
killed or sent to concentration camps."
In the meantime, the expert on Central South-Eastern Europe
working in the office of State Secretary Wilhelm Keppler, the former
Chief of the Reich Office for Soil Research in the Reich Ministry
of Economics, Edmund Veesenmayer-a Brigadier General in the
SS who later became German Minister and Reich Plenipotentiary in
Hungary-was sent on a first-hand fact-finding tour of Hungary. In
his secret report of April 30, 1943 13 he portrayed Hungary as an
"arrogant nation with very little national substance" and as a very
insignificant ally. He blamed the Jews as the ones primarily respon-
sible for the defeatist attitude in the country and for the "extensive
sabotage of the common war aim." Hungary's sheltering of the
Jews was attributed to the Hungarians' belief that they would thereby
escape serious air raids and would be able to protect "Hungarian
interests after the war by proving through the Jews that they waged
the war on the side of the Axis Powers only because they were
forced to." Regent Horthy was portrayed as being surrounded by
Jews and by "aristocrats with Jewish family relations." In enumer-
ating the four enemies of Germany inside Hungary, he listed "1) the
Jews and 2) the aristocracy with family relations to the Jews" as
the most important ones.

llfbid.
12See Nuremberg Doc. No. 736-D on the Hitler-Horth:y meeting at Schloss
Klessheim of April 17, 1943.
13NG-2192.

12
 In his second secret report on Hungary dated December 14,
1943 14 Veesenmayer reiterated his contention that "the Jews are
enemy No. 1 and the 1.1 million Jews amount to as m:any sabo-
teurs ... and they will have to be looked upon as Bolshevik van-
guards." Portending the German occupation of March 19, 1944,
Vessenmayer suggested that if Horthy were replaced by "the Fuehrer,
the Reich, and a Delegate of the Reich who is up to his milssion, the
Hungarian problem would be solved for all practical intents and
purposes." He supplemented his report by conveying the t!ssence of
a secret discussion with Bela J urcsek, Minister of Supp1ly in the
Kallay Government, who had informed him about the Prilme Mini-
ster's double dealings with the Allies. Among his suggestions and
recommendations, he urged that the Germans engage in "ever-
growing criticism in regard to the Jewish question, concentration of
troop contingents .. . on various important points of the German-
Hungarian border, the eventual delegation of a political special rep-
resentative vested with far-reaching powers for a certain duration,
and [in the case of the bombing of Budapest] notification to the
enemy that for every Hungarian killed ... 100 wealthy Jews will
be shot and their property used for reparation purposes.·"
In the meantime, Kallay's inauspicious "secret'' negotia1tions with
the Western Allies became increasingly irritating to the Germans.
Fearing the repetition of Italy's example of 1943, especially in the
light of the Russian's inexorable advance in the East, Germany de-
cided to bring about the occupation of Hungary. Not negligible in
this decision was also the "unsolved" Jewish question in the country.
In fact, one of the official pretexts for the occupation was. "the un-
restricted presence of some one million Jews as a concrete menace
to the safety of German arms in the Balkan Peninsula." 16 The occu-
pation itself took place during Horthy's second visit to Schloss
Klessheim where he had been called by Hitler, allegedly 1to discuss
the terms on which Hungary would remain in the war. Horthy
arrived on March 18, 1944 and at 5 P.M. of the same d!ay Major
Kraussoldt of the W ehrmacht informed the Foreign Office about de-

t4NG-5560.
I5American Jewish Yearbook, New York, Vol. 46, 1944, p. 257.

