Akbaruddin Owaisi Case

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2013 SCC OnLine AP 930 : 2014 Cri LJ 2199 : (2013) 6 ALT 101 :
(2013) 2 ALD (Cri) 855
In the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad

(BEFORE RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J.)
Akbaruddin Owaisi
Versus
The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others
Writ Petition No. 824 of 2013
Decided on July 19, 2013
Page: 2204
ORDER
1. Does Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
(hereinafter called “Cr.P.C”) permit registration of two separate
complaints in two different police stations for offences arising out of one
occurrence/event/incident? If so, does the Cr.P.C. permit parallel and
simultaneous investigations being conducted thereinto? If, on the other
hand, the Cr.P.C. does not permit two parallel investigations by police
officers of two different police stations, for offences arising out of the
same incident, can the Station House Officer or the Magistrate transfer
the complaint registered in one police station to the other for
investigation even if both the police stations have territorial jurisdiction
to register and investigate the said complaint? In such a case, should
the transferred complaint be treated as a Section 162, Cr. P.C.
statement by the Station House
Page: 2205
Officer of the police station to which it is transferred? These are some of

the questions which arise for consideration in this Writ Petition.
2. The factual matrix, in which these questions arise, needs to be

noted first. The petitioner delivered a speech on 08.12.2012 at
Nizamabad which resulted in a public outcry. Crime No. 1 of 2013, for
offences under Sections 153, 153A and 295A, IPC, was registered on
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02.01.2013 by the third respondent at Nizamabad. In the meanwhile

the ninth respondent filed a private complaint before the IV Additional
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad which was referred, under
Section 156(3), Cr.P.C, to the fifth respondent who registered the said
complaint as Crime No. 5 of 2013 for the offence under Section 153A,
IPC, and issued a notice to the petitioner under Section 41-A, Cr.P.C
asking him to appear on 10.01.2013. For the same or a similar speech
delivered by him, several other complaints also appear to have been
lodged against the petitioner in different Courts/police stations. Another
speech delivered by the petitioner on 22.12.2012, at Nirmal in Adilabad
District, resulted in Crime No. 1 of 2013 being registered by the fourth
respondent on 02.01.2013 for offences under Sections 153A and 121,
IPC. While the relief sought for in this Writ Petition includes a direction
to the police officers not to register any further FIR against the
petitioner in relation to his speech at Nizamabad and Nirmal on
08.12.2012 and 22.12.2012 respectively, Sri S. Niranjan Reddy,
Learned Counsel, would submit that the petitioner does not seek an
adjudication, in this writ petition, on the validity of the several
complaints registered in respect of his speech at Nirmal, and it would
suffice if the Court were to examine the legality or ptherwise of the
second FIR registered as Crime. No. 5 of 2013, in relation to the
petitioner's speech at Nizamabad, for which a complaint had already
been registered by the third respondent as Crime No. 1 of 2013, even if
the 5th respondent is presumed to have territorial jurisdiction to
register the said FIR., The submission of the Learned Counsel, in short,
is that, since the complaint was already registered as Crime No. 1 of
2013 by the third respondent, a second FIR in respect of the very same
incident (speech) is barred; and, consequently, while investigation into
Crime No. 1 of 2013 can be continued by the third respondent, Crime
No. 5 of 2013 before the fifth respondent must be quashed.
3. The petitioner, a member of a registered State political party, is
also a Member of the A.P. State Legislative Assembly. He spoke at an
assembled gathering at Nizamabad on 08.12.2012 which he claims had
touched upon various social and political aspects, including those which
concerned the minority community. In his writ affidavit the petitioner
states that he does not bear any ill-will, grudge or negative emotion or
sentiment against any community and believes that all citizens,
irrespective of their faith or religion, must be treated as equals; on
28.12.2012 an article was published by a media house selectively
highlighting parts of his speech, without placing the whole speech
delivered by him in context; this article resulted in the news getting
viral; video parts of the speech were picked up by the electronic media,
posted on the internet and aired; on 24.12.2012 he left for medical
treatment to the United Kingdom; as a result of the media trial against
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him, pressure was mounted for initiating action; only as a populist

reaction, the third respondent had registered Crime No. 1 of 2013; and
thereafter, on a private complaint being filed by the ninth respondent,
the IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad had referred
the said complaint to the fifth respondent under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C
which was registered as Crime No. 5 of 2013. The petitioner's reference
to several other complaints, lodged against him, pursuant to his speech
at Nirmal on 22.12.2012, need no mention as its legality or otherwise
has not been put in issue in the present writ proceedings.
4. The petitioner would contend that the 5th respondent should have
caused an enquiry, whether or not similar complaints were pending,
before registering FIR No. 5 of 2013; registering multiple FIRs against
him for the very same incident is arbitrary, irrational and violative of
Article 14 of the
Page: 2206
Constitution of India; it also affects his right to liberty under Article 21,
and his right of free movement under Article 19 of the Constitution of
India as he would be constrained to move from one police station to
another as is evident from the notice issued to him by the fifth
respondent under Section 41-A, Cr.P.C.
5. In his counter affidavit, filed on behalf of the second respondent,

the Additional Director General of Police, Hyderabad would submit that
on 05.12.2012 Sri Nayeemuddin and his followers belonging to the
political party to which the petitioner belongs, had approached
Nizamabad police station and had sought permission for a public
meeting to be conducted on 08.12.2012 from 8.00 p.m. police force
was deployed and bandobust was entrusted on 08.12.2012 from 2.00
p.m. onwards; several persons, including the petitioner, addressed the
gathering which concluded at 12.00 midnight; and the compact disc,
containing a video of the meeting, showed that the petitioner had
delivered a provocative speech which was likely to promote enmity
between different communities. After referring to certain portions of the
speech, it is stated that the petitioner had deliberately and maliciously
intended to outrage religious feelings by insulting the religious beliefs
of others and to create communal disturbances in the country; he had
abetted and instigated Muslims to wage war against the elected
Government of India, and had sought to promote enmity between
different religious groups; such acts were prejudicial to the
maintenance of harmony; a suo motu case was, therefore, registered in
larger public interest by the third respondent as Crime No. 1 of 2013,
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for offences under Sections 153, 153A and 295A, IPC, on 02.01.2013 at
23.00 hrs. and investigation was taken up; during the course of
investigation, the DVD was sealed and packed in the presence of panch
witnesses; the petitioner had deliberately and intentionally evaded the
notice under Section 41A, Cr.P.C only to avoid investigation; he was
taken into custody on 08.01.2013 at 17.30 hrs. in connection with his
speech at Nirmal which had resulted in Crime No. 1 of 2013 being
registered against him by the fourth respondent; he was sent to judicial
remand; investigation is not yet complete; some more witnesses are
required to be examined; the specimen voice of the petitioner, recorded
in the open Court of the I Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class,
Nizamabad, was sent to FSL, Chandigarh for comparison of the speech
recorded in the seized DVD; as soon as a report is received from FSL,
further action would be taken; on the IV Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Hyderabad referring it to him, under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C,
the fifth respondent had registered the complaint; a second complaint
in regard to the same incident is maintainable moreso as the complaint
in Crime No. 5 of 2013 was not made by the complainant in Crime No.
1 of 2013 before the Nizamabad police station; the complainant, in
Crime No. 5 of 2013, stated that his feelings were hurt after watching
the speech, given by the petitioner, on T.V.; and the contents of both
the complaints differ from each other.
6. In his counter affidavit, the eleventh respondent would state that
registration of multiple FTRs/complaints does not violate the
petitioner's fundamental rights; no blanket order can be issued to the
respondents prohibiting registration of FIRs against the petitioner; the
petitioner's speech at Nizamabad and Nirmal, coupled with his body
language, were intended to provoke a section of society to wage war
against the Government; the petitioner had abused Hindu Gods in India
as a whole; a prima facie case was made out before the Learned
Magistrate who had referred the complaint for investigation under
Section 156(3), Cr.P.C; no law prohibits registration of more than one
FIR in respect of the same occurrence; though the occurrence may be
one, aggrieved victims may be more; each aggrieved person has the
right to lodge a complaint in respect of an offence, insofar as his
grievance is concerned, even if it arises out of the same occurrence; the
complaints filed against the petitioner are different and distinct, and
are maintainable on their own, despite the fact that the occurrence is
one and the same and Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India has no
application.
Page: 2207
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7. In his reply affidavit, the petitioner would state that he is

aggrieved by the action of the respondents, in registering multiple
complaints/FIRs in respect of one alleged occurrence, which violated his
constitutional and fundamental rights; he did not deliver statements
likely to promote enmity between different communities; in this writ
petition he has not sought that all the FIRs be quashed; the relief
sought for is confined only to interdict multiple FIRs being Registered
with respect to the same alleged offence; though he had gone abroad
for treatment in U.K. and was due to return only on 15.01.2013, he
came back to India on 07.01.2013 itself; it is incorrect to state that he
had deliberately and intentionally avoided complying with the Section
41-A notice; in view of his precarious medical condition, he had
requested for a four days adjournment to comply with the notice; he is
an MLA and bears strong allegiance to the Constitution and its values;
the legality of the FIRs regis tered at Nizamabad and Nirmal, and the
investigation being carried on pursuant thereto, are not being
questioned in the present writ petition; he reserves his right to
question the same in appropriate legal proceedings; his grievance in
this Writ Petition is confined to registration of multiple FIRs in a
vexatious manner, contrary to the procedure envisaged in the Cr.P.C.
and the dicta of the Supreme Court; and it is incorrect to state that the
complaint given before the IV Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Hyderabad is not the same as the one registered at Nizamabad.
8. Elaborate oral submissions were made by Sri S. Niranjan Reddy,
Learned Counsel for the petitioner; the Learned Government Pleader for
Home; Sri N. Ramachandra Rao, Learned Senior Counsel and Sri C.
Subba Rao, Sri S. Sriram and Sri N. Harinath; Learned Counsel
appearing on behalf of the unofficial respondents. Written submissions
were filed by Sri N. Ramachandra Rao Learned Senior Counsel, Sri S.
Niranjan Reddy, Sri S. Sriram and Sri N. Harinath. The submissions of
Counsel on either side and the judgments cited by them, shall be
referred to while examining the rival contentions under different sub-
heads. I have taken the liberty of para-phrasing judgments of the
Supreme Court and various High Courts, construing provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, substituting them with similar
provisions under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
I. IS REGISTRATION OF MULTIPLE FIRs IN THE SAME POLICE
STATION, FOR THE SAME OCCURRENCE, BARRED UNDER
SECTION 154(1), Cr.P.C.?
9. Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would
submit that, in respect of an incident/crime, more than one FIR cannot
be registered; and, even though exceptions were carved out thereto,
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the declaration of law, in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala1. , has not been
negated in any of the subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court.
10. On the other hand Sri S. Sriram, Learned Counsel for respondent
No. 10, would submit that multiple FIRs can be registered for the same
offence, more particularly when the subsequent FIRs narrate the
occurrence in a different spectrum or raise a different facet of the same
allegation; while the Code provides for only one trial, it does not bar
registration of multiple FIRs as an inviolable principle; neither T.T.
Antony1. ; nor Babubhai v. State of Gujarat2. can be understood to have
laid down any principle to the effect that, irrespective of the nature of
the offence alleged against the accused, multiple FIRs are
impermissible; and the issue of multiple FIRs must be considered on
the facts of each case.
11. Before examining the rival conten tions, it is necessary to briefly
note the provisions of the Cr.P.C. relating to the receipt and registration
of complaints of cognizable offences, and the procedure prescribed for
investigation thereinto culminating in a report being filed by the
investigating officer before the concerned Magistrate. The receipt and
recording of an information report is not a condition precedent to the
setting in motion of a criminal investigation. There is no reason why the
police, if in possession
Page: 2208
through their own knowledge or by means of credible information

through informal intelligence which genuinely leads them to believe
that a cognizable offence has been committed, should not, of their own,
undertake investigation into the truth of the matters alleged. Section
157, Cr.P.C, when directing that a police officer shall proceed to
investigate the facts and circumstances, supports this view. In truth
the provisions as to an information report (commonly called a first
information report or an FIR) are enacted for other reasons. Its object is
to obtain early information of alleged criminal activity, and to record the
circumstances before there is time for them to be forgotten or
embellished. (King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad3. ).
12. Chapter XII, Cr.P.C. relates to information to the police and their
powers to investigate. The opening words of Section 154, Cr.P.C. imply
that there has to be an FIR about an incident which constitutes a
cognizable offence. (Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh4. ). An
information, given under sub-section (1) of Section 154, Cr.P.C, is
commonly known as the FIR though this term is not used in the Code.
It is the earliest and the first information of a cognizable offence
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recorded by an officer-in-charge of a police station and marks the

commencement of the investigation. The investigating agency has to
proceed only on information about the commission of a cognizable
offence which is first entered in the police station diary, by the Officer
In-charge. (T.T. Antony (2001 Cri LJ 3329); Babubhai (2010 AIR SCW
5126)). Section 154(1), Cr.P.C contains four mandates to an officer in
charge of a police station. The first enjoins that every information,
relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally, shall
be reduced to writing; the second directs that it be read over to the
informant; the third requires that every such information, whether
given in writing or reduced to writing, shall be signed by the informant
and the fourth is that the substance of such information shall be
entered in the station house diary. A further directive is contained in
sub-section (1) of Section 157, Cr.P.C. that, immediately on receip of
the information, the officer in charge of the police station shall send a
report of every cognizable offence to a Magistrate empowered to take
cognizance of the offence and then proceed to investigate the facts and
circumstances of the case. (T.T. Antony (2001 Cri LJ 3329) Bijoy Singh
v. State of Bihar5. ).
13. The non-qualification of the word “information” in Section 154
(1), unlike in Section 41(1)(a) and (g), Cr.P.C, is to prevent the police
officer from refusing to record an information relating to the
commission of a cognizable offence, and to register a case thereon, on
the ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility
of the information. In other words, the ‘reasonableness’ or ‘credibility’
of the information is not a condition precedent for registration of a case.
The sine qua non for recording an FIR is that there must be an
information, and that information must disclose a cognizable offence. If
information disclosing a cognizable offence, satisfying the requirements
of Section 154(1), Cr.P.C, is laid before him the police officer has no
option but to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form i.e., to
register a case on the basis of such information. (State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal6. ). The FIR sets the machinery of criminal law into motion. It
is the document on which the entire case of the prosecution is built.
(Anju Chaudhary). The F.I.R has limited use and is not an encyclopedia
of the prosecution's case. (Ramesh Maruti Patil v. State of
Maharashtra7. ). It is not the requirement of the law that the minutest
details be recorded in the FIR lodged immediately after the occurrence.
(Bijoy Singh (2002 Cri LJ 2623)). There is no provision in the Cr.P.C
which requires an investigating agency to provide a hearing to the
affected party be fore registering an FIR. (Samaj Parivartan Samudaya
v. State of Karnataka8. ).
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Page: 2209
14. After registration of the FIR, begins the sequence of

investigation in a case, collection of evidence during investigation and
formation of the final opinion which culminates in the filing of a report
under Section 173 Cr.P.C. (Anju Chaudhary, (2013 Cri LJ 776). The
officer in charge of a police station has to commence investigation as
provided in Section 156 or 157 CrPC on the basis of the entry of the
FIR, on coming to know of the commission of a cognizable offence. (T.T.
Antony, (2001 Cri LJ 3329)). “Investigation” primarily consists in the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case. By definition,
under Section 2(h) Cr.P.C, it includes “all the proceedings under the
Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer”. (H.N.
Rishbud v. State of Delhi9. ). Commencement of investigation by a
police officer is subject to two conditions, firstly the police officer should
have reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence as
required by Section 157(1), and secondly the police officer should
subjectively satisfy himself that there is sufficient ground for entering
on an investigation even before he starts the investtigation. Clause (b)
of the proviso to Section 157(1) Cr.P.C. postulates that the police
officer shall draw his satisfaction only on the material placed before him
at that stage, namely, the FIR together with the documents, if any,
enclosed therewith, before he enters on an investigation. (Bhajan Lal,
(1992 Cri LJ 1992 Cri LJ 527). The power of the police to investigate
any cognizable offence is uncontrolled by the Magistrate, and it is only
in cases where the police decide not to investigate the case can the
Magistrate intervene and either direct an investigation or, in the
alternative, himself proceed or depute a Magistrate subordinate to him
to proceed to enquire into the case. (State of W.B. v. Sampat Lal10. ;
S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari11. ”).
15. Under the Code, investigation consists generally of the following
steps: (1) proceeding to the spot, (2) ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances of the case, (3) discovery and arrest of the suspected
offender, (4) collection of evidence relating to the commission of the
offence which may consist of (a) the examination of various persons
(including the accused) and the reduction of their statements into
writing, if the officer thinks fit, (b) the search of places or seizure of
things considered necessary for the investigation and to be produced at
the trial, and (5) formation of the opinion as to whether, on the
material collected, there is a case to place the accused before a
Magistrate for trial. (H.N. Rishbud, (AIR 1955 SC 196); Augustine v.
State12. ; Krishna Lal Gulati v. The State13. ).
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16. “Investigation” takes in several aspects and stages ending

ultimately with the formation of an opinion by the police officer,
(Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra14. ), under Section 169 or 170 CrPC,
as the case may be, and in forwarding his report to the Magistrate
concerned under Section 173(2) CrPC. (T.T. Antony, (2001 Cri LJ
3329). Under Section 173(2)(d) the investigating officer should state
whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by
whom. The Code thus contemplates that the investigating officer should
himself assess the evidence collected by him and form his own opinion
regarding the complicity of particular persons in respect of the offence
alleged. (Augustine, (1982 Cri LJ 1557). The formation of the opinion,
whether or not there is a case to place the accused on trial before a
Magistrate, is ‘left to the officer in-charge of the police station and that
opinion determines whether the report is to be under Section 170 being
a ‘charge-sheet’, or under Section 169 ‘a final report’. Formation of
opinion by the police is the final step in the investigation, and that final
step is to be taken only by the police and by no other authority.
(Abhinandan Jha, (AIR 1968 SC 117);
Page: 2210
Pradeep Dutta Bhowmik v. State of Tripura15. ; Heera Lal Pandit alias

