Date: December 11th 2005 Time: 06:13 am Facts

Buncefield explosions and fire Location: Hemel Hempstead (UK) Site: Buncefield oil storage depot

Activity Storage  Transport □ Refining □ Chemicals □ Petrochemicals □ Exploration □ Production □

On Sunday morning December 11 2005, Tank 912 at the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited (HOSL) part of the Buncefield oil storage
depot was filling with petrol. The tank had two forms of level control: a gauge that enabled the employees to monitor the filling
operation; and an independent high-level switch (IHLS) which was meant to close down operations automatically if the tank was
overfilled. The first gauge was stuck and the IHLS was inoperable – there was therefore no alert to the control room staff that the tank
was filling to dangerous levels.
Eventually large quantities of petrol started flowing out of vents at the top of the tank, turning into a flammable vapour cloud, as it
cascaded down the side of the tank. CCTV footage showed a misty white cloud spreading from the tank more than 20 minutes before
the explosion. The gaseous cloud covered nearly 8 hectares of ground by the time it was ignited, possibly by a spark in a fire
pumphouse or an electrical generator building close to the site. The incident was the largest peacetime explosion in European history,
producing a tremor measuring 2.4 on the Richter scale. The explosion was heard at a distance of up to 160 km. Other lesser explosions
occurred subsequently. As a direct result of the primary explosion, a fire spread to 21 of the facility's large storage tanks, lasting for 5
days.

TOTAL S.A.
TOTALMajor Accidents Restricted Distribution
Classification:
TOTAL - All rights2005
Buncefield, reserved
 Consequence Description: Consequences
People  o no fatalities (Luckily, on Sunday morning no employees were present in neighboring facilities)
o 1 severely injured person, 42 persons sustained minor injuries (mostly cuts from broken glass)
Environment  o Recorded material damages exceed 750 million euros
o 700 to 1,000 mbar at the level of the ignition zone, 7-10 mbar at a 2 km distance from the site
Assets  o A tremendous black cloud propagated over the southern part of England, migrated over France's
Brittany and Normandy coastal regions on December 12 2005, before moving southwest in the
Media  direction of Spain. A portion of the extinction water could not be contained onsite and flowed into
the natural environment, polluting the soil and both surface and underground water resources.

Immediate Causes:
Causes
o The process safety controls on safety critical operations were not maintained to the highest standard:
o Neither of the two automatic level detection systems within the tank was operable.
o Having failed to contain the petrol, there was reliance on a bund retaining wall around the tank (secondary containment)
and a system of drains and catchment areas (tertiary containment) to ensure that liquids could not be released to the
environment. Both forms of containment failed.

Other Causal Factors:

o No adequate knowledge of the designers, manufacturers, installers and those involved in maintenance, of the major hazard
environment in which the equipment was to be used.
o Lack of leadership and top-level engagement in dealing with significant risks to people and the environment
o Poor communications at shift handover

Actions: see REG-GR-HSE-029

Actions
o Requirement of automatic and independent high-high level control barrier on flammable liquids storage tanks
o Improvement of bund’s structural integrity and proper design of retention basins.
o Increase of flammable vapor detection requirements
o Improve Major Risk Awareness from senior management to operators in the field.

TOTAL S.A.
TOTALMajor Accidents Restricted Distribution
Classification:
TOTAL - All rights2005
Buncefield, reserved