13
tails of "Operation Margarethe," the military code name for the
occupation of Hungary. 16 The occupation took place in the morning
of March 19, while Horthy was under virtual house arrest. When
he was allowed to return he was in the company of Veesenmayer,
the newly appointed Minister and Reich PleniJpotentiary. Hitler·s
decree relating to Veesenmayer's appointment also stipulated that
"to perform tasks of the SS and Police to be carded out by German
agencies in Hungary, and especially police duties in connection with
the Jewish problem, a Higher SS and Police Leade:r will be appointed
to the staff of the Reich Plenipotentiary and will act in accordance
with his political directives." 1'7
During one of his first meetings with Horthy, Veesenmayer empha-
sized that "the time of eternal compromising is past and the idea
of gaining time ... was not in accordance with thte will of Hitler. '' 18
He immediately assumed over-all responsibility for the formation of ·
a new, Nazi-oriented Hungarian government, n~taining the power
to approve, keep, and bring about the dismi!ssal of individual
ministers. 19
Eichmann's office was, of course, alerted in atdvance of the im-
pending occupation. Eichmann himself saw his life's dream come
true. He finally had a chance to test his well-oiled death apparatus
on a massive and grandiose scale in a lightning operation. And,
indeed, the "master," as Heinrich Mueller, his immediate superior,
had called him, proved to have been at his best i111 Hungary. Havin~
the benefit of years of experience in the deportation and extermi-
nation program as directed centrally from Berllin, he could now
test his efficiency in the field. Within the course of three months
he cleared Hungary (excepting Budapest) of Jews!
Members of the Eichmann Sonderkommando met early in March
at Mauthausen, where the blueprint for the "final solution" was
discussed in minutest detail. In addition to Eichmann, the Sander-

16NG-5525.
17NG-2947.
18NG-5522.
19NG-5680.

14
kommando contained Hermann Alois Krumey, 20 Otto Hunsche, 21
Dieter Wisliceny, 22 Theodor Dannecker, Abromeit, Novak, and
Dr. Seidl. Of lesser importance were Schmidtsiefen, Kryschak, Rau,
Hartenberger, Girzick, Burger, Wolf, Ramberger, and S:chmidt. 23
They were ably assisted by Otto Winkelmann, Higher SS and
Police Leader and Himmler's immediate representative in Hungary,
and by his assistant Ernst Kienast, Geschke, commanding officer of
the Security Police, and by Veesenmayer and his staff-Adolf Hezin-
ger, Carl Rekowski, Grell, and Feine.
Immediately after the entry of German troops into Budapest
hundreds of prominent Jews were arrested, together wiith many
anti-Nazi Hungarian political leaders, and held as hostage:s, signal-
izing the beginning of an unending sequence of suffering and
brutality. By the end of March the number of Jews arrested in
"individual actions" (Einze/aktionen) rose to 3,364, 2 -l and by the
time the "special action" (Sonderaktion) began in the second half
of April it had climbed to 8,225. 25
Soon after the occupation, Ernst Kaltenbrunner. Chief of the
Security Police and SD, also appeared in Budapest and was instru-
mental in having Laszlo Endre andLaszl6 Baky included in the Min-
istry of the Interior as State Secretaries in charge of the Jewish
question. They became Eichmann's closest co11aborators and worke1

2°SS-Obersturmbandfuehrer Krumey was captured in Italy in May 1945. He

was questioned in the so-called "Lidice-children" case but no charges were
pressed against him at Nuremberg. Twice arrested and freed by a Frankfurt
am Main court "for lack of evidence," he was rearrested in May 1960 fol -
lowing the capture of Eichmann. The arrest is to a large extent atttribut'lblc
to the activities of the World Federation of Hungarian Jews whicJh prepared
and submitted the incriminating evidence.
210uo Hunsche, one of Eichmann's chief lieutenants in Hungary, lived freely
in West Germany until November 1960 when he was arrested and charged
with complicity in the murder of about 1,500 Hungarian Jews.
220ieter WisJiceny was Eichmann's chief assistant in Greece, Slovakia, and
Hungary. Captured after the war, he testified for the prosecution in Nurem-
berg. Tried by a Slovak court in Bratislava, he was hanged in July 1948.
23-See Appendix A-II of Affidavit C by Wisliceny in Na zi Conspiracy and Ag-
f!ression . VoL VIII. Washington: U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1946, pp.
606-621.
24NG-5527.
25NG-5596.