Hira Lal v. State of Bihar16. ).
17. The powers conferred on police officers to investigate into

cognizable offences, is unfettered as long as it is legitimately exercised
in strict compliance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C. The scheme
envisages a Magistrate being kept in the picture at all stages of the
police investigation but does not authorize him to interfere with the
actual investigation or to direct how that investigation is to be
conducted. (Bhajan Lal, (1992 Cri LJ 527); A.K. Roy v. State of
W.B.17. ). The court would not interfere with the investigation or during
the course of investigation which would mean from the time of lodging
of the first information report till the submission of the report, by the
officer incharge of the police station, in Court under Section 173(2) Cr
PC, this field being exclusively reserved for the investigating agency.
(State of Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju18. ; Union of India v. Prakash P.
Hinduja19. ; King Em peror, (AIR 1945 PC 18); H.N. Rishbud, (AIR 1955
SC 196); State of W.B. v. S.N. Basak20. ; Abhinandan Jha, (AIR 1968 SC
117) and State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha21. ; Sampat Lal, ((1985) 1
SCC 317 : AIR 1985 SC 195)). The scheme of the Code is that an
investigation is a normal preliminary to an accused being put up for
trial for a cognizable offence except when the Magistrate takes
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cognizance otherwise than on a police report in which case he has the

power under Section 202 of the Code to order investigation if he thinks
fit. (H.N. Rishbud, (AIR 1955 SC 196). While it is open to the
Magistrate to accept or disagree with their opinion, he cannot compel
the police to form a particular opinion on the investigation and to
submit a report as that would encroach on the sphere of the police and
compel them to form an opnion so as to accord with the decision of the
Magistrate. (Abhinandan Jha, (AIR 1968 SC 117).
18. Where more information than one are given in respect of the
same incident, involving one or more than one cognizable offences, it is
implied in Section 154 Cr.P.C that the officer in charge of a police
station need not enter every one of them in the station house diary. It
is the information first entered therein which is the FIR postulated by
Section 154 Cr.P.C. All other subsequent information made orally or in
writing after the commencement of the investigation, or such other
cognizable offences as may come to the notice of the police officer
during investigation, are statements falling under Section 162 Cr.P.C.
and cannot be treated as an FIR as it would in effect be a second FIR,
(T.T. Antony, (2001 Cri LJ 3329); Babubhai, (2010 AIR SCW 5126), will
amount to an improvement of the facts mentioned in the original
complaint, and hence prohibited under Section 162 Cr.P.C. (Upkar
Singh v. Ved Prakash22. ; T.T. Antony). The distinction between an
information relating to a cognizable offence under Section 154 and a
statement under Section 161(3) is that, while the former is required to
be signed by the person giving the information, in the latter the
statement of the witness is, in terms of Section 162 Cr.P.C, not
required to be signed by him. While the information, referred to in
Section 154 Cr.P.C, results in commencement of investigation of a
cognizable offence by a police officer, the statement under Section
161/162 Cr.P.C. is recorded during the course of the investigation and
is among the inputs available to the investigation officer in forming an
opinion whether or not there is sufficient evidence or a reasonable
ground to forward the accused to the Magistrate. The nature of
information received under Section 154 and the names of the
witnesses, whose statements are recorded under Section 161 and 162
Cr.P.C, also form part of the police report under Section 173(2) and (5)
Cr.P.C. The report as envisaged by Section 173(2) has to be
accompanied, as required by
Page: 2211
sub-section (5), by all the documents and statements of the witnesses

therein mentioned. One cannot divorce the details which the report
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must contain as required by sub-section (2) from its accompaniments

which are required to be submitted under sub-section (5). The whole of
it is submitted as a report to the Court. (Satya Narain Musadi v. State
of Bihar23. ).
19. There can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every

subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or
the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable
offences as the police officer has to investigate not merely the
cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected
offences found to have been committed in the course of the same
transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as
provided in Section 173 CrPC. (T.T. Antony, (2001 Cri LJ 3329).
Whenever further information is received by the investigation agency, it
is always in furtherance of the FIR. (Chirra Shivraj v. State of Andhra
Pradesh24. ). Where, as a result of further investigation, certain
information is gathered a second FIR is unwarranted and, instead, filing
a supplementary charge sheet will suffice. (Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah
v. The Central Bureau of Investigation25. ). For the same event and
offences against the same people, there cannot be a second FIR. (Anju
Chaudhary, (2013 Cri LJ 776)). Filing of multiple complaints, relatable
to the same transaction, must be controlled as it causes tre mendous
harassment and prejudice. (Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal
H.,26. ).
II. CASES WHERE THE RULE, AGAINST REGISTRATION OF TWO FIRs
FOR THE SAME OCCURRENCE/INCIDENT, WILL NOT APPLY:
20. The submission of Sri S. Sriram, Learned Counsel, that T.T.
Antony, (2001 Cri LJ 3329) is a fact based judgment, and the principle
laid down therein cannot be said to be the “law” for the proposition of a
bar on registration of multiple FIRs irrespective of the facts of each
case, does not merit acceptance as the declaration of law, in T.T.
Antony), has not been diluted in any subsequent judgments of the
Supreme Court even though exceptions have been carved out.
(Amitbhai Anil Chandra Shah, (2013 Cri LJ 2013). The rule, that any
further complaint against the same accused for the same incident,
subsequent to the registration of a case is prohibited under the Cr.P.C,
will not apply:—
(i). in case the FIRs are not in respect of the same cognizable
offence or the same occurrence giving rise to one or more
cognizable offences nor are they alleged to have been committed
in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence as
the one alleged in the first FIR. (Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v.
State of Gujarat, (2006) 1 SCC 732) : (2006 Cri LJ 964).
(ii). where the incident is separate and the offences are similar or
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different, or where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude

that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR
recorded first. (Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh: (2013)
Cri.L.J. 776 (SC).
(iii). where several distinct offences/incidents have been reported. In
such a case the investigating agency should issue separate FIRs
under Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. (Jagathi Publications Ltd. Rep. by Y.
Eshwara Prasad Reddy v. Central Bureau of Investigation: 2012
(2) ALD (Cri) 762).
(iv). to cryptic, anonymous or oral messages which do not clearly
specify a cognizable offence and cannot be treated as an FIR. No
exception can be taken if, upon receipt of proper information,
another detailed FIR is recorded, and the detailed FIR is treated
as the FIR. (Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1970) 2 SCC
113 : (1970 Cri LJ 1415); Vikram v. State of Maharashtra, (2007)
12 SCC 332) : (2007 Cri LJ 3193).
(v). where, for an earlier period, there was an FIR which was duly
investigated into and culminated in a final report which was
accepted by a Competent Court. (M. Krishna v. State of Karnataka
((1999) 3 SCC 247 :
Page: 2212
AIR 1999 SC 1765) : (1999 Cri LJ 2583).
(vi). where the earlier complaint was decided on insufficient material

or was passed without understanding the nature of the complaint,
or where complete facts could not be placed before the court and
the applicant came to know of certain facts after the disposal of
the first complaint. In such cases the test of full consideration of
the complaints on merits must be applied. (Shiv Shankar Singh v.
State of Bihar [(2012) 1 SCC 130).
(vii). in cases where there are different versions, they are in respect
of two different in cidents/crimes, and when new discovery is
made on factual foundations. Discoveries may be made by the
police authorities at a subsequent stage and can also surface in
another proceeding. (Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab:
(2009) 1 SCC 441 : (2009 Cri LJ 958); Babubhai v. State of
Gujarat : (2010) 12 SCC 254) : (2010 AIR SCW 5126).
(viii). even in cases where the first complaint is registered and
investigation initiated, it is possible to file a further complaint
based on the material gathered during the course of investigation.
(Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash ((2004) 13 SCC 292 : AIR 2004 SC
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4320 : (2004 Cri LJ 4219); Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi

Administration) (1979 CriLJ 1346) : (1979) 2 SCC 322).
(ix). where two FIRs are lodged in respect of the same incident
having materially different allegations of commission of different
cognizable offences. (T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001 CriLJ
3329 : (2001) 6 SCC 181; Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash ((2004)
13 SCC 292 : AIR 2004 SC 4320) : (2004 Cri LJ 4219).
(x). to a counter claim by the accused in the first complaint, or on
his behalf, alleging a different version of the said incident. In case
there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, it would be
treated as two different FIRs and investigation can be carried
under both of them by the same investigating agency. (Upkar
Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292 : (2004 Cri LJ 4219);
Kari Choudhary v. Most. Sita Devi: (2002) 1 SCC 714 : AIR 2002
SC 441): (2002 Cri LJ 923); Ashok Kumar Tiwari v. State of U.P
(2008 CriLJ 4668 (Allahabad High Court)).
(xi). where the FIRs are regarding independent and distinct offences,
registration of a subsequent FIR cannot be prohibited on the
ground that some other FIR had been filed against the petitioner
in respect of other allegations made against him. (Ramesh-
chandra Nandlal Parikh v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 1 SCC 732) :
(2006 Cri LJ 964).
(xii). in cases where the same group of people commit offences in a
similar manner in different localities falling under different
jurisdictions. Even if these incidents are committed in close
proximity of time, there can be separate FIRs. (Anju Chaudhary v.
State of Uttar Pradesh: (2013) Cri.L.J. 776).
21. Bearing in mind the rule, against registration of two or more
FIRs for the same occurrence or incident and the exceptions thereto,
the contentions urged by the Counsel for the unofficial respondents,
regarding the statutory rights of complainants, victims and aggrieved
persons to have their respective complaints registered and investigated
into, needs to be addressed.
III. STATUTORY RIGHT OF A CITIZEN TO MAKE, AND OF THE POLICE
OFFICER TO REGISTER, A COMPLAINT:
22. Sri N. Ramachandra Rao, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit
that every information regarding a cognizable offence, given under
Section 39(1) Cr.P.C, must be recorded in the form of an FIR; the
statutory right under Section 39 Cr.P.C. cannot be denied to a
complainant merely because a complaint, relating to the very same
offence, was already intimated by any other person; and multiple FIRs
in the present case, is inevitable if lodged.
23. Section 154 Cr.P.C. places an unequivocal duty upon, and gives
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no discretion to the police officer in charge of a police station to register

an FIR on receipt of information that a cognizable offence has been
committed. (Anju Chaudhary, (2013 Cri LJ 776); State of Uttar Pradesh
v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi27. ). Non-registration of a crime is violation of
a human right. Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 1948 (UDHR), Article 9 of the
Page: 2213
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR) and

Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution ensure the right to the
procedure established by law and injunct that a person shall not be
deprived of his dignity, life and liberty except in accordance with the
fair procedure established by law. Article 8 of UDHR and Articles 3(a), 3
(c) of ICCPR, Articles 14 and 21 of Constitution read with Section 154
CrPC make it clear that, if a cognizable offence is not registered and
investigated, it would result in violation of human rights. (Uppalapati
Nirupa Rani v. Koganti Lakshmi28. ).
24. The statutory rights and duties of police officers to ‘register’

information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, to
investigate a case where the commission of a cognizable offence is
suspected, and to submit the report of such investigation to the
Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence upon a
police report, are not circumscribed by any power of superintendence or
interference by the Magistrate. Neither is sanction required from a
Magistrate to empower the Police to investigate into a cognizable
offence (Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn29.) nor should judicial
authorities interfere in matters which are within the province of police
officers and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry.
The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not
overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with the due
observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to
exercise its own function always, of course, subject to the right of the
Court to intervene in an appropriate case. The Court's functions begin
when a charge is preferred before it and not until then. (King Emperor,
(AIR 1945 PC 18); Abhinandan Jha, (AIR 1968 SC 117); Sampat Lal,
((1985) 1 SCC 317 : AIR 1985 SC 195); S.N. Basak, (AIR 1963 SC
447).
25. Every citizen who has knowledge of the commission of
cognizable offence has the duty to lay the information before the police
under Section 39 Cr.P.C, (State of Gujarat v. Anirudhsing30. ), which
obligates every person, who is aware of the commission of the offences
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mentioned in that Section, to give information to the nearest Magistrate

or Police Officer. There is no statutory obligation on a citizen to inform
the police about offences other than those mentioned in Section 39
Cr.P.C. (Dr. Satyasaheel Nandlal Naik v. State of Maharashtra31. ), as it
merely casts a duty and an obligation to report offences mentioned
therein, omission to discharge which is made penal. The said Section
has been designed with the purpose of securing information relating to
the commission of an offence with all expedition so that investigation
should ensue. Once the information, relating to the commission of the
offence has actually reached the Police Station the requirements of
Section 39 Cr.P.C. are fully satisfied. Every eye-witness or every person
who is in the know of the circumstances relating to an offence is not
expected, thereafter, to go to the Police Station to give a report of what
he saw. (State of Maharashtra v. Dashrath Lahanu Kadu32. ).
26. The offences which the petitioner is alleged to have committed
are stated in FIR No. 1 of 2013, registered at Nizamabad Police Station,
to be under Sections 153, 153-A and 295-A IPC. The offence alleged
against the petitioner in FIR No. 5 of 2013 of Osmania University Police
Station is under Section 153-A IPC. None of the aforesaid offences are
referred to in Section 39 Cr.P.C and the said provision has, therefore,
no application to the facts of the present case. Even otherwise the
statutory obligation under Section 39 Cr.P.C. is only to give information
to the nearest Magistrate or police officer. There is no provision in the
Cr.P.C. which casts a corresponding obligation on a police officer to
register each such information, given by different persons, as separate
FIRs.
IV. RIGHT OF A VICTIM OR A PERSON AGGRIEVED TO MAKE A
COMPLAINT:
27. Sri N. Ramachandra Rao, Learned
Page: 2214
Senior Counsel, would refer to Sections 198 & 199 Cr.P.C. which relate
to complaints filed by aggrieved persons, to contend that preventing a
citizen, or an aggrieved person, from filing an FIR or a complaint would
amount to denying a citizen his constitutional right. Learned
Government Pleader for Home would submit that a second complaint is
maintainable if the complainant is not the same. Sri N. Harinath,
Learned Counsel, would submit that an “Offence” is said to have
occurred or to have been committed only when a victim, as defined in
Section 2(wa), surfaces and files a complaint regarding the said
offence; any person who is offended on hearing the speech delivered by
the petitioner, or any part thereof, would be a victim having the right to
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file a complaint against the accused; any victim can file a complaint,
and any number of victims can file complaints if they are victims of an
offence; in so far as registration of the F.I.R is concerned it would be
the first complaint of the victim of the offence; the law has to be
understood to mean that the same victim cannot file a second
complaint for the same offence against the same accused for the same
incident or offence; the grievance of each complainant would be
different, and the quantum of injury caused to the said complainant can
be dealt with only during the course of trial and not at the stage of
filing the complaint; the right of a citizen to initiate proceedings cannot
be fettered; each complaint filed by different victims has to be
investigated as a separate crime, and the police have to register as
many F.I.Rs as the number of complaints received by them; and the
prayer sought for in the writ petition, if granted, would result in denial
of justice to prospective complainants and prevent them from seeking
redressal of their grievance in a court of law.
28. Every crime is considered an offence against the Society as a

whole and not only against an individual even though it is an individual
who is the ultimate sufferer. It is, therefore, the duty of the State to
take appropriate steps when an offence has been committed. (State of
Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar33. ). A criminal proceeding is
not a proceeding for vindication of a private grievance, but is a
proceeding initiated to punish the offender in the interests of society. It
is for maintaining stability and orderliness in Society that certain acts
are constituted as offences, and a right is given to any citizen to set the
machinery of the criminal law in motion for the purpose of bringing the
offender to book. Punishment of the offender in the interests of society
being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for the larger
good of society, the right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled
down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait jacket formula
of locus standi. The locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign
to criminal jurisprudence. (Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar34. ;
R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay35. ).
29. Registration of a complaint, under Section 154 Cr.P.C. is not
victim-specific but is information-centric. Emphasis thereunder is on
the information in the complaint and not on the complainant. Section
154(1) Cr.P.C stresses on the requirement of reducing every
“information” relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, into
writing i.e., registration of the “information” otherwise called an F.I.R.
No matter who the informant is, as long as the information received
relates to the commission of a cognizable offence, Section 154(1)
Cr.P.C mandates the officer, in charge of a Police Station, to reduce the
information into writing and enter the substance thereof in a book kept
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by such an officer. While the victim would, undoubtedly, be aggrieved

on a congnizable offence having been committed against him, it is not
only he but anyone else, in the know of such an offence having been
committed, who can also convey such information to the officer in-
charge of a police station. This can be better explained by way of an
illustration. If one offence is committed against several persons each of
them would be a “victim” as defined in Section 2(wa) Cr.P.C.
whereunder a
Page: 2215
person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act
or omission, for which an accused person is charged, is a “victim”
including his or her guardian or legal heir. Any one of such victims can
inform the police officer of a cognizable offence having been committed
and such information is required to be reduced into writing (i.e., an
FIR). Once an FIR is registered the investigation thereinto would
include all victims and not merely the victim who has provided
information to the police. The necessity of the other “victims” giving
complaints becomes superfluous as the information, relating thereto,
has already been recorded as an FIR. There is no provision in the
Cr.P.C. which confers a right on each of the victims to make a
complaint, or a corresponding obligation on the police officer to register
each of them as an FIR, when an FIR has already been registered in the
police station with respect to the said occurrence/incident.
30. The general rule is that any citizen has the right to bring
offenders to justice irrespective of whether he is personally aggrieved
by the offence or not as every crime is an offence against the State and
the Society at large. Citizens have not only the right but the duty to
ensure that offenders are brought to justice. The Legislature, in its
wisdom, has however chosen to place restrictions on this right in
specified cases on grounds of public policy. (M.P. Narayana Pillai v. M.P.
Chacko36. ). Sections 198 & 199 Cr.P.C., are provisions where there is
not only a restriction but also a prohibition against the courts taking
cognizance otherwise than by a complaint from a person who is
aggrieved by the offence. (M.P. Narayana Pillai36. ). ‘Complaint’ is
defined in Section 2(d) Cr. P.C., to mean any allegation made orally or
in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the
Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an
offence, but it does not include a police report. A complaint need not
mention the Sections under which it has been made. What is required
to be stated in the complaint are the facts which would enable the
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Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence. (Shyam Lal v. State37. ).

Section 2 Cr.P.C opens with the words ‘unless the context otherwise
requires’ which indicate that, before every clause under Section 2,
these words must be read. The word ‘complaint’, as defined in Section
2(d), means that, if in a particular context the word ‘complaint’
indicates some other sense other than the meaning to be conveyed
under Section 2(d), the complaint need not be taken to be as defined
under Section 2(d). The word ‘complaint’, used under Section 198
Cr.P.C. does not connote the meaning assigned to it under Section 2
(d). The word ‘complaint’ has been used in Section 198 Cr.P.C., in the
ordinary sense of the term, i.e. the expression of grief, statement of
injury suffered, statement of injury or griev ance. (Mahendra Kumar v.
State of U.P.38 ).
31. A complaint under Sections 198 & 199 Cr.P.C can be filed only
by an “aggrieved person”. In the Law Lexicon with legal maxims, it is
stated that a “person can be said to be aggrieved if, apart from the
general interest such a person has as a member of the public may
have, he has a particular or special interest in the subject matter
supposed to be wrongly decided.” In the Judicial Dictionary, 13th
Edition by KJ. Aiyar, the expression “Aggrieved person” is defined to
mean a person who has got a legal grievance i.e. a person is wrongfully
deprived of any thing to which he is legally entitled and not merely a
person who has suffered some sort of disappointment. Any fanciful or
sentimental grievance would not suffice, and there must be a legal
grievance. (Parminder Kaur v. Joginder Kaur39. ; G. Narasimhan v. T.V.
Chokkappa40. ; Raxaben v. State of Gujarat41. ). A person who does not
have any legal grievance cannot be a “person aggrieved” within the
scope of Section 198 Cr.P.C. (In re P. Kondiah42. ). Unlike certain other
offences, cognizance of the offences referred to in Sections 198 and 199
Cr.P.C can only be taken
Page: 2216
on a complaint given by an aggrieved person and not from any other

informant. It is obvious from Section 199 Cr.P.C. that, before a person
can be convicted for an offence, there should be a proper complaint
against him by the persons specified therein; the complaint should
have been made to a Magistrate with a view to his taking cognizance of
the offence; and a report to the police does not amount to a complaint.
(Shyam Lal, (AIR 1958 All 76)). Sections 198 and 199 Cr.P.C., create a
bar which has to be removed before cognizance is taken. Once the bar
is removed, on the proper person having filed a complaint, the Sections
have worked themselves out. If there were any other restrictions the
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Code would have said so. Not having said so, one must treat the
Section as fulfilled and having worked itself out. (Ashwin v. State of
Maharashtra43. ). The offences referred to in the subject two FIRs are not
among the offences referred to in Sections 198 and 199 Cr.P.C. and, as
such, these provisions are of no relevance to the case on hand.
32. Wherever the Code requires only the victim, or the person
aggrieved, to make a complaint and for the Magistrate to take
cognizance thereof, it has so provided as in Sections 198 and 199
Cr.P.C. Unlike Sections 198 and 199 Cr.P.C. which enable the Court to
take cognizance of an offence only upon a complaint made by a person
aggrieved by the offence, Section 190(1)(a) does not place any such
restriction and enables the Court to take cognizance on receipt of a
complaint of facts from any person as long as the complaint alleges
commission of a cognizable offence. The right conferred on the victim,
except where the Cr.P.C. has expressly provided otherwise, is only to
have the offence investigated, and the offender tried and convicted.
Investigation into the commission of a cognizable offence is,
necessarily, preceded by information being received and recorded by an
officer in charge of the police station. It is wholly unnecessary for the
officer, in charge of a Police Station, to receive and record the complaint
given by each “victim” of the very same offence, and it would suffice if
information of the commission of a cognizable offence is recorded and is
investigated from whatever source the information may have been
received. The statutory right conferred on a victim or the statutory
obligation cast on a police officer is only to have the information,
relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, recorded and to
have an investigation caused thereinto. No right is conferred under the
Cr.P.C. for each victim to insist that his complaint be registered under
Section 154(1) Cr.P.C., even if the information, relating to the
commission of the very same cognizable offence, has already been
received by the officer in charge of the police station, has been reduced
into writing, and its substance has been entered in the book kept by
the said police officer. Once information is given to a police station and
an FIR is registered, there is no further right given to any other
complainant/victim/aggrieved person to have his complaint registered
as another FIR provided, of course, that the complaint which he seeks
registration of relates to the very same incident/event/occurrence
(other than a counter-complaint) which has already been registered.
V. IS THE RIGHT OF OBJECTING TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF
PROSECUTION, CONFERRED ONLY ON THE PERSON WHOSE
COMPLAINT IS REGISTERED AS AN FIR?
33. Sri N. Harinath, Learned Counsel, would submit that the right of
a victim would be scuttled if his complaint is considered as a statement
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
under Section 162 of Cr.P.C. as the state government may withdraw

prosecution at any point of time thus affecting the rights of a citizen in
getting his grievance redressed in a court of law.
34. As any citizen can lodge an FIR or file a complaint and set the
machinery of the criminal law in motion, and his locus standi to do so
cannot be questioned, there is no reason why a citizen, who finds that a
prosecution for an offence against Society is being wrongly withdrawn,
cannot oppose such withdrawal. If he can be a complainant or initiator
of criminal prosecution, he should equally be entitled to oppose
withdrawal of the criminal prosecution which has already
Page: 2217
been initiated at his instance. If the offence for which a prosecution is

being launched is an offence against society, and not merely an
individual wrong, any member of the society must have locus to initiate
a prosecution as also to resist withdrawal of such prosecution, if
initiated. (Sheo Nandan Paswan, ((1987) 1 SCC 288 : AIR 1987 SC
877)).
VI. SCOPE OF SECTIONS 186 AND 210 CR.P.C:

35. Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, Learned Coun sel for the petitioner, would
submit that the provisions of Sections 154, 186 and 210 Cr.P.C. are a
clear pointer that the whole scheme of the Cr.P.C. contemplates one
FIR, one investigation, one trial and one decision; Section 186 Cr.P.C,
therefore, contemplates discontinuance of more than one inquiry/trial;
and Section 210 Cr.P.C. permits only one proceeding to go on either
separately or jointly.
36. On the other hand Sri S. Sriram, Learned Counsel, would submit
that the scope of Section 186 Cr.P.C. did not fall for consideration in
T.T. Antony, (2001 Cri LJ 3329); the code, which recognizes only 3
stages in a criminal proceeding i.e. Investigation, Inquiry and Trial, is
part substantive and part procedural; the term “trial”, in contra-
distinction to the term “inquiry” and “investigation”, would indicate that
the remedies, available at distinct stages of the prosecution, cannot be
preponed or secured at a stage prior to the event, on the plea of the
underlying intent of the Cr.P.C; Section 186 or Section 210 Cr. P.C.,
would require at least one of the FTRs to reach the post-cognizance
stage; in the present case, admittedly, no court has taken cognizance
as yet and pre-cognizance investigation is underway; Section 210 Cr.
P.C. would not apply having regard to the fact that the FIRs are
registered in two different police stations; Section 186 Cr.P.C. cannot
be invoked at the pre-cognizance stage; a remedy expressly made
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
available, to a person aggrieved, at a particular stage of the prosecution

cannot be applied at any stage prior thereto contrary to the provisions
of the Code; the remedy of Section 186 Cr: P.C. cannot be contended
to substrate every stage of the prosecution; the code specifically makes
available certain remedies at certain stages, such as “the right of the
accused to be heard at the time of framing charges” (sections 227 and
228), and examination of the accused in inquiry or trial (section 313)
which are specifically post-cognizance rights; Section 186 Cr.P.C, which
is also a post-cognizance right, is not available at the stage of
registration of FIRs; as the modes of taking cognizance of the offence
have been enumerated under Section 190 Cr.P.C., the term
“cognizance” in Section 186 cannot be restricted only to cases where
the Magistrate has taken cognizance otherwise than on a police report;
and such a reading would involve rewriting the legislation, and
providing a restrictive meaning to the term “cognizance” for the
purposes of Section 186 contrary to the express words and the intent of
Cr.P.C.
37. Section 186 Cr.P.C. empowers the High Court to decide which of
the two or more Courts, which have taken “cognizance” of an offence,
ought to enquire into or try that offence. Section 190 Cr.P.C enables a
Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence either (a) upon receipt of a
complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police
report of such facts; and (c) upon information received from any person
other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such
offence has been committed. Section 190, in Chapter XIV Cr.P.C, lays
down how cognizance of offences will be taken by a Magistrate. The
word “cognizance” has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. The dictionary
meaning of the word “cogni zance” is-“judicial hearing of a matter”.
(Pastor P. Raju, (2006 Cri LJ 4045)). The expression “cognizance”
merely means ‘become aware of and when used with reference to a
court or a Judge, it connotes ‘to take notice of judicially’. It indicates
the point when a Court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an
offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence
said to have been committed by someone. It is different from initiation
of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of
proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of
cases and
Page: 2218
not of persons. Under Section 190 Cr.P.C. it is the application of the

judicial mind to the averments in the complaint that constitutes
cognizance. (Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd.44. ;
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Bhushan Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi)45. ; Swaraj Thackeray v. State of

Jharkhand46. ). Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or
action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate as such applies
his mind to the suspected commission of an offence’. (Pastor P. Raju18. ;
R.R. Chari v. State of U.P.47. ). When the Magistrate takes notice of the
accusations and applies his mind to the allegations made in the
complaint or police report or information and on being satisfied that the
allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence, decides to initiate
judicial proceedings against the alleged offender, he is said to have
taken cognizance of the offence. (Pastor P. Raju, (2006 Cri LJ 4045);
Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra48. ; Kishun Singh v.
State of Bihar49. ). In its broad and literal sense, it means taking notice
of an offence. This would include the intention of initiating judicial
proceedings against the offender in respect of that offence or taking
steps to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial
proceedings or for other purposes. (Pastor P. Raju18. ; State of W.B. v.
Mohd. Khalid50. ). The word “cognizance” embraces within itself all
powers and authority in the exercise of jurisdiction and in the taking of
authoritative notice of the allegations made in the complaint or a police
report or any information received that an offence has been committed.
(Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia v. Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel51. ).
Trial follows cognizance and cognizance is preceded by investigation.
This is the basic scheme of the Code in respect of cognizable cases.
(Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab52. ; H.N. Righbud, (AIR 1955
SC 196)). To attract Section 186 Cr.P.C., cognizance of the same
offence should have been taken by two or more courts. Then only can
the High Court enter upon and decide upon the Court where the
enquiry or trial should take place. Where the cases are pending
investigation in the respective police stations, and have not reached
either of the Courts for enquiry or trial, the petitioner cannot invoke
Section 186 Cr.P.C. (Veerapaneni Ravikanth v. The State of Andhra
Pradesh53. ). Section 186 Cr.P.C. would apply to all the three forms of
cognizance being taken by a Magistrate under clauses (a) to (c) of
Section 190 Cr.P.C. and not merely when cognizance has been taken by
a Magistrate upon receipt of a complaint of facts which constitutes such
offence.
38. A bare reading of Section 210 Cr.P.C. makes it clear that, during
an inquiry or trial relating to a complaint case, if it is brought to the
notice of the Magistrate that an investigation by the police is in
progress in respect of the same offence, he shall stay the proceedings
of the complaint case and call for the record of the police officer
conducting the investigation. Investigation commences after receipt of
information of a cognizable offence starting from Section 154 Cr.P.C.
and culminates in the filing of a report under Section 170 Cr.P.C. After
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filing of the police report under Section 170 Cr.P.C. and before
commencement of trial, the interregnum period can be called an
“inquiry”. (The State, Represented by the Deputy Superintendent of
Police, SPE, CBI, Hyderabad v. Shri B.P. Acharya54. ; V.C. Shukla v.
State, through CBI55. ; Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das56. ). The object of
enacting Section 210 Cr.P.C. is threefold: (i) it is intended to ensure
that private complaints do not interfere with the course of justice; (ii) it
prevents
Page: 2219
harassment to the accused twice; and (iii) it obviates anomalies which

might arise from taking cognizance of the same offence more than
once. Before Section 210 can be invoked, the following conditions must
be sat isfied. (i) there must be a complaint pending inquiry or trial; (ii)
investigation by the police must be in progress in relation to the same
offence; (iii) a report must have been made by the police officer under
Section 173; and (iv) the Magistrate must have taken cognizance of an
offence against a person who is accused in the complaint case.
(Sankaran Moitra, ((2006) 4 SCC 584 : AIR 2006 SC 1599)). The
Section proceeds on the basis that a complaint case and a case
instituted on a police report, for the commission of the same offence,
can proceed simultaneously and the Court would await the Police report
before it proceeds with the complaint in such cases. The purpose again
is to try these cases together, if they are in relation to the same
offence, with a view to provide a fair and effective trial. (Samaj
Partivarthan Samudaya, ((2012) 7 SCC 407 : AIR 2012 SC 2326)). It is
difficult to accept the submission, urged on behalf of the petitioner,
that the underlying principles of Section 186 and 210 Cr.P.C. should be
made applicable to the present case, as both the FIRs are still under
investigation and cognizance has not been taken by a Magistrate in
either of the two complaints.
VII. TESTS TO BE APPLIED TO DETERMINE WHETHER TWO FIRS