15
out with him the program leading to the "final solution of the
Jewish question."
The newly formed Szt6jay Government began its ignominous rule
by unleashing what seemed a never-ceasing avalaJnche of anti-Jewish
decrees. 26 The Jews were dismissed from all branches of the public
or municipal services; they were debarred from the professions; they
were deprived of virtually all possibilities of earning a livelihood;
their businesses were closed and their stocks blocked; they had to
surrender their cash assets (over 3000 pengo) ; their radios, tele-
phones, cars, and bicycles were confiscated, and tihey were forbidden
to use any means of transportation except stre:et-cars; they were
excluded from hotels, cafes, restaurants, theatres, movies, and other
public facilities used by non-Jews; the Jewish organizations were
dissolved and the Jewish communities all over the country were
placed under the immediate jurisdiction of the Jewish Council
(Zsid6 Tanacs) of Budapest. Established under the orders of the
Gestapo, the Council was headed by Samuel Stern, a highly esteemed
member of Horthy's Privy Council. 27 The Jewish Council, probably
unwittingly and against its own will, became the c:hief instrument for
the execution of the anti-Jewish measures order1ed by the German
and Hungarian authorities.
In the afternoon of March 19, the leaders of the Jewish commu-
nity of Budapest were approached by the SS. KrUimey and Wisliceny
(Eichmann arrived only on March 21 ) appeared at the headquarters
of the Community at Sip Utca, 12 and requested through Laszlo
Ban6czi that the Jewish leaders meet them the following day at 10
A.M. At this meeting the Jews were informed tlhat "in accordance
with an agreement concluded between Germany and the Hungarian

2 6All enactments had to go out as Ministerial Orders, since Horthy would not
sign any anti-Jewish laws. Thus he conveniently wasllted his hands of the
anti-Jewish measures without however making any suggestions that the
Germans' requests be refused.
27 Jn addition to Mr. Stern, the first Jewish Council included Dr. Emo Boda.
Dr. Erno Peto and Dr. Karoly Wilhelm representing: the reform Jews of
Pest, Dr. Samuel Csobadi representing the reform }(:ws of Buda, Samuel
Kahan-Frankl and Ftilop Freudiger as the delegates of the Orthodox com-
munity, and Dr. Nison Kahan representing the Zionis1ts. It was reorganized
on May 6, 1944, by virtue of Decree. No. 176,744/1944, VII.b. B.M. issued

16
government, the right of dealing with Jewish questions rests exclu-
sively with the Germans." 28 They were reassured that no harm
would befall them or Hungarian Jewry if they obeyed orders, and
that there would be no arbitrary arrests or deportations. The Ger-
mans, they were told, were only interested in increasing the output
of the Hungarian war industries, for which purpose they would also
ask for Jewish "volunteers." Virtually hypnotized by these promises
and manifestations of good will, the leadership left the conference
with an air of optimism and confidence with regard to the future of
Hungarian Jewry. This feeling was to some extent reinforced by
another contact with the Germans, established through the Budapest
Rescue Committee headed by Dr. Rezso (Rudolph) Kasztner. Early
in April Kasztner approached Wisliceny, who was "recommended"
to him by Rabbi Weismandl of Bratislava as a very venal person
who could be dealt with. Negotiations were soon taken over by
Eichmann, who offered the exchange of one million Jews for 10,000
trucks, which he said were not to be used against the Western
Allies. J eel Brand, Kasztner's assistant, was actually flown out of
Hungary in a German plane to establish contact with the British
but was soon arrested by the latter.29 Although the negotiations were
on the whole unsuccessful, if not harmful, 1,709 Hungarian Jews