RELATE TO THE SAME OR DIFFERENT INCIDENTS:
39. Let us now briefly refer to the tests which should, ordinarily, be
applied to determine whether or not the two FIRs under consideration
relate to the same incident/transaction. The law recognizes a common
trial or a common FIR being registered for one series of acts so
connected together as to form the same transaction as contemplated
under Section 220 Cr.P.C. The expression ‘same transaction’, from its
very nature, is incapable of exact definition. (Anju Chaudhary, (2013
Cri LJ 776); Mohan Baitha v. State of Bihar57. ). The distinction between
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two FIRs relating to the same incident, and two FIRs relating to
different incidents or occurrences of the same incident, should be
carefully examined. (Babubhai) : 2010 AIR SCW 5126. The merits of
each case must be considered to determine whether a subsequently
registered FIR is a second FIR relating to the same incident or offence
or is based upon distinct and different facts and whether its scope of
inquiry is entirely different or not. It will not be appropriate for the
Court to lay down one straight jacket formula uniformly applicable to all
cases. This will always be a mixed question of law and fact depending
on the merits of a given case. (Anju Chaudhary4. ). The test, to
determine whether two FIRs can be permitted to exist, is whether the
two incidents are identical or not. (Ram Lal Narang, (1979 Cri LJ
1346)).
40. The concept of “sameness” has been given a restricted meaning.
In order to examine the impact of one or more FIRs. the Court has to
rationalise the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply the
test of ‘sameness’ to find out whether both FIRs relate to the same
incident and to the same occurrence; and whether they are in regard to
incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction or relate
completely to two distinct occurrences. It is only if the second FIR
relates to the same cause of action, the same incident, there is
sameness of occurrence and an attempt has been made to improvise
the case, would the second FIR be liable to be quashed. In cases where
every FIR has a different spectrum, and the allegations made are
distinct and separate, it may be regarded as a counter complaint, but it
cannot be stated that an effort has been made to improve the
allegations that find place in the first FIR or that the principle of
“sameness” is attracted. (Babubhai, (2010 AIR SCW 5126); Surendra
Kaushik v. State of Uttar Pradesh58. ).
41. It is not possible to enunciate any formula of universal
application to determine whether two or more acts constitute the same
transaction. They are to be gathered from the circumstances of a given
case indicating
Page: 2220
proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action,

commonality of purpose or design. For several offences to be part of the
same transaction, the test to be applied is whether they are so related
to one another in point of purpose or of cause and effect or as principal
and subsidiary, so as to result in one continuous action. Where there is
commonality of purpose or design, where there is a continuity of action,
then all those persons involved can be accused of the same or different
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offences “committed in the course of the same transaction”. Where two

incidents are of different times with involvement of different persons,
there is no commonality, the purpose thereof is different, they emerge
from different circumstances, and would not form part of the same
transaction. (Anju Chaudhary, (2013 Cri LJ 776)).
VIII. IS THE TEST OF “SAMENESS” SATISFIED IN THE TWO FIRs

UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE PRESENT CASE?
42. Sri S. Sriram, Learned Counsel, would submit that the facts of
the case are required to be perused, the test of “sameness” is to be
applied, and only on a finding that the FIRs are the same, would
judicial intervention be justified; having regard to the allegations
contained in each of the FIRs the “test of sameness” is not satisfied;
the allegations revolve around different spectrums of the same offence,
and different facets of the offence committed by the petitioner by virtue
of the contents of the speech delivered by him; in the nature of the
contents of the speech delivered by the petitioner, and having regard to
the range and myriad belief systems of the Hindu Community, different
portions of the speech were aimed at affecting various sections of the
Hindu community; and the facets of the speech noticed in the FIR at
Nizamabad do not address other parts of the speech which are reflected
in the FIR Registered by the 5th respondent.
43. The suo motu complaint, registered as FIR No. 1 of 2013 on
02.01.2013 by the II Town Police Station, Nizamabad against the
petitioner herein for offences under Sections 153, 153A and 295A IPC,
relates to a speech given by him at 8:00 PM on 08.12.2012 at a public
meeting in Nizamabad. On the basis of information obtained from a
compact disk, containing a video graph of the said meeting, the
complaint records certain portions of the said speech. Another
complaint lodged by the ninth respondent, before the IV Additional
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, alleges that, on 08.12.2012
at 10 PM and on 09.12.2012 at about 9 AM, four TV channels had
telecast the highly provocative speech of the petitioner which was
derogatory to one religion; and the telecast was seen by him within the
local area of Osmania University P.S. The complaint refers to the very
same speech delivered by the petitioner on 08.12.2012 at Nizamabad
including certain parts thereof which are, allegedly, not referred to in
the complaint in FIR No. 1 of 2013 of II Town Police Station,
Nizamabad. The complaint of the ninth respondent was referred by the
IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, to the Station
House Officer, Osmania University Police Station, on 03.01.2013 and
was registered thereat as FIR No. 5 of 2013 on 04.01.2013 for the
offence under Section 153-A IPC.
44. Except to state that the complainant had watched the speech,
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delivered at Nizamabad on 08.12.2012, on television the incident/event

in both the complaints relate to the very same speech given by the
petitioner. Both the complaints have a common purpose and design,
and they relate to the same event. The cause of action is the same,
there is sameness of occurrence and they relate to the same incident
i.e., the very same speech. The principles of “sameness” is, therefore,
attracted. The mere fact that FIR No. 1 of 2013 before the Nizamabad
police station, narrates certain parts of the speech which the petitioner
delivered on 08.12.2012, whereas the complaint registered as FIR No.
5 of 2013 before the Osmania University Police Station relates to some
other parts of the very same speech given on 08.12.2012, is of little
consequence as, on registration of a complaint, the investigating officer
is bound to examine all parts of the speech during the course of his
investigation and form an opinion only thereafter whether or not the
Page: 2221
petitioner should be charged of some other offence in addition to, or

other than, those referred to in the complaint registered as an FIR. If
both the complaints, in the case on hand, had been registered in the
same police station, the second complaint would have necessitated
being quashed and treated as a statement under Section 162 Cr.P.C.
The problem which this Court is however con fronted with, in the
present case, is that one complaint (suo motu complaint) was
registered as an FIR at Nizamabad II Town Police Station while the
other was registered as a complaint in Osmania University police
station, that too pursuant to its being referred for investigation by the
Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
IX. TWO FIRS REGISTERED IN TWO DIFFERENT POLICE STATIONS

BY TWO DIFFERENT COMPLAINANTS AGAINST THE SAME
ACCUSED FOR THE SAME INCIDENT:
45. Let us now refer to the cited judgments of other High Courts
where the complaint lodged in one police station was quashed on the
ground that another complaint was already lodged in a different police
station for the same offence or the Court in the other place had taken
cognizance of the offence. In Kashi Nath Choudhary v. The State of
Bihar59. the Patna High Court held:—
“……………On the basis of reasoning and decisions in T.T. Antony,
(2001 Cri LJ 3329), it would now be apparent that the investigation
of the second FIR i.e. Begusarai P.S case No. 274/2004 dated
16.9.2000 is unwarranted as the case was instituted for the same
incident and for the same facts. However, this does not preclude the
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investigating authority/agency from making further investigation or

taking action against any of the persons who are found to be
involved in the occurrence during the investigation or trial of the
case……………”
46. In Subhash Narayan Koli alias Saindane v. The State of
Maharashtra60. the Bombay High Court observed:—
“………………From the observations of the Apex Court in the above
referred judgment T.T. Antony1. , it is clear that there cannot be a
second FIR in respect of same cognizable offence and same incident
or occurrence. From the facts which are discussed in above
paragraphs, it is clear that for the recovery of contraband from the
premises situated at Jainabad Walmikinagar Jalgaon, kept by the
applicants, the applicants are shown as accused in CR No. 56/2006
registered with Bajarpeth police station. Again for the same seizure
of contrabands they are also shown accused in CR No. 19/2006
registered with Shanipeth police station, Jalgaon, which is not
permissible in law……………”
47. In Balwinder Singh v. State of Haryana61. prosecution was
launched against the petitioner twice regarding theft of the same motor
cycle, the first under FIR No. 511 dated 5.8.2009 at P.S. City Karnal,
and the second in FIR No. 278 dated 31.8.2009 at Gohna P.S. Following
the judgment of the Supreme Court in T.T. Antony, (2001 Cri LJ 3329),
the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that there can be only a single
trial for a single offence, and cognizance of the offence can be taken by
a court only once; in the present case, cognizance had already been
taken by the I Class Judicial Magistrate, Gohana in FIR No. 278 dated
31.8.2009; there can be more than one information pertaining to the
same incident in different police stations, but the petitioner can be tried
only in one case; in the second FIR, cognizance has already been taken
by the court; therefore, in the interest of justice and to prevent abuse
of the process of the court, the investigation conducted in FIR No. 511
dated 5.8.2009, under Section 379 IPC at P.S. City Karnal, be treated
as investigation in FIR No. 278 dated 31.8.2009 as cognizance had not
yet been taken in FIR No. 511 dated 5.8.2009; and the concerned court
should not take cognizance of the said FIR, and should send the challan
to the court of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Gohana for trial along
with FIR No. 278 dated 31.8.2009.
48. Following the law laid down in T.T.
Page: 2222
Antony, (2001 Cri LJ 3329), the Jharkhand High Court, in Bishnu Dayal
alias Vishnu Dayal Gupta and Naresh Kumar Gupta v. The State of
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Jharkhand62. , held that, since there can be no second F.I.R, there can
be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in
respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or
incident; a single offence cannot be investigated repeatedly by different
police stations which Cr.P.C. does not permit; and, since the Ranchi
trial is going to be concluded, the petitioners cannot be subjected to a
fresh trial on the basis of a second F.I.R. at Jamshedpur.
49. All the aforesaid judgments, wherein the second complaint was
quashed, followed the law laid down in T.T. Anthony, (2001 Cri LJ
3329) which related to a situation where two complaints were lodged in
the very same police station. Would it make any difference if two
complaints, relating to the same occurrence/incident, are lodged in two
different police stations as in the case on hand?
50. Both the Learned Government Pleader for Home and Sri N.
Ramachandra Rao, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit that there is
no prohibition under the Code for registering an FIR for the same
incident in another Police Station; there is no bar to register a case
when there is no dispute regarding the territorial jurisdiction of both
the police stations to register the complaint; and the remedy available
to an accused is to file an application under Section 407 of the Code
before the High Court or to seek anticipatory bail under Section 438
Cr.P.C. Sri S. Sriram, Learned Counsel, would submit that, as the FIRs
were registered in two different police stations, the FIR registered by
the 5th respondent is not based on the result of the investigation in the
first FIR; and the subsequent FIR was registered at a different police
station at the instance of a different complainant.
51. On the other hand Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, Learned Counsel for
the petitioner, would submit that, since the Cr.P.C. does not
contemplate registration of more than one FIR in respect of one crime,
it does not make any express provision for dealing with this unprovided
for situation; the provisions of the Cr.P.C. do not expressly stipulate or
permit initiation or continuation of multiple prosecutions; on the
contrary the scheme of the Cr.P.C, particularly Section 154 thereof,
provides for only one FIR to be registered for setting the criminal law
into motion; the scheme of Chapter XII Cr.P.C, commencing from
Section 154 to Section 173 requiring the police to proceed to the spot
of the crime and submit a report in default to the Magistrate (Section
157), the manner of conduct of investigation and filing a report before
the Court (either under Section 169 or 173), contemplate that this
whole process is to be undergone by one Police Station; as long as
there is one crime, there can only be one FIR and one investigation; the
very fact that Section 186 discontinues one case would mean that
permitting multiple investigations to continue would be a useless or an
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empty formality as eventually only one trial can be conducted; the logic
and reasoning in T.T. Anthony, (2001 Cri LJ 3329) and Babu Bhai,
(2010 AIR SCW 5126), in respect of same Police Station, would apply a
fortiori to different police stations also, as the difficulties and abuse in
relation to multiple FIRs within the same Police Station would apply in
a far larger proportion in respect of different Police Stations; the
exceptions carved out in subsequent judgments do not include cases
where the crime is one and the versions are not substantially different;
different parts of the same incident, presented by different persons as
complaints, would not amount to different versions requiring different
FIRs to be registered; and Section 71 IPC indicates how a single
offence should be construed.
52. Would the rule, prohibiting two FIRs being registered under
Section 154(1) Cr.P.C, for the same offence/incident at the same police
station, apply also in cases where two complaints are lodged in two
different police stations? In order to answer this question, it is
necessary to examine the provisions of the Cr.P.C. relating to the
territorial jurisdiction of police stations/Magistrates.
X. TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF POLICE OFFICERS TO REGISTER
Page: 2223
COMPLAINTS & INVESTIGATE AND OF MAGISTRATES/COURTS TO TAKE

COGNIZANCE OF AND TRY OFFENCES:
53. Section 156(1) Cr.P.C enables an officer in charge of a Police

Station, even without an order of a Magistrate, to investigate any
cognizable offence which a Court, having jurisdiction over the local area
within the limits of such station, has the power to inquire into or try
under the provisions of Chapter XIII Cr.P.C. Section 2(j) Cr.P.C defines
“local jurisdiction”, in relation to a Court or a Magistrate, to mean the
local area within which the Court or Magistrate can exercise all or any of
its or his powers under the Cr.P.C, and such local area may comprise
the whole of the State or any part of the State as the State Government
may, by notification, specify. The territorial limits of the area within
which the Police Officer may investigate a cognizable offence, even
without the order of the Magistrate, is confined to the local area of the
Court having jurisdiction to inquire into or try such offences.
54. A complaint, in a criminal case, follows the place where the
cause arises. (Rasiklal Dalpatram Thakkar v. State of Gujarat63. ).
“Offence” means an act or instance of offending’; ‘commit an illegal act’
and illegal means, contrary to or forbidden by law’. “Offence” has to be
read and understood in the context as it has been prescribed under the
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provisions of Sections 40, 41 and 42 IPC which cover offences

punishable under the I.P.C. or under a special or a local law or as
defined under Section 2(n) Cr.P.C. or Section 3(38) of the General
Clauses Act, 1897. (Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. Attorney
General for Canada64. , Thomas v. State of Punjab65. ; Jawala Ram v. The
State of Pepsu (now Punjab)66. ; and Standard Chartered Bank v.
Directorate of Enforcement67. ; S. Khushboo v. Kannia-mmal68. ).
Offences are, in their nature, local and the jurisdiction of the Criminal
Court is also local. The competence of a forum to take cognizance of or
to inquire into or try an offence is determined by the place where the
offence is committed. A Magistrate, therefore, has no power by virtue of
Section 177 of the Code to try an accused for an offence committed
wholly outside the limits of his jurisdiction. (State v. Dhulaji Bavaji69. ).
Section 177 Cr.P.C. adopts the Common Law of England that all crimes
are local and justiciable only by the local courts within whose
jurisdiction they are committed. The General Rule of Lex fori, as
contained in Section 177 Cr.P.C, is modified by the exceptions or
alternatives provided for in the Sections, following Section 177, under
Chapter XIII Cr.P.C. (Charu Chandra Majumdar v. Emperor70. ; B.
Patnaik v. K.A.A. Brinnand71. ). The word “ordinarily” in Section 177
means “except where provided otherwise in the Code”. (Ramnarayan
Baburao Kapur v. Emperor72. ). Sections 177 to 184, in Chapter XIII
CPC, indicate the places where certain alleged offences should be tried.
The ordinary rule as to jurisdiction, under Section 177 Cr.P.C, is that it
is the area within which the offence is committed, and not the place
where the offender may be found, that determines the Court which has
jurisdiction to try the offence. (Venkataraman v. Pushkalammal73. ; In re
Kochunni Elaya Nair74. ; Mahi Pal v. State of Haryana75. ). The Legislature
has used the word “shall” in Section 177, while it has used the word
“may” in the other Sections in Chapter X11l Cr.P.C. If there be an
offence which falls under more than one of these Sections (i.e., Section
177 to 184), it may be tried at any one of the places mentioned
therein. (Banwarilal Jhunjhunwalla v. Union of India76. ). The provisions
of Chapter XIII Cr.P.C, i.e Sections 177 to 186 Cr.P.C, make
Page: 2224
it clear that, while cognizance of an offence can be taken by two or

more Courts in relation to one incident/event/crime, there can only be
one inquiry or trial. The jurisdiction aspect becomes relevant only when
the question of enquiry or trial arises. It is fallacious to think that only a
Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case has the power to take
cognizance of the offence. (Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh
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Agarwal77. ; Motorala Incorporated v. Union of India78. ). A Magistrate,

taking cognizance of an offence, need not have territorial jurisdiction to
try the case as well. The power of a Magistrate of the First Class, to take
cognizance of the offence, is not impaired by territorial restrictions.
After taking cognizance he may have to decide the Court which has
jurisdiction to en quire into or try the offence. That situation would
reach only during the post cognizance stage, and not earlier. (Trisuns
Chemical Industry77. ; Ashok Singhal v. State of U.P79. ). The Magistrate
cannot be expected to examine the question of his jurisdiction closely
at the initial stage when he has taken cognizance and has issued
process, but the accused have not yet made their appearance before
the Court. What is expected of a Magistrate is the prima facie
satisfaction about his having jurisdiction. (Motorala Incorporated, (2004
Cri LJ 1576)).
55. The question which then arises for consideration is whether, in

cases where jurisdiction is conferred on two or more Courts, parallel
investigations can be carried on by each of the police stations falling
within the local area of each such Court having jurisdiction to inquire
into and try such offences? It is in this context that the submissions
regarding “cause and consequence” must be examined.
XI. “CAUSE AND CONSEQUENCE” -SECTION 153 IPC READ WITH
SECTION 179 AND 196 CR.P.C.
56. Sri N. Ramchander Rao, learned Senior Counsel, would submit
that the offences alleged in both the complaints are offences against a
section of the society, and not against any particular person; when
offences are committed against a single person i.e., an individual or a
juristic person, the FIR has to be registered by the aggrieved person
only and, in such a situation, two FIRs can be permitted; the law laid
down in T.T. Anthony, (2001 Cri LJ 3329) will apply only in cases where
the offence is against a group or any identifiable group; and, in such an
event, any aggrieved person in the said group may file an FIR or a
complaint. Sri S. Sriram, Learned Counsel, would submit that the
offence alleged in the present case is one of “cause and consequence”
implicit in Section 153A; any ramifications arising out of Section 179
Cr. P.C., would not be a ground for interference, at the instant
premature stage, since “trial” in the instant case has not begun; the
offence under Section 153-A IPC is not complete once the speech is
given but is completed only when the speech reaches the person or
group of persons who were intended to be hurt by the said speech as in
the case of defamation; there cannot be any territorial limits in the very
nature of such offences; having regard to the content of the offence
enumerated in Section 153A IPC, more particularly 153A(1)(c), it is
clear that the offence can be registered on a consequence being felt by
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the targeted community; while the facet of Section 153A(1)(a) and

153A(1)(b) can be contended to be concluded with the speech being
delivered, which is a matter of “law and order assessment” by the
State, the “feeling of fear or alarm” caused in the minds of the affected
community can only be prosecuted by such persons who have felt such
fear or alarm; Section 196 Cr.P.C. only bars cognizance being taken in
respect of certain offences including Section 153-A, but does not bar
filing of a subsequent FIR or causing an investigation thereinto or the
filing of a report u/S. 173 Cr.P.C; the very fact that Section 196 Cr.P.C.
contemplates grant of State permission, before cognizance is taken of
the offences enumerated therein, reinforces the contention that there
can be a complainant, other than the State, in respect of an offence
under Section 153-A; it cannot be validly
Page: 2225
contended in law that the State is the prosecutor and the first
registered FIR ought to be construed as an FIR representing the cause
of any of the subsequent complainants who have felt “alarm” or “fear”
arising out of such speech; and Section 196 and Section 186, Cr.P.C.
contemplate more than one FIR, not necessarily with the State being
the complainant in both the FIRs. Sri N. Harinath, Learned Counsel,
would submit that there is nothing in the code which prevents filing of
multiple complaints by multiple victims in special circumstances, such
as the case on hand, wherein the offence relates to a hate speech and
is not a local issue, but is an offence against society; it is an offence
against public administration and public morality which affects the
public and society at large; and, as the speech has given rise to
multiple offences, multiple FIR's are maintainable.
57. On the other hand Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, Learned Counsel for
the petitioner, would submit that the offence, in relation to a speech
attracting Sections 153-A, 295-A or 505(2), IPC, is complete when the
speech is made; the consequence thereof is immaterial; when the
consequence is of relevance, as in Section 153, IPC, it is specifically
provided that, if the act were to lead to a conesquence, then the
offence and punishment would be as provided; the distinction in the
language between Sections 153 and 153-A is apparent; therefore the
offence/crime in relation to the alleged incident can be only one; the
contention that Section 153-A, IPC inheres the possibility of multiple
complaints is premised on a wrong interpretation of Section 179,
Cr.P.C. by referring to “cause and consequence” or “cause and effect”
theories; Section 179 is attracted only when the “consequence or the
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effect” combines with “the cause” to complete the offence; unlike

Section 153, IPC, the consequence or effect, for the alleged offence
under Section 153-A, is irrelevant; and this contention is
discountenanced by Section 196, Cr.P.C. which requires prior sanction
from the Government for initiating prosecution under the relevant
Sections.
58. It is wholly unnecessary for this Court to examine the rival
submissions, on the scope and purport of Section 153A, IPC, as the
Legislature has made a specific provision in the Cr.P.C. wherever it
intended a particular procedure to be followed in respect of certain
offences under the IPC. In the absence of an express provision to the
contrary, the procedure prescribed under the Cr.P.C would apply to all
offences, under the IPC, as are listed in the first schedule to the Cr.P.C.
Section 196(1)(a), Cr.P.C prohibits cognizance being taken of offences,
punishable under Sections 153A, 295A and 505(1), IPC, except with
the previous sanction of the Central or State Governments. As the
offences are of a serious and exceptional nature and deal with matters
relating to public peace and tranquility with which the Government is
concerned, the object of Section 196(1) Cr.P.C is to prevent
unauthorized persons from intruding in matters of the State and to
ensure that such prosecutions, for reasons of policy, shall only be
instituted under the authority of the Government. The underlying policy
is evident on a reading of the offences enumerated in Section 196(1),
Cr.P.C. in respect of which prior sanction is a must before cognizance of
such offence can be taken. (State of Karnataka v. K. Rajashekara80. ).
The object of Section 196, Cr.PC is to ensure prosecution only after due
consideration by the appropriate authority so that frivolous or needless
prosecutions are avoided. (Inguva Mallikarjuna Sharma v. The State of
Andhra Pradesh81. ).
59. The opening words of Section 196(1), Cr.P.C. are “No court shall
take cognizance” and, consequently, the bar created by the provision is
against the taking of cognizance by the court. There is no bar against
registration of a criminal case or investigation by the police agency or
submission of a report by the police, on completion of investigation,
under Section 173, Cr.P.C. If a criminal case is registered, investigation
of the offence is done and the police submits a report as a result of
such investigation before a Magistrate without the previous sanction of
the Central Government or of the State Government or of the District
Magistrate, there will
Page: 2226
be no violation of the Section and no illegality of any kind would be

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committed. (Pastor P. Raju) (2006 Cri LJ 4045). The restriction placed

by Section 196(1)(a), Cr.P.C, in relation to an offence under Section
153A, IPC, is only on cognizance being taken by the Court without
obtaining sanction from the Central or State Governments. Absence of
any other express provision to the contrary in the Code can only mean
that the procedure prescribed under Section 154(1) for registration of
complaints, and under Sections 156 and 157, Cr.P.C for investigation of
offences, would apply to the offence under Section 153A, IPC also.
Consequently one complaint can alone be registered as an FIR, and one
investigation carried out even in respect of such an offence.
XII. REGISTRATION OF TWO COMPLAINTS IN TWO DIFFERENT

POLICE STATIONS FOR THE SAME OFFENCE/INCIDENT-WOULD IT
VIOLATE THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED?
60. Would permitting two complaints, re lating to the very same
incident/event/transaction, being registered in two different police
stations and for parallel investigation being carried on pursuant thereto
violate the fundamental rights of the accused under Articles 20(2) and
21 of the Constitution of In dia?
61. Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, Learned Counsel for the petitoner, would
submit that registering a second FIR would violate a person's right
under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India; the expression
“prosecuted and punished” used therein would mean one continuous
process commencing from initiation of prosecution (i.e., filing an FIR)
till the stage of punishment (when judgment would be pronounced by
the Court); the word ‘prosecution’ also means and includes conduct of
investigation and, hence, multiple FIRs constituting multiple
prosecutions would violate the petitioner's fundamental rights under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India; and the burden of showing that
the procedure established by law permits multiple prosecutions is on
the State. On the other hand Sri S. Sriram, Learned Counsel, would
submit that as registration of an FIR is merely to set the criminal law in
motion, and to secure inquiry and trial into a cognizable offence, it
cannot be said to have prejudiced the accused or to have violated his
fundamental rights.
62. “In initio” means in the beginning. The dictionary meaning of
“initiation” is cause to begin. The term “prosecution” would include
institution or commencement of a criminal proceeding. It may also
include an inquiry or investigation. In its wider sense, the word
“prosecution” means a proceeding by way of indictment or information,
and is not necessarily confined to prosecution for an offence. The term
“prosecution has been instituted” would not mean when charge-sheet
has been filed and cognizance has been taken. It must be given its
ordinary meaning. (State, CBI v. Sashi Balasubramanian82. ; Ashok
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Singhal).
63. The ambit and content of the guarantee, under Article 20(2) of
the Constitution, are much narrower than those of the common law rule
in England or the doctrine of “Double Jeopardy” in the American
Constitution. Article 20(2) of the Constitution does not contain the
principle of autrefois acquit. Our Constitution-makers did not think it
necessary to raise this part of the common law rule to the level of a
fundamental right, and thereby make it immune from legislative
interference. This has been left to be regulated by the general law of
the land. In order to enable a citizen to invoke the protection of clause
(2) of Article 20 of the Constitution there must have been both
prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence. The words
“prosecuted and punished” are to be taken not distributively so as to
mean prosecuted or punished. Both the factors must co-exist in order
that the operation of the clause may be attracted. (S.A. Venkataraman
v. Union of India83. ; Sangeetaben Mahendra bhai Patel v. State of
Gujarat84. ). As both the complaints in F.I.R. No. 1 of 2013 before
Nizamabad II Town Police Station and F.I.R. No. 5 of 2013 before
Osmania University Police Station are still at the pre-cognizance
Page: 2227
stage, the petitioner cannot be heard to complain that his fundamental

rights under Article 20(2) of the Constitution has been violated.
64. The criminal justice administration system in India places

human rights and dignity for human life on a high pedestal. The
investigation should be judicious, fair, transparent and expeditious to
ensure compliance with the basic rule of law, should be conducted in a
manner so as to draw a just balance between the citizen's right under
Articles 19 and 21 and the expansive power of the police to make
investigation. These are the fundamental canons of our criminal
jurisprudence and are in conformity with the constitutional mandate
contained in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (Babubhai, (2010
AIR SCW 5126); Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)85. ; Nirmal Singh
Kahlon, (2009 Cri LJ 958)).
65. Article 21 of the Constitution of India stipulates that no person
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the
procedure established by law. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State
action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of
reasonableness is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness
which pervades Article 14. The procedure contemplated by Article 21
must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity
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with Article 14. It must be “right, just and fair”, and not arbitrary,
fanciful or oppressive. Otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and
the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied. (Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India86. ).
66. The words “personal liberty”, under Article 21 of the
Constitution, are of the widest amplitude covering a variety of rights
which goes to constitute the personal liberty of a citizen. Its deprivation
can only be in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Criminal
Procedure Code conformable to the mandate of the Supreme Law, the
Constitution. (State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma87. ; Babubhai, (2010 AIR
SCW 5126)). Registration of a second FIR in the same police station, in
respect of an offence or different offences committed in the course of
the same transaction, is not only impermissible but also violates Article
21 of the Constitution. (T.T. Anthony, (2001 Cri LJ 3329); Amitbhai
Anilchandra Shah, (2013 Cri LJ 2313)).
67. As registration of two complaints relating to the very same
incident/event in two different police stations (except in cases where
the Rule referred to hereinabove, against registration of two FIRs for
the same incident/offence, will not apply), would result in parallel
investigations being caused there into, it is necessary to briefly note
the powers of a police officer in causing investigation pursuant to
information having been received of the commission of a cognizable
offence. Section 41(1) Cr.P.C. empowers any police officer, without an
order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, to arrest any person
against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible
information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he
had committed a cognizable offence. While Section 41(1)(b)
circumscribes the satisfaction to be arrived at by the police officer
before making the arrest it is evident that, subject to the limitation in
Section 41(1)(b), the power to arrest an accused is conferred on in
every police officer investigating a cognizable offence.
68. Ordinarily the court will not interfere with the investigation of a
crime or with the arrest of an accused in a cognizable offence. Arrest is
a part of the process of investigation intended to secure several
purposes. The accused may have to be questioned in detail regarding
various facets of motive, preparation, commission and aftermath of the
crime and the connection of other persons, if any, in the crime. There
may be circumstances in which the accused may provide information
leading to discovery of material facts. It may be necessary to curtail his
freedom in order to enable the investigation to proceed without
hindrance and to protect witnesses and persons connected with the
victim of the crime, to prevent his disappearance, and to maintain law:
and order in the locality. For
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Page: 2228
these or other reasons, arrest may become an inevitable part of the

process of investigation. (Parvinderjit Singh v. State88. ). The word
‘arrest’, is derived from the French word ‘Arreter’ meaning “to stop or
stay” and signifies a restraint of the person. The word ‘arrest’, when
used in its ordinary and natural sense, means the apprehension or
restraint or the deprivation of one's personal liberty. The question
whether the person is under arrest or not, depends not on the legality
of the arrest, but on whether he has been deprived of his personal
liberty to go where he pleases. (Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak
Mahajan89. ). At the stage of investigation and initial arrest the rule of
audi alteram partem has no application and the accused has no right of
notice or hearing before his arrest, if any, in a cognizable case. (Ajeet
Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh90. ; Union of India. v. W.N. Chadha91. ).
Likewise the investigating officer is given the power, under Section 41-
A, Cr.P.C, to require before himself the attendance of any person
appearing to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case. He has
also the authority to examine such a person orally and to reduce his
statement into writing in the manner provided in Section 162. (H.N.
Rishbud, (AIR 1955 SC 169)).
69. Multiple investigations by multiple police stations could well

result in an accused, who can eventually be tried and punished for the
said incident only once, being subjected to repeated arrests by different
investigating officers and being called upon to appear before different
police officers attached to different police stations, in connection with
the investigation of the same offence. While the power to arrest an
accused is conferred on the investigating officer under Section 41,
Cr.P.C, construing the provisions of the Cr.P.C. as enabling different
investigating officers attached to different police stations to, one after
the other, arrest the same person for the same incident/occurrence
would not be a fair or a just procedure. The petitioner's fundamental
rights, under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, would be violated
as he would not only face the threat of imminent and numerous arrests
by different investigating agencies for the same incident/occurrence,
but his liberty would also be restricted on his being required to appear
before different investigating agencies conducting parallel investigation
into the same incident.
70. Sri N. Ramachandra Rao, Learned Senior Counsel, would
however contend that the accused has the protection against multiple
FIRs by seeking multiple bails under Section 438, Cr.P.C. It is no doubt
true that any person, who faces a reasonable threat of being arrested,
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can seek anticipatory bail under Section 438, Cr.P.C. It is only in

exceptional cases that the power under Section 438, Cr.P.C. is to be
exercised. The power, being important in nature, is entrusted only to
the higher echelons of the judiciary i.e., the Court of Session or the
High Court. (D.K. Ganesh Babu v. P.T. Manokaran92. ). No blanket order
can be passed under Section 438, CrPC to prevent the accused from
being arrested at all in connection with the case. Anticipatory bail is
given for a limited dura tion to enable the accused to surrender and
obtain regular bail. (HDFC Bank Ltd. v. J.J. Mannan93. ; Adri Dharan Das
v. State of W.B.94. ; Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. The State of
Maharashtra95. ).
71. Should a person be made to undergo the ordeal of an imminent
arrest by different investigating officers attached to the different police
stations for the same offence? Should he, each time a complaint is
registered against him in a police station for which a complaint has
already been registered in another, be required to seek anticipatory bail
under Section 438, Cr.P.C? Would his being asked to appear before
different investigating officers pursuant to a notice issued
Page: 2229
under Section 41-A, Cr.P.C., in connection with the very same incident,
not violate his fundamental right of liberty under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India? The answer to all these questions can only be in
the negative.
XIII. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES : COURTS SHOULD LEAN IN