by State Secretary Endre. The new Council included in addition to Mr. Stern,
Drs. Peto and Wilhelm, Messrs. Kahan-Frankl and Freudiger such figures
as Sandor Torok, Dr. Jozsef Nagy, Chief Medical Officer of the Jewish
Hospital, Dr. Janos Gabor, the legal representative of the Jewish community
of Budapest, and Dr. Bela Berend, Chief Rabbi of Szigetvar.
The Council's chief legal adviser was Dr. Imre Reiner, a leader of the
Jewish orthodoxy and one of the most courageous figures during this un-
happy era in Hungarian Jewish history.
28This was corroborated by Hungarian governmental organs when they were
contacted to this effect. See also Samuel Stern's Affidavit, a copy of which
is available at the YIVO Archives in New York.
29Joel Brand was a member of the Zionist-led Budapest Rescue Committee.
In July 1944 he was sent to Turkey with the approval of the SS and en-
trusted with the mission to negotiate this exchange with the Anglo-Ameri-
cans. Brand eventually fell into British hands and the whole mission proved
fruitless. For Brand's account see Alex Weissberg, Die Geschichte von Joel
Brand. Koeln-Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1956, 319 p. Also available in
French, Hebrew and English translation.

17
were transferred to Switzerland via Bergen-Belsen. 30 Of these, 388
came from Kasztner's home town of Cluj ( Kolozsvar). :u
The bulk of Hungarian Jewry, however, fared less well. In its
implementation of the "final solution of the Jewish question in
Hungary," Eichmann's Sonderkommando followed the well-tested
approach which had been employed successfully in other Nazi-
occupied countries. It involved 1) marking the Jews, 2) placing
them into ghettos, and 3) deporting them "upon the request of the
local authorities."
The compulsory wearing of the Yellow Badge (the Star of David )
was ordered on March 31 by virtue of Cabinet Decree No.1 ,240/-
1944. 32 The decision relating to the placing of the Jews into ghettos
was reached at a secret meeting at the Ministry of the Interior on
April 7, 1944. A highly confidential order to this effect was sub-
mitted to all prefects, mayors, gendarmerie commanders and other
interested persons. 33 They were informed of the Hungarian govern-
ment's decision to clear the country of Jews "within a short period
of time." The Jews were to be rounded up on a territorial basis with-
out regard to sex or age, and would be allowed to take along only
a minimal amount of supplies: the clothes they wore, two sets of
underwear and shirts, a fourteen-day supply of food, and other bag-

30Eugene Levai, Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry. Zuerich:

The Central European Times Company, 1948, p. 271.
3 1 Jn his dealings with the Germans, Kasztner negotiated primarily with Kurt
Becher, Himmler's economic representative in Hungary. Kasztner's contro·
versial wartime activities became the object of a heated political and legal
controversy in Israel where he had settled in 1946. Found guilty of colla·
boration with the Nazis by a lower court, he was cleared by the Israeli Su·
preme Court in 1958. He was assassinated in Tel Aviv in 1957. F u
Kasztner's report on his wartime activities, see Der Bericht des juedischen
Rettungskomitees aus Budapest, 1942-1945. Basel: Vaadat Ezra vo-Hazalah
bo-Budapest, 1946, XIII, 191 p., mimeogr.
32For text see Vtidirat a nticizmus ellen. Dokumentumok a magyarorsztigi
zsid6iildozes tortenetehez. Vol. I: 1944 marcius 19-1944 majus 15. A nemet
megszallast61 a deportalas megkezdeseig. Edited by Ilona Benoschofsky and
Elek Karsai. Budapest: A Magyar Izraelitak Orszagos Kepviselete Kiadasa.
1958, pp. 53-54.
33See Decree No. 6163/1944 of the Minister of the Interior in Vadirat a
nticizmus ellen, op. cit., pp. 124-127. The actual notifications relating to the
establishment of ghettos were released only on April 28, 1944. I bid.. pp.
241-250.