FAVOUR OF A CONSTRUCTION WHICH WOULD UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTORY PROVISION:
72. If registration of multiple complaints, and multiple investigations
being caused pursuant thereto, by different police stations would result
in violation of the fundamental rights of an accused under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India should this Court then proceed on the premise
that, since there is no express provision in the Cr.P.C, prohibiting
separate complaints being registered at the instance of different
complainants for the same offence/incident, it should be presumed that
such complaints are permitted or should this Court hold that, as only
one enquiry or trial is provided for under the Code for one
incident/event, there is an implicit bar under the Code for more than
one complaint being registered, and investigation being conducted
there into?
73. The provisions of the Act (in the present case-the Cr.P.C) must
be interpreted in a manner so that its constitutionality is upheld.
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(Aslam Mohammad Merchant v. Competent Authority96. ). The rule of

presumption in favour of constitutionality, as a principle of construction,
is that if two meanings are possible then the courts will reject the one
which renders it unconstitutional and accept the other upholding the
validity of the impugned legislation. (State of Rajasthan v. Basant
Nahata97. ; Kerala State Housing Board v. Ramapriya Hotels (P) Ltd.,98. ;
State of M.P. v. Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co.,99. ; Kedar Nath v.
State of Bihar100. ). If the language is rather not clear and precise as it
ought to be, the attempt of the court is to ascertain the intention of the
legislature and put that construction which would lean in favour of the
constitutionality unless such construction is wholly untenable. (State of
Karnataka v. Hansa Corpn.101. ; Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher102. ).
74. The Code neither expressly provides for, nor does it explicitly
bar, two or more investigation agencies investigating a single incident
giving rise to one or more offences. Does any provision of the Cr.P.C, by
necessary implication, either enable or prohibit such investigation? As
offences were hitherto local, an investigation being caused thereinto
was also “local” i.e. it was only the police station, within whose
territorial limits the offence was committed, which was investigating
the offence. While the possibility of more than one Court taking
cognizance of an offence was envisaged by the framers of Cr.P.C, it is
evident that as offences and investigations caused pursuant thereinto
were hitherto local, they did not foresee or visualise the possibility of
multiple complaints being registered in different police stations for the
same incident/event or two or more police Stations investigating the
same offence and, as such, no express provision is made in this regard.
Provision of a remedy under Section 186, Cr.P.C, to ensure that there is
only one enquiry or trial for one offence/incident, does not mean that
the Code, by necessary implication, permits two or more police stations
to investigate the same offence as it is implicit in Section 154 Cr.P.C,
and the underlying theme of Chapters XII to XV of the Code, that there
can be only one complaint, one investigation, one inquiry, one trial and
one punishment for an offence.
75. Accepting the submission of Sri S. Sriram, Learned Counsel, that
the Legislature did not intend placing a similar restriction as stipulated
under Section 186, Cr.P.C. on an investigation by two or more police
stations or on cognizance being taken by two
Page: 2230
or more Magistrates for the same offence, would result in violation of

the petitioner's fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India as parallel investigations, by different Police Stations, would
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not only result in his being forced to appear before different Police
Officers attached to different police stations, on a notice being issued to
him under Section 41-A, Cr.P.C, it may also result in his being arrested
by different investigating officers of different Police Stations, in the
exercise of their powers under Section 41, Cr.P.C. That apart, no useful
purpose would be served in multiple investigations being caused into
one offence, by two or more investigating officers attached to different
police stations, when it is only one of reports submitted under Section
173, Cr.P.C. which would, eventually, be inquired into and tried by one
Court.
76. As Section 186, Cr.P.C. has to be so interpreted as to be in

conformity with the provisions of the Constitution, and not to fall foul
thereof, the said provision must not so be construed as, by necessary
implication, to permit parallel/multiple investigations, and its resultant
consequences, for the very same incident. The provisions of Chapter
XIII, Cr.P.C, which provides for the manner in which an enquiry or trial
should take place in different situations, are made only to ensure that
no person, alleged to have committed a cognizable offence, goes scot-
free and that he should be tried and punished for the offence by the
Court having jurisdiction to inquire into and try such offences. Even in
cases where two or more police stations have territorial jurisdiction to
register FIRs in relation to the very same incident/event, it is only one
of such police stations which can register a complaint in relation thereto
under Section 154(1), Cr.P.C and cause an investigation under Sections
156 and 157, Cr.P.C. The complaint lodged in any other police station
must be transferred to the police station where an FIR is already
registered, and should be treated as a statement under Section 162,
Cr.P.C.
77. The question which then arises is which of the complaints
registered in the two police stations, in the instant case, should be
permitted to remain as an FIR and which of them should be transferred
to the other and be treated as a statement under Section 162 Cr.P.C?
Before examining this issue, it is necessary to deal with the contention
that this Court should desist from resorting to such an exercise at the
present premature stage when the complaints in both the FIRs are still
under investigation.
XIV. IS THIS WRIT PETITION PREMATURE?
78. Both Sri N. Ramachandra Rao, Learned Senior Counsel and Sri N.
Harinath, Learned Counsel, would submit the judiciary should not
interfere with the police in matters which are within their province, and
into which the law imposes on them the duty of inquiry; this is not the
stage where this Court's jurisdiction can be invoked by the petitioner;
and the writ petition is premature. Sri C. Subba Rao, Learned Counsel,
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would submit that the High Court should not tinker or tamper with the
procedure established by law, more so as the complaints are still under
investigation; this Court must await completion of the process of
investigation and can interfere, if at all, only after investigation into the
complaints are completed; and registration of multiple FIRs would only
result in a comprehensive investigation into all aspects by different
agencies which may assist the Court to take a view of the matter either
under Article 226 of the Constitution or 482, Cr.P.C. or during the trial
of the case itself. Sri S. Sriram, Learned Counsel, would submit that,
after the investigating agency submits a report u/S. 173, Cr.P.C, it is
for the Magistrate to examine whether all the facts relating to the said
offence are covered by the multiple FIRs or not; at the stage of
investigation, there cannot be any interference by Courts; the
substantive rights under the code can be enforced only after cognizance
of the offence is taken; in the present case FIRs have merely been
registered and pre-cognizance investigation has been ordered under
Section 156(3); and the scheme of the Cr.P.C. does not require the
accused to be heard at the stage of registration of the FIR, or at the
time of investigation, or at a stage when the court is taking cognizance
of the
Page: 2231
complaint. On the other hand Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, Learned Counsel,

would submit that the Writ Petition is not premature as mere
apprehension, of an imminent violation of a fundamental right, is
sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court.
79. It is no doubt true that this Court should exercise due

circumspection and caution, and not unnecessarily interfere when a
complaint into a cognizable offence is still under investigation, as the
possibility of another incident, giving rise to a similar or a different set
of offences, coming to light during the course of such an investigation
cannot be ruled out. It cannot, however, be lost sight of that in cases
where multiple investigations into the very same offence may result in
the possibility of the fundamental right of an accused, under Article 21
of the Constitution, being violated non-interference may well result in
failure of this Court to discharge its constitutional obligations of
safeguarding the fundamental rights of citizens. The right to life and
liberty of a citizen imposes a corresponding duty on the rest of the
society, including the State, to observe that right, that is to say, not to
act or do anything which would amount to infringement of that right
except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. In other
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words, conferring the right on a citizen involves the compulsion on the

rest of society, including the State, not to infringe that right. Post-
violation resort to Article 226 is a remedy for restoration of the right,
while pre-violation protection is by compelling observance of the
obligation or compulsion under law not to infringe the right by all those
who are so obligated or compelled. If a threatened invasion of a right is
removed by restraining the potential violator from taking any steps
towards violation, the rights remain protected and the compulsion
against its violation is enforced. If the right has already been violated,
what is left is the remedy against such violation and for restoration of
the right. (S.M.D. Kiran Pasha v. Govt. of A.P.,103. ). It would be wholly
inappropriate for the Court, in cases where multiple complaints are
registered in different police stations in relation to the very same
incident, to exercise restraint, await completion of investigation and
permit violation of the fundamental rights of a citizen under Article 21
of the Constitution of India.
XV. IS THERE ANY PROVISION IN THE CRPC FOR TRANSFER OF
COMPLAINTS FROM ONE POLICE STATION TO ANOTHER?
place reliance on Naresh Kavarchand Khatri v. State of Gujarat104. ;
Rasiklal Dalpatram Thakkar v. State of Gujarat105. ; and Satvinder Kaur
v. State (NCT of Delhi)106. to contend-that power is conferred on the
statutory authorities, under the Cr.P.C, to direct transfer of
investigation from one Police Station to another in the event it is found
that they lack jurisdiction in the matter; and the investigation, being
conducted by an Investigating Officer who lacks territorial jurisdiction,
should be transferred by him to the police station having the requisite
jurisdiction. Learned Coun sel would fairly state that there is no specific
provision in the Cr.P.C which enables an officer, in-charge of a police
station, to transfer complaints registered in his Police Station to
another, even if he lacks territorial jurisdiction to register the complaint
and proceed with investigation.
81. While the underlying theme, of Chapters XII to XV, Cr.P.C, is
that there should be one investigation for one crime, the Code has not
expressly stipulated any procedure for the manner in which complaints,
relating to the same crime lodged in two different Police Stations by
two different complainants against the very same accused, should be
dealt with. In this context it is useful to examine the provisions of the
Cr.P.C. relating to transfer of cases. In spite of conferring jurisdiction
for trial of a particular offence by any particular court, as provided
under Section 177, power is given to the Government under Section
185, Cr.P.C. to confer jurisdiction on, and give a direction to try that
Page: 2232
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case in, a different sessions division than a court in the Sessions

division within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed and
to which the case was committed having regard to the local jurisdiction.
(Public Prosecutor v. D. Venkataranga Reddy107. ). Under Section 187,
Cr.P.C if the Court which has jurisdiction has not taken cognizance of
the matter, and the offence is brought to the notice of a Magistrate who
is not competent to try it, the latter may send it to the Magistrate who
is competent. Section 187, Cr.P.C. confers extended powers on Courts,
and is meant to confer a larger jurisdiction on Magistrates to enquire
into offences committed outside their local limits. The legislative intent,
in conferring such jurisdiction, is to meet the technical plea raised by
an accused suspected of having committed an offence outside the
Magistrate's jurisdiction, in regard to which there is no judicial enquiry
pending and the Magistrate considers it necessary to hold an inquiry
with a view to send the accused to the proper Court for further enquiry
or trial. It could not have been the intention of the Legislature that
there should be two parallel Courts with different local jurisdictions
holding enquiries into the same offence at the same time. Where a
Court has taken cognizance of an offence under the ordinary rule and
has, accordingly, issued a warrant of arrest directed to a Magistrate or a
police-officer outside its jurisdiction, the powers of the Magistrate are
limited to the execution of the warrant. All that the Magistrate is then
concerned with is to ascertain whether the person arrested is the
identical person named in the warrant. Only when no cognisance has
been taken by the Court empowered to try an offender under the
ordinary rule referred to, does the question of holding an inquiry under
Section 187, Cr.P.C. arise. (In re Sagarmal Khermraj108. ).
82. The power given to the High Court under Section 407, Cr.P.C, to
transfer cases from a criminal court subordinate to its authority to
another such criminal court of equal or of superior jurisdiction, is in
spite of the jurisdiction conferred on any court under Sections 177 to
185 (both inclusive). Section 407 enables the High Court to order that
any offence be inquired into or tried by any court not qualified under
Sections 177 to 185 (both inclusive) but in other respects competent to
inquire into or try such offences. For any of the reasons mentioned in
Section 407, the High Court has absolute power to transfer a case from
one court to another competent to inquire into or try such a case,
though the later court has no jurisdiction conferred on it under any of
Sections 177 to 185. (D. Venkataranga Reddy, (1976 Cri LJ 1252)). The
fact that the Code does not contain any other provision giving power to
a Magistrate to stop investigation by the police cannot be a ground for
holding that such a power must be read in Section 159 of the Code.
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(S.N. Sharma, (1970 Cri LJ 764)).

83. Even if it is presumed that power inheres in a police officer to
transfer the complaint lodged with his police station to another, in
cases where the offence committed is beyond the territorial limits of his
police station, it is difficult to hold that he can transfer the complaint
even in cases where both the Police Stations have territorial jurisdiction
to investigate the said complaints or one of the complaint is, or both
the complaints are, registered pursuant to their being referred for
investigation by the Magistrate under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C.
XVI. IS THE POLICE OFFICER ENTITLED TO REFUSE TO REGISTER
AN FIR ON A COMPLAINT HAVING BEEN REFERRED BY THE
MAGISTRATE UN DER SECTION 156(3), CR.P.C.?
84. Sri N. Ramachandra Rao, Learned Senior Counsel, would submit
that on receipt of a complaint from an aggrieved person the Magistrate,
if he feels that a cognizable offence is made out, can forward the
complaint to the local police within the jurisdictional limits of his Court;
and, on its receipt, the police officer is bound to register the FIR u/S.
154, Cr.P.C. Learned Gov ernment Pleader for Home would submit that
the 9th respondent's complaint was registered on its being referred,
under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C, by the IV Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Hyderabad; and the fifth
Page: 2233
respondent had no option but to register the complaint forwarded to

him under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. Sri S. Sriram, Learned Counsel,
would submit that registration of an FIR by the police, on receipt of
information, is not discretionary but is mandatory.
85. As noted hereinabove no police officer can, on his own and

without an order of a Magistrate, investigate a cognizable case beyond
the local area jurisdiction of a Court in whose limits the police station,
to which he attached to, is located. Section 156(3), Cr.P.C, however,
enables a Magistrate, empowered to take cognizance under Section
190, Cr.P.C, to direct investigation of a cognizable case. The power, to
direct police authorities to investigate, is available to the Magistrate
both under Section 156(3), CrPC and Section 202, CrPC. The only
difference is the stage at which the said powers may be invoked.
(Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau v. State of Gujarat109. ; Rasiklal
Dalpatram Thakkar, (2010 Cri LJ 884); Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia).
While the power under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. is exercised before
cognizance is taken i.e., at the pre-cognizance stage, Section 202,
Cr.P.C. would apply only to cases where the Magistrate has taken
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cognizance and chooses to enquire into the complaint either himself or

through any other agency. Both these cases would fall in different
classes. (Anju Chaudhary, (2013 Cri LJ 776); Dilawar Singh v. State of
Delhi110. ; Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau (2010 Cri LJ 2441); Suresh
Chand Jain v. State of M.P.111. ; Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai v. State of
Gujarat112. ; Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana
Reddy113. ; Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau, (2010 Cri LJ 2441)).
86. When the Magistrate has applied his mind only to order an
investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code he is not said to have
taken cognizance. It is an order in the nature of a pre-emptory
reminder or intimation to the police to exercise its primary duty and
power of investigation in terms of Section 156(1) of the Code. Such an
investigation embraces the continuity of the process which begins with
collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with the final report
either under Section 169 or submission of a charge-sheet under Section
173, Cr.P.C. (Anju Chaudhary, (2013 Cri LJ 776); Mona Pawar v. High
Court of Allahabad114. ). While the investigation, contemplated in
Chapter XII, can be commenced by the police even without the order of
a Magistrate that does not mean that, when a Magistrate orders an
investigation under Section 156(3), it would be a different kind of
investigation. (Mohd. Yousuf v. Smt. Afaq Jahan115. ). An investigation
begun in furtherance of an order under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. is not in
any way different from the kind of investigation commenced in terms of
Section 156(1). They both terminate with the filing of a report under
Section 173 of the Code. (Anju Chaudhary4. ; Dilawar Singh, (2007 Cri
LJ 4709)). In ordering an investigation under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C,
the Magistrate is not empowered to take cognizance of the offence and
such cognizance is taken only on the basis of the complaint of the facts
received by him, which includes a police report of such facts or
information received from any person other than a police officer, under
Section 190 of the Code. (Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau, (2010 Cri LJ
2441)).
87. In order to proceed under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C, what is
required is a bare reading of the complaint and, if it discloses a
cognizable offence, then the Magistrate, instead of applying his mind to
the complaint for deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for
proceeding, may direct the police to investigate. (Anju Chaudhary,
(2013 Cri LJ 776); Srinivas Gundluri v. SEPCO Electric Power
Construction Corporation116. ). It is then the duty of the officer in charge
of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence
disclosed by the
Page: 2234
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complaint, conduct investigation in accordance with Section 156,

Cr.P.C. and, thereafter, take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII
of the Code. (Suresh Chand Jain Anju Chaudhary4. ; and Dilawar Singh,
(2007 Cri LJ 4709)). Sub-section (2) of Section 156 ensures that, once
an investigation is commenced under sub-section (1), the same is not
interrupted on the ground that the police officer was not empowered
under the section to investigate. It is in the nature of a “savings clause”
in respect of investigations undertaken in respect of cognizable
offences. (Raasiklal Dalpatram Thakkal, (2010 Cri LJ 884)).
88. Where an investigation is undertaken on the directions of the

Magistrate under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. a police officer, empowered
under sub-section (1) of Section 156, is bound, except in specific and
specially exceptional cases, to conduct such an investigation even if he
is of the view that he lacks jurisdiction to investigate the matter. It is
not within his jurisdiction to refrain from holding a proper and complete
investigation merely upon arriving at a conclusion that the offences had
been committed beyond his territorial jurisdiction. The investigating
agency is required to place the facts elicited during the investigation
before the court in order to enable the court to come to a conclusion
whether or not it has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. Without
conducting such an investigation, it would be improper on the part of a
police officer to forward his report with the observation that, since the
entire cause of action for the offence purportedly arises beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the Court, it should be transferred to another
police station. Once the facts are received, it is for the Magistrate to
decide his next course of action and decide whether or not he has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint (Rasiklal Dalpatram
Thakkar, (2010 Cri LJ 884)).
89. Once a complaint is forwarded for investigation, by the
Magistrate under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C, the police officer is obligated
to receive the said complaint, register it as an FIR under Section 154,
Cr.P.C. and cause an investigation thereinto. It is not open to him
either to refuse to cause investigation or even to inform the Magistrate
that it is appropriate that the investigation be caused by another Police
Station. Section 201, Cr.P.C provides for a situation where a complaint
is made to a Magistrate not competent to take cognizance of the
offence and, thereunder, in case a complaint is made directly to him,
for which he is not competent to take cognizance of the offence, the
Magistrate can either direct the complainant to the proper Court or
return the complaint for presentation to the proper Court. The Code
does not empower a Magistrate, competent to take cognizance of and
try the offence, either to return the complaint or to transfer it to
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another Magistrate who may also be competent to take cognizance of

and try the offence. Where more Courts than one have territorial
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and try the offence, the Code does not
empower one Magistrate to transfer the complaint made before him to
another Court, let alone transfer a complaint registered in one police
station to another. Reading any such power as being available either to
the Magistrate or to the Station House Officer, by necessary implication
in any of the provisions of the Code, would amount to judicial
legislation. What then is the remedy?
XVII. POWERS OF THE HIGH COURT UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OR SECTION 482, CR.P.C.
submit that it requires the exercise of the inherent and extraordinary
powers of the High Court to quash the subsequent FIRs either under
Section 482, Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India;
the fact that such extraordinary powers are required to be exercised
would also point to the fact that the scheme of Cr.P.C. does not permit
more than one FIR; and these submissions are premised on the
petitioner's submission that the speech at Nizamabad constitutes only
one crime for the purpose of investigation.
91. It does appear that the only remedy available under the Code,
where parallel investigations are being conducted consequent upon
complaints being registered in two
Page: 2235
different police stations, is to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court

under Section 482, Cr.P.C. In addition, the extraordinary jurisdiction of
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be
available to have one of the complaints quashed or to have the
complaint transferred from one Police Station to the other. When the
criminal law machinery is set in motion, the superior courts should not
mechanically use either their inherent powers or the writ jurisdiction to
intervene with the process of investigation and trial. (Pepsi Foods Ltd.
v. Special Judicial Magistrate117. ; Pastor P. Raju, (2006 Cri LJ 4045); S.
Khushboo, (2010 Cri LJ 2828)). Ordinarily criminal proceedings,
instituted against an accused, must be tried under the provisions of the
Code and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said
proceedings at an interlocutory stage. The inherent jurisdiction of the
High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case
either to prevent the abuse of the process of court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to
lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this
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inherent jurisdiction. (R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab118. ; Zandu

Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque119. ). The words
“Nothing in this Code” used in Section 482, Cr.P.C. is a non obstante
clause, and gives it overriding effect over other provisions in the Cr.P.C.
(Manoj Sharma v. State120. ). In the exercise of its inherent power, the
only reuirement for the High Court is to see whether continuance of the
proceeding would be a total abuse of the process of court. The Cr.P.C.
contains a detailed procedure for investigation, charge and trial and, in
the event it is desirous of putting a stop to the known procedure of law,
the High Court must exerise circumspection, and great care and cauion,
to quash the complaint in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.
(Trisuns Chemical Industry (1999 Cri LJ 4325); Medchl Chernicals &
Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E Ltd.,121. ).
92. Ordinarily the power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be

exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the Code
(Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee122. , R.P. Kapur, (1960 Cri LJ 1239);
Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal123. ). However, in rare and exceptional cases, a
departure can be made. (Manoj Sharma, (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1171).
The ultimate exercise of discretion under Section 482, Cr.P.C. or under
Article 226 of the Constitution is with the court which has to exercise
such jurisdiction in the facts of each case. (Manoj Sharma). A case of
fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs not being a
counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable
offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same
transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either
investigation is under way, or a final report under Section 173(2) has
been forwarded to the Magistrate, would be a fit case for exercise of the
power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. or under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution. (Amitbhai Anil Chandra Shah, (2013 Cri LJ 2313)).
93. On its jurisdiction being invoked under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India or under Section 482, Cr.P.C. which of the two
complaints should this Court treat as the FIR and which of them as a
statement under Section 162, Cr.P.C.?
94. Sri S. Niranjan Reddy Learned Counsel for the, petitioner, would
submit that, on a complaint being received regarding the commission
of a cognizable offence, the officer in-charge of the police station
should, before registering such a complaint, first enquire, whether an
FIR has been registered in any other police, station, in relation to the
very same incident, even if it was given by a different complainant;
and, only if it is not, should he then register the complaint and cause
an investigation thereinto. Learned counsel would contend that, even in
cases
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Page: 2236
where a complaint is referred for investigation under Section 156(3),

Cr.P.C. the police officer should inform the Magistrate that a similar
complaint has been registered in an there police station and request
him to recall the earlier order passed under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C.
While fairly stating that there is no such express provision in the Cr.P.C.
Learned Counsel would submit that, since the legislature has failed to
keep abreast with the times, this Court should iron out the creases in
the Cr.P.C. and hold that such a power inheres in every officer in charge
of a police station.
XV111. JUDICIAL LEGISLATION IS IMPERMISSIBLE:

95. The Latin maxim, “Neque Legis Neque Senatus Sconsulta Ita.
Sorivi Possunt Ut Omnis Casus Qui Quanto Que In Sedirinut
Comprehendature Sed Saffic It Eaquae Plaerum Que Accibunt
Contineri”, means that neither the laws, nor Acts of Parliament, can be
so written as to include all actual or possible cases, and it is sufficient if
they provide for those things which strictly or ordinarily happen.
(Morgan's Legal Maxims). The Court is often confronted with a situation
which may not have been contemplated at the time of drafting the
Statute. (Mahendra Kumar, (1988 Cri LJ 544)). The legislature often
fails to keep pace with the changing needs and values nor is it realistic
to expect that it will have provided for all contingenties and
eventualities. (Rattan Chand Hira Chand v. Askar Nawaz Jung124. . It is
not within human powers to foresee the mani fold sets of facts which
may arise and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in
terms free from all ambiguity. The English language is not an
instrument of mathematical precision. It would save the Judges trouble
if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect
clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a Judge cannot
simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on
the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament. A Judge
must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and
should iron out the creases. (Seaford Court Estates Ltd.; Norman v.
Norman125. ; Hansa Corpn., ((1980) 4 SCC 697 : AIR 1981 SC 463)).
Courts should be slow to pronounce the legislature to have been
mistaken in its constantly manifested opinion upon a matter resting
wholly within its will, and take the plain ordinary grammatical meaning
of the words of the enactment as affording the best guide, but to winch
up the legislative intent, it is permissible for courts to take into account
the ostensible purpose and object, the real legislative intent and the
purpose and spirit of the enactment so that no absurdity or practical
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inconvenience results. Otherwise, a bare mechanical interpretation of

the words and application of the legislative intent devoid of concept of
purpose and object will render the legislation inane. (Deepak Mahajan,
(1994 Cri LJ 2269)).
96. Should this Court then read section 154 or any other provision of
the Cr.P.C as, by necessary implication, to empower the police officer to
refuse to record information, relating to a cognizable offence, on the
ground that, in relation to the same incident, FIRs are registered in
different police stations? It must not be forgotten that the judge, even
when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at
pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own
ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from
consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to
vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion
informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system,
and subordinated to ‘the primordial necessity of order in social life’.
Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains.
(Benjamin Cardozo's ‘The Nature of the Judicial Process, Yale University
Press (1921); and The Newabgani Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Union of
India126. ). A construction which requires, for its support, addition or
substitution of words or which results in rejection of words, has to be
avoided. (Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of
Vested Forests127. ,
Page: 2237
Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn128. ; A.R. Antulay v.

Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak129. ; Dental Council of India v. Hari Prakash130. ,
J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan131. and State of Jharkhand v. Govind
Singh132. ). Courts should not, ordinarily, add words to a statute or read
words into it which are not there. (Delhi Financial Corpn v. Rajiv
Anand133. ). There is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication
from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. Courts
expound the law, they do not legislate. (State of Kerala v. Mathai
Verghese134. , Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal135. ). A Judge is
not entitled to add something more than what is there in the Statute by
way of a supposed intention of the legislature. (Union of India v.
Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd.136. ). The legislative casus
omissus cannot be supplied by a judicial interpretative process. (Maruti
Wire Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. S.T.O., I.S.T. Circle, Mattancherry137. ,
Govind Singh). Judges must exercise judicial restraint. In the name of
judicial activeism, judges cannot cross their limits and perform
executive or legislative functions or take over functions which belong to
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another organ of the State. (Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass138. ;

Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen139. and S.C. Chandra
v. State of Jharkhand140. ). Notwith-standing the sagacious counsel of
Sri S. Niranjan Reddy that, under Section 154(1), Cr.P.C. the police
officer has the inherent power to refuse to register a complaint even if
he has territorial jurisdiction, on the ground that another complaint has
been registered in respect of the very same incident in a different police
station, this Court must resist the temptation of biting the “forbidden
apple” of law making under the guise of interpreting them. While these
and other aspects may necessitate immediate legislative intervenetion,
it would be wholly inappropriate for this Court to don the robes of a
Legislator and, under the cloak of statutory interpretation, undertake an
exercise of legislation.
XIX. CAN FIRS BE TRANSFERRED FROM ONE POLICE STATION TO

ANOTHER IN THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION
482, CR.P.C. OR ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION?
97. Would this Court be justified in expressing helplessness when its
jurisdiction is invoked by a person complaining of violation of his
fundamental rights and a case is made out of an imminent threat
thereto? In what manner should this Court exercise its jurisdiction
either under Section 482, Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India to provide relief and ensure protection against
violation of the fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution?
98. Exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court, either under Section
482, Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to transfer
complaints registered in one police station to another, presents several
difficulties incapable of easy resolution. If more than one complaint,
relating to the very same occurrence/incident, is registered in different
police stations, which of the complaints should be treated as the FIR
and which of them as a statement under Section 162, Cr.P.C? Should
the date of registration of the complaint, by the police officer under
Section 154, Cr.P.C, be taken as the yardstick or should it be the
earliest of the dates on which the complaint is made, either to the
police officer or to the Magistrate, which must be taken into
consideration? Does Chapter X111 of the Code, which relates to
jurisdiction of Courts, provide any guidance in this regard?
Page: 2238
99. Section 186, Cr.P.C. is a remedial measure for a possible

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deadlock which may occur if two Courts either each refused to take
action on the ground that the case should be tried by the other Court or
both proceeded to try the same case. The doubt mentioned in Section
186, Cr.P.C. is not a doubt as to jurisdiction but to which of the Courts,
having jurisdiction, should try the case under the circumstances. If a
doubt arises as to the Court, by which such an offence should be tried,
it must involve a doubt as to the suit ability of one Court as compared
with an other from the point of view of “convenience and expediency”.
On such a doubt arising the High Court, exercising powers under
Section 186, Cr.P.C, would have to decide with reference to the
convenience of all concerned. (Charu Chandra Majumdar, (AIR 1917 Cal
137)). Section 186(b), Cr. P.C. ap plies only when both the cases are
common and they arise out of the same occurrence or the same
transaction, and the parties are the same. (G. Sreeramulu v. V.
Rangaswamy141. ). If Section 186, Cr.P.C, which has been provided to
remove doubts from the point of view of ‘convenience’ and
‘expediency’, is to serve as a guide, whose convenience should this
Court take into consideration? If it is the convenience of the
investigating agency, would the place where the incident occurred (in
the present case-Nizamabad) not be more convenient? If, on the other
hand, it is the convenience of the accused which must form the basis,
should this Court then treat the complaint registered with Osmania
University Police Station as the FIR and direct transfer of the complaint
registered at Nizamabad to Osmania University Police Station and be
treated as a statement under Section 162, Cr.P.C. These are all matters
which the Cr.P.C. has neither specifically provided for nor does it
provide any guidance for declaring principles of law capable of uniform
application.
XX. TRANSFER OF CASES TO A SINGLE INVESTIGATION AGENCY
100. I find considerable force in the submission of Sri C. Subba Rao,
Learned Counsel, that the freedom of the individual cused must be
balanced with the power of the State to respond thereto. In a
constitutional democracy, wedded to and governed by the rule of law,
responsibilities of the judiciary arouse great expectations. Judicial
scrutiny is not a printed finality, but a dynamic process. Its application
to the actualities of governance is not a mechanical exercise, but a high
function of statecraft. (Maqbool Fida Husain v. Rajkumar Pandey142. ). A
just balance, between the fundamental rights of the citizens under
Article 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to
investigate a cognizable offence, has to be struck by the Court. The
sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen
each time to a fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same
incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent
upon filing of successive FIRs. It is beyond the purview of Sections 154
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and 156, Cr.P.C. nay a case of abuse of the statutory power of