18
gage not to exceed a total of 50 kilogram. 34 They were not to be
permitted to take along money, jewelry, gold or other valuables.
In accordance with these directives, the rounding up of the Jews
started in the areas under the jurisdiction of Gendarmerie District
VIII of Kassa ( Kosice), covering the territory of Carpatho-R.uthenia.
Then came the turn of the areas in Gendarmerie Distric:t IX of
Kolozsvar (Cluj), District X of Marosvasarhely (Tirgu-·Mures),
District VII of Miskolc, District V of Debrecen, District VI of
Szeged, District IV of Pees, District III of Sopron-Szombathely, Dis-
trict II of Szekesfehervar, and finally District I of Budapest.
On April 13, i.e., immediately prior to the beginnin~: of the
""ghettoization" program, the North-Eastern part of the country
( Carpatho-Ruthenia and Transylvania) were declared "op1erational
zones" so as to justify the "removal of possible collaborators with
the enemy."

The evacuation of the Jews from their homes and their pllacement
in the ghettos were carried out by the Hungarian police and gen-
darmerie under the command of Major Laszlo Ferenczy and the
over-all supervision and guidance of the Eichmann Son!derkom-
mando. The Jews were aroused in the early morning hours, given
only a few minutes to pack their bundles, and then driven into their
local synagogues. There they were deprived of all their valuables
and began the long sequence of suffering that for most of them
ended in the gas chambers of Auschwitz. Their homes were most
often left unlocked and looted shortly after their forced dteparture.
The number of Jews concentrated in the major ghettos was as
follows: 35

348edding, mattresses, etc., had to be included within the weight allowance.

The 50-kilogram total, however, was often only theoretical since the Jews
were most frequently not given enough time to pack essential possessions.

19
the deportations. However, they were not to be allowed to go to
Palestine via Rumania, for that would conflict with Germany's obli-
gations towards the Great Mufti of Jerusalem (Amin L. Husseini). 74
Eichmann's scheme was to induce the Hungarians into resuming the
deportations, after which he would immediately halt the "emigration"
as well. 75 In one of his discussions with Veesenmayer, Eichmann was
even more specific in this respect. He went beyond the scope of
the Fuehrer's order and re-stated Rimmler's position that the "Jews
in question were without exception biologically valuable material,
many were old Zionists whose immigration to Palestine would be
extremely undesirable. " 76 He completed his plans in anticipation of
the authorization for the resumption of the deportation of Jews
from Budapest providing for an operation "to be carried out as
suddenly as possible and so rapidly that the Jews considered for
emigration will already have been shipped before the formalities
were completed. "77
Horthy, however, was adamant in his decision. Eichmann and
Veesenmayer, in turn, became more insistent in their demands and
kept up their relentless pressure on the various members of the
government. Andor J aross, the Minister of the Interior, assured
Veesenmayer that he was willing, "even against the instruction of the
Regent, to carry out in a roundabout way the clearing of Budapest
Jews," in the same manner as had been done in the suburbs. 78
Horthy, on the other hand, toyed with the idea of getting rid of the
Szt6jay Government, but, as was often the case with him, he let the
news leak out. Hitler became furious and he let Horthy know through
Ribbentrop and Veesenmayer that such a move would be considered
by the Reich as "treason." 79 Hitler also insisted that measures b~
74See also the Mufti's letter of June 22, 1944, to the Hungarian Minister of
Foreign Affairs requesting that all measures be taken to stop the open or
clandestine emigration of Hungarian Jews to Palestine. Eugene Uvai,
Black Book, op. cit., pp. 284-285.
75See Reichel's memorandum to Wagner of August 15, 1944 (lnl. II 1404g.) .
76See facsimile, 3 in the appendix for Veesenmayer's telegram to the Foreign
Office of July 25, 1944 (NG-1806). See also Eichmann's own special note
of July 24 to Guenther (facsimile, 4) concerning this matter.
17 /bid.
78 NG-5532.
7'9NG-2739.

31
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