investigation in a given case. (Amitabhai Anil Chandra shah, (2013 Cri
LJ 2313)). If the possibility, that all the acts and transactions may be
so inter-connected that they would ultimately form one composite
transaction, cannot be ruled out it would be imperative for the Court to
direct complete and comprehensive investigation by a single
investigating agency. (Samaj Parivartan Samudaya, ((2012) 7 SCC
407 : AIR 2012 SC 2326)).
101. What then is the course which this Court should adopt? Sri S.
Sriram, Learned Counsel, would submit that the High Court, as the
sentinel on the qui vive to protect human rights, can intervene and
issue an appropriate mandamus, and transfer cases to a single
investigating agency when investigation of a crime can result in the
abuse of process or miscarriage of justice.
102. As the statutory provisions, under the Cr.P.C, are silent on
these aspects recourse to executive instructions, if any, is not
impermissible. Executive instruction can supplement a statute or cover
areas to which the statute does not extend, but it cannot run contrary
to the statutory provisions or whittle down their effect. The Government
cannot
Page: 2239
amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions. But,

if the rules are silent on any particular point, the Government can fill up
the gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not
inconsistent with the rules already framed. (Joint Action Committee of
Air Line Pilots' Association of India (ALPAI) v. Director General of Civil
Aviation143. ; State of M.P. v. G.S. Dall & Flour Mills144. ; Sant Ram
Sharma v. State of Rajasthan145. ; State of Gujarat v. Akhilesh C.
Bhargav146. ; K.H. Siraj v. High Court of Kerala147. ). Executive
instructions can supplement and not supplant statutory provisions or
rules. While a statutory provision or rule cannot be modified or
amended by executive instructions, a valid provision or rule, having
some lacuna or gap, can be supplemented by it. (Senior Supdt. of Post
Offices v. Izhar Hussain148. ; St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v.
Regional Director, NCTE149. ). If the statutory provisions or rules are
silent on any particular point, the Government can fill up the gaps,
supplement them and issue instructions not inconsistent with the
statutory provisions and rules already framed. (Sant Ram Sharma145. ).
103. The Andhra Pradesh Police Manual notified in G.O. Ms. No. 201
Home (Police C) Department, dated 08.09.2001, while stipulating that
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the police officers should follow the provisions of the Cr.P.C and the
Rules, prescribes detailed guidelines including, among others the
manner in which police officers should act in registering and
investigating offences. This Manual is in the nature of executive
instructions issued under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. Order
866-1, thereunder, relates to certain classes of crimes to be
investigated by the GID (Crime Investigation Department). Clause (Y)
thereof relates to cases of such a nature as, in the opinion of the DGP,
the Additional DGP-CJD or district authorities, call for investigation by
an officer of the CID. Order 866-3 records that the Government of
Andhra Pradesh had, vide G.O. Ms. No. 438 dated 05.10.1988, declared
the Office of the CID as one Police Station for the entire State of Andhra
Pradesh under Section 2(s), Cr.P.C, and had directed that one of the
Deputy Superintendents of Police (DSP) working in the said office be
nominated for this purpose, by the Head of the said Office, to be the
Station House Officer within the meaning of Section 2(s), Cr.P.C for the
said Police Station.
104. In the absence of any statutory provision in the Cr.P.C. to the
contrary, and as the CID is notified as one Police Station for the entire
State of Andhra Pradesh, it would suffice if both the complaints relating
to the petitioner's speech at Nizamabad on 08.12.2012, lodged in
Nizamabad II Town and Osmania University Police Stations, are
transferred to the CID P.S; either one of them is registered as an FIR
under Section 154, Cr.P.C, and the other is treated as a statement
under Section 162, Cr.P.C. Though it was a case where an FIR had
already been lodged with the C.B.C.I.D. this Court, in Prabhakaran v.
State of A.P.150. observed:—
“………………After arguing for some time, learned counsel for the
petitioner has submitted that, the action of the respondent-police in
booking successive First Information Reports in various police
stations for the very same set of facts is wholly illegal, that once a
crime is registered basing on a complaint and investigation is
commenced, all the subsequent complaints with regard to the same
set of facts be treated as statements under Section 162, Cr.P.C. even
though they are registered as crimes as per the decision of the Apex
Court, that the police officer concerned has already transferred one
of the cases to C.B.C.I.D. for investigation, and that it is reported
that the aggrieved parties were
Page: 2240
directed to lodge complaints before the C.B.C.I.D.

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Considering the submission of the learned Counsel and in the

facts and circumstances of the cases, the office concerned, before
whom one of the cases is transferred, is hereby directed to treat the
other cases registered in various police stations as also the fresh
complaints in connection with the same transaction as statements of
other aggrieved persons and investigate the matter as one case and
file a final report either way before the Court concerned…………………”
XX1. CONCLUSION:
105. As this Court would have to examine whether the FIRs
registered against the petitioner satisfy the test of “sameness” and only
then exercise its powers either under Article 226 of the Constitution or
under Section 482, Cr.P.C, to grant relief, it would be wholly
inappropriate for this Court to give a blanket order to respondents 1
and 2 not to register further complaints against the petitioner. As Order
866-I(Y) of the A.P. Police Manual empowers the 2nd respondent to
transfer cases to the CID, a mandamus shall issue to him to transfer
both FIR No. 1 of 2013 at Nizamabad II Town P.S. and FIR No. 5 of
2013 at Osmania University P.S. to the CID P.S. forthwith. On receipt
thereof the DSP, designated as the CID PS Station House Officer, shall
register one of them as an FIR and treat the other as a statement under
Section 162, Cr.P.C; cause an investigation with utmost expedition;
and forward his report to the competent Magistrate/Court at the
earliest.
XXII. A BRIEF FOOT NOTE:
106. There is an urgent need for adequate provisions being made in
the Cr.P.C. prescribeing the procedure in cases where multiple
complaints are registered in different police stations for the same
occurrence/incident/event/crime, all of them having territorial
jurisdiction to investigate the complaints. In Maqbool Fida Hussain,
(2008 Cri LJ 4107) the question which the Delhi High Court was
confronted with was as to which court would be considered as the
competent court having jurisdiction to try the matter when a painting,
uploaded on a website and accessible to people across the globe, was
being viewe by different people/complainants across th country who, in
turn, were offended with such a painting and had filed their
complainats various places in India. It is in this context that the
learned Judge opined:—
“………In my considered view, this particilar aspect of jurisdiction
fettered within the parameters of scrutiny of Section 202 of the said
Code as discussed above derives its importance especially with the
advent of the technological explosion where a person sitting
anywhere across the globe can get access to what ever information
he has been looking for just with a click of a mouse. Therefore, it has
become imperative that in this information age, jurisdiction be more
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circumscribed so that an artist like in the present case is not made

to run from pillar to post facing proceedings. It was found necessary
to at least examine this aspect in view of the large number of
incidents of such complaints which had been brought to light by
press resulting in artists and other creative persons being made to
run across the length and breath of the country to defend them
selves against criminal proceedings initiated by oversensitive or
motivated persons including for publicity. This however is not an
aspect where a direction can be issued since it is within the domain
of appropriate legislation. The learned ASG while assisting this Court
fairly stated that he would advice the Government to take steps by
way of appropriate legislative amendments as may be proper
keeping in mind the balancing of interest between the person
aggrieved and the accused so as to prevent harassment of artists,
sculptors, authors, filmmakers etc in different creative fields. I say
nothing more but hope that this aspect would get the attention it
deserves and the legislature in its wisdom would examine the
feasibility of possible changes in law.….”
(emphasis supplied)
107. Soon thereafter, in “S. Khushboo (2010 Cri LJ 2828)”, certain
remarks made by an actress, in an interview to a leading English
Magazine, (considered by many to be innocuous), resulted in as many
as 2. criminal complaints being filed against he mostly in the State of
Tamil Nadu.
Page: 2241
108. It is not difficult to foresee instances, in the not too distant

future, of multiple complaints being lodged in different police stations
by different complainants for the same incident. A “movie”, screened in
different theatres across the country, could be considered offensive by
some viewers. A tweet on ‘twitter’ or a posting on ‘face-book’ may
result in some of those, who view it, feeling outraged thereby. All these
could result in multiple complaints being filed by different complainants
in different police stations spread all over the country. The plight of an
M.F. Hussain (2008 Cri LJ 4107) or a S. Khushboo (2010 Cri LJ 2828)
may well be the plight of several others who, in the absence of
adequate provisions and a specific remedy under the Code, can only
invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution or under Section 482, Cr.P.C.
109. This Court may not be understood to have observed that the
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cognizable offences, which an accused is alleged to have committed,

should not be investigated into. This Court is merely of the view that it
would suffice if one complaint is lodged, a provision is made by the
legislature to empower either the Magistrate or the officer in-charge of
the police station to transfer complaints registered, or sought to be
registered, in one police station to another where an F.I.R. has already
been registered in respect of the same offence/incident and ensure that
a thorough investigation is caused there into, with utmost expedition,
by a single investigation agency. Despite the assurance given by the
learned Additional Solicitor General before the Delhi High Court in M.F.
Hussain (2008 Cri LJ 4107), more than five years ago, no action has, as
yet, been taken on the legislative front. As a writ of mandamus cannot
be issued to the legislature to enact a particular legislation, (State of
Jammu & Kashmir v. A.R. Zakki; State of Andhra Pradesh v. T.
Gopalakrishna Murthi) and Supreme Court Employees Welfare
Association v. Union of India), one can only hope that necessary
legislation is made in this regard at the earliest to protect the
fundamental rights of a citizen, under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India, against the consequences of multiple complaints being
registered against him, for the same incident/offence, in different police
stations and, at the same time, ensure that the offences, in the FIR
registered against the accused, are investigated by a single
investigating agency with utmost promptitude and expedition.
110. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly. The Miscellaneous
petitions pending, if any, shall also stand disposed of. No costs.
111. Order accordingly.
———
1. (2001) 6 SCC 181 : (2001 Cri LJ 3329)
2. (2010) 12 SCC 254 : (2010 AIR SCW 5126)
3.
AIR (32) 1945 PC 18
4. (2013) Cri LJ 776 (SC)
5. (2002) 9 SCC 147 : AIR 2002 SC 1949 : (2002 Cri LJ 2623)
6. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : (1992 Cri LJ 527)
7. AIR 1994 SC 28
8.
(2012) 7 SCC 407 : (AIR 2012 SC 2326)
9. AIR 1955 SC 196
10. (1985) 1 SCC 317 : (AIR 1985 SC 195)
11. (1970) 1 SCC 653 : (1970 Cri LJ 764)

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12. 11982 Cri LJ 1557 (Kerala HC FB)
13. 1976 Cri LJ 1825 (Allahabad High Court-Lucknow Bench)
14. AIR 1968 SC 117
15. 2004 Cri LJ 1697 (Gauhati HC)
16. 2003 Cri LJ 2976 (Patna HC)
17.
AIR 1962 Cal 135
18. (2006) 6 SCC 728 : (2006 Cri LJ 4045)
19. (2003) 6 SCC 195 : (2003 Cri LJ 3117)
20. AIR 1963 SC 447
21.
(1980) 1 SCC 554 : (1980 Cri LJ 98)
22.
(2004) 13 SCC 292 : AIR 2004 SC 4320 : (2004 Cri LJ 4219)
23. (1980) 3 SCC 152 : (1980 Cri LJ 227),
24.
(2010) 14 SCC 444 : (2011 Cri LJ 971).
25. 2013 Cri LJ 2313
26.
(2010) 5 SCC 663 : (2010 Cri LJ 2860)
27.
AIR 1964 SC 221
28. 201 (1) ALD (Cri) 907
29.
(1979) 2 SCC 322 : AIR 1979 SC 1791 : (1979 Cri LJ 1346)
30.
(1997) 6 SCC 514 : AIR 1997 SC 2780 : (1997 Cri LJ 3397)
31. 1996 Cri. L.J. 1463
32. 1972 (45) Bombay Law Reporter 450 (Bombay High Court DB)
33.
(2008) 9 SCC 475 : (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 907)
34. (1987) 1 SCC 288 : AIR 1987 SC 877
35. (1984) 2 SCC 500 : (1984 Cri LJ 647)
36.
1986 Cri.L.J. 2002 (Kerala)
37. AIR 1958 All 76
38. 1988 Cri.LJ. 544
39.
2004 Cri. L.J. 2329
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40. (1972) 2 SCC 680 : AIR 1972 SC 2609
41. 1992 Cri LJ 2946 (Guj)
42.
AIR 1954 Mad 947
43. AIR 1967 S.C. 983
44. (2008) 2 SCC 492 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 471 : (2008 Cri LJ 1636)
45.
(2012) 5 SCC 424 : (2012 Cri LJ 2286)
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Disclaimer: While every effort is made to avoid any mistake or omission, this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/ rule/
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Page 1 Monday, September 04, 2023

In the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad

Officer of the police station to which it is transferred? These are some of

2. The factual matrix, in which these questions arise, needs to be

02.01.2013 by the third respondent at Nizamabad. In the meanwhile

him, pressure was mounted for initiating action; only as a populist

5. In his counter affidavit, filed on behalf of the second respondent,

7. In his reply affidavit, the petitioner would state that he is

through their own knowledge or by means of credible information

recorded by an officer-in-charge of a police station and marks the

14. After registration of the FIR, begins the sequence of

16. “Investigation” takes in several aspects and stages ending

Pradeep Dutta Bhowmik v. State of Tripura15. ; Heera Lal Pandit alias

17. The powers conferred on police officers to investigate into

cognizance otherwise than on a police report in which case he has the

sub-section (5), by all the documents and statements of the witnesses

must contain as required by sub-section (2) from its accompaniments

19. There can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every

different, or where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude

AIR 1999 SC 1765) : (1999 Cri LJ 2583).

(vi). where the earlier complaint was decided on insufficient material

4320 : (2004 Cri LJ 4219); Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi

no discretion to the police officer in charge of a police station to register

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR) and

24. The statutory rights and duties of police officers to ‘register’

mentioned in that Section, to give information to the nearest Magistrate

28. Every crime is considered an offence against the Society as a

by such an officer. While the victim would, undoubtedly, be aggrieved

Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence. (Shyam Lal v. State37. ).

on a complaint given by an aggrieved person and not from any other

under Section 162 of Cr.P.C. as the state government may withdraw

been initiated at his instance. If the offence for which a prosecution is

VI. SCOPE OF SECTIONS 186 AND 210 CR.P.C:

available, to a person aggrieved, at a particular stage of the prosecution

not of persons. Under Section 190 Cr.P.C. it is the application of the

Bhushan Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi)45. ; Swaraj Thackeray v. State of

harassment to the accused twice; and (iii) it obviates anomalies which

VII. TESTS TO BE APPLIED TO DETERMINE WHETHER TWO FIRS

proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action,

offences “committed in the course of the same transaction”. Where two

VIII. IS THE TEST OF “SAMENESS” SATISFIED IN THE TWO FIRs

delivered at Nizamabad on 08.12.2012, on television the incident/event

petitioner should be charged of some other offence in addition to, or

IX. TWO FIRS REGISTERED IN TWO DIFFERENT POLICE STATIONS

investigating authority/agency from making further investigation or

COMPLAINTS & INVESTIGATE AND OF MAGISTRATES/COURTS TO TAKE

53. Section 156(1) Cr.P.C enables an officer in charge of a Police

provisions of Sections 40, 41 and 42 IPC which cover offences

it clear that, while cognizance of an offence can be taken by two or

Agarwal77. ; Motorala Incorporated v. Union of India78. ). A Magistrate,

55. The question which then arises for consideration is whether, in

the targeted community; while the facet of Section 153A(1)(a) and

effect” combines with “the cause” to complete the offence; unlike

be no violation of the Section and no illegality of any kind would be

committed. (Pastor P. Raju) (2006 Cri LJ 4045). The restriction placed

XII. REGISTRATION OF TWO COMPLAINTS IN TWO DIFFERENT

stage, the petitioner cannot be heard to complain that his fundamental

64. The criminal justice administration system in India places

these or other reasons, arrest may become an inevitable part of the

69. Multiple investigations by multiple police stations could well

can seek anticipatory bail under Section 438, Cr.P.C. It is only in

XIII. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES : COURTS SHOULD LEAN